Reviews

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The aftermath of World War I left various military thinkers and practitioners in a quandary. How does an operational force maneuver on a battlefield scarred with trenches, mines and natural obstacles? Part of the answer was to be found in the newly designed tank. However, employment during World War I amply demonstrated the limitations of British, French and German tanks. The question remained: What is the best way to employ this system? The interwar period allowed all the previous combatants to evaluate and to craft their own responses to this basic question.

Westin Ellis Robeson presents a detailed look at how the U.S. Army approached the employment of tanks on the World War II battlefield. His focus is on the separate tank battalions of World War II, specifically 781st Tank Battalion, and its use by the Seventh Army during the campaigns across Southern France and Germany. He divides his work into three parts. Part I covers the development of the tank and armored doctrine during World War I. Part II addresses the reaction of American planners to German armored operations. Part III concludes with a detailed examination of separate tank battalions and their value in various combat operations.

Robeson begins by detailing the post-World War I schools of thought regarding tank operations. Basically, Britain developed two types of tanks. One was a slow moving, heavily armored tank to support walking infantrymen, and the other was a fast moving, lightly armored vehicle capable of breaking through and routing enemy forces. Americans looked at the tank as an infantry-support weapon. It would provide firepower to the infantry. Unfortunately, for both Britain and America, the Germans built an armored force around a combined-arms approach that relied on speed, reliable communications equipment and firepower to overwhelm an opposing force. The early successes of the Germans left little doubt that American pre-war armor doctrine needed to be revised.

The author then reviews the experimentation that led to the creation, testing and employment by the United States of armored divisions. Originally, an armored division was structured around one infantry and two tank regiments for a total of some 300-plus tanks. By 1942, it became evident that this structure was too large to be employed effectively. While the First, Second and Third Armored Divisions already overseas retained their original structure, all subsequent divisions contained three tank and three infantry battalions. This required roughly half the tanks allocated to the first three armored divisions. While this proved to be a correct move, the lack of armored support for infantry divisions presented a challenge that was met by forming independent or General Headquarters (GHQ) tank battalions. By the end of the war, there would be 65 independent tank battalions in the Army’s force structure. They would be employed in a manner not foreseen prior to their entering combat.

A common tank battalion structure was employed. Regardless of assignment to either an armored division or as an independent tank battalion, each battalion consisted of three Sherman tank companies containing 17 tanks each, a light-tank company of 17 Stuart tanks, a service company and a headquarters company. Within the headquarters company a reconnaissance, mortar and logistics platoon supported battalion operations. Also, several 105mm M4 Shermans were placed throughout the battalion to supplement the already considerable organic firepower.

While detailing the problems and successes of this organizational transition, Robeson addresses the development of anti-tank forces and the M4 Sherman tank program. Detailed discussions are presented regarding the development of various engines for the Sherman and the effectiveness of the 75mm main gun. These details supplement a text that places a great deal of relevant points before the reader while avoiding meaningless minutiae.

Given this foundation, the author then moves onto the combat employment of 781st Tank Battalion. While assigned to 7th Army, the 781st was never employed as a battalion. Rather, during its eight months of combat, the battalion witnessed its tank companies being attached to five divisions. In most cases, a given tank company sent
individual platoons to support regiments within the assigned division. As Robeson notes, this was in spite of separate armored battalion doctrine which “stressed that such units should be deployed en masse, rather than broken up and dispersed on independent missions. But this theory never fully materialized in the field, where geography and infantry commanders dictated otherwise.” Here, maneuver commanders demonstrated the flexibility and responsiveness that characterizes combined-arms operations.

This is a well-researched, highly detailed, fast-reading work. Complex subjects such as Sherman engine design and performance, tank-ammunition armor-penetration studies, design improvement for the light tank and detailed reviews of tactical engagements are captured in a fluid writing style. This is a book that will appeal to a wide audience seeking to enhance their knowledge of a vital but often overlooked tactical asset of World War II.

RETIRED COL D.J. JUDGE

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There are those of us who only think of Ralph Peters as the angry writer castigating both left and right for its failure to properly prosecute the War on Terror. Those of the Fulda Gap era remembered when he burst on the scene with Red Army, the mirror image of Tom Clancy’s Red Storm Rising. Peters has written two well-received works of fiction on the American Civil War in the east. Although enjoyable reads, when it came time to downsize for the final Army move since the Army no longer gave one a professional-book moving waiver, Peters’ books were donated. Why? They just didn’t “reach” some place within my Soldier’s soul. Yet I eagerly awaited this book that rages from Washington, DC, in the summer of 1864 to Cedar Creek.

Valley of the Shadow centers in part on a cast of has-beens, castoffs from their respective armies. We see the future author of Ben-Hur, Lew Wallace, cast in the role of buying time with a scratch force of Union soldiers at Mononacy, trying to buy time for forces to arrive in Washington from Petersburg. Wallace is still trying to recover from his alleged failures at Shiloh, a stigma he never lives down. We see Jubal Early, a generally unpleasant man, called by Lee “My Bad Old Man,” trying to replicate the moves of Stonewall Jackson in the valley and capture the Federal capital. We have John Gordon, seemingly sent from the Army of Northern Virginia to both get “seasoning” and perhaps to serve as Lee’s eyes and ears. Last but not least, we have the up and coming Union general, Phil “Little Phil” Sheridan.

Peters captures much of Early’s essence, perhaps as well as any non-fiction work on Early I’ve read. Peters understands at some instinctual level that Early was perhaps a great division commander who knew how to maneuver and get the most out of his men. When it came to higher-level command, though, and this in an era of pre-staff, Early tended to flounder. He was an excellent man to give a plan to and allow him to execute it with some latitude, because you could expect him to carry it out violently. When it generally comes to the art of strategy, aside from the brilliant campaign that nearly captured DC, Early seems adrift and unable to come up with a coherent strategic campaign plan. Yet there is more to him, and Peters captures that as well – Early’s ideological fervor and a sense that Early, unlike Lee, understood this was a new type of war, one of total war, which is why we see Early with an ear cocked throughout to Union opinion. Early in a sense reached the same conclusions of Sherman and Sheridan on how the war needed to be waged, though he was not quite as ruthless yet and he lacked the striking power to affect it.

Custer is introduced just as we would imagine – boyishly enthusiastic and simply wanting to smash ‘em up. Peters seems to take note of the alleged ongoing military purge of its warrior caste by highlighting this aspect of Custer. Both the political correctness and the ongoing social engineering made for safe officers, but they were hardly the warrior caste we need in time of war. By extension Peters tells us we need those types, like Custer and Patton, for when we need them, they won’t be there.

What was compelling about this book is I developed an affinity for the characters early on, to include the historic ones. In his previous books, I was never actively engaged by the characters but here, Peters brings people to life, no mean feat in ground that has been endlessly plowed, particularly successfully by Jeff Shaara. Valley of the Shadow is, if the reader will pardon my pun, beyond a shadow of a doubt Peters’ finest work to date. Peters brings
to life a critical period of the American Civil War that is generally overlooked. Peters’ ability as a former Army officer allows him to put the Early-Wallace-Sheridan campaign in the Shenandoah River Valley into the rich historical perspective it deserves. *Valley of the Shadow* is a must spring or summer evening’s read.

*(Editor's note: ARMOR as a professional bulletin does not normally publish reviews of novels, but Peters’ novels have relevant lessons in leadership. Peters, who retired from the U.S. Army as a lieutenant colonel, served in 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry Regiment, then part of 1st Armored Division.)*

**LTC (DR.) ROBERT G. SMITH**

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Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, defines coalition warfare as “an *ad hoc* arrangement between two or more nations for common action.” It is generally viewed as a short-term solution to a given military challenge. During World War II, the United States and Australia entered into a coalition that neither side had anticipated or planned for prior to 1942. In that year, GEN Douglas MacArthur arrived in Australia fresh from his escape from the Japanese forces then conquering the Philippines. He wanted to lead the force back to recover the Philippines. To accomplish that task, he needed the materiel and manpower assets of both the United States and Australia. How this incredibly difficult undertaking was accomplished is the subject of Australian author Dr. Peter J. Dean’s latest work on World War II in the Pacific.

Dean organizes his work around key themes and areas of study. He evaluates Allied strategy and the military organizations of both countries, along with details on each nation’s military command-and-control procedures. This is an analytical narrative of an extremely complex subject matter focusing on a little-known area of the world. Strategic, operational and tactical movement in New Guinea and Papua demanded a unique combination of strategy, intelligence, training and logistical operations to be successful. Neither coalition partner had the ability to perform the task alone; they needed each other to defeat the Japanese.

The book divides the subject matter into five parts. Part I addresses the pre-World War II assumptions of various nations – specifically, the American reliance on retaining the Philippines as a base of operations for attacks against Japan. The United States war plans were known as the Rainbow Plan with colors designated for specific areas of concern. Thus, War Plan Orange covered potential operations in the Pacific against the Japanese. At the same time, Australia aligned its national interest with those of Great Britain. Under this approach, the large British naval base in Singapore would provide sea and land forces to protect its Pacific colonial possessions as well as Australia and New Zealand. Both Australia and New Zealand would provide manpower to supplement the British effort. This was referred to as the Singapore strategy.

Complicating the pre-war planning was the 1939 declaration of war by Great Britain against Germany. This action witnessed Australia and other British dominions supplying land forces to support British operations in North Africa and Greece. Trained troops were fighting far from Australia as world events changed. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor caused the collapse of both pre-war strategic approaches as the loss of the Philippines and Singapore forced Australia and the United States to enter into a coalition of convenience to ensure their survival.

As war began in the Pacific, Dean enters into Part II of his book, where he explains the effects of the American strategic approach that gave first priority to military actions against Germany. The Pacific was a secondary theater of operations. This led to the creation of two major American commands in the Pacific. The Navy and Marine Corps would plan and conduct operations within the Pacific Ocean Area under the command of ADM Chester Nimitz. At the same time, the Army, led by MacArthur, would drive toward the Philippines in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA). Inevitably, this structure saw a constant competition for resources between the American commanders. Because of this resource-constrained environment, MacArthur quickly appreciated that pending the arrival of American men and materiel, he would require Australian land forces to implement his operational plans. The battles conducted within SWPA by a combination of Australian and American ground, air and sea forces from 1942
to 1943 are thoroughly examined and provide fascinating insights on doctrinal and leadership conflicts between the two nations.

Parts III and IV of the book cover the highs and lows of this unique coalition of forces. While detailing the bond formed between the Australian and American forces at the operational and tactical levels, Dean examines the conflicts at the strategic level in detail. The role personalities play and their effect on lower-level plans and operations is effectively conveyed by the author.

Part V concludes the work. Here, the coalition of convenience suffers mightily as large American forces arrive in SWPA and leave little for the Australian forces to do beyond participating in meaningless backwater operations.

Dean presents a well-balanced examination and discussion of coalition warfare. This work offers many points for maneuver commanders to consider, study and discuss. The value of political support is well illustrated, for example, by the cordial relationship between the Australian prime minister and MacArthur. At the same time, the stormy association of GEN Thomas Blamey, the commander and chief of Australian forces, and MacArthur threatened to tear the coalition apart at various times during the war. How these difficulties are surmounted, often by subordinates who work in harmony, should prove insightful as a guide for current and future coalition operations by maneuver commanders.

This is a well-written book that objectively examines a little-appreciated area and aspect of World War II. It should appeal to, and enlighten, readers interested in expanding their knowledge of events in SWPA.

RETIED COL D.J. JUDGE

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The prelude to and the conduct of the Battle of Waterloo truly bridges an era, for here was a new beginning, the promise of a Napoleon who vowed to behave within the accepted European order. Waterloo served as an end to an era with Napoleon’s final defeat and the collapse of any internal support for Bonapartism. Waterloo serves as a bridge to a century of peace, as the great powers determined under the auspices of the Congress of Europe that they would ensure no such threat along the likes of Bonapartism would arise again. Hussey’s *Waterloo Volume I* lovingly details this almost-overnight resurgence of the Napoleonic Empire but pays considerable attention to the cracks in that facade.

Hussey sets up the Waterloo campaign and Napoleon’s return from Elba by his adroit handling of the critical context of the 1814 campaign and Napoleon’s first abdication. Seldom does one see a deposed leader returning to power so fast under these circumstances as Napoleon did within a year. Hussey relates to us that the Bourbon Restoration was a near-textbook example of how to do everything wrong in consolidating power. The Bourbons managed to alienate large parts of the French population and, more importantly, the former Napoleonic army. Hussey touches upon the fact that Napoleon’s return to power was built upon the support of mid-level officers and soldiers and not upon his former marshals.

This thesis in one sense speaks to the eagerness of why the allied powers wanted to crush the restoration of Bonapartism, fearing both the revolutionary and imperial fervor it sparked. Hussey details the herculean task confronting Bonaparte and of his efforts in re-establishing power. In this, the 100 Days Campaign, Bonaparte’s legendary energy would serve him well. However, Hussey notes that Bonaparte’s former marshals and members of his government failed Napoleon time after time. His marshals had aged and now wanted to live the good life, wanting no more life in the saddle.

In a sense, Hussey’s eye for details of the death by a thousand cuts to Napoleon in terms of energy wasted by dealing with administrative matters better handled by clerks helps the reader understand the mistakes that would happen later. But for Napoleon, we sense the most important failure would come in the re-establishment of a large-enough trained army to face the overwhelming coalition.
Hussey gives even the reader unfamiliar with the period more than a thumbnail description of the main figures arrayed against Napoleon – old and familiar foes. First is Prussian Field Marshal Gebhard von Blucher, who despite believing he was pregnant by an elephant, was the scourge of the French. He was an offensive-minded general who – no matter how often knocked down – would set himself on you again. Blucher, though, had major internal issues with his own staff and generals, who greatly mistrusted their allies, particularly the British and Wellington. The British were viewed with suspicion – perhaps in this reviewer’s estimation a holdover still from the era of Frederick the Great, when British gold rented Prussian manpower to fight their continental battles.

Then, of course, there is the wild card of Wellington, who had defeated many of Napoleon’s marshals and generals in Spain. Until the 100 Days Campaign, Wellington and Napoleon had never faced each other. We see time and time again Napoleon disparaging Wellington’s abilities, failing to heed the advice of those who had fought against and lost to Wellington in Spain.

A theme Hussey returns to repeatedly that dominates all Napoleon’s decision-making is the fact that like in Orwell’s 1984, France had seemingly been at war since 1792. Manpower, horses and fresh, good leadership were all in short supply. Both in the disaster of the 1812 Russian Campaign, where at least 120,000 horses perished, and the long 1813 campaign, Napoleon had exhausted his cavalry arm. The immediate impact was that this arm of decision – so important to the trifecta of combined arms adroitly handled by Napoleon in battle after battle – was now but a shadow of its former glory. As well, the loss of so many horses made every other aspect of campaigning difficult, from moving artillery quickly on the battlefield to making logistics far more problematic, as the resources were simply not there in abundance.

Hussey excels at subtly advancing his core concept that all of Napoleon’s decisions and attempts at work-arounds to compensate for the lack of most everything was fueled by his lack of time. All of his decisions are examined not in a vacuum of what he could have done but against what were the realistic options Napoleon had within his power to execute. The frontal assault at Ligny? Not the best choice of tactics, but when viewed in terms of time and the need for an overwhelming victory to unhinge the coalition against him, it makes sense.

If nothing else, Hussey subtly leads us along those types of pathways, instructing us on the range of the probable Napoleon could have chosen vs. wild, speculative armchair quarterbacking. However, if Hussey perhaps needed to summarize anything, it is the impact of French Marshal Michel Ney’s failure to move on and seize the critical crossroads of Quatre Bras. Its second- and third-order effects could have easily been broken out again, for the reader might not have fully picked up how this impacted Waterloo. Perhaps Hussey does so in Volume II.

Hussey’s first volume is without peer for its overall treatment of the Waterloo campaign. It is simply unfathomable to imagine anyone holding themselves out as a serious student of Napoleonic history to pass this work by, for in terms of scope, readability and a simple-but-comprehensive account for many facets of the campaign, this book is without peer.

Coalition warfare is all the rage in the modern era, and in exploring the topic, Hussey details the complexities of waging coalition warfare while keeping your eye firmly on your own national objectives. Hussey’s work forces the reader to desire to possess and read the second volume.

LTC (DR.) ROBERT G. SMITH

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We Few, U.S. Special Forces in Vietnam, Nick Brokhausen, Havertown, PA; Casemate Publishers, 2018, 360 pages, no maps or photographs, $32.95.

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Nick Brokhausen inserts his personal experiences, observations and thoughts with precision in We Few, U.S. Special Forces in Vietnam between two poetic and appropriate quotes extracted from William Shakespeare’s Henry V: “But we in it shall be remembered; we few, are happy few, we band of brothers for he today that sheds his blood with me shall be my brother” and “We are but warriors for the working day; our gayness and our gilt are all besmirch with rainy marching in the painful fields.”
Brokhausen delivers an insightful and captivating perspective of his assignment as the “One-One” or assistant team leader with Reconnaissance Team (RT) Habu under the Military Assistance Command Vietnam-Studies and Observations Group (MACV-SOG), in Command and Control-North (CCN) Region of Vietnam during 1970.

Brokhausen communicates a series of descriptive short stories that isolate the individual personalities of RT Habu’s members, adjacent recon teams and the recon company leadership. Those familiar with the movies Apocalypse Now (United Artists, 1979), Platoon (Orion Pictures, 1986) or Casualties of War (Columbia Pictures, 1989) will recognize the humaneness aligned with serving in ground combat units during the Vietnam War. He clearly articulates a disdain for the North Vietnamese Army, Viet Cong and those who threatened fellow warriors. He expresses the emotional aspects that challenged the mind and body of Americans, Montagnard tribesmen, Vietnamese and Chinese Nungs serving in the RTs. His commitment, competence, candor, compassion, courage and care for “brothers in arms” offers an opportunity to “get to know” everyone as they co-existed in the operational environment.

Brokhausen’s injection of humor replicated antics choreographed in two American situational comedies, McHale’s Navy (1962-1966) and M*A*S*H (1972-1983). The amusing and foolish behavior demonstrated or displayed by the members of RT Habu generated an occasional quaint smile or lengthy outburst of laughter. Their pranks, tomfoolery and antics during stand-down time, recovery operations and rest/relaxation periods communicated the importance of leaders affording Soldiers the opportunity to “blow off steam” while tacitly enforcing regulations, policies and standards. It is highly unlikely that today’s Soldier would attempt any of the mischievousness or illegal behavior executed by Soldiers in previous armed conflicts. Not because they lack the resourcefulness for entertaining themselves or others, but due to a prescriptive tolerance level by subordinates, peers and superiors.

Brokhausen interconnects anecdotal accounts of small-unit tactical engagements to provide an overview of the challenges, opportunities and risks associated with support from Joint Forces capabilities during the Vietnam War. He transmits details that activate each human sense through an imaginative response to the reproduction of a mission. He focuses on the significance of conducting training, rehearsals, pre-combat checks/inspections and after-action reviews to contribute to “mission success.” His historical reflections yield a culminating event that destroys a target, seizes an objective or recovers a “brother in arms.” The missions assigned to RT Habu reflect everything but a “study and observation” experiment. Perhaps the most prevailing affiliation of SOG is that the mission sets assigned to RTs required a highly skilled, experienced, educated and dedicated Soldier/team. A mission set that only a Special Operations Forces unit could accept, organize, man, train, equip, sustain and execute.

The title for this book directly links to Shakespeare’s “band of brothers” prose to elegantly envelop the relationship between man and conflict. Brokhausen releases the motivation of those willing to serve in a military unit during an armed conflict. He reserves the jubilation of those who survive the hell of war. He dignifies the sacrifice of those who perish during combat and non-combat situations. He acknowledges the perverse behavior of those seeking financial or political capital from an armed conflict. He recognizes that a portion of society will navigate through day-to-day activities in or around a region or state at war. He memorializes the camaraderie that Soldiers, sailors, Marines, airmen and Coast Guardsmen enjoy advancing our national interests and national security. We Few, U.S. Special Forces in Vietnam is a recommended read for small-unit leaders and others seeking a short but entertaining non-fictional book over a four-day weekend.

COL WILLIAM A. WYMAN JR.
U.S. Army Reserve

(Editor’s note: COL Wyman is a new reviewer for ARMOR. A strategist (FA 59A), he is a branch-qualified armor, infantry and civil-affairs officer. Currently he is the Chief of Staff to the Deputy Commanding General-U.S. Army Reserve within U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. He previously served in the Vermont and Massachusetts Army National Guard. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, College of Naval Command and Staff and Joint Forces Staff College, and is a student at the Air War College. He holds a bachelor of arts degree in paralegal studies from Our Lady of the Elms College, Chicopee, MA, and master of military arts and science in theater operations from U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS.)

Mike Guardia’s biography on GEN Donn A. Starry is a must-read for professional soldiers. Crusader is the story of the Army’s most important change agent of the last half of the 20th Century. Guardia’s skillful prose lends context to Starry’s writings, oral histories and development as a leader. It is appropriate for a young Armor officer to write the biography of a mounted-warfare icon. No one had a greater impact on the thinking, education and training of Armor officers during the Cold War than Starry; he directly or indirectly influenced us by his leadership, tactics, practice of operational art and strategic thinking.

Starry graduated from West Point in 1948 and entered an Army that occupied Europe and Asia. It was underfunded, understrength, undertrained and underloved by Congress and the Truman Administration. His post-Vietnam army echoed his post-World War II army.

Starry’s first assignment was to Company C, 63rd Tank Battalion, 1st Infantry Division, in West Germany. His platoon had a wealth of combat experience – all his tank commanders were platoon sergeants or tank commanders during World War II. LTC Creighton Abrams, who would become the Army’s Chief of Staff, was the battalion commander. Starry later served under Abrams on five occasions.

Starry performed the usual company- and field-grade command-and-staff duties of an Armor officer. In a non-branch assignment, he was a combat-arms instructor at the Army Intelligence School. During this assignment, he became concerned with the Army’s stress on tactical nuclear weapons at the expense of conventional forces. This apprehension would cause him to question, in part, the efficacy of the “Active Defense” doctrine of the late 1970s and early 1980s.

After commanding 1st Battalion, 32nd Armor, in West Germany and attending the Army War College, he went to Vietnam in 1966 as a member of the Mechanized and Armor Combat Operations, Vietnam (MACOV) study group. Conventional wisdom held that armor and mechanized-infantry operations weren’t feasible in Vietnam with its rainy season, rice paddies and double- and triple-canopy jungle. MACOV’s findings dispelled what Starry called “mythology” and determined that mechanized and armor operations, although challenging, were possible in Vietnam.

Commanding in combat is the defining moment for any officer; it came for Starry when he took command of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in 1969. His true test as a commander came when the regiment, part of the United States and South Vietnam Army Task Force, invaded Cambodia to clear out North Vietnamese sanctuaries and logistics facilities along its border with Vietnam. Starry and several troopers were wounded by an enemy grenade during a fight for an airfield. He sustained shrapnel wounds, the most serious being in the abdomen. After spending 12 days in a forward hospital, Starry returned to the regiment as it was finishing the fight in Cambodia.

There are many examples of combat-leadership lessons in the book’s Blackhorse chapter. The most important addresses where the commander positions himself to visualize and command the ebb and flow of battle.

By 1973, most of the American combat troops had left Vietnam, and Starry assumed command of the Armor Center and School at Fort Knox, KY. In October of that year, the Yom Kippur War between the Arabs and the Israelis began. Starry made many trips to Israel between 1973 and 1976 and saw the results of the war’s unimagined lethality, dominated by maneuver, direct and indirect firepower, and rapid attrition. Starry believed that war between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact would, on a greater magnitude, replicate the Yom Kippur War.

The Arab-Israeli War established the need for a new “how to fight” doctrine. The 1976 edition of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Active Defense – written mostly by U.S. Army Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) commander GEN William E. Depuy and Starry – stressed winning the first battle against enemy lead echelons but didn’t address his follow-on echelons. This doctrine resulted in a firestorm; some officers called it a “die in place” attrition-based manual. When Starry took command of TRADOC in 1977 after commanding V Corps in Europe, he directed the
Command and General Staff College and the branch schools to rewrite FM 100-5. He wanted a doctrine that would destroy the Pact’s first echelon while simultaneously delaying, disrupting and defeating the enemy’s follow-on echelons. The fundamental premise of the AirLand Battle doctrine was to extend the battlefield by striking deep with long-range fires and joint Army-Air Force deep attacks.

Mike Guardia through his portrayal of Starry’s life and times teaches that future victories emanate from the vision, courage and commitment of leaders who do in peacetime the heavy lifting of organizing, equipping and training an army. Although Starry retired eight years before the first Persian Gulf War, the Army he built won that war.

RETIRED LTC LEE F. KICHEN

Acronym Quick-Scan

FM – field manual
MACOV – Mechanized and Armor Combat Operations, Vietnam
RT – reconnaissance team
SOG – Studies and Observations Group
SWPA – Southwest Pacific Area
TRADOC – (U.S. Army) Training and Doctrine Command