1. (U) REFERENCES:
   b. OPORD 09-66 (Operation ATLANTA), Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry
      Regiment, 6 September 1966.
   c. Map Series FNI, 150,000-65III, 65IIII, 65IVII, 65III, 65IIII, 65III, 65III,

2. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: 11th Armored Cavalry, Operation ATLANTA
   Search and Clear, Base Camp Security, and ROADRUNER.


1. (U) GENERAL: On 27 September 1966, II Field Force Vietnam directed the
   11th Armored Cavalry Regiment to secure a base camp area in the vicinity of
   Plei Meo to clear and secure highways 4 and communication in portions of Phuoc
   Long Kheah and Phouc Tay Provinces. Execution of the mission was initiated under
   the code name Operation ATLANTA. The operation commenced on 29 October 1966.
   Initially the operation was confined to securing of National Highway 4 from
   Bien Hoa to Xuan Loc and a portion of Interprovincial Route 2 to the area of the
   new base camp. Concurrently, security would be provided for the engineer work
   parties involved in the clearing and preparation of the area for occupation by
   the Regiment in the latter part of November. A few days after the operation
   started the 1st Squadron and engineer units were joined by the 2nd Squadron which
   organized and operated out of a combat base in the Cua Chan rubber plantation
   (IS 3999) for almost a month. The Regiment’s general area of operation is depicted
   in Annex E. Initially this area of operation was divided into 3 areas as shown
   in the table below. Later the general area was expanded to include 5 areas.

While the 1st and 2nd Squadrums were operating out of their combat bases
in the Xuan Loc area, the 3rd Squadron was securing the Regimental Staging Area
in Long Bien and providing security for the Bien Hoa - Long Bien area (Operations
UNIONTON and MARSHALLTOWN). In addition to providing security, the 3rd Squadron
conducted aggressive patrolling activities and provided artillery fire support
for the Long Mai sensitive area. The command elements of the Regiment were operating out of the base camp area to be
followed in the next 4 weeks by the remaining headquarters elements and the 3rd
Squadron.

The Regiment continually demonstrated its versatility and maneuverability
throughout the operation. It was not uncommon to find the squadron operating on
three independent missions covering terrain from Bien Hoa (Operation ATLANTA) to
the northern most limits of the 1st Australian Task Force TACR as shown in Annex E. The
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment remained constantly on the alert ready to exploit its
considerable firepower and inherent crosscountry mobility.

a. The reporting officer of this report is Colonel William W. Cobb,
   Commanding Officer, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

b. Task Organization. Control of the operation was exercised by Head­
   quarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, operating initially out of a tactical
   command post at Long Bien which later moved to the base camp area. The initial
   task organization is indicated below. Due to the duration of the operation and the
   additional requirements placed on the Regiment, frequent changes in task organ­
   ization were necessary and are shown as the occurred in paragraph 8. Execution
   Commanders are shown in Annex D.

.UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
5. **INTELLIGENCE:**

a. Prior to Operation:

(1) **VC Main Force:**

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(3) Incidents: VC activities along National Highway 1 from BTHA to XUAN LOC, south along National Highway 1 and Interprovincial Route 2 to SA RLA ranged from ambushes of GVN and ARVN forces to roadblocks and tax collection points. The nature of the incidents indicated an attempt by the forces operating along these lines of communication to restrict the movement of civilian traffic while denying their use by friendly forces. A complete list of incidents is outlined in Annex F to this report.

### (4) Reported movements:

(a) An ARVN agent reported that a VC Battalion located vicinity YS 2382 on 6 October moved to the NEUON TRACH Area vicinity YS 11086L5. US evaluation D/3. (Comment: No main force battalions are held to be operation in this area at this time).

(b) A USG agent reported a VC Battalion vicinity YT 3307 to YT 3501 to YT 3200 on 29 September 1966. ARVN evaluation D/3, US evaluation D/3. (Comment: Reliable agent report has unit vicinity YT 3301 on 3 October. Possibly company size element of the 5th VC Division or the unconfirmed LONG KHANH Provinical Company, C106).

(c) An ARVN agent reported the UW 8 3/8 Artillery Battalion was being transported from YT L703 on 1 October to CAM DUONG (location unknown).
3 October by local laborers: ARMZ was reportedly: No unit is listed under that number; however, elements of the 83A Artillery Regiment are known to be infiltrating South Vietnam and reportedly headed for III CTZ. Leading elements could have reached XU Qty LOC area by this time. The regiment was reportedly equipped with the U/1 66A rocket firing weapon. Characteristics: Maximum range 10km, effective range 500m, kill radius 250m. US evaluation F/6.

(5) Enemy situation. The VC can be expected to harass convoys with mines, sniping, minor attacks of up to platoon size anywhere along routes in the Regimental sector. Mortar and minor harassing attacks could also be expected on base camps and combat base areas. Although not presently indicated, the VC does possess the capability of mounting a regimental size ambush on convoys and attacks on the 11th Armored Cavalry Base Camp.

(6) Intelligence sources: The following sources were utilized to plan the operation:

(a) II F Force V Intelligence Report.
(b) Agent reports.
1 18th Division (ARVN), (Formerly 10th Division).
2 Central Intelligence Operations.
3 National Police.
(e) Intelligence Estimate - III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ).
(d) MACV monthly order of battle updated.
(e) II F Force V Intelligence Imagery.
(f) Pictograph maps.
(g) Visual reconnaissance.

(7) The intelligence information compiled for Operation ATALANTA varied in currency from four days in the case of order of battle (OB) reports to a little over a week for the incident reports. The information incorporated in the initial operation order was only two to four days old.

b. During the month of November the VC continued to harass the 11th Armored Cavalry with units up to platoon size. His actions were characterized by mining incidents along the Saigon - Xuan Loc railroad, sabotage and harassment by AMPs, PDU dumbs, bridges, and acts of terrorism on the local populace. His activities were restricted primarily to the Long Binh - Bien Hoa area. Information (agent reports) received on 13 November noted the presence of VC platoons and companies operating in Area of Operations 3 (AO3) thus giving him the capability of massing main force units in AO3 for a direct attack on the base camp. Moreover, available information indicated no such threat was imminent. Agent reports further disclosed the presence of the 274th VC Regt along National Highway 1 between South grid lines 50 and 60. Other reports disclosed the construction of ambush positions on the north and south of Highway 1 vicinity YT 6206. Documents discovered in the vicinity of Hill 309 (YT 1600) indicated the presence of the 274th Regiment Rear Service Unit which normally operates in PHOUC DY Province. Visual reconnaissance flights by Forward Air Controllers (FAC) revealed the possible evacuation by women and children from villages northeast of the base camp. No appreciable amount of information of immediate combat value was gleaned from the RED HAZE and SLAR missions flown in support of Operation ATALANTA.

c. Terrain was a consideration, but not a limiting factor on Operation ATLANTA. The primary area of operation was confined to LONG XUAN Province. The central portion of LONG XUAN Province generally has rolling terrain covered with plantations and cultivated fields. North of XUAN LOC the area breaks into a series of long ridges radiating from Hill 396 (YT 3912). Vegetation in this area consists mainly of plantations along Route 20 and to the east of Hill 396. The area is interspersed with cultivated fields and plantations. To the east of XUAN LOC the terrain is dominated by CHUA DIN (YT 6010) and is covered with dense forest. On the south, high ground follows generally along Interprovincial Route 2 with long...
ridges extending east and west. To the east of Diem Xuan LOC, the terrain is broken by hills as is the area southwest of XUAN LOC. Vegetation in this area consists of isolated rubber plantations interspersed with cultivated fields, but the majority of the vegetation is dense first growth, with some secondary growth. Streams traverse the area draining generally to the east and west of XUAN LOC. The majority of these streams are non-navigable.

d. CIA/PYOP:

(1) Psychological Operations:

(a) Psychological operations during ATLANTA began initially by using a "Good Guy" leaflet drop and utilizing loudspeaker transmissions to announce the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment's arrival in the XUAN LOC area. Reports later received indicated this method was appreciated by the people of the District of Xuan Loc thus developing an immediate rapport with the local populace. Leaflet drops were also made on suspected and known Viet Cong positions and on Viet Cong controlled hamlets. In conjunction with the drops and during tactical operations loudspeaker transmissions both live and taped were directed at the Viet Cong from overhead. Information received from ralliers and prisoners indicated that the loudspeakers were heard and that the leaflets were being read.

(b) Activities. During Operation ATLANTA the following support missions were conducted:

- 1,979,500 leaflets were dropped during 16 leaflet drop missions.
- 9 loudspeaker missions were flown for a total of 13.0 loudspeaker hours.
- 5 "No Dose" missions were flown totaling 10.8 hours.
- 5,000 curfew posters were distributed.
- 39,100 news letters were distributed.
- 200, 1967 Vietnamese calendars were distributed.

(2) Civic Action: On 5 December (in conjunction with a cordon and search operation conducted by the 3rd Squadron of the villages of CAM KY and BENH DI) a MEDCAP plan was initiated. In addition to medical assistance basic foodstuffs (powdered milk, bulgar wheat, rice, and cooking oil) were distributed to the villagers.

Once the villages had been cordoned off the people were airlifted to district headquarters at DOI THNH for screening and issuing of identification cards. Over 300 persons were transported in the operation. However, only 20 of them permitted the MEDCAP team to administer any medical aid. It was quite apparent from the outset that the people had been well indoctrinated by the Viet Cong on the dire consequences and effects if any of them should accept medical help from US troops. The food was received in much the same manner.

This was the first time the Blackhorse Regiment has encountered a locale where so many of the people were pro-Viet Cong. In order to counteract this situation an extensive psychological program has been initiated in this area stressing the importance of the people rallying to the cause of the Government of Vietnam.

6. MISSION: The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment secures a base camp vicinity TI 2936; clears and secures National Highway 1 and Interprovincial Route 333 from BENH HOA (TT 0012) to GIAY (TT 6312); Interprovincial Route 2 from XUAN LOC to the boundary of the 15th Australian Task Force (1st ATF) TO at TI 51697; National Highway 20 from junction of National Highway 1 (TT 6200) to Bac Lieu TT 3616; Interprovincial Route 333 from GIAY (TT 6312) to VO D.T (TT 7332); opens and clears a route from vicinity TI 4401 to DAI THNH (TS 1392).

7. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: The overall concept of the operation was developed with the idea of executing the plan in four phases.

- Phase I would involve a clear and secure operation along National Highway 1 from BENH HOA (TT 0012) to XUAN LOC (TT 4508) by the 1st Squadron with the 919th Engineer Company preparing to assist in base camp development. The 2nd and 3rd Squadrons would continue to provide security for the staging area with the 2nd Squadron ready to assume the mission of the 1st Squadron and provide a troop size reaction force.

Page 4 of 15 Pages
b. Phase II would commence with the 2nd Squadron assuming the mission of
the 1st Squadron securing the mission of
National Highways 1 and 20 while the 1st Squadron would move to secure a combat
base security TT 1301 and secure the Regional Base Camp site (YS 4580). In
addition the 1st Squadron would be prepared on order, to secure National
Highway 1 and Interprovincial Route 333 south and east from XUAN LOC (TT 5508)
to GIA RAY (TT 6312). 3rd Squadron to continue securing the staging area and be
prepared on order to establish a combat base vicinity YS 3995 and secure and clear
Interprovincial Route 2 from XUAN LOC (TT 5508) to the boundary of 1st ATP TACR
(YS 5879). The 919th Engineer Company (revised) would be prepared on order to move
to the base camp and assist in its development.

c. In Phase III the 1st Squadron would continue to secure the base camp
conduct route security on National Highway 1 from XUAN LOC (TT 5508) to GIA RAY
(TT 6312) while being prepared to conduct a route security mission on Interprovincial
Route 333 from GIA RAY (TT 6312) to VO DAT (TT 7332). 2nd Squadron would con-
tinue its route security mission on National Highway 1 while conducting search and
clear operations south of the road junction of Routes 1 and 20 at the same time
directing routes to OMO rubber plantation vicinity YS 3995; on order relieve 1st
Squadron of base camp security mission. The 3rd Squadron would on order secure a
combat base vicinity YS 3995; on order clear and secure Interprovincial Route 2
from XUAN LOC to the boundary of the 1st TACR; and be prepared to open and clear
a route from the Regional Base Camp to LOC THE HQ (YS 1392) and provide base
camp security. 919th Engineer Company would continue to provide assistance for
base camp development and combat engineer support for the squadrons.

d. During the final phase, Phase IV, the 1st Squadron would on relief
of base camp security by the 2nd Squadron continue its route security mission on
National Highway 1 from XUAN LOC to GIA RAY and initiate similar operations on
Interprovincial Route 333 to VO DAT. 2nd and 3rd Squadrons and 919th Engineer
Company would continue with their assigned missions stated in Phase III.

8. EXECUTION: 20 October - Changes in Task Organization

1st Squadron

Troop L, 3rd Squadron

1st Squadron initiated Operation ATLANTA at 0230H moving out on National
Highway 1 from the Regional Staging Area in LOG BAH (TT 0612) organizing a
combat base vicinity TT 1301. During the move small arms fire was received by
Company D and Howitzer Battery. 2nd Squadron remained in the staging area preparing
for movement on 23 October while the 3rd Squadron provided security for 2nd Bat-
talion, 3rd Artillery to NUAN CAT.

21 October

Troop B and Company D conducted search and clear operations vicinity
YS 11096 with only light contact. Numerous tunnels were uncovered and destroyed.
Troop L conducted operations to the east, burning 30 huts and destroying 10
tunnels at YS 35977. At 2140 hours Troop B received a burst of automatic weapons
fire wounding one man, and observed 13 VC probing perimeter positions vicinity YS
110982. Fire was returned with unknown results.

22 October

Operation ATLANTA continued with only minor incidents during the day.
One ML13 (ACAV) from Troop B was damaged by a pressure mine at YS 558875 with no
casualties. Four Viet Cong Suspects (VCS) were detained by Troop B vicinity YS
471857 and evacuated for interrogation.

23 October - Changes in Task Organization

1st Squadron

Troop L reverted to 3/11 effective 1500 hours.

Operation ATLANTA continued with negative contact. A tank from the
919th Engineer Company was damaged by a mine at YS 110983 resulting in one US
WIA. 2nd Squadron moved from the staging at 0650 with Troop G and advance party elements to organize a combat base at OHD QUE vicinity YS 3999.

21 October

Operation "ATLANTA continued with the 1st Squadron conducting search and clear operations vicinity YS 11479 resulting in negative contact. A 5/4 ton truck with three passengers from the L094th Radio Research Detachment received one command detonated claymore mine and 3 rounds of small arms fire vicinity YS 166895, resulting in one US KIA, one US WIA, and one 5/4 ton truck damaged. The main body of the 2nd Squadron departed the staging area 0730 hours, closing in its combat base at 0900 hours without contact.

25 October

Operation ATLANTA continued with search and destroy operations vicinity of the Regimental Base Camp and the 2nd Squadron's combat base resulting in negative contact. 3rd Squadron provided security for the STARGOM area (YS 080115) as part of UNTOWN (continuous operation - security for HEMN HOA area).

26 October - Operation ATLANTA continued with negative contact. 1st Squadron conducted patrols vicinity of the Regimental Base Camp and REGIMENTS along Interprovincial Route 333 from XUAN LOC (YT 404076) to GIA RAY (YT 630120). Day and night patrols were conducted by the 3rd Squadron from the staging area.

27 October - Operation ATLANTA continued with the 1st Squadron making a zone reconnaissance south of the Regimental Base Camp. During the reconnaissance at least 10 tunnels containing clothing, rice, hand grenades, cooking utensils and documents were located and destroyed. Three A/C/AVs from Troop A were damaged by pressure type mines resulting in one US WIA. Negative contact was made by the 2nd and 3rd Squadrions.

28 October - Operation ATLANTA continued with search and destroy operations vicinity Regimental Base Camps and BUDBY operations with a local Popular Force (PF) platoon achieving negative results. Troop K provided a convoy escort for 188th Maintenance Battalion from LONG BINH YT 06120 to Blackhorse Base Camp without incident. In conjunction with the 1st Squadron's activities along Interprovincial Route 2, 165,000 leaflets were dropped from YS 6690 to YS 6683.

29 October - Operation ATLANTA continued without contact. Search and clear operations by Troop A disclosed a hut containing 12 expended 57mm RM rounds, a horse made battery, and anti-American propaganda, at YS 155568. Troop F continued BUDBY operations with a local PF platoon vicinity YT 141015.

30 October - Operation ATLANTA continued with local security operations around Blackhorse Base Camp. Contact was made with 1-6 VC by an ambush patrol from Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron vicinity YS 166930 engaging the VC with small arms and hand grenades. The enemy returned fire with 7-10 rounds of small arms and then broke contact. VC casualties unknown; no US casualties. Troop L continued to provide security for the LONG BINH ASP.

31 October - Operation ATLANTA continued with the advance elements of the Regimental Command Group closing in the base camp at 0900 hours. Search and destroy operations continued in the vicinity of the base camp while Troop C provided security for a bridge classification team from Company G, 27th Engineer Battalion (C) from XUAN LOC along National Highway 1 and Interprovincial Route 333 to C/V RIA HUY (YT 876196). Troop C received 10-15 rounds automatic weapons fire vicinity YT 160053 with negative results. Search and clear operations by Troop A located a hut (YS 353928) containing 250 pounds of rice. Progress continued on the development of the base camp by 27th Engineer Battalion. Troop E uncovered 200 pounds of rice, 100 B-30 batteries and medical supplies vicinity YT 343051. Troop L continued to provide security for the LONG BINH ASP with no contact.

1 November - Troops A and B conducted a dismounted night march at 0230 hours encircling villages at YS 120940 and YS 163996 with no contact. The 27th Engineer Battalion continued to develop the base camp.
2 November - Changes in Task Organisation

1st Squadron

Troop F (OPCON 1/11 for base camp security)

Preparation for the displacement of the Regimental Headquarters elements continued while Troop G road marched to GIA RAY (YT 621110) along National Highway 1 and Interprovincial Route 333 without contact. Security measures were initiated by the 1st Squadron to assist Company C, 27th Engineer Battalion in securing the GIA RAY rock quarry. Security operations by the 3rd Squadron continued in the LONG BIHN - BIHN HOA area.

3 November - Changes in Task Organisation

Troop I OPCON 2/11 for base camp security

The Regimental Command Group closed in to the base camp area (YT 141955) at 0920 hours. Troop A with support from Howitzer Battery continued to operate along Interprovincial Route 333. Troops E and G received automatic weapons and small arms fire with Troop G observing at least six persons vicinity YT 141982. Troop F engaged two Viet Cong vicinity YT 125975 firing 3 rounds M79 canister with unknown results.

4 November

1st Squadron

Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery attached to 1st Squadron.

Operation ATLANTA continued with the 1st Squadron pushing northward in conjunction with BUDDY cordon and search operations in the SUDI CAT area. Sporadic mining and small arms incidents were encountered with no US casualties. Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery provided fire support for the operation from GIA RAY. Base camp security continued to be maintained by the 2nd Squadron while the 3rd Squadron secured the staging area.

5 November - Troop A provided security for engineer work parties constructing culverts in the vicinity CAV GIA HUYNH (YT 677196). Route clearing operations proceeded northward along Interprovincial Route 333. Company B, 27th Engineer Battalion deployed on a rock quarry site off Highway 1. In support of the Regiment's activities loudspeaker operations were conducted at VO DAT from YT 8612 to YT 8945. Base camp and staging area security continued to be maintained by the 2nd and 3rd Squadrons with no significant contact.

6 November - Security and route clearing operations continued along Interprovincial Route 333 with the 1st Squadron making a show of force at VO DAT. 600 pounds of wheat were located (YT 647078) and evacuated by Troop A. Sniper fire vicinity of YT 654071 was received by Troop C resulting in one US WIA. Troop E and 2nd Squadron trains closed in the Regimental Baseuyen from their combat base camp at CMG 502. Units of the 3rd Squadron continued to conduct security operations with elements of the 3rd Brigade 9th Infantry Division; no significant contact made.

7 November

Troop's A and B conducted dismounted patrols in AO while Troop C conducted a route reconnaissance on Highway 1. In conjunction with the patrols, BUDDY operations were run with elements of the 52nd Ranger Battalion vicinity YT 610205 east to YT 691205 and YT 772280. Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery displaced to YT 692218 to provide support east of VO DAT (YT 7332). Construction of a culvert bypass (YT 678196) was completed by Company C, 27th Engineer Battalion and opened for traffic. Security of the base camp continued to be provided by the 2nd Squadron; staging area security was provided by elements of the 3rd Squadron with Troop D and one platoon of tanks from Company H working with elements of the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division providing a screen of the LONG BIHN ASP, with no significant contact.

8 November - Changes in Task Organization.

1st Squadron OPCON to 1st Infantry Division effective 1400 hours.
Troop I released to 3rd Squadron for Operations UNIONTOWN and MARSHALLTOWN.

1st Squadron terminated its operations in the GIA R-Y - VO DAI area at 1000 hours. Squadron elements cleared GI: R-Y (TT 6311) at 1300 hours on their way to LAX KHE (TT 7730) stopping for - Class I and III resupply at the LOI VGK staging area. The first elements of the squadron arrived, 200km's later, in IAI KHE at 1630 hours, and by 1830 the entire squadron had closed. The move involved approximately 200 vehicles and 1000 men completelycontactorry. Elements of Troop G relieved the 1st Squadron contingents of security operations around the rock quarry at GI: RAY while Troop F ran security and clear operations from the Dalatbase Camp vicinity of YT 5520. Occasional small arms fire was received by Troops F and I with negative results. However, Troop E had an UGM detonating a pressure type mine (TT 579100) resulting in one US WIA and damage to the LCL7. The remaining Regimental units conducted security operations in the staging area and LONG Binh - Bien Hoa area.

9 November

1st Squadron continued under the OPCOM of the 1st Infantry Division as part of Operation ATLEBORG. 2nd Squadron continued to protect the base camp and dispatch patrols outside the perimeter with no contact. No significant activities occurred in the staging area. 3rd Squadron continued Operation UNIONTOWN.

10 November

Local patrols and security of the base camp area continued to be maintained by the 1st Squadron while the 3rd Squadron secured the staging area and operated in the 173rd Airborne Brigade's PCTR as part of Operation UNIONTOWN. 1st Squadron remained OPCOM 1st Infantry Division. No significant results were achieved.

11 November

1st Squadron continued under the OPCOM to the 1st Infantry Division.

2nd Squadron continued patrolling and securing the Regimental Base Camp with one patrol from Troop G providing security for the GI: RAY rock quarry in the vicinity of TT 6311. Troop G had an LCM hit by a claymore mine (TT 631111) resulting in one US WIA and negative damage to the truck.

3rd Squadron continued Operation UNIONTOWN and provided security for the staging area. An H Company M1A3 Tank attached to Troop H detonated a pressure type mine vicinity of TT 631111 slightly damaging the vehicle. On National Highway 1 a 3/4 ton truck from Troop G traveling in convoy was hit by a claymore mine resulting in no US casualties and only minor damage to the vehicle.

12 November

1st Squadron remained under the OPCOM of the 1st Infantry Division.

Security of the base camp and the rock quarry continued to be maintained by the 2nd Squadron.

3rd Squadron continued providing support for Operation UNIONTOWN and security for the staging area with no significant action.

13 November

1st Squadron continued to provide armor support for Operation ATLEBORG under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division.

2nd and 3rd Squadrons continued to maintain security of the base camp and staging area respectively.

14 November

Activities remained the same with the maneuver elements continuing with their missions. Company H conducted search and destroy operations vicinity of XUAN LOC (TT 3810) with negative results.
醛ene I released to 3rd Squadron for Operations UNIONTOWN and MARSH: LITOWN

Let Squadron terminated its operations in the GIA R:Y - VO DAT area at 1000 hours. Squadron elements cleared GI: R:Y (YT 6311) at 1300 hours on their way to Lai Khe (MT 7138) stopping for - Class I and III resupply at the LONG BINE staging area. The first elements of the squadron arrived, 200km s later, in Lai Khe at 1630 hours, and by 1830 the entire squadron had closed. The move involved approximately 200 vehicles and 1000 men completely contact ready. Elements of Troop G relieved the 1st Squadron contingents of security operations around the rock quarry at GIA RAY while Troop E ran search and clear operations from the Mahanoros Base Camp vicinity of YT 6530. Occasional small arms fire was received by Troops F and I with negative results. However, Troop E had an Army colocating a pressure type mine (YT 657900) resulting in one US WIA and damage to the ACAV. The remaining Regimental units conducted security operations in the staging area and LONG BINE - BIEN HOA area.

9 November

1st Squadron continued under the OCP0N of the 1st Infantry Division as part of Operation ATTLEBORO. 2nd Squadron continued to protect the base camp and dispatch patrols outside the perimeter with no contact. No significant activities occurred in the staging area. 3rd Squadron continued Operation UNIONTOWN.

10 November

Local patrols and security of the base camp area continued to be maintained by the 2nd Squadron while the 3rd Squadron secured the staging area and operated in the 173rd Airborne Brigade's TACR as part of Operation UNIONTOWN. 1st Squadron remained OCP0N 1st Infantry Division. No significant results were achieved.

11 November

Let Squadron continued under the OCP0N to the 1st Infantry Division.

2nd Squadron continued patrolling and securing the Regimental Base Camp with one platoon from Troop G providing security for the GIA RAY rock quarry in the vicinity of YT 6311. Troop G had another hit by a claymore mine (YT 637081) resulting in one US WIA and negative damage to the track.

3rd Squadron continued Operation UNIONTOWN and provided security for the staging area. An M Company M60A3 Tank attached to Troop K detonated a pressure type mine vicinity of YT 638169 slightly damaging the vehicle. On National Highway 1 a 3/4 ton truck from Troop A traveling in convoy was hit by a claymore mine resulting in no US casualties and only minor damage to the vehicle.

12 November

1st Squadron remained under the OCP0N of the 1st Infantry Division. Security of the base camp and the rock quarry continued to be maintained by the 2nd Squadron.

3rd Squadron continued providing support for Operation UNIONTOWN and security for the staging area with no significant action.

13 November

1st Squadron continued to provide armor support for Operation ATTLEBORO under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division.

2nd and 3rd Squadrions continued to maintain security of the base camp and staging area respectively.

18 November

Activities remained the same with the maneuver elements continuing with their missions. Company M conducted search and destroy operations vicinity of XUAN LOC (YT 3810) with negative results.

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16 November

2d Squadron continued Operation ATLANTA conducting local patrols from the base camp and securing the GHA rock quarry all with negative results.

2d Squadron continued providing support for Operation UNIONTOWN and the security of the staging area. Troop L received 25 rounds of automatic weapons fire vicinity of YT 06085, fire returned with negative results. Troop I observed and challenged 2 civilians in black pajamas breaking a trail through the jungle (YT 057140). Upon being challenged they broke and ran at which time the troop fired 20 rounds of small arms, possibly wounding one of them.

17 November

Patrols from the 2d Squadron searched the area around the base camp to locate the positions used by the VC to shell the camp the previous night. At 1135 hours Troop Q fired 32 rounds 75mm recoilless rifle fire at YT 055981. A further search of the area found three mortar positions (YT 055991) with six 82mm rounds, assorted mortar fuses and night firing equipment.

2d Squadron continued Operation ATLANTA under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division at LAK KHE.

2d Squadron continued to support Operation UNIONTOWN and provide security for the regimental staging area. At 2115 hours an ambush patrol from Troop I heard noises at YT 000116 engaging the suspected area with one round of 79mm ammunition, two hand grenades were received on position. 8 - 10 rounds of M-16 were also fired in the direction of the noises along with six rounds of L.2 inch HE causing a secondary explosion after the patrol withdrew. No US casualties, VC casualties unknown.

18 November

2d Squadron continued Operation ATLANTA under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division.

2d Squadron continued to conduct patrols and secure the base camp perimeter and the rock quarry. Probing actions were made along the perimeter in Troop E's sector at 0115 hours and 0305 hours. Suspected locations were engaged with M79 rounds, results unknown.

2d Squadron continued to provide security for the staging area and support for Operation UNIONTOWN. The 2d Platoon of Troop L at 1825 hours received 30 rounds of small arms fire vicinity YT 075066. Fire was returned with M-79 and small arms fire, results unknown. Contact was broken at 1845 hours.
19 November

1st Squadron continued to participate in Operation ATTIKSDORO now under the operational control of the 173rd Airborne Brigade effective 0700 hours.

2nd Squadron conducted patrols in the vicinity of the base camp (YS 1497) and provided security for the rock quarry. At 0015 hours a patrol from Troop F received 5-7 60mm mortar rounds from TD 43095L, resulting in no US casualties. Artillery fire was returned with unknown results.

3rd Squadron continued UNIONTOWN operations and security of the staging area. The area of operation remained quiet with only occasional small arms firing. A squad size base camp was located (TT 095086) consisting of a 20 meter long trench, 5 foxholes, and cooking utensils.

20 November

1st Squadron was released from operational control of 173rd Airborne Brigade and closed on the staging area at 2035 hours.

2nd Squadron continued to conduct patrols and provide security for the base camp.

3rd Squadron continued to support operation UNIONTOWN and security of the staging area as well as the LONG BINH ASP.

21 November - Changes to Task Organisation.

Troop F and L OPOON 173rd Airborne Brigade in support of UNIONTOWN.

The Regiment continued Operation ATLANTA and was relieved of the UNIONTOWN mission by the 173rd Airborne Brigade. At 1025 hours a regimental convoy traveling on National Highway 1 towards XUAN LOI was ambushed vicinity TT 275100 to TT 290099. Fire was immediately returned by the escort platoon from Troop C along with air strikes by helicopters and fighter aircraft in addition to artillery being fired in support of the beleaguered convoy. The 1st Squadron moved to the ambush site as a reaction force from the LONG BINH staging area. Major contact was broken at 1137 hours except for sporadic contact during the remainder of the day. US casualties were 7 KIA (5 from 11th Armored Cavalry), 8 WIA (7 from the 11th Armored Cavalry); VC losses included a final total of 30 KIA (RC) 1 VCS. 1 weapons captured listed in Annex A. US equipment losses included 6 ML13 destroyed, 1 ML13 damaged, 1 2½ ton trucks destroyed, 1 UHIB damaged; VC losses included 1 57mm RR, 1 AK47 rifle, 2 RPG rounds and miscellaneous documents.

1st Squadron remained in the area of the ambush to conduct a sweep the following day.

2nd Squadron remained at the base camp conducting security patrols around the perimeter.

3rd Squadron was released from Operation UNIONTOWN at 1100 hours by the 173rd Airborne Brigade. Continued to provide security for the staging area.

22 November

1st Squadron conducted search and destroy operations south of the ambush site. Four more VC bodies were found with another 75-100 VC KIA (Possible). Eight 57mm RR rounds, a tripod w/TES mechanism for either a recoilless rifle or heavy machine gun were also located.

The 2nd and 3rd Squadrons continued to provide base camp and staging area security respectively.

23 November

1st Squadron performed base camp security for a portion of the perimeter with no significant events. Patrols from Troop C found a grave (TT 274072) containing a body with a pistol belt and one US grenade.
2nd Squadron conducted search and destroy operations in the vicinity of TT 44003 and provided security for a portion of the GIA RAY rock quarry. At 1145 hours Troop F bored 8-10 rounds of small arms fire vicinity YT 495015; a sweep of the area was made with negative results. A platoon from Troop G received an unknown number of rounds of automatic weapons fire and heard one large explosion believed to be a claymore vicinity YT 570063. Fire was returned with automatic weapons with negative results. A possible tax collection point was reported by the Air Observer at YT 575065.

3rd Squadron continued to secure the staging area and supported Operation UNIONTOWN.

26 November

Operation ATLANTA combined with the 1st Squadron performing convoy escort missions from LONG HORN to the Regimental Base Camp; conducted search and destroy operations in the vicinity of their assigned sector of the base camp perimeter. Troop G reported locating a fortification complex consisting of 80 bunkers and trenches forming a "T" from YT 278087 to YT 275075, and from YT 278080 east to YT 281079.

2nd Squadron conducted search and destroy operations (YS 3195) with Troop F and provided security for the GIA RAY rock quarry. On two different occasions persons were detected along the perimeter manned by Troop E. A trip flare was ignited at 0815 hours revealing two persons. Fire was received at this time resulting in one UB VTA. Two rounds of mortar fire were received at 1820 hours in the 2nd Squadron area. Light fire teams were scrambled and the howitzer batteries from the 1st and 2nd Squadrons were used to engage the suspected mortar position. Reinforcing fires were also requested and provided by the 51st Artillery Group in THUAN LOC.

3rd Squadron remained in the staging area providing security and support for Operation UNIONTOWN.

25 November

1st Squadron conducted search and destroy operations vicinity of YT 495012. 35 VCs were apprehended in a hamlet containing VC propaganda material and empty 60mm mortar containers; seven were detained for further questioning. Troop B also conducted ROADRUNNER operations from YT 44937 to YT 2810 without incident.

2nd Squadron utilizing Troop F opened Route 390 for tracked vehicles, from the base camp (YS 495956) west to National Highway 15 at LONG THORN (YS 319925). The bridge located at YS 499913 was determined passable only for wheeled vehicles with a bypass available for tracked vehicles. ROADRUNNER and security operations were performed by Troops E and G.

3rd Squadron continued to provide security for the staging area and support for Operation UNIONTOWN with Troops I and L under the operational control of the 173rd Airborne Brigade. Troop K conducted ROADRUNNER operations and convoy escort from LONG HORN to THUAN LOC without incident.

26 November

Operations remained quiet with the squadrons providing convoy escorts, limited search and clear operations and base camp security. Support for UNIONTOWN activities continued to be provided by the 3rd Squadron.

27 November

Search and destroy operations by the 1st Squadron east of the perimeter uncovered 30 12.7 mm machine guns of local manufacture in a tree wrapped in plastic. Troop A also found 9 VC packs with personal equipment and new black nylon pajamas.

The 2nd Squadron conducted search and destroy operations northwest of the base camp and continued to maintain security of the GIA RAY rock quarry site.

Security of the staging area and continued support of UNIONTOWN operations were provided by the 3rd Squadron. Convoy escorts were also provided for regimental vehicles moving to and from the base camp.
26 November - Changes in Task Organization

Troop K relieved Troop L of its UNIONTOWN mission effective 1200 hours.

1st Squadron continued Operation ATLANTA with search and destroy operations (YU 1400) northeast of the base camp with light contact. ROADRUNNER and convoy escort operations were run between Blackhorse Base Camp and LONG Binh.

2nd Squadron operated north of the base camp on search and destroy operations and continued to maintain security for the rock quarry.

3rd Squadron continued to participate in UNIONTOWN with Troops I and L under the operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade.

29 November

Operation ATLANTA continued with the 1st Squadron making a reconnaissance in force along National Highway 1 and Interprovincial Route 333 from XUAN LOC to GIA RAY.

2nd Squadron assumed a portion of the UNIONTOWN mission under the operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade. Troop F provided escort for Regimental convoys and conducted search and destroy operations vicinity of YU 1402.

3rd Squadron continued an Operation ATLANTA with one Troop still participating in Operation UNIONTOWN.

30 November

1st Squadron's reconnaissance in force operation continued with no contact. A report from a 10th ARVN Division FIC indicated approximately 300 VC were observed at YS 4849. 2nd Squadron units were dispatched to conduct a search and destroy operation which resulted in only minor contact.

3rd Squadron meanwhile maintained security of the staging area and

continued to move its equipment and supplies to the base camp. Troop L completed its move to the base camp at 1315 hours.

1 December - Changes to Task Organization.

Troop G relieved Troop I of OPCON mission to 173d Airborne Brigade.

Troop I reverted to 3rd Squadron control.

1st Squadron secured the rock quarry and conducted ROADRUNNER operations between GIA RAY and the base camp.

2nd Squadron Operation ATLANTA with negative contact and participated in Operation UNIONTOWN with Troops E and G.

The 3rd Squadron (-) closed in the base camp at 1100 hours, with the remaining elements from the Provisional Squadron.

2 December

1st Squadron conducted an area reconnaissance (YS 1997) and a ROADRUNNER operation to GIA RAY at the same time providing security for the GIA RAY rock quarry. At 1610 hours a resupply convoy consisting of 2 M18A3 Tanks and 3 ACAVs (from Company D and Troop B) and 2 2½ ton trucks (one from the 27th Engineer Battalion) was ambushed by an estimated VC Main Force Battalion (Reinforced) at YU 627071 while returning from GIA RAY. A reaction force of the 1st Squadron (-) moved to the site shortly after contact was made. Reinforcing fire was received from 7 air strikes and artillery fire from the 5th Artillery Group at XUAN LOC. The main ambush force was positioned southwest of National Highway 1 with elements of the squadron positioned on the west, north and east sides of VC Positions. TAC air and artillery were utilized to seal off the escape routes to the south. Contact was broken at 1750 hours, with only sporadic firing continuing until 1950 hours.

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Illumination of the sealed area and suppressing fires were provided by an AC-130 "Spooky" ship after nightfall. As of 2200 hours US casualties were 13 WIA, 1 KIA, destroyed, and 1 HMM tank damaged. VC losses included 38 XIA (27), 3 machineguns (2 with ladders) and 1 70mm assault rifle. The attackers were light blue uniforms with white belts and bandoliers of woodchip draped over their shoulders. One noticeable item of clothing locking was that most of them were not wearing shoes. Expanded rounds of 79mm and 75mm recoilless rifles were found near the ambush site.

2nd Squadron continued to secure the base camp and support Operation "UNI
tOWN".

3rd Squadron secured the base camp and conducted area reconnaissance in the vicinity of coordinates T3 K209.

3 December

At 0700 hours the Regimental Command Group moved to the site of the ambush while the 1st Squadron continued search and destroy operations south and west of the ambush site. At 0720 hours Troop A uncovered an extensive tunnel system (TT 59063) and shortly thereafter captured 3 VC, 2 of whom were wounded. One of the WC stated that he was a member of the 1st Company, 1st Battalion, 27th Regiment, 5th VC Division. At 1205 hours Troop C captured another wounded VC and evacuated him for medical treatment. Prior to daylight the VC's route of withdrawal had been sealed by artillery from 2/35th Artillery and an Air Force AC-130 orbiting overhead.

The 2nd Squadron remained at the base camp and conducted ROADRUNNER operations between the base camp and LON G BISH.

The 3rd Squadron moved from the base camp to establish blocking positions along National Highway 1 from TT 59065 to TT 630087 in support of 1st Squadron's search and destroy operations at the ambush site. Negative contact was made and the squadron closed in the base camp at 1235 hours.

1 December

1st Squadron continued to search the 2 December ambush site. At 1025 hours Troop C captured a 75mm recoilless rifle with 267 rounds and tripod at TT 629073. Later on Troop C found 1 75mm recoilless round, 3 grenades, 6 entrenching tools, 25 fuzes and 1 VC KIA (2D). Total losses from the ambush were 1 US KIA (from 27th Engineer Battalion), 22 US WIA and 99 VC KIA (2D), 3 VC (KIA). See Annex B for breakdown of weapons captured.

2nd Squadron continued to conduct ROADRUNNER operations between the Regimental Base Camp, and LON G BISH and provide support for Operation "UNI
tOWN".

3rd Squadron continued to improve its perimeter defenses while providing base camp security.

5 December

ROADRUNNER operations were conducted between GLA RAY and LON G BISH with negative contact by the 1st and 2nd Squadrons.

3rd Battalion mounted a BUDDY search and destroy operation with the 1st Battalion 133rd Infantry Regiment (ARVN) in the vicinity of T3 L25950. The ARVN troops made an armoured assault after the 3rd Squadron had cordoned off the area. Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery was attached for the operation and organized a fire support base at T3 L2596. A detailed analysis and report of the operation is outlined in Annex C to this report.

6 December

1st Squadron continued Operation "TL-246" with ROADRUNNER operations to GLA RAY and LON G BISH. Troop B continued to provide security for the GLA RAY rock quarry.

The 2nd and 3rd Squadrons continued to secure the base camp and conduct ROADRUNNER operations to and from LON G BISH.
The disposition of the Regiment remained the same except for the 2nd Squadron. With the 1st Squadron accounting for the rock quarry and the 3rd Squadron providing base camp security the 2nd Squadron terminated Operation ATLANTA and at 1300 hours and came under the operational control of the 173rd Airborne Brigade for Operation OXYGEN/DEUX.

5 December

The Regiment terminated Operation ATLANTA at 2300 hours.

9. (U) SUPPORTING FORCES:
   a. Artillery:
      (1) Size of Force:
         Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry
         Howitzer Battery, 2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry
         Howitzer Battery, 3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry
         56th Artillery Group

      (2) How and When Employed:
         Battery B, 2d Bn, 35th Artillery (155mm SP) - 2 - 4 December
         1st Squadron on GIA RAY ambush (2 Dec).

      (3) Concept of Operation: The howitzer batteries organic to the Regiment were used in direct support of their parent squadrons with the additional mission of providing general support for the entire Regiment. General support reinforcing fires and harassing and interdiction (H&I) fires were provided by the 56th Artillery Group.

         Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 32nd Artillery (OPCON to 56th Artillery Group less command from 23rd Artillery Group) (5/175mm SP) - 21 November and 2 December provided general support reinforcing and H&I fires.

         Battery C, 7th Battalion, 79th Artillery (105mm towed) - 20 October - 6 December provided supplementary H&I fires.

   b. Signal:
      (1) Units Employed: A detachment from Company B, 53rd Signal Battalion consisting of a radio relay terminal (AN/MGC - 17), and HF radio van (AN/GRC-26), a communications center (AN/MGC - 17) and 10 signal personnel under the command of Lieutenant Ing.

      (2) Method of Employment: The detachment was utilised to terminate command and central telephone circuits to II F Force V, provide access to the Army Area Communications System, and to provide a communications center for the 11th Armored Cavalry.

      (3) Execution: The Regimental Signal Officer determined what circuits were needed for the operation and forwarded his requirements to the II F Force V Signal Officer. II F Force V then submitted work requests for the installation of the necessary terminals which were established by the 53rd Signal Detachment. Lines from the terminals were extended by personnel from the Regimental Communications Platoon. Initially, circuits were established to the LONG BINI staging area. However, as the Regiment cleared the area these circuits were dropped and others established in the base camp area. The first circuits in the base camp were operational by 31 October 1966.

      (4) Concept of Operations: The 53rd Signal Detachment deployed with the forward command post elements of the Regiment on 31 October and remained at the base camp providing communications between the Blackhorse CP and higher headquarters.
9. Army Aviation:

(1) Units Employed:

(a) Aviation Platoon, HRT, 11th Armored Cavalry
(b) Aviation Section, HRT, 1/11th Armored Cavalry
(c) Aviation Section, HRT, 2/11th Armored Cavalry
(d) Aviation Section, HRT, 3/11th Armored Cavalry

(2) Method of Employment:

(a) Aviation Sections - General support of the Regiment.
(b) Aviation Sections - Direct support of their respective
squadrons; cross-attached between squadrons as situations required.

(3) Concept of Operations:

(a) The Regimental Aviation platoon provides a limited lift
 capability within the transport section utilising six UH-1D's, and command and
 control support utilising the two OH-23D's in the command and control section.

(b) The UH-1D's provided aviation support in a variety of ways
 such as command and control, logistical troop and cargo lifts, combat troop and
cargo lifts, medical evacuation, reconnaissance, training, aircraft maintenance,
administration, mail delivery, FOC, psychological warfare, and hauling of perishable
rations.

(c) The OH-23D's were used primarily for command and control
and administrative missions. They were also used quite extensively for convoy
escort, artillery adjustment and reconnaissance operations.

(d) The UH-1D's were effectively used in such roles as ambush
suppression, escort of airmobile operations, truck convoy escort, daily perimeter
reconnaissance of the base camp, and as a standby immediate reaction security force.

(4) Significant engagements during which Army Aviation played
a major role:

(a) Ambush suppression and search and destroy operations,
vicinity coordinates YT 2610, 21-23 November 1966.

(b) Ambush suppression and search and destroy operations,
vicinity coordinates YT 6307, 2-4 December 1966.

(5) Operation Alexandria in support of 3/11, search and destroy
operations vicinity of coordinates YS 1684.

(5) Statistical data on Army Aviation support operations:

(a) Hours flown:

\[ \begin{align*}
&1 \text{ OH-23D} - 647 \text{ hours.} \\
&2 \text{ UH-1D & AH-1S} - 1937 \text{ hours.}
\end{align*} \]

(b) Sorties flown:

\[ \begin{align*}
&1 \text{ Command and control} - 856 \text{ Sorties.} \\
&2 \text{ Combat Support} - 3207 \text{ Sorties.} \\
&3 \text{ Combat Assault} - 337 \text{ Sorties.}
\end{align*} \]

(c) Cargo transported - 62.5 tons.

(d) Passengers transported - 4, 357.
I. Historical supporting organic aviation units:

(a) 69th Assault Helicopter Company (airlifted 1/43 ARVN Regt on Operation Alexandria Fas).

(b) 25th CM Co provided PCL support at the Regimental Base Camp.

d. U.S. Air Force:

U.S. tactical air elements were employed in support of the 11th Armored Cavalry throughout Operation "PLANTAX." O-1 Aircraft of the TACF, 11th Armored Cavalry were flown daily in the support of operations. Missions flown consisted of VR, from which valuable intelligence data was collected and submitted; FAC, in which tactical fighter and bomber aircraft were employed against both preplanned and immediate targets selected and requested by the Regimental S-2 and S-3 sections; convoy escorts during which both O-1, and when required, fighter aircraft escorted 11th Armored Cavalry convoys; and Artillery Adjustment, in which the FAC's in the O-1 aircraft adjusted both Regimental and other support artillery against targets within the area of operations. Administrative flights were flown by the O-1 aircraft but these were mainly in support of TACF requirements.

(2) Control:

All Air Force elements utilized during the operation were under the command and control of the 7th U.S. Air Force (PACAF).

(3) Effectiveness:

The majority of the tactical fighter and bomber strikes were, as determined by subsequent agents reports, considered very effective. These agents reports must be relied upon because ground follow up action was generally impossible due to the terrain and/or other tactical considerations. On two occasions when the Regiment had convoys ambushed by sizable Viet Cong forces tactical airpower was instrumental in keeping friendly losses to a minimum and was of great aid in dispatching the enemy force. Killed by air body count in these encounters was low due to the Viet Cong tactic of rapidly evacuating their killed and wounded. Again, subsequent agent reports supported the fact that the tactical air forces employed were very effective and the actual body count told only a small portion of the story.

(4) Statistical Data on Air Force Support Operations:

(a) Sorties flown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VR</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escort</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery Adjustment</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Strike</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

(b) Type aircraft flown with breakdown of number of sorties

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Number</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F-100</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-5</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-57</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-1</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(a) A total of 200 tons of ordnance was expended with the following breakdown by types:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>750# GP Bomb</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500# Bomb</td>
<td>172</td>
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<tr>
<td>250# Bomb</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250# Frag Bomb</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>750# Nepal</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.75mm FFAR</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illumination Flares</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>.50 Cal Ammo (Rounds)</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20mm E21 (Rounds)</td>
<td>96.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Engineer:

(1) Units:

- 919th Engineer Company (Armored)

(2) Method of Employment:

During the operation engineer elements were attached to the squadrons based on their assigned missions. Attachments in some cases were made down to troop and company level with an engineer squad providing the support. Tasks assigned the 919th Engineer Company (Armored) ranged from base camp development and security to combat engineer support (clearing mines, destruction of fortifications and construction of temporary bridging).

(c) Execution:

On 20 October the 1st Platoon attached to the 1st Squadron moved to the area of the base camp and began clearing fields of fire, utilizing three tankackers and one full tracked bulldozer. While the fields of fire were being cleared and the base camp perimeter secured each of the three platoons were providing combat engineer support to the various Armored Cavalry Troops when an independent mission was required. Specifically, a squad from the 1st Platoon supported Troop A by probing and clearing mines in suspected areas and destroying bunkers, tunnels and booby traps. One of the other squadrons from the 1st Platoon while supporting Troop B on a reconnaissance mission encountered an ingeniously camouflaged mine complex de-signed to disable an armored vehicle and once stopped, destroy it with a charge that was placed at a higher elevation than the first. They also destroyed enemy bunkers and tunnels as they were located. While the 3rd Squad of the 1st Platoon supported Troop L on a search and destroy operation it constructed a hasty bridge crossing in order for the troop to continue with its mission.

On 26 October the 1st Platoon moved back to the staging area to assist the Company Headquarters in their move to the base camp. The following day the 2nd Platoon completed its move to the base camp.

By 31 October the entire company had displaced to the base camp area and was busily engaged in constructing defensive positions and sandbagging living areas. Building materials were obtained and precut for use in construction of permanent bunkers for the base camp. In conjunction with the installation of the perimeter defenses technical assistance was provided to the various troop units occupying the camp.

(d) Results:

By 8 December the perimeter wire and bunker system was 60% completed in the base camp area and work on the base camp roads and drainage ditches was 50% completed. Vertical construction was in its initial stages with priority of effort going to latrines, showers and messhalls. All base camp development projects were accomplished in conjunction with the 27th Engineer Battalion (C).
10.  

a.  Friendly Losses:

KIA = 8
WIA = 49

Equipment lost or destroyed:

AGAV = 3

Equipment damaged:

AGAV = 9
Tank M60A3 = 3
CHAR = 3
GM20 = 1

b.  Enemy Losses:

(1)  Personnel:

KIA (KC) = 136
KIA (Pscs) = 108
WOG = 51
WGS = 276

(2)  Weapons and ammunition:

Recoilless Rifle:
  .75mm w/mount = 1
  37mm w/mount = 1
Machine gun = 5
Submachine gun = 6
Rocket Launcher = 1
Mortar (60mm) = 1
Small Arms = 8
Artillery Rounds = 2
Mortar Rounds = 25
Recoilless Rounds = 11
Rockets = 2
Mines = 26
Grenades = 26
Small Arms Ammunition = 2570

(3)  Installations:

Base camps = 8
Fortifications
  Tunnels = 51
  Trenches = 59
  Tunnel/Bunker Complex = 3
  Foxholes = 204

(4)  Foodstuffs:

Rice = 11/2 tons
Peanuts = 1 ton
Salt = 1 ton
Miscellaneous = 1100 lbs
11. (V) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Logistics:

Resupply:

(1) Methods. Let Logistical Command on request of the Regiment established a forward supply point (FSP) in the Regimental Base Camp area. During Operation ATLANTIC, resupply of Class I, III and IIIA was handled by supply point distribution from the FSP. Class V resupply was and still is being accomplished by supply point distribution from the 3rd Ordnance Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) at Long Binh. Class II and IV supply (except PLL repair parts) were received through the 256th Quartermaster Supply and Service Battalion at Long Binh.

(2) Techniques. Logistical convoys were used to provide the primary mode of resupply for the units of the Regiment and the FSP. Aerial resupply was employed only on an emergency basis.

(3) Basic Loads:

(a) Class I. Each unit of the Regiment carried a 3 day supply of KGI’s on their vehicles with a 2 day supply in their unit trains.

(b) Class III. Each Squadron Support Platoon is authorised seven 1200 gallon tank and pump units by TOC7. Additionally, each squadron has been authorised two 5,000 gallon tankers with tractor by TOC7 (USARV Form 47). Experience during the operation has shown that the Regiment used an average of 67,113 gallons of Class I, II and IIIA per week broken down as follows: JP-4, 8, 904 gallons; AVGAS, 1,506 gallons; kerosene, 35,487 gallons; diesel, 21,216 gallons.

(c) Class V - Below is listed a consolidated list of the Regimental basic load:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DODAC</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>LO/D</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1305-1011</td>
<td>12 Ga. Shotgun</td>
<td>40,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1305-1055</td>
<td>5.56mm, Ball</td>
<td>1,739,880</td>
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<tr>
<td>1305-1056</td>
<td>5.56mm, Tracer</td>
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<tr>
<td>1305-1217</td>
<td>7.62mm, Tracer, Carton</td>
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<tr>
<td>1305-1320</td>
<td>7.62mm, 3rd, 5rd Clip</td>
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<td>1305-1331</td>
<td>7.62mm, Linked, Ball and Tracer</td>
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<td>1305-1427</td>
<td>7.62mm, Linked</td>
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<td>1305-1528</td>
<td>Cal .30 Carbine, Ball, 10rd Clip</td>
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<td>1305-1545</td>
<td>Cal .50 Ball</td>
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<td>Cal .50 Ball and Tracer, Linked</td>
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<td>1100-0060</td>
<td>6mm, MG6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1100-0071</td>
<td>6mm, Fixed HE, M386</td>
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<td>1115-0258</td>
<td>9mm, Sub, WP</td>
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<td>1115-0262</td>
<td>9mm, Cannister</td>
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<td>1115-0266</td>
<td>9mm, JS</td>
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<tr>
<td>1115-0280</td>
<td>9mm, HE-T</td>
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<td>Item</td>
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<tr>
<td>1330-0599</td>
<td>Green, Hand, Frag</td>
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<td>1330-0900</td>
<td>Green, Hand, Inconel</td>
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<tr>
<td>1330-0970</td>
<td>Green, Hand, Off, Black, HC</td>
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<tr>
<td>1330-0990</td>
<td>Green, Hand, Green</td>
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<tr>
<td>1330-0995</td>
<td>Green, Hand, Red</td>
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<td>1330-0995</td>
<td>Green, Hand, Violet</td>
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<tr>
<td>1330-H500</td>
<td>Nick, HC, 3.5&quot; F</td>
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**Non-fusing, Non-metallic**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
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<th>Basic Load</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>135G-2709</td>
<td>M18, AP, M31A, Non-fusing, Non-metallic</td>
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**Thickner, Inconel Oil, M2, 100 lb drum**

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<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>135G-2709</td>
<td>Thickner, Inconel OIL, M2, 100 lb drum</td>
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**Sig. Illus, Acr. Fric**

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<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Basic Load</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>135G-2709</td>
<td>Sig. Illus, Acr. Red</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>135G-2709</td>
<td>Illus, Acr. Yellow</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135G-2709</td>
<td>Sig. Illus, Acr. Green</td>
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<tr>
<td>135G-2709</td>
<td>Sig. Illus, Green, White Star Cluster</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135G-2709</td>
<td>Sig. Illus, Green, White Star, Para</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135G-2709</td>
<td>Sig. Illus, Green Star, Cluster</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135G-2709</td>
<td>Sig. Illus, Red Star, Cluster</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135G-2709</td>
<td>Sig. Sct, Red</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135G-2709</td>
<td>Sig. Sct, Yellow</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135G-2709</td>
<td>Sct, Sct, Red, Para</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135G-2709</td>
<td>Sig. Sct, Green, Para</td>
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<tr>
<td>135G-2709</td>
<td>Flare, Acr, para</td>
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<td>135G-2709</td>
<td>Flare, Surface, Trip, M9</td>
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<td>135G-2709</td>
<td>Starter, FIRE</td>
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<tr>
<td>135G-2709</td>
<td>Chg. Demo, Block, Comp, Ch</td>
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<tr>
<td>135G-2709</td>
<td>Chg. Demo, Block, TNT, 1 lb</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Chg. Demo, Block, TNT, 1 lb</td>
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<tr>
<td>135G-2709</td>
<td>Chg. Demo, Block, TNT, 1 lb</td>
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<tr>
<td>135G-2709</td>
<td>Chg. Blast, Spec-Elec, J2</td>
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<td>Chg. Blast, Spec-Elec</td>
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<tr>
<td>135G-2709</td>
<td>Blasting, Explosive, M1</td>
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<td>Cord, Deton, Reinforced</td>
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<td>135G-2709</td>
<td>Fuse, Blasting, Time, Explosive loaded</td>
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<tr>
<td>135G-2709</td>
<td>Ignite, Time Blasting Fuse, Pull Wire Type</td>
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<tr>
<td>135G-2709</td>
<td>Rct, 2.75&quot;, w/adapter</td>
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<tr>
<td>135G-2709</td>
<td>Rct, 66mm, Heat, M72</td>
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<td>Fuse, Point Det, M78, GP</td>
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<td>Fuse, Point Det, M31A series</td>
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<td>135G-2709</td>
<td>Fuse, Point Det, M557 w/booster M25A1</td>
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<tr>
<td>135G-2709</td>
<td>Fuse, Proximity, M25 series</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>NOMENCLATURE</th>
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<tr>
<td>Rifle, M16</td>
<td>h75</td>
<td>88h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, M6</td>
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<td>2,23h</td>
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<tr>
<td>M3, 7.62mm, M50</td>
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<td>687</td>
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<tr>
<td>M3, 7.62mm, M60</td>
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<td>M3, 7.62mm, M73</td>
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<td>Carbine, M1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistol, M1911A1</td>
<td>1,007</td>
<td>1,006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submachinegun, M3A1</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG, Cal .50, M2</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenade Launcher, M79</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M59 (1h tubes each)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket Launcher, 3.5&quot;</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>M5 (10mm serial)</td>
<td>4</td>
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</table>

*Note: The remaining text is not fully legible or is not relevant to the table.*
b. Transportation. The Regiment relied principally on organic transportation support located in the support platoons of the squadrons for its combat service support. Organic support was provided by the Saigon Area Transportation Office to move 2,500 short tons of WARECO, CONEX containers and tonnage from the staging area to the base camp area. The Regiment was required to pluckup Class II and IV supplies (less repair parts) and Class V from supply points in the LONG BINH area (an approximate 110km turn around). The same combat service support vehicles were also used to deliver from the base camp supply points to the squadrons which in some cases involved another 110km turn around. The use of tactical support vehicles to return to rear area supply points as well as deliver from forward supply points to the units of the Regiment has resulted in the accumulation of excessive mileage on the tactical support vehicles of the Regiment. This situation will be alleviated somewhat when a planned forward supply point for Class V is established in the base camp. However, the problem of Class II and IV will continue until such time as a PSP is established for these supplies.

c. Medical Evaluation and Hospitalisation.

(1) Concept: The squadron medical platoons would provide immediate treatment and prepare casualties for evacuation to the 37th Medical Company and/or request "Dust Off" support. Aeromedical support could be provided by either the Regimental Aviation Platoon or Aeromedical units located at LONG BINH depending on the availability of aircraft.

(2) Execution: Each armored cavalry troop normally had medical personnel and evacuation vehicles attached to them from the squadron headquarters troop. Initial medical aid was provided by these aidmen while awaiting aerovacuation. Whenever a landing zone could not be secured or the terrain was such that the helicopters could not land, the attached evacuation vehicles were utilised to move the casualties to the squadron aid station and subsequently to the 93rd Evacuation Hospital in LONG BINH or the 3rd Field Hospital in SAIGON. Over 80% of the Regiment's casualties were evacuated by air. Responses to "Dust Off" requests were immediate and highly effective. On several occasions the "Dust Off" pilots exposed themselves and their aircraft to heavy enemy fire as well as friendly artillery fire in order to evacuate a critically wounded trooper.

12. (U) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: No special techniques or equipment employed or developed during Operation ATLANTA.

13. (U) COMBINED ANALYSIS: Operation JUANITA proved to be a most successful operation not only from the standpoint of casualties inflicted on the Viet Cong but the number of lines of communication that have been opened to friendly forces. No longer can the Viet Cong freely utilise them for movement of their forces and supplies nor set up tax collection points to harass and extort money from the local populace. The persistent, aggressive and far reaching actions of the Regiment have continually kept him off balance thus preventing any massing of forces for any massed attack. The two instances (ambushes) when he was able to mount an offensive action resulted in complete routs. Geographical locations heretofore considered privileged Viet Cong sanctuaries were breached by the armored columns of the Blackhorse Regiment destroying base camps, fortifications, and capturing precious stores of food. The operation only further demonstrated the flexibility, effectiveness, and prowess of an Armored Cavalry Regiment in an insurgency environment. The situations encountered by the Blackhorse ran the gamut from RO/DRUMMER and convoy escort missions to cordons and search operations whereby the squadron had to seal off and then move in and physically root the Viet Cong Forces. On each occasion the enemy was decisively engaged and felt the full combat power of the Regiment with telling results. Throughout the operation the Regiment has been able to move at will in LONG BINH and Binh Tuy Provinces and the northern most portion of Phuoc Tuy Province both on and off the highways experiencing little difficulty with terrain or geographical obstacles.


Operations AEHL and RED were the Regiment's initial operation in the IZAN LOC. Several DAF areas and initial efforts were being expanded securing and organizing the base camp; however, on at least two occasions ARVN and Popular Force units participated in search and clear/destroy operations in the Blackhorse TAG.

Each of the Regiment's preliminary efforts were devoted toward establishing lines of communication with the 18th ARVN Division, District and Province officials and the National Police. Currently the Regiment has exchanged liaison officers with the 18th Division and has established 24 hour contact with the local Vietnamese officials. Additionally, a limited program has been instituted whereby the National Police accompany the squadrons on their operations which so far have proved most beneficial to all concerned. Future plans call for an expansion of this program with the ultimate goal of speeding up the pacification effort in LONG KHAIH and Binh TUY Provinces.

1. (4) LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Operations.

(1) Item: Obtaining clearance to engage sampans.

Discussion: When there is a possibility of helicopter fire teams encountering sampans, target clearances and identification problems may arise since clearance must be obtained from District. This requirement causes undue delay and often results in the target escaping the area before clearance can be obtained.

Observation: The problem can be greatly simplified and facilitated by carrying a Vietnamese Official on board one of the ships who is authorized to give permission to fire once the target has been identified.

(2) Item: Employment of combat engineer Platoons.

Discussion: During operations adequate and efficient engineer support is not always provided because the Platoons are often fragmented even though operational requirements and missions sometimes do not warrant the employment of an entire platoon.

Observation: Commanders should evaluate their engineer support available and in consonance with the mission at hand assign tasks to the engineer commander at the same time maintaining support flexibility.

(3) Item: Control of airspace over the battle area.

Discussion: During an ambush there were four observation aircraft, four UNISH gunships, a medical evacuation helicopter, and one command helicopter all over the ambush site at one time or the other. With the possible exception two of the four observation aircraft were there by necessity.

In addition high performance aircraft were making strikes on each side of the road which resulted in a few near misses.

Observation: One airborne element should coordinate the airspace above the battle area when more than one type of aircraft is operating in the area. The old rule of thumb that the slower aircraft should temporarily leave the area until the faster ships have delivered their ordnance would be very appropriate in this case.

(4) Item: Convoy reaction force.

Discussion: The ambushes of 21 November and 2 December clearly indicated the need and the value of a highly mobile, and self sustaining force with the capability of rapidly closing with the enemy.

Observation: Convoy reaction forces should be composed of armor elements, if possible, supplemented with armed helicopters (AH-1C).

(5) Item: Reaction of convoy escorts in an ambush.

Discussion: Recent experiences have shown that the first minutes of contact and reaction thereafter by the escort are most critical.
Observation: Maximum firepower and bold execution of counter-ambush techniques will effectively neutralize the ambushing force.

(6) Item: Location of Viet Cong ambush forces.

Discussion: During the 21 November 1966 ambush the Viet Cong positioned themselves on the grass and undergrowth flanking (2 to 3 meters) the road with the apparent idea that the gunners field of observation would be masked by their own vehicles (ACAV).

Observation: ACAV gunners should be trained to fire ahead, to the rear, and down as the vehicle passes through a killing zone.

(7) Item: Employment of hand grenades in an ambush.

Discussion: Experience has shown that the Viet Cong position their closest forces just off the road sometimes in the drainage ditches. Machineguns located on the ACAV's experienced difficulty in effectively covering the close-in, immediate area on either side of the vehicle.

Observation: The hand grenade is an excellent close-in counter-ambush weapon.

(8) Item: Employment of snipers as part of the ambush force.

Discussion: The employment of snipers particularly in ambush sites having rubber or similar height trees can inflict heavy casualties on the ambushed element. Snipers are very effective because the ambushed force normally is concentrating its attention on the forces on the ground.

Observation: Plans for fire distribution should included the engagement of possible sniper locations once contact has been made.

(9) Item: Utilization and employment of armed helicopters.

Discussion: The armed helicopters (AH-1C) organic to the Armored Cavalry Regiment can best be utilized and employed when consolidated at Regimental level (air cavalry troop). This allows greater flexibility and combat support missions will allow continuous and greater aerial support for the armored cavalry squadron.

Observation: Armed helicopters consolidated for combat and support missions will allow continuous and greater aerial support for the armored cavalry squadron.

(10) Item: Liaison requirements.

Discussion: During Operation ATLANTA a liaison officer was assigned to the 10th ARVN Division in Kien Long and the 10th ARVN in turn assigned an ARVN officer to HQ, 11th Arm Cav Regt. This made radio coordination possible and has proven invaluable.

Observation: Timely liaison with other units in an area of operations is of great importance, and can provide information that would be otherwise unattainable.

(11) Item: Control of convoys.

Discussion: During Operation ATLANTA numerous convoys moved to and from the Regimental Base Camp. Control of these convoys during movement and limiting their size became a problem. During movement there is the ever present threat of ambush, especially against such lucrative targets as resupply convoys, and control becomes even more difficult and important.

Observation: Convoy must be effectively controlled and their size limited to reduce the possibility of VC exploitation of weak points.
(a) Item: Signal support.

Discussion: When a regimental forward or tactical command post is employed, a multi-channel radio link is necessary to extend necessary command and control circuitry. This support must be requested from a higher headquarters. If there is sufficient time for planning, support can be programmed and obtained. However, if a situation develops rapidly, this support may not be available to deploy with the tactical CP.

Observation: A need exists for a permanently assigned multi-channel radio link within an armored cavalry regiment. Equipment has been requested expected in-country in July.

(b) Item: Command Post Vehicle M-577Al.

Discussion: When the command post vehicle M-577Al is used as a "fixed station" CP, the heat build-up inside the vehicle causes deterioration of parts in the communication equipment. There are measures that can be taken to alleviate the heat build-up.

1. Insure adequate ventilation.
2. Utilise a fan to cool equipment.
3. Keep radio transmissions to a minimum.
4. Provide overhead shelter for the M-577Al. When not transmitting, place the T-195 in the standby position.

Observation: Radio operators and supervisors should be made aware of the measures to be taken to prevent damage to communications equipment in the M-577Al when operating in a static position.

(c) Item: Frequencies.

Discussion: The frequency spectrum has proven to be extremely crowded in III CTZ. Constant command emphasis and supervision is needed to minimize interference and expedite traffic passage.

Observation: Frequency interference exists, but units can communicate and make effective use of assigned frequencies by observing correct procedures.

(d) Item: Training.

Discussion: Rules of engagement training.

Observation: Rules of engagement as imposed in parts of Vietnam require the individual soldier to initiate combat under varying conditions and with a variety of weapons. Without specific training oriented towards this type of engagement the results could be detrimental to our efforts in Vietnam.

Observation: COMUS training for Vietnam bound troops should include some of the general rules of engagement i.e. action against snipers in towns, progression of weapons to be used and destruction of homes and huts and why these rules are necessary. Once assigned to a unit in-country the individual should receive further instruction on any rules common only to that unit.

(e) Item: Patrols.

Discussion: Daylight recon patrols and night ambush patrols in the vicinity of both the staging area and base camps have been found to be extremely effective in deterring VC attacks on these areas.

Observation: An aggressive plan for patrolling the areas around base camps will deny the VC opportunities to plan, practice and execute attacks.
(1) Item: Loudspeaker operations.

Discussion: Information received from Viet Cong prisoners and ralliers indicates that loudspeaker missions are not effective when flown above 2,000 feet or on windy days.

Observation: The altitude and wind activities will have a direct effect on the overall results of loudspeaker missions.

(2) Item: Chieu Hoi Program.

Discussion: Reports continue to come in from the field stating that the Viet Cong do not trust the allied forces in particular the Americans. It is quite apparent that Viet Cong propaganda is still able to influence their thoughts. All the ralliers in LOC# KH# Province during Operation ATLANTA turned themselves in to GVN and ARVN forces.

Observation: Leaders at all echelons of command must be aware of and stress the importance of the Chieu Hoi Program and especially how to identify and handle a rallier.

* Additional lessons listed in Annex C Operation Alexandria
ANNEX A

21 NOVEMBER AMBUSH NARRATIVE
Operation ATLANTA, which began on 20 October 1966, was the operation in which the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment cleared, secured, and occupied a base camp in the vicinity of LONG GIAO, 12km south of XUAN LOC, RVN. The convoy of 21 November was one of many convoys moving supplies, equipment and men from the staging area to the base camp as Operation ATLANTA progressed.

Details represented in the convoy included Headquarters and Headquarters Troops, 11th Armored Cavalry, 28th Military History Detachment, 3rd Chemical Detachment, 11th Armored Cavalry Tactical Air Control Party, 51st Military Intelligence Detachment, 3rd Transportation Group, as well as elements of the 81, 82, 83, and 87 staff sections of Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry.

The terrain and vegetation in the area provided good fields of fire and concealment for the ambush force. On the south side of Highway 1A, where the heaviest concentration of enemy troops was located, the brush, jungle and secondary growth begins at YT 272359 and continues to YT 282100, where an area of grass and rice paddies (one sketch map). This area coincides with YT 272096 where brush and high grass dominate the area. The north side of the road is generally level or only gently slopes and consists of high grass vegetation interspersed with low scrub bushes throughout the ambush area.

Last minute minutes prior to the ambush, an intelligence report was received at 06, 11th Armored Cavalry, indicating that VC forces were in position at least a mile proved to be the ambush site. This information was passed immediately to the 1st Squadron, parent unit of the convoy escort platoon.

The ambush of 21 November 1966

The escort commander received warning of the impending ambush when his own vehicle was less than 1,000 yards from the ambush site. All vehicles except the lead ACV were notified of the impending ambush before the VC commenced firing. In the convoy and escort passed by the ambush site they employed reconnaissance by fire which was returned by a heavy volume of small arms, automatic weapons, mortars, recoiless rifles, and hand grenades.

Approximately one-half of the convoy passed through the killing zone safely before a team was hit by recoiless rifle fire which stopped and burned in each a position that no other vehicles could pass. Within two minutes the three trucks behind the first one to be hit were destroyed on the road. The two ACVs closest to the firing moved immediately to protect the trucks under fire engaging the enemy with all their available weapons. This action, combined with the small arms fire returned by the personnel who had dismounted from the trucks when the rear portion of the convoy was forced to halt, kept the enemy elements from overrunning the convoy. After a brief but furious exchange of fire, both of the ACVs that had come up to protect the trucks took disabling recoiless rifle rounds, and had to be evacuated by their crews, most of whom had become casualties.

As the fire fight was raging in the killing zone, the escort platoon leader organised a hasty escort from three ACVs in the lead and moved that section of the convoy on towards XUAN LOC. As then immediately turned around, and with one other ACV moved to the northwest toward the command post. Halfway to the burning trucks, the platoon leader was forced to leave the ACVs accompanying his vehicle to act as security for the DUST-OFF helicopter coming in to evacuate
History. In an attempt to clear his vehicle was struck by a recoiless rifle round which disabled only the radio, on the vehicle, but wounded two crewmen. Before reaching the scene of the action the platoon leader's vehicle engaged the ambush from both sides of the road until the enemy fire stopped. During this time the casualties delivered by an air-strike, and supervised the evacuation of wounded by SNN-397.

**FIRE SUPPORT (U)**

There was no artillery fire in support of the ambush fight, however, later in the day artillery was explosed to support search and clear operations in the area. There was a total of four firing runs made by armed helicopters and two air-strikes flown in support of the convoy. Later in the day an additional air strike was flown in support of search and clear operations.

The Light Fire Team from the Aviation Platoon, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, placed the following ammunition on the ambush:

| 1st Firing Run | 2 DMEL | 12 Rockets (2.75 FPAR) | 12,500 rounds 7.62 M2 (+) |
| 2nd Firing Run | 3 DMEL | 18 Rockets | 12,500 rounds 7.62 M2 |
| 3rd Firing Run | 3 DMEL | 10 Rockets | 12,500 rounds 7.62 M2 |
| 4th Firing Run | 3 DMEL | 2 Rockets | 12,500 rounds 7.62 M2 |
| TOTAL | | | 42 Rockets | 50,000 rounds 7.62 (+) |

The Air Force delivered the following ordnance on the site of the ambush:

| 1st Air Strike | Flight of 1 F50's | 6-500 pound bombe | 6-750 pound napalm bombs | 7,200 rounds 20mm |
| 2nd Air Strike | Flight of 2 F5's | 2-500 pound bombe | 2-750 pound bombe | 2-2.5 Type 2 CBU clusters |

**RESULTS**

(U) Enemy losses included:

- Personnel:
  - KIA (25): 30
  - KIA (POW): 75 - 100

- Equipment:
  - 57mm Recoiless Rifle: 1
  - AIA h7 Assault Rifle and Tripod: 1
  - RPD-2 AT Rockets: 2
  - RPD AT Hand grenade: 1
  - Stick grenades: 35
  - Tail fin assemblies from expanded RPD-2: 2
  - AT rockets: 3
  - 75mm RR Casings: 3
CONCLUSIONS

Information obtained from documents found on the VC bodies indicated elements of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 27th VC Regiment comprised the ambush force.

Though the VC destroyed 2 combat and 1 administrative vehicles the convoy was not warned, despite the fact that the major portion of the enemy force only had to contend with the small arms of the escorted personnel and two ACASV’s. This was determined by three factors:

First was the counter fire from the ambushed column, which began as soon as the trucks stopped.

Second was the fact that the escort unit was warned of the ambush and entered the killing zone firing their automatic weapons. This undoubtedly inflicted casualties on the enemy and may well have caused the VC to initiate the ambush prematurely.

Third it must be accepted that the tremendous volume of fire put out by the ACASV’s was instrumental in causing the VC to break contact and flee.
ANNEX B

2 DECEMBER AMBUSH NARRATIVE
On 2 December 1966 elements (resupply convoy) of the 1st Squadron were ambushed by the 275th Viet Cong Main Force Regiment on National Highway 1 northeast of SOUK DAT. The ensuing action dramatically displayed the optimus of proper counterintelligence techniques and actions. So violent was the execution of the counterintelligence ambush that within 70 minutes the squadron had rendered the 275th VC Regiment ineffective as a fighting force without the loss of a single trooper. This one action assisted immeasurably in paving the way for more extensive operations by the Blackhorse Regiment to the north and east of VO DAT.

**Background (1)**

Operation ATLANTA began on 20 October 1966 with the 1st Squadron conducting a clear and secure operation along National Highway 1 from BIEN HOI to XUAN LOC and securing the site of the Regiment’s permanent base camp south of XUAN LOC. Operation ATLANTA was not only conceived on the idea of carving out a piece of real estate and building a base camp, but in opening up and securing roads and permitting the flow of civilian commerce throughout the provinces around XUAN LOC. Once the base camp area had been secured, search and destroy and ROADRUNNER operations were conducted toward VO DAT along National Highway 1, and Interprovincial Route 2 to the 1st ATF TAC.

Convoys with supplies, equipment, and troops continued to arrive from the LONG Binh staging area in ever increasing amounts throughout the remainder of October and the entire month of November. On 2 November the entire Regiment began providing security for a company from the 27th Engineer Battalion (C) in the vicinity of GIA RAY adjacent to National Highway 1 at the base of CHUA CHAN Mountain.

Viet Cong activities in the 11th Armored Cavalry’s area of operation were relatively minor in nature during the month of November except for the ambush of 21 November. On 27 and 28 November the Regiment received RED HAZE reports of approximately 80 emissions south of National Highway 1 (vic YT 2010 - 2110 - 2107 - 2007) and agent reports of movements north and south of National Highway 1 in the vicinity of SOUK DAT and CHUA CHAN Mountain. On the 29th the 1st Squadron moved into the area of the reported activity and conducted a zone reconnaissance north and south of Highway 1 as far as GIA RAY remaining overnight, returning the next day without contact. On the same day the 1st Squadron returned to the base camp, a FAC from the 18th ARVN Division (Formerly the 101st Division) reported receiving automatic weapons fire and observed an estimated Viet Cong battalion off Interprovincial Road 2 vicinity of TA BANG (YT L235). Shortly thereafter a second report was received, this one from XUAN LOC subsector indicating another Viet Cong battalion was located (YT 3405 to YT 3606) west of XUAN LOC approximately 5 kilometers. The 2nd Squadron was immediately dispatched to check the reported activity to the south on Interprovincial Route 2 while the 1st Squadron moved to the west on Highway 1 to search the other suspected area. Both operations produced negative contact.

The 1st and 2nd Squadrons returned to the base camp resuming their mission of base camp security. The next day Troop B relieved elements of the 2nd Squadron providing security for the GIA RAY rock quarry. Agent reports still indicated enemy activity around GIA RAY. Consequently, reaction forces were continually on the alert and each convoy’s movement was closely scrutinised.

The terrain in the area of the ambush is gentle, sloping to the southeast from the commanding terrain in the area, Chua Chan Mountain (elevation 837m). Drainage flows from the mountain to the northeast to the southeast. The highway is flanked by elephant grass on both sides turning into heavy secondary growth approximately 60 meters off the road. The initial area of contact was flanked to the west by a portion of a rubber plantation. Trafficability was limited once the vehicles entered the undergrowth. However, it did not impede the advance of the Blackhorse Troopers. The weather was hot and clear continuing throughout the night and the next day.

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**Page 1 of 4 Pages**
On the second of December Troop B plans a platoon of tanks from Company D units securing the site of the rock quarry while Troop A manned the squadron's sector of the base camp perimeter. A resupply convoy had arrived earlier in the day at the base camp and was on its way back to the rock quarry when it was ambushed at 1640 hours by an estimated 2 battalion Viet Cong force. The area selected by the enemy for the ambush is located on a stretch of Highway 1 that has come to be known as "Ambush Alley" (IT 6026296 to YT 629084, along Highway 1) (see sketch 1). The convoy, consisting of 2 tanks, 3 AC47's and 2 2 ½ ton trucks, reacted violently to the attack with the encroaching vehicles aborting the two trucks out of killing zone then returning immediately to take the entire killing zone with 50mm cannister, 30 Cal and 7.62 machinegun fire, grenade and 40-mm fire (see sketch 2).

Word of the ambush was received by the 1st Squadron units in the base camp and Troop B located 5 kilometers north of the ambush at the rock quarry. Within seven minutes after the squadron received the information, Company D (-) was on the move towards the ambush to be followed 10 minutes later by Troop C. Meanwhile Troop B had arrived at the ambush site, moving right into the killing zone smothering the Viet Cong positions, many of which were only off the shoulder of road, with withering fire. A Viet Cong recoiless rifle round hit one of the tanks knocking off the commander's cupola, but it did not deter the crew as they continued to fight and in the ensuing battle fired every round of 50mm on the tank.

By this time the tanks of Company D began to arrive on scene having traveled 22 kilometers in 25 minutes, commencing moving through the ambush site raking one side of the highway while Troop B worked over the other side. Howitzer Battery which followed Troop C and was in turn followed by Troop A 15 minutes later, moved into a fire support position near 3000m CAT. Once Troop C reached the ambush site it moved through the killing zone firing everything it had, and taking up positions on Highway 1 beyond the R3 of 333 and 1 in an effort to seal off the Viet Cong's routes of withdrawal.

The Viet Cong apparently thinking that Troop C was the last of the reinforce- ments began to fire again on the road only to be caught in a crossfire between the on-charging Troop A and the tanks of Company D. This fire fight lasted about ten minutes then Charlie began to lose his taste for combat with the Troopers of the Blackhorse. Troop A moved into positions astride Highway 1 west of Troop B while Troop C shifted further south in an attempt to block the Viet Cong's escape routes (see sketch 3).

Reinforcing fire was provided both from the ground by the 5th Artillery Group and fighter aircraft based at REAN HQ directed by the Regiment's FAC personnel observing the ambush site from overhead. Further support was provided by the Squadron's light fire team and aircraft from the Regiments Aviation Platoon.

The Viet Cong had dug in and covered positions on both sides of the road (see sketch 2) covering the killing zone with heavy and light machineguns, 60mm mortars, at least one 75mm recoiless rifle and small arms. Viet Cong forces were also positioned close to the shoulder of the road with grenades, with the apparent hope of damaging the suspension systems of the AC47's and tanks which proved to be fruitless. They did however, provide lucrative targets for the grenadiers on the passing AC47's as they dropped their hand grenades and fired their M79 launchers with deadly accuracy.

At 1750 hours contact was broken by the Viet Cong with only sporadic firing continuing until 1950 hours. In order to seal off the escape routes to the south (see sketch 3) a combination of artillery and air support was utilized to fire throughout the night on suspected avenues of withdrawal (trails, stream beds, ridge lines). Illumination and surprising fires were delivered by rotating AC47's "Spook" ships over the area until morning light. An initial check of the area indicated the VC had 83 KIA (29) in the 70 minute encounter with the "First of the Blackhorses"

After remaining in position all night along the road the 1st Squadron started to clear the ambush site, sending dismounted patrols approximately 200 meters off the road. Mounted patrols conducted search and clear operations on the trails traveling 10 kilometers into the jungle. To further tighten the knot around the area the 3rd Squadron moved from the base camp assuming the 1st Squadron's blocking positions while the 1st made a sweep of the area. A forward CP from the
Regiment was also moved into the area to facilitate command and control of the operations. As the clearing operation progressed the Viet Cong body count climbed, reaching 28 with at least another 100 KIA (POSS). At approximately 1630 hours the 3rd Squadron and Regimental CP moved back to the base camp leaving the 1st Squadron to continue their clearing of the area.

FIRE SUPPORT (U)

At the time of the ambush there were no preplanned fires or air strikes, however, within ten minutes after the ambush started, supporting fires from fighter aircraft and the 55th Artillery Group were on the way. Thus providing Horditzer Battery, 1st Squadron enough time to position itself at SOUL CAT where it was able to provide direct support for the entire ambush area. Prior to darkness a Battery from the 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery was dispatched from DAC Lap to provide further support. Highway 1 was established as the fire coordination line (see sketch) with the air strikes directed to the east and south of the highway and the artillery to the west and north. FAC personnel from the Regiment directed, in coordination with the ground commander, seven air strikes from their light observation aircraft observing the ambush site. CBU’s, 250 pound bombs, napalm and 20mm cannons were directed into the area uprooting trees and cutting huge gouges out of the jungle below. During the hour of darkness a ACH7 “Spook” ship was continually overhead providing illumination and suppressing fires on request and as targets of opportunity appeared. Supplementing the above mentioned fire support were light fire teams from the 1st Squadron and Regiment. The light fire team from the 1st Squadron personally bagged at least 5 Viet Cong when it caught a group of them in the open.

A total of 22 sorties were flown as follows:

- AOA = 3
- F25 = 5
- T100 = 10
- ACH7 = 4

Ordnance expended included:

- CBU = 8 (missiles)
- Bomb, 500 lbs = 16
- Bomb, 750 lbs = 6
- Napalm, 750 lbs = 22
- FFAR, 2.75” = 76
- 20mm (HEI) = 10,000 rds
- 30 Caliber = 15,000 rds

There was a minimum of one FAC overhead at all times and at some times as many as 3 in the air at once. Continuous communications were maintained with the ground commander for the duration of the ambush.

Artillery direct support was provided by Horditzer Battery 1st Squadron.

Reinforcing fires were provided by Battery H (155SP), 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery.

A total of 1700 rounds were fired in support of the operation.

RESULTS

(U) Enemy losses included:

- KIA (GC) = 99
- KIA (POSS) = 100-150
- VCC = 3

Equipment:

- 75mm RR = 1
- 7.62 Hvy MG = 1
- 7.62 Lt MG (Type 58) = 1

Page 3 of 4 Pages
7.62 Lt MG (Type 56) 4
AK 47 Assault Rifle 3
Chicom Carbine w/Bayonet 1
Bmg 105mm Rocket Launcher 1
80mm Mortar 1
E50 Sub M3 1
Carbine M2 (US) 1
Small Arms Ammunition 1500 rounds
Grenade (Fragmentation & Concussion) 45
HE AT grenade 2
Mortar Ammunition (60mm) 15

A search of the ambush area and information obtained from captured documents and prisoners indicated that the 275th VC Rgt (Main Force) reinforced with heavy weapons sprung the ambush which 70 minutes later turned into a disastrous defeat. The decisive defeat of the Viet Cong can be attributed to several things:

First and foremost is that at no time in the ambush was the Viet Cong able to gain control of the situation even though he had the advantages of surprise and fortified positions. The violent reaction by the escort force completely stripped him of any advantages he might have had. Once out of the killing zone the escort force minus the trucks charged head long down the road belching fire on both sides of the road. This spontaneous action held at bay the attacking force until the reaction forces arrived.

Secondly, the rapid reaction of the remainder of the squadron in reaching the ambush site within 25 minutes after traveling a distance of approximately 22 km.

Third, the immediate establishment of a fire coordination line (Highway 1) thus permitting maximum utilization of both air and ground supporting fires.

Fourth, the ability of the convoy to withstand the initial shock and then be able to retaliate so effectively.

The final results might have been even better if it had stayed light another two hours. However, weather conditions did not limit the ability of control personnel to place effective fire on the enemy positions.

Inclosures:

Sketch map 1, Sketch map 2, Sketch map 3, Sketch map 4, and Topographic Map.
Sketch 2

Local Guerrillas

75 mm

3 km

Highway 1

Suicat

In Process

IP Route 333
ANNEX C

AFTER ACTION REPORT - OPERATION ALEXANDRIA
Artillery support for the operation was supplied by the following:

**Artillery Battery 34 Squadron** fired the following missions:

1. 050000 to 050300 Dec. BAI was fired in various areas. 40 rds HE were fired. It was unobserved, effectiveness unknown.

2. 050315 to 050915. 297 rds HE and 42 rds WP were fired for preliminary fires and to seal off the objective areas. It was unobserved and results unknown; however, based on the number of VCO estimated it can be assumed that it was effective in helping to establish the seal.

3. 050600 Dec. 2 rds of WP were fired as a navigational aid to Tn L.

4. 050900 Dec. 366 rds HE and 48 rds WP were fired for a blocking barrage which was requested by S-3. An FO observed and reported the fire effectively blocked avenues of escape.

5. 051045 to 051400. 396 rds of HE and 32 rds WP were fired for combined assault on line by Tn I, Tn K and Tn L. At one point on this mission a dead space was encountered in a deep draw. The assault elements could not effectively clear the area without halting the assault. Howitzer Battery effectively closed their sheet and was able to completely fill the area with fire and reduce enemy harassment from that position.

6. 051610 to 051645 Dec. 137 rds HE and 13 rds WP were fired by the 105 Battery and 155 Battery as a final protective fire for Tn I and Tn L as they withdrew from the area. This was a TCF mission. Artillery batteries are not usually located together in Vietnam to allow them to mass their forces in this way. However, the mission was effectively accomplished.

b. 1 Battery 9/35 Artillery 155MM SP fired 454 rds HE and 10 rds WP in missions ranging from BAI to a TCF. As such battery has a range of 3 to 4 miles and its effect on a target is three times that of a 105, the battery provided a valuable asset to the operation.

c. Provisional Mortar Battery, composed of the mortars in the Armored Caveldy Troop massed in one battery, fired four BAI missions in the vicinity of objective Alpha. As a supplement to our Howitzer Battery and a second source of indirect fire the Provisional Mortar Battery is very valuable.

6. **Intelligence**

a. Prior to Operation: Numerous sources, 1st Australian Task Force, Photo Ton Province and Saigon Headquarters, Doc Thanh Advisor and aerial observation all indicated that an unknown local force was operating in the area. Countless incidents of sniper fire, mines, road cuts and tax collection points had been reported by these sources. It was suspected that the local force units provided cuts to allow the 274 and 275 VC Regiments to cross Interprovincial Highway #2. They also served as guides to the Regiments then in the area.

The 3-2 American advisor in Phuoc Ton Province further indicated that the area could harbor a transient VC Base Camp as there were tunnels and trenches sighted on several occasions, and the fortifications were on a VC east-west route of movement.

b. Value of prior intelligence: Prior intelligence was a valuable indication of what might be expected in the area. Expected terrain limitations came as no surprise and full advantage was taken of those areas where we knew armored vehicles could operate best. The 43 ARVN Inf Tn was requested to cope with expected unfavorable terrain where it existed and to provide a search element for widely dispersed and isolated units in objective A. Prior intelligence from aerial observation allowed for proclaimed artillery to be placed on expected routes of enemy withdrawal. Actual enemy resistance did exceed that which was expected and planned for.

c. Intelligence during the operation: Intelligence gained from OPERATION ALEXANDRIA definitely identified the local force to be local force Company C-26. Of the 42 confirmed VC captured, interrogators found one who was a member of the 274th VC Regiment. Documents collected have not been fully evaluated but one revealed the location of a VC mine field. Tunnels and bunkers indicated a defensive position and verified suspicions that the area was utilized as a transient Base Camp.

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A tank commander and leader in the lead turret was cut down at that location by 81 mm. The crew began to make a run on the location. The air observer and 67 called in artillery to stop the area while TA I assaulted the positions. Two men who used the machine gun were killed, 1000 lbs of machine gun and 45 VCS were destroyed. The 120 VCS was destroyed, light fire from tanks followed by 740 air assault the area. The gun crew was also kept on stand-by pending the completion of the assault. The 120 VCS and the aircraft carried heavy fire and was forced to land at Nuck Camp. As the 67 and 120 VCS were crossing, the machine gun crew died, and TA I requested the body be removed.

The search for objective Alpha where TA K was in blocking position.

A detailed search was conducted. By 0935 TA K had discovered 5000 lbs of rice and 2000 lbs of 45 VCS.

The search was accomplished for TA I until 1022 almost two hours after the search started. Upon completion of Dustoff TA I called in additional small arms and automatic weapons. The artillery was launched at 0930, and the light fire then followed by 740 air assault the area.

At 1019 TA I requested a second dustoff. The second dustoff was completed at 1037. TA I still had a H2A at its location, and dustoff was called in by TA I. A H2A could pick up the body. One of the aircraft from the H2A area was discovered and destroyed by 147. By 1447 TA I had 2000 lbs of 45 VCS in the blocking position.

A second dustoff was called to objective Alpha by 1406. The second dustoff was not completed. In the meantime the H2A area was covered by TA K. The second dustoff was abandoned. The village had been burnt, and the area was covered by smoke. A second dustoff was called and destroyed by 1600. Two companies were seen. Two anti-tank mines, and one 45 VCS were destroyed by 1800. 2000 lbs of small arms and one 45 VCS were taken by 1830.

A detailed search of objective Alpha was necessary at 1832. TA K observed a small group of troops who dispersed due to dustoff. The search was successfully completed by 1900.

A second dustoff was called at 1900. A small group of troops dispersed due to dustoff. The search was successfully completed by 1930.
11. EXEJ3UTION

General: Headquarters 3d Sqdn 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment issued
OPORD 09-66 (OPERATION ALEXANDRIA) on 2 Dec 1966 assigning the mission as
stated in paragraph 9 above. On 211800 Dec all unit commanders were briefed
on the mission. At 021500 Dec coordination was made with the participating
ARNF unit, the Squadron Commander, 8-3, a liaison officer and the Regimental
2 traveled to Bien Hoa on 6 Dec to affect coordination with Phase Two officials
and American Advisors; the Battalion Commander of the 43 ARVN Infantry,
and Liaison officer of the 68th Armored Company. On 4 Dec liaison was
made with B 2/35 Army.

4 December 1966

At 041400 Dec, How Battery deployed to the Couteney Rubber Plantation
at YS458920 in preparation to fire Bofors' fires and direct support missions on 5
Dec 66. TM L mounted, moved south on route Black at 041745 Dec and from YS458956
to YS459173 the team dismounted and took position on either side of Route 2 to
secure that portion of the route for the road march on 5 Dec. TM L occupied
these positions by 041846 Dec. The TM L vehicles returned to Base Camp after
the dismounted personnel took position.

5 December 1966

Phase I of the operation commenced at 0515 hrs with howitzer Battery
and B Battery 2/35 Artillery conducting preparatory fires in objectives A
and B to seal the area until the teams could take position.

At 0515 TM K crossed Sp and proceeded south on route BLACK travelling
south to affect a seal on objective Alpha. TM L brought its vehicles to
the positions it occupied on route BLACK. The team mounted and proceeded
south to complete the seal on objective Alpha. TM L brought its vehicles
to the positions it occupied on route BLACK. The team mounted and proceeded
south to complete the seal on objective Alpha.

Provisional Mortar Battery followed in march order and deployed to
the south on route BLACK to YS457840 where the Battery was laid.

3/919 Engineers was last in march order, and took up position with
Provisional Mortar Battery.

At 0545 How Battery stopped preparatory fires and started interdiction
fires on suspected route of withdrawal from objectives A & B.

At 0650 TM K had completed the seal on objective Bravo. TM I reported
its portion of the seal for objective Alpha was complete at 0647. At 0656
the first lift, one company of the 45th Infantry (ARNF) was on the landing
zone. At 0709 TM K reported they were in position and were sealing their
position and completed the seal at 0735.

Phase II. At 0640 TM K commenced a search of area Bravo. The search
in objective Bravo revealed several posters and leaflets which were anti-
American. At coordinates YS458950 in the vicinity of a concrete plantation
house TM K found a 30 meter long tunnel. By 0725 TM K had taken about 150 VOS
and requested air evacuation for the suspects so that they could be taken
to the interrogation point at Binh Dinh. At 0745 TM K reported having located
2000 pounds of ammunition which they destroyed.

The third lift of the 45th Infantry was completed at 0600. At this time
the ARVN Force moved east from the landing zone at YS417862 and moved into
objective Alpha to initiate a search of the area.
12. Results

a. Friendly

(1) Personnel
- US - 2 KIA, 10 WIA.

(2) Equipment
- 2 tanks suffered track and suspension damage.
- 1 M-79 lost.

b. Enemy

(1) Personnel
- 4 VC KIA
- 2 VC WIA (Confirmed)
- 0 VC KIA
- 600 VCS captured.
- 42 VOC detained.

(2) Tunnels and Fortifications
- 24 major tunnels were found.
- 2 fortified positions were explored. Punjil stakes, booby traps, spider holes and anti-aircraft were among the defenses employed.
- None of the tunnels or fortifications could be completely destroyed as it would have required major engineer effort: equipment and time not available to the Squadron.
- Captured and/or destroyed:
  - 4100 lbs of peanuts destroyed.
  - 151 tons of rice destroyed.
  - 2 tons of rice evacuated.
  - 70 Chicom stick grenades destroyed.
  - 2 claymores destroyed.
  - 2 Pressure type anti-tank mines captured.

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS: As OPERATION ALEXANDRIA involved only a single day, problems in administrative procedures were at a minimum. Some of the following areas are worthy of comment.

a. Treatment of Casualties: Tm I suffered a KIA early in the action. However, evacuation could not be effected for several hours. Dustoff would not evacuate a KIA even though the body could easily have been placed on a dustoff ship when it was in the area to evacuate a wounded soldier. The OH-13's organic to the Squadron could not evacuate the body due to the extreme weight of the Ordnance carried by the aircraft.

A swifter method will have to be devised for KIA evacuation. Not only is the presence of a dead comrade a definite morale factor, but the body creates a handiicap when the unit must move rapidly and frequently. Units must be ready to evacuate casualties or KIA by armored ambulance to a safe landing zone for pick-up.

b. Communications: In future operations the Squadron would like to switch all airborne communications to the admin/log net as traffic becomes extreme on the command net. At one time a request for dustoff and a request for a fire mission were in competition with each other, indicating a need for established priorities on radio traffic.

14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUE.

The only item of equipment that met full combat utilization for the first time was the M132 Flame Thrower. The ability of this weapon to burn thick brush and route a hidden enemy is unequalled. It is such a valuable weapon when readily available to the troop that it is felt that two M132's should be organic to each troop.

15. COMBINED ANALYSIS: OPERATION ALEXANDRIA was most successful in terms of physical damage inflicted upon the enemy, numbers of confirmed VC captured, and the psychological advantage gained by easily entering an enemy stronghold and establishing US control in the area. Further, indispensable intelligence was gained about activities and operations in the Regiment TALOR. The stores and fortifications found definitely established the area as a staging area used by the 5th VC Division for east-west movement. The single most important success was the capture of important local VC leaders who gave valuable information on terrorist rings and infiltration of the area. The operation also provided the opportunity for men to man entrenched positions, utilize the Squadron's tunnels, and explore the processing and evacuation of prisoners and documents. The troops also encountered punjil stakes and other booby traps.
One disappointment in the operation was with the performance of the 43 Infantry (ARVN). It was hoped that they would provide the task force with a capable means of conducting a detailed ground search of the objective areas. However, the ARVN Infantry troops lacked disciplined leadership and the conduct of the search was rapid and sloppy. Those areas that were searched were burned after the troops confiscated all pigs, chickens, bicycles, and other assorted items of value to them.

It is hoped that another mission will be undertaken with the 43 Infantry and that through a more definitive command relationship more skillful teamwork can be formed.

16. RECOMMENDATIONS. See Annex E.
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III. 1/3-11 Arm Cav (-1 plat)
    1/RF/3-11 Arm Cav
    1/FO/How/3-11 Arm Cav
    1 - M132

II. L

    1/3-11 Arm Cav
    Lt Sco 3/RF/3-11 Arm Cav
    1 - M132

I. X/3-11 Arm Cav

    HV Sco 3/RF/3-11 Arm Cav
    1 Co/1-43 Inf (ARVN) (OCPON)
    1 FO/How/3-11 Arm Cav
    2 GVN National Police (OCPON)

II. M

    X/3-11 Arm Cav (-2 plat)
    2/RF/3-11 Arm Cav
    1 FO/How/3-11 Arm Cav

TP CON

    How Btr
    Prov Mort Btr
    3/919 Eng
    1 Engr Recon Tm/27 Engr
    Lt fire Tm/2-11 Arm Cav (OCPON)
    MI Tm/11 Arm Cav
    2 FO/How/3-11 Arm Cav
ANNEX 3 to Report and Evaluation of Advance of FSBB into OPERATION ALEXANDRIA

1. ITEM: AVOIDING ENEMY TETES
   a. Discussions: Rather than merely reconnoissance into heavily vegetated areas such as woodlands, jungles or banana groves reconnoissance by fire should start short of the suspected area and be walked into the target.
   b. Observations: Fire discipline and coordination exhibited by the enemy indicated that well conducted reconnaissance by fire can cause an enemy unit to reveal itself by return fire, or it will suppress his fire.

2. ITEM: FIRE DISCIPLINE
   a. Discussions: When a team or a vehicle crew has more than one automatic weapon they should closely control their fire during enemy contact so that there is always at least one automatic weapon firing while the others reload.
   b. Observations: Wounded personnel in OPERATION ALEXANDRIA indicated they were wounded because all automatic weapons ran out of ammo at the same time and the crew had no suppressive fire while they reloaded. This clearly dictates the need for control on firing automatic weapons.

3. ITEM: LAND NAVIGATION AT NIGHT
   a. Discussions: Night movement under black out conditions can either achieve great surprise and success or create chance. Surprise and success will be achieved if the following procedures are adopted:
     1. Know the distance between SP and objective and have the lead element measure the distance on his odometer to insure that the objective or turn off to the objective is found.
     2. Luminous compasses are valuable as an added reference for movement and to quickly determine general direction.
     3. Preplanned artillery concentrations utilizing WP are an important aid to determining exact location and achieving proper positioning on the objective area.
   b. Observations: On OPERATION ALEXANDRIA the Third Squadron enjoyed a successful night movement by employing the procedures listed. It is recommended these considerations be SOP for movement during hours of darkness.

4. ITEM: GAINING ON A KNOWN OR SUSPECTED ENEMY POSITION
   a. Discussions: When moving against a known or suspected enemy position armored vehicles should lead the dismounted elements so that any anti-personnel mines, booby traps or automatic weapon fire will be absorbed by the armor. Dismounted personal can be utilized best by following behind to conduct a detailed search of the area, utilizing the protection of the armor and automatic weapons.
   b. Observations: The combination of a mounted-dismounted team advancing on an enemy position proved effective in OPERATION ALEXANDRIA however greater speed and skill could be achieved if training were conducted in this procedure by ARVN units.

5. ITEM: DETECTING UNDERGROUND BUNKERS AND FIRING POSITIONS
   a. Discussions: On OPERATION ALEXANDRIA some underground bunkers and firing positions were detected by long mounds of earth. This was prevalent in banana groves, and in most cases trenches, bunkers and firing positions were found under the mound.
   b. Observations: Search elements should be instructed concerning mounds and what they could indicate.

6. ITEM: EMPLOYMENT OF PUNJHI STAKES
   a. Discussions: Punjhi stakes were found around an enemy defensive position. They were easily recognizable in the grass and the points were aiming away from the position.
   b. Observations: Troops should be trained to look for punjhi stakes and read into them what their employment could mean i.e. the direction they are pointing is expected route of friendly force advance. The opposite direction might hide an enemy position.

7. ITEM: EMPLOYMENT OF M-132
   a. Discussions: For maximum utilization of the M-132 the following techniques were found to be most effective.
     1. Fire mixture short of target and allow the flame to roll into objective.
     2. Fire low when possible as the mixture will dissipate if fired higher than necessary.
8. ITEM: ARMED ON LINE
   a. Observations: At one point Ta I, Ta K and Ta L came on line to
      assault a wide area that contained enemy positions. With the help of an
      aerial observer 79 armored vehicles easily formed on line and advanced,
      all weapons trained on the enemy positions.
   b. Observation: Armor can be employed successfully in mass formations
      in certain areas of Vietnam.

9. ITEM: CONTROL OF COMMS NET
   a. Discussion: During the operation there were times when valuable
      transmissions had to compete for the opportunity to use the command net.
      Requests for dustoff were being cut out by spot reports which competed
      with commanders controlling air strikes. It was resolved to shift all air-
      mobile transmission to the admin/log net.
   b. Observation: Airmobile communications may remain on the admin/log
      net to lessen transmissions on command net. Other suggestions include
      training people to listen before transmitting and fairly establishing their
      own priorities should important traffic be on the net.
ANNEX C (Surveillance Conducted on OPERATION ALEXANDRA.) to Dumbat Operations After Action Report on OPERATION ALEXANDRA.
CONFIDENTIAL
ANNEX D

ROSTER OF OFFICERS


11th Armored Cavalry Regiment - COL William W. Cobb

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry Rgt - CPT Marven L. Doerr

1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment - LTC Martin D. Howell

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron - CPT Richard H. Fanning (20 Oct - 23 Nov) /LT Franklin P. Wing (24 Nov - 6 Dec)

Troop A, 1st Squadron - CPT John E. Bailey
Troop B, 1st Squadron - CPT John L. Landry
Company D, 1st Squadron - CPT Bill Peasley
Howitzer Battery, 1st Squadron - CPT William K. Fraase

2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment - LTC Kibbey M. Horne

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 2nd Squadron - CPT Bob E. Shamberger
Troop E, 2nd Squadron - CPT Richard M. Miller
Troop F, 2nd Squadron - CPT Howard C. Bant
Troop G, 2nd Squadron - CPT Glen J. Thorson
Company H, 2nd Squadron - CPT John G. Russell
Howitzer Battery, 2nd Squadron - CPT William R. Perry

3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment - LTC Palmer A. Peterson

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 3rd Squadron - CPT Calvin J. Reese (20 Oct - 6 Dec) /CPT Ted A. Walsh (6 Dec - 8 Dec)

Troop I, 3rd Squadron - CPT Peter P. Horoschak (20 Oct - 9 Nov) /CPT Joel R. Parker (10 Nov - 8 Dec)
Troop J, 3rd Squadron - CPT Wayne P. Halstead
Troop K, 3rd Squadron - CPT Larry L. Mangel
Company L, 3rd Squadron - CPT Herbert C. Harpel Jr.
Howitzer Battery, 3rd Squadron - CPT Leonard Dege

77th Medical Company - CPT Dennis J. Blais

219th Engineer Company (Armored) - CPT Donald J. Crocker

409th Radio Research Detachment - CPT Lee Gentry

52nd Military Intelligence Detachment - CPT Alfred J. Dietska (20 Oct - 18 Nov) /MAJ Geraldino L. Gray (19 Nov - 8 Dec)

33rd Chemical Detachment - /LT James T. Price

17th Public Information Detachment - MAJ Paul Blackwell (20 Oct - 7 Dec) /CPT Owen Ditchfield (8 Dec)

26th Military History Detachment - MAJ Bruce R. Nilsson
## INCIDENTS: BIAH LOC on National Highway One.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Coordinates</th>
<th>Incident</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26 Mar 66</td>
<td>1377126</td>
<td>Ambush of SVN personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Jul 66</td>
<td>139112</td>
<td>Ambush of Civil Officials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Aug 66</td>
<td>139128</td>
<td>Ambush of RF personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Jan 66</td>
<td>131108</td>
<td>Roadblocks and mines, small arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Jun 66</td>
<td>226058</td>
<td>Mine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Jul 66</td>
<td>352010</td>
<td>Roadblock.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Aug 66</td>
<td>131101</td>
<td>Small arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Aug 66</td>
<td>131101</td>
<td>Small arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Aug 66</td>
<td>168095</td>
<td>Roadblock, small arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Sep 66</td>
<td>131102</td>
<td>Roadblock, small arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Sep 66</td>
<td>270100</td>
<td>Possible extortion point.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Sep 66</td>
<td>131102</td>
<td>Boby-trapped roadblock.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>272092</td>
<td>Train mined.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## INCIDENTS: XUAN LOC to PHUOC LE (BARIA) on Routes 1 and 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Coordinates</th>
<th>Incident</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 Jun 66</td>
<td>L07638</td>
<td>RF Mil pers ambush - 6 KIA, 5 WIA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L27654</td>
<td>RF Mil pers ambush - 3 KIA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Jun 66</td>
<td>L0630</td>
<td>Small arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Jun 66</td>
<td>L62817</td>
<td>AT mine found - destroyed in place over by long - not clear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Jun 66</td>
<td>L63820</td>
<td>Roadblock, dirt sounds, cut.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jun 66</td>
<td>L39721</td>
<td>Road cut - passable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jul 66</td>
<td>L60037</td>
<td>Small arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Jul 66</td>
<td>L51853</td>
<td>3 mines - 1 APC-1 torn damaged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Aug 66</td>
<td>L5880</td>
<td>Road reported mined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Aug 66</td>
<td>L58989</td>
<td>Road cut.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Aug 66</td>
<td>L61795</td>
<td>Road cut.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Aug 66</td>
<td>L61796</td>
<td>Roadblock with pass word pl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Aug 66</td>
<td>L65970</td>
<td>Road cut.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Aug 66</td>
<td>L49914</td>
<td>Tree over road-held up traffic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Aug 66</td>
<td>L41960</td>
<td>Dirt mound across road and just off road.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Aug 66</td>
<td>L39737</td>
<td>One dirt road each side.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Aug 66</td>
<td>L49739</td>
<td>Crater in road.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Aug 66</td>
<td>L45970</td>
<td>Dirt road block.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Aug 66</td>
<td>L46971</td>
<td>Deep trench across road.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Aug 66</td>
<td>L45970</td>
<td>Road cut.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Aug 66</td>
<td>L45980</td>
<td>Crater in road.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Aug 66</td>
<td>L46840</td>
<td>2 brushwood roadblocks-ICDM apart.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Aug 66</td>
<td>L57816</td>
<td>Barbed wire barrier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Aug 66</td>
<td>L50813</td>
<td>Mine, hit by truck.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Aug 66</td>
<td>L55854</td>
<td>Mine, hit by truck.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Aug 66</td>
<td>L56854</td>
<td>APC, hit mine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Aug 66</td>
<td>L59876</td>
<td>Jeep, hits mine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Aug 66</td>
<td>L53862</td>
<td>Numerous but passable cuts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Aug 66</td>
<td>L55871</td>
<td>APC destroyed by mine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Aug 66</td>
<td>L55907</td>
<td>Truck hit mine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Aug 66</td>
<td>L58696</td>
<td>ARVN APC damaged by mine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Sep 66</td>
<td>L45980</td>
<td>Command automated mine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Sep 66</td>
<td>L68978</td>
<td>U/I explosion, small arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Sep 66</td>
<td>L32960</td>
<td>Mine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Sep 66</td>
<td>L47919</td>
<td>Small arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Oct 66</td>
<td>L58685</td>
<td>Two road cuts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX

M.P (w/overprint) AREA OF OPERATION

omitted - too big to copy
ANNEX F

VIET CONG INCIDENT REPORTS

26 MAY 1964 - 3 OCTOBER 1966