STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE

1ST SQUADRON

THE UNITED STATES CAVALRY
1 October 1966

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE

1. GENERAL.
   a. Effective upon receipt until superseded or rescinded.
   b. Applicable to all organizations, attached, and support units.
   c. Changes to S-3 when appropriate.

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ANNEX A - PERSONNEL
ANNEX B - INTELLIGENCE
ANNEX C - OPERATIONS
ANNEX D - LOGISTICS
ANNEX E - COMMUNICATIONS
ANNEX F - MAINTENANCE
ANNEX G - REPORTS

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INDEX A: (Personnel and Administration) to 1st Sqdn, 4th Cav Field SOP

1. Replacements:
   a. Requisitions through S-1. Units receive replacements through S-1. Transportation for replacements to Troops provided by S-1 in conjunction with S3 and S4.

   All incoming personnel receive required 40 hour replacement training and such specialized training as is deemed necessary under Squadron control prior to arrival at parent Troop.


2. Discipline, Law and Order. Personnel awaiting trial, except those requiring physical restraint, remain with units while in combat; those requiring physical restraint escorted by unit to S-1.

3. Prisoners of War and Civilian Internes.
   a. PW's evacuated to Squadron collection point unless specified otherwise in OPORD.

   b. Wounded PW's evacuated through medical channels.

   c. S-2 operates PW collecting point.

4. Graves Registration.
   a. S-1 is responsible for graves registration and establishes collection point.

   b. Troops evacuate deceased personnel to collecting point vicinity Squadron Command Post or helicopter evacuation site (Dust-Off) located in safe haven area as announced. Deceased personnel evacuated by helicopter delivered to 1st Supply and Transportation in DI W. S-1 notifies Troops which hospital PW's evacuated to SAP.

   c. Troops properly identify and forward deceased personal effects found in area to S-1.

   d. Following engagements with enemy, Troops immediately account for all individuals. Render spot report (para 7, Reports). Troops initiate immediate and detailed search for any personnel reported as missing.

5. Morale and Services.
   a. R and R

      (1) One 5 day R & R authorized.
ANNEX III (CONT'D) to 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Field Sup

(2) R & R quotas on "as received" from Division basis. Troops notified of quota at least 5 days prior to time of individual's departure.

(3) Each R & R designate will have an alternate in the event the primary candidate is unable to depart on R & R.

b. Leaves: 7 days leave authorized, 15 days approved by Squadron Commander in exceptional circumstances, all leave requests with recommendations by Troop Commander to S-1.

c. Passes: While in base camp not more than 10% of a Troop's present for duty strength will be allowed passes daily.

d. Decorations and Awards.

(1) No quotas.

(2) All recommendations to Squadron, ATTN: S-1.

(3) Recommendations can be initiated by any person having knowledge of action but recommendation of Troop Commander must be included.

(4) Awards must be properly prepared as required in 1st Infantry Division Regulation 672-1 and AR 672-5-1. Poorly prepared (to include lack of neatness) recommendations may cost the individual his award. Two copies of DA Form 638 or US AR Form 157 are required for the Distinguished Flying Cross, Soldier's Medal, Bronze Star Medal, Army Commendation Medal, and Air Medal. Three copies of DA Form 638 or US AR Form 157 are required for the Silver Star and Legion of Merit. Eight copies of DA Form 638 are required for the Medal of Honor, Distinguished Service Cross and Distinguished Service Medal. Eye witness statements needed: Medal of Honor - 3, Distinguished Service Cross and Silver Star - 2; all other valorous awards - 1. Citations are needed for all valorous awards; none needed for meritorious awards. Citations will be double-spaced, all in capital letters, with standard opening and closing.

(5) Recommendations for posthumous awards to Squadron, ATTN: S-1, within 48 hours following action.

(6) Presentations made without delay.

e. Mail: Unit mail delivery through this Headquarters for Phu Loi based Troops. Other Troops through base camp major command. During operations mail delivered to Troop location by S-1 in coordination with Trp D (air).

f. Pay:

(1) Class A agents procure MPC's and plasters from major command in base camp location.

(2) Request for orders on change in Class A agents to Squadron, ATTN: S-1 at least 15 days prior to payday.
ANNEX A (CONT'D) to 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Field S.P

6. Personnel actions.

a. All personnel actions to Squadron .MTN: S-1. In base camp, correspondence hand-carried. In combat or field location correspondence delivered by Troops to S-1/3-4 operations center in Squadron Command Group.

b. Prerogatives: No change to current Division policy. (Division Regulation 624-207)

7. Reports.

a. Morning reports.


c. Accident reports to Squadron .MTN: S-1 within 48 hours following accident. Not required during combat operations.

d. Casualty reports.

(1) Casualty Foulser Report (DA Form 1154) hand-carried by messenger to Squadron S-1 within 8 hours when possible.

(2) Casualty Report (DA Form 19) when necessary by radio or telephone to Squadron S-1 in lieu of Casualty Foulser Report (when distance prohibits messenger with DA Form 1154) within 8 hours. Line number and letter radio/telephone procedure used. (Division Reg 600-6 format (Annex G, Reports).

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ANNEX B (Intelligence) to 1st Sqdn, 4th Cavalry Field SOP

1. Prisoners of War (PWs).
   a. Capturing units will search, silence, segregate, speed and safeguard prisoners.

      (1) PWs will be allowed to retain money, valuables, and personal effects.

      (2) PWs will not be allowed to eat, smoke, or drink prior to interrogation by the IPW team unless the length of time exceeds humane practice.

      (3) Prisoners will be tagged to record time, date, place, capturing unit and circumstances of capture.

      (4) Capturing units may interrogate PWs briefly for information of immediate tactical value.

      (5) All captured Military Personnel not actually allied with US Forces will be considered PWs until their status is determined. VC personnel captured wearing ANZ uniforms are not entitled to PW status, and will be turned over to civil authorities as criminals.

      (6) Wounded or injured PWs will be taken to the aid station and evacuated through medical channels if deemed necessary by medical personnel.

      (7) Wounded PWs will be interrogated when the squadron surgeon deems it will not endanger the PWs life.

      (8) Information obtained by medical personnel will be reported to the S-2.

   b. Report immediately to S-2 capture of enemy air crews or any other individuals who may be of special value.

2. Captured Documents.
   a. Captured documents will be tagged and evacuated to G-2 after screening by S-2.

   b. Documents found on PWs will be carried by prisoner escort to the collecting point. Technical documents found with captured equipment will remain with the equipment.

   c. Documents identification tags will include time, place and date found or captured, unit capturing, and circumstances surrounding capture. No writing will be placed on the document.

3. Captured Material.
   a. Captured weapons.
ANNEX B (CONT'D) to 1 Squadron, 4th Cavalry Field SC.

(1) Units capturing weapons will tag each weapon to indicate time, date, place found or captured, unit capturing, and circumstances surrounding capture. In the event an individual has capture the weapons and desires it as a war trophy, both his name and unit will also be placed on the tag.

(2) After tagging, captured weapons will be collected at Troop collection points and provided with a guard or guard as needed. When possible separate collection points will be provided when more than one unit is turning in weapons (attached Infantry).

(3) As soon as the information becomes available, units will report to S2 the number, type, and condition of weapons captured and contact S4 to arrange for evacuation of captured weapons to a squadron collecting point.

(4) S-2 in conjunction with S-4 will arrange for evacuation of unclaimed and automatic captured weapons to a location designated by G-2. Only semi-automatic or bolt action single shot weapons may be claimed as war trophies.

b. Enemy equipment which is too large to evacuate will be safeguarded and reported to the S-2.

c. Small items of special intelligence value will be handled prescribed for documents. Maximum care will be used to avoid damage, breakdown or destruction of such equipment.

d. Capturing units are responsible for destruction of equipment in the event of imminent recapture.

4. Weather: S-2 will disseminate weather information and light data for the benefit of the squadron.

5. Essential Elements of information (EEI).

a. Special EEI will be announced for each operation required.

b. Other intelligence requirements, (OIR) (To be reported to S2/ S3 operations by fastest means):

(1) What is the attitude of civilians in the area; are they continuing normal daily routines?

(2) Are any young men in town? Are any civilians visible in town?

(3) If VC are encountered, what is their unit? Are they local guerillas? hard core VC? NVZ? What type equipment, uniforms, weapons do they have? What is the condition of weapons?

(4) What is status of VC supply of Class V? If VC is captured or killed, how much ammunition was in his possession? How much had he fired?
Jnl b (JNTU) to 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Field Sup

(5) What is the location and condition of obstacles, water crossing points, bridges, and possible bypasses around them?

(6) Are maps accurate?


a. Troops will establish a minimum of three OPs during daylight hours and necessary LPs during the hours of darkness to maintain all around security of their forward areas of responsibility. Locations will be included in unit fire plans and forwarded to S2 within 1 hour after occupying an area.

b. Trp D (dr) OW has responsibility for preparation of the reconnaissance and surveillance plan and forwarding a copy to S2 by most expeditious means. Following execution of recon and surveillance plan, Trp D (dr) OW will provide S2 with a report of results obtained.

7. Terrain.

a. Continuous reports will be submitted to S2/S3 Ops by Troops on the conditions of roads, bridges, fords and obstacles.

b. Recon reports will be submitted to S2 by most expeditious means.

c. Terrain conditions having immediate operational significance will be reported to S3.

8. Spot Reports.

a. Spot reports will be reported as necessary on the squadron command net.

b. Enemy use of smoke will be reported by fastest means available to S2/S3 Operations.

9. Civilian infiltrations.

a. Civilians attempting to infiltrate through the squadron sector to or from an occupied area will be denied entry.

b. Civilians found within the squadron sector following sealing off of the area will be apprehended and evacuated as VOs.

10. Security of Information.

a. Documents and orders showing disposition of elements above squadron level will not go below squadron. Those showing squadron disposition will not go below troop level.

b. All patrols will be inspected prior to departure by an officer for information that would be useful to the enemy in the event of capture.
ANNEX B (CONT'D) to 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Field Art

c. All installations and areas will be searched prior to evacuation to ensure no classified information is left behind. Troop Commanders will give oral reports to S2 that their areas have been cleared.

d. Sign and countersign will be issued by the S-2 daily for a 24 hour period and will not be carried in written form below troop level. Any suspects or known compromise will be reported to 3-2 immediately.

e. During combat operations and when moving or posted on perimeters of base camps, blackout conditions will be enforced from dusk to dawn.

11. Maps: Units will request map coverage shortages ASAP after receipt of an operation order.

12. Debriefing: Troop commanders and/or key troop personnel will report to Squadron CP to be debriefed at the earliest opportunity following an operation.

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ANNEX C (Operations) - 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Field SOP

1. Squadron headquarters.

a. Organization:

(1) Command Group: The command group will consist of the Squadron Commander, Squadron S-3, Arty Liaison Officer, S-2, S-3 Air, 1 LNO, Comm Officer, Ops NCO, S-2 NCO, S-4 NCOs, S-7 NCOs, Hq Trp CO, Sgt Major, Sgt Surgeon, 4 Hq Security NCOs and 5 Hq Enlisted Tracks.

(2) Jump CO:

(a) Tailored from the command group.

(b) Elements not part of the Jump CP remain in a relatively safe area.

b. Operations:

(1) S-3 will establish and operate a joint operations center. S-2/S-3 tracks will be back to back in secure areas, and separated by 100 meters in unsafe areas.

(2) S-4 will establish and operate a joint administrative center.

(3) The S-3 is the Battalion Fire Support Coordinator.

(4) The command CP will move on order of the S-3 under the supervision of the Headquarters Trp CO.

(5) Priorities of work on closing location:

(a) Establish operations and communications.

(b) Establish internal security.

(c) Install wire to switchboard.

(d) Erect bunkers, dig latrines, and improve area.

(6) Security:

(a) Hq Trp CO will coordinate the available security elements to provide 360 degree inner security.

(b) During hours of darkness, a system of cellular defenses will be employed. Upon attack of the Command Group, all individuals will leave their assigned area. As the alarm, all personnel must cease all movement. Any movement thereafter will be considered to be enemy. "ALL CLEAR" signal will be given by the Squadron Operations Center.

(7) As much as possible, the command post will be arranged in a circular pattern.
2. Operations Orders:

a. Warning Orders will habitually be issued for all operations.

b. Mission type orders habitual, fragmentary orders as required.

The following orders group is established for the issuance of orders.

Orders Group (S2/S3 Complex)

Sqdn C
Sqdn D
Sqdn S-7
S-2
S-4
S-3 Air
Line Trp C's
HQ Officer
Line Officer

CO's of attached tactical elements

Maintenance Officer
Surgeon

The following special distribution for written Operations Plans/Orders is established:

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<th>Individual/Section/Unit</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Trp D (.air)</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Attachment</td>
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ANNEX C (CONT'D) to 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Field SOP

3. Security:

a. Stand-to: 3 Types:

(1) Type 1: Stand-to will be from 30 minutes before and until 30 minutes after H/1T. At that time personnel will be on 100% alert with all weapons and equipment manned and radios on. Vehicular engines will not be started but radio reports will be transmitted.

(2) Type 2: Stand-to time will remain the same as in Type 1. Engines will be started and a report rendered to the operations center.

(3) Type 3: Engines will be started and all weapons fired.

b. Local security is the individual unit responsibility and will be in sufficient force to eliminate surprise attack, provide warning, and protect personnel and equipment.

c. Security between units will be maintained at all times. Those areas between units not covered by observation and fire will be patrolled and an OP or LP established; supplementary positions will be established to cover these areas by fire. Starlight scopes and Xenon S/L5 will be employed on all perimeters on a rotating basis. All tracked vehicles will be dug in, terrain permitting, when a tank dozer is available.

4. Contact and Coordination:

a. Responsibility for contact is from left to right. Where contact is broken both adjacent units will take immediate action to reestablish contact.

b. Responsibility for contact is from rear to front. Sufficient unit liaison will be established to ensure contact.

c. All units and sections in the Sqdn Command Net will employ all means available to maintain radio contact with Squadron NCS.

d. Units report location of CP immediately upon occupation.

5. Marches:

a. All marches are considered tactical.

b. Sqdn moves as one march serial composed of individual march unit. March column will not form in easy areas; rather vehicles will normally proceed from easy area position directly to position on route of march without stopping.

c. Rate of March:

(1) Walk: 0–5 mph
ANNEX C (CONT'D) to 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Field SUP

(2) Trot: 6-15 mph

(3) Canter: 16-25 mph

(4) Gallop: 26 above

d. Interval:

(1) Daylight: 50 meters between vehicles (Open column).

(2) Night Service Drive: 25 meters between vehicles or dust distance.

(3) Blackout: Twice the speedometer speed in yards.

(4) Unusual conditions: Distance necessary to maintain control. Not less than dust distance.

e. Halts: Halts will be on order of the Squadron CO.

f. Control (General)

(1) Daylight: Unit commanders will affix a S liste panel on their vehicle.

(2) Hand and arm signals will be utilized for movement, change of direction, or halts by each vehicle commander (Wheels: Driver).

(3) Radio transmissions will be held to an absolute minimum.

(4) Unit commanders will report crossing and clearance of all check points to the Squadron X-ray station.

g. Security: Gun tubes will be positioned to afford all around protection.

h. Miscellaneous: Disabled vehicles will pull off to the right side of the road, motion the column around, and report location and trouble. Vehicles that fall out will automatically join the trail party.

i. See convoy SUP for further details.

6. Assembly Areas.

a. Units will organize assembly areas for 360 degree security.

b. Contact points will be designated by Sqdn order, as necessary.

c. No fires or direct lights are authorized.
d. Priority of Work:

(1) Establishment of OPs and LPs.

(2) Clear fields of fire.

(3) Digging in the tracks.

(4) Registering artillery (from aerial OP).

(5) Putting out concertina wire.

(6) Putting out Claymore mines.

(7) Adjusting starlight scopes and M19 periscopes.

(8) Digging of foxholes.

c. Loud talking and unnecessary noises will be kept to an absolute minimum.

f. All personnel will know who is on their flank, the position of the leader, and what unit is to the rear of their position.

g. Listening posts will habitually be employed.

h. Registering mortars and artillery is habitual.

i. All personnel will know what indirect fires are available in their sector by designation and location.

7. Mine Warfare and Barriers:

a. No minefields, barriers, or booby traps may be emplaced without the approval of the Squadron Commander.

b. Request for minefields and/or barriers will be submitted, with overlays, upon closing any area or position.

c. Use of concertina wire: Habitual.

8. Overlays.

a. Units will submit overlays to Squadron S-3 upon closing:

(1) Assembly areas.

(2) Defensive positions.

(3) Blocking positions.
b. Unit overlays will designate positions down to platoon level, and exact position of unit CP, helipad, and location of all tanks in the perimeter.

c. Weighting of the defensive perimeter will be done, based on the recommendation of the S-2, of the most dangerous avenue of approach. The perimeter may be weighted by:

(1) Concentrations of mortar and artillery fire.
(2) Additional tanks on the main avenue of enemy approach.
(3) Additional personnel on tracks on the main avenue of enemy approach.

9. Reports: (See Annex G)

a. Tactical reports will be rendered to the S-2/S-3 Operations Center. It will be the responsibility of the officer on duty to ensure that the CO and the S-3 have either monitored or been informed of reports of an immediate tactical nature.

b. The S-2/S-3 Ops center will monitor all reports and will transmit to higher headquarters if necessary.

c. Reports of immediate interest to the S-2/S-3 Ops center will be rendered by the most rapid means available.

d. All reports will be rendered at the time of occurrence. The only exception is the Situation Report. The SITREP will be rendered whenever the situation changes or hourly. "No Change" SITREPS are required.

e. The S-2/S-3 Ops Center will normally operate one net, the Squadron Command Net. An additional net will be used if two diverse operations are under Squadron control.

(1) Command Net:
   (a) Crossing SP.
   (b) Crossing Phase Lines.
   (c) Passage of check points.
   (d) Crossing RP.
   (e) Closing RP.
   (f) Crossing LD.
   (g) Seizure of objective.
   (h) Stand-to.
ANNEX C (CONT'D) to 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Field SJP

(1) Initial enemy contact.

(j) Change of Unit Commander.

(k) Situation Reports (See Annex ).

(l) Loss of friendly or enemy contact.

(m) Spot reports.

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ANNEX D (Logistics) to 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Field SOP

1. General: This unit will operate a Logistical Control Post (LCP) forward and rear under the supervision of the S-4.

   a. The LCP Fwd will consist of the SL/S4 track with representatives from S-1 and S-4, staff sections, and the Squadron Aid Station.

   b. The LCP Rear will consist of the support platoon, the squadron maintenance platoon, and the communication platoon.

2. Supply: The squadron support platoon under the supervision of the S-4 is responsible for resupplying all organic and attached units. Subordinate unit executive officers are responsible for submitting resupply request well in advance of actual need to S-4.

   a. Class I:

      (1) Individuals will carry 3 days "C" rations on vehicles at all times. Hot meals will be served for supper and breakfast when aircraft are available for delivery.

      (2) Class I resupply to forward areas will be accomplished as follows: Subordinate unit MPs will ensure that a hot meal with mess personnel are available to accompany helicopter, which will arrive at the helipad pickup point 15 minutes prior to pickup time. The support platoon leader will brief mess personnel on aircraft loading procedure and extraction procedure, and ensure that sufficient paper plates, paper cups, and plastic eating utensils accompany each unit mess to the forward area. The support platoon leader or his representative (MCO) will accompany the first sortie to the forward area and remain until extraction of empty mormite cans, water cans, and mess personnel has been accomplished.

   b. Class II & IV: (See Squadron Consolidated Supply SOP)

   c. Class III: Normal POL resupply will be accomplished by the support platoon upon request of unit MPs. When resupply by air is necessary, request must be submitted 24 hours in advance.

   d. Class V: The support platoon is responsible for maintaining records, procurement, and resupply of Class V. Troop MPs will ensure unit basic loads are replenished as expended. Basic loads will be sufficient to facilitate at least 2 hours of sustained combat. Immediately upon enemy contact, ammunition will be delivered to helipad and all personnel resources of subordinate units at the rear location will report to the support platoon leader to assist in resupply.

3. Medical: The Squadron Surgeon is responsible for the establishment of medical evacuation and for the processing and evacuation of WIs.

   a. Medical evacuation request will be submitted to the Squadron Surgeon via the Log Net. Medical evacuation carriers will be dispatched forward by the Squadron Surgeon upon request.
b. Medical Support:

(1) Each Troop will be supported by the attachment of a medical aid evacuation team with the M113 armored personnel carrier when on a separate mission.

(2) Combat troops will not accompany wounded to Fwd CP area, unless ordered.

(3) Crew members are responsible for evacuation of wounded from vehicles.

(4) The Trp medical aid evacuation team is responsible for medical evacuation to the Sqdn Fwd CP area.

(5) During the march, evacuation will be along the route of march, or as prescribed.

(6) Sqdn Aid Station will make a daily report of all individuals evacuated to Division, to S-1 by name, rank, service number, MOS and unit.

(7) Weapons evacuated with casualties will be picked up by S-4 at the Sqdn Aid Station.

(8) Helicopter evacuation will be used on request of the unit commander.

(9) The Trp medical aid evacuation team normally moves with the Sqdn medical platoon.

(10) Detached units will take their medical support with them.

(11) Sequence of Events: Dust-Off is requested through Opn Center when Troop CO determines that it is required (Reference SOI Item 93-1).

4. Maintenance: See Annex F

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ANNEX E (Communications) to 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Field SOP

1. General: Signal communications will be installed, maintained, and operated in accordance with SDI's, SSIs, and as prescribed herein.

2. Radio:
   a. This Squadron operates the following nets:
      (1) Squadron Net.
      (2) Squadron Ad Net.
      (3) Squadron Admin Net.
   b. Station traffic logs will be maintained by all NCS Stations utilizing DA Form 11-53. Logs will be opened daily at 0000Z and closed daily at 2400Z. Completed log sheets will be filed for a period of 6 months.
   c. Composition of the Squadron Command Net:
      (1) CO
      (2) S-3
      (3) S-3 Air
      (4) S-3 Ops (NCS)
      (5) Sqdn Liaison Officers
      (6) Arty Liaison Officer
      (7) Line Trp CO's
      (8) Line Trp NCS's
      (9) Attached tactical units
      (10) FAC
   d. Composition of the Sqdn Admin Net:
      (1) XO
      (2) S-1
      (3) S-4
      (4) Maint Officer
      (5) Asst Maint Officer
      (6) Maint Plt Sgt
      (7) 2 VTRs
      (8) Hq Trp CO
      (9) Trp Maint Officer
      (10) Trans Section Idr
      (11) Medical Section
      (12) Line Trp XO's or 1st Sgt
      (13) Attached Admin units
      (14) AVIB Section
      (15) S-1/S-4 Ops (NCS)

NOTE: No other stations are required to remain in this net, but all stations will enter this net as necessary to send Admin/Log traffic.
e. Composition of the Squadron At Not:

(1) S-1/S-4  (NCS)
(2) S-4 Rear
(3) Line Troop 50 tracks

f. Jamming will be reported to the S-2 immediately.

(1) Information to be reported:

(a) Time of jamming.
(b) Frequencies being jammed.
(c) Type of jamming signal.
(d) Strength of jamming signal.
(e) Unit being jammed.

(2) When jammed the following countermeaures will be used:

(a) Detune set.
(b) Situate radio with natural terrain feature between the set and jamming signal.
(c) Change to Operations frequency.
(d) Dummy transmissions will be maintained on jammed frequencies when personnel and equipment are available.
(e) Keep transmissions clear, concise, and complete.

(3) Wire Communications:

a. When the tactical situation permits, wire communication will be established with all Troops, from higher to lower unit.

b. Sqdn Commo will lay wire from the Sqdn switchboard to the CO, S-2, S-3, S-1/S-4, and other staff sections as time and circumstances permit.

4. Signal Operating Instructions:

a. The complete SOI will not be carried forward of Troop CP.

b. SOI extracts will be prepared and disseminated by the Sqdn Communications Officer on a need to know basis.

c. Only those codes and ciphers prescribed by this headquarters will be used.
d. All SOIs will be carried in the left breast pocket of the outer garment and attached to the individual with an ID chain or heavy string.

e. All SOI extracts with items will be exchanged with a signature by receipt on DA Form 1203. Each time the SOI changes hands, it must be accompanied by DA Form 1203.

f. Each line Troop will receive 5 SOI extracts. One will have HAC items (Command Track).

5. Standard Warnings:
   a. Mortar Attack: Metal striking metal, 3 gongs.
   b. Fire: 3 short blasts of a vehicle horn.
   c. Ground attack: 3 short blast of a vehicle horn, evenly spaced, a short pause, then repeat.
   d. All clear: One long blast on a vehicle horn of 10 seconds duration.

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1. General: This SOP applies to all troops of 1st Squadron, 4th US Cavalry, with the exception of Troop D (Air). Those portions of the SOP which can be applied to ground operations and vehicles will be adhered to by Troop D (Air).

2. Organization for Maintenance:

a. Based on the requirement to maintain a semi-permanent base camp and support Squadron combat operations in the field, the squadron maintenance effort (individual troops included) will be organized as follows:

   (1) Squadron Maintenance Platoon

   (a) The Squadron Maintenance Officer is responsible for and will supervise and coordinate all maintenance activities in the forward and base camp areas.

   (b) The Squadron Automotive Maintenance Technician will supervise all maintenance activities in the base camp area, prepare and submit all recurring reports to the appropriate headquarters, supervise all repair parts operations, organize and supervise the squadron preventive maintenance program, and provide staff supervision for each troop maintenance section in the base camp area.

   (c) The Squadron Motor Sergeant will operate primarily with the forward recovery section in the field, supervising the operation of the platoon's VTrs, recovery, repair and evacuation beyond troop capabilities, and coordinating maintenance activities between the forward section and the base camp. He will also assist the Automotive Maintenance Technician in all areas above as directed by the Maintenance Officer and Maintenance Technician.

   (d) The Squadron Maintenance Platoon will provide and/or maintain the following:

      (1) Forward area recovery section.

      (2) Back-up maintenance support for HHT and lettered troop maintenance sections.

      (3) Quarterly preventive maintenance contact team.

      (4) Trail party on Squadron operations.

      (5) Coordinating all requests for repair parts with Technical Supply elements, 701st Maintenance Battalion.

      (6) PLL for Squadron Headquarters and HHT automotive and engine mechanical equipment.

      (7) Coordination of direct support maintenance job requests with Shop Office elements of the 701st Maint Bn.

      (8) Processing of all evacuated and float vehicles.
ANNEX F (CONT'D) to 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Field SOP

(2) Headquarters Troop Maintenance Section

(a) Hq Troop maintenance activities will be concentrated in the base camp area with primary emphasis on wheeled vehicle and generator preventive maintenance.

(b) Troop Maintenance Section will also provide:

1. On-tracked vehicle mechanic to accompany the CP Group at all times.

2. Wrecker and contact team support to the Support Platoon as required.

(3) Lettered Troop Maintenance Sections

(a) The Troop Executive Officer will coordinate all troop maintenance activities with the Squadron Maintenance Officer and/or his representative(s). Troop maintenance sections will be organized to meet the maintenance requirements of the troop when operating under squadron control, independently, or as an attachment to an infantry battalion or brigade.

(b) Troop maintenance sections, to include the maintenance Kill, critical repair parts, and VTR will accompany the troop on all operations unless otherwise directed by the Squadron Executive Officer.

(c) Troop parts clerks will remain in the base camp area colocated with the Squadron Maintenance Parts Section. They will maintain all records pertaining to the troop's prescribed load and will prepare parts requests as required. Parts usage data collected in the field will be forwarded to the troop parts clerk on a continuous basis by any means available.

(d) High demand repair parts will be carried on all troop operations. Low demand repair parts can remain at the base camp under the control of the troop parts clerk.

3. Specific Maintenance Procedures:

a. Job Requests (DA Form 2407)

(1) Individual troops operating separately or attached to a Brigade will job request all equipment through their organic maintenance personnel to the appropriate supporting ordnance company. Squadron Maintenance will be informed daily NLT 1700 of disposition, status, and job request number.

(2) On squadron level operations or when Squadron Maintenance is present in the immediate operational area, all job requests will be processed through the Squadron Maintenance Platoon. This is applicable to all job requests. No troop will go directly to the supporting unit under these circumstances.
b. Evacuation of Vehicles and Equipment:

(1) Squadron controlled operations (two or more troops):

(a) All nonoperational equipment will be evacuated to Squadron Maintenance Collection Point(s) by the individual troop maintenance sections. Squadron Maintenance will evacuate to support maintenance.

(b) Requests to evacuate nonoperational equipment from the troop area by Squadron Maintenance will be submitted to the Squadron Maintenance Officer.

(2) Separate troop operations: On separate troop operations (Squadron Maintenance is not available) each troop will evacuate directly to support maintenance.

c. Float Vehicles:

(1) All vehicles floated to support maintenance for replacement will be processed by Squadron Maintenance.

(2) All OEM and radios, less mount, will be removed and kept by the supply sections of each troop.

(3) New floats will be requisitioned less OEM with the exception of the radio installation kit which will be mounted.

(4) Vehicles replacing combat loss vehicles will be received with all equipment. Each troop supply will submit a request for the combat loss replacement.

(5) Crews and complete sets of OEM, to include radios and GVC helmets will be provided for float replacements by the owning troop. No vehicle will depart the Base Camp area until it is ready to fight.

d. Request for Repair Parts:

(1) On separate or detached operations, each troop will submit their own requests to their direct support maintenance. Notation of this demand will be made by the Troop Motor Sergeant to include the following information:

(a) Nomenclature of part.

(b) Quantity used (from carried PLL) or requested (from D. S. Maintenance).

(c) End item.

(d) Federal stock number.

(e) Status of request (filled or due out).
ANNEX F (CONT'D) to 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Field SOP

Squadron Maintenance parts section will be available to assist the line troops whenever needed.

(2) On all Squadron Operations requests will be passed through Squadron Maintenance. Each individual troop will keep a record of demands on their own document register. All direct exchange parts will be handled by Squadron Maintenance.

(3) Each troop will insure that all replacement repair parts are entered on the individual vehicle logbooks DD Form 2406-3.

(4) It is imperative that a complete record of demands be kept by the individual line troop concerned regardless of source of supply of repair parts.

(5) No repair parts from Squadron PLL will be issued to the line troops unless such part is otherwise nonavailable through designated supply channels.

(6) Shipment of repair parts by helicopter will be coordinated through the Sq. in the forward area or Phu Loi Base Operations in the base camp area.

c. Cannibalization of Vehicles: No vehicles will be cannibalized without the complete knowledge and specific authorization of the Squadron Maintenance Officer. Vehicles that are a combat loss will not be cannibalized until they have been declared a combat loss by the supporting ordnance unit.

d. Quarterly Services:

(1) Quarterly Services will be accomplished by the Squadron Maintenance Preventive Maintenance Team.

(2) This team will consist of five men:

(a) Team Chief - log book expert

(b) Turret Mechanic

(c) Two Track Mechanics

(d) One Radio Mechanic - Squadron Commo Platoon

(3) Crows will be made available for the inspection and will remain with the vehicle until the service has been completed.

(4) The inspection cycle each month will consist of three 9 day periods and one three-four day period.
During the nine day periods each of the three line troops will be inspected and all Quarterly Services for that month will be completed before the team leaves.

The three to four day period will be spent in the Squadron Maintenance Area.

Assistance may be requested from the line troops for Quarterly Services if an unduly large number of vehicles are due an inspection/service.

g. Auxiliary Equipment (Generators)

(1) All supervisors will insure that the standards of preventive maintenance and the quality of maintenance records are in accordance with the appropriate Technical Manual and TM 38-750.

(2) Each engineer generator will have a trained operator available at all times. Each generator operator will have an immediate supervisor.

(3) All operators will perform daily maintenance services consisting of Before, During and After Operation checks. Refer to the appropriate Technical Manual.

(4) On lubrication procedures, the operator will refer to the appropriate Lube Order which is found in the TM. The recommended time will be reduced by one half.

(5) All stationary generators may be operated from auxiliary tanks. Moving equipment will not be operated from auxiliary tanks.

(6) Fire extinguishers will be available for each piece of equipment at all times.

(7) All generators will be grounded to a 3-9 foot rod driven into the ground.

(8) During refueling operations, the equipment will be shut down. Care will also be taken to insure that gas cans are filled with just gasoline and have no condensation.

(9) Engineer generators less than 10 kw will be shut down each 4 hours and checked by the operating personnel. All supervisors will check periodically to see that this is accomplished. Engineer generators greater than 10 kw will be shut down after 12 hours of operation and left idle for 12 hours before placing back in operation.

(10) All malfunctions and unusual noises will be reported immediately to the Squadron Maintenance Powerman Specialist.

(11) When an engineer generator is to be sent to support for a job order, all operator and organizational level faults will be corrected before the item is evacuated.
h. Reports:

(1) A track vehicle deadline report will be submitted to Squadron Maintenance by all Troops by 1700 hours daily, except Mondays and Thursdays (see par h (2)). The following information will be included in the report: Organizational number, job request number, place declined, reason declined to include FSN if declined for organizational repair parts, and date declined. (The unit produced deadline form may be used). The reason for deadline will be specific i.e., not "engine" but "cracked engine block" etc.

(2) A complete equipment status report will be submitted to Squadron Maintenance by 1700 hrs each Monday and Thursday. The report will include all tracked vehicles, wheeled vehicles and generators declined at organizational or direct support maintenance. Information required on each piece of equipment is as stated in par h (1).

(3) Each Troop will conduct an Equipment Serviceability Criteria check once each month on the final day of each month if operations permit. Results of the ESC will be reported on DA Form 2406 and submitted to the Squadron Maintenance Officer by the most expedient means available.

LEWANE
Lt Col

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WILKINS
S4
ANNEX G (Reports) to 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Field SOP

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<td>Line Troops</td>
<td>ASAP</td>
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Lt Col

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Martin
H. Martin
S3
ANNEX G (CONT'D) to 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Field SUP (Inclosure 1)

SPOT REPORT

ALPHS

WHAT OBSERVED AND HOW MANY

BRavo

WHERE

CHARLIE

WHEN

DELTA

WHAT DOING?
ANNEX G (CONT'D) to 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Field SOP (Inclosure 2)

SHELLREP, MORTREP, BOMBREP (State which)

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<tr>
<td>ALPHA</td>
<td>Position of Observer</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRAVO</td>
<td>Grid or magnetic azimuth in degrees or hills (Omit for aircraft)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHARLIE</td>
<td>Time from</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELTA</td>
<td>Time to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>Area Shelled (mortared or bombed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOXTROT</td>
<td>Number and nature of guns, mortars, or aircraft</td>
</tr>
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<td>GOLF</td>
<td>Nature of fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOTEL</td>
<td>Flash to Bang time</td>
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<td>JULIET</td>
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**Example**

- ALPHA: Hot Shot 36
- BRAVO: PV 497632
- CHARLIE: Grid azimuth flash 1245 mils
- DELTA: 0945
- ECHO: 1013
- FOXTROT: PV 452647
- GOLF: 1 Unknown
- HOTEL: Registration
- INDIA: 4 Seconds
- JULIET: Negligible

(Omit items not known)
ANNEX G (CONT'D) to 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Field SOP (Inclosure 3)

SITREP FORMAT

UNIT CALL SIGN

DATE/TIME

CP LOCATION

ACTIVITY
1. Defending
2. Attacking
3. Clearing
4. Assembling
5. N/O

EXAMPLE

SITREP

ALPHA

Hot Shot

BRAVO

151200

CHARLIE

FM Dodge U 1.5, R 1

FM Dodge U 1.8, R 1.8

FM Dodge U 2.4, R 2.5

DELTA

FM Dodge U 1.8, R 2

ECHO

1
ANNEX G (CONT'D) to 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Field S&F (Inclosure 4)

CAPTIVE CARD

CARD NO. ____________________________

FULL NAME __________________________

GRADE OR FUNCTIONAL __________________

UNIT ________________________________

SPECIALTY __________________________

AGE ________________________________

NATIVE OF __________________________

DATE AND TIME OF CAPTURE __________ 

LOCATION OF CAPTURE ________________

WEAPON(S) __________________________

DOCUMENTS __________________________

CAPTURED BY _______________________

* MACV Form 340

MACJ2 (6 iar 66)
ANNEX G (CONT'D) to 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Field SYP (Inclosure 5)

DOCUMENT CARD

FULL NAME OF CAPTIVE ____________________________

RANK OF CAPTIVE ____________________________

TYPE OF DOCUMENT(S) ____________________________

Nap, Handbook, Newspaper etc

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES ____________________________

DATE/TIME OF CAPTURE ____________________________

LOCATION ____________________________

CIRCUMSTANCES ____________________________

CAPTURING UNIT ____________________________

MACV Form 341

MACJ2 (5 Jan 66)
ANNEX G (CONT'D) to 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Field SOP (Inclosure 6)

ROAD AND BRIDGE REPORT

ALPHA ______________ LOCATION
BRAVO ______________ WEIGHT
CHARLIE ______________ WIDTH
DELTA ______________ OVERHEAD CLEARANCE
ECHO ______________ MATERIAL
FOXTROT ______________ APPROACHES
GOLF ______________ LOCATION OF FORDS/EXPASSES
TRUCKED VEHICLE STATUS, 1ST DRAGON, 4TH CAVALRY, APO US FORCES 96345

PART I

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1. CARRIER 14577
2. CARRIER 132.1
3. CARRIER 1106
4. CARRIER 1113
5. RCVY VEH 1486
6. TANK 114823

PART II

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### Daily Personnel Status Report

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**Replacement Training**

- Number of Officers Present:
- Number of Replacements Undergoing Training:
- Number of Replacements By Troop:

**HQ**

- A
- B
- C
- D (Air)
- E

**Total**
ANNEX C (CONT'D) to 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Field Force (Inclosure 10)

COLUMN LETTER

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QUESTION FOR 4TH CAVALRY

1. Does a route security mission include the requirement to keep the route at night open?

ANSWER: Route security is that security furnished on a given route to insure that a convoy can move from one point to another unimpeded during a given time frame. The mission to provide this security implies that the route will be cleared of mines and obstacles, and that a counter attack force of sufficient strength to attack and subsequently defeat an enemy force will be provided. Normally there is no requirement to keep a route open at night; however, in an effort to minimize the enemy capability to emplace mines and obstacles, or to occupy positions along the route at night, we employ artillery H and I fires, artificial illumination and observation and listening posts.

2. What specific tasks are directed and implied by the following missions:
a. Search and Clear?
b. Search and Destroy?
c. Clear Routes?

ANSWER: Search and Clear, and Search and Destroy missions are synonymous. The term search implies a designated area be searched for enemy units, fortifications and material located within the designated area during the search be destroyed. Both missions require that specific areas be searched, and enemy units, fortifications and material be destroyed. A route clearance mission directs that a specific route be cleared of all mines obstacles and booby traps.

3. If armored cavalry troops are detached to Brigade Headquarters what is made of the squadron headquarters?

ANSWER: When armored cavalry troops are detached the squadron headquarters provides varying degrees of administrative and logistic operations. It is normally recommended for the cavalry troops not to be attached to higher headquarters. Originally armored cavalry troops were constantly attached to brigades, however during recent months this situation has been curtailed and the squadron now normally operates with one armored cavalry troop at most detached.

4. Have armored cavalry squadrons been attached to brigade headquarters for operations?

ANSWER: The armored cavalry squadron has been employed under both division and brigade control.
5. What attachments have been made to armored cavalry squadrons for operations?

ANSWER: Attachments normally include infantry, engineer elements (mine sweeping teams, demolitions teams, and dozer tanks), a forward air controller team, a gun ship team (two UH 1B helicopters mounted with machine guns or rockets), and an artillery L0 and FO team.

6. What is the availability of canister ammunition in country?

ANSWER: No difficulty has been experienced concerning the availability of canister ammunition.

7. What is the basic load of the main gun tank ammunition for the M48 A3 Tank?

ANSWER: The basic load of main gun tank ammunition for the M48 A3 Tank is 62 rounds consisting of the following: 14 rounds HE, 10 rounds WP, 34 rounds canister and 4 rounds of shot.

8. What elements of the troop and squadron trains accompany the ground troops on operations?

ANSWER: The bulk of the maintenance section from the cavalry troop and the medic M-113 with medic crews from the squadron normally accompanies a troop on an operation. The squadron S-4 normally provides all other classes of supply to the troop by an air lift.

9. How frequently does the squadron command group accompany the armored cavalry troops on operations both: In vicinity of base camp? And away from base camp?

ANSWER: Depending on the size and duration of the operation the squadron command group accompanies the armored cavalry troops on operations. Normally operations involving 2 or more troop units for more than one day are accompanied by the squadron command group.

10. Is composition and method of operation of the command group other than normal? Any special security requirements practiced?

ANSWER: This is a normal operation with normal security measures practiced. The command group consists of the commander, S2, S3, and S3 Air, S4, squadron surgeon, commo officer and the headquarters commandant. This group is necessary because combat operations are conducted without maintaining an MSR. The group that moves with the combat elements is the only group that is in place to exercise command and control.
The S2 and S3/S3 Air establish centers of operation in separate M577's. Those tracks are usually separated by a minimum of 100 meters in a defensive perimeter. Both tracks have the same radio capabilities and the personnel assigned to each can perform the duties of either the S2 or S3. The S4 must accompany the command group to be immediately responsive to supply needs and to ensure the smooth aerial delivery of all classes of supply. It is imperative that they be at the point where requirements are generated so that he can assign priorities to the aerial delivery of supplies. The S4 operates from a M577. The surgeon is required because of the method of casualty evacuation. When casualties occur the battalion surgeon with medical personnel establish themselves in the closest safe area to the battle. Normally this will be an area just out of the range of direct fire weapons. The area is secured by the command group and is used as a clearing point for casualties. Wounded are brought to the "Dust-Off" area by track ambulance. They are treated by the surgeon and either released to duty or evacuated by air. This is a critical area since an MSR is not maintained. The adjutant commandant is responsible for the security of the command group and uses the two command M13's and the two ground surveillance M13's with the personnel assigned to each. The group is composed of 9 tracks, 2 LOH's to include the S3 577, S3 Air 577, S1/S4 577, medics 577, S2 577, 2 ground surveillance tracks, S3/C0 command tracks, and can command, control, and train the squadron as it moves. The command group is tailored to fit the situation. An additional duty of the surgeon is to perform medical service in areas where medical care is not normally available, during moves of the command group.

11. Is the air cavalry troop normally employed under squadron control?

ANSWER: By virtue of the flexibility of the Air Cavalry Troop it has normally been employed under Division or Brigade control. The mission results employing the Troop in this manner indicate success; however, in many cases mission debriefings indicate that the mission assigned was not compatible with its capabilities in as much as the mission could have been accomplished by any like vice evacuation unit.

Each time the Air Cavalry Troop is detached the capabilities of the squadron are reduced. In addition, squadron in turn must request air support from Division. It is strongly recommended that the air cavalry troop be employed under squadron control.

12. What combat service support is furnished the armored cavalry troops from the squadron when the troop is attached to a brigade headquarters?

ANSWER: All combat service support is furnished the armored cavalry troops by the headquarters to which the troops are attached, except support peculiar to armor units. Squadron because of the specific maintenance and resupply needs of an armor unit must remain in the system. Air transportation is provided by the brigade headquarters for resupply and maintenance. Class I: Brigade provides, Class II: Squadron provides, Class III Brigade provides, Class IV: Brigade provides, and Class V: both provide. Mail is a problem because of the many diverse locations that the line troops operate in.
4TH CAVALRY QUESTIONS (cont)

Squadron issues daily delivery of mail regardless of attachment. Class V-brigade cannot resupply some items of Class V - they must use our agencies to requisition the amounts needed. Brigade transports items as required.

13. Have the armored cavalry troops been employed for search and clear operations in areas of dense vegetation, if so, how do the techniques of employment differ from an area reconnaissance?

ANSWER: The armored cavalry troops are normally employed for reconnaissance in force operations; however, search and clear and search and destroy missions are performed and include operations for the cavalry as the blocking force, sealing force, attachment to the infantry, and as the vanguard for blazing trails through the jungle. Other missions in conjunction with the above include the destruction of bunkers and tunnel complexes by TNT or tank fire. The effectiveness of the cavalry during search and clear/destroy missions is dependent upon the trafficability of the road or trail network within the area where the most firepower can be brought to bear against the enemy. Cavalry is employed with the intention of finding, fixing, developing the situation and killing VC. Troops will generally stay in tact. The longer the VC remain in contact the more that are killed and the larger the force and firepower brought to bear against the VC.

14. Can the mission of route security assigned to an armored cavalry squadron or armored cavalry troop be accomplished by securing the route or does the length of the route normally require that the mission be accomplished by convoy escort?

ANSWER: A route security mission can normally be divided into two distinct phases. Initially the route will be cleared by an armored unit with attached infantry and engineer elements. The infantry will sweep both sides of the route while the armored force provides overwatching firea along the road. The engineer elements will clear the route of mines and obstacles. The second phase of the mission involves holding the sides of the road with infantry while armored escorted convoys move along the route. The second phase may also consist of holding the route with a number of strong points while escorted columns pass. The infantry hold the sides of the road with saturation patrolling. The air cavalry troop can extend depth of forces along the road. The forward observers to include artillery, air, S-3, and the commander cover the area with observation and observe the route. The area is scaled off from civilian traffic.

15. Under average conditions, what is the capability of the armored cavalry troop to accomplish route security, (distance, both laterally end in depth along the route)?
4TH CAVALRY QUESTIONS (cont)

ANSWER: The capability of the armored cavalry troops to accomplish route security is dependent on several factors. There is no prescribed distance. The primary factor being the terrain and vegetation along the route. In dense, rugged terrain the ability of the troops to establish mutually supporting strong points is substantially less than in open areas. In addition the ability of the troop commander to effectively employ artillery is decreased in dense vegetation. A second factor affecting the ability of a cavalry troop to secure a route is the number and type of attachments. Infantry elements, mine sweeping teams, and demolition teams increase the ability of the armored cavalry troops to secure a route. There is no prescribed distance for securing a route. It is important to maintain at a minimum platoon integrity. Separated vehicles do not add to combat strength as does utilization through normal chain of command. A convoy escort involving a troop must not be broken down further than platoon level. In dense jungle areas normally, the infantry must clear the road for 50 meters on either side to get rid of command detonated mines. (See convoy escort SOP which is attached).

16. What techniques that armored cavalry units have used have proven successful in reducing vulnerability to ambush of a column on a road?

ANSWER: The most successful technique used in reducing vulnerability of columns to ambushes has been the use of an armor - infantry formation supported by air and artillery. The armor - infantry formation is best composed of a lead armored cavalry troop, a trail troop carrying a company of infantry and a reserve troop. Within suspected areas of ambush this unit has found the most effective formation to be a compressed L formation.

The compressed L formation has been found to add vehicles and firepower to the immediate ambush area or killing zone. In this area maximum casualties are inflicted on the enemy. For once the enemy force has been in contact for a period of time, the enemy splinters his force into small groups making destruction more difficult. The steps followed with the compressed L formation are as follows:

a. The lead troop compresses from a normal march interval of twenty-five meters to an interval of 10-15 meters using a herringbone formation for the track vehicles.

b. The infantry company riding on the trail troop vehicles dismounts.

c/ The trail troop closes its interval from 300 meters to the rear of the lead troop and compresses in a herringbone formation to an interval of 10-15 meters.

d. The infantry company attacks up the column on one side of the road.

e. Depending on the advance of the infantry, the trail troop leapfrogs forward by squad, section, or platoon through the lead troop to prevent masking of the armor column fires by the infantry advance.
4TH CAVALRY QUESTIONS (cont)

e. The reserve troop is committed, terrain permitting, through the infantry, on the flank of the enemy.

f. Infantry battalion conducts airmobile assaults with preselected LZ's on the flanks and rear of the enemy to seal the VC in the killing zone.

Throughout the entire procedure maximum firepower is continuously brought to bear on the enemy. Continuous artillery and air support are brought in on both sides of the road.

In this terrain basic armor employment doctrine has changed. Armor has become the fixing force by virtue of its staying power and standoff distance. Infantry has become the maneuver force by virtue of its air mobility. It is important that the infantry battalions used as the battle field assault force land close to the site of the ambush.

17. When in base camp, do you operate from a tent or do you operate from a M577 HL?

ANSWER: Operations are conducted from a bunker complex composed of logs and sandbags.

18. How is the S-2/S-3 and S-3 Air complex organized and set up for operations when in the base camp?

ANSWER: When in base camp the S-2/S-3 complex is organized in a building with a communication bunker acting as net control station. When in a stabilized field posture, relatively secure, two 577 HL vehicles are positioned back to back for the operations complex. In VC infested field locations S-2/S-3 operations are separated by 100 meters between vehicles.

19. Do you maintain security around the S-2/S-3 complex in addition to normal perimeter security?

ANSWER: Additional security for the S-2/S-3 complex is provided by four M-113 APC's organic to the ground surveillance section and the command group. The radar sets have not been used since the squadron has been in this country. Presently I am having my staff prepare the necessary paperwork to turn in the radar sets organic to the line troops. The AN/TPS 33's were turned in several months ago because we had no use for them. The CP is normally well within the perimeter of the squadron. Starlight scopes and flare snips are both employed at night for added security.

20. Do you have other than assigned TOE weapons for security purposes, i.e., M60 mg, M79 grenade launcher, etc?
4TH CAVALRY QUESTIONS

ANSWER: Two M-60 machine guns have been requisitioned as an augmentation to each M577 11 for security purposes. The APC main weapon is a cal .50 mg. Secondary weapons are the M60's. The M14 and M79 are auxiliary weapons and are used when the main armament is not functional. The M14 is more dependable than the M16 by virtue of fewer malfunctions under dusty conditions. This was proven in the actions of this squadron on July 9. The tanks main weapon is the main gun. There is no absolute requirement for a rangefinder since most target acquisitions are within 200 meters of the firing vehicle. We use mostly canister ammunition. The M-73 mg has proven to be a very reliable weapon. The cal .50 mg is completely unsatisfactory as mounted on the M48 A3 Tank. I recommend that the cal .50 mg be mounted with a Chrysler mount. The 4.2" mortar is not suitable for mobile operations this weapon is of no use except in static situations. The cal .45 submachinegun is good for drivers of track vehicles and should be the primary weapon for all track drivers.

21. Do you use your AM radio's for normal reporting of information?

ANSWER. The AM radios are used for normal reporting of administrative and logistical type information when elements are spread. Difficulty in the use of this radio has been experienced because of the age of the equipment in operation. The intelligence not is presently not being utilized in the division.

22. Do you normally carry all individual equipment (gas masks, etc) into operations?

ANSWER: Only minimum essential equipment is carried by individuals into operations. The individual equipment of primary importance is the individual weapon, gas mask, poncho, blanket, change of clothing, steel helmet, and armored vest, 2 pair of boots, 3 pair of socks flashlight, salt tablets and stove.

23. Is "Stand-To" customarily hold in (base camp) (field locations) at 000 or other normal time or circumstances.

ANSWER: "Stand-To" is customarily hold in field locations. Because of several VC attacks at 0600 or thereafter "Stand-To" has been established from 30 minutes prior to B&T to 30 minutes after. We normally use 3 types of "Stand-To" varied to meet the situation.

Type I: Stand-To is a silent stand-to with only reports given and engines not cranked. All personnel are up and alert.

Type II: Stand-To includes all reports but weapons are not fired; however, vehicles are cranked.

Type III: Stand-To includes vehicles being started, reports given,
1. INTELLIGENCE.

a. Are air cavalry units capable of collecting adequate information to accomplish the three normal reconnaissance missions (zone, area, and route)? Explain each answer.

ANSWER: In Vietnam jungle type terrain, heavy undergrowth, and tree canopy are the dominating factors of all types of reconnaissance. Route recon is the most effective of the three types of reconnaissance. However, route recon is greatly hindered by overhanging tree canopy, and even on open roads terrain adjacent to the route at times is so dense that air recon is ineffectual. Area and zone recon in large part are not of the desired quality due to the above mentioned terrain problems. However, because of the dense undergrowth ground recon is often less effective than air recon and far more time consuming.

b. How is air reconnaissance conducted to gain information over densely wooded terrain? Is the procedure used effectively?

ANSWER: In densely wooded terrain air reconnaissance is limited and we usually employ surveillance along trails, streams, etc., to detect enemy movement. Reconnaissance by fire is often employed.

c. How do techniques, tactics and procedures for the conduct of reconnaissance missions deviate from those prescribed by current field manuals? (Specifically F17-36 and XT 17-95-1)?

ANSWER: Large concentrations of Viet Cong seem to be non-visible in open fields or along route of communication. The enemy effectively utilizes the jungle terrain for concealment. Our present book tactics seem too for board conventional type warfare with open terrain and a distinguishable enemy. We are not familiar with XT 17-95-1.

d. What means are used by air cavalry units to distinguish between friendly and guerrilla indigenous forces observed in reconnaissance operations?

ANSWER: One of the most difficult aspects of recon in VN is determining who is an enemy and who is not. As stated in C. above the Viet Cong are not a distinguishable enemy, except in pitched combat. Ground briefings are given if friendly educes personnel are our area of operation. Friendly uniforms are distinguishable however, VC uniforms are the copy of the common Vietnamese.

e. Is information collected by air cavalry units generally valid or is ground reconnaissance required to confirm air reconnaissance data in a significant percentage of operations? Explain by type area.

ANSWER: Information gathered by air Cav units has a high percentage of validity. Usually enemy activities are taken under fire either by gunships, artillery or TAC Air.
EBA Questions (cont)

2. If the air cavalry troop, using guidance contained in current doctrinal literature, explain locating and identifying enemy dispositions? Are there limitations or restrictions in:
   (1) Doctrine? Explain and recommend changes.
   (2) Equipment? Define equipment limitations and recommend changes and modifications where appropriate.
   (3) Organization? Comment on size and composition of platoons and section where appropriate.

   ANSWER: (1) Basic doctrine and tactics are still the foundation of air recce; however, in guerrilla warfare all tactics must modify "Lessons Learned", and new tactics are being forwarded to the United States daily and those should be compiled to form a basic guerrilla warfare text.
   (2) At present due to density, altitude and gross weight, our OL-13's do not mount a weapons system. The new IOM coming out of production at this time will give out light scout teams the firepower needed. In the present configuration our light aircraft are UL-1B's and cannot carry the Aero Rifle Platoon if it was at full strength. We would need 6 UL-1D's to lift only the rifle platoon. This could be accomplished only if all six were flyable.
   All our gunships are over gross weight at take-off with the present weapons system.
   We do not possess adequate equipment for successful night reconnaissance. The Starlight scope has been utilized with some success.
   Radio navigational aids are wholly inadequate or non-existent.
   (3) Our Basic TOE has been modified as follows:
   (a) The heavy scout section and the Aero Weapons Section have been joined to form our gunship platoon.
   (b) "Slick" aircraft belonging to the CO Operations Officer and Supply have been joined with the Aero Rifle Platoon to form the Lift Platoon. Maintenance has retained its slick for maintenance recovery and parts resupply.
   (c) The light scout sections, along with the platoon commanders OL-13 form the scout platoon.

6. Do the ground reconnaissance troops materially assist air cavalry in the collection effort and how are ground troops employed in air cavalry/ground reconnaissance operations? Discuss tactics, techniques, procedures, and mission of effectiveness.

   A SMH: The Cavalry Squadron as a whole is usually employed in VIV as a find, fix and eliminate force. The Air Cav is utilized by the squadron for flank security, route reconnaissance, recce by fire for possible ambush sites, and command and control. The Aero Rifle Platoon is utilized for security of bridge sites, strong points, etc., forward of the seen ground elements.
EMI Questions (cont)  

h. What tactics, techniques, and procedures have been used to provide timely intelligence data which permits successful counter-guerrilla operations?

ANSWER: The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol provides intelligence data for future counter-guerrilla operations and has proved highly successful. Formal intelligence gathering processes are utilized in spot reports, POW's informers, etc.

i. Is the squadron intelligence section capable of processing data collected and received from other headquarters, thereby producing meaningful intelligence within satisfactory time limits? In discussing deficiencies, if any consider numbers and types of personnel communications facilities, military intelligence augmentation (to include interpreters) as a minimum.

ANSWER: See previous questions relating to intelligence.

j. Is reconnaissance by fire employed to a significant degree by air cavalry? If so, state representative conditions in which it is used and how effective it has been in accomplishing the mission.

ANSWER: Reconnaissance fire frequently used has been effective. The VC utilize good concealment and usually show themselves only during attack. At this time reconnaissance by fire is used to disclose the VC ambush sites, landing zones and enemy concentrations and positions are normally reconnoitered by fire. Hard core units are usually well disciplined and do not return fire. Local guerrilla forces usually return fire. Recon by fire is not used in pacification areas, villages, towns and on highways.

k. In reconnaissance in force employed to a significant degree in CI operations? State size of force involved, duration of operation, and results obtained.

ANSWER: See questions relating to operations.

l. Are air cavalry units capable of collecting adequate information to accomplish normal security missions? Explain.

ANSWER: In normal security missions the spot reports of the air cav are essential to draw the enemy into a committed prior to the ambush.

m. Are air cavalry units capable of collecting adequate information to accomplish normal economy of force missions (e.g., offensive actions, defensive actions, and retrograde operations)? State specific techniques that differ in those operations from those used in reconnaissance missions.

ANSWER: Yes, however, in VII, tactics outlined in your question have seldom, if ever, been employed by this unit or sqdn. Retrograde and defensive tactics do not apply while offensive tactics are limited to missions of find, fix and eliminate the enemy.
n. Are air cavalry units effective in conduct of convoy escort operations? Specifically, can air scouts detect and provide early warning of guerrilla ambush positions, roadblocks, or other operations used to disrupt ground unit movements? Explain.

ANSWER: Yes, no ground unit movement is conducted without the use of some form of aerial reconnaissance. The Aero Scouts ability to detect an ambush is dependent on the terrain. Heavy tree canopy and dense underbrush definitely assist the VC and hinder reconnaissance. Road blocks are identified easily.

o. Are air cavalry units capable of providing up-to-date accurate information on the conditions of routes of lines of communication (LOC's) without ground confirmation (consider use of the rifle platoon in spot location confirmation as an air operation)? Explain.

ANSWER: Yes. Air elements can provide adequate route intelligence. Presently the Aero Rifle Platoon is being trained in rino detection and will be utilized, however it is impossible to cover long stretches of highway.

p. Are defolients effective for air cavalry use in reconnaissance, security, and economy of force roles? If so, state how employed for each type of operation.

ANSWER: Yes. Defolients have not been used, with respect to a specific operation it is highly recommended that massive use of defolients be incorporated in all operations.

q. For reconnaissance missions, either solely for reconnaissance or to support other operations by air cavalry, are air cavalry units usually used in their TOE organization (e.g., are subordinate elements placed under operational control of ground elements or employed under troop control)?

ANSWER: Air Cav Elements have usually been employed under troop control; however, the troop as a whole has been attached to other organizations numerous times.

r. Is air cavalry capable of independent (troop) operations in the intelligence effort or is other fire support essential? Explain.

ANSWER: No. Other fire support, gunships, artillery and TAC are always incorporated on troop missions.

s. Do air cavalry units have the capability to find and fix guerrilla forces while exciting ground or airborne forces to destroy the guerrillas?

ANSWER: The Air Cav Troop can and has located enemy elements and destroyed them.
t. Do air cavalry units employ heat sensing equipment mounted on aircraft to locate truck fires, weapons factories, or other heat type targets? If so, include type of equipment, conditions under which used, and success.

ANSWER: No. This mission is conducted by the Astro, Platoon of the Avn Dn.

u. Is there a system provided for exchange of intelligence between US and Vietnamese forces which has application of direct value to air cavalry units? If so, explain system. If not, explain how such exchange is accomplished.

ANSWER: Yes. See questions pertaining to the gathering of intelligence.

v. Are counterintelligence measures taken by air cavalry units generally those outlined in current doctrinal literature? If not, explain differences and measures used successfully (denial, detection, and deception).

ANSWER: Yes. Normal security measures are taken; deception is of primary concern through our experiences in Vietnam. Techniques utilized are false landings, mock battles (nightengale), and fake air crashes.

w. Is communications security a significant problem in counter-guerrilla operations? If so, discuss measures taken (other than normal procedures; e.g., radiotelephone procedures training) to reduce the problem.

ANSWER: See previous reply concerning communications security.

x. Are ground surveillance radar sets effective in providing early warning of guerrilla activity? If so, how are the sets employed and for what type targets are they considered reliable (e.g., vehicles or non and vehicles)?

ANSWER: There are no ground surveillance radar sets in the Air Cavalry Troop.

2. MOBILITY.

c. Are the mobility capabilities of air cavalry units adequate to accomplish assigned missions without augmentation? Discuss in terms of ground mobility, air mobility, speed and maintenance requirements. If augmentation is required, specify by TOE where necessary and why.

ANSWER: No. In lift capability, with regard to air mobility, organic aircraft are incapable of lifting the assigned Avn Rifle Platoon in a single combat assault. The unit is incapable of displacing itself without the use of larger direct support aircraft. With regard to ground mobility again the unit is incapable of out-loading an assigned vehicles. Of particular concern is the aircraft maintenance section. Reference speed it is obvious that a speedy movement of the total unit is out of the question. As an estimate it would take up wards of 12 hours or greater to transport this unit, minus wheels, 50 miles with the present allotment of lift aircraft.
b. Is the armed LH adequate to accomplish assigned missions as a scout aircraft in terms of:

(1) Range?
(2) Performance?
(3) Payload?
(4) Vulnerability?
(5) Maintenance requirements?

Explain negative replies.

ANSWER: The LH is not capable of accomplishing all missions.

(1) Range - The present fuel capacity allows operation in the Division TAOR.

(2) Performance - Due to density altitude and over gross conditions the OH-13 cannot utilize the current submarine.

(3) Payload - Max payload is only one passenger in this theater.

(4) Vulnerability - The present scout vehicle is extremely vulnerable to enemy fire.

(5) Maintenance Requirements - Maintenance hours, required per flight hours continues to rise in Vietnam. After one year's use, availability rates become marginal. Single greatest problem has been avionics. The greatest disadvantage is that the aircraft has only one voice radio and cannot not with any higher headquarters when on a mission.

c. Is the armed VH adequate to accomplish assigned missions as a scout vehicle in terms of:

(1) Range?
(2) Performance?
(3) Payload?
(4) Vulnerability?
(5) Maintenance requirements?

Explain negative replies.
EIA Questions (cont)

**ANSWER:** Capabilities of armed HH-1 Scout aircraft:

1. Range, good, due to airspeed capability; however, on station time, is limited to less than 2 hours.

2. Performance - Has been acceptable in the stated production requirements.

3. Payload - Again within designed limitations; however, this unit requires a greater lift capability.

4. Vulnerability. Present A/C is extremely vulnerable to enemy fire.

5. Maintenance. Maintenance difficulties with this aircraft confine themselves to avionics and instrumentation.

d. Which aircraft (L0H or UI) best meets the requirements of the scout role?

**ANSWER:** Pure observation is handled adequately by the L0H. However, any other scouting mission is best performed by the UI-1B.

e. How is mobility affected by weather, terrain, and enemy countermoves during unit air movement employing nap-of-the-earth or other type techniques? Discuss by type area and operation if appropriate.

**ANSWER:** Of the factors mentioned, weather remains the most serious impediment, with an aggressive enemy anti-aircraft effort second. Nap-of-the-earth techniques are only utilized when mission accomplishment is at stake.

f. Is the 50% greater speed requirement over that of the utility helicopter for the cavalry helicopters which is currently considered necessary a valid requirement? If valid, is the requirement only for airmobile escort missions or does it apply to all escort and air cavalry missions?

**ANSWER:** No. An overall increase in speed is desirable for all helicopters. The air cav vehicle need only be equal in speed to all utility helicopters.

g. How are air cavalry units organized to provide flank security for movements? Explain best type of flank security where terrain to flanks is difficult (e.g., reduction of speed to allow for flank elements to move parallel to the moving unit or to rely on speed for protection)?

**ANSWER:** (1) We utilize light scouts for observation and gunships for supressive fire and reconnaissance b fire. (2) This flank security as described is non-existent in Vietnam.
h. Of what value is ground surveillance radar in aiding surface movement during periods of reduced visibility? Explain its technique of use.

ANSWER: No experience factor.

i. Does the current authorization of air cavalry ground support vehicles satisfactorily meet mobility requirements to support the organic troops?

ANSWER: No. With the present authorized vehicles we could not move all our equipment.

3. FORCE FIREPOWER.

a. Do air cavalry units as presently organized possess aircraft with sufficient weapons in the proper configuration to accomplish normal cavalry missions? Explain.

ANSWER: Yes, with the normal complements of weapons designed for use in Vietnam.

b. What aircraft weapons configuration are most effective for scout aircraft?

ANSWER: The H6 helicopter.

c. Are scouts aircraft weapons used primarily for:

(1) Suppressive fire?

(2) Reconnaissance by fire?

(3) Other - explain?

ANSWER: (1) Suppressive fires not supplied by scout aircraft.

(2) Reconnaissance by fire primarily employed by scouts.

d. Are air cavalry units normally employed for reconnaissance missions in its TOE configuration or in a scrambled configuration? ("Scramble" is defined as reorganization of elements of troops to different mixes of weapons and aircraft by type to perform a specific mission; e.g., rifle Platoons of squadron assembled to form a rifle troop).

ANSWER: The troop normally always scrambles. We normally employ in the organization configuration as described in LF (3). Only when scrambled can the troop partially lift the Aero Rifle Platoon and field an adequate number of fire teams to support operations.

e. What type missions are conducted employing the scrambled troop organization?

ANSWER: See answer to d. above.
f. What scrambled organization, if any, is most effective for each type reconnaissance, security, or economy of force mission? Explain each.

ANSWER: See answer to d. previous page.

g. Are air scouts normally employed under troop control or under the operational control of ground cavalry units?

ANSWER: They are employed under control of ground and air cavalry units depending on the situation.

h. Does the technique of employment of the air cavalry rifle platoon differ from that specified in current doctrinal literature? If so, recommend specific changes to doctrinal literature.

ANSWER: No.

j. Do personnel of air cavalry units have individual weapons which are best suited to each individual's mission? Explain negative replies and specify by TOE line item where changes are recommended.

ANSWER: Yes.

k. When operating from forward tactical positions, how does the air cavalry troop provide security for its CP and helicopters on the ground?

ANSWER: Normally the CP of the air cavalry troop operates from a secured airfield. When required all personal run the perimeter with gunships acting as reserve force. The air cav troop cannot secure itself.

l. Is the air cavalry troop organization adequate to protect itself from direct or close-in indirect (60mm and 4.2" mortars) fires? If not, what solution is being employed in Vietnam?

ANSWER: No. Operation from secured airfields and evacuation if under mortar attack are our adequate protection.

m. How do the squadron CP and trains secure themselves in field locations? Are organic personnel and weapons adequate to provide security?

ANSWER: No. Experience factor with an air cav squadron.

n. Is sufficient supporting fire available in air cavalry units to protect airmobile unit or rifle platoon landing zone? Is this fire effective?

ANSWER: Yes. The fire is effective.

o. If fire referred to in 3.m. above is adequate, does ammunition payload meet requirements for minimum sustained operations?

ANSWER: No. Not for sustained operations.
p. How is aerial supporting fire of converging aerial forces controlled?

ANSWER: By command - control aircraft.

c. What are the most effective means and techniques for distinguishing chemical weapons, such as CS or CN in air cavalry operations? Explain.

ANSWER: We have utilized the E 159 CS Cluster with excellent results.

r. In what type missions are chemical also most effective? Explain.

ANSWER: For sealing off an area and to break contact.

4. COMMAND, CONTROL and COMMUNICATIONS.

a. Are communications facilities available to air cavalry adequate to provide effective command and control for subordinate elements? Consider both air and ground unit capabilities. State type of radio equipment used (e.g., new or old series Hi radios) and whether actual performance meets normal planning ranges and reliability.

ANSWER: The communication facilities in the air cavalry troop are only adequate when all elements are airborne.

b. Are alternate means (other than radio) of accomplishing command and control effective? State which means are most effective and the degree and manner of employment.

ANSWER: There is no effective C & C in Vietnam without adequate communications.

c. Are communications capabilities adequate to adjacent and higher headquarters for command, control, and coordination? State how effective communications are achieved between air cavalry units and other allied or Vietnamese forces.

ANSWER: See answer c. for first question. Communications is only reliable through competent interpreters. The commander must utilize his HF not to monitor Squadron. As soon as the Aero Rifle Platoon is engaged, the commander must leave higher control net. This is a ridiculous situation. The new series radios are in use; however, the type of radio is not the governing factor. In the air cav troop 26 aircraft must operate on one net.

d. Are air or ground radio relays normally required? State how each is employed and how ground relays are secured.

ANSWER: Not at our level except for special operations (e.g., LRFP operations).
EQA Questions (cont)                                             Page 11

a. What percentage of each day of operation is controlled by use of airborne helicopter CP's? State how effective the helicopter CP is from a communications and operational standpoint.

ANSWER: 96%. Highly efficient with additional radios. It is limited by the normal maintenance and avionics problems as previously defined.

f. How are supporting fires controlled by air cavalry units? Consider air weapons platforms, tactical air support, and supporting indirect fire.

ANSWER: Supporting fires when employed are controlled through G & G aircraft.

g. How is airspace over an operational area controlled and coordinated? State specific control measures used and coordination required to prevent losses of unit aircraft to friendly supporting fires.

ANSWER: Airspace over an operational area is controlled as follows: Once the ground commander selects his support - Tac Air, Arty - Organic Air, all other elements must leave the immediate area. It is impossible to coordinate both in the same area.

h. What type control measures are appropriate to operations in Vietnam (e.g., phase lines, contact points, axes of advance and zone of control) and which are most frequently used.

ANSWER: Check points, SP's, RR's, Reference Points, Phase lines and Axis of Advance are most frequently used. Axis of advance is most common.

i. Of what value is organic ground surveillance radar in control of movement during periods of reduced visibility? Explain in detail.

ANSWER: No experience factor.

5. SERVICE SUPPORT.

a. How is resupply in the forward area accomplished by air cavalry units? State percentages of aerial supply by class which normally must, accomplished by aerial resupply.

ANSWER: Organic or supporting aircraft. 99% of all classes of supply are air delivered.

b. See 5a. What percentage of total is delivered by aircraft organic to the air cavalry unit, by other army aircraft, and by Air Force retail delivery.

ANSWER: Question not relevant to this size unit.
c. Does the current air cavalry organization adequately provide service support for the units? State deficiencies in terms of vehicles, air and ground, and recommendations by TOE items to eliminate the deficiencies. If suitable vehicles are in the Army inventory, so state. If not, define the vehicle requirement.

ANSWER: Yes at unit service platoon level.

d. Do air cavalry services support elements separate from field and combat trains, or from permanent or semi-permanent base camp locations? Give reasons for use of stated method of operations.

ANSWER: Semi permanent base camps. These are the only areas that can be considered semi-secure.

e. How are organic surface supply means secured while performing their support mission? State movement security impact, if any, on combat unit resources to accomplish stated security requirements.

ANSWER: At this level we do not have organic surface supply means.

f. How are organizational maintenance and direct support aircraft maintenance functions accomplished during tactical operations? Include procedures for evacuation of downed helicopters and other similar operations as appropriate.

ANSWER: We operate from secure bases and utilize higher echelon for recovery.

g. What deviations from normal procedures (as stated in current FMs) are required in performance of organizational and direct support maintenance of ground vehicles, operation of vehicle collecting points, and security of forward area maintenance teams in order to provide effective, responsive maintenance support? Explain procedures used in detail (e.g., vehicles abandoned until recovered, crews remain with vehicles until evacuated, vehicles recovered immediately with price paid in terms of delays in performance of tactical or logistical missions by units to which disabled vehicles are organic or attached).

ANSWER: N/A.
1. RECONNAISSANCE

2. Unit deviations from present doctrine published in field manuals are required by armored cavalry units when conducting route, zone, or area reconnaissance?

A note: General differences in operations as opposed to doctrine begin with local changes in organization. The infantry squad and support squad in the recon platoons have been combined to form a third scout squad. The 4.2" mortar has been replaced with the 81mm mortar for use in defensive perimeters, and the infantry squad has been split up to support other scout crews in the platoon in order to provide five man crews for all six scout vehicles. The crews consist of one driver, one TC, two machine gunners, and one ammunition handler. We have found this organization to yield a considerable improvement in our fire power and staying ability in a fight. The immediate response of artillery to fire requests more than balances the loss of the mortars as offensively employed indirect fire support.

The absence of what is normally considered a "secure rear" requires a new definition of the term as applied to usage here. The "rear" here must be considered to mean the rear of the column or formation of which you are a part. One means commonly utilized to maintain an element of security for this "rear" is closing the rear vehicles (normally the CP and command group) up close to the tail troop in the column; and in general maintaining reduced interval throughout the column. Where such tactics in a conventional warfare environment would invite disaster in the form of air strikes, artillery fires, and the like, the resulting masked fires of the platoons and troops in a smaller area provides the fire superiority necessary in countering an attack in heavily wooded or jungle areas.

Rather than conducting such missions as route, zone, or area reconnaissance with the objective being that of intelligence gathering, the majority of operations conducted call for reconnaissance in force missions with the primary objective being detection, assessment, and defeat or capture of any VC unit encountered. Information regarding terrain and trafficability of routes is gathered incidental to the reconnaissance in force. Answers to all remaining questions in this regard which refer to reconnaissance missions, will be answered based upon considerations surrounding reconnaissance in force missions unless otherwise specified. A route reconnaissance is generally conducted as the first phase of a road security/clearing operation to move a convoy, with engineer elements attached to clear mines and roadblocks, and to bridge obstacles along the route. Infantry elements are also normally attached to clear and secure the flanks of the road-bound part of the operation. During such missions laterals, if checked at all, must be checked using the same process as the main route by a unit preferable no small or than a platoon. In the event the terrain on the lateral is more open than the main route, a more extended formation may be used; however, the principle remains the same. The overall conduct of a route reconnaissance in our area of Vietnam is generally a slow, tedious process, distinctly different from the school concept of rapid movement and engagement with the enemy only when necessary.
b. In the present T/O and O.I. equipment such as radar, secrecy to optics, infrared of value in performing reconnaissance missions? What techniques and procedures were used in their employment?

NOTE: Many items of T/O and O.I. are used often with excellent results, others are seldom used if used at all.

Radar is used occasionally by infantry units in defense of permanent, so crews; however, it was seldom used by our squadron, and as a result the sets have been turned in and the vehicles converted to combat 149's (called 40's locally, for Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicles) to augment the fighting strength of the squadron. Problems were primarily from out deadline, getting from numerous sources, and time consumed in setting up. In some areas the sets may be put to good use, but in our area we felt that the benefits were outweighed by the drawbacks.

Optical equipment carried on the vehicles is very useful here just as it is in any war; the more powerful the optics the better the observation. Similarly, equipment such as binoculars and observation scopes can be used to good advantage during night time operations.

Starlight scopes have given excellent results whenever used. The only drawback has been utilization under solid overcast conditions which is obviously an unavoidable problem considering the nature of the terrain. These scopes are not at present a part of our T/O; however, we have six of each type (large and small) per troop. Personnel in O.G.U.S should receive more instruction on starlight prior to being assigned to Victoria, since maintenance and operation is often a problem with new personnel.

Until recently we had only the 12 inch search lights and had seldom used them. We now have 10 xenon lights mounted on the tanks of an attached unit. We have used them once in the white mode, while in a night blocking position, with good results. Thus far we have not used the xenon lights in the E. mode.

149 E. periscopes mounted in drivers compartments have been used once in a defensive perimeter. In this instance 7 VC were detected walking toward the perimeter at a distance of 75 to 100 ft.

c. How is air cavalry employed by armored cavalry units to accomplish reconnaissance missions? In discussing, include what type operations are best suited for armored cavalry units without air cavalry support.

NOTE: Whenever the squadron moves there is an automatic requirement for gunships. When used in conjunction with a ground movement, and in support of T/O's, gunships are extremely useful in interdicting VC escape routes and generally bringing troops to VC positions. "Glider" 11B's have been used for a number of missions to include "lightning bug" flights, CS missions, insertion/extraction of patrols, and logistical runs. "Lightning bug" flights involve the use of a number of aircraft landing lights mounted in the door of a U.18, with gunships flying cover. Over suspected areas the lights are turned on and off intermittently, occasionally giving the covering gunships a target by either lighting one up or by drawing fire from the ground. Similar results have been obtained by using a starlight scope continuously in place of the intermittent landing lights.
CS missions involve mounting an M156 Riot Control Grenade Cluster System for CS gas on a slick to be used in conjunction with a sweep of VC force, or as a last ditch move to avoid being overrun by dropping it in the midst of attacking forces.

The area rifle platoon has been used as a force to seal areas for counter and destroy missions, to secure vital bridge sites along the main route of advance to destroy VC tank points along highways, as an on-circuit force to assist in blocking VC attempting to escape from a sweep as a bomb drops a cannon team following B-52 strikes, and to reinforce area's cavalry troops with infantry.

Junior leaders have been utilized to good advantage as command and control vehicles for all operations and to guide cross-country movement of vehicles in dense jungle and upcountry, in addition to their normal role as aerial scouts for the squadron.

It is a policy that no unit will move without air cover, to include both gunships and a FAC, if proclaimed artillery fires.

d. Are reconnaissance in force operations conducted, or are other type operations such as raids or limited objective attacks used to achieve the same objective?

MEMOR: All missions are essentially reconnaissance in force missions oriented on limited objectives. Raids, as such, are seldom conducted.

e. If reconnaissance in force operations are conducted, what is the usual size and composition of the force?

MEMOR: Normally the smallest unit used to conduct a reconnaissance in force would be a cavalry troop reinforced with one infantry company riding on top of the cavalry tr conv vehicles, supported by engineer mine and artillery and air cover.

f. What type intelligence support is required from outside sources for armored cavalry units to accomplish an assigned mission?

MEMOR: Prior to commencing an operation, the squadron attempts to compile all enemy information available, relying heavily upon reports received through American advisory channels, as well as all reports following interrogation of suspects, MIs, and VC "ralliers" (VC who have voluntarily defected to AMN authorities).

Items of intelligence desired include estimates of enemy strength in the operational area; extent of enemy activity in the area; enemy use of mine warfare in the area; identity of enemy units by designation and type (local guerrillas, VC main force, MI); attitude of local civilians toward VC, AMN Government, and US forces; road conditions and cross-country trafficability are always determined prior to commencing an operation.

g. Is the intelligence support received from outside sources adequate, timely, and accurate?

MEMOR: No. It is inadequate, untimely and rarely accurate unless corroborated.
h. What counterintelligence measures have been found to be successful denial, detection, and deception?

ANSWER: Due to a lack of information relating to the enemy’s intelligence gathering sources, we have no way of knowing of the success of failure of our measures.

i. Do operations require special communication security measures to insure the success of an operation?

ANSWER: To date there is no evidence to indicate that the VC monitor our nets or have the reaction capability to utilize or act upon any information gained from monitoring nets; however, strict communications security measures are enforced at all times.

j. What techniques are used to secure information for intelligence purposes when the unit is involved in civic action such as assisting the local community in clearing fields, building schools, or other activities?

ANSWER: The best technique found thus far has been simply to talk to the people through interpreters. Beyond this, the squadron has no capability to gather detailed information from outside sources.

k. Does the SC section require additional personnel, other than those provided by TIC, to perform the unit’s intelligence function? In discussing, explain the requirement for the additional personnel?

ANSWER: No.

1. What methods are used to distinguish between friendly and enemy indigenous personnel?

ANSWER: An ID card check is used as an indicator. (See enclosure 1)

The best detector are VC interpreters, but they are frequently wrong. The only positive indicator is the first shot he fires at you, although any VC (regardless of clothing) who runs from US elements would be considered a VC suspect based upon his actions.

m. At what levels are interpreters required?

ANSWER: Interpreters are needed down to troop level as a minimum. We have grouped our interpreters into a squadron “pool” and assign them to troops as operational necessity dictates. As a general rule we try to send an interpreter with every operation platoon sized or larger. By keeping control of them at squadron level we have less difficulty in providing adequate coverage throughout the squadron.

n. Is there an organization established for the exchange of intelligence between US and Vietnamese forces? If so, how does it function? If there is no specific organization for intelligence exchange, how is it accomplished?
III Questions

Q1. There is no central clearing house for squadron level information. In the absence of an organized system similar to that at division level, intelligence is gathered by sending S2 or IWO to province LG or to Special Forces units in the area. Information obtained from such sources is generally the same as that which would be sent down at a later date, but having it now instead of later can be an important difference.

o. What surveillance systems are being employed to acquire targets for the following fire support means:

(1) Artillery and mortars.
(2) In of helicopters.
(3) Fixed wing aircraft.
(4) Trucks

ANSWER: (1) Command and Control (C2) LORs, FOG, E missions, NO, truck units.
(2) C and G OH, armed helicopters, ground units.
(3) FGC, G and C LOR, ground units.
(4) Normally no specific target for tank fire is visible; tank fire is the general direction of any small arms fire with cadet. G and C LORs can be used to an extent in directing tank fire.

p. Does the Vietnam environment pose any problems in aircraft identification? If so, how are the problems solved?

ANSWER: No.

3. Mobility (These answers are known to apply in the west GIZ; they may apply elsewhere; however, this unit has no experience in other areas)

a. Do existing ground vehicles provide adequate mobility to perform tactical operations? In discussing, state deficiencies by type operational area, season, or other pertinent factors. Also include an overall percentage of terrain that will support armor operations.

ANSWER: No. Outside of rubber areas dense jungle is nearly impossible with at slow clearing process. Frequent throw tracks are a hazard in attempting to move in such terrain. The wet season complicates movement in such areas due to overhead cover preventing the ground from drying. Rubber plantations and open areas other than rice paddies are generally trafficable during the wet season. The soil in most open areas has a very high moisture content which gives relatively firm support, although on occasion vehicles become bogged in open areas and rubber where the ground has become soaked c to a high water table. During the wet season the majority of areas which would support armored operations are inaccessible due to heavy ground cover and jungle. Armored operations during this season are restricted to roads and main trails.

During the dry season the only hinderance to cross country movement is the density of jungle in some areas, and unbridged streams. Due to weather conditions and the nature of the terrain itself, it is impossible to make any sort of accurate estimate of trafficability percentages.

...
b. To provide adequate ground mobility, what standard vehicle substitutions are recommended to replace present organic vehicles? If applicable, discuss substitutions by TOI positions - scout sections, tank sections, support platoons or others.

**ANSWER:** Ambulance 1/4 tons should be replaced with 1/43'61's. At present there are only 2 1/4, 3 ambulance vehicles in the squadron; this number is inadequate, and necessitates on occasion the use of LGV's to evacuate wounded. 1/61 and 1/34 vehicles in scout sections should be replaced with 1/13 1/1's. Neither the 1/61 nor the 1/34 have adequate mobility to keep up with 1/13's and 1/6A3's in Vietnam.

A possible substitution would be the 1/551 Sheridan for 1/4A3 tanks in armored cavalry platoons. Such a substitution would give the cavalry troops a wider choice of routes during cross-country movements (assuming the 1/551 has mobility characteristics comparable to the 1/13). Should such a substitution be made it is recommended that the 1/4A3 tanks removed from the cavalry troops be combined to form a tank troop, thus leaving the squadron with an element capable of withstanding mines and anti-tank fires which would stop the lighter 1/13 vs. 1/551.

c. Is continuous engineer support required to eliminate or cross obstacles or other means of denial whether natural or manmade? If not, discuss what operations are usually conducted without engineer support?

**ANSWER:** Yes. Frequent obstacles such as roadblocks and craters, as well as mines require attachment of engineers for all operations. All streams encountered have proven impossible without some sort of engineer support to bridge them.

d. What type operations have been found to minimize the enemy's capability for mobility?

**ANSWER:** Our presence in or occupation of an area, coupled with aggressive saturation patrolling severely hinders VC movement. He must live with the fact that when he is seen, he is subject to artillery, TAC air, and ground attack. Any stops we are able to take to disrupt his lines of communication and supply, increase his chances of being seen and reduce his freedom of movement.

e. In addition to organic vehicles, what mobility support, other than engineer, is required for tactical operations? In discussing, state type of support by type operation.

**ANSWER:** None.

2. Do organic vehicles provide adequate armor protection to enable the unit to move about the battlefield to successfully engage the enemy?

**ANSWER:** It has been found that the 1/13 is entirely adequate for movement on the battlefield; however, in Vietnam they are being used as fighting vehicles as well, and for this purpose they are inadequate. As supplied, the 1/13 has no protection for the TC. Units in Vietnam have added gunsights; however, these have not proven entirely satisfactory.
Other units in III have different types of armor for the TC vehicles which appear to be superior to that used by this unit; however, the equipment has not been field tested as of this writing. Also due to the danger of contact-activated mines, crews with the exception of drivers, must ride on top of the vehicles, exposed to sniper and small arms fire, and claymore mines. The usual procedure is to ride on top of a truck; upon contact, crew drop inside to assume a fighting posture.

1. What techniques in field expedients have been found successful in crossing obstacles either service or natural? In discussing, include only that is necessary to complement the mobility characteristics of the vehicle.

**ANSWER**: No have used few expedients other than using logs or ISP to cross soft areas.

2. Is it feasible to employ troops or squadrons of mixed armor vehicles on tactical operations when such vehicles have different trafficability capabilities?

**ANSWER**: Yes. Vehicle limitations must be understood by both unit and vehicle commanders, and extra care taken when a difficult area is encountered. Most operations center on road nets, so it is usually possible to find by-passes or employ engineer bridging. The key is not constantly the squadron in an area where it cannot move or adequately employ its engineer support.

3. Are the armored vehicle launched bridge vehicles of assistance in maintaining unit mobility? If so, include techniques by type operations.

**ANSWER**: Yes. Normal employment would be to bridge obstacles as mentioned in 2.c above.

3. **FORCE-FIREPOWER**

2. Are individual weapons adequate to provide self-protection and to provide the individual with the necessary firepower to defeat a similarly equipped enemy force? If not, explain deficiencies by POS positions and which weapons should be replaced.

**ANSWER**: At present, the squadron is armed primarily with the M4 rifle as an individual weapon. Since Cav operations and engagements are mounted, the M4 is preferred over the M16 (at present issued to air cav troop for lightweight) due to the better reliability of the M14 under extreme heat conditions. Also some M16s were found to melt from the extreme heat caused by the sustained high rates of fire thus for typical of mounted cavalry battles.

The side mounted M2 .50 cal MG mounted in the TC cupola on the M4A3 is entirely unsatisfactory. The difficulty in loading the gun and the 50 r and a no can provide too great a hindrance to the TC in a battle to allow him to effectively utilize his .50 cal. Consideration should be given to replacing the cupola with an adaptation of the M60 type cupola with the M2 MG.
b. Are ground mounted crew served weapons (machine guns, mortars, others) adequate in number and type to provide required firepower to defeat enemy forces? If not, explain deficiencies and recommended changes.

A/SER: No. As mentioned in a. above, each LCV should have 2 130 MG, each T75 or 133 should have 1 130 MG, and each 1577 should have 2 130 MG with provisions for mounting one on the TC hatch. The 4.2" mortars are being exchanged for 60 mm mortars which have proved to be a far superior close support weapon for short ranges.

c. Do vehicular mounted weapons provide the sustained heavy calibret fired and shock effect during both daylight and during periods of limited visibility necessary to defeat enemy forces? In the discussion of the most effective vehicular mounted weapons system and the vehicle that produces the most shock effect.

A/SER: Yes. The most effective weapons system is the tank mounted 90mm gun with cannon or tank. The next most effective is the LCV mounted .50 cal MG.

d. What special ammunition either in types or basic loads is required for operations?

A/SER: Best used ammunition is 90mm cannon, .50 cal, 7.62mm linked and 40mm HE.

e. Do present control system for close air, air cavalry and artillery provide adequate support?

A/SER: Yes.

3. What tactics, techniques and procedures have been found successful in the various types of operations undertaken by armored cavalry units? Cover the operations listed in the basic instructions that can be accurately discussed.

A/SER: Since road clearing/securing missions are most common for cav, these will be discussed first.

Formally an infantry company is attached to the sqdn for such operations and 1 troop has generally been 0-1601 to another brigade. Therefore the tank organization discussed here will include 2 cavalry troops and 1 infantry company.
The two troops move in a closed column with a 25 meter interval, the infantry company riding on the ACAV's of the lead troop. Upon reaching a suspected area the elements of the ground control, in the rear of the column, carry out a search of the area, and mark the locations for further search. All 4 platoons (plus 3 squads in 3 miles of 10-15 meters apart, armed with weapons squad divided among rifle squads.)

Depending on the situation, the lead elements of the infantry will move on line with either the lead ACAV or the lead platoon (no contact made) or the rear ACAV of the lead platoon (contact made by lead platoon only.) Thus no contact has been made, mine sweeping teams will normally be operating on the road with the infantry constantly looking for signs which could be used to blow current detonated mines. However, the column halts, and whenever it is taken under fire, it assumes a "herringbone" formation. The column halts, closing to a 15 meter interval with each successive vehicle moving towards the opposite side of the road, and pulling as close to the edge of the road as possible. This formation provides maximum firepower and observation to the flanks while maintaining an area for each vehicle to maneuver to avoid pinpointing by enemy fire.

When contact is or has been made, the infantry comes on line, the cav platoons begin a "leapfrog" process to move the column in to the fight. The lead platoon and troop hold fast; the trail platoon of the lead troop begins a move to the head of the column and takes positions as a continuation of the "herringbone". This leapfrog from the rear to the front continues until the entire column has been engaged. Meanwhile the infantry holds its position until the cav troops have moved forward to the extent that the trail platoon of the column is even with the infantry. The infantry moves forward on line, riding its flanks with every 10-15 meters to aid in fire support and air strikes. As the forward movement of the infantry makes the firing of the platoon, the column, continuing the leapfrogging process.

This procedure is continued until the entire ambush area has been swept or the enemy breaks contact and withdraws.

Variations on this procedure are not complicated and are readily understood, such as the addition of a second Inf Co riding on the lead troop, or the absence of infantry.

When naming vehicles for such operations experience has proved that the minimum number for an ACAV is 4 while the maximum number is 5 as stated in I.A. above. More than 5 men would crowd the vehicle to such a degree that less than 4 men would result in loss of 1 automatic weapon since one man must spend considerable time resupplying the track commander with .50 cal ammo, and bringing out both 7.62 mm and .50 cal ammo. An attempt should be made to supply a 5 man ACAV crew with attached infantrymen, as the additional personnel only would compound the problems of fighting the vehicle.

When in a defensive posture during operations in the field the usual procedure is to pull into a perimeter, determine where each vehicle will be located, then use the vehicles to clear fields of fire and observation, knocking down brush around the perimeter. The attached infantry is placed either as an outer ring completely around the perimeter in front of the cav vehicles; or, if a portion of the perimeter is more heavily wooded than the rest and lends itself to defense by infantry, that portion may be weighted entirely with infantry, discounted cav elements providing security forward of their vehicles on the remainder of the perimeter.
ClypserSES are positioned one per vehicle or one for every 3-3 infantry positions. An inner perimeter role up of the General Group vehicles is positioned to allow the 4x4 Top LAV's to move easily to any portion of the outer perimeter. These 4 vehicles serve as the squadron reserve. Stress should be placed upon a detailed fire plan, and 2 and 3 fires should be placed around the perimeter throughout the night.

5. When air cavalry or other armed helicopters are used in conjunction with armored cavalry, what tactics, techniques and procedures have been employed successfully? This quest on may be combined with question 3 if appropriate.

Answer: See para 3.f. ab vo/

6. Is the attachment of infantry units or other combat forces (less engineer) required for most combat operations? Discuss the role of the attached units by type operations

Answer: It is desirable to have infantry attached. The organic rifle squads in the cavalry platoons are non-existent as tactical entities, the squad numbers being utilized as additional crew members or other vehicles in the platoons. In jungle areas the attached in every ride LAV's to a preselected position from which they are used to sweep through the undergrowth on the flanks. In a defensive perimeter the attached infantry normally conduct dismounted patrols in the area and provides perimeter security as discussed in 3.2 above.

4. Of the total operations conducted by the unit, what percent has been in a separate maneuver unit, and what percent has been in a support role?

Answer: Until recently the squadron was not employed as a squadron. As a result the ample period has been 10% as a separate maneuver unit, and 90% in support of someone else.

6. In a support role, what tactics, techniques, and procedures were found to be successful when operating with infantry, engineers, or other forces?

Answer: Engineers: Cavalry secures roads while they are being cleared, and secures work sites.

Infantry: Cavalry provides transportation, direct supply of water, Class I, Class V, secures 72g, provides security and blocking force for search and clear missions, aids in clearing routes through brush and provides pre-moving fire.

Artillery: Cavalry secures firing positions and occasionally teamwork pieces, secures convoys.

1. To provide additional security forces, such as securing a command post, what organization, technique, and procedures are used?
3. Which type tactical operations usually require more than one artillery forward observer or forward air controller?

ANSW.: All squadron operations require one FO per troop. Normally one FO in the air in a given area is sufficient. Airborne FO requirements are filled by squadron SQ or SQ overwatching the column in LOC's.

2. What techniques and procedures are used to provide security to the flanks, rear, or front during an operation?

ANSW.: The answer to this question depends upon the size of the operation. If a brigade size operation, security for the flanks and rear are provided by infantry battalions. If the operation is squadron size or smaller, flank and rear security is provided by attached infantry elements and the trail units in the squadron column. In the case of both large and small operations, security to the front is provided by LCOs, helicopter gun teams and TIC air, in addition to OS and DFs. Preplanned artillery concentrations fired as harassing and interdicting missions to the front and flanks also provide an element of security; however, the best flank security is provided by discounted, attached infantry.

4. What techniques and procedures have been used for the successful employment of radar and night vision devices?

ANSW.: Radar has not been explored by the squadron. Starlite scopes have been used on the "frontline," and with some success in the air in conjunction with a helicopter gun team; however, when used in this airborne role results are limited unless the area observed is relatively open. (See also 1.b.)

5. When searches are conducted in cities, villages or hamlets for caches, or other items, what tactics, techniques, if used, and which have been more successful?

ANSW.: In some operations a search of a village has been coupled with a nodal operation, the nodal serving to pacify the people while the village is searched. Searching is usually done by ANW units or infantry while the Cav is used to seal the area. On some operations cav has been used to flush VC into an infantry screen after an initial sealing of the area.
q. In psychological operations, what techniques are used and which have been considered successful?

ANSWER: The only specific tasks relative to psy-war assigned to this squadron have been firepower demonstrations (firing M60 mounted machine guns and 90mm tank guns) and moving into an area as a show of force.

r. Which type combat operations lend themselves more readily to the inclusion of psychological operations?

ANSWER: Search and destroy missions, and seal and search missions are the only operations which lend themselves more readily to psy-war.

s. To increase the combat power of armored cavalry units, what organization changes are considered necessary? In discussing, consider the frequency of the operations requiring the change. Questions t, u, and v may be combined with this question if appropriate.

ANSWER: Several local organizational changes have been implemented in the squadron, the most drastic being in the recon platoon as covered in i.c. As operational necessities, there should be an infantry section organic to the squadron, and one additional tank per troop equipped with a wiper blade.

t. Have tank mounted searchlights been employed, in either white or infrared light mode, in either offense or defense? In defense, have they been coordinated with radar sets and have they been effective in rapid re-pointing of targets given to them by the radar?

ANSWER: On hand searchlights are 18" lights with only a white light capability, and have been seldom used. Combined utilization of radar and lights has never been used. However, it is felt that a need for xenon lights exists, and steps have been taken to obtain a xenon light per tank. Anticipated use would be primarily limited to the defense on a perimeter, both to observe enemy with IR mode, and to illuminate the battle area should the perimeter be attacked.

u. Have effective countermeasure to our searchlights been developed?

ANSWER: None, beyond attempting to shoot them out.

v. Have searchlights been mounted on personnel carriers, if so, how are they employed?

ANSWER: No.

v. What are the principles and techniques used by the ground observer in adjusting indirect fire in the jungle?

ANSWER: The best method found thus far is adjusting by sound. This is not as accurate as observed adjustment; however, it has been found adequate.
10. Have armored units in Vietnam used infantry ammunition in offensive and defensive operations? If so, what were the general results of the use of this ammunition in both types of operations?

ANSWER: Yes. In every instance of its use the ammunition has produced devastating results, both in terms of target effect and psychological effect upon the enemy. The round is capable of penetrating very dense undergrowth up to 100 meters. Although this sounds to be a short range, it must be remembered that most ambush type engagements take place at ranges of from 5 to 150 meters.

7. What special target acquisition procedures are taught and used in Vietnam? What success has been gained?

ANSWER: None known of.

4. CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS.

a. Does the present T.O. provide adequate personnel and equipment for the command and control of the unit?

ANSWER: Yes.

b. What use has been made of airborne command posts? In discussing, state what percent of the time it is used during an operation.

ANSWER: Airborne command and control ships are utilized constantly during all operations.

c. Do units normally require use of radio relay? In discussing, state type of relay (air or ground) and at what operational distances are they normally required?

ANSWER: Radio relay is normally needed only when a troop is detached to a brigade at some distance from the squadron C.P. In such cases the type of relay required varies with atmospheric conditions and terrain. Most frequently used relay stations are helicopters flying missions for the squadron between various base camps. It has never been found necessary to have a relay station, assigned as such, on a full-time basis.

d. In static type operations, is there a requirement for frequent moves of the command post for security purposes?

ANSWER: When operating from a semi-permanent base camp, no. When operating from a field location the CP should be moved at least once every 72 hours.

e. In stationary locations, does the command post habitually require combat elements for security or can it be secured by organic headquarters personnel? In discussing, include type operation, area of operations, and composition of security forces normally used.
All Questions (cont) 

5. What type central measures, such as phase line, contact points, axis of advance, zones of action are most frequently used in the control of operations?

6. What techniques or procedures have been developed to control direct and indirect fires when two or more units are approaching the same area from different directions? At what point in the operation does an individual assume overall control?

7. Spoke is used to mark the front and flanks of both units; fire coordination lines are consistently used. When two units of equal size approach each other the unit in contact at the time normally assumes positive control of the second unit.

8. Is the current family ofryn radios, as mounted in vehicles currently used by other units in Vietnam, performing the mission as desired? Are operating and planning ranges reduced, if so, how far? Relate to each type standard series radio.

9. General experience in the use of the(tex and various types has been found completely satisfactory in all respects. Ranges are reduced when operating in rubber shoes through heavy jungle, but the amount of range lost is not consistent, and has not been to the extent that squadrons' operations were hindered as a result.

10. For present authorized strengths in EC elements, how do current units at battalion and higher level displace and continue to adequately control and control their subordinate elements? How are these EC's staffed for 24 hour operations?

11. The EC complex, to include the En Surgeon's C-130, moves immediately to the rear of the trail troops depending upon the four AE Trp LCN's for local security. The EC complex due to its proximity to any combat unit is utilized to assume the Aero-Defence role. The forward location of the EC complex with the airborne command and control aircraft provides adequate communications control for all squadron operations. 24 hour operation is provided by 121 personnel assigned to the EC section.

5. SERVICE SUPPORT

a. Does the present 201 provide adequate personnel and equipment to perform combat service support functions? In discussing, refer to 201 positions where appropriate and include use of indigenous personnel.
LEAD Questions

**Q.** We utilize no indigenous personnel for combat service support. Although the squadron habitually operates a squadron supply, a forward logistical supply point, and a forward logistical control point, the present JCS provides adequate equipment but stretches the personnel of the support points quite thin when operating two or more support bases. More specifically, the addition of an 18 supply center as a forward logistical coordinator and the addition of one supply clerk is considered essential.

b. In considering the various types of tactical operations, what percent of combat service support is usually provided by air? In discussing, indicate classes of supply and type services.

LEAD: 100% of all classes of supplies are airlifted to forward positions during combat operations.

c. What techniques and procedures are used to deliver supplies by fixed wing aircraft or helicopters?

LEAD: S-4 personnel estimate resupply requirements one day prior for fixed wing aircraft; resupply wing aircraft have less need for this 1 day prior notice. Based upon an estimate of requirements 34 requests aircraft sorties by type aircraft and number of sorties. When resupplying by fixed wing aircraft, and the load in the aircraft is not all for one unit, it is imperative that the different loads be clearly marked as to destination and unit, or be accompanied by personnel to prevent mix-ups. Positive communications between source and destination must be maintained to reduce confusion and insure prompt off-loading at destination. At least two individuals shall be present at each end to supervise breakdown of supplies into loads and assist in aircraft loading and scheduling.

d. What techniques and procedures are used in providing logistical medical services by fixed wing aircraft or helicopters?

LEAD: Logistically services are provided as in C above; Aero-med-Evac is provided on call, the time being less than 45 min from notification to pickup, depending upon weather and visibility.

e. When required, what type security is usually furnished on-the-spot, medical or administrative vehicles, and convoys during movements? In discussing, include movements in tactical formations as well as normal movements required for resupply or other functions.

LEAD: A squadron supply convoy has never been conducted. When convoys are scheduled in conjunction with other units, a minimum of one security vehicle is assigned to convoy security. Logistically vehicles are seldom present in tactical formations. Medical support vehicles normally accompany the C. (See Encl. 2, Convoy Escort SOP)

f. What security is required to safeguard vehicles being required or evacuated? In discussing, include the number of individuals or size unit that are usually required to perform this function.
g. What type military civic actions are normally assigned to the unit?

ANSWER: None are specifically assigned to the squadron, although the squadron frequently participates in HEDCAP and pacification operations.

h. What type civic actions can normally be accomplished without special equipment or personnel?

ANSWER: Limited HEDCAP can be conducted by the squadron; pacification operations are usually tied in with psywar operations and political goals.

i. What forms and records are maintained on items of equipment under the TAER system (T1: 38-750)? If none, is there any indication for a requirement to maintain certain records for maintenance management?

ANSWER: Log books and all accompanying forms are maintained.

j. Those units that were directed to take their PLL's and ASL's to the overseas command, did they find that their authorized stockage list supported their requirements for a 15 day period?

ANSWER: The squadron brought its PLL to RVN and found that a PLL based upon pacoco time demand histories is inadequate for combat operations.

k. Are units maintaining prescribed loads and authorized stockage loads to the required amounts? How are repair parts requirements determined? Demand, or item for item repair or replacement?

ANSWER: Yes, requirements are presently being determined by demand history.

1. To what extent are anti-personnel mines (M8A1 Claymore) being used for defense of logistical installations?

   (1) Are they readily available?

   (2) How are they being put to use?

ANSWER: Claymore mines are widely used on perimeters as command mines. They are readily available, even the VC use them.

m. Are brigade trains, as currently discussed in our M11's, being employed and is there any modification in their organization? How are they secured?

ANSWER: Brigade Trains as originally conceived are not used. The Brigade Base Camp takes the place of the Brigade Trains Arre, and is secured by combat units assigned to the camp as a home station.
1. Cavalry notes are an official publication of this Headquarters and will be retained on file. Cavalry notes will cover various items of interest to the squadron and will be used to establish permanent operating procedures not covered in the field standard operating procedures. Suggestions of techniques used can be forwarded to this headquarters attn: 5-3 for inclusion in future cavalry notes. Cavalry Notes and commanders policy files will be required reading for all incoming 100's and officers.

2. Now is the time to inventory spare parts kits for the M73 7.62 machine gun, the cal .50 machine gun and the M60 machine gun. If spare parts are missing or broken, place them on requisition.

3. New training of flamethrower track crews is an area of concern. All personnel that operate the flamethrower tracks must be thoroughly familiar with the operation and maintenance of the flamethrower equipment. A copy of the training program for this unit will be forwarded to this Headquarters attention 5-3.

4. With a primary and an alternate linesweeping team will be trained for each mine detector. Plans will be placed on unit orders and a copy forwarded to this Headquarters attn: 5-3. A copy of the training program will be forwarded to this headquarters attn: 5-3.

5. Unit commanders will insure that all personnel are cross-trained in the use of demolitions for blowing booby traps, duds, and explosive ordinance found. Often low personnel will not be available for this type mission, and organic cav personnel must be prepared to use demolitions.

6. When the squadron has 2 separate operations at the same time one operation will be controlled on the Squadron Operation's Net, and the other on the Troop Command Net.

7. All units assigned or attached will operate a station in the Squadron Logistics Net (AN&P) when in field locations. This net will handle all administrative and logistical traffic and will be open for traffic as the situation requires.

8. Line troops attached or Troop to other units desiring logistical support from squadron must keep the Logistics Net informed of future plans and locations.

9. In's: and marches or route clearing operations will normally be on 1/50,000 maps. Operations within a F.O.R will be on 1/25,000 maps.
10. Tactical Observations:
   a. Thorough aerial reconnaissance will be made by all
      leaders down to platoon level prior to an operation. Unit commanders
      will request aircraft through 3-2/3-0-3馋号me.
   b. Prior to any operation unit commanders will war plans with all principle leaders, to cover assigned missions and
      possible contingency missions.
   c. Unit commanders are failing to make use of all available supporting arms. Artillery, the air, and aerial gun teams are
      available on every operation, as call. Each troop has an artillery FO
      available for use as a troop line support coordinator.
   d. Slm mortars will be centrally located in a defensive perimeter and will be positioned so that the trajectory of fire from
      the SLM has only a minimal distance to travel over the heads of friendly troops.

11. Logistical Observations: Drop .50's must insure that
      detailed logistical requirements for aerial supply are forwarded
      to the S-4. Examination will be requested by type and amount in rounds.
      Fuel will be requested in gallons total. The practice of requesting
      4 basic load for 1 plane will be discontinued.

12. Use of smoke: In operations where marking of a location
      or position is considered necessary, the use of smoke is useful
      particularly when aircraft are involved.
   a. Ref S&I It., 91-3:
      (1) White smoke will only be used to guide enemy
          targets. When used to guide air strikes, its use will be confirmed
          by radio, contact with F/O, dive fighters or
      (2) Red smoke indicates danger, presence of enemy, is
          not land; unsafe conditions, downed aircraft and similar warning
          actions. Red smoke will not be used to mark friendly
          positions or to call in air strikes or friendly fire.
   b. All other smoke colors mark friendly positions
      only.
   c. Never mention on the radio the color of smoke to be
      used. Simply state that smoke is being used and let the aircraft
      identify the color of colors.
   d. Each LOR of Delta troop will carry 12 smoke grenades
      of which 2 each red and 2 each white will be carried.

13. Identity of commanders and command vehicles: Additional
      antennas, visible map cases, field glasses, "Jack rack" radio or
      unusual weapons often disclose the identity or location of commanders
      or command vehicles. These indicators should be avoided. Every
      LOR will have 3 radio antennas. Each 577 will carry four antennas.

   a. March interval during daylight will be 50 meters
      each column and 25 meters closed column.
b. Tank gunners will ride in the lead vehicle and the leader will ride outside of the vehicle. Individual crewmen will be assigned a direction to which to include the tank at all times. Each vehicle will provide 360° observation with the nose.

c. Tank turrets will be rotated in the direction considered not dangerous by the lead leader. The cal. 50 mg should be oriented in a direction opposite from the main gun. Platoon leaders will ensure that 360° coverage is maintained within the platoon by orienting vehicle weapon in left and right.

d. During convoy escort missions the armored cavalry

troops will not be broken into below platoon fighting blocks. A
platoon fighting block consists of a scout section of 3 scout tanks of the vehicles each and a flank section of 3 tanks.

e. All convoy escort missions and rear in force missions

will be led by the section of at least two tanks.

f. Single 3-C.V's will not be dispatched for any reason.

3-C.V's will always be used when a smaller requirement exists.

g. Air scout tank will normally fly a lane to the right

and left the flanks of the column.

h. In case of an attack at close ranges or intense

fire, tanks must be prepared to protect other tanks by firing
carrier ammunition at each other vehicle.

i. Unit commanders will have 3-C.V's on tanks directly

in the columns into position in the rear column. Units will
not "line up" prior to evince. Constant clear and security will
be maintained at all times for the vehicle level into 1m in the

column.

j. In all times vehicles will be disposed so that every

vehicle is in position to support another vehicle; for example, if

the vehicle is on fire, a raid block or suspected enemy position,

the vehicle should be in position to support or protect the

vehicle attacked.

15. Use of LOR's. In order to provide the ground commander

with additional observation and control, LOR's will be provided

(two preferably, minimum of one) for each operation. If the equip

ment is priced, the troops should provide the officer observer.

Under a liaison officer will be made available upon request. The

concept is:

a. Make a unit channel frequency.

b. Lead element unit the aerial observer (A0), on his

Auxiliary Receiver.

c. AO be 3-C.V. to provide additional fire support, tactical

air, 3-C.V. etc., as required.

d. One 3-C.V. airborne at all times during operation near

lead element.

e. When the operation is squadron sized (two or more troops)

the function will usually be fulfilled by the squadron 30, 33, or 34

16. "Over-Off".

c. Anyone requiring "Over-Off" will request the above

channels.
b. The base station contacts 'Juke-Off,' gives available details and informs on under supervision, the operation.

c. The CO determines when and where the actual pickup occurs and may assign a subordinate to control the operation.

d. Base station and CO should be informed on Command with 'Juke-Off' is enroute, on station, and complete.

e. If a unit, requiring 'Juke-Off' is unable to get results on the second notit it is authorized to go directly to the 'Juke-Off' frequency or another frequency to secure the required support.

17. Visual Recon (V3) and/ or by fire.

Conch:

(1) Attempt to detect enemy action earlier than planned.

(2) Make sector selection in advance.

(3) Possibility to use available means (notical air, tanks, etc.)

(4) Ability to respond to enemy action resulting from reconnaissance.

18. Actions during attack

In the main by fire, a heavy volume of fire and movement in the least effective direction towards the ambush.

b. When engaged with the enemy, it is not enough to fire into the vectors. Tracked vehicles must resort to their additional asset of mobility; therefore, the action on contact with the enemy should be to move and shoot to the left.

c. Vehicles when placed on perimeter security will move from their last selected daylight primary positions to alternate positions just prior to nightfall.

d. Calling up at night will assume a posture of a staggered formation. That is to say vehicles will not form a perfect circle, but one which is irregular in shape and takes advantage of available terrain.

19. Perimeter Security. Cavalry leaders need to realize that each and every perimeter in Vietnam is a front-line defensive formation which requires an aggressive program of day and night patrols dismount observation/listening posts and a high percentage of the men on line on watch.

20. Airmen: All wires are to be considered dangerous. Do not touch or pull on any wires. Leave all wires alone.

21. Sandbags: Each C.O. and 577 will have a minimum of one layer of sand bags all the way to the floor. 1/4 tons and trucks will have the same on the floor board.

22. Reconnaissance by fire: By the first two vehicles or following vehicles in a column at 90° angle is ineffective and will not be permitted. Reconnaissance by fire is effective when directed at the rear and above ground along side the road forward of the head vehicles of the column. Recon by fire will be permitted on order of the Squadron Commander on the Squadron Operations Officer.
23. Binoculars: Binoculars will be worn and used by all vehicle commanders. Drop commanders will ensure that binoculars are available in sufficient number for all cash vehicle commanders.

24. Conditions: Charges are never prepared with only 1 fuse. 2 ¼ # fuses are always used.

25. Trim vans: Trim vans often provide the necessary offset distance to lessen the effect of missile weapons. Trim vans will always be fully extended on operations. Broken trim vans will be repaired or replaced.

26. Vehicle crewman: Often in the heat of battle the vehicle commander must be replaced by another member of the crew. As a minimum, two crewmen on each vehicle must be cross-trained for each job.

27. Infrared scopes and starlight scopes: All night lighting devices will be used on a rotating basis around the defensive perimeter. No 2-4 scope may be used for a period up to 30 minutes then cut off and either vehicle’s equipment switched on.

25. In receipt of an operations order whether it be oral or written, certain troop leading steps must be followed.

a. 3-3, receives order, puts it on operations map; staffs the division to determine the task evaluation; reduces the order at garrison level; briefs his chain of command and makes aerial Recon whenever the unit situation permits.

b. Area commanders; receives oral briefing from 3-3; asks all pertinent questions reference his mission; requests interpreter if possible, makes aerial Recon if time and situation permits; gives order; brief leaders and hit sites; executes missions.

23. Fire support of all enemy forces must be coordinated prior to the missions. The following conditions are desirable:

a. Artillery and tactical air should be given keen to operate in. It should be noted where artillery support will originate so that the air will not be hindered by the flight path of the artillery shells. This technique will enable air and artillery to be delivered simultaneously.

b. Air and helicopters will be utilized to fill the gap between air and ground, they may also be used for reconnaissance by fire prior to contact.

30. Heli scouts and M-60 weapons teams will be employed in several different manners depending on the situation:

a. A scout in the flanks and ahead of the column with the M-60 weapons team on strip alert.

b. Heli scouts in close to the column with the M-60 weapons team in the flanks.

c. M-60 weapons team in close to the column with the M-60 weapons team in the flanks.
31. If we should come in contact with an attempted ambush in which the enemy has employed numerous command type mines in the killing and of the ambush, we must be aware of and prepared for the alternative we will have.

a. Get off of the road and assault the enemy positions.

b. Stand fast on the road reducing all movement whereby one mine might be the untried and continuing the fight.

c. Utilize the trail troops or attached infantry to roll up the flanks, rolling out the enemy positions.

32. Air and ground forces and mines can be expected at prominent terre in features some of which are: road junctions and bridge sites. Where possible these places should be avoided and when crossing is necessary it should be unadventurously as possible.

33. Every vehicle commander should be aware of the procedures of contact for employment of the harrassing or compressed I formations. In the harrassing formation the lead troop will take up firing positions with the main weapons on the right. The trail troop will be brought into the battle a platoon at a time moving through the engaged troop by long fire. This will be done until they have reached forward of the lead halt of the engaged troop. In the compressed formation infantry troops will be utilized to sweep either flank moving toward the enemy. This will result in using the fires of the last platoon. They will cease fire while the infantry passes their position and then leave front to the lead of the column.

34. Important units in reporting; crossing or clearing check into will give location of both lead and trail elements.

35. Volunteer from march column to assembly area larger position or defensive perimeter. Unit Commanders will ensure that vehicles crossing the area of a march column do not halt but continue to move smoothly to their new position.

36. Concertina wire. All Ch.t's will carry rolls of concertina wire for use in defensive perimeters.

37. The following spot report format will be used:

1. Unit
2. Unit observed and how many.
3. Where
4. When
5. What doing.

[Signature]
RODEY W. STRUNES
Capt., Armor
Adjutant
BATTLE NARRATIVE
25 August 1966
Commanding Officer - Troop C

Initial Troop C dispositions on 25 August 1966 were as follows:
1st Platoon attached to 1st Bn convoy control.
2d Platoon attached to 1/26 Infantry Bn.
3d Platoon and Troop Hq (-) attached to 1/26 Infantry Bn. The 3d platoon
was further split and sub attached within the 1/26 to Company L and B.
The Troop Hq group (-) consisted of the CO's APC, the maintenance APC, the Ops/
Comm APC, the Medical APC and the VTR in addition to two 3d platoon tanks
were attached to Company C 1/26.

At 0630 hours on the 25th, the troop Hq group (-) transported two
ten men patrol groups south along Hwy 16 to drop off position in the vicinity
of Company B 1/26 and elements of the 1st Engr Bn. While at that location
word was received that elements of the 1/2 Infantry were in contact in
a jungle area west of Hwy 16. The Troop (-) was given instructions to move
back to the 1/26 CP area.

Upon closing the Bn CP the CO of Company C 1/26 gave the order to
mount up all of his company on every track available and carry his company
into reinforcing positions on Hwy 16. The Troop moved to a holding
position at coords XT 896360 where the 3d platoon joined with the Troop
Hq elements. The VTR remained at the 1/26 Inf CP.

At this time the troop received the mission of carrying Company C
to a jump off position at general coords XT 8436 where this company would
move north into the jungle. Troop C (-) was then to establish a blocking
position along the SE edge of the jungle area and be attached to the 1/2
Inf. About this time I learned that the 2d platoon had been committed with
a company of the 1/2 Inf to go into the jungle after a surrounded patrol.
The troop (-) rapidly moved north along Hwy 16 and then due west through
the rubber north of and parallel to Route Orange. Company C 1/26 was
dropped at their assigned jump off position and the troop assumed the assigned
blocking positions. Permission was granted by the CO 1/26 Inf to leave
his not and the troop entered the 1/2 radio net. The acting CO 1/2 Inf
Dracula 5, acknowledged the troop reports and re-affirmed the blocking
mission. The troop (-) deployed in a line formation, with the greatest possi­
ble distance between vehicles, to cover an area from coords XT 841360
NE to coords XT 859378. The troop remained in this position with OP's and
rear security. Route Orange was covered by tank gun and .50 caliber fires.
Sov. VCS's were captured and held. The air-attacks and many helicopters
could be observed but no enemy was encountered. During this time the 2d
platoon leader, Hsg Barrow, was contacted. He stated that they were on the
move in very thick jungle, but he didn't know exactly where the unit was
or was going. A little later he called me and informed me that his
tank and one other vehicle was disabled, that he had orders to keep on
moving towards the VC base camp and that the infantry CO wanted to destroy
the vehicles. I checked with the X0 1/2 Inf and secured permission not
to destroy these vehicles. The 2d platoon leader was instructed to remove
all weapons and as much ammo as possible from those tracks and place this
equipment along with the crews in his other vehicles.
He reported that his unit was under constant fire and was trying to get on the move toward the VC base camp and also reported that he had many wounded aboard his APC's. I asked for his location and told him I'd set up a Dust-Off and resupply area. Neither he nor the infantry company CO could give a coordinate location. He also reported that he wasn't able to fire his 50 calibers because the infantry thought they would be hit. I called the XO 1/2 Inf to advise him that the troop APC could be effective in laying down a good base of fire if the infantry would pull back a little and let the APC's form a circular perimeter. I also told him we had plenty of ammo, grenades, water and C rations on board the troop vehicles. He acknowledged. The troop continued to maintain blocking positions SE of the jungle area along clearings in the rubber. The 2d platoon reported that it was in the VC base camp, receiving many casualties, that everyone was pinned down and that the tracks could not maneuver.

A frag order was received from either the S-3 or XO of the 1/2 Inf to move the troop to a position at coords XT 414403 and link up with Company B 1/2 Inf. The troop moved East, north and then NW to that location. Link up was made with the S-3 1/2 Inf and CO B 1/2. Company B was loaded on the APC's and orders given that this force under control of CO Company B would move due SW into the jungle until a link up with Company C 1/2 and Troop's C 2d platoon was achieved. The CO of Company B and the S-2, Capt Downs, rode on the Troop CP track (C-66). The S-3 1/2 Inf declined to ride with the troop per request and stated he would walk with the CP group into the battle area. Permission was given to establish a Dust-Off/resupply site in a clearing in this area with the Ops and infantry APC's. This site was later moved to a clearing at coor's XT 856394.

The troop began its move SW in a line formation thru cleared areas and light jungle. Radio contact was made with the 2d platoon, through 3SG Shipley who reported that both the 2d platoon leader and platoon sergeant had been hit and their vehicles knocked out. He reported many wounded. I couldn't give a position, but said to guide on smoke from airstrikes and helicopters circling overhead. I told him medical help and reinforcements were on the way. At this time the troop entered dense jungle, two APC's throw tracks and the troop deployed in a column formation led by 3d platoon tanks.

Some guidance was received from the air but the move was generally a plunge SW through the dense jungle. From time to time instructions were received from the 1/2 Inf XO to turn right or left or go north of south. Troop positions were marked by smoke several times. The troop with infantry loaded continued to crash through jungle for sometime. Finally a tank from the 3d platoon reported that it was in the center of the VC base camp and in contact with the 2d platoon. This tank had become separated from the platoon and crashed into the base camp and began to receive heavy small arms fire. The infantry of Company B 1/2 dismounted, Capt Downs stayed aboard C-66 until he left to assume command of Company B, and the troop (-) pushed ahead through very thick jungle into the center of the base camp.
Upon entering the base camp the 3d platoon was assigned the mission of forming a perimeter oriented to the E - NE, shooting down snipers and picking up any wounded in the area. Just as the 3d platoon turned, they APC was knocked out by anti-tank fire and radio contact with the 2d platoon was lost. The troop CP group with C-66 and the radio APC headed into the center of the base camp to check on the 2d platoon. The first APC encountered was C-23 with Sgt Cundees. Nothing indicated that there were deep trenches on either side of his position. I couldn't contact the 2d platoon CP or SSG Shipley. This time, I called C-23 directly on the 2d platoon frequency and told him to move east to join the 2d platoon and clear the route for these two APC's. There was no radio contact with the 2d platoon on the troop frequency. Soon contact was made with SSG Shipley on the 3d platoon frequency. He stated he was in charge of what was left of the 2d platoon, but didn't know where the platoon or platoon APCs were located, but that both were wounded. I pulled my APC into the jungle when I was in what seemed to be the center of the base camp. I saw several stationary 2d platoon APC's and many infantry either wounded or seeking cover in the VC trenches and bunkers. I waved the radio track into this area to pick up and treat wounded.

The exact order of events is extremely difficult to reconstruct due to heavy enemy fire and general confusion. The following sequence describes normally what took place in the base camp once the trop (-) arrived:

Contact was made with the X 0 1/2 Inf who acknowledged our arrival in the base camp. He stated that the CO of C Company 1/2 would be in charge of all friendly forces in the area and that infantry companies were advancing towards the camp from all directions. I dismounted to look for the 2d platoon CP and the company commander. I encountered SSG Shipley aboard one of his APC's and told him to have the 2d platoon continue to expand the clearing that they had been making for medics and to set up a perimeter facing to the west to secure the LZ. He said he had about 3 or 4 APC's encountered scene after scene of wounded infantrymen and dead, laying in trenches or in holes among others not wounded but not shooting. I asked several infantry NCO's where their leaders were located and where the infantry positions were. They didn't know where their CO or platoon leaders were located and said that their people were all over the area, but had no organized defense. About this time we received mortars or rifle grenades in the area and several tracks were hit. I returned to my APC and tried to contact the S-3 or XO. I had negative contact but could reach the 1/2 Yankee section, which also reported negative contact with their 3 or 5. I got out of the track again and encountered the CO of C 1/2 Inf. I told him we had plenty of water, ammo for M60 and M79 and had hand grenades on all tracks and that we could resupply from us. I asked him where his people were located, he said in front of the tracks, in a circle around the heart of the camp. He told me that our 50 cal fire was endangering his people and stopping the advance of friendly infantry coming into the base camp from all sides. I instructed the tro-op to cease fire. He further stated that the S-3 wanted a couple of APC's to pick up the CP group, but he didn't know where the S-3's party was located. I told him that we established a Dust-Off site and resupply point to the east in a clearing at the edge of the jungle and suggested that we send some APC's with wounded back to this location.
He declined, saying that everyone would stay in position and hold on until more infantry arrived. I went back up the line of APC's and encountered the 2d pltn 1/3, 1SG Barrow, he was badly wounded in the arm and shoulder, his arm was in a sling and he was rather dazed. I asked him for "0" status of his platoon; he just asked "What the hell are we doing here, sir?"

He stated that most of his people were wounded and three were dead and that he had 3 or 4 APC's still running. His own track was disabled. I gave him some salt tablets. He stated that many people were passing out inside the APC's. I told him we would evacuate the wounded soon, I then tried to contact someone in the 1/2 Inf in order to appraise them of the situation. I could only contact the yankee station who reported negative contact with either their XO, S-3 or the CO's of B and C Company. I then called the CO of C 1/26 with whom I had been working. His radio operator reported that the CO had been hit and that they were separated at that time.

I then tried the 1st Bde frequency which I had pre-set on my radio. I contacted the Bde S-3 and gave him a detail status report of conditions in the base camp.

During this time we were being sniped at continuously. Every now and then what seemed to be mortar rounds would fall in the center of the area. Several APC's were hit. Sometime during this period an airforce helicopter came into the clearing. Just as it settled there was a heavy volume of fire and the aircraft crashed to the ground. More mortar type rounds followed and were reported to the 1/2 Infantry CP as seemingly coming from the SW. All during this time the operational APC's of the 2d and 3d plts were trying to maneuver and shoot down snipers. The APC's could hardly move because of the extremely thick jungle and many infantrymen lying all around the carriers. When we did try to lay down some base of fire against snipers infantry would yell that we would hit there people. We couldn't fire extensive 50 cal. fire into the trees because there were so many helicopters overhead. One Army Dust-Off ship tried to come into the clearing but must have been hit as it started to behave erratically and then pulled out of the area. Someone then came up to the rear of my APC and said Colonel Barry, Bde C), wanted to see me. I moved up the line, encountered the burning medic track and 1SG Barrow who told me that the medics were OK and the Colonel was just ahead behind the next APC. I reported to the Colonel, he asked for a status report, I told him about the 2d plt, but would have to check on the number of operational APC's. I found out that the troop had ten APC's running at that time. Colonel Barry told me to load all wounded and dead and move to a clearing to the west down a trail which he pointed out. Just as I got up to turn back to the medic track, the XO of the 1/2 who was moving across the clearing towards the west shot down in a hail of enemy fire. I moved out to drag him into the medic track and a medic grabbed his other arm and helped me carry him to the rear of the medic track and Sp4 Harris started to give him mouth to mouth breathing, but I believed he was dead. When I started to get up and return to Colonel Barry some Cev trooper grabbed no down behind an APC, as he fired his L-1A2 to the west into some trees. I got up and told Sgt Shipley to line up the 2d platoon and move out the APC's to the west as they were loaded with wounded. I gave PSG Barrow the same word and told Sgt Dennis in my track to get the word to the 3d platoon. We all then started loading wounded and dead. I recall many people pitching in to help load the tracks.
There were a few others who were in a daze and wouldn't do anything. PSG Barrow and I would move from track to track loading wounded and urging people to hurry and to find more wounded. I told him that we would take out all our dead also and for him to load up Sgt Candeo's body. He was helping to carry the wounded, in particular one man (Steven Bird) with his foot just about blown off. I asked Bird what happened and he said he had kicked a grenade under a seat inside his APC. I ordered Sgt Barrow to get on the last 2d plt APC commanded by Sgt Smith. We also put the XO, Maj Clark's body on this track. The 3d platoon was then clear of the base camp area and the 3d platoon loaded some more wounded and prepared to move out with the last of the troop.

At this time the troop had 10 operational APC's which moved to a clearing and established a perimeter in conjunction with an infantry platoon. The 3d platoon was in bad shape and Sgt Smith was put in charge of reorganizing it and securing a position of the clearing. Later Lt Rezock assumed command when more replacements arrived. The 3d platoon was in good shape and they were alert to return, get water and go back into the base camp. During this time the troop directed many helicopters and Dust-Offs into this clearing. I controlled the Dust-Off aircraft initially and then worked at establishing a perimeter and reorganizing the troop. Also during this time the 3d platoon and the troop (-) made many runs into the base camp to bring in a variety of supplies and take out dead and wounded. In coordination with the CO Company A 1/2 Inf a defensive plan was worked out for the night around the clearing. Those APC's not involved in resupplying and medical evacuation were used to beat down the brush and expand the clearing. T... m... ... ... ... ... ... 

The 3-3 1/2 Inf called prior to darkness and wanted all APC's to be pulled back into the base camp with all of Company A 1/2. I asked him if he didn't want to keep the clearing secured as it was the only evacuation/resupply point and it held a large stock of ammo. He later gave the troop the mission of holding the LZ in coordination with the CO A 1/2.

The troop continued to bring in supplies and evacuate wounded throughout the night from the base camp. The last Dust-Off aircraft came into the clearing at 2330 and the situation was quiet throughout the remainder of the hours of darkness.

/s/ STEVE SIONTERRY
/t/ STEVE SIONTERRY
Capt, Armor
 Commanding
On 25 August 1966 South Vietnam at 0725 hours, while the 2d Platoon Troop C, 1st Sqdn 4th Cav was attached to 1/2 Infantry Bn, we received a message over 55.65 frequency that a patrol had penetrated into a VC Base Camp of Bn size and were pinned down. At this time the 1/2 Bn CO gave me a fix order to carry up with their C Company. We loaded up their unit of about 35 men into our (7) APC's and (1) tank with Co C CO in charge and headed due west. We were breaking trail with our one M4A3 tank in the lead. We were running through very thick jungle for about 1 hour and heading right into the smoke of the battle. We did not know exactly when we penetrated the enemy outer perimeter but found ourselves in with the pinned down patrol. We off loaded the Infantry to secure a position while we loaded up with the dead and wounded of the patrol unit. We unloaded the infantry unit again. When we thought we had all the men on board our APC's we headed out of the Base Camp due east. Up until this time we had surprised the enemy and he was not ready for us. For this reason we received very little fire. We proceeded west and ran into a swampy area. Out tank tried to turn to avoid this obstacle, on turning he either was hit by mortar fire or a mine (not sure of facts) and lost a track. The platoon Sgt's APC C-20 then tried to maneuver around to the tanks left. Due to the marshy area and heavy foliage he also threw a track. It was at this time that the infantry CO found that he was missing a platoon of men and that they were still back in the VC Base Camp where they had off loaded. He then radioed me that we were to turn back into the base camp again. I then had to call my own troop CO and tell him of my troubles and ask what I was to do with the tank and APC. My orders from him were to off load the 50 caliber, IL-60 and as much ammo as we could. We put these guns on our other APC's with their crews on each of the remaining 6 APC's and headed back into the VC Camp. By this time the VC had regrouped and knew we would return for the rest of the troops he had pinned down. As we hit the center of his camp this time he was ready for us. He was in the tunnels and trenches, and had snipers in the trees. We did not have a tank to lead the way and for this reason we had to return the same way we came in. When we go to the infantry platoon they were all over our previous trail and every time we tried to get out of our APC's to move then we were hit by mortar and hand grenades. I lost 3 TC's at this time. The VC were popping up out of the spider holes all around us and lobbing grenades into the APC hatches. Pvt's were taking command of the tracks and calling me to ask for help. My answer to them was to perch up their wounded and take salt pills and drink water, and pray, pray, pray! There was no help for anyone. By this time we had so many wounded in the track that none were passing out from heat exhaustion. I got out and rode my way forward to where the Infantry CO was and while talking with him my platoon Sgt and myself were hit with scrapnel. I thought we were near an entrance to a tunnel so I told them to get back a ways out of grenade range. I then went back to my track to get another 1st Aid Pack and then started making all the wounded get out of the APC with the help of the infantry and the crew members not wounded. I found a shaded place away from the holes and tunnels. I radioed my CO and told him that we had tried to clear a place for a Dust Off area but that two of my TC's were hit while running into the trees with either mortar or hand grenades, and also that the APC's just were not heavy enough for the job.
I tried to fire about 20 different AR 15's and did not fire the first round. Every M-14 I got my hands on fired with no trouble at all. After getting as many of the wounded to this one location I seen that they needed salt and water so I started making the rounds to my tracks for salt and 5 gal water cans and canteens. It was at this time that I needed help from the few men I had who were not wounded and that about 5 or 6 were so far gone from fear and heat exhaustion that I had to literally kick their tails to make them get up and move to firing positions with the M-60 and M-14 and to help men carry the water cans. Some of them had given up and were as good as dead then, I told PFC Edy to get off his ass and to help me because he has always been a good GI. It was then I found that he was deaf and was willing to work under fire with me by hand and arm signals.

Sometime in the afternoon a tank from the 3d platoon 4th Cav found its way to our location and tried to clear a place for a Dust-Off. He was doing a good job until he threw a track. One airforce helicopter then tried to land but was hit before it touched the ground and crashed.

A little later in the day the Medical Track, 63, and the CO's track made its way to us. As I ground guided the Medical APC in close to my wounded he stopped, dropped his rear ramp. As I started to assist Sp4 Harris in removing the litters his track was hit and he and his other medics were blown out the rear of the APC. At this time the equipment inside the APC caught fire. After getting Harris away from his track and to the place where I had the other wounded I returned to his track to try to remove the medical goods and put out the fire. My platoon medic came up and I throw supplies at him and he went back to the wounded. I could only pull out the things that were burning because the batteries had shorted and were giving off a gas, plus the small arms ammo was exploding. I then went to my 23 track after more water. When I opened the rear door I found Sgt Condles with his face blown away. But I needed his 3 or 4 cans of water, so I could only feel remorse for him and started dragging the 5 gal water can out over the top of him. It was at this time my CO arrived and seen what I was trying to do and asked who the body was. I told him it was Sgt Condles and that I needed salt pills bad. He said to come to his track that he had a bottle. As he left for his track and I was still removing water cans from the track, the infantry CO was making his way across the open trail when he was hit by sniper fire from a tree. I don't know where or how I came into possession of it but I was shooting at the sniper with a 38 Colt revolver. I seen a body fall from the tree. I then carried the water to my wounded and went to the CO's track for salt pills. It was about this time that infantry reinforcements arrived. With their arrival we loaded up all the wounded of ours and the infantry's. I put the unarmed in the good tracks. I think I still had five running at this time. After seeing that all the men I could find were loaded, I caught the last APC and we moved back east again. With what weapons we still had firing we cut loose into the tops of trees for cover from the snipers.

PSG Barrow was placed on an evacuation aircraft after reaching a clearing approximately 1000 meters SW of the VC Base Camp.