In early May 1966, a Civilian Irregular Defense Group patrol, led by U.S. Special Forces personnel, killed a Viet Cong Lieutenant about two kilometers southeast of 100 XII District Town, along National Route 13 in northern BINH DUC Province. Among the papers discovered on the body of this officer was a war and a plan for the attack on 100 XII District Town and the Special Forces Camp by three Viet Cong Regiments and one North Vietnamese Army Regiment. The discovery of this document marked the beginning of a prolonged campaign along National Route 13, leading from Coulper through BINH DUC, the provincial capital of BINH DUC Province; onward to the north through 6TH TANH District Town; through 100 XIII District Town; through 10TH SAI (BINH) the provincial capital of BINH DUC Province; and finally north through the 100 XIIII Plantation to the Cambodian Border.

On 17 May, a CDF Force and one battalion of the 9th MV Regiment engaged a two battalion VC force which included the 27th Battalion 726th Regiment and possibly a battalion of the 271st Regiment. The action, which took place vicinity XU 5704, about two kilometers from the Cambodian Border, resulted in heavy casualties by both sides.

(U) The 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, was dispatched to 100 XII with three infantry battalions and one artillery battalion on 19 and 20 May 1966. Between 19 and 26 May, this brigade established a defensive perimeter around the 100 XII airstrip and patrolled and conducted search operations westward to the Cambodian Border without substantial contact. The brigade returned to its base at 100 XII on 26 May 1966.

Subsequently, intelligence from several sources indicated that the VC, having postponed their attack, intended to go ahead with their original plans. Agents reported through the Vietnamese Army that the VC were inaugurating a campaign to last from 26 May until 20 August to destroy friendly forces along Route 13; to interdict the route and to lay an en or attack 100 XII, HAI QUAN, 10TH BINH, 6TH KHE, and 500 BB. VC forces involved consisted of six regiments. It was assumed that those regiments included three of the 9th Viet Cong Division, 271st, 272st, and 273rd; and another grouping of the 101st, 141st, and possibly the 250th Regiments of the North Vietnamese Army.

The 3d Brigade returned to 100 XII on 2 June 1966 with one infantry battalion and one artillery battalion. At this time, the 5th KHE Division Commander, with headquarters at HAI QUAN, informed the Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division, that he believed the Viet Cong would attack the 100 XIII provincial capital, 10TH SAI. The decision was made to move one troop of the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, with two ground units to 10TH SAI.

On 2 June, the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry was moved to 100 XIII for assignment to infantry rotation force and A Troop, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, moved from 100 XIII through 6TH TANH to 10TH SAI. Although road blocks, mines, and sniper fire were encountered Troop arrived at 6TH TANH about 1300 without significant contact.
UNCLASSIFIED

At this point the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry was moved by helicopters to the "C" Hill position, placing it in a better position to react to any engagement between "C" Hill and Hill QUA. At 1400 hours, approximately 12 kilometers south of Hill QUA in a densely wooded area, the lead tank received a direct hit from a 75mm recoilless rifle. The ambush by all three battalions of the 726th Vijet Gong Regiment was triggered. During the three and a half hours duration of the battle, Troop A was supported by a number of airstrikes, and 105 mm, 155 mm, and 5" artillery. The 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry was committed in an airborne assault to the north of the battle area and swept both sides of the woods in support of the cavalry. Coupled with the valiant fight by A Troop, these measures destroyed 90% of the 1st Battalion 2726th Regiment, including the battalion commander. Fifty percent of the 2d Battalion was destroyed, while the 3d Battalion was generally south of the main action. The chief of staff, 2726th Regiment, re-artillery was also killed during the engagement. Troop A and the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry continued to hold Hill QUA the following day.

(1) On 11 June 1966, A Company, 2d Battalion, 26th Infantry committed one rifle platoon with a 124mm reconnaissance platoon in an airborne recon operation on the western side of the LOC KHE air strip to affect a link up. Eight contact was made at 0930 and about noon, C Company was committed to assist. By 1400 hours it was apparent that the VC force consisted of at least one battalion and the remainder of the 2d Battalion, 26th Infantry moved by foot to the LOC KHE Plantation. Receive air and artillery fire prior disabled the infantry in overwhelming the positions and by 1600 the VC withdrew leaving 95 dead and numerous weapons on the battlefield. Subsequent reports from plantation workers and captured VC revealed that the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry had destroyed over 50% of the 1st Battalion, 726th Regiment.

(2) The 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry under 0.601 of the 1st Brigade conducted an air mobile raid on 21 June in the area of a reported rice storage area along 0.1900 River west of the KHE Plantation. This raid discovered 1506 tons of rice and large quantities of other supplies. A second unit, the 2d Battalion, 26th Infantry, was committed before the operation terminated on 26 June.

(3) The 1st Infantry Division was deployed, on 30 June to 3 & D enemy location. The 1st Battalion 26th Infantry was conducting operations to the northwest. The 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry, under division control, with attached 1st Squadron, 4th Cav lry (-), was conducting area reconnaissance operations and infantry reconnaissance patrolling in the general area of the NAM LOI - AL LOC Plantation co. The 1st Battalion, 10th Infantry was securing engineers finishing the airstrip at HMN TAN. The 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, under control of the Division Artillery Command, continued its pacification operations in the NAM LOI area with the NAM DUC Province Chief and the 7th HMN Regiment.
About 0600 on 2 June, Troops D and E, 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry proceeded north from TAN QUAN and deployed on NUC adjacent to the damaged COLOC bridge. The column then moved north to conduct an armed recovery mission along Route 13 and secure engineer equipment to be brought on the return trip from HCM to the bridge site. Four thousand meters from the bridge site, Troop D started receiving rocket fire, small arms, and mortar fire and this was exacerbated by all three battalions of the 271st Viet Cong Regiment. The Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division was notified of this action while he was with the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry at TAN QUAN for a fixed-wing airlift to COLOS. At 1020 the 3d Brigade Commander was instructed to react to the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry from its operation at the COLOS BE Airstrip at COLOS. At 1000 hours the 3d Brigade Commander ordered to move the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry and the Brigade Command Post to COLOS in that order and upon arrival to take command of the operation. By 1330 hours, the 2d Battalion, 13th Infantry, had been committed into a landing zone north of the cavalry and placed under the operational control of the squadron commander. It is interesting to note that when the battle started, the Commanding Officer, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry was under the COLOS of the 2d Battalion, 13th Infantry; however, because he was in command on the ground, the 2d Battalion, 13th Infantry was placed under his command. The 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry crossed COLOS by fixed-wing aircraft at 1530 hours and by 1600 hours was introduced by airborne assault into an LZ west of the battle area. By 1620 hours, the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry had come into COLOS and was prepared for an airborne assault. The 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry was ordered to move from TAN QUAN by fixed-wing aircraft to COLOS and assume the mission of security for COLOS - TAN QUAN. With the infantry sweeping north and west, the U.S. and ARVN cavalry blocking along Route 13 and the road south of the battle area, and air strikes and artillery covering the routes of withdrawal, the 271st Viet Cong Regiment was defeated by 1700 hours and began withdrawing to the northwest. Eighty-eight close air support sorties were flown in support of the battle and the 6" and 155mm batteries expended 277 and 216 rounds respectively. The Viet Cong bodies counted on 30 June totaled 297 killed, due to bad weather on 1 July, the airborne assault by the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry into an LZ farther to the west did not take place until 1100 hours. This landing was made into an area in which VC prisoners indicated the 271st Regiment was only a few miles away. A heavy preparation by air and artillery was fired, including fires from one battery which had been lifted into the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry LZ by 37-57. Additional wounded VC were picked up in the area, but there was no evidence of a major force in the immediate area of this landing zone.

At 1400 hours, 1 July, the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry was lifted by assault helicopters from their perimeter along Route 13 into two LZ's farther to the northeast. At 1600 hours, A Company proceeded to a major trail crossing and became heavily engaged. C Company and the Recon Platoon were sent to reinforce A Company. Company B was 1500 meters farther to the north and the battalion command post was 1000 meters to the north. Companies A and C received a heavy volume of mortar and automatic weapons fire against their perimeter during the early evening. During the night a VC battalion surrounded the two companies. The battalion headquarters had no significant contact.
UNCLASSIFIED

Page 4

On 2 July, the VC launched a series of five assaults against the 12th Company, C Company, and the 3rd Battalion. The 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, was sent from the south to link up with the 1st Battalion, 2nd Infantry. Their attack was repelled with losses to the 2d Battalion, 273d Infantry, that included 72 killed. The 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, minus one company at the artillery base, was assembled on Route 13 and held to an 12 east of the battle. The leading zone was secured by the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, and the attached infantry companies of the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, At the time, the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry was ordered to move by air to the west, while the 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, proceeded to the north. The 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry, 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry, and 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, probed north and west to the coast. During the night, the 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry, moved south and west to the coast. The 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, 2d Battalion, 26th Infantry, and 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, were assembled at the 101st Airborne Division. The 1st Battalion, 4th Cavalry, (-) assembled at the 101st Airborne Division. The 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, 2d Battalion, 26th Infantry, 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry, and 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, and 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, were assembled on Route 13. These troops stood down for two days for rest, resupply, and maintenance of armored vehicles. The first chapter of the Campaign along Route 13 was closed.

U) While the battles with the 271st and 273d Regiments took place north of Hoi Quan, the 273d Regiment left partially recovered from its battle south of Hoi Quan, moved to an area near 0800 Thanh and 100 Thanh. Further reports indicate that another regiment may have taken up positions along Route 13 between 0800 Thanh and 100 Thanh. When the 273d Viet Cong Regiment launched 1 Troop, it may have expected a soft counterattack and instead ran into an armored troop. The diary taken from the body of a VC captain from the 273d Regiment after the battle on 30 June indicated that his mission was to destroy U.S. armored forces on Route 13. It thus appears that the VC are under orders to fight and win the battle of National Route 13 and that they intend to do so regardless of losses. The remaining chapters in the Campaign along National Route 13 are yet to be written.

The remainder of this document describes the battles along Highway 13 and covers the battle of 9 July near the Mekong rubber plantation, and the battle of 26 August which did not involve any squadron elements under squadron control.

UNCLASSIFIED
Combat After Action Report (OP EL PASO II)


3. General: 1/4 Cav conducted combat movement to reposition 1st Infantry Division elements; conducted security missions and continuous recon in force operations.
   b. Task Organization: Task organization during this phase of OP EL PASO consisted of: Troop A commanded by Cpt Ralph H. Sturges; Troop B commanded by Lt James C. Flores; Troop C commanded by 1st Lt Eyles Ellongborg; Troop D commanded by Maj Clyde H. Bryan; 3d Trp commanded by Cpt Ronald Davidson. Troop A was the only unit involved. TF control consisted of LTC Leonard L. Levasse, Squadron commander; Maj George E. Taylor, Squadron S-3; Cpt Ed Full, Squadron S-2; Cpt Alex L. Groeno, Squadron S-1 and Cpt William Groeno, Squadron S-4.

4. Intelligence:
   a. Available information prior to commencement of OP EL PASO II: Information had been received of the presence of three VC main force Regiments: 271, 272, and 273 were active in the area from LOC NHH (XT 7406) to LOC (HON QUAN) (XT 7588) west to the Cambodian border. Other information had been received that VC local forces had been engaged in interdicting Highway 13 using road blocks and tax collecting points from LAI KHE (XT 7738) north to the Cambodian border.
   b. Enemy Situation:
      (1) On 8 June 1966, 2/18 Infantry was moved to LAI KHE Airfield as an infantry reaction force and troop A 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry commenced its move from LAI KHE through CHON TIANN to HON QUAN. Although road blocks, mines, and minor harassment were encountered, Troop A arrived at CHON TIANN about 1300 without significant contact. At this point 2/18th Infantry was moved by helicopters to the HON QUAN Airfield, placing it in a better position to react to any engagement between CHON TIANN and HON QUAN. At 1400 hours approximately 12 kms south of HON QUAN in a densely wooded area. The lead tank hit a mine which triggered an ambush along three kms of road by the 272 Regiment. The fighting lasted for three and a half hours with air strikes assisting the unit. The 2/18 Inf was committed in an air mobile assault to the north of the battle area and swept both sides of the woods in support of the cavalry. Results indicated that 90% of the 1st Battalion, 272d Regiment, including the Battalion Commander, 50% of the 2d battalion was destroyed, while the 3d Battalion was generally south of the major action. The chief of staff 272d Regiment reportedly was also killed during the engagement. Troop A and 2/18 moved to HON QUAN the next day.
      (2) On 11 June 1966, A Company, 2d Bn, 25th Inf committed one rifle platoon with a CIDG reconnaissance platoon in an air mobile reconnaissance operation to the western edge of the LOC NHH Plantation. The remainder of A Company moved by foot from the LOC NHH Airfield to effect a link up. Light contact was made at 0900 and about noon, C Co was committed to assist. By 1400 hrs it was apparent that the VC force consisted of at least one battalion and the remainder of the 2d Bn, 26th Inf moved by foot to the LOC NHH Plantation.
b. 9-18 June 1966. Troop A and the 2/18 Inf conducted daily recon in force operations throughout the area of operation with negative results. Security was also provided for the NOK QUAN Airstrip.

8. Supporting Forces: Before contact the column had continuous visual reconnaissance from an airborne Forward Air Controller. Upon enemy contact continuous combat air support was rendered by the Air Force.

9. Results:
   a. US Casualties: KIA 15; WIA: 34.
   b. US Equipment Destroyed:
      4 crew served weapons.
      9 small arms weapons.
      2 personnel carriers (M113's)
   c. VC Casualties: KIA: 170 (BC), 250 (est), 4 VC captured.
   d. VC Equipment Captured:
      12 crew served weapons
      30 small arms weapons
      18 ChiCom grenades.

10. Administrative matters:
   a. Administrative and Logistical orders provided were adequate.
      (1) Supply: Supply of Class I, III, and V was carried by troops as basic load. Resupply was moved from Lai Kho and Phu Loi by air craft.
      (2) Maintenance: Maintenance of vehicles was greatly assisted by the arrival of an ordance contact team from the 70lst maintenance Battalion.
      (3) Treatment of Casualties: Dustoff aircraft provided immediate evacuation to rear areas for proper medical treatment.
      (4) Transportation: Transportation of all items of resupply was accomplished by aircraft.

11. Conclusions and Lessons Learned:
   a. Infantry in front of the fighting elements limits the fire power of the Cavalry units. Infantry units should be employed in a separate sector.
   b. Armored columns on the move should have a minimum of 1 fire team overhead. It is desirable that a FAC with immediate air strikes be available.
   c. The headquarters elements should be utilized for evacuation of the wounded, leaving the combat vehicles at the point of contact.
Massive air and artillery fire power assisted the infantry in overrunning the positions and by 1900 the VC withdrew leaving 98 dead and numerous weapons on the battle field. Subsequent reports from plantation workers and captured VC revealed that the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry had destroyed over 50% of the 1st Battalion, 273d Regiment.

c. Terrain and Weather:
(1) Terrain: The area of operations can be characterized as flat with many streams throughout the area, wooded areas run from heavy dense jungle growth to areas dominated by rubber tree plantations. Secondary roads are trafficable even during prolonged periods of wet weather. Cross country trafficability in from good to excellent in dry periods, but extremely limited during wet periods.

(2) Weather: Characterized by early morning fog clearing off by mid-morning. Rain showers occurred every day from light drizzles to heavy showers with occasional thunder storms of intense but short duration.

5. Mission: 1/4 Cavalry (-) completed all missions assigned. Missions consist of: convoy escort and security while positioning 1st Infantry Division combat elements; conducting several and extensive S&D missions; and recon in force operations. 1/4 Cavalry (-) was to locate VC/HRV forces, capture and/or destroy them and their equipment to prevent the VC from escaping to the Cambodian border, and reconnaissance of National Route 13 preventing sabotage and mining incidents along the highway, to prevent VC/HRV forces from mounting a front offensive directed against U.S. and ARVN base camps and subjecting villagers of BIHN LONG to VC taxation.

6. Concept of Operations: To locate and stop VC forces within BIHN LONG Province from harassing U.S. and GVN forces. To conduct recon patrols and S&D missions in the area of operations in conjunction with the 2/18 Infantry.

7. Execution:
(a) June 1966: Troop A executed a combat movement along National Route 13 in order to strengthen U.S. forces in the BIHN LONG Province. Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance by fire was used in most areas. Troop A became OICOM 3d Brigade when they arrived in its TAOR. In a heavily wooded area approximately 12 km south of AH LOC the lead tank hit a mine and simultaneously, the entire column came under heavy mortar, recoilless rifle and automatic weapons fire. The VC force estimated in regimental size was later confirmed as the 272d VC main force regiment. The VC forces were armed with recoilless rifles, anti-tank weapons, mortars, 50 caliber machine guns and small arms. Initial contact was made around 1400 hours. Continuing air strikes were placed upon the enemy as well as the organic cavalry weapons. The 2/18 Infantry linked up and established a perimeter for the night. U.S. casualties were light and two APC's destroyed. VC losses were 105 KIA (EC), 250 KIA (est), 3 VCC, and several crew served weapons captured.
INTRODUCTION

The 272d VC main force Regiment was defeated on 8 June 1966, in a densely wooded area along National Route 13, referred to as Base Mark 69. The VC were attempting to stop the efforts of the 1st Infantry Division in the AN LOC, LOC KMH area.

BACKGROUND

Operation EL PASO II began on 2 June 1966 when intelligence indicated that three Viet Cong and one North Vietnamese regiments were poised to resume their "Monsoon Campaign" by attacking GVN and US Special Forces compounds in LOC THAI, DONG QUAI, LOC KMH and SONG BE. Because of this threat, commanding general, II Field Force, Vietnam directed one infantry and one artillery battalion to be employed to LOC KMH to strengthen the defensive in these areas. No significant battle had been fought prior to 8 June 1966.

The 3d Brigade 1st Infantry Division had been dispatched to LOC KMH with three infantry battalions and one artillery battalion. Between 19 and 26 May the 3d Bde established a defensive perimeter around the LOC KMH airstrip and patrolled and conducted search operations westward to the Cambodian border with substantial contact. The 3d Brigade returned to its base on 26 May 1966 at LAI KHE.

Subsequently, intelligence from a number of sources indicated that the VC, having postponed their attack, intended to go ahead with their original plans. Reports reported through the Vietnamese Army that the VC were inaugurating a campaign to last from 20 May until 20 August to destroy friendly forces along Route 13 to interdict the route; to harass or attack LOC KMH, DONG QUAI, CHON THAI, DONG THAI and SONG BE. VC forces involved consisted of six regiments. It was assumed that these regiments included three of the 9th Viet Cong Division, 272d, 271st, and 273d, and another grouping of the 101st, 141st and possibly the 250th regiments of PAVN.

The 5th ARVN Division Commander with headquarters at PHU LOI, informed the Commanding General 1st Infantry Division that he believed that the Viet Cong would attack the BLIII KMH Provincial Capital, DONG QUAI. This led to the decision to move Troop A, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry with two ground units to DONG QUAI. The 3d Battalion 18th Infantry was moved to LAI KHE airfield as an infantry reaction force as Troop A commenced its move from PHU LOI, through LAI KHE and CHON THAI to DONG QUAI.

THE BATTLE OF BEACH MARK 69

On 8 June 1966 Troop A 1st Squadron 4th Cavalry departed PHU LOI at 0700 enroute to DONG QUAI, KMH, where there existed a threat of a Viet Cong monsoon offensive. Under the direction of LTC Leonard L. Leaven, above then in a OH 13 helicopter, the troop proceeded up the old road bed (vic XT 839191) (see map 41) to LAI KHE rather than use highway 13 the scene of many mining incidents. At about 0805 the lead tank of the 1st Platoon hit a mine (vic XT 837241), with no resulting casualties, but the vehicle was disabled.
At this time an APC of the second platoon was experiencing mechanical difficulties and the decision was made to send both vehicles back to F.U. LOI.

When the column resumed its northward move it left the railroad bed and moved across country. The third platoon took the lead from this point and moved on to M.I. 220 to refuel. Two vehicles dropped out of the column and were picked up by the trail party and brought forward.

After refueling the column pushed north on Highway 13 out of M.I. 220. The AWB got stuck at the north check point of M.I. 220 and was left for the trail party to retrieve. The troop passed through CIA THIR at 1300 hours and had made no enemy contact. The decision was made to push on to CIA 347.

At about 1415 hours the 3d platoon lead vehicle hit a mine (vic HT 766792, see log). A short time before a claymore had been detonated but no casualties resulted. Almost simultaneously the entire column came under intense small arms, automatic weapons, mortar and recoilless rifle fire. Lt Joseph Hale, 3d Plt. Cmdr., reported that he was in heavy contact with an undeterminable force. Capt. Ralph Sturges, troop commander immediately ordered the 2d platoon, led by Lt. David Kintner, to come up and reinforce the third platoon.

Reports indicated that the Viet Cong were employed along 3,000 meters of the highway with the majority of their concentration on the west. The troop commander's vehicle was hit by recoilless rifle rounds wounding the driver, Sp 4. James Desery. The observer, Sgt. Vic Scapitalite, took over the driving responsibility. Looking forward the crew could see a recoilless rifle crew taking aim on their vehicle. All of a sudden the entire area became very quiet as SFC Vernon Cole commander of the attack on the ground threw an grenade. The Viet Cong let loose with a burst from his 132 flame thrower APC roasting the VC to a crisp.

The crew moved forward into some high ground and began to set up a perimeter. The first platoon leader Lt. Louis Boucul, reported that one of his vehicles was experiencing mechanical difficulties (vic HT 766792), and that they were leaving a tank with it for security. Further up the road a 1st platoon APC was blazing fire resulting from several hits. At 1530 hours the 1st platoon leader Capt. Richard Wetzel reported that the Viet Cong had captured an APC and had driven it off into the woods with the headlights on. Fire was not immediately called in on the vehicle for fear that a U.S. soldier might still be in the vehicle. A letter revealed that it was the vehicle in which 1st Sgt. Michael Copes had been seriously injured in when it took two direct hits from a recoilless rifle.

Compiling all of the reports in the perimeter Capt. Sturges realized that there was one tank stuck south of the 1st platoon tank and APC that had been under sporadic fire. Under the capable guidance of Lt. Kintner the evacuation of the wounded personnel was organized.

With a lull in the fighting Capt. Sturges called for his trail party, which had been held up at CIA THIR to come forward. The trail party, headed by the troop executive officer Lt. Donald Copes reached the first stuck tank and retrieved it with no difficulty. At this point the JDC was emplaced on the highway to brief Lt. Copes on the tactical situation and the latest reports on enemy locations.
Radio contact had been lost with the 1st platoon tank and APC but suddenly the voice of SFC Eugene Blair, 1st platoon, could be heard requesting assistance. Capt. Sturdivit immediately diverted the air force jets to SFC Blair's position and SFC Blair called then in very close to his position due to attempts by the Viet Cong to storm his position. Then the VC were driven off. SFC Blair was assured that the trail party would soon link up with him. Prior to this SFC Blair was in the infantryman for 17 years, but never rode inside of a tank.

When the trail party reached vic. (15756722) the lead vehicle hit a mine seriously wounding the driver, SPC Hugh Oliver. The vehicle commander exchanged drivers and the column moved on. It went about 75 meters further and hit another mine at which time the trail party came under mortar, recoilless rifle and automatic weapons fire. The tank took a direct hit and burst into flames throwing the vehicle commander SPC Charles Norris clear of the tank. SPC Norris had a brief struggle with a VC in the bushes and then reached the safety of an APC. As soon as he got inside of the vehicle a grenade was tossed inside, but an alert Grenadier, tossed it out before it exploded.

The column again started north leaving the burning tank behind and picked up the first platoon vehicles before crossing into the perimeter. Specialist Oliver was dead, badly burned and blind in one eye. Specialist Oliver was the first driver of the tank that led the trail party. It was believed at first that Oliver was killed when the mortar round hit the vehicle, but as he explained, he was thrown into the jungle unconscious. When he regained his senses he could hear the VC running off into the woods and the vehicle moving off so he ran back to the road and climbed into the still burning tank and drove it into the troop perimeter.

Shortly after contact had been made the 2/19 Infantry battalion was airlifted from 151/150 to assist Troop A. The only suitable landing zone was a considerable distance to the north so consequently the battalion did not reach Troop A until after the fighting had subsided. The 2/19 Infantry immediately secured the area for VC bodies, and then tied in with Troop A on the perimeter.

The fighting lasted for four (4) hours resulting in American losses of 14 NVA's and 37 NVA. The 105TH Regiment which was engaged suffered 105 KIA (DC) with an additional 350 estimated killed. Troop A had 2 APC's destroyed, and two tanks badly damaged.
FIR SUPPORT

There was a minimum of two F.A.C on station at all times. These F.A.C's were in constant communication with the squadron commander and the troop commander. At the time initial contact was made there was a flight of fighters high in the clouds on the way to another area. These fighters were quickly diverted to the battle area. The battle occurred in an area which was outside the fan of the artillery at CAON F.T.A. and the artillery at HOB J.A.N. Consequently it was strictly an Air Force show with no artillery.

From the initial air strike, close air support was continuous and unlimited. A total of 43 sorties were flown with 17 flights of fighter-bombers.

Ordinance expended included:
- 26,240 lbs high explosive
- 20,500 lbs napalm
- 13,160 lbs frag bombs
- 24 canisters CBU

There was a minimum of 2 UH-1B fire teams air/ground at all times.

RESULTS

Enemy losses included:
- 170 VC KIA (DC)
- 250 VC KIA (Est)
- 4 VC captured
- 30 Small arms
- 12 Crew served weapons
- 78 Chi Con grenades

Friendly losses:

1300R:
- 13 KIA
- 30 WIA

D Co 1st Inf:
- 2 KIA
- 4 WIA
**SECOND PLATOON**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Medal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>COLLETT</td>
<td>BRONZE STAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>CORBIN</td>
<td>LNAME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>COPES</td>
<td>SILVER STAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>KAPFFERT</td>
<td>LNAME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPT</td>
<td>STURGIS</td>
<td>BRONZE STAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>KINKEAD</td>
<td>SILVER STAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>BAKER</td>
<td>BRONZE STAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>MEDINA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>KINLEY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>SANDERS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>DEPOGGI</td>
<td>LNAME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>GUILLAIN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>LECHELOR (TRF B)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>LUKE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>WILLIAM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>DOWNS (TRF B)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>TULII</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>KLEARER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>LOGAN (TRF B)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>COUCH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**THIRD PLATOON**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Medal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>BLAIR</td>
<td>SILVER STAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>SCHLIEER</td>
<td>BRONZE STAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>LORENZ</td>
<td>BRONZE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>LYNCH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>DURRIS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>FREEMAN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>SCHRATZER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>BOWLING</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>RODRIGUE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>SILVERA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>LUNDIN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>MC GLOKIN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>SLIVERS</td>
<td>BRONZE STAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>LIMAR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>OLIVER</td>
<td>SILVER STAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>LUKES</td>
<td>BRONZE STAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>SMITH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>SORRENSON</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>LILES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>LILES (TRF C)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>HORNIS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>LOSSEE</td>
<td>LNAME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>JARVIS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>MC CARRIY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>HORNIS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>SLUTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>CALLER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>RICHARD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1ST ENGINEERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Medal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>DISCHER</td>
<td>BRONZE STAR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
STURGIS, ALLEN H
COPES, RALPH A
DOUTLIP, LOUIS L
HINCKEL, DAVID C
LACE, JOSIAH R

RAPE, MICHAEL
LUHAN, RICHARD L
MEDINA, OSWALDO

SSG 2 SFC 6

MILLER, ALBERT L
JULR, EDWARD F
DREYER, ANDREW W
FISCHER, FRANCIS L
KELLER, WILLY JR
JOHNSON, ROBERT A
JENSEN, THOMAS H
LINDE, ROY F

MC CARTHY, WILLIAM W
HoLLIS, HOWARD H
KORRI, CARL W
KUMMEL, FRANCIS C
SANDERS, DURIS L
SANTA-CRUZ, CARLOS
YARD, JOE E

SGT 25

BECKERT, JOE O
CARRIER, MARVIN R
*COOK, DONALD E
COUCH, RAY C
GUNN, JOHN W
HAYES, WILLIAM H
JENSEN, JOHN C
KICK, PHILIP K
LERN, W. THOMAS
SMITH, ROBERT D
SMITH, JOHN D

SP 5 25

SCOLLING, ROBERT W
CALLON, DONALD L
CURTIS, ALLIS G
*FARNSWORTH, DONALD L
FELSTA, DONALD W

RA 04071394 CPT
RA 05532138 1ST LT
RA 05321630 1ST LT
RA 05227468 1ST LT
RA 05101547 1ST LT
RA 32822488 1ST SG E8
RA 15204799 PSG E7
RA 18355081 PSG E7
RA 21757596
RA 39958294
RA 18590540
RA 12337426
RA 25236619
RA 17422567
RA 54032686
RA 19291595
RA 37816227
RA 37587950
RA 24914580
RA 23786302
RA 17458213
RA 51261405
RA 18359195
RA 27377019
RA 55872838
RA 15494975
RA 25334676
RA 14692943
RA 53292831
RA 14565474
RA 16706467
RA 16588208
RA 19779273
RA 32526909
RA 32593923
RA 12689568
RA 17370224
RA 18325156
RA 18325156
RA 12508814
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>SSN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DE ROSSI, JOSEPH</td>
<td>US 55805092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRANE, JAMES</td>
<td>US 55804980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DILLON, ROBERT P</td>
<td>US 26288667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANZ, ROBERT G</td>
<td>US 51547811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GILKING, BURTON B</td>
<td>RA 16326613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRUBI, DAVID R</td>
<td>RA 15730088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUILLETT, EDWARD L</td>
<td>US 52633945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOWARD, JACK A</td>
<td>RA 17715715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRLERT, RONALD J</td>
<td>US 56380772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVES, SHEPPARD L</td>
<td>US 53408728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JILLS, TERRANCE B</td>
<td>RA 53720970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KESSLER, RICHARD C</td>
<td>US 55822429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KINZER, JOHN E</td>
<td>RA 18690775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANDING, ROLAND L</td>
<td>RA 17663704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOSSEE, LENA J</td>
<td>US 56546695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUSICA, THOMAS H</td>
<td>US 55806743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O'NEIL, JOHN F</td>
<td>US 55034277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NELLYGRAFF, GEORGE R</td>
<td>US 52650890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETERSON, MERRILL 0</td>
<td>RA 17721057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PISKESSINGER, DAVID A</td>
<td>RA 16614675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAICE, KATE</td>
<td>US 56379521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REAG, MILLARD W JR</td>
<td>US 52640264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIVELI, GREG L</td>
<td>US 52649413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROBINSON, JOHN E II</td>
<td>RA 15719619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANDERS, JERRY D</td>
<td>RA 19839833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHADE, RONALD W</td>
<td>RA 13794339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHECZAR, MICHAEL L</td>
<td>RA 16811684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHIEF, GARY R</td>
<td>US 52614620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKYLER, ROBERT C</td>
<td>US 51545452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERRILL, JOSEPH S II</td>
<td>RA 11463048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAC DOMA, ROGER C</td>
<td>RA 19842837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAN REILWICK, LOUIS R SR</td>
<td>US 51543221</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PVT M**

HILLS, FLOYD B                | RA 15424093 |

* Indicate M: KIA on 8 June 1956. Awards to be made posthumously.*
AVID-QH

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (OP EL PASO II)

TO: Commanding Officer
    1st Brigade
    ATTN: S-3
    1st Infantry Division
    APO San Francisco

29 July 1966


2. (U) Dates. 18 June-10 July 1966.

3. (U) General. 1/4 Cav (-) conducted combat movement to reposition 1st Infantry Division elements; conducted extensive S&D missions; and continuous recon in force operations.
   a. Reporting Officer: LTC Lovane, Leonard L.

4. (U) Intelligence.
   a. Available information prior to commencement of OP EL PASO II: Information had been received of the presence of three VC main force Regiments, 271, 272, and 273 were active in the area from LOC HINH (XU 7408), All LOC (HION QUIN) (XT 7538) west to the Cambodian border. Other information had been received that VC local forces had been engaged in disrupting Highway 13 using road blocks and taxi collecting points from LAI KHE (XT 7735) north to the Cambodian border.
b. 

b. Enemy Situation:

(1) During the period 13 June through 29 June 1966 there were no significant engagements with VC forces.

(2) On 30 June 1966, Troops B and C along with elements of the 2/18th Infantry engaged elements of the 271st VC main force regiment in the vicinity of XU725020. The battle lasted approximately seven hours. Initial contact came at 090909 when Trp B 1/4 Cav received heavy mortar fire along the length of the column in the vicinity of XU 725020. At 090945, B 1/4 Cav began receiving heavy and intense AW and SA fire from the vicinity of XU 723020, and became heavily engaged when the VC attempted to split the column. C 1/4 Cav and C 2/18 Inf were moved forward to assist Troop B, and also became heavily engaged. The VC employed AW (cal.,50 and 7.62mm), small arms and recoiless rifles. Elements were dug in and concealed on both sides of Highway 13. Enemy losses were 270 VC KIA (BC), 300 KIA (est), seven VCC, weapons captured included 23 crew served weapons, 50 small arms, 1630 rds of SA arms, three rounds for the Soviet Anti-tank grenade launcher RPG-2, one AN/PRC-10 radio, five US protective masks (M17), one hose made protective mask and two 7.62 barreled. All weapons and equipment captured were through the combined efforts of the Cavalry Troops and infantry battalions during the mop-up phase conducted after the battle.

(3) During the period 1 July through 8 July 1966 there were no significant engagements with VC forces by units of the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry.

(4) On 9 July 1966, Troops B and C engaged elements of the 272d VC main force regiment vicinity XU680744. Reinforcing infantry battalions were helilifted into the battle area to seal off escape routes of the VC. Initial contact was made at 091109, and lasted for approximately three hours. Cumulative totals of enemy losses were 239 VC KIA (BC), 300 KIA (est), those were total counts conducted during mop-up operations. Weapons captured by units of the 4th U.S. Cavalry included six US Browning Automatic Rifles, six Soviet 7.62mm SKS Carbines, one US carbine, M1, two Soviet model bolt action rifles, one CMNCOM 11, 7.62mm, three US 11-14 rifles, one 60mm mortar with base plate, and one tripod for a recoiless weapon.

c. Terrain and Weather:

(1) Terrain: The area of operations can be characterized as flat with many streams throughout the area, wooded areas run from heavy dense jungle growth to areas dominated by rubber tree plantation. Secondary roads are trafficable even during prolonged periods of wet weather. Cross country trafficability is from good to excellent in dry periods, but extremely limited during the wet periods.

(2) Weather: Characterized by early morning fog clearing off by mid-morning. Rain showers occurred every day from light drizzles to heavy showers with occasional thunderstorms of intense but short duration.

d. Fortifications: None.

c. CA/Psy ops: Sick calls were conducted in numerous villages by the squadron medical surgeons. No leaflet drops were conducted by units of the squadron.
5. **Mission:** 1/4 Cav (-) completed all missions assigned. Missions consisted of: Convoy escort and security while prepositioning 1st Infantry Division combat elements; conducting several and extensive S&D missions; and reconnaissance in force operations. 1/4 Cav (-) was to locate VC/RVN forces, capture and/or destroy them and their equipment, to prevent the VC from escaping to the Cambodian border, and reconnaissance of National Route 13 Preventing sabotage and mining incidents along the highway, to prevent VC/RVN forces from mounting a monsoon offensive directed against US and ARVN base camps and subjecting villagers of BINH LONG Province to VC taxation.

6. **Concept of Operation.** To locate and stop VC forces within BINH LONG Province from harassing US and GVN forces. To create a friendship with the local villagers and inhabitants of nearby hamlets that were predominantly controlled by the VC. To conduct extensive reconnaissance patrols and S&D operations in the area of operations by strategically positioning and vigorously employing all combat elements of the 1st Sqdn 4th Cavalry. To provide security for other elements of the 1st Infantry Division and to serve as a flexible, highly mobilized counter-attack forces.

7. **Execution:**

a. **190700 June 1966:** 1/4 Cavalry executed OPORD 42-66 (OP EL PASO II), HQ 1/4 Cav, dt 16 June 1966. 1/4 Cav (-) executed combat movement along National Route 13 in order to preposition 1st Infantry Division combat elements. Squadron (-) moved from PHU LOI to NH LOC, securing Highway 13 at critical points. Squadron (-) closed in vicinity Anh LOC/QUAN LOI areas with negative enemy contact. Maximum use of reconnaissance by fire was utilized in known hostile areas. Artillery preparation, TAC CAS and armed helicopters (both CH 47A and UH 1B) fires were used. Upon arrival 3d Bde TAOR, OPCOM 3d Bde.

b. **19-29 June 1966:** 1/4 Cav (-) conducted continuous escort and security missions along National Route 13, provided security for infantry elements conducting S&D operations, established squad-sized ambush patrols jointly with Infantry elements during hours of darkness daily. During this period of time the squadron encountered light enemy contact.

c. **30 June 1966:** 1/4 Cavalry (-) conducted recon in force along Highway 13 while providing security for an AVLB located at critical bridge sight (XT721973). While moving north from BI69 to BM 101 lead elements were taken under fire by heavy enemy forces, at UT 725020. Simultaneously, a heavily armed VC force ambushed the cavalry elements from vic UT 724,008, the VC main force regiment. VC forces were armed with recoilless rifles, antitank weapons, mortars, 50-caliber machine guns, BAR's, and small arms. Initial contact was made at 0930 hours. Continuous CAS, artillery, and organic cavalry fires were placed on enemy positions. These forced the VC to retreat to safe havens along the Cambodian border.
Infantry units were promptly air lifted to possible avenues of escape to event and block the VC forces from retreating to safe havens. Cavalry forces with attached infantry regrouped and set up an assembly area at XT 721972 to pursue fleeing VC forces. Results of an estimated 300 VC LA (est) and 270 VC XIA (BC) and 23 crew served weapons, 50 caliber and all arms (Soviet, ChiCom and US) weapons captured during the battle. US casualties were light and two vehicles destroyed (MCV's). LPI's were posted around perimeter of assembly area with negative enemy contact during the hours of darkness.

d. 1-8 July 1966 Cavalry (-) elements conducted daily reconnaissance in force operations throughout area of operations with attached infantry elements resulting with negative enemy action.

c. 9 July 1966: 1/4 Cav (-) moved from AH LOC on a recon in force mission 090700 July 1966. On movement to HMM TMAH at 1110 hours vicinity XT 362743 Cavalry units were ambushed by the 273rd VC Regiment. Continuous CAS and TAC CAS, artillery preparation, helicopter gunships and organic cavalry fires were placed on enemy positions. Both attached infantry elements and vanguard infantry elements deployed to sweep and block possible avenues of escape. The enemy used recoiled rifles, anti-tank, mortars, various Soviet, Chicom, US automatic and small arms weapons. Contact subsided approximately 1400 hours resulting in estimated 300 VC WIA, 239 VC XIA (BC) and numerous weapons captured, US casualties were light and four APC's destroyed. 1/4 Cav (-) remained in position at XT 393740 and XT 662736 on 9 July 1966. they continued to hold these positions and on 10 July proceed to HMM TMAH and returned to AH LOC the following day with negative enemy contact.

6. Supporting Forces: Upon enemy contact, continuous CAS support by USMF, An ARVN APC Troop (Troop 1/3d Cav) stationed at AH LOC helped to provide resupply and evacuation.

9. Results.

c. US Casualties: XIA-24, WIA-123.
b. US Equipment Destroyed:
   26 crew served weapons
   43 small arms weapons
   3 personal carriers. (M13)
   2 mortar carriers. (M106)

c. VC Casualties: XIA (BC)-509, WIA (est)-60K, VCC-7.
d. VC Equipment Captured:
   23 crew served weapons
   62 small arms weapons
   1,820 rds small arms ammo
   1 PRC - 10 radio set.
10. Administrative Matters.

a. Administrative and logistical orders provided were adequate.
   (1) Supply: Supply of Class I, III, and V was carried by troops as basic combat load. Resupply moved from LAF NNE and PHOUG VIEH to the Squadron Forward Logistical Control Point at A/N LOC by aircraft, then distributed while the squadron was engaged in combat. The ARMY APC Troop located at A/N LOC assisted with surface resupply.
   (2) Maintenance: Maintenance of vehicles was slow due to time element for resupply from base camp area. 701st Maintenance Battalion Contact Teams provided immediate and efficient maintenance assistance. The overall maintenance posture was good.
   (3) Treatment of casualties: Treatment of casualties was excellent with emergency medical evacuation timely and sufficient.
   (4) Transportation: Transportation most items of resupply was generally accomplished by the use of aircraft. Very little resupply was made by surface means. Medical evacuation by Dust-Off procedures.
   (5) Communications: during OP EL PASO II various communications techniques were utilized to insure constant effective communications at all levels. It was determined that both a reporting net and a net for command and control should be utilized. This method proved effective and is recommended for adoption.
   (6) Medical evaluation: During OP EL PASO II the medical section operated as a forward aid station, taking care of routine sick call, and any emergencies arising from the troops. During enemy contact the medical section set up and operated an emergency aid station at the forward resupply point. The aid station promptly and efficiently took control of treatment of wounds, and Dust-Off for emergency medical evacuation. Resupply of medical items to troops was on an "as needed basis." Emergency medical evacuation was prompt, excellent and timely through Dust-Off procedures.

b. Personnel analysis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANIZATION DESIGNATION</th>
<th>OPERATION INITIATED</th>
<th>OPERATION TERM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Squadron Authorized</td>
<td>1,019</td>
<td>1,019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squadron Assigned</td>
<td>1,312</td>
<td>1,229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDY</td>
<td>1,174</td>
<td>1,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIF</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBC IIQ Trp</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trp B</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trp C</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trp D (air)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total PBC</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. Special Equipment and Techniques.

a. Equipment: During the battle of 9 July, RCA was dropped from a CH 47 helicopter. Results have not yet been determined.

b. Techniques:
   (1) Designation of specific zones for artillery and close air support; designation of priority of fires within these zones. Designation of fire zones, i.e. air on west of road, artillery on the east, allows the simultaneous use of all types of supporting fires.
UNCLASSIFIED

(2) Infantry mounted on and fighting from armored personnel carriers. Found to be unsatisfactory, when the crew exceeds five men, the members tend to get in each others way, infantry can best be utilized by riding on vehicles of the trail troops, then committed as dismounted infantry where needed.

(3) Concentration of elements in "killing zone". An extra closed column (10-15 meters between vehicles) proved effective in that it massed more firepower in the VC "killing zone".

(4) Troop "Y" formation. This technique envisions an armored cavalry troop marching with two columns straddling a road where off-road nobility is affected. Two armored cavalry platoons move side-by-side approximately 20 meters on either side with the third platoon moving on or off the road with the forward elements abreast with the last element of the landing platoons. This formation affords mutual supporting fires from two platoons is a given area of contact and puts the maximum amount of strength to the front of the troop.

12. (4) Conclusions and Lessons Learned.

a. Dust-Off and resupply site should be established by elements other than those engaged in the battle. The wounded must be evacuated by Dust-Off/resupply elements, allowing maximum firepower to be brought to bear on the enemy. Empty medical evacuation vehicles including armored personnel carriers and helicopters should be utilized to ferry ammunition to the engaged elements.

b. Reserve (trail troops must be committed as soon as contact with the enemy is established in order to bring maximum firepower to bear on the enemy at the earliest opportunity.

c. It is beneficial to carry infantry or have them immediately available on the trail troops as they are able to influence the battle at the critical time and place.

/s/ LEONARD L. LEMAY
/t/ LEONARD L. LEMAY
LTC, Armor
Commanding
Troop B was conducting an area reconnaissance north on Highway 13 in Binh Long Province, along with Troop C and elements of the 1st Brigade.

Troop B was leading the armored column and reconning by fire to the flanks. At approximately 0930 hours the head of the column crossed the Can Le (Golden Gate Bridge) AT24013 and was immediately fired upon by an undetermined number of Viet Cong. The volume of fire increased as the lead elements returned fire. At this time the troop commander estimated that the column had triggered a Viet Cong ambush of regimental size. The troop commander, Lieutenant Flores, immediately informed the squadron commander who was air borne at the time of the enemy ambush.

Meanwhile the troop deployed into defensive positions by staking vehicles to enable them to fire on both sides of the combat area. At this time the head of the column was receiving heavy recoilless weapons fire and the 3d platoon was heavily engaged.

The squadron commander immediately called in TAC air and friendly artillery fire, on both sides of the armored column, and at the same time committed troop C into battle. The 3d platoon had at this time suffered moderate casualties and was quickly reinforced by the tanks from the 1st, 2d and 3d platoons.

All platoons reported heavy contact on both flanks and the troops were inflicting heavy casualties on the Viet Cong, who by this time became disorganized under heavy fire from the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry elements.

As the battle progressed, throughout the morning the 75's – 57 recoilless rifles had destroyed 1 tank and knocked out 2 others. Enemy mortar fire had also knocked out 3 105's and at this time the casualties were immediately evacuated to the rear of the column. Throughout this evacuation there were countless acts of heroism. In most cases individual crews would abandon their destroyed vehicles to continue fighting on the ground with their individual weapons.

The battle continued throughout the day for six hours. After the Viet Cong had broken contact and retreated into the heavy elephant grass and jungle area, the estimated Viet Cong body count was well over 300 killed in action and several wounded prisoners captured. There were countless enemy weapons captured, to include several 75 and 57 recoilless rifles, dozens of automatic weapons and various types of small arms and ammunition.

The armored column remained at this scene of battle for the next few days and continued to search for the enemy. We found several shallow graves and evidence that several wounded Viet Cong had been carried off during the battle.
after three or four days of searching the armored column returned to the LOC; refitted and rearmed and waited for the next mission.

/s/ANTHONY S. HONIZ
/t/ANTHONY S. HONIZ

1SG, Troop B
1st Sqdn, 4th Cav
ATTACHED INFANTRY ACTION - 30 June 1966

Commanding Officer Troop C

On 30 June 1966, Troop C was assigned a zone recon mission as part of a Squadron recon in force operation North of An Loc, RVN. The troop was assigned an operational area generally west of highway 13 with the axis of advance being the secondary roadway leading from Bt 69 (Coords XT 721 994) to the west.

For this operation Company D (-) 1/18 Infantry Bn was attached to Troop C. This force consisted of 2 rifle platoons (platoons were understrength and consisted of about 30-33 men), a weapons platoon (-) of about 10 men, and the company Hq group. One rifle platoon was attached to Troop B.

The infantry platoons were loaded aboard the 1st and 2d armored cavalry platoons of Troop C. Company Hq B 1/18 rode with the Troop CP group. The infantry weapons platoon rode with the 3d platoon of Troop C. The 3d platoon also had attached the troop mortars in battery.

After moving north on Highway 13 and crossing an AVLB emplaced at coords XT 721972 (later known as Golden Gate), the troop moved north to check point 1 at Bt 69 and deployed westward.

The 3d platoon, troop mortars and the infantry weapons platoon established a strong point at this road junction (coords XT 722995). The infantry at this location dismounted and together with dismounted cavalry troopers set up ground security for the mortars and 3d platoon APC's.

The two infantry platoons and the infantry company Hq remained mounted as the troop moved to the west. The infantry remained mounted as the cavalry platoons maneuvered in line formation on either side of the east-west roadway until the second stream was crossed. The jungle growth thickened at this location, the infantry platoons dismounted and moved ahead of the APC's. Just as the recon advance continued Troop B became engaged with a large VC force. The 3d platoon, Troop C reported receiving small arms fire at this same time.

The two dismounted infantry platoons and company Hq were remounted and the troop started it move back to Bt 69 with the 1st platoon, Troop C in the lead. As the troop closed into the Bt 69 strong point the 3d platoon was heavily engaged against Viet Cong automatic weapons fire coming from the North along both sides of the road. White phosphorous mortar rounds or rifle grenades began to fall into the area.

Upon arriving at the cross roads the infantry remained mounted initially but as they were being shot off the APC's the infantry CO requested permission to dismount.

The infantry dismounted and were given instructions to form a perimeter in the same areas assigned to the cavalry platoon on which they were riding. The 3d platoon, Troop C with troop mortars shifted to the north, took the NW corner of the intersection, the 1st platoon the NE and the 2d platoon the south side of the secondary road in both sides of highway 13. Heavy incoming fire continued and numerous infantry were wounded.
I saw the infantry company FO get hit by a white phosphorous round and one of their platoon leaders shot through the neck and killed along with his radio operator.

The troop was then ordered to move north along Highway 13 and relieve pressure on Troop B. There was no radio contact with the infantry at this time, heavy fire had then pinned down and there was insufficient time to contact the infantry leaders on the ground for reloading. The troops moved north leaving elements of the 3d platoon, the troop mortars and the infantry company (-) at Bi 69.

Later on the fight around SNOK Dong quieted down and other elements of the 1/18 Infantry began to land at an LZ at co-ords XT 721004 the 1st platoon brought B 1/18 (-) forward to the main battle area (co-ords XT 724009). The company then came under control of the CO 1/18 Infantry who had just arrived in the area. The infantry company took up immediate positions to the east and west of the highway battle area. Later the company conducted sweeping actions to the west.
SUBJECT: Ground Forces Commander's Daily Situation Report (SITREP) 300001 to 302400H Jun 66 (U)

TO: Commanding General
II Field Force Vietnam
ATTN: G-3
APO 96266

1. OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

a. General: 1st Inf Div engaged in a major battle in the EL PASO II operation 30 Jun. This was the "Battle of BM 69" (Bench Mark 69) in the vicinity of XT7299. This engagement was with a VC force conclusively identified as the 271st VC Regt of the 9th VC Div. The battle developed when B/1/4 Cav, conducting a ROAD RUNNER operation along Hwy 13 north from RON QUAN to LOC NINH, made initial contact with an unknown VC force in the vicinity of XU725020 at 0930H. Trp B received a heavy mortar attack along the length of the column while in the vicinity of XU723020 at 0945H the troop began receiving SA and AW fire and became heavily engaged with what was then estimated to be a battalion size force. The VC were equipped with .50 cal MG's, two of the positions being located and destroyed early in the action. A heavy volume of Trp B's organic fire power, in addition to artillery and air strikes were delivered into the VC positions, dug in and concealed on both sides of the roads. 2/28 Inf was immediately alerted and other elements of 1/4 Cav (-) were committed to the battle. 2/18 Inf elements conducted an air mobile combat assault into an LZ to the N of the VC positions. The 5th ARVN Div elements responded immediately by the timely arrival of Lt Col TUAN, Deputy Division Commander to coordinate the employment of ARVN forces. Three CIDG companies were dispatched to blocking positions to the north. An AIR troop and 2 companies of 1/9 ARVN Regt were placed under the operational control of the 1st Inf Div and initially occupied blocking positions to the south. The ARVN and US forces closely tied in their flanks and began constricting the area in a boxing-in maneuver on the NE, E, SE, S and SW. 1/2 Inf conducted an air mobile assault into LZ BLUE (XT670990) to the west and began sweeping to the east. The battalion that landed to the north (2/16 Inf) began sweeping from that position against the block. Artillery, E.A.W., and helicopter gun ships played important roles and responded in a minimum of time to supply timely and accurate fires into the VC positions. Armed OH-47 gun ships were in the target area within 15
minutes of initial contact and poured a heavy and effective volume of fire into the VC positions. To gain the maximum effectiveness from the supporting fires, artillery fires were placed on one side of the road and air strikes on the other side. The heavy volume of air, ground, and artillery fire severely mauled the 271st VC Regt with the following results attained: 300 VC KIA (30), 300 VC KIA (Prob); 6 VCC; 40 weapons among which were 2 57mm RR, and 1 7.52 MG on wheels. This major engagement necessitated the rapid deployment of 1st Inf Div forces and thus extensive realignment of units was made. Army Air and Air Force Airlift were immediately responsive to the requirements, and in a six hour period 5 plus infantry battalions, 1st Bde Hqs, and 2 artillery batteries were successfully redeployed. 1/28 Inf was moved from SONG BE to QUAN LOI. 2/18 Inf (-) was helilifted from QUAN LOI to LZ 2. 1/2 Inf was moved from PHUOC VINH to QUAN LOI, and further lifted into LZ BLUE. 2/2 Inf moved by fixed wing from LAI KHE to QUAN LOI. 2/2/16 Inf moved from BEAR CAT to PHUOC VINH. 1/16 Inf moved overland from AO north of LAI KHE back to LAI KHE. A/2 33 Arty was moved (CH-47) from SONG BE to QUAN LOI. 1/7 Arty was moved overland from QUAN LOI to HON QUAN. 1st Bde CP was moved from PHUOC VINH to QUAN LOI. Army Air supplied 30 UH-1D's, 3 CH-47's and 6 CV-2's in support of the operations and the Air Force supplied 4 C-123's in support of the division operations.

In addition USAF, USNF, and VNAF supported the division with a total of 100 fighter sorties. 4 of these sorties were SKY SPOT missions and 4 B-57 sorties flying seeding missions. Among the results of the close air support were (BDA) 1 57mm RR position and 3 machine gun positions.

(b) 1/18 Inf: The battalion remained under the OPCON of 1st Inf Div and continued to secure the MINH THAN base area. Security was also provided for the engineer work parties working in and around the airfield area. Company SKD operations were conducted in AO's BRANDY and GIN with negative contact.

(c) Div Rear: 1st Engr Bn had a command detonated mine set off between two vehicles at 1710H in the vicinity of XT931080. No damage or casualties resulted and the fire was not returned.

(2) 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div:

(a) General: 1st Bde CP moved to a forward position from PHUOC VINH to QUAN LOI by airlift closing at 1530H. The brigade CO assumed operational control of 1/2 Inf, 1/28 Inf, 2/18 Inf and 1/4 Cav (-) at that time. 1/2 Inf was also airlifted to QUAN LOI. A total of 20 UH-1, 23 and CV-2 sorties were used for the lift. At 1745H 2/16 Inf arrived at PHUOC VINH from BEAR CAT and assumed the mission of providing security for the PHUOC VINH base camp perimeter.

(b) 1/2 Inf: At 1003H the battalion was alerted for air move to QUAN LOI (XU6190). The first lift commenced at 1234H and the battalion closed at 1530H. The battalion then conducted an air mobile assault into LZ BLUE (XT670995) at 1625H in support of the Battle of BM 69 with the 271st VC Regt of the 9th VC Div. The battalion closed into the LZ at 1609H. A total of 54 sorties of UH-1D's were utilized. CO A commenced movement to an objective in the vicinity of XU685005. There was negative contact by the battalion. The battalion positions are as
follows: Hqs and Co C-XT676996, Co A-XU685005, Co B-XT685993. The battalion established overnight ambush sites at XU685012, XU683014, XU68300 and XU6870.

(o) 2/18 Inf; 1/4 Cav (-): At 1550H lst led assumed OPCON of both elements. In the earliest part of the day 1/4 Cav (-) and 2/28 Inf made contact and became involved in a major battle with the 271st VC Regt—the Battle of BI 69. Trp C came under heavy, direct fire attack in the vicinity of XT725020 at 0930H while conducting a ROAD RUNNER operation north along Hwy 13 to LOC NINH. At 0945H Trp B became heavily engaged with an estimated 400 VC at XT723020. The VC were using mortars, RR, AW and SA fire. 2 MG positions were spotted and these were .50 cal MG's mounted on a chassis with wheels. Co C/2/18 Inf and Trp C were called in to relieve the pressure on Trp B. The VC appeared to be making an attempt at 0950H to try and split the Trp B column. The VC were located on both sides of the road. Air strikes and artillery fires were immediately employed, with artillery on one side of the road and air strikes on the other. This control measure allowed for the maximum use of supporting fires. Armd CH-47’s answered the call for support and were on station at 0945H. Organic ground, air, and artillery fires were heavily poured into the VC positions and inflicted a heavy toll of the VC. Co B was moved by truck from QUAN LOI to HCN QUAN at 1030H. Co C became heavily engaged at 1039H, while enroute to Trp B’s position, in the vicinity of XT720996. Co A conducted an airmobile assault into LZ 2 (XT724014) followed by Co C. Co A then pushed their attack to the south, staying on the west of Hwy 13. The battalion CP displaced to LZ 2. ARVN elements assisted in the operation as 3 CIDG companies were employed to occupy blocking positions to the south. Trp C maintained a blocking position to the SE. 1/2 Inf was airlifted into LZ BLUE (XT6799) to the west and commenced S&D operations to the east against the blocks. Blocking forces continued constricting the area and tied in their flanks to block-in the VC forces. All companies of 2/28 Inf and 1/14 Cav were engaged with the heavy contact lasting until 1730H. The VC force was a minimum of a regiment and subsequently found to be the 271st VC Regt of the 9th VC Div. Results of the battle up to this time (2400H) are 300 VC KIA (BC); 300 VC KIA (Prob); 8 VCC (wounded); 14G; 2 57mm RR; 37 SA (rifles).

(3) 2d Bde, 1st Inf Div:
(a) General: 2/16 Inf conducted a company size patrol north of the brigade BEARCAT base camp with negative contact. One company also was airlifted to PHUOC VNH at 1725H where it was placed under OPCON of 1st Bde. 1/16 Inf remained OPCON 1st Inf Div. 2/16 Inf also placed under OPCON 1st Bde. 4/23 Inf continued operations under OGAN 9-66 (Operation UNCERTAIN) and continued S&D operations to the NW of BEARCAT with one company.

(b) 2/16 Inf: Co A moved into an area north of BEARCAT bounded by YT130025, YT150085, YT240060, YT240050, YT182010, and YL69030 to conduct company size patrolling. There was negative contact. Co A remained in a overnight position in the vicinity of YT175074. Co B was on standby as brigade RRF and Co C was alerted at 1435H for a move to PHUOC VNH. The airlift commenced at 1725H with Co C closing at 1813H, assuming the mission of base camp security.
(c) 4/23 Inf: The battalion secured the RMK rock quarry and the SEACOM site with Co A. Co D continued S&D operations in the area bounded by YT1004, YT1005, YT1304, YT1306. No enemy contact was made and the unit occupied an overnight position in the vicinity of YT110052, and established ambush sites for the night. Co C conducted S&D operations in area C (YT0416), but with negative contact.

(4) 3d Bde, 1st Inf Div:
(a) General: The brigade TF continued their participation in EL PASO II in the SONG BE AO. A battalion and a company airmobile assault was conducted in the AO and 2 artillery batteries displaced to new positions (one airlift).
(b) 1/28 Inf: At 1000H 1/28 Inf conducted a combat assault from LZ RED to Obj 1. Upon landing the battalion received scattered SA fire. Patrols searched the area with negative results. At 1020H the battalion was ordered to QUAN LOI. The battalion (-) was already on Obj 1 and Co A was still on LZ RED. Co A was moved to NUI BA RA. The battalion (-) was moved to NUI BA RA Airfield closing at 1350H. The last lift of Co C was lifted directly from Obj 1 to QUAN LOI. The battalion (-) was then lifted from NUI BA RA to QUAN LOI by UH-1D closing at 1620H. Upon closing, the battalion came under OCPON 1st Bde.
(c) 2/28 Inf: At 0900H Co B conducted a combat assault into an LZ in the vicinity of YU190134. Co B secured an area for arrival of B/1/5 Arty by CH-47. At 1500H the battalion patrol found several well camouflaged bunkers with good overhead cover. Several houses in the area had tunnels under them. 1 bag of rice was found and destroyed. At 1510H C/2/13 Arty moved to NUI BA RA and closed 1545H. ARVN supplied trucks and provided road security. Co A moved by foot from their overnight position to NUI BA RA Airfield, closing at 1745H. The battalion (-) remained at NUI BA RA Airfield. Co B and B/1/5 Arty remained in the vicinity of YU190134.
(d) 1/16 Inf: The battalion continued their S&D operation north of LAKHE without contact, and at 1420H were ordered to return to LAKHE base camp, closing at 1717H. Upon arrival the battalion assumed responsibility for security of the LAKHE base camp.

(5) 1st Inf Div Arty:
(a) Div Arty Fwd: B/1/5 Arty airlifted from the vicinity of YU145072 to the vicinity of YU192130 closing at 1040H. 8/6 Arty (-) provided artillery support for 1/4 Cav operation throughout the day. 0/17 Arty convoyed to the vicinity of XT766897, closing at 1400H. A/2/33 Arty was airlifted from the vicinity of SONG BE (YU145072) at 1735H to the vicinity of XT814905. All tubes were in position at 1850H. A/2/33 Arty was attached to 8/6 Arty. C/2/13 Arty convoyed from the vicinity of YU195037 to YU145527 and closed at 1508H.
(b) LAM SON II: 1/26 Inf, in cooperation with 5th Recon Co, 5th ARVN Div, and A/1/4 Cav, successfully sealed HOA THANH in the vicinity of XT849137 at 0630H. The BINH DUONG Search Forces entered the hamlet, assembled a total of 159 men, ages 15-45, screened them at National Police HQs and searched the village. Three of these men were apprehended as they attempted to leave the hamlet. Of the men screened there were 3 WOs, 10 draft dodgers, 7 deserters, and 4 males with false ID cards.
Within the cordon and search area, search forces apprehended 2 VC after they were identified by PF soldiers in the hamlet. A total of 92 villagers were screened in the 969 interrogation tents. The majority of the people were uncooperative during the 969 interviews. Nine names of VC operating in the PHU HO village were added to the blacklist. Both of the VC were on the blacklist utilized by interrogation teams. In the operational area, search forces discovered one tunnel which was destroyed by a domo team. 4 hand grenades were found and destroyed and one COMMUNIST flag was captured. Approximately 450 people took part in the festival activities. 205 people were treated by the MEDCAP teams. The VIS team provided PSY WAR movies and rice was distributed in 2 kilo bags to 106 villagers. Provincial youth services prepared popcorn for the children and the Provincial Agricultural Services prepared 3 gallons of bulgar wheat for sample distribution. Entertainment was also provided by the 5th ARVN Cultural Team and the 5th ARVN and RF Bands. Approximately 450 meals were served to the villagers. In addition, a raffle was conducted in which 7 villagers received prepared gift packages. 4/1/6 Inf, while participating in the seal of HOA THANH, pursued 3 VC in the vicinity of XT855135 at 0925H. Contact was never gained with the fleeing VC, however the company captured 1 pistol bolt and 2 grenades while in pursuit.

b. Plans Summary:
(1) 1/18 Inf: The battalion will continue to provide security for the MINH THANH base perimeter and the engineer work parties. A company size S&D operation will be conducted in AO BRANDY. 2/2 Inf remains OPOO! 1st Inf Div and maintains security of the division base and facilities in the QUAN LOI AO.

(2) 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div: The brigade will position forces to prevent VC withdrawal into safe havens. 1/2 Inf secures LZ BLUE for arrival of 4/2/33 Arty with one company NL T 0630H; 1/2 Inf (-) moves on axis LEAG to seize and secure Obj 1 (XU93027) subsequent to seizure of bridge at XT685998 by 1/4 Cav (-); upon arrival on Obj 1 1/2 Inf (-) prepares to conduct combat patrols to the northwest or to conduct heliborne assault into LZ PINK (XU94033) or LZ PURPLE (XT51661). 1/23 Inf conducts airmobile assault on LZ GREEN (XT616499) commencing 0900H and seizes Obj BASEBALL (XT623999). 1/28 Inf on order moves to LZ WHITE (XU565057) on axis PEACK; upon arrival LZ WHITE conducts combat patrols with primary attention to the southeast. 2/18 Inf moves to and occupies blocking position ONGO (XU707012) commencing 0600H and prepares to attack to the west in event 1/2 Inf establishes contact. 2/18 Inf prepares to conduct airmobile assault on LZ PINK or PURPLE on order. 1/4 Cav (-) moves on Route HANK to secure bridge at XT635998 commencing 0630H; continues to move on Route HANK to seize Obj SOCCER (XT674999); 1/4 Cav detaches one troop to secure A2/33 and on order moves on Route HANK to seize Obj BASEBALL (XT623999).

(3) 2d Bde, 1st Inf Div: 2/16 Inf will continue company size patrolling of BEARCAT base camp with Co A and will maintain Co B as brigade RRF. Co C will remain attached to 1st Bde. 4/23 Inf (-) will continue their security mission under ORLAN 9-66 (Operation UPTONTOWN). Co B will complete S&D operations in the vicinity of TT1205 and will be extricated from the area at approximately 1200H.
UNCLASSIFIED

(4) 3d Bde, 1st Inf Div: On 1 Jul B/1/5 Arty will be moved from their present location to QUAN LOI by CH-47. Upon completion of the move of B/1/5 Arty, B/2/28 Inf will be moved to NUI BA RI Airfield by UH-1D. 2/28 Inf will conduct local patrolling in the vicinity of NUI BA RI Airfield. 1/16 Inf will continue to secure the L1 KHE base camp area.

(5) 1st Inf Div Arty: Div Arty Fwd will continue support of Operation EL P20 II. A/2/33 Arty will be airlifted to the vicinity of XT669982 at 0630H. B/1/5 Arty will be airlifted from the vicinity of SONG BE (TU192130) to an LZ in the vicinity of XT814905. The PHU LOI Pacification TF continues Operation LHI SON II with 1/26 Inf conducting S&C operations and establishing overnight ambush sites in assigned AO's. Security will continue to be provided for cadre teams operating in TAN PHUOC KIM NAM and Binh Gia Lam. 3/C Inf Bn continues construction of a road to connect TAN PHUOC KIM NAM with Hwy 313 and roadwork south of TAN PHUOC KIM NAM.

c. Major Unit Operations:

(1) Operation LAM SON II: 1st Inf Div Arty; continuing.

(a) US LOSSES:
   1 Personnel: 6 KIA, 71 WFL.
   2 Equip Damaged: 2 APC's.

(b) EN LOSSES:
   1 Personnel: 8 KIA (DC), 12 KIA (est) total of 625 VCS as follows:
   23 VC probation violators; 28 individuals on blacklists;
   15 false ID cards; 44 deserters (ANH, PF); 209 draft dodgers; 307 VCS
   held for interrogation.

   2 Equip Captured: 5 Sis; 1 syringe; 1 pistol bolt;
   1 plastic gas mask w/2 packets of chemicals; 1 diary.

   3 Equip destroyed: 8 tunnels; 32 hand grenades;
   5 base camps; 900 rds 7.62mm; 12 rds 105mm, 7-155mm rds; 4 CBU bomblots; 3-
   8 inch rcs; 9 AP mines; 1 FR rocket; 15 rifle grenades; 5 huts; 3 rucksacks;
   2 helmets; 3 wails; 3 Landmines; 17 uniforms; 1 gal gasoline; 1 Qt oil;
   150 lbs rice; several booby traps; 10 lbs done; 4-4.5 V batteries; 1 shelter
   half; 30 foxholes; 15 pots and pans; 2 claymores; 1-20lb bomb; 3 trench
   systems with foxholes; 50 foot traps.

(2) Operation EL P20 II: 1st Inf Div; continuing.

(a) US LOSSES:

   1 Personnel: 76 KIA, 251 WFL.
   2 Equip Damaged: 2 UH-1B; 6 UH-1D; 3 OH-13; 3 APC;
   3 tanks; 1 CH-47; 105 mm howitzer.

   3 Equip destroyed: 1 APC; 1 CH-47; 1 UH-1D.

   4 Equip lost: 1 H60 KG, 3 H16's, 1 PRC-25.

(b) EN LOSSES:

   1 Personnel: 533 KIA (BO), 791 KIA (est): 26 VCS;

61 VCS; 1 Rollar.

   2 Equip Destroyed: 27 81mm rcs; 33 60mm rcs;
   2 155mm rcs; 3 105mm rcs; 1-3.5 rocket; 1 HT mine; 2 Claymores; 2 JP mines;
   1 CBU bomblot; 22 base camps; 118 huts; 14 sampans; 172 bunkers; 2 hospitals
   6 tires; 1 1-1/2 ton trailer; 2 hand carts; 30 gal scuco; 6-5gal cans tobacco

UNCLASSIFIED
3. Equip Captured: 1522.5 tons rice; 5400 sheets tin; 25 tons salt; 16.5 tons dried fish; 1 60mm morter; 5 57mm RR; 79 13; 184 grenades; 64 60mm mortar rds; 9 RPG2 grenades; 2476 rds SL; 1 MG-42HB; 1-7.62 HG on wheels; 2 Panzerfausts; 1000 gal kerosene; 1000 cans stearines; 500 hoo hocks; 600 gal oil; 8000 aluminum pens; 300 lbs tea; 900 soup ladles; 20 kerosene stoves; 15 thalas bottles; 1 lb TNT; 2 typewriters; 1 water pump 2-7 HP motors; 2 web belts; 1350 lbs flour; 2 bicycles; numerous documents; medical supplies; kitchen facilities.

2. STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS:

C. Objectives:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Init/Torn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C1</td>
<td>BINH DUONG</td>
<td>XT885172</td>
<td>S&amp;C</td>
<td>LAM SON II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>BINH LONG</td>
<td>XU735089</td>
<td>S&amp;D</td>
<td>EL PASO II</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D. Force:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Obj</th>
<th>Contact</th>
<th>Inti/Torn</th>
<th>Init By</th>
<th>Air Spt</th>
<th>LOC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D1</td>
<td>1st Inf Div Arty</td>
<td>C1</td>
<td>1000H/1020H</td>
<td>Fri</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2</td>
<td>1st Inf Div</td>
<td>C2</td>
<td>0930H/1930H</td>
<td>Fri</td>
<td>FL/1Kvy</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

E. Losses/Damage:

K1 Enemy:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Size/ID</th>
<th>KIA/VCC</th>
<th>WpnS</th>
<th>ArmS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D1</td>
<td>2/Unk</td>
<td>0/2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2</td>
<td>Regt/271st</td>
<td>300 (BC)</td>
<td>2.57mm RR, 1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>300 (cst)</td>
<td>7.62 Kvy HG</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

K2 Enemy: None

K3 Friendly:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Size/ID</th>
<th>KIA/NI/Cptr/ML</th>
<th>WpnS</th>
<th>ArmS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D2</td>
<td>Regt/27sst</td>
<td>10/66/0/0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

K4 Friendly:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Size/ID</th>
<th>Structures</th>
<th>Material</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D2</td>
<td>Regt/27st</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>1 UH-1D, 2 UH-1D, 1 tank</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 APC's
K5  Total friendly initiated small unit actions w/o contact: 42
K5A  Friendly initiated small unit contacts: 0

"A TRUE COPY"

DEPUTY

/s/ WILLIAM G YARBOROUGH
/t/ WILLIAM G YARBOROUGH
Capt. Armor
S3 Air
Intelligence sources had indicated that there was a Viet Cong Regiment in the HMM THAN area. The I D Infantry Division immediately made plans to find and fix the unit. Word leaked out that a small unit would proceed to HMM THAN on the AN LOC HMM THAN Road, but actually plans were made for a heavy armor task force to make the trip. Proplanned airstrike and artillery fires were included in the planning.

The 1st Squadron 4th Cavalry (-) departed AN LOC at 0700 hrs 9 July with Trp C loading followed by Trp B Go B 1/2 Inf was carried on the squadron vehicles. They were divided up so as to provide seven (7) men on each M-113. It was felt that if contact were made it would be in the vicinity of position DICK, a bridge at XT 694751. With this in mind Trp C moved out, this time in column formation with all three platoons on the road. A proplanned airstrike went in at position TOI, a road junction at XT 663736 while a GO-Go aircraft reconnoitered the area to the southwest of TOI. The GO-Go aircraft, a CH-47 helicopter with 4 cal. .50 machineguns, a 40mm grenade launcher and 2-7.62mm machineguns, was being field tested in the Republic of Vietnam at this time. Despite the ordnance dropped on the position the Viet Cong did not reveal their presence at this time. At approximately 1100 hours Lt Jack Lyons, 1st Plt Ldr of Trp C, reported that his lead vehicle had spotted 10 Viet Cong personnel running across the road. Five minutes later he reported that 10 more had run across the road and he was taking them under fire. This seemed to set off the entire ambush. The lead vehicle at this time was in the vic XT 682743.

Lt Lyons deployed his platoon, putting the main firepower of his tanks in the direction of the fleeing enemy. The whole column was receiving intense automatic weapons, small arms, recoilless rifle and mortar fire. Cpt Steve Slattery Trp C commander called for an air strike and the air force responded with Vayco along the road.

The forward air controller at 1200, reported to the Squadron Commander, LTC Leonard Luneo that he had sighted the VC on the north side of the road and was bringing tactical air in on them. Cpt Slattery reported to LTC Luneo that the rear of his column was being hit hard by recoilless rifle and mortar fire.

Cpt David Kelley, Trp B commander moved his troop forward into the battle area after receiving the command from the squadron commander. Cpt Kelley sent his second platoon forward and he immediately lost his plt leader, Lt Benjamine Phillips, and the Plt Sgt FSG Roberto Quijano, due to direct mortar hits. The second platoon tank section leader SSG Chester Folsom took charge of the platoon and moved it forward to assist Trp C.

Cpt Kelley instructed his third platoon leader, Lt Richard Wroe, to secure an area for medical evacuation for wounded. The GO-Go aircraft received several hits and went down in the vicinity of the Dust-Off area. This area was still receiving small arms and mortar fire. Sgt John Blair a vehicle commander in the third platoon of Trp B was running short of ammunition and had "burned up" his .50 cal machinegun. Using his initiative he took his vehicle up to the downed GO-Go and acquired one of their 50 calibers and a supply of ammunition.
He made several trips bringing ammunition up to resupply the vehicles. Meanwhile at the point of heaviest contact, SSG Alfred Trp C, 1st Plt scout section leader reported sighting several VC moving a recoilless rifle trying to get it around to his flank. SSG Breitschindler, in the lead tank, attempted to take it under fire. He was mortally wounded by a sniper's bullet as he attempted to take it under fire. He was mortally wounded by a sniper's bullet as he attempted to raise himself up from his cupola for a better look. SSG Alfred was wounded shortly thereafter but remained behind his weapon, rallying his crew members to repel the VC attack.

The Dust-Off area was becoming jammed with vehicles and Cpt Slattery ordered his second platoon leader Lt Stanislas Roczek to take charge. With able assistance of SSG Guy Killingsworth of Troop D Lt Roczek got the Dust-Off area operations smoothly and started the combat vehicles back to the front.

Col Lowane, upon seeing the direction of the main attack, reported this to the Division Commander who sprang the rest of the troop, three infantry battalions poised to cut off the retreat of the battered VC force. With air on the north, artillery on the south adding to the tremendous fire power of the cavalry unit on the ground, the VC soon broke contact and fled. The 1/28 Inf landed to the north and attacked in a southwest direction while the 1/18 Inf landed and worked closely with the 1/4 Cav (-).

B and C were given the mission to set up a blocking position from XT 693-750 to 650728.

Troop C (air) had been providing flank reconnaissance and fire support, and was given the mission to put their Acre Rifle Platoon in at position DICK to ROW with Troop C at the bridge site.

The fighting had lasted for approximately three hours resulting in American losses of 12 KIA's and 51 WIA's. The 272 Regiment, which was engaged suffered 278 KIA (BC) and 300 (est) KIA. Troop C had 4 APC's destroyed.

Fire Support

At the time Troop C made contact, a planned air strike was about to be put in forward of their position. This was quickly reverted to the area where contact had been made. The FAC requested immediate air and there was constant air coverage throughout the battle. There was at least one artillery observer in the air at all times. The fire support had been split up prior to contact and the air worked the south side of the road and left the north side to the artillery. Gun teams filled in between sorties and concentrations. The CH-47, GO-GO, provided heavy fire before being shot down.

Results

Friendly Losses:

Troop C

12 KIA

39 WIA

Troop B

21 WIA
On the morning of 9 July 1966, the 1st Squadron 4th Cavalry (-) moved to execute a division size recon in force mission in the area south of An Loc and west of Highway 13. The main axis of advance was along the Mihn Thanh Road. This road is a secondary laterite road which was in excellent condition during the operation. It extends from the southern portion of the XA CAT Rubber Plantation at coordinate XT 744801 through secondary undergrowth and over two semi-fordable streams to the entrance of the Mihn Thanh rubber plantation area at coordinates XT 638706.

The squadron moved from its perimeter at the An Loc airstrip with Troop C leading followed by Troop Skp. SF time was early morning approximately 0730.

Artillery units were pre-positioned to support the squadron move to the SW. Air support was readily available with an air-camp over the column and an airforce IFO riding in the squadron CAC helicopter.

Troop C moved south of Hwy 13 to a Rd at XT 760847 where the troop then proceeded west and south along secondary laterite plantation roads to a holding area at approximate coods XT 745808.

Troop C order of march and formation were as follows:
1st Platoon, CP group w/CO's APC Radio APC
2d Platoon, 3d Platoon and Hq (-) group consisting of Operations/Comm APC, AVIB and Maintenance section APC.

The troop VTR had been left at the Mihn Thanh plantation during an earlier operation. The flame thrower track (Zippo) was integrated into the tactical formation of the 1st platoon. Tactical formation throughout the majority of the operation consisted of the 1st platoon flanking the road way on the right or west and NW of the road, the 2d platoon on the left or East, south and SE of the road. The CP group, 3d platoon and Troop Hq (-) followed by various distances along the roadway with the Troop CP group generally aligned with the rear vehicle of the flanking platoons.

Three tanks were available for this operation; one from the 1st platoon advanced along the roadway, the other two tanks led their respective flank platoon formations. The 3d platoon did not have tanks. The squadron (-) had integrated elements of Company B, 1/2 Inf Bn into troop formations on 7 July giving a total of six fighting troopers aboard each track.

Although it is impossible to narrate the separate actions of either attached infantry or organic cavalry troopers, it must be said that these infantrymen adapted quickly and excellently to cavalry troop tactics and fught exceedingly well.

With the troop halted in the pre-recon positions, artillery preparations were fixed along the route of advance. Poor weather delayed pre-planning airstrikes approximately an hour. The Troop remained in this holding position at coods XT 745806 for slightly over an hour until the low ceiling lifted.

LTC Lowane, Squadron CO, gave the order to move out and Troop C in a deployed formation, moved south and then SW parallel to the roadway. As the troop left the southern edge of the rubber, the underbrush and jungle growth became so thick that the 1st platoon was unable to maneuver in a flanking formation on the right of the road. The platoon returned to the roadway and proceeded SW in a column formation along the road.
So the 2d platoon, because of extremely limited visibility and thick jungle growth, was forced to return to the road from its left flanking formation. The troop continued in this posture for approximately 2,100 meters.

The troop returned to its flanking wedge formation approximately at coords XT 730786. This wedge formation was continued by Troop C for several hours as the Squadron (-) conducted its recon mission along the axis of advance. Recon by fire was employed by the flanking platoons. No return fire was received and no enemy activity observed. During this time artillery preparations were being fixed several thousand meters in advance of the troop's local elements. The effectiveness of this fire could be observed along the roadway. Fire teams and an armed Chinook were making passes along the road in front of the troop. Overhead there were many LOH's and other command and observation aircraft. However, no signs of enemy activity were observed. The advance continued in this manner without incident until the troop reached a position short of Objective DICK on the bridge site at coords XT 694751.

Upon arrival at coords XT 698754 the troop assumed a box formation with the 3d platoon deployed facing west, the flanking platoons deployed to the north and south respectively and the Troop Hq securing the rear of the box and maintaining contact with the trail troop - Troop B. Artillery preparations followed by airstrikes were used in softening up the bridge area. A particularly effective napalm strike was employed to burn out dense undergrowth along the left side of the road adjacent to the bridge. Following the strikes the 3d platoon supported by overwatching tank fire, with two engineer nine sweeper/demolition teams attached, rapidly moved forward in a mounted posture to the bridge sides of the bridge, a quick check was made for demolitions and then the 3d platoon leader, FSG Torres crossed several APC's to add force on the far side of the bridge. Extensive scouting and checks were made of the bridge and surrounding areas. No evidence of enemy activity was found. The bridge was in good condition and would facilitate the crossing of heavy armor.

During this time the TC of C19 received a moderately serious small caliber bullet round in one of his legs. No incoming rounds had been heard in the area, although a gun team had just made a pass and it was felt that the man had been hit by a tracy slug. It is entirely probable that he could have been wounded by a hidden enemy sniper.

Upon securing the bridge at DICK, the 1st and 2d platoons respectively were rapidly moved forward across the bridge and into blocking positions along either side of the roadway at approximate coords XT 688748. It was late mid morning by this time.

At this time a radio message was received from the Squadron CO, to speed up the operations. Because of time factors and the thick jungle growth the troop reverted to a column formation, as described earlier, and moved out to the SW towards Objective TOM or the RJ at BM 59 (coords XT 663737).

The advance continued without incident until the lead platoon leader, Lt Lyons (1st Platoon) reported 5 to 7 VC's running across the road from right to left at approximate coords 671740. He quickly reported a group of 20 VC running in the same direction. Both these groups were immediately taken under fire. This information was rapidly reported. It was soon followed by reports of incoming small arms, then automatic weapons fire.
Rapidly the lead elements deployed and were engaged by enemy mortar and anti-tank fire. As enemy contact developed rapidly the word was passed to the SQ CO, that "this was it"! A large VC Force had been contacted just short of objective TDK. Precise detail narration of the battle is extremely difficult because of the lack of observation, loss of contact with vehicles and killed and wounded leaders and vehicle commanders.

The SQ CO requested a determination as to which side of the road the main concentration was located. Initially this was difficult to determine because of the tremendous volume of fire being put out by all the deployed APC's. Reports were made that the VC were attempting to cross the road at the front of the column from right to left. Additional reports were received of heavy enemy fire being received at the rear of the troop and coming from the left side of the road. Initial determination was made that the main VC force was located on the left or south side of the road. Soon after this, as accurate casualty counts, concise reports and aerial observer reports tallied up; it was determined that enemy forces were concentrated on the right or NW side of the road. Artillery fire was reconcentrated in this area and its devastating effect could be observed by the ground troops.

Airstrikes were immediately called in on the left side of the road. They were continuous and extremely effective, especially the Skyraiders – napalm runs and several of the GBU attacks.

Artillery barrages were devoted to the right side of the road. They ranged both up and down the troop column and in and out from the roadway. Fires were brought in quite close to the troop APC's but no damage was sustained by friendly forces.

During this period several CS gas drops were made from helicopters of Troop C (air) 1/4 Cavalry. These provided extremely effective. The gas drifted over the roadway and settled along the dense jungle on the NW of the APC's along the road. Initially some slight concern developed in certain numbers of the troop, this was quickly overcome and the CS concentration in the troop battle area was not sufficient to cause nausea.

A plane level approach to the halted contact actions starts initially with the 1st platoon, the lead platoon. The 1st platoon was leading with two tanks. This platoon received the brunt of initial enemy fire. The TC of the lead tank was killed immediately by a bullet round in the head. Soon after the platoon leader reported his scout section out of action. Later it was learned that the section leader and 2d squad leader were killed and casualties sustained on all vehicles.

The attached infantry NCO's remained the TC positions where possible. Soon the platoon leader was hit by fragments in the face, neck and head. He was evacuated by his platoon SGT, PSG Crawford, who took command of the platoon. The 1st platoon at this time was receiving under the pressure of heavy enemy fire. PSG Crawford returned to the forefront of the column, initiated action to reach the lead tank and caused the 1st platoon to hold its own at the lead of the troop column. The TC of the flame thrower tank was seriously wounded and placed in the lead APC. The flame thrower APC continued to fight viciously. Under direction of the Troop CO, PSG Crawford had his zippo expand its napalm along the right side of the road at about a 25 degree angle with the roadway. C-13, the scout section leader's vehicle was down to a two man crew as it returned from the Dust-off or medical collecting point at the rear of the column. It was hit by antitank fire and was soon burning, likewise C-19 was hit by enemy fire disabled and was soon burning, about mid-way along the column just off the road.
As the fight continued, the 1st platoon had both tanks in full operation along with the four APC's. They had lost four TC's killed.

The OP group was split upon initial VC contact as the medevac APC began collecting the wounded and taking them to a collection evacuation point with the troop HQ (F) group. C-66, the troop CO's tank, was initially in a position at the rear of the 1st platoon APC's then moved local elements of the 2d platoon. All tanks were constantly moving and readjusting positions to avoid anti-tank and mortar fire. The majority of platoon vehicles remained on one side of the road or the other in their herringbone positions. The commander's tank, C-66 was constantly on the move to both sides of the road. The second platoon was leading with tank C-25, commanded by the platoon sergeant, SSG Wilson. This platoon reacted quickly and effectively to close on the 1st platoon, deploy and lay down a heavy volume of tank, 50 caliber and 7.62 machine gun and 1.79 fire. C-25 tank maneuvered along both sides of the road firing HE and canister into suspected locations. It was hit in the turret by either anti-tank or rifle grenade fire. The TC was moderately injured and forced to evacuate the tank. This tank was rapidly removed by SSG Born and continued to fight well during the remainder of the battle. The 2d platoon APC's were well deployed along either side of the road in a tight formation. They provided the stable center of sector for the troop column.

Since contact was lost with the medevac APC, permission was given for the 2d platoon to collect wounded and return to the dust-off area in one of the fighting carriers. Upon return of the evacuation tank to the platoon a report was made that C-23 had been hit by the 20mm cannon fire and that C-29 had sustained several anti-tank round hits and was disabled with all the crew killed or wounded. The 2d platoon continued to fire aggressively and concentrated its fires on the right side of the road. Later as the enemy withdrew, elements of the 2d platoon with Lt. Rozek, the platoon leader, moved to the Dust-Off site, consolidated and moved the wounded to a new Dust-Off location at objective DICK, west of the bridge.

The 3d platoon was hit by enemy fire from both sides of the road immediately after the action initiated in the 1st platoon area. This platoon was unable to close in the 2d platoon in a tight formation. A gap of about 300 meters developed between these platoons as the fighting progressed. The 3d platoon soon was in a heavy engagement of its own around the AVLB, the troop HQ group and an armed Chinook which had been shot down on the roadway. This position, at coordinates XT 667746, became a strong point and the initial Dust-Off site. The 3d platoon fought to protect the growing number of casualties which were accumulating at the Chinook or GO-GO site. In the process the platoon lost two tanks to anti-tank fire. These tracks also burned. Fortunately the gap between the two platoons was never capitalized upon by the VC and the troop was not split. The road remained open but heavy fire was received from this area. The troop headquarters (-) group is included with the 3d platoon because they fought the engagement in the same location. The crew of the AVLB gave a good account for themselves, they maneuvered the vehicle continuously and used machine gun fire and grenades to keep the enemy at a distance. This vehicle was not damaged. The maintenance section fought their APC as a gun tank and covered the medevac APC and the operations/commo APC (050).
SFC Dennis, commo chief worked his 50 caliber machine gun and the raics alternately and loaded many wounded into his track. He kept reports flowing and called in the initial Dust-Off evacuations. The area of the downed Chinook became too "hot" for Dust-Off's. The WIA's were placed in the modic APC for cover and beside the various firing APC's. This accounted for the loss of contact with the modic track. Several of the modics were wounded while they cared for the wounded and one burned seriously when he entered one of the burning APC's to rescue wounded.

Troop B elements began to enter the fighting zone and advanced up Troop C's horningbone column taking up firing positions. Several of the vehicles closed the gap between the 2d and 3d Platoons. Later the commanding officer of Troop B, Capt Kyles, came to the forward location of the 1st and 2d Platoons with a full cavalry platoon. These vehicles took up firing positions with the majority of the fire being placed on the roadway.

At this time in coordination with the CO of Troop D (air) the Dust-Off and resupply site was reestablished to the NE of the downed Chinook at Objective DICK. This area was relatively free of enemy fire and had a larger area which could accommodate several helicopters. This new site remained the evacuation and resupply point throughout the rest of the battle and during the reorganization phase.

With Troop B well disposed along the roadway and recon elements of that Troop pushing to the SW, Troop C was ordered to phase back its forces to objective DICK with the assigned mission of securing that area, protecting the bridge and resupplying, the platoons moved back in order: 3d, 1st and 2d. All wounded were taken directly to the Dust-Off site and all dead evacuated aboard APC's to that area. Resupply and re-arming began immediately. Support was tremendous! Plenty of arms of all kinds, replacement weapons, medical supplies and support personnel were brought into DICK. The troop was joined by the Squadron Headquarters APC section along with the 1577 Squadron modic track, with surgeon. Troop D (air) Aero Rifle Platoon was landed and attached to Troop C at DICK in the late afternoon.

During this period larger reinforcements had also arrived in the immediate battle area in the form of the 1/23 Infantry, which was airlifted to DICK and swept SW along the right position of the road; and an ARVN APC Troop (with an RF Company) which closed on the eastern edge of DICK in mid-afternoon. The RF Company secured the LZ at DICK for several hours by pushing out a considerable distance into the dense undergrowth on either side of the road and the stream line. This allowed Troop C to resupply and return rapidly. The ARVN APC Troop later moved to secure the downed Chinook for the night.

As the afternoon drew to a close Troop C had completed resupply, reconnaissance, Class I and was in a tactical posture for future missions. The troop was given orders to hold, at DICK, secure the bridge and establish the forward squadron CP. The troop disposition consisted of the 3d platoon and a rifle squad securing the bridge and the area to the east of the bridge. The 2d platoon and the Aero Rifle platoon (-) on the south or left side of the road with emphasis on the thick underbrush near the road. The battle day ended with the troop in the above described posture at Objective DICK.

The following lessons learned are foremost in mind during the preparation of this narration; flame thrower APC's (Zippel) should be kept under direct control of the troop CO. The location of the enemy concentration must be quickly determined by troops on the ground as well as aerial observers. A heavy initial base of fire on all suspected areas is essential to gain fire superiority rapidly in any attempted ambush.
Zippo's should be employed immediately upon determination of the enemy concentrations. Track mounted Zippo service units should accompany the column. Medics should not be utilized as a "storehouse" for wounded, but kept in constant shuttle between the fighting area and a Dust-Off site. A Dust-Off resupply site must be established and controlled by operational and medical personnel in a reasonably secure area once enemy contact is made. Medical evacuation from the battle area must be controlled by small unit leaders as well as medical clearing personnel.
33 Opn: Opn. Opn. 23 Journal

2 0530 Trps 3-2.2-Cp: Stand-to complete

3 0700 Trp 3 CO-Opn: SI at this time.

4 0730 Trp 3 CO-Opn: SI at this time.

5 0740 Trp 3 CO-Opn: Holding at pen HAIX until

Further orders.

6 0800 Trp 3-Opn: CP 3 nov.

7 0801 Trp 3 CO-Opn: Checked out 1 VCS, new results.

8 0817 Trp 3 CO-Opn: Started moving toward GI 17

9 0847 Trp 3 CO-Opn: Starting to move.

10 0904 Trp C-Opn: Trp C CO came at CP 4

11 0920 Trp D CO-Opn: CP 4 nov.

12 0935 S3-Opn: Air strike going in at pos 1011,

7C to recon by fire & of TPI.

13 0950 Trp C-Opn: Head ele at GI 5

14 1000 S3-Opn: 6th size VJ force spotted at vic

667376, moving.

15 1035 Trp C-Opn: Head dust-off for one man v slight to

wound, vio 6674000.

16 1035 Opn monitored: Dust-off in for Trp C

wounded at this time. 1st wounded by

fire, Dust-off complete at 1027 hrs.

17 1050 CO-Opn: Notify 1/15 Inf an air strike

(alpsn) will go in at vic 663727 in

3 min.

18 1110 Trp C CO-Opn: Under attack vic 663743, coming

near.

19 1111 Hq CO: Have VJ in sight, working on

them to the N.

20 1125 CO-Opn: Now appears main force is to the S.
21 1130 Trp C: (Mon) Bring kit load at rear v/7 mort and IP.
22 1133 CO-Trp C CO: Cover the NWB.
23 1135 CO-Trp C CO: Trp D is moving up around the NWB, coming up on Trp C rear.
24 1137 (Mon) Trp C-Trp C CO: Hit hard back here, many wounded, only about 3 NW are firing.
25 1140 CO-Trp C CO: Trp D moving up to your front now.
26 1142 Trp C-Trp D: Have wounded, clear area for Dust-Off. Trp D: Clear CP 6.
27 1145 S3-Opr: Sit Rep CO-CO is down 50' meters S of CP, 500; Trp D elm securing ground ship; rest of 1/4 Cav extends to CP 6 in three strips firing principally to the S.
28 1200 1st Bde CO-33: 1/15 Inf will land at 15 (ID) at 1215 hrs, will work v/you.
29 1202 CO-Trp C CO: Have your one to head of Trp C.
30 1207 CO-33: Going in to refuel, take over battle.
31 1211 S3-Opr: Have 54 and E IC arrange for empty Dust-Off next to bring in cargo.
32 1220 S3-Opr: Sit Rep: Mr has been hitting S of road, totalling 3 NW, only in Air now. 2 vehicles burning, one being evac, needs crew.
33 1225 1st Bde Opr-Opr: Arm going in, one look on the way now.
34 1245 1st Bde CO-33: 1/13 Inf under 5000 1/4 Cav.
35 1246 S3-Opr: 2 IC's landed v/wounded at LT 695750, get Dust-Off in there.
36 1252 33-30: 1/13 Inf will be at II on II side of road.
37 1254 1st Bde CO-33: 1 670 moving NW along trails from head of column.
38 1306 CO-1/26 Inf CO: Your echo at 15 (ID) still along 1039.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

39 1425
Trp B-Opn: Captured 2 VC.

40 1429
Trp C-Opn: ORDER 500m ele lying N of LC

41 1505
1st Ede-Opn: Men chopper TCs to block
along route IIEE to the S fr 693750 to 350728.

42 1605
1st Ede-Opn: 1/18 Inf revert to 1st Ede OIC.

43 1715
Co-Opn: Trp D (Air) Ltr rifle plato to be

44 1910
Trp B-Opn: Last an Ltr rifle plato being

45 1912
Trp D CO-Opn: Leaving 3/3 Inf not to get on

46 1920
Opn-1st Ede Opn: Sitrep: Cas 18, 111,
51 WIA; veh cos; 5 07:4212: VC heavy c.unt
65; these figures subject to change later
as more info is obtained. Wève captured:
1 Soviet MTL green branch, WIC 7, SH; 302637;
1 Soviet 7.62 mm RIG 320, 550728, 563476;
1 Soviet cable 10942, SH; 4285.

47 0000
Co-Opn: Relay to S3 and Asst S3; Do not

48 2400
Opn-23: Closed S3 Journal.
SITUATION: Trp A OIC 1st 1/26 Inf at KU LOI.
Trp D (air) 1/26 Inf Div at NEW BOX.
1/3 Cav (-) (2 Con Gp, Trp D and Trp C)
cond crew recon SE of 655600 to loc

DAVID G. HUMPHREY, Major, Armor, S3

/\ David C. Martin
UNCLASSIFIED

 vic ALL LOC 0001 09 Jul 55 2400 09 Jul 66

"EXTRACT"

Squad disposition 0900GCT thru 0924GCT:
Trp A 1/25 Inf, 1/511th, Trp D
(Lair) 1/25 Inf Div, 1/511th 1/4
Ccv (-) (Lt Con Gp, Trp D and Trp C),
conducted area reccon SW of ALL LOC to loc
out of the 27th VC Regiment.

0700
Trp C lead ele S.

0710
Trp B lead ele S.

1110
Initial contact by Trp C.

1400
Contact broken (approx).

Trp Losses: KIA  MIA  WIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trp</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trp C</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trp D</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squad</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Vehicles: 1113  1105

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trp</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trp C</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trp B</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squad</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Weapons: 1160  179  114  116

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trp</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trp C</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trp B</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squad</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enemy body count - 265; En'pns count - 26.

Capture Armo: 7.62-15 rds; AT Gren-9;
Chicen Land Gren- 1; US Land gren-1;
7.62mm-250 rds; 30 cal. (U.S.) - 150.
33 FWD
1st Squadron 4th Cavalry VNC 408LOG 0001 20 Jun 66 2400 Jun 66

1 0001
Opn-03: Opened 93 Journal
1/1 J.R

2 0120
Trp C-Opn: Req VNA at 2/18 Int Loc 0515
Info J.R

3 0615
Trp C-Opn: Stand-to complete, send in two HC's for Class I, will take VNA back to fix th.
Info J.R

4 0005
Trp C-Opn: Moving to Int Loc now.
S3 J.R

5 0612
Trp 3 C-Opn: NDB is in place now.
S3 J.R

6 0827
Trp C-Opn: Close in my plotter 20 at this time.
Info J.R

7 0937
Trp 3-Opn: Int plott 01 Int Loc for bridge site now.
G3 J.R

8 0940
Trp C-Opn: 92 at this time.
G3 J.R

9 0910
Trp C-Opn: Crossing bridge now.
G3 J.R

10 0936
HC 31-Opn: Airstrke route on in.
S3 J.R

11 0932
Trp B C-Opn: HC ale loc UT 725020 on hill. Roc mortar fire, no airstrke possible.
G3 J.R

12 0953
HC 31-Opn: Roc fire from Comb 50, I can see two VC pans-penton quickly in COU in. S2 11/18 J.R

13 0940
Trp B C-Opn: Roc Dust-Off.
Dust-Off J.R

14 0942
HC 31-CO: VC bringing in reinf from W.
S2 J.R

15 0943
Trp B C-Opn: VC coming from E side of road UT 723020.
S2 J.R

16 0945
Opn-Trps B & C CO's: Dust-Off on the way to C-1.
Info J.R

17 0948
CO-C/3 arty CO: Put arty in at UT 7289 5; at UT 723025. Hold arty, airstrike point in.
Info J.R
18 0950 71C 31-Opm: 4th airstrike complete. Info JIR
19 0953 Trp D 31-Opm: Rec port and TR fire, being hit hard, quite a few cas. G3 JIR
20 0954 CO-5/6 Art Co: Artillery B or F from UT730000 to UT730015. Will use airstrike to the W. Info JIR
21 0955 CO-Opm: CA is primarily on W side of rd. S2 JIR
22 0957 S3-Opm: CA will be pushed back to bridge crossing site for Dust-OFF. S2 JIR
23 1000 CO-Opm: Approx 400 VC at UT725000 mostly on W side of Hwy 13. S2 JIR
24 1002 CO-Trp B 31-Opm: Shoot into that pile of logs to your right front. Info C
25 1003 5/6 Art Co-Opm: Artillery is loaded, ready to fire. Co: Go ahead, shoot. Info C
26 1004 Trp B 31-Opm: Loc'd fire from UT723020, S2 C
27 1005 Trp B 31-Opm: Lt th is cut off, has a few cas. S3 C
28 1006 Trp C 31-Opm: Cept hvy fire on his column. Trp B 31-Trp C 31-Opm: Head a th get up here quick and move it. Info C
29 1007 Trp C 31-Opm: Have loc's 3 MG's knocked out already. S2, S3 C
30 1010 71C 31-Opm: Airstrike on W side of rd. For you stop arty. Opm: Arty stop!. Artillery W Co C
31 1011 Trp B 31-Opm: 1 th and 1 APC at head of column is cut off. S3 C
31 1012 CO-Opm: 2/2/16 Inf loaded on trks and moving out to embush loc. G3 is expelling air and Inf. S3 C
31 1013 2/15 Inf 31-Opm: Giving you all the trps I can to help you fight the battle. Info C
31 1019 CO 31-Opm: Proceed to embush site, will arr in 10 min. Info C
31 1020 5/6 Art Co-Opm: Req permission to fire arty CO: Neg at this time. Info C
36 1021
Trp C GO, Opn: Moving upon Trp B at this time. GO: Have to keep on column where Trp B is rec'd fire.
Info C

37 1023
GO GO 4, Opn: In Trp C area, waiting on fire tr.
Info C

38 1024
GO-Opn: What fire is HITTING on, needed in up more.
Info JIR

39 1025
CO-MAC 31: Are there airstrikes coming in? I want to put in GO GO in 5 min.
MAC: So sherd, airstrikes in 1 hr, will let you know when they get here so you can lift GO GO.
Info JIR

40 1026
GO-Inst: Get up to GO CO to W of rd at coord 715015.
Info JIR

41 1026
GO- CO CO: I want you to saturate the area at 730014, can you do it?
Info JIR

42 1026
GO 3/4-CO: Roger, is it free fire on both sides of rd or just the W side, also how about airstrikes? GO: Airstrike be in shortly, I want you to saturate the area first, Free fire both sides of rd.
Info JIR

43 1027
HITTING-CO GO: Where do you want us? GO GO: One on side and behind rd.
Info JIR

44 1027
MAC 25-CO: What in ETA next strike? GO: 5-8 min on target, will give you 2 min warning.
S3 JIR

45 1027
Opn-GO GO: You have about 5 min to fire.
AcIn JIR

46 1028
MAC 25-Opn: Req you hold fire, airstrike about to begin.
GO CO JIR

47 1028
MAC 25-OK: Have GO GO orbit to CB of rd.
GO GO JIR

48 1030
Trp B GO, Trp C GO: Love the up 300 ntrrs more please, tell GO 200 C T (Trp C th), to be careful of H.
Info JIR

49 1031
Trp B-Opn: N W of rd, just off rd 300 ntrrs. GO JIR

50 1031
CO-MAC 31: Can you get the strikes in front 5 to 6 in that area and I'll have GO CO hit that saturation point.
Info JIR
1033
50  CO  CO:  Saturate area 725014 where the trail intersects the main route. CO: Are the 3rd out of there? CO: No, no more 3rd of that to you see noticess.

1034
51  02 CO: There is your strike on W side of rd 30 meters.

1034
52  CO: That is just not hit.

1035
53  CO: You can use any of 3/18 Inf you wish. I am moving another 2n in 1036
their area will take all day, what do you estb on strength? CO: About 400 mostly on 1037
side of rd, some on E with 2n. CO: As soon as they break contact I want you to move 1038
out and got some of them. I'll be in the opn area, keep me informed.

1037
55  CO: Put airstrikes a little further to the 1038
V so I can get GO20 in there.

1038
56  CO-2/18 Inf  CO: That is your loc: 3/18 Inf CO: Just waiting to pull out. CO: Have 400
them re to GO20 Inf and unit there.

1039
57  03 CO: You monitor 2/18 Inf, take them to 1040
Golden Gate and unit there.

1040
58  03 Arty CO-03: 1 kil SW of clearing 1041
there is one hell of bunch of 70, where 1042
you are firing at now. Airstrike just 1043
of it.

1042
59  CO-00 CO: See where the white smoke is 1044
work the W side of rd to where the trail 1045
intersects the main rd.

1045
60  03 Arty  HQ CO: We are shooting now. 1046
CO: Start shooting 135mm on E side of rd.

1046
61  03 Arty CO-03: In the clearing to the SW 1047
of were you been shooting, there is a hell 1048
of a bunch of them W N. I just dropped red smoke 1049
and FAC should see it. They are all over that 1050
area there. They are moving SW into the woods.

1048
62  CO-03 Arty CO: Artly in there. 03
Arty CO: It will cross the path of CO CO: That's a chance we'll have to take, 1051
have him stry low.

1047
63  CO-20 CO: Get in a little closer to the 1048
rd.

1048
64  Trp CO 00: Trk has been hit at lead of 1049
coin
65 1049
CC-CC: Let's get some arty on that road and get fast. Info J.R.

66 1050
CC-CC 31: Putting in arty by 71 50 2.
MAC: We just hit the road twice w/ 20mm.
CC: You did, I didn't catch it. Can you work to the N? MAC: Yes, we need a lot of room for the fighters, let me have the W and put arty on the E.
Info J.R.

67 1050
CC-CC: Keep striking on the W with fighters, I want air further S.
Info J.R.

68 1050
INFORM 1-CC 60 4: Just go down for fuel and ammo. CC GO: Make one more pass.
5-30pm: Get another INFORM.
Info J.R.

69 1052
33-CC: CC GO is down, 50' meters NE of the column.
Info J.R.

70 1052
Trp C CC-Opn: Need air and arty along the road.
Arty MTO J.R.

71 1052
Trp 3 CC-Opn: Have 7 veh up w/ Trp C, RR is apparently after th.
CC J.R.

72 1053
CC: Haven't got it yet.
Info J.R.

73 1055
Trp 3 CC-CC: We need ammo, perhaps you can get CC to bring some. CC-Opn: send W1 to CC w/ ammo.
Info J.R.

74 1057
33-Opn: Send 32 APCs to Golden Gate.
Opn: W1 APCs already at Golden Gate, they have gas there.
Info J.R.

75 059
Trp C CC-Opn: Need air strikes to N and W.
MAC: The air strike going in now, will advice you when we get thru w/ Con.
MAC-Trp C CC: Just made a correction, check this next report.
Info J.R.

76 1100
Opn 33-Trp 21: Relay to 33 the Trp 3 ain we shot now, they need to know the loc of the column. CC CC GO. MAC: He is up now, no problem.
Info J.R.

77 1106
MAC: Column CC GO is gone and you are cleared. Info J.R.

78 1101
INFORM 2-CC: The CC GO has made it safely to Div, will send zero rifle plot back to DIV 101. Opn: For bring them in to our loc.
UNCLASSIFIED

79 1102  CO-5/6 Arty Co:  But arty on 723004.
    C/Arty Co:  Artillery on the way. Info J.R.

80 1105  Rebel 36-Co:  54 Mm tr on station.
    36-Co:  Go to 725004, W side of 36 and make a strafing pass. Info J.R.

81 1108  C-3-Co:  AEW will blink to IV, 5 kilo to
    your left.  With 06 as fire coord line, 1 Co
    and 1 Trp AEW on alert, take about 45
    min to get to your loc. Info J.R.

82 1109  Trp C CO-3-Co:  Short of ammo, all the
    rest knocked out. Info J.R.

83 1111  7/16 Inf CO-3-Co:  Go C of n has lost contact
    w/one platoon.  Go 4 cm ready to go, waiting on
    2cm. Info J.R.

84 1112  CO-5/6 Arty Co:  But another volley in
    same place. Info J.R.

85 1113  CO-Trp 3 Co:  Ptn to C-1 and regroup.
    Ptn to go II again. Info J.R.

86 1115  CO-Trp C CO:  I want you to stay in nos w/4
    all your co's up there. Info J.R.

87 1116  CO-33:  What is the Sit a Golden Gate?
    Opn:  Have rifle Co T-40's and more
    Pers on the way. Info J.R.

88 1118  Trp C CO-3-Co:  Mtn at 723004, CO-3-Co:
    Send an airstrike in there. Info J.R.

89 1119  CO-5/6 Arty Co:  Shift lines to W side of
    06.  C/Arty CO:  Right after this volley.
    Info J.R.

90 1120  C-3-Co:  Cell detonator of AEW is crater
    Sling 3, CO instr then to secure W of
    Golden Gate. Info J.R.

91 1122  Trp B CO-3-Co:  At 723002 between my ele up front
    and 06 02 breaking in need an airstrike.
    02 35:  We'll hit it. Info J.R.

92 1123  CO-Trp B CO:  Lets get a fire up to CR-1 and hit
    both sides of rd. Info J.R.

93 1124  CO-Trp B CO:  Which side of rd is it on? Ans:
    W side of rd coord 723004. Info J.R.

94 1126  7/16 Inf CO:  I would like as many of your
    ele Co's on or at coord 724014.  Start hoping Info
    to the S, unit I now airstrike further
    to the W.  I think we can pick up a hell of a lot.
95 1117
2/18 Info CO-CC: I will give you CO & IG at your request your OIC. CO: I want to airlift your old CO at Golden Gate to the rice paddy w/your other CO. Info JIR

96 1133
CO-S3: I want you to set up ZE at Golden Gate to airlift you & Co to rice paddy via 724014. Info JIR

97 1139
CO-TAC 35: I want you to start working S to U about 300 meters W of rd, while I bring in my intel to the right side to the E. Info JIR

98 132
CO-Trp C CO: I want your men along the rd to catch the 303's as they are chased by the Inf. Info JIR

99 132
CO-6/6 Art Co: Young outarty on E side of rd from 955 to 010. Stay on E side of rd. The Inf will be on the W side of rd. Info JIR

100 1133
CO-Trp B CO: I want you to be prop at CH1 to go N on that secondary rd, to block. The Inf will head to the W of there and start sweeping S. Info JIR

101 1134
Trp B CO-CC: Fire to (50) on otion & writing instr. CO: Cover the E side of rd about 70-35 meters from S to U from CH1. Info JIR

102 1137
S3-C): 12 at Golden Gate is 735626. Info JIR

103 1139
CO-TAC 35: I want you to pulverize the area west to the rice paddy, 724014, supposed to be a .50 and the 0030 mt's W of rd. Info JIR

104 1140
CO-Trp C CO: Send out H, leave small crew back to take care of cas. Info JIR

105 1141
CO-TAC: Have the Dust-Os making pick up now, CO: Nots get then going. Oms: Have all station moving in now. CO: Nots get the Dust-Os out. Info JIR

106 1142
CO-2/13 Inf S3: Putting in air strik where your old will land, don't commit them until I give you the word. Info JIR

107 1143
CO-MAC 35: Start air strike now. Info JIR
106 1'45 G3-Co: We do not know which direction the VC are withdrawing from; therefore you recommend to put this Inf in the area you have into pos. G0: I don't think they are withdrawing.

109 1126 Co-Inf D Co: Have your section's recon to the VC about 400 meters, see if they can see anything withdrawing of the VC.

110 1147 3/18 Inf Co-Co: When airstrike is finished start leading your two platoon on rice paddies and start this to S. I have one of my platoon on the ground another at CP 1 to block to W.

111 1147 Opp-2nd: Will set up CP at bridge, take care of wounded, etc.

112 1150 Co-Inf Co-Opn: They have just killed my 3d platoon at.

113 1151 3/18 Inf Co-Co: 1st platoon committed in 05.

114 1100 3/18 Inf S3-Co: Co's A and B curtain to LZ now.

115 1102 2/18 Inf S3-Co: Air strike completed. Co: Do you have any more info? MAC: Yes, Co: Keep them coming in.

116 1206 2/18 Inf S3-Co: Co A, first lift, on LZ.

117 1212 2/18 Inf S3-Co: Rec fire from W of LZ.

118 1215 3/2 Opn: AWF APO Co curtain, CC directs.

119 1219 2/18 Inf S3-Co: 2d airlift abn now.

120 1222 Co-Inf D Co: Deploy V of Co 1 to creck on pl. D Co: Do there in 10 min.

121 1223 Co-Inf D Co: Commando's Co-D to CTO, MG to pick up recon pl.

122 1227 2/18 Inf Co-Co: A/2/18 Inf alt on LZ now.

123 1'38 1/2/35 Inf Co-Co: Air strike too close.

124 1'38 1/2/35 Inf Co-Co: Air strike to W.

125 1232 2/18 Inf Co-Co: Put Co D 3/18 Inf in on same LZ, more than 50 on line SW/Co A

126 1232 Opp-2nd: Have 4/111 at CP1, Opp have Dustoff on the way.
136 1233  CO - 1/7/6 Inf Co: Hold pos until Co B links up w/Co. Info JIR
137 1234  O3 B/3/6 Inf Co: Berlin LZ w/red smoke. Info JIR
138 1236  Co - Co: anything else we can do? Info JIR
139 1236  Co - Co: I just heard a report that the VC are moving 2300 meters off the rd, see if you can get CIC to put CCB on other side in there S to the bridge (17705999) or even S of the bridge. CO - Co: I monitored. Info JIR
140 1237  S3 - Co: 1st airmate off at this time, will take 4 lifts of 5 each. Info JIR
141 1238  CO - Trp B Co: Are you in your blocking pos yet? Trp B: Set up CCB on that secondary rd. Info JIR
142 1239  S3 - Co: 1st lift is out, 2nd lift is landing. Info JIR
143 1240  CIC 35 - Co: Where do you want this next strike? Co: From bridge 17705999, 2300 meters off rd. Info JIR
144 1241  O3 - S3: Is that 2nd lift on the way yet? S3: They have just lifted off, on the way. O3: JIR
145 1242  Opc - Co: 3 HHP's on the way w/avv, red smoke, 2 more trucks on arrival. Co: Do you have them? Opc: Plenty of 3s. Co: Load one truck of ammo, send it to Trp O pos. Info JIR
146 1243  S3 - Co: 11th AAC Co moving in from Golden Gate. CO - Trp B Co: Will putting on Crater Slim (11th AAC Co) in 15 min to strengthen your blocking pos. Info JIR
147 1245  S3 - Co: 2nd lift on the way in. O3: JIR
148 1246  O3 - Co: Have you had any contact w/10c? Co: No. Info JIR
149 1246  CO - 11th AAC Co: You are 100 feet at crossing site; cross WTP, go to 17720994 (11/01) Turn W; set up blocking pos facing E. Info JIR
150 1250  Trp B Co - Co: Moving into pos now. O3: JIR
151 1251  CO - 11th AAC Co: Are you moving to CCB? 11th AAC Co: Moving in from Golden Gate. Info JIR
142 1352

INFO 37-CO: It fires in back on station any inst Co: Work over area S of rd
at 1771565.

143 1354

INFO Co-37-CO: How are you doing now?
37-CO: Pretty good. I contact now.
Can we get a Meet-Off in here for cas?
37-CO: Meet-Off for Trp C S of C, 1500 hrs
Cpt: Imo ship (Clown 6) on the way
in, he will evac us.

144 1354

C/6 37-CO: I'm over here W of the rd.
see a few VC coming out of the woods.
you'd like to put in a fire to block.
37-CO: Execute.

145 1354

INFO 1/3 18 Inf Co: Have one go ready to go;
there are one coming in, I will take end and eth
S along the rd.

146 1300

C/18 Inf 33-33: Are there any 3rd sis at
17100120? 33: Log, 33-33: See one
VC pp time in air strike. 33: Go ahead.

147 1302

INFO 33-33: Are there any 3rd sis at
17100120? 33: Log. 33-33: See one
VC pp time in air strike. 33: Go ahead.

148 1304

C/18 Inf 33-33: arty looking N of 33, do
not want it any closer. 33-33: Help
the way to C/3 arty.

149 1306

INFO 33-Trp D Co: AMTR AIC CO is moving in behind
you bck generally K and W.
33-33: Is aero rifle plat commited yet?
33-33: Log, on the way to Golden Gate.

150 1306

INFO 33-Trp D Co: Do you have Co C 2/18 Inf
move with you? Trp D Co: Log

151 1309

DIV Arty CC-40: 8" arty going into your
left, support you move airstrike to the
left and let arty cont to fires.

152 1310

INFO 33-DIV Arty CO: Stop the 8" arty, one ran just went in
where they are unloading. 33: Log, do you see the arty
moving in that area? Trp D CO: Yes

153 1311

INFO 33-DIV Arty CO: Stop the 8" arty, one ran just went in
where they are unloading. 33: Log, do you see the arty
moving in that area? Trp D CO: Yes

154 1314

INFO Trp D CO-S3: We are working to the W of
the 79 grid line. Trying to stop en-
withdrawal. 33: Log, Co you see the arty
firing in that area? Trp D CO: Yes

155 1315

INFO 33-CO: AMTR AIC U in place blocking
pos complete.

156 1316

INFO 33-CO: AMTR AIC Co Aiv: Have your U V on
that trail.
157 1317 CC-Opn: Get 2 Dust-Off for the downed chopper in LZ

158 1318 S3-MX: MC Co: You are in the wrong place. CO: Have you moved down that trail to the W? Ans: Yes

159 1320 G3-CO: Will have another CO go (CH47A) on station for you in 5 min.

160 1321 CO-Trp D CO: Check area around downed chopper.

161 1322 Dust-Off 70-CO: How many more gas do you have down there? CO: Ok at Golden Gate.

162 1325 3-GO: Rec rept 180 VC at KT 744967 at 1300 hrs.

163 1330 CC-Go1-Opn: On station v 1 hr fuel and ordnance

164 1334 S3-Opn: Will use GO GO IV of RJ

165 1336 1/6 Arty Co-S3: We have a hell of a bunch of VC at LT 713017, may be setting up ambush for 7/16 Inf, CO GO: Will put fire in at 713017, will work u smoke.

166 1339 FAC 31-CO: Have air strikes for you then GO C finishes.

167 1339 1/6 Arty Co-Go: They have all moved into the wood line across the stream.

168 1340 FAC 31-CO: Where do you want the next strike? CO: It should be W at 700010, by the stream.

169 1341 FAC 31-CO: You have a hell where strike is at. CO: Notified him and is moving out now.

170 1342 2/16 Inf S3-CO: Hy lead elmore 600 mtrs S of LT.

171 1350 HCO-Opn: Gcs; Trp B-6 HHa, 23 W1A and Trp G-2 HHa, 17 W1A.

172 1401 G3-Opn-Opn: Rec loc Crater Sling 3, Cpn: Loc at vic 715995.

173 1401
173 11:02 REBEL 37-Trp D CC: Going into refuel at PN 401.

174 11:06 Trp B CO-OP: 2/18 Inf elem were blocking from C1 U 2 E1m.

175 11:10 Trp B CO-2/18 Inf S3: Use cas in your post.


177 11:13 Trp B CO-OPn: Have Mustang I take nsx, Ref Trp 0/76.

178 11:15 CO-OPn: Tell CO he has done a splendid job, I am putting him under OP-CO: 1st Bde

179 11:16 2/18 Inf S3-OPn: 200 mtrs S of LZ have wounded VC, need Dust Off.

180 11:17 REBEL 31-OPn: Lutting in airstrike at vtc 7082010. There is an H23 in the vtc you can get it out of there.

181 11:20 2/1 Inf-OPn: At 7090-5 spot 3 squad of VC.

182 11:22 S3-OPn: Tell Trp D CC elem to ck rd vtc 73299, rec rept seeing VC.

183 11:23 2/18 Inf-S3: See 4 VC at 712016.

184 11:24 S3-S3: Fix radio on 1st Bde push now.

185 11:25 S3-OPn: Get these wounded out, also one at Trp 3.

186 11:27 Trp C CO-OPn: I have 2 KIA and 21 WIA, also 16 APC's and no-ths ops.


188 11:30 CO-OPn: Aset S3 is to take and of Golden Gate e'm.

189 11:31 Asst S3-CO: 1st Bde Cmdr wants to meet you someplace, can you go to Golden Gate? CO: Roger.

190 11:32 2/18 Inf-OPn: By elt at 715046.

191 11:33 Opn-CO: 1st Bde Cmdr enroute to Golden Gate.

192 11:34 2/18 Inf CO: Can you contact CO and tell him we have switched 2/18 Inf
193 1435
194 1438
195 1439
196 1442
197 1444
198 1445
199 1446
200 1450
201 1453
202 1454
203 1456
204 1502
205 1503
206 1510
207 1511
208 1512
209 1514
210 1515

10C/4-CC: Get on 1st Bde push, 56000 he is trying to contact you.

Opt Relay-Opn: Sec fire 3 of CT 1.

LNO/1-Opn: 3/13 Inf S3 is at Golden Gate.

2/3 Inf-Opn rear: Do you have a couple slicks we can use to transport our U.

Div Relay-Opn: We can relay any msg to DLM if you lose contact.

CO-501: Keep saturating the area for a while, ARTs are down in the W and E 40 mtrs for Golden Gate.

Opn-2/18 Inf S3: 3 frd MIA at 1/4 Cav CP loc, req a Dust-Off at 724006.

Opn-LNO/1: If you have any slicks avail send them to 724006 to be used for air evac.

CO-Opn: Ps contact w CO & S3. Where are those pr. ser. Opn: vic 724006.

CO-CC: Come to Golden Gate, have 3 VCC.

Clown 6-Opn: Have walking wounded, where do you want them? Opn: Take then to Div.

Mustang-Opn: Tell Trp D CO at your loc, Trp D Opn has Inf avail slick avail if needed, also will have CCH ship avail in about an hour.

Mustang 1-Trp D rear: Have no need for CCH ship, slick or Inf at this time.

33-Opn: We have a few more MIA and VCC here at Golden Gate.

Clown 9-Opn: On way to Golden Gate to pick up MIA and VCC.

Opn-CO: Bag from 6/6 Arty, rec perm to fire arty from CP 22 to SW.

C) CO 1-CC: Back on station, will standby.

CO-Trp 3 CO: What's the Sit? Trp D CO: No contact in last 10 min, people moving if and S. We have been cutting them up in the past 45 min.
UNCLASSIFIED

211 1515 Co-Trp D CO: 1st Me ele loc from Ctl left 5 km w from 500 Ibrns. Info J.R

212 1527 Opn-S3: Inform CO not to move any farther than 5039999 and from the S because of arty conc. Info J.R

213 1530 Trp D CO-S3: Western most veh is at 7039999. Info J.R

214 1522 Trp C CO-S3: By lst plat is at ML has no contact w/- 85, can you investigate. G3 J.R

215 1523 Opn-Trp B CO: What is the Inf loc? Trp B CO: Co E at 2999990 to 715005; Co C at 724006 to Ctl, AN1 from Ctl. Info J.R

216 1529 Opn Adv: Opn rear: leg from CO; XO is to come fwd to op date soonest. Opn Rear: XO is at Div rear on courts and boards. Opn Adv: Give him a call and get him up here. Info J.R

218 1534 Co-S3: Do you have any ore captives, if so where are they? S3: Have 10 VC at Trp C loc, will take them to 701001. Info J.R

219 1536 Co-CO CO: Put some fire on 710015 and to the West. Info J.R

220 1537 1-1 CO: Get some arty and air in on that area, stop feeling around w/ CO CO, taking to long. Info J.R

221 1539 1-1 CO: Have any fighters in area, Can ve be any assist to you? Info J.R

222 1540 Opn-S3: Have some ECO air if 1/1/18 Inf needs it. Info J.R

223 1545 S3-Trp D CO: 12-15 scouts at 791064, en moving B, going to investigate. Info J.R

224 1546 S3-CO: W and SW from 6900, do you have any air going in. CO: Peg, Artly. Info J.R

225 1550 Trp E CO-CO: VC at 715005, They are blocking Co A. Info J.R

226 1555 INFO/1-Opn: 22S Acor briefed 1st Bde S3 here at our loc. Info J.R

227 1555 S3-CO Dmr: Air strike will be put on at 7001. Info

228 1609 S3-Trp D 3: Like to have 1-1 Trp-02N or w outbrush.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>230</td>
<td>S3-TRP B Co: Dust-Off on my end, push.</td>
<td>Info J.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230</td>
<td>S3-TRP B Co: We about 2 or 4 WO, will need Dust-Off as soon as airstrike is completed.</td>
<td>Info J.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>231</td>
<td>23-0pn: I will be on station tonight w/Starlight and Lighting.</td>
<td>Info J.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>232</td>
<td>1611 Opn: 1st Bde CO rec you call him on his push.</td>
<td>Info J.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233</td>
<td>1616 Trp B Co: 6 people carrying weapons at the hill near rice paddies.</td>
<td>Info J.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>234</td>
<td>1618 Opn-CO: 1st Bde CO wants you to block stream before out of V.</td>
<td>Info J.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>235</td>
<td>1622 S3-CO: Going back to 1st Bde CO to refuel and get some water and food for Trp B.</td>
<td>Info J.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>235</td>
<td>1623 CO-TRP B Co: Make sure you have a strong blocking pos.</td>
<td>Info J.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>236</td>
<td>1623 CO-TRP B Co: Make sure you have a strong blocking pos.</td>
<td>Info J.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>237</td>
<td>1625 S2-CO: 100 VC carrying ops at 760963 in village. Also in grid square 650015 or 660030 is a VC base camp.</td>
<td>Info J.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>238</td>
<td>1633 CO-CO: arty fire being placed on 760963.</td>
<td>Info J.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>239</td>
<td>1635 ADC/3-CO: No village at 760963.</td>
<td>Info J.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>240</td>
<td>1638 30-33: keep on laying in air and arty.</td>
<td>Info J.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>241</td>
<td>1651 Trp C 00-0pn: Left rec fire vic 740992.</td>
<td>Info J.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>242</td>
<td>1755 S3-CO: At Golden Gate organizing recup, we also have some 100 VC troops to help secure the area.</td>
<td>Info J.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>243</td>
<td>1854 CO-0pn report: Get XO u here ASAP.</td>
<td>Actim J.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>244</td>
<td>1900 CO-TAC 34: Sit the whole darn tom.</td>
<td>Info J.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>245</td>
<td>1903 S3-CO: Have trucks coming back for recup, moving OP to Golden Gate, also rec Spookley.</td>
<td>Info J.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>246</td>
<td>1735 03-0pn: Rept 100 VC carrying more than one vpm per man spotted at 705725, FC drives it out.</td>
<td>Info J.R.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
247 1630 CO-Trp B CO: Stay on roa toni ht. Info J.N.

248 1607 MG 31-CC: Air strike at 7:30. Info J.N.

249 1920 Trp 6 NO-Cpn: Have reporters at Trp 6 roa to get back toni ht. Info J.N.

250 1655 Opn-Trp 6 NO: Clen to carry 2 ships of reg up to Golden Gate, and rtn w 3 prisoners and 1 reporter. Info J.N.

251 1900 CO Trp B CO: Move along roa to 2 of bridge at CP 1. Info J.N.

252 1909 CO-Trp B CO: Kick up NNW adv Info J.N.

253 1912 Trp C NO-Cpn: MID at our loc, if we can keep MID toni ht, will be able to get 1 th and 1 NO going to bow. Info J.N.

254 1915 Clen 9-Cpn: We have 2 UCC, inbound for LCC. Opn: Float for them to Div. Info J.N.

255 1927 Clen-7-Trp B CO: Have a load of water for you and coming in. Info J.N.

256 1930 Trp B NO-Cpn: Tell CO I coord w 3, he has approval plan we discussed. Also, ret my leaf when you have finished. CO J.N.


258 2100

259 2200

260 2300

261 2400

262 2400 Opn#53: Closed 53 Journal.

STAFF: Trp A 0300 1/8 Inf, HQ 101, Trp B (air) 0300 1st Inf Div, HQ 101, Trp C, Trp 5 and 6-Man, route recon, in area of all 300 from bridge to CF 1, Fr. and W, then E. On recon on contact roa at 0220 hrs, contact broken at 150 hrs. Con 5P with 2-300 Bridge, Trps B and C to GP. For on contact rest of night.

/s/ G.A. Taylor