MILITARY MONOGRAPH

TITLE: SCOUTING AND PATROLLING

SCOPE: To bring out experiences gained in scouting and patrolling in the European Theatre, and to compare these experiences with similar experiences of others.

Prepared by: Henry C. Bowden, Jr.
(Name)

Captain, Cav.
(Rank)
SCOUTING AND PATROLLING

In combat the army thrives on information. To assure success in battle, commanders must have information about the enemy, the terrain, and about the troops fighting beside them. Scouts and patrols are among the agencies which can adequately furnish them such information.

Daniel Boone and Buffalo Bill are dead. They left us, however, a legend of experienced pioneers who matched their wits with nature and the wily foe — the American Indian. We Americans, long ago, gave up outdoor life for the more comfortable indoor type of living. The invention of light bulbs have blinded our eyes to darkness; radios and telephones have dulled our ears. We had much rather stand up on our two feet than flatten out on our bellies on the ground. We like to talk and show off. In short, creeping and crawling doesn't fit our natural character. We hate to wait; we like to get things done; we're restless.

To help save our country during the past war, we turned to many of the techniques that our forefathers used in building our country. Many Americans were taught to use the ancient technique of scouting and patrolling that was as old as our country. Whatever your arm or service, you must be a scout in combat and you must use patrols in combat. Both have been proved in every war in the history of the world.

Incidentally, I will use the two words scouting and patrolling throughout this article. Though the two words do not mean the same, we can -- with little change -- fit the two together very easily. We can say that a patrol is made up of scouts because in a sense every man in a
patrol is a scout. The difference being that we can't say a scout is made up of patrols. Then, let us say that except for missions that scouting and patrolling is almost the same since, generally speaking, the job of either is the same. This comparison is hard to visualize. One man does not make a combat patrol, nor do two companies usually go on a night sneak patrol; but if the mission given these two agencies could be accomplished with such organization then it would be rather foolish to quibble over the name.

I believe I can safely say that scouting and patrolling was born the same time as war itself. I do know that Chapter II, 1st verse of Joshua reads: "And Joshua sent two men to spy secretly, saying, 'Go view that land even Jericho'. And they went." That is probably the first record we have in print of the use of a patrol or of a scouting party of any kind.

Another historic example of the early use of scouting and patrolling goes back to the days of the French and Indian War. During the war, there was a very colorful group of scouts called Rogers Rangers, and were so called because of their commander Major Robert Rogers. This unit of some six hundred frontiersman became known as the eyes and ears of the British-American Army. They adopted the best features of Indian warfare in that they learned how to see without being seen, kill silently, and make maximum use of cover and concealment. As a result of their proficiency in this type of tactics, they became both

1. Chapter II, 1st Verse of Joshua, The Bible.
famous and feared. In comparing Rogers Rangers with our modern army, we can say that they were the reconnaissance battalion of the British-American Army.

To bring the above mentioned historic example up to date, I'd like to quote a message that Major General A. A. Vandegrift of the 1st Marine Division sent back from Guadalcanal. "My message to the troops in training is to go back to the tactics and leadership of the days of Rogers Rangers." On another occasion, General Vandegrift said, "Right along with mechanization and blitzkrieging -- with tanks, planes, and jeeps -- the course of many a battle is being decided by the skill and courage of the individual fighting soldier. Since in modern war, the enemy may appear anywhere in any war theatre it is necessary for you to act like a scout whatever your arm or service."2

To add to what has been brought out in these historic examples, I believe we can say that when discussing scouting and patrolling, we are talking about a subject that is very old yet still modern and that the tactics and use of scouts and patrols have changed only with the improvement of weapons and equipment.


On September 17, 1944, Supreme Headquarters sent the 94th Infantry Division to relieve elements of the 83rd Infantry Division in and about St Nazaire and Lorient, France. The mission being to contain and screen the enemy in this area. This was certainly an unusual mission for an unmotorized unit such as an infantry division because the area to be covered was much more than could physically be covered by an infantry division. To understand the importance of this mission, we must first look at a map of France and learn the "big picture" as of 17 September 1944, when the 94th Division took over its new duties.

During the preceding months of the war, the might of the Wehrmacht in France had withered at a rapid rate before the power of the U. S. forces. First, from the beaches and coastal defenses of Normandy; then, after the breakthrough at St Lo from the Breton Peninsula, and finally under the devastating thrusts of General Patton's armor from north central France. By September the greater strength of the Nazi Army that was west of the Siegfried Line had become somewhat ineffective.

So rapid was the advance of the Allied Forces that many small pockets of fanatical Nazis were either by-passed or cut off from the major German forces. Probably realizing that it would be useless to try to hold out in their individual positions of resistances, these small enemy groups drifted into natural centers of resistance along the Atlantic coast of France and with their back secured against
the sea they took up a defensive stand to face the Allied might. These relatively small pockets of resistance were the "forgotten fronts" — forgotten, that is, by press and public, but they will probably never be forgotten by the American and French troops who held these 75,000 well fortified, well fed, and well equipped Germans in tow from the late summer of 1944 until surrender of the Hitler War Machine on May 8, 1945.

The "forgotten front" stretched along about 300 miles of the French coast, from Lorient on the southside of the Breton Peninsula to the southeast bank of the Gironde River just north of Bordeaux. The presence of enemy troops in this area denied the Allies the use of the best Atlantic ports and also left the Germans with safe harbors for their U-boat Wolfpacks that would have otherwise been handicapped with the complete liberation of France. The 75,000 Nazis in this area were somewhat dispersed. There were approximately 34,000 divided among Pointe de Grave Peninsula on the Gironde, Le Trenblade, the island of Oleron, and La Rochelle region. The 41,000 others were divided between St Nazaire and Lorient. St Nazaire was thought to be hoarding some 23,000 of these; however, it is known that the strength of enemy in Lorient and St Nazaire changed about as often as did their outpost position — which was daily.

The enemy in St Nazaire, the area which my regiment was primarily interested, was occupying an area about 250 square miles in size, which forms a rough triangle on the map; one side of the
triangle being the Atlantic Ocean, a second side the Lorie River, the other side a straight line about forty-five miles of France's landscape. On the third side was where the 376th Infantry Regiment, the 94th Division, went into a defensive position making the other unfordable barrier of the triangle.

I give you this picture so you may get an idea of the area that my regiment was occupying when our men and officers began to slowly and costly learn the technique of scouting and patrolling. I do not believe that any other outfit in the American Army patrolled more than we did while we were in this situation. The 1st Battalion, 376th Infantry Regiment, the battalion which I was in at the time, operated three patrols daily for a period of over two months. The other two battalions were operating on a similar schedule.

I'd like to mention here before going on that initially this patrolling program was carried out with the same personnel that manned front line positions day in and day out. We had no reserve platoons in our companies, because our frontage was so wide that we had to use all available men in the company to cover it. The three line companies, however, did rotate positions, being on line eight days and then going into battalion reserve for a four-day rest period. However, the reserve company was on a fifteen minute alert for counterattack, and often was given alert drill in carrying our counterattack plans to different assembly points in rear of front line positions. I feel that this is a very good point and believe it a good principle to follow.
when occupying a static defensive position.

Another point I'd like to bring out here is that it is not ideal to have the same men that are in position do the patrolling. This brings on unnecessary fatigue. If it is possible, organize special patrol squads or sections or platoons from twelve to thirty men and one or two officers. They don't all have to be from the same company or battalion, but they should live together so they will learn each others movements, traits, and habits, such as the sound of each other's voice, whistle, the silhouette of each other, and in some cases even learn the sound of each other's footsteps. Understand that organizing such groups as these is advisable only in a static situation where a large scale patrolling program is anticipated. These groups should be either on a battalion or regimental level to centralize and facilitate their shelter, feeding, rest, and control. Another point to remember when using this system is that these men are performing special operations and are undergoing more hazardous duty than the men occupying the defense; therefore, they should be given plenty of rest before and after an operation, and awards should be prompt and plentiful. A last point to mention here is that deficiencies found on one operation should be worked out before going on the next one.

I want to emphasize again that such organization for extensive patrolling can be carried out only when an organization is in a static position as was the 94th Infantry Division in their
operation that I have mentioned. Some units in Italy carried out a similar operation. One I know of in particular was the 38th Infantry Division. I can find no record of the units in the Pacific using such methods for organized patrolling, but I can see no reason why it would not be as workable a solution for units operating in jungle type warfare.

The British used a system similar to the one I have mentioned on controlling of patrols by battalion and regiment.

"The battalion commander designated a field officer as battalion patrolling officer. The patrolling officer established a patrolling headquarters and a patrolling O.P. in the battalion area. The headquarters included a briefing officer, certain intelligence personnel and operation for the O.P. The commanding officer laid down general policies and the patrolling officer handled all details."4

This appears to be, with slight modification, the same system we used. That is, battalion control.

From the same article, but not from British sources the following statement appears.

"Efficiency of patrols is greatly increased by having a warm, lighted, dugout in each battalion area reserved exclusively for patrols. At least an hour and a half before the mission, the patrol leader can assemble all members there and accomplish the following: Warn the men, thoroughly instruct each man, field strip, clean, and dry each weapon, and review each man's duties. Give the men a chance to drink some hot coffee, study aerial photograph, and talk over the mission. This helps them become a team, and makes a difference in their performance."

I know this to be a very helpful procedure because when we first started our patrolling operations, our preparation consisted of merely appointing a squad to patrol a few hours in advance of the designated time to move out. As a result, our patrols were very ineffective, but we soon learned from experience that our system had to be changed. Again, I would like to say that this elaborate set-up could only be accomplished in a static situation.

It is believed that the Germans used the same personnel, in as much as possible, for their patrol work and it is generally agreed that they had us "beat a mile" when it came to patrolling.

5. R. B. Lovett, E.G. USA Adjutant General, Ch. I, "Patrolling and Reconnaissance", Battle Experience, p. 2, (July 1944 to April 1945), HQ ETO USA.
"Even prior to the organization of special assault companies and assault platoons, an idea with which the Germans began experimenting several months prior to the end of the war, some units evidently made it a practice always to draw their patrols from a specific company. Either the same platoon was sent out over and over again, or a detachment of the 'cross-section' type was sent out — always under the same officer. In this manner, selected personnel became increasingly experienced in patrol work. It is believed that the enemy's use of specialized personnel for patrol work will be undertaken on a larger scale in the future."  

Again, we see from the enemy that the use of organized groups for patrolling is prevalent.

Before going any further in this subject, let's stop and take a look at the definitions of scouting and patrolling.

"A scout is a soldier employed in reconnoitering under conditions which require exceptional ability in the use of arms, ground and cover movement, in observing and in accurately reporting the results of his observation. Scouts usually operate in pairs." 7 I do not disagree with this definition of a scout, but I feel that we are rather foolish to train only a few men in each platoon and company for scouts. In the first place, the few scouts in a platoon or

company are not enough to secure the necessary information desired; and in the second place, their job is not a very permanent one. I'd like to feel that I could make the above definition apply to as many men in my company as possible. Naturally, some of your men will make better scouts than others; and when selecting a patrol, don't pick all your best scouts for the same patrol or you'll probably have nothing but second-rate scouts for the next patrol. Hold out some of the good ones for the next patrol and so on just as long as possible. By this system, you will train the poorer ones to be better and you preserve your better ones a little longer. Likewise, don't work your best patrol leaders too often, or they will get careless. A good guide to follow is the principle used by a big league baseball manager. Use your best pitcher every four or five days, and he will be more effective.

This may sound somewhat controversial to the statement I made concerning the forming of patrol groups from 12 to 30 men and one or two officers on the battalion or regimental level; but you must remember your average day in and day out patrol is not going to be a full platoon, and is not going to always be led by an officer. Only on occasions, will you send out a large combat patrol, and on these occasions using the battalion and regimental type control system, you have a well trained group; and when you use smaller patrols, you have any number of well trained, capable leaders. You will have to have a constant replacement system for this group; but it should be a piecemeal turnover and not a complete change in personnel, or you will be defeating one of the purposes of having such a group.
The average size of patrols used by my company was five to 15 men. We always carried a large percentage of automatic weapons to justify the small size of the patrol. After all, patrolling is more or less a hit and run proposition, and you can hit harder with automatic weapons and run faster with a small number of men -- not to mention the fact that control is greatly simplified with a smaller group.

Let's look again at FM 21-75, and see what it says about a patrol.

"A patrol is a detachment of troops sent out from a larger body on a mission of reconnaissance, security or combat. There are two classes of patrols as determined by their mission: reconnaissance patrols and combat patrols." The first part of this definition can hardly be disputed, but I would like to change the latter part of it in a manner similar to the change the artillery made with their various and numerous barrages. I prefer to have just one type patrol, and that it be called a patrol. You could vary the size and mission of the patrol, but I can see no particular need for having so many different names. My reason for using the one type of patrol is more or less a psychological one. It is a set principle to give a patrol only one mission because one mission is all one patrol can efficiently carry out. If you send a reconnaissance patrol out to recointer a point, and they run into trouble before they recointer this point -- unless they are exceptional -- they will come in because their mission was to recointer not to fight. On the other hand, if you send a combat patrol

out, and they don't find a fight, they feel that their job is done and
they pack up and come home. My contention is — don't give the patrol
a name, give it a mission.

Now that we have defined the components that we are discussing,
let us look at the jobs that they can do. That is, patrol missions.
Patrols may be assigned missions which will likely require them to
engage actively in combat. Before we decided to call patrols just
patrols, such a patrol may have been called a combat patrol. Missions
such as capturing prisoners, destroying enemy personnel by raiding
or infiltrating enemy lines, seizing and holding ground, and destroying
enemy infiltrating groups may and probably will require some fighting.
Some missions often given patrols are raiding, screening, infiltrating,
assaulting, demonstration, and mopping up. Other type missions include
the securing of information, such as location of friendly troops —
this may be called liaison — or locating hostile positions and
installations, locating routes, streams, crossings, obstacles, and
terrain features. Patrols can and often will be used to maintain
contact with the enemy. There are probably as many missions that can
be given to a patrol as there are commanders in the army because a
patrol can perform any mission that the men and weapons are capable of
performing. The important thing to remember is to give a patrol a
single, simple mission. That is, just give them one mission, and be
sure that the one mission is definitely and clearly stated and
understood. You can give a patrol a very tough mission such as
capturing a town, or you can give them an easy mission such as observing a road junction; but only one at a time. An outstanding patrol leader of the 79th Infantry Division had the following to say about patrol missions. "Only one mission should be given to a patrol, and it should be definitely and clearly stated. If you are given two or more missions such as penetrating as deeply as you can and bringing back a prisoner, one of the two missions is bound to suffer. The result is that you are not successful in either." 9

My first patrol in France was a typical example of assigning a patrol a wrong mission. About 2500 yards from my company's defensive position on a bluff directly to our front stood a very beautiful French Chateau. From the upper story windows of this building, the Germans could fire harassing MG fire into my company's position — which they did quite often. At this time, we did not know that the Germans used this building only occasionally and were not occupying it as a permanent position. I organized my patrol with two light M.Gs., five B.A.Rs., one 81 M.M., one arty. F.O., and 18 riflemen. We also carried one 300 radio, two sand power phones, and 1000 feet of light field wire. We were loaded — actually, overloaded.

My orders were to move out to the chateau, and if I saw the enemy or was fired on from the vicinity of the chateau, to attack it. I moved out, and within an hour had reached a ridge that directly overlooked the position. After posting all around security and setting my M.G. and mortars in what I thought to be good positions, I picked a vantage point to observe the building. After two uneventful hours,

9. Ch. I, Battle Experience, HQ ETO USA, (July, April, 1945), p. 3.
I radioed battalion and asked what to do. It was getting dark, and I wanted to make preparation for the night. Battalion sent the message to return, so I took the patrol in. At the time, I was glad to get back in friendly territory; but the next day I realized I had accomplished nothing, for the simple reason I had been given no definite mission. I believe the mission should have been either to reconniter the vicinity of the chateau or to take it. I accomplished neither.

In summing up patrol mission, I'd like to leave the following thoughts with you: Give the patrol only one mission. Be sure it is clear and understood, and if the mission assigned is of such nature that it may or may not be accomplished -- give a secondary mission to keep the patrol from being wasted effort. An example of the latter statement would be in case of a patrol being given the mission of attacking a known enemy outpost to take prisoners, and they found the outpost unmanned; give them a secondary mission of reconnaissance of the position.

We have now established the fact that a scout may be a member of a patrol; a patrol is usually made up of scouts, and a patrol will have only one mission. Suppose we now decide how this patrol will operate. The first event in sequence of forming a patrol will be to assign it a mission. The higher commander keeps the accomplishment of the mission in mind when he selects the patrol leader. The more important the mission, the more careful his selection must be.
The leader chosen must then be given the privilege of picking the men and weapons and equipment he desires for the job. After all, he is the man going out to do the job — not you. Give him all the cooperation possible by obtaining the equipment he desires.

From the time the patrol leader is chosen and the mission selected, it is the job of the chosen leader to work out his plan with his patrol. He will probably be aided by the S-2 concerned, the company commander concerned, or the unit patrol officer. This depends on the patrolling system being used. He should be sure all members know the job they are to have, know the route, alternate route, formation to be used, communication and signal plans, and any other measure that he deems pertinent to the success of the patrol. He should if time permits make a small sand table on the ground, if no better place is available, and rehearse the operation. He may be able to take all members that are to participate to an O.P., and look over a portion of the route or area to be covered during the patrol. Incidentally, the patrol leader should be given his mission as far in advance of the time of execution as possible. Thirty-six hours in advance is desirable. This much time, however, is not always possible. With everything ready — weapons clean, all men well fed, rested, oriented on their job, — the patrol is ready to move out.

Just prior to moving out, the S-2 or patrol officer should give the patrol leader the last minute information on the situation concerning his patrol. That is, any last minute reports on the enemy or area
concerned and the operation of friendly units, patrols, and any other information that may be of any use.

During the planning phases, consideration must be given to the fact that the patrol may run into trouble; therefore, a reserve must be tentatively organized. This reserve can be of any size desired and may be drawn from any company in the battalion or regiment. If you are using the battalion or regimental type control patrolling system, you may have one of the companies furnish an alert platoon for that particular patrol. This alert platoon may carry on with their usual duties, but at least two of their leaders must be oriented and must be present when the patrol leader is working out his plans. The three important things to remember in planning for a reserve are: First, to have one; second, have the leader of the reserve oriented; and, third, have it of such strength that if committed it can do the job. If a company is sending out the patrol, the reserve of course will come from that company.

This reserve in my opinion is a very essential and important factor. Patrols are prone to get surrounded due to their small size, and also due to the fact that the enemy is sitting waiting for them to walk into his position. The enemy also has the advantage of being able to reinforce his position with fire and personnel because he is in his own territory. Having this reserve formed helps the morale of the men on the patrol greatly, and also is a great man saving device.

The Germans had a very clever way of using a patrol reserve.
The majority of their patrols were either split in two approximately even parts, or they followed one patrol with another at about 300 yards. This rear patrol acted as a rear guard and a reserve; and as soon as contact was made, they would hit with their reserve which in most cases greatly influence the course of action. I feel this principle worth consideration. My main objection to the technique is that it does commit more men to the enemy. In other words, you are actually using more men than necessary if you don't need the reserve.

We will now assume that the patrol moved out, accomplished its mission, and returned. Immediately upon return, the patrol leader and second in command and probably another key member of the patrol should be quizzed by the S-2 or patrol officer or by both. This constitutes the patrol report. The complete sequence of the operation should be given, and the information recorded by the S-2 who should put all information in its appropriate place. S-2 should also keep a patrol report jacket or file.

After the information is recorded, the S-2 or patrol officer should show the patrol leader how the obtained information fits in with prior information in the big picture. The little factor stimulates interest, and shows the patrol leader just how important a part he has played.

I'd like to mention here before leaving the discussion of patrol reports that the value of patrolling is wasted if the information
PATROL ORDER
APO 230 U.S. Army

Step One
Directive

Patrol — —
No.
Troops
1. Mission
2. Size
3. Time Out
4. Return
5. Route
6. Remarks

Authentication

This patrol order was used by the 38th Cav. Ron. Sq. Mecz.
DETAILED PLAN OF PATROL
APO 230 U.S. Army

Step Two
Plan
Date Time

Patrol No.

1. Patrol Leader — —
2. Second in command — —
3. Mission
4. Alt. Mission
5. Size of Patrol
6. Time Out date time
7. Return date time
8. Time order was rec'd. by ldr. in advance of time out (36 hr.) date time
9. Time order was given to patrol in advance of time out date time (24 Hrs.)
10. Route (by overlay)
11. Alternate (by overlay)
12. Formations to be employed (by diagram)
13. Communication Plan (In detail from front to rear)
14. Are there any patrols to R or L? Yes No
   a. If yes, what is plan of coordination.
15. What type signals are to be used to control party
16. Disposition of attached personnel
   a. Arty.
   b. Engr.
   c. Med.
17. Employment of supporting weapons
   a. M.G.
   b. Arty.
   c. Mortar
18. Action of patrol upon contact with enemy
19. Action upon discovery of enemy mines or booby traps
20. Plan of defense if patrol is ambushed
21. Assembly or rally point

This patrol plan was used by the 38th Cav. Rom. Sq. Mecz.
PATROL REPORT
APO 230 U.S. Army

Step Three
Results

Patrol

Patrol Leader

No.

Troops

1. Mission
2. Size
3. Route
4. Time of departure
5. Time of return
6. Number of enemy observed
7. General
8. Condition of patrol

Authentication

This patrol report was used by the 38th Cav. Rcn. Sq. Mecz.
gained while patrolling is not properly recorded and used. I'd like to
mention an example of the failure to record and use information that
occurred in my outfit. We were in a small German town a few thousand
yards inside the Siegfried Line in a temporary defensive position
pending further offensive employment. The town was located in a
valley with the Germans holding the high ground some 1500 yards to our
front and right flanks. The enemy held ground was heavily wooded and
impassable to wheeled or track vehicles except for one narrow sunken
road that ran directly into our position. From the crest of the hill
to our front where this small sunken road ran over the hill, the
enemy would bring up a self-propelled direct fire weapon of some kind
and fire directly into our position. We decided if we could mine
this road, we could greatly hamper the reoccurrence of such action.
We sent out a night patrol of four or five men and a couple of
engineer mine specialists to do the job. It was definitely a tedious
job that required much skill and untiring initiative on the part of
the patrol, but due to the experience and use of good men for the job
the mission was accomplished. The mines were laid.

The patrol leaders upon return received a pat on the back
from the battalion C.O.; the S-2 was delighted; and, of course, I
as company commander was very proud. Assuming that the patrol report
given to the S-2 was recorded and information properly handled the
action was forgotten. The following day, however, we attacked --
driving the enemy back and gaining enough ground for our attached
tanks to get rolling. The first of our attached M4s barreling along this only available sunken road was immediately halted when two simultaneous explosions very definitely blew off both tracks. Our tank support was hampered due to no nearby roads and our anticipated exploitation was halted. This to me is a classic example of failure to use information of patrol activity. This one small factor cost us several hours, several men, and much embarrassment.

Some units used patrol forms in recording their patrol information. This, they claimed, helped them to use all information to the best advantage. In considering the use of such form, I will have to mention again that such an elaborate system will probably only be used when an outfit was operating an extensive patrol program. However, these forms serve as a good check list in the planning stage of a patrol, and also an excellent means of keeping patrolling records.

In most of my explanation, I have usually summarized it by saying that so and so is possible only when a unit is in a static position or in carrying out large scale patrolling operation. Many times you use patrols when your unit is attacking. In fact, you may use patrols in any type of situation. The thing to remember here is that such patrols will be sent out with little or no planning or orientation and that the results obtained will rest primarily on the ability and initiative of the patrol leader. The better the patrol is; the better the results are likely to be.

It would be difficult to talk about patrolling without
mentioning night patrols. The following is from a consolidation of remarks made to observers in the XII Corps.

"(A) Division X

(1) This division has used small patrols of 4 to 6 men, led by officers or noncommissioned officers. Battalion commanders interviewed stated that they do not consider night patrolling profitable for the following reasons:

(a) The patrols do not accomplish their mission, either through timidity or because of hasty and inadequate reconnaissance. Instances have been frequent in which patrols sent out make no attempt to reach their objective, but simply hide out for what they consider an appropriate period of time and then return with stories about running into opposition or getting lost. This has necessitated the practice of sending out one or more check patrols to verify reports, and to assure that patrols will make every effort to accomplish their missions.

(b) Definite results cannot be obtained unless the patrol is led by an experienced officer.

(c) The practice of sending out several patrols for each mission has resulted in too large a proportion of the unit being tired for the next day's operations.

(d) Losses from ambush, booby traps, personnel mines, and enemy patrols have been excessive in comparison with results obtained.

(e) More information can be secured, and in a much shorter time, by daylight observation and daytime patrols."

This particular division evidently had little success with night patrols. My experience with night patrolling shows me that they are a difficult type of patrol to operate, but can be useful and are invaluable if used properly. My advice for night patrols is to use only men with excellent night vision; men who are adapted to detect objects at night; use small patrols with all automatic weapons if possible; and use all tracer ammunition if possible. At night a tracer fired in your general direction looks as if it is coming directly at you. Another good point is to give the night patrol a name. A name like the "Bloody Raiders" or "Black Hawks" is good. My battalion had what we called the "Night Raiders", which we used for every type mission in the book. One of our main missions for them was harassing known enemy positions or taking single prisoners by stealth. The use of patrols for this purpose, however, should only be carried out by men with much experience and should be volunteers. Higher headquarters should remember, and the men participating in the night patrol should thoroughly understand that night patrolling is a very slow process. Movement is hindered by the darkness. Roads, trails, and landmarks are sometimes difficult to identify. Noise carries farther at night, and the ability to keep oneself oriented is extremely difficult. Everything you see looks like the enemy, and every movement sounds like enemy activity.

The Germans patrolled extensively at night; but their night patrols were not very daring except in bad, rainy, or windy nights.
On nights when the wind was blowing or the rain coming down in torrents, we usually got enemy patrol activity to our front and sometimes to our rear. They were masters in taking advantage of nature's natural noises to aid them in their sneak activities.

In summing up night patrols, the best word I can give you is to use them only if you can't get the desired results in the daytime.

I think it will be worth while to mention patrol equipment. The main thing to remember regarding equipment is not to let your men carry so much that it will hinder their ability to move.

It is desirable to carry a large percentage of automatic weapons on a patrol. These give you plenty of hitting power, and as I mentioned before -- a patrol is more or less a hit and run proposition. We found the stripped B.A.R. and the submachine gun very useful, and the M1919A6 machine gun much better than the M1919A4. However, if these weapons are not readily available the M1 rifle and carbine will do the job.

Hand grenades are invaluable as patrol weapons for both daylight and night. They don't give away your position as easily as gunfire; they serve as close support artillery, in a sense, in that they can be used to destroy enemy and light material objects where flat trajectory fire won't do the job; and they are helpful in dislodging enemy from otherwise permanent dugouts or holes. Either the fragmentation, white phosphorous, or both should be a must for every patrol.
Trench knives and bayonets are not to be forgotten when equipping a patrol. Both should be secured to the leg by a strap or string to prevent their catching on brush and like objects. I found it better to carry the trench knife in top of the boot because it's accessible and out of the way. I do not advise the use of the bayonet at night. Substitute the trench knife for night patrols.

The olive drab clothing with natural battle camouflage serves the purpose for patrol clothing in spite of the fact that the enemy used various and sundry types of camouflage suits. A little smudging of the face and hands, and a few twigs in the helmet are enough garnish to make our soldiers as inconspicuous as a man can be in the daylight. If there is snow on the ground, white caps and pants should be worn by patrol members. Weapons and other pieces of equipment should be garnished with white cloths, and helmets should either be covered or painted. At night, the face and hands should be blackened, a sweater worn for the outer upper garment and wool trousers on the lower. Wool knit hat in preference to the helmet. The reason for these differences is that these pieces of clothing absorb light rather than reflect it and that is a very important factor at night.

Pants should not be tucked into the shoes because the buckles will be exposed, and will probably catch on bushes and make noise. It is desirable to wear soft sole shoes, but these are not always available. Remember this night patrol, however, is usually a sneak and peek affair and any little detail of safety may mean your return
to your starting point.

The last item of patrol equipment I'd like to mention is certainly not the lease important. I am speaking of communication equipment. It is my firm opinion that daylight patrols should have some type of communication with the base from which they are operating. With good communication, a patrol can rapidly report unexpected findings that may aid the command in exploiting them or prepare to combat them. An example of this would be the finding of unoccupied defensive position. A quick report and quick action on the part of the commander in occupying these would save time and lives. Another example would be the early discovery of an enemy attack or counterattack. Both cases probably would be possible only with patrol communication.

The communication system always seems to give the men confidence. They can talk with someone in friendly territory; they can adjust artillery; and they can ask advice on decisions they may have to make; and the commander can give them orders while they are out.

Our patrols always carried the SCR 300 radio when on daylight missions. We used check points to learn the progress they were making; their positions in case we fired artillery; and to find out whether or not they needed a reserve.

I do not feel that night patrols with sneak and peek missions should have radios, or at least should not be required to carry them. The choice should be left up to the patrol leader himself. Any radio
makes noise, but at night they seem to be more noisy.

The last of my points of discussion should have probably been the first, but I was afraid if I started with it I'd never get past that one point. That is, the training of scouts and patrols. The aim to take when training for scouting and patrolling is well said in a statement by Lt. Col. James Warner Bellah. He said, "The scout must learn to crawl noiselessly, slowly, and interminably. He must be infallible in his orientation at all times. He must be as ingenious in the use of cover as a Comanche Indian. He must have the ruthlessness of a knife-killer, the persistence of a fanatic, the endurance of a martyr, and above all, the patience of a saint." This statement signifies the many subjects the individual fighting soldier must learn in order to be able to scout and patrol. To crawl noiselessly, slowly, and interminably means the soldier must master the art of creeping and crawling. To be infallible in his orientation would indicate the learning of the use of the compass and the ability to read a map and terrain features. To be ingenious in the use of cover and concealment, one must learn to camouflage and to make use of natural objects that hide him from the enemy. That a scout be as ruthless as a knife-killer implies that he must be proficient in the use of weapons. The other mentioned words of wisdom imply the physical conditioning required of a well trained scout.

All these things that the individual soldier should know in order to be a good scout or a good patrol man are not subjects that are uncommon to our everyday training program. They are all everyday, down-to-earth subjects that the infantry soldier is exposed to throughout his basic and unit training. If every man in an infantry company could master them, there would be little need to spend much time in teaching scouting and patrolling technique. In every good chain there is a weak link, and you won't find every man in any company well rounded in all infantry techniques. You will have to select the men with the greatest skills in these simple basic subjects and train them.

Conduct exercises wherein the patrol is treated as it would be in combat, and strive above all for realism. Have the patrol briefed; give the patrol leader a chance to organize, and get his men and himself thoroughly oriented. Give him a general route and a mission. Have enemy outposts or positions. Have umpires and cut sheets. Use these cut sheets to stimulate competition between patrol leaders. Give the best performances some reward, and be strict against violations of the basic technique of the infantry soldier.

In my infantry training we covered scouting and patrolling many, many times. We thought it rather childish to spend time on it. Our maneuver patrols usually consisted of a few men leisurely walking down a road or across a field, and returning with even less vigor than when they left. The first 15 minutes of my first patrol in combat
taught me that patrolling is pretty serious business and survival
meant applying what I already knew about cover and concealment, creeping
and crawling, and moving quickly and quietly, and team work.

I have often heard men say they learned more in their first
engagement in combat than in all their training. I think that is a
foolish statement. What they really mean is that they had to apply
what they had already learned in order to survive.

In closing I'd like to briefly summarize what I have tried to
cover. I gave you a brief introduction and two examples on the early
use of scouts and patrols. I've presented a few of the principles that
have been concluded by others; and how my outfit and other outfits
proved, tested, and in some cases disagreed with them through use in
combat. I've covered each sub-topic of my main subject lightly
because I wanted to cover the subject completely. Any one of my
sub-topics could easily be the title of a book.

I'd like to leave you with one thought. In the past war
many great decisions as to the employment of divisions, corps, and
armies were made on the information gathered by a small body of men
often accused of sneaking and peeking -- the patrol.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


The Bible, Chapter II, 1st verse of Joshua.


Operations Note 19, Officer of the Commanding General, 11 Dec. 1944.