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Title: Conference by Colonel Temple G. Holland on the New Georgia Campaign and Interviews with Colonel Holland by Members of the Academic Sections, The Infantry School.

Author: Birmingham Military Sub-District, Birmingham, AL

Abstract: From page 1: “I shall divide my talk into the following four parts: 1 – General observations relative to the training of my regiment, the 145th Infantry, prior to entry into combat and other factors which influence any operation in the South Pacific; 2 – The overall picture of the New Georgia Campaign; 3 – Narrative of the operation as it was carried out; 4 – My conception of the principles of jungle operations against the Japanese.”

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CONFERENCE BY COLONEL TEMPLE G. HOLLAND
ON THE NEW GEORGIA CAMPAIGN
AND INTERVIEWS WITH COLONEL HOLLAND
BY MEMBERS OF THE ACADEMIC SECTIONS
THE INFANTRY SCHOOL
I shall divide my talk into the following four parts:

(1) General observations relative to the training of my regiment, the 145th Infantry, prior to entry into combat and other factors which influence any operation in the South Pacific.

(2) The overall picture of the New Georgia operation.

(3) Narrative of the operation as it was carried out.

(4) My conception of the principles of jungle operations against the Japanese.

PART I

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

On or about November 15, 1942, I assumed command of the 145th Infantry of the 37th Division, then garrisoning the Fiji Islands. Without boring you with details, I'll cover our training by saying that we early decided on the following principles for jungle combat:

First. Contact and control are paramount both in importance and in difficulty of achievement.

Second. Discipline and physical development in all ranks must be Prussian in its thoroughness.

Third. Every possible item in jungle operations, even to include items of minor tactics, must be developed into an S.O.P. which would work night or day - in the jungle or in the open.

Fourth. All training to be conducted along the line of the combat team, that is, the rifle squad with its BAR - the rifle platoon with a light M.G. - the rifle company with its platoon of Heavy M.G. - and so on. All attachments were automatic when the units moved into the field. However, upon development for combat, all such attachments automatically ceased and heavy weapons reverted to the control of the Battalion Commander, unless otherwise ordered.

The final result was that by early spring, 1943, this regiment was capable of and did make, a fifty mile march through the jungle in three days - carrying with it - all weapons, save the 37-mm, one unit of fire, and sufficient rations for the journey. The entire march was harassed night and day by units of the Fiji Independent Commandos, who acted as the enemy. These
Commando units were composed of native Fijians led by New Zealand officers and N.C.O.s.

About the last of March, we were moved to Guadalcanal for garrison and staging preparatory to the New Georgia Operation.

Tojo gave us his first attention as we landed and bombed one ship, but fortunately only one man was slightly wounded and practically no cargo was lost. However, it was a good experience and let the men realize that we weren't playing for peanuts from there on out. Their heretofore lackadaisical approach to foxhole digging was suddenly transformed into one of the most efficient dirt moving projects I have ever witnessed, so that we were soon settled into a base camp with defenses dug in and manned.

Now, here, I thought, was the golden opportunity for perfecting our battle technique. There were still a few Japs on the island, we had the actual battle grounds of the canal over which we could rehash the tactics used, and in brief, get ready to move in on Tokyo without delay.

The next few days, however, demonstrated the error of my estimate of the situation.

First, it required about five hundred men for manning the defenses and for interior patrolling.

Second, over one thousand men were ordered to bivouac near the beach and unload cargo from boats.

Third, the remainder of the outfit went on police, malaria control and salvage.

It was all very necessary work, there's no question about it, but to a combat commander, it was most discouraging.

I could talk for hours on the heartbreaks and disappointments that are the lot of a combat outfit on an advance base, but shall sum it up by saying: If your outfit isn't trained when you get there, it never will be. Another point to remember is that all operations in the South Pacific are controlled by the Navy, so in accordance with Navy procedure, you must never be surprised to awaken some morning and find that some company or battalion of your unit has been given secret and direct orders attaching it to another organization for some operation or other; and when you call your chief of staff to ask what the score is - he consoles you with the reply that it is news to him also.

PART II

THE NEW GEORGIA OPERATION

One day in the latter part of June, 1943, I went to visit my 3rd Battalion, and found that it had been attached to the Fourth Marine Raider Regiment and was preparing to embark for New Georgia. I asked to see a
The 145th Infantry was alerted in reserve for the New Georgia task force consisting of the 43rd Infantry Division, the 4th Marine Raider Regiment, two Infantry Battalions and one Medium Artillery Battalion from the 37th Division, and various Naval base personnel, such as P.T. boat units, A.A. elements and Navy Seabee Battalions.

On "D" day the following was to happen: (See Chart 3)

The 103rd Infantry, the 4th Marine Raider Battalion, together with Navy base personnel were to land simultaneously at: Viru Harbor, Segi Point and Wickham Anchorage. The Marine Raider Regiment, less one battalion, plus the 3rd Battalions of the 145th and 148th Infantry was to land at Rice Anchorage; while the remainder of the 43rd Division moved on Rendova Harbor, preparatory to the invasion of New Georgia Island proper. The objective of the operation was to capture Munda airport on New Georgia Island. The 7th Marine Raider Battalion was pulled out from Segi and returned to its Regiment for the Rice Anchorage Operation. In general, progress was satisfactory. The Rice Anchorage Force, riding on destroyer transports, landed during darkness on a very narrow, short beach, under fire of four Jap shore batteries. (See Chart 4) The destroyers furnished fire protection until the landing was completed and then withdrew without loss.

The Rendova landing was completed in spite of a Jap bombing attack and some spirited shooting by the few Jap defenders. The sad part of this action is that after the beachhead was consolidated and all the equipment of the units had been properly placed, the men lined up for chow, just as they were accustomed to do on maneuvers. A sudden Jap air raid hit this scene and exacted approximately three hundred casualties. A good many observers decided then that they had observed enough, but in the general exodus of boats, etc. the Japs struck again, getting a mong other things, the troop ship MacCauley.

Events now moved along swiftly enough. The plans for continued operation called for: (See Chart 4)
Battalion, 145th Infantry was left at Rice Anchorage to secure the beach and supplies. The 3rd Battalion, 148th Infantry was ordered to move south to establish a road block on the trail leading to Munda, while the Marines moved to Enogai to liquidate the Jap garrison there.

The operation proceeded as planned until the Marines ran into difficulty at Enogai where they struck a strong Jap position, which cost them a reported twenty-five percent casualties in thirty minutes. They then withdrew to a position northeast of Enogai where they reorganized and remained in a position of readiness until the early part of August. The 3rd Battalion, 148th Infantry, was halted in a location generally east of Enogai. This left Bairoka Harbor and vicinity in the hands of the Japs until after the fall of Munda, when the 25th Division moved North and in conjunction with the Marines from Rice Anchorage, pushed the Japs off New Georgia Island.

Meanwhile on Rendova the 172d and 169th Infantry Regiments prepared to move across to New Georgia. After some difficulty as to suitable beaches and the loss of twenty-four hours, a landing was effected at Zanana. The plan called for a move (See Chart 4) to the Bariki River and then an advance, regiments abreast, to Lambeti Plantation. This to be followed by a sweep up the beach to Munda Airport; where in conjunction with the Rice Anchorage Force, attacking from the North, the Japs were to be "Driven into the sea."

The first resistance was encountered as the leading elements crossed the Bariki River, a typical Jap strong point covered the river crossing and occupied the high knolls around it.

For four days the two regiments consolidated their landing and prepared to attack, and on July 8th jumped off from the Bariki River Line.

During this period the remainder of the 145th Infantry was being infiltrated to Rendova Island. I say "infiltrated" because there is no other name for it - we were moved up, Company and Battalion at a time, in anything that would float, as fast as it became available. We had with us five units of fire, and ten days' rations.

The two regiments of the 43rd Division after reducing the initial strong point were making slow progress along the Munda-Zanana trail - every step being a constant fight against logistics, jungle, mud and Japs. When they reached the point "A" (See Chart 4) forward progress had almost ceased and the general situation was about as follows:

The two regiments were strung out in a single column along the trail and were becoming rather intermingled. The Japs were on the offensive and were raiding every night - all night. Some of our troops were becoming hysterical and, I am sorry to say, using every subterfuge to get back to the beach where some boarded departing boats and later had to be rounded up from all over the Pacific. I understand that they found a couple of them even as far back as San Francisco.

The Rice Anchorage group was at a stalemate.

The artillery was generally disposed along the islands southeast of
Zanand; (See Chart 4) and were supporting the ground action.

The 43rd Division Artillery was supplemented initially by the medium battalion of the 37th Division from Kokorana (See Chart 4) and by a battery of 155 rifles located on Rendova. Later the light battalions of the 37th Division were brought in and placed on Roviana Island; so that in general, the Infantry was supported by fire overhead, diagonally across the front, and even to the front. The divisional artillery was charged with direct support. The 155 rifles were charged with keeping the slot between New Georgia and Kolombangara (See Chart 3) clear of shipping. The Navy and Air Corps bombarded Lambeti, Munda, Vila and the surrounding area. Altogether it was the best example of combined air, navy and artillery supporting fires that can be imagined.

On July 9th, a Regimental Commander became a casualty and I was sent to New Georgia to assume command of the 169th Infantry. Taking with me enough of my staff and other personnel to give me liaison with all units of the new regiment, I joined them early on July 10th.

Shortly after my arrival, new operational orders were issued changing the original plan as follows: (See Chart 4).

The 172d Infantry was to turn and attack south to Laiana Beach, where they were to establish a new beachhead. This would permit the landing of elements of the 103d Infantry and also would shorten the supply line which was becoming quite long for hand carrying.

My new regiment, the 169th, was to continue the attack toward Lambeti and then to turn west with the 172d and 103d for the move on Munda.

The 172d moved out on its new mission, leaving the 169th about in the position indicated by point "A" on the chart. Using 145th Infantry officers as liaison, the 169th was soon gathered into 145th Infantry S.O.P. Combat Bivouac, (See Chart 1) and the following day, we attacked.

I want to dwell a bit on this initial attack for it has several points of interest and it presents a problem in jungle combat, our solution of which, I doubt will find one hundred percent agreement by the Infantry School.

The problem briefly stated is this:

The Regimental combat team is now alone - and in this S.O.P. formation. (See S.O.P. Chart 1):

Visibility is limited to about twenty feet in any direction.

The supply and wire communications have been completely cut off by Jap snipers and M.G. groups, and also, by a small wandering battalion of Japs, who, incidentally, have blundered into the advance Division C.P. - a story within itself.

Supply is by parachute.

-5- RESTRICTED
The men are jittery and the Regiment is slightly less than fifty percent strength.

The Japs are attacking every night, all night, but cannot be located during the daylight.

A study of photographs show that somewhere close by, there should be a large Jap strong point.

A steady toll of casualties is piling up and each time anyone moves, it seems to be the signal for Jap mortars and M.G.'s to open fire.

The Regimental objective is Lambeti Plantation.

The question was: Should we accept our losses and sit tight while we patrolled to accurately locate the Jap position, or should we move out toward Lambeti and develop the situation as we went along?

Our solution was: To move out at once, attacking terrain in the direction of Lambeti but never to let ourselves get into such formation that we were vulnerable from any direction.

Our next problem, of course, was: What terrain to attack? We couldn't see anything - the photograph showed nothing but jungle, and we were anything but certain as to where we were. We solved this, by firing an artillery concentration at what we estimated to be 600 yards in the direction of advance. We then sent the 3rd Battalion on a limited attack, straight at that concentration.

We sent the 1st Battalion swinging to the right, along what appeared to be a ridge running generally in the direction of our initial objective. In other words, we attacked, enveloping to the right, the envelopment swinging on an arc of about 400 yards radius.

The 2d Battalion was moved in around the Regimental C.P. to wait in reserve.

The 3rd Battalion gained contact with the Japs early, but continued to gain ground until it reached its objective. Here the artillery had thinned the jungle somewhat, and the Battalion Commander telephoned that he was at the foot of a small knoll and asked permission to take it. This permission was granted.

Meanwhile the enveloping 1st Battalion had run into trouble - not only had they hit a dug-in position head-on, but the Japs were counterattacking from the southwest and the Battalion was definitely stopped.

We sent the second battalion to move up a thickly wooded draw, running east and west between the 1st and 3rd Battalions. (See Chart 4) In other words, we counterattacked the counterattack. This permitted the withdrawal of the 1st Battalion and put us back in the 145th Infantry Combat Bivouac S.O.P.; and in this position, we spent the most horrible night of our operation. Words beggar description of those night raids by the Japs. They
used their entire bag of tricks: dual purpose guns, mortars, commando tactics, yelling, screeching, hand grenades, knives; they even moved in loud speakers with phonograph records of battle noises, and set them up within our areas. May it forever be said to the credit of those men of that New England Regiment – they stood their ground and kept their heads, killed what they could, and took their own losses in stride.

A study of the situation convinced us that a large Jap strongpoint lay to our right front, a few hundred yards away (See Chart 4), another lay to our left front, a bit further away, but that the ground to our immediate front had been partially vacated by its garrison in meeting our envelopment from the north.

Acting on this assumption, we attacked early the next morning, sending the 1st Battalion to skirt the south of the 3rd Battalion and capture what appeared to be a piece of commanding ground about five hundred yards to the front. The attack, preceded by artillery and mortar preparation, succeeded nicely. The Japs caught off base – not only gave us a hill overlooking both of their strong points, Lambeti Plantation, and the Munda air strip, but also a lot of MGs, mortars, ammunition and other material. I shall never forget the thrill of that first view of Munda where we could count approximately two dozen Jap planes, which would never fly again. We spent the remainder of the day closing up, consolidating, digging in, and otherwise getting ready to capitalize on our good luck.

Before night fall, the Jap had realized his error and was preparing to rectify it. Long before dark, we could see columns of Japs moving in from all directions, and here is where our artillery really enjoyed itself. They had begun registration immediately we had the observation, and when a column was spotted, a concentration was called for. One time, while I was listening in I heard the observer call, "Right 25." The Artillery Executive Officer immediately countered with: "What the hell – the effective radius of one round is 30 yards, why the 25 yard shift?" "Well," said the observer, "I missed one of the little bastards."

That night, the Jap attempted to retrieve his position, but we were ready for him. The 105's boxed our forward hill on three sides, firing twice each hour at irregular intervals, with concentrations on call – all about 300 yards from our troops. Our mortars covered likely approaches, and when the mad rush came that night, we gave them everything we had. The following morning on the hill itself, we buried 99 dead Japs including 6 officers and took our first prisoner, a Jap whose chest was completely torn open, but who was still conscious and able to talk. Unfortunately, our two Neisi Jap interpreters had been wounded and evacuated, so we had to hold our prisoner for later questioning by higher headquarters.

As we prepared for our next move toward Lambeti – we received the information that the Laiana Beachhead was established, and that we were to hold our present position pending the arrival of more troops, and the issuance of new orders.

Briefly, what had transpired was: (See Chart 5) The XIV Corps had assumed command of the operations and moved to Rendova Island. The 103rd
Infantry was moving in to the south of the 172d Infantry. The 145th Infantry (less 3d Battalion) was moving in to relieve the 169th Infantry, the remainder of the 37th Division (less one RCT) was moving in to the north and rear of the 169th position. The 161st Infantry (25th Division) had arrived and was attached to the 37th Division for the operation.

I was ordered to reassume command of the 145th Infantry immediately and effect the relief of the 169th. This relief was accomplished two days later in broad daylight, under cover of our mortars and all the artillery we could beg, borrow and steal.

The resulting order of battle and plan for continuing the attack was somewhat as follows: (See Chart 5)

The 145th Infantry was to hold its ground until the other units were abreast of it, then the Corps, with Divisions abreast, was to push westward to the sea.

The 145th moved first to get in column of battalions preparatory to jumping off, and then for a week, we sat and took it. Took it especially from the Jap mortars and dual purpose guns. Our casualties from this source alone, averaged better than a dozen a day. We occupied our time, replying as best we could. We studied air photos, we patrolled and we shot with the artillery. Incidentally, we'd hit the jackpot occasionally, and a Jap gun or ammunition dump would go up; but the situation early resolved itself into the one shown on the chart (See Chart 5) and there it remained for what seemed an eternity. Day after day, artillery - naval, and air bombardment preparations were fired and attacks were ordered. Day after day units would almost reach their objective only to be stopped and forced to fall back. Eight marine light tanks were brought ashore. Two of them broke down almost at once, but the remainder went in on the south sector and advanced several hundred yards before they were stopped and turned back by Jap resistance. Four of them were then dispatched to help the regiment on our right. They drove in without delay but two tanks became hopelessly mired within the first hundred yards. The remaining two withdrew to Lelana Beach, leaving the two casualties to become potential pillboxes against us for any Jap who got smart enough to use them. We trained all our heavy mortars on them each morning, so as to be ready any time they became unfriendly.

It was during this week of waiting that we made the only offensive use of our 37-mm guns. With much toil and labor, we manhandled four guns up to the front line. We then amused ourselves sniping at pillboxes in the two Jap strong points.

I hope you can picture the awfulness of this waiting. We would try to help our neighbors, but no matter how carefully we coordinated fires and obtained clearances, as soon as we opened up, someone was certain to yell, "For God's sake, quit - you are shooting up my troops." Generally this was due to the Japanese practice of firing mortars at any located point in our area whenever any of our concentrations were brought down. Our new troops were unable to distinguish this from our own artillery, and the result was just what the enemy wanted: all our artillery would be stopped until every
gun could be checked.

Finally toward the end of this period, we were able to help the situation by sending our 2d Battalion around (See Chart 5) the 161st Infantry to the north. It then attacked southwest across the front, thus clearing the line of departure.

Our regimental plan called for the encircling battalion to strike at such an angle that the completion of the move would still leave us in column of battalions, but would place the 2d Battalion in the lead. The 1st Battalion was to support the action with fire. By dark of the third day following, the maneuver was completed as planned. Incidentally, it was during this maneuver, that we found a good use for our flame throwers. By shooting them straight up, they gave a column of black smoke upon which we could take a compass bearing and locate our units.

The regiments on each flank now moved up abreast - and the following day, about the last of July, the main attack jumped off in full swing. At this time, the 145th took one rifle company and some heavy weapons from each of its two battalions and formed a provisional third battalion.

I was quite proud of the regiment. It handled very easily under fire. Our combat team bulldozer buried over 240 Jap Marines on the first position captured. We continued to use our original method of successive limited objectives.

We met Japs at the positions shown on the chart, and usually had to use a whole day on each one. Each night we would dig in on the position captured during the day, sleeping among dead Japs who, incidentally, ripen pretty fast in that climate. We used their blankets and mats and many times we ate their food.

It was during this drive, that I saw things which made me wonder what makes the American soldier tick, for example:

One soldier during a Jap bombing and strafing raid was on his knees in his foxhole, praying with all his heart, at top of his voice. A light personnel bomb hit approximately a hundred yards away. The soldier looking up said, "Jesus Christ that was close!" and then went right along with his prayer.

On another occasion, our assault had surprised a Jap officers' mess at breakfast. As we moved forward, we found three soldiers calmly seated at what remained of the Jap mess, eating hot rice, with the fight still going on not one hundred and fifty yards in front of them.

But what affected me the most, was that at each position, the fight had hardly moved on, when the hill would be swarming with human vultures from rear elements - such as signal companies - ordnance units - engineers - and reserve infantry - all bent on beating the other fellow to the souvenirs.

The last show of any importance for the 145th Infantry during this particular operation, was the capture of Bibilo Hill. This hill is about

-9-
300 feet elevation, and had held us up for an entire day. Three times we had reached the hill and three times we were forced to fall back. Our position was on a hill, previously captured, which was generally about the same elevation as Bibilo. The two being separated by a deep ravine, everything thoroughly wooded.

Late in the day, orders came down for us to bypass this last remaining strong point and to proceed to the sea by way of a valley which was fairly open, running east and west, beginning immediately north of Bibilo Hill. (See Chart 5)

Being nervous about turning our backs to such commanding ground, we requested and received permission to devote not to exceed one hour to its capture, the following morning.

To make certain that we could do this, we brought our artillery down 300 yards in front of our leading rifle elements, firing on the top and forward slope of Bibilo. We concentrated our mortars between leading riflemen and the artillery preparation, firing on the top and near slope. We scissored the top and sides of the hill with all the M.G.s we could lay our hands on. As a matter of interest, this placing of mortar fire on the near side of the artillery concentration, was because the Japs had a practice of moving into the interval toward our line to get out from under an artillery barrage. When the barrage was lifted, they would then move back to their position to wait for the infantry attack.

For thirty minutes we literally made the top of that hill bounce. Japs — Jap pillboxes and guns were flying as much as fifteen feet in the air. A lot of them, blown from their holes, would run around in little circles like stunned chickens, to be laid like grass by the M.G.s. Finally, under cover of our M.G.s, we attacked, enveloping from the north, using one battalion, while the remainder of the Regiment side-slipped and pushed on to the sea.

Meanwhile to the south, the 43rd Division, supported by the remaining Marine tanks, cleaned up Munda Airport. It was then ordered to assume the defense of the airport, and was charged with mopping up the neighboring small islands.

The final mopping up of New Georgia dragged on into the second month, when the 25th Division, which had arrived in Corps Reserve, was dispatched to press up from the south and meet the Rice Anchorage Force. The 37th Division was assigned to back up the 25th Division's drive on Bairokla: Many Japanese escaped from Bairokla to Kolombangara, by means of barges, small boats, etc. However, the Navy and Air Force claim that most of these were taken care of either while moving to Kolombangara or on the next shuttle to the north toward Bouganville.
PART IV

PRINCIPLES OF JUNGLE OPERATIONS

Now in conclusion, I'd like to state briefly for your consideration, my conception of the principles of jungle operations against the Japanese.

First and foremost, I place discipline. Discipline of the individual and of the unit. Undue fraternizing between officers, non-commissioned officers and their juniors is unhealthy. The officer or non-commissioned officer, who runs to his juniors for sympathy, when some senior corrects him for some dereliction, is not the leader the men follow when the going gets tough. I saw too many officers and non-commissioned officers killed, because when it became necessary to advance, they had to act as scouts before the men would move. The practice of "Hey fellows, what do you say we push this truck out of the way?" definitely does not pay dividends in combat.

Also, don't let anyone ever tell you, even as a joke: "Oh, they'll get down, or they'll scatter out, when the bullets start flying." Gentlemen, I know different. They'll do in combat exactly the same things you let them get away with on maneuvers. I have seen men bunch within fifty feet of enemy pillboxes, and I've seen those same men stand open-mouthed and gawk, perfectly astounded at the men falling all around them.

I doubt very much if I ever shall make a popular commander over here, because I've seen so many officers and men die unnecessarily, that I shall be rabid on this subject.

Along this same line, I would place toughness of the individual. By toughness, I do not mean getting noisy drunk in night clubs and hotels, and daring any and all to come out and fight. I have in mind the ability to live with nothing save the bare essentials. I have in mind that when the foxhole is dug, to be able to stay in it without tearing down all the natural camouflage to make a bed. I have in mind to be able to stay in a fighting attitude during continuous rain, and not lay your weapon down in eighteen inches of muck while you try to rig a shelter over the hole, which is to be your home for the moment. I have in mind whole units, officers included, advancing during the fire fight, loaded down with water, captured blanket rolls, rations and souvenirs, and not one round of ammunition. I have seen men and officers carrying as many as four Jap rifles - mortars, etc., in addition to their own, using all the time and care in the world to keep the souvenir equipment clean and oiled, while their own weapons were in such shape as to be practically unserviceable.

I could go on and on with this - how I have seen whole spools of precious communication wire cast aside in favor of an extra box of "C" rations; how I have seen innumerable other examples of physical comfort taking precedence over the necessities of the fight; and when on the battle field, you climb down their throats about it, they look at you in perfect amazement as if to ask: "What's wrong with this guy, what have I done that's so God-awful bad?"
Gentlemen, I can only repeat what I have said so many times before: "It does no good to say: 'I told you so' to a dead man."

Next I would place - S.O.P., S.O.P., in everything that can possibly lend itself to standardization, even to development for combat. And to all commanders, I recommend very strongly the S.O.P. combat bivouac, with its perimeter defense; which we developed and used so successfully that many other units sent their Regimental Commanders over to learn how it was done.

We used it whenever we halted for any reason whatsoever; and for reorganization after taking each objective. We practically always assumed this formation before jumping off to the attack.

S.O.P. may cover many items of combat intelligence. Our own intelligence platoon was organized along the lines of a filter center. It used every means that was legal and some that were not so legal to assemble information, filter it, and pass it to the S-2 by sound power, much in the manner of a blow by blow radio description of an athletic event.

We had a non-T/O defense platoon for the Regimental C.P. It was composed of what you might call the limited service men of the regiment. This platoon and the C.P. itself had an S.O.P. for going into position, which permitted us to go into action under any condition, without delay. All that was necessary was for myself, the executive officer, or the adjutant to designate the location of my personal foxhole with reference to the front.

The principles of leadership and tactics, as are taught at the Infantry School, apply one hundred percent in the jungle. The only qualifying factors are that in their application:

All development for combat is monotonously the same - hence, S.O.P.

Visibility is usually nil - which limits your use of maneuver and artillery to very orthodox methods.

The jungle prevents reconnaissance as we would like to make it, and your knowledge of locations and situations will depend on your ability to read an air photo, and the reports of your patrols. These patrol reports, incidentally, must be taken with a large grain of salt. If you act on any information, you should act at once, for what is true at the moment may be absolutely wrong three hours later.

Finally, when you get the Jap located - shell the hell out of him with mortars, artillery and anything else you can find, and then go in promptly with rifle and bayonet while he is still groggy.

One of the biggest faults, I found among commanders, was the tendency to sit back while they shelled the Jap position, then send a patrol over to see if the Japs were still there. The patrol would then return to guide the unit up, and when the unit moved up, the Japs, most times, would be back and ready for them. The unit would then fall back and repeat the process, day after day, until finally the Japs would withdraw.
Too many Japs in New Georgia escaped with their lives. I feel that most of them will have to be killed sooner or later, and I believe the time to do it is when they first oppose you and it can be done group by group.

To summarize:

1st. Train, toughen and discipline your troops here, now -

2nd. Make every possible, permissible activity S.O.P. to include: bivouacs and assembly areas, march formations, patrolling, intelligence, liaison and supply.

In dealing with supply, pay special attention to who is available to carry what, and when, and its enforcement by means of straggler posts.

We found, using S.O.P. in amphibious operations, that a battalion can land from L.C.I.s - establish an initial five hundred yard beachhead, with all communications, C.P.s, O.P.s, etc., wired in and operating, five units of fire and ten days' rations unloaded from boats, all within fourteen minutes. Some companies could do it in seven minutes.

The standard wire communications are effective and can be maintained. However, just as all litter and ration parties must be guarded, all wire parties must be guarded; and never forget, the Jap is always tapped in on your lines. Also, unless your wire lines are cleverly laid, you will likely have to relay them each morning.

The combined ration assemblies are not as good in the front line as individual rations. They cause too much waste. Incidentally, we were not troubled with dysentery until they started sending hot food to the front line from the beachhead.

Your 81-mm mortar, with your 105 howitzers, are your best close support artillery. The bomber is good, but better used as distant artillery. Dive bombing a strong point is excellent for morale, but I have seen a five hundred pounder strike within twenty yards of a man and do no more than rattle him around in his foxhole.

The crying need when I left the jungle was for a very light weapon capable of placing an explosive on a point target. The bazooka may be the answer, although we lacked the ammunition to give our bazookas a test.

Finally, don't attempt to learn too much about the Jap before attacking. In the first place you'll never know enough, and the more time you give him, the more difficult he is to deal with. Keep your plans simple, your contact and control perfect, then go ahead. The Jap is easily beaten when you stun him a bit with explosive and close promptly.

- The End -
but - we had a ringside seat!
Attack Committee:

Q. One very basic question has come up in all these discussions of South Pacific conditions and that is the tactical condition. I believe one remark you made the other day was that in a certain position, visibility was limited to 20 feet or 20 yards, an extremely small limit, and yet a little later on it became evident that there were certain supporting fires—fire on locations of the Japanese and that there were positions where visibility was greater and observation might be obtained. There is probably a simple description of that. Could you give us an idea of just what that business of observation was?

A. My experience was with the South Pacific. Almost every island is a different terrain problem. In Guadalcanal, for example, the valleys, ravines, streams, etc. were the extreme jungles, while the top of the ridges, hills, etc. were clear of trees and brush and were covered with three or four feet growth of heavy grass. Rendova, New Georgia and other islands in this vicinity were completely covered, both hills and ravines, with a heavy jungle. Initial visibility from the ground was limited to from 10 to 30 feet in any direction. Many times, troops stumbled into jungle positions unknowingly, the first indication being hostile fire from mortars and machine guns. To obtain visibility we normally brought our artillery down on the suspected location. The slang description of this procedure was called, "Cutting grass." These concentrations usually thinned the jungle enough to permit some visibility.

Q. In getting observation for mortar fire, did the observer generally stay on the ground or climb something?

A. The observers usually stayed on the ground. To visualize the terrain in New Georgia you might take the desks of this room and you have a fairly good "to scale" representation of the hills and valleys. For example this row of desks might be a ridge, this a valley, this another hill, that desk over there another hill. Standing on this crest after the artillery had fired on that ridge, you could see enough for your operation.

Q. Getting away from the subject of frontages for the operations of the battalion and, in one of your maps the other day you had several regimental zones of action shown and just from the scale I estimated perhaps 600 to 700 yards was the average frontage in that set-up. Will you discuss the use of attack frontages in that operation?

A. Frontages are very narrow in comparison with the frontages reported from the European theatre. Our own particular regimental zone of action during the New Georgia operation was approximately 500 yards wide. The regiment on my right and left each had a zone of approximately 600 yards in width.
RESTRICTED

Attack Committee (Cont'd):

Q. You feel that this same set-up as to difficult visibility, made it necessary to operate on a narrow front?

A. The problem of contact between neighboring units and also making a clean sweep of the Japanese positions made it mandatory to have narrow frontages. However, it must be remembered that the 145th Infantry was a two battalion regiment during this action. Also, it is necessary to cover fairly thoroughly any zone of advance due to the Japanese practice of organizing mutual supporting hills. I read one defense order captured from the Japanese which specifically directed that when any one hill was organized, other positions would be organized so that fire could be delivered on the supported hill on both the forward and reverse slopes.

Q. Relative to frontages used in attack of any one situation, is the normal attack in column formation or in wedge with one leading?

A. We used both the column and the wedge. The attack might be in column initially, the wedge being assumed when opposition forced the leading battalion to slow down perceptibly.

Q. May I pursue that for just a moment? Did you pass through a unit that was stopped or try to get around the flank?

A. Normally we built our base of fire on the leading unit and used it also for the limited or holding attack. Single or double envelopments were then made by the use of the two rear units passing around, one on each flank of the forward unit. A position captured by the leading unit alone, without the use of the rear units was usually passed through by the rear units to continue the attack, the idea being to keep a strong pressure on a withdrawing enemy. This would not have been possible if we had waited for a complete organization of the leading unit.

Q. What is reorganization? We don’t teach any particular method of reorganization. Would you give us a hasty and complete definition of reorganization and what is done?

A. I consider this a most important feature of combat and is alone justification for the use of our SOP combat bivouac formation. Units become intermingled, individuals become lost and leaders lose some control during the final assault of any stronghold. In our system, the leader concerned, would indicate the front with respect to which he wanted his unit to take up the formation-SOP combat bivouac. This signal, passed on, told each individual approximately the place on the hill where his unit would be reorganized. Once a unit arrived at its new location, the SOP called for, beginning with the squad, a report, through channels, covering strength, status of weapons, ammunition, etc. This report was verbal or by runner with an informal message. Commanders then, based on the report, transferred men, weapons and ammunition with the idea of equalizing their unit. If, for example, twelve men were needed in one platoon, normally six men would be taken from each of the other two platoons. This system of reorganization works well and without too much loss of time.
Attack Committee (Cont'd):

Q. You make no differentiation as to future contemplated use or past employment of a unit?

A. No, it was complete each time.

Q. How much time did it take for battalions to go through this procedure, equalize companies and start again?

A. That of course depends on the terrain, distance involved and on the enemy attitude. In any condition similar to this operation, a battalion should be completely reorganized in not to exceed forty minutes.

Q. I think that clears up that question. There's nothing in the book on that. In regard to the importance of the use of arm and other official signals during the attack, did you stress the arm signals rather than shooting flares for example?

A. We observed secrecy as long as we could. Once a movement was discovered we used the most expeditious means for communication. Usually a movement was not discovered until the final stages of a maneuver and during this phase signalling by a leader was an invitation to the Jap sniper to shoot. We found that the use of SOP in development for combat eliminated the necessity for a lot of signalling, shouting, etc. Most of the instructions necessary could be handled by telephone in the larger groups and by runner in the smaller groups. We used command telephones to include the company and the machine gun platoon in the attack.

Q. What did you find to be the best formation to use in crossing a formidable, definite stream line?

A. To make the answer to that question intelligent I would like first to describe the streams in New Georgia which we encountered. These streams were narrow, 15 to 20 yards in width; some of them over waist deep, fairly swift and in most cases covered by overhanging trees and vines. We made no particular recognition of a stream crossing. We used exclusively the same tactics we would have used had the stream not been there. In other words, we have no real test on a river crossing.

Q. What was the chief use made of the reserve companies and platoons?

A. We felt that every unit was not only available, but likely to be used in any attack. However, if there was a difference between the use of the reserve company or companies it might be covered by saying that they were always on the alert for the Jap flanking movement around our leading unit and they were also a base upon which the leading unit could fall back under conditions similar to this. Let's assume that the leading unit unknowingly bumped into a strongly built-in Jap position. To assault it means to lose too many rifles. Consequently, we normally pulled that unit back approximately 300 yards and brought our mortars and artillery down on the Jap position. In pulling that unit
Attack Committee (Cont'd):

Back we were never worried because the reserve units were in position either to cover or to attack, depending on the Jap reaction.

Q. You didn't launch an assault immediately when you found a strong position?

A. Sometimes. But usually we preferred to precede an assault by artillery or mortars, or both.

Q. We have heard that most of the reserve units were used as carriers. Did you do this in your regiment?

A. We didn't use combat troops during the fight. We used bandsmen, anti-tank company, service company, drivers and cooks. We kept a forward dump in the battle area and at times detachments were sent back from battalions to supplement the ammunition pioneer people. But I believe that anyone who says a reserve is not needed in jungle combat is wrong because Jap tactics call for continued flanking movements against your attack.

Q. After you pull troops back 300 yards, do you believe in launching an assault with the same unit?

A. During the time that artillery was firing we usually issued the attack order. My own experience was that we usually resumed the attack by sending the same unit forward and other units in enveloping movements.

Q. That doesn't replace the initial preparation prior to moving forward?

A. I think I have not made myself clear on the method of advance. For example, we would take one hill, reorganize and prepare to continue the attack. In the continuation of this attack, we would first locate the next Jap position, usually by moving forward on successive objectives until we bumped into it. Sometimes we could see what would appear to be another hill in front of us from 600 to 1000 yards out and we would make that our objective and actually fire on it. Just as often as not, about half way there we would bump into a dug-in position which we had not seen. We would then pull the leading unit back, place a concentration of artillery and mortar fire on the new position and then go in with riflemen.

Q. How close did the troops get into these artillery concentrations and what method did you most often use to shift artillery before troops closed in for the assault of that objective? You mentioned 300 yards. Could you come up any closer?

A. Many times we could come to within 100 yards. Usually it was 300 yards. The lifting itself was done by arrangement between the commander concerned and the forward observer of the affected unit. They were usually right together.
Attack Committee (Cont'd):

Q. You spoke several times about the double envelopment. That brings back to me the original question about the method of moving out with one column in front. Was double envelopment used frequently and successfully over there?

A. I would say we used it in the battalions of my regiment as much as we used single envelopment.

Q. The reason for this question is that in our teaching, we describe its use where the situation gives us a preponderance of force and absolutely no enemy flanks.

A. I can clear that up. I am speaking of maneuvers within battalions. Over there your frontages are so small, your operations are so intimate, that the regimental commander handles his regiment more or less like the battalion commander handles his battalion. There were only two occasions in this operation, when the entire regiment was committed to action at the same time. Normally the fact that a battalion was completely committed was of no great concern because practically always one battalion remained uncommitted, and many times two battalions were available in case the committed battalion was in trouble.

Q. Where a double envelopment was employed, I assume that when the point of the wedge established or fixed the enemy position and you decided to commit your two remaining reserve units, one around each flank; was it possible for the center one to pull out and become a reserve within a minimum length of time?

A. To a very little extent, not enough to call that a principle. The only time that I recall when a battalion completely committed needed a reserve, it was made by sending it a complete company from another battalion.

Q. Is it possible for a battalion in the center to pull back and then become available for reserve in itself?

A. No. The center battalion was usually required to drive forward. If for no other reason, it would drive forward to keep the enemy occupied at the front and prohibit successful use of shifting units. The Jap moves very fast within a prepared position. You release the pressure on him at one point and you can see him running to another prepared position to meet a new threat.

Q. How influential was the use of heavy weapons in formation of the battalion plan of maneuver or was the plan of maneuver eliminated and battalions and companies of the battalions charged with executing the mission with the use of heavy weapons through detachment?

A. I am not sure I have that clear. We will try it. At no time did we have occasion to attach heavy weapons to a rifle company for offensive action. The employment of the heavy weapons was covered by the battalion com-
Attack Committee (Cont'd):

...commander in his'attack order and were directly under his control. Quite often the battalion commander took his battle station at the observation post of the 81 mm. mortar.

Q. How about the position of the heavy weapons company commander? Was his reconnaissance of a very limited nature or was he able to make this with assistance? How was the heavy weapons company commander used by the battalion commander?

A. He was used so far as I know in exact accordance with the teachings of the school. Of course reconnaissance of any nature was limited. Usually an attack order would be something like this in procedure: The battalion commander would give the objective which he desired covered by mortars and by machine guns, the time of the preparation and approximately the amount of the preparation. The heavy weapons company commander would then take his platoon leaders, reconnoiter and make actual disposition of the unit. Having made these preparations, arranged for ammunition etc., the heavy weapons company commander reported to the battalion commander and then proceeded to the OP. He may or may not be present when the actual order is issued to the rifle companies. During the actual fight the weapons company commander was usually with the battalion commander.

Q. Did you use the word "preparation"? I think you mentioned the time of preparation - do you mean preparatory fires?

A. That's right.

Q. About how long before the approach?

A. Anything up to about thirty minutes, in spite of planning, the jungle handicaps any time schedule.

Q. To what extent, in planning fires at the outset of the attack did you make any use of heavy weapons companies of the battalion or battalions in reserve?

A. Practically always. I don't recall any time, however, where it was necessary to physically remove from the battalion area any guns to support regimental action.

Q. You kept them within the grip of the reserve battalion?

A. Right. Usually it was done through the battalion commander by giving him a fire mission. The coordination of the fire wherever possible was between maneuvering battalion and battalion firing. A good many times, however, it was necessary that the regiment coordinate the fire, in which case I usually did that personally.

Q. You didn't resort to S-3 or anybody?

A. No, I usually did that personally.

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Q. Did you make use of raiding in an attempt to gain information from the enemy?

A. We didn't to any great extent. We sent patrols during the daylight to our front and flanks. Quite often these patrols came back with some information but more often their information was negative rather than positive.

Q. What method did you use to gain information?

A. We were very fortunate in that the first position captured by my regiment there was a command post which contained complete Jap orders for the operation, maps showing dispositions, installations and strength, and plans for future operations. These were sent back to the division, properly translated and returned to us, and the general Jap scheme of defense was very well known to us.

Q. Did you, generally speaking, use large combat patrols or small reconnaissance patrols?

A. Small reconnaissance patrols.

Q. You did send out any combat patrols?

A. Not to the front. I'd like to say the reason was we had no necessity for them. However, I believe that there will be times in the operations with the Japs that strong combat patrols will be necessary to the front. Our use of combat patrols was almost exclusively limited to opening and reopening lines of communication and supply and for clearing areas of snipers, MG groups, etc. These varied in size from three men to a platoon.

Q. Did you stick to trails or go into the jungle for reconnaissance?

A. I can't give an answer on that. Usually it is better to stay off the trails if it is possible.

Q. We had two solutions. One officer came back and said he stuck to trails and another said you should patrol on rolling ground all throughout the zone.

A. It all depends on what your patrol is doing. If it is to locate the next Jap in front, stay on or near the trail and you are certain to find him. A good many of our patrols were on trails to the rear, reopening a supply line that had been cut; running down a wire break, etc. We had more patrolling to the rear and flanks then to the front.

Q. How did you maintain contact between front line units in attack?

A. We never turned a unit loose without a specific point where we were going to get together and if that was a considerable operation we ran
Attack Committee (Cont'd):

a base line and checked every other possible way. In addition we used patrols and liaison officers and N.C.O.'s.

Q. How about patrols between companies and units on the right and left?

A. We used them extensively. However, a patrol in the jungle is good only to tell you that a certain point is approximately so far to your left and on about such and such an azimuth from your location, but that is not definite enough for your needs.

Q. Did you use smoke or something like that to indicate objectives? How did you overcome the limitations of patrols? What were the means you substituted?

A. I had an officer with each regiment on my flanks and when his unit moved he paced it off, recorded the azimuths and plotted it on his map. He would then telephone his location using our own code. It is extremely important to know exactly where these units are on the right and left because of the use of artillery. I repeat, most of your initial concentrations of artillery are brought in by sound ranging, and unless you know definitely where other units are, there's a lot of confusion and danger.

Q. If you were going to start to train a regiment for use in that area what steps would you take to overcome collecting souvenirs? You mentioned that our troops would gather souvenirs and Japanese weapons.

A. I believe the answer to that is division control. A straggler line should follow closely behind the combat elements. They should certainly take charge of all captured headquarters and dug-outs, until the intelligence people have taken the important military items for inspection. I believe then that it should be understood by every man of the division that the service elements of the division will collect all souvenirs and hold them for equitable distribution by special services after the fight. If I were training a regiment again and could not sell that idea to the division commander I would do it with my own personnel.

Q. What local security did you put out at night and by what method?

A. At the end of each day's fight all units assume the combat bivouac formation at full allowable distances and intervals. Immediately as many men as could be spared went to work digging in perimeter "four man" foxholes which lay generally through the support squads of the outside platoons. These are usually about 40 to 50 yards inside the outside perimeter of the rifle elements.

Q. Did the outside riflemen dig single foxholes?

A. Both single and double. Just at dusk the outside riflemen withdraw
Attack Committee (Cont'd):

to the four-man foxholes inside the perimeter. Whenever possible booby traps and trip wires were left on the outside position so as to give warning of the Jap approach. We kept no listening posts or other occupied positions outside that inner perimeter.

Q. Do you have a copy of the combat bivouac sketch?

A. It is at the printer's and undoubtedly will be distributed if approved.

Q. Were orders complete orders or piece-meal orders?

A. At the beginning of each phase a regimental order was issued as nearly perfect as possible. The S-2 gave the enemy situation, the S-3, our own disposition and I issued a verbal order from notes. Orders for continuation of an attack were from fragmentary to almost complete field orders.

Q. In other words, orders from the division down should be in fragmentary form at all times. Do you agree?

A. No. I know of no order that can replace the five paragraph order in an initial operation. For example, when I first assumed command of the 169th and we prepared for our attack, there was no better method than the full complete order. Also, when the 145th moved down to relieve the 169th, there was no better method than a complete order.

Q. Your attacks were coordinated attacks or piece-meal? These orders would indicate coordination as far as the terrain would permit.

A. I don't recall any example of piece-meal attack, assuming that by piece-meal we mean employing units as they arrive. Each of our attacks was started as a coordinated operation. It perhaps did not involve all the units in the maneuver initially, but later fragmentary orders would be issued, covering operations of the other units as the need for their employment developed.

Q. How long, as a rule, did you take in the actual issuance of this field order, and how far in advance of the hour of attack did you give it to your subordinates?

A. The complete field orders, the two that I issued were about four o'clock in the afternoon for an attack starting the next morning. The fragmentary order might be similar to this. You get the battalion commander on the phone—he is familiar with the situation—and you say that Jones has just got on a hill but is being held up by a newly discovered Jap position about 200 yards north of that hill. You take your battalion and move due north from your position 200 yards and swing to 270 degrees, and take that new position. As to the order, how long it would take to issue it, I can only estimate from memory. It didn't take any longer than it does right here at school. I would say thirty minutes would cover all phases of it.
Restrict Committee (Cont'd):

Q. I'd like to go back to one thing that came up before. You implied awhile ago and said the other day there was almost no night tactical activity. Would you explain from the regimental commander's viewpoint the principal reasons why night attacks were not employed?

A. I had several reasons for that. Initially the Japs were on the offensive during the night, all night. Using our method of firing around perimeter with a few selected individuals using automatic guns inside the perimeter, we were causing the Jap many more casualties than he was us. We calculated that we were doing pretty well using this method. The Jap wasn't being reinforced to any extent from the north so he was steadily decreasing his strength. There was no occasion in front of my own regiment where our night attack would succeed as well as our day attacks. However, the Jap, according to our information, had no night defense. Some of our patrols, the Fijians were through their bivouac a number of times. Also, I personally felt that the American soldiers that we had in this operation were not sufficiently trained for successful night attack in the jungle.

Q. During night operations, did the Japs use artillery or mortar preparation on your position?

A. The Jap attack was always preceded by mortar fire. This is the first indication you have that he is coming.

Q. Would they follow that pretty close?

A. When they did come in they came in fairly close behind their mortars.

Q. Silently, or did they usually make a lot of noise?

A. On their night raids they were silent until they were close to the position and then they would make noises from all directions. I think it might be wise to consider what they have in mind on these night raids. I don't believe they had any idea they could wipe out our position, but figured that they could terrorize the American troops and so confuse us that we might get to shooting among ourselves or get us so frightened we would pull out. On their real night attacks they came in mass with no apparent effort at stealth.

Q. In what strength would the Jap operations be?

A. I can only guess. I think most of their raids were small commando groups, say three or four groups of twelve to twenty men each. In the night attack, they would charge in mass with up to several hundred troops.

Q. Those night attacks of the Japs were they ever successful?

A. No.
Q. Did the Jap ever realize that this was uneconomical and take steps to change?

A. That night attack on the 169th Infantry was the last Jap offensive action of importance in New Georgia.

Q. Did you require all elements down to company to submit through battalion their plan of fire attack to you, both defensive and offensive? When you gave an order did you require them to submit back to you their plan of maneuver so you would know what they were doing?

A. In most cases, yes, with reference to battalion commander. In a few cases I personally directed the employment of the companies, especially for the leading battalion.

Q. In maneuvers in this country the whole thing moves so rapidly that practically none of the things you describe can be done. I have been on a half dozen and all these small things were not included in the training time. The troops leave this country in good physical shape and that's about all.

A. In our case there was no particular need for battalion commander to require his company commander to send plans to him. In issuing of the battalion order, those matters were handled verbally.

Q. Did battalions make definite plans for weapons such as mortars and machine guns?

A. That's right.

Q. To include 60s?

A. No. Our general practice was not to employ 60s initially. The 60s were left to the company commander for his use as the situation developed.

Q. The same general rule applied to light machine guns and heavy machine guns?

A. That's right.

Q. To what extent and with what effectiveness did the Jap use anti-personnel mines and booby traps?

A. The only reported use of Jap anti-personnel mines was during the last phase of the operation at Munda. We received word that a mine field lay across the right half of our zone and that we were to cross it with caution. We didn't find any mines at the place but we did find quite a number of the magnetic type mines stored in Jap dug-outs and around their CP's, which were available for use.
Attack Committee (Cont'd):

Q. It was actually not a mine field?
A. No, not that we could discover.

Q. In that connection, was there an anti-tank platoon and was it used in that alleged mine field?
A. No, in each battalion the pioneer ammunition people were especially trained for use in mine removal. The Regimental Mine Platoon was also especially trained, but they were not used on this particular occasion because they were busy bringing up ammunition and supplies. It so happened at Guadalcanal we had to clear a large mine field laid by marines who had lost all maps of the field. This meant a thorough search using the two mine detectors which we were able to get from the engineers and any other means we could improvise. In addition to this antitank mine field there were large areas filled with booby traps placed by the American Division. To accomplish this, it was necessary to employ all members of the regiment so that before we were in New Georgia operation most of the regiment was experienced in this connection. They actually located and removed thousands of tank and anti-personnel mines. It cost about two dozen casualties all told.

Q. To what extent was the 60-mm used without base plate?
A. It was not used to any extent. It could have been. We planned on it, but we had no need to employ it. The action was not so fast that we couldn't put up the base plate and bipod.

Q. Could they keep up all right?
A. They were right along with the riflemen.
Defense Committee:

Q. Were either of your regiments, the 145th or the 169th, ever in a situation where it took up an organized battle position in sustained defense, a position that was to be held at all costs?

A. Exclusive of defense positions on the previous bases, each of these regiments had one defensive set-up during the New Georgia operation. The position was on the same ground for both regiments. The initial occupation and defense was by the 169th, which was later relieved by the 145th which held the position until the New Georgia forces went again on the offensive. This position was the high ground overlooking Lambeti Plantation or approximately two miles north of Liani Beach.

Q. Could you give us the general set-up, including its frontages, depth, unit assignments, curtain of fire, to include PPLs, PTA, wire, mines, AP or AT, artillery, normal barrages and concentrations?

A. This defensive position which we occupied initially with the 169th was more or less forced on us by the situation which demanded that we pass from the offensive and wait until the arrival and development of additional American forces. Please bear in mind that we were preparing to continue the attack and expected to jump off any day after the first four days. The termination of the attack phase left us in column of battalions, the combat team acting alone. This regiment, the 169th, a three battalion regiment (each battalion at one-half or less than one-half strength), was in column of battalions separated by roughly 600 yards between each battalion. The order from front to rear was 1st battalion, 3rd battalion, 2nd battalion. Upon receiving orders to hold the ground which we occupied at the time, pending the arrival of additional troops, the second battalion was sent forward to help organize the main line of resistance with the first battalion. The resulting organization then was first and second battalions defending the forward area on the main line of resistance and the third battalion holding the regimental reserve area. The distance between the forward and rear area was roughly 600 yards. The area occupied by each battalion was roughly 300 yards in diameter. Each battalion within its own area organized for complete all-around defense, establishing approximately the SOP combat bivouac formation of the 145th Infantry. Around the perimeter of each battalion was placed an interlocking band of automatic fire. Normal barrages of artillery were placed to the front and to each flank of the forward area. Mortars were sited to cover probable approaches within the gaps of artillery fire. Firing by individual rifleman was limited to those on the perimeter and a few selected individuals on the inside. Wire communication was complete to include company CPs and weapons platoons. Evacuation was from battalion to the regimental aid station, by regimental medical personnel augmented from time to time by personnel from the collecting company. Evacuation from the regimental aid station was by the collecting company, augmented by returning ration and ammunition parties. Supply was both by hand-carry and parachute drop (At this point Col. Holland drew a diagram on the blackboard).
Defense Committee (Cont'd):

Q. Did you use wire?
A. We used wire complete to the companies and to the weapons platoons and mortar sections.

Q. I mean barbed wire.
A. We used no barbed wire. We had none and if we had, I doubt that we could have carried it that far. We used a trip wire made from old communication wire.

Q. Did you use booby traps?
A. We did use booby traps improvised from hand grenades with the 145th Infantry particularly. We put out quite a number of them each night and took them in each morning, preparatory to the expected jump-off.

Q. Did you take up the ones that were not exploded?
A. Every morning, we put them out the last thing at night. A man would be given about three and he was charged with getting them in the next morning.

Q. Did you have any mines at all?
A. We had no mines.

Q. On firing of mortar from the reserve battalion on ravines, did you have a set schedule or did you fire on sound?
A. We fired no mortars at night unless attacked. The Artillery would fire at irregular periods. "A" might fire at 9 o'clock and the second time at 9:15, "B" might fire at 9:05 and then at 9:55. It was entirely up to the battery commander, just as long as he fired twice each hour and at a different hour each time.

Q. You occupied a different position at night from the one in daytime. When did you shift?
A. At daybreak the outer perimeter moved out. They moved down considerably past the half way mark of the hill into one and two man foxholes. At dusk they fell back to the night perimeter. When they fell back they would leave booby trap grenades in the outer position. In some cases we took 03 rifles and placed them in the ground pointing to a Jap route of approach, tying the triggers with a string back to the night position. That night when the Japs would start a nuisance fire with knee mortars we would pull the string. For some reason this usually stopped the Jap.

Q. Where was the 600 yards from the 300 yards diameter? Was that a single ring?
Defense Committee (Cont'd):

A. The 600 yards is from hill to hill. It is not a single ring. Each unit is dug in for all-around defense, starting with the squad, making small rings within the outer ring of the battalion.

Q. How was the artillery placed?

A. With each front line company is an observer. At each battalion command post was a liaison officer with detail. The artillery battalion commander was with the regimental commander. The artillery battalion itself was on an island southeast of Zanana, approximately three-quarters of a mile off shore from New Georgia. Here is an interesting feature on communication. For the wire communication across the water we used 110 wire laid on the bottom of the bay, and it stood up. It worked better than the big rubber cable they had going across to Rendova.

Q. I imagine that where you were, the jungle was pretty thick. Was there mutual fire support?

A. Yes, This area was pretty well thinned out on the hill itself by artillery fire before we moved in. At the bottom of the hill the jungle commenced again. However, we specialized in close-in cross fires, even with rifles, so the jungle did not affect our mutual support.

Q. Did you get any attack against that position?

A. We had a very good one the first night. The Japs made a mass assault on the forward hill. On that hill we killed 99 Japs and we also picked up a wounded Jap prisoner.

Q. Would they carry their wounded off?

A. In their field order, which I read, it stated definitely that they were to bring back their dead and wounded.

Q. In that attack was the supporting fire with normal barrages?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they go down?

A. Yes.

Q. Did foxholes have overhead shelter in that location?

A. The foxholes were built with the rear half covered except where we occupied old ones built by the Jap. They were completely covered.

Q. Relative to the same foxholes, these twelve or fifteen men you say you lost, were those men in foxholes when they became casualties, or were they moving around in the area?
The first round usually caught somebody outside but, after that they were usually in the foxholes. I lost a Catholic Chaplain and a doctor because they wouldn't stay in the foxholes. The first volley got twelve or fifteen men and they jumped out of the foxholes to help them. Before the campaign was over I got the doctors and chaplains to realize that their work should be brought to them.

Q. Did you have any dive bomber support during this time?
A. Plenty. The Navy bomb divers were on call.

Q. What was the general plan of advance? Did the Jap organize reverse slopes—ever, sometimes, or always?
A. We were fortunate to capture the Japs' CP and along with that came all their orders, plans and maps and I personally read the transcript of the order for organization of defense. It directed the organization of mutually supporting guns and hills. It stated that whenever a hill is occupied other guns will be placed so that fire could be brought on both forward and reverse slopes. I had the idea that we would find Japs organizing on the ravines and reverse slopes but that was not true. They organized hills in New Georgia as we would. Each hill had another hill which covered it by fire and it covered the forward and reverse slope of that hill. They had a lot of positions that were not actually occupied. I mean by that, they were supplemental positions, available for occupation. They moved fast from one position to another. As soon as they knew where we were going, they immediately moved to meet us. Many times we got on a hill without too much trouble only to get knocked off by fire from a new position we didn't know about.

Q. I think that is exactly as we would organize.
A. They are right along the military crest of the hill. What you can see of the Jap you can lick. It's only when he starts opening up from unlocated positions that you have to get into trouble.

Q. That still comes within our principles. Did you have any trouble keeping the men on the forward slopes of the hill?
A. No.

Q. Isn't there a tendency to draw back on the reverse slope?
A. You are assuming that all casualties came on the forward slope. That's wrong. The mortars hit all over the hill.

Q. Were there many cases of shock?
A. Quite a number of shock and war neuroses early in the action.

Q. Could you tell me how you remedied this? Did you evacuate them or bring them out of the shock, or what?
A. Any case that was suspected to be unreal was sent back into the line after a short rest. A real shock case cannot be sent into the line again until he has had a long rest and treatment. I have in mind an officer on this same hill the first day. Two Jap mortar shells hit on each side of him simultaneously. To all outward appearances he wasn't hurt, but he was a raving maniac. To the observer, it is a miracle he wasn't torn to pieces. This officer was evacuated to one of the forward hospitals for two weeks, after which, on his own insistence, he was released to go back into action with his unit. He came by and talked to me several minutes and looked perfectly normal. He got back to his company about the same time the Japs were doing a little machine gun and mortar firing and went to pieces again. He was evacuated to the States and I believe, since, has been retired.

Q. Did you have any cannon platoon or company?
A. Neither.

Q. Bazookas?
A. Bazookas but not ammunition.

Q. Did you pick the bazookas up on the way out?
A. They were issued to us on Guadalcanal. We never had a chance to fire even one round. We tried to learn how to use them and planned to take them in expecting ammunition would be sent up, but when the final day of embarkation came and we had no ammunition, we left them behind.

Q. Counterattack plan - inasmuch as they never penetrated your position, I expect you didn't use them, but what were your plans?
A. To planned to use the unoccupied battalion simply to restore the position. We had three routes reconnoitered and planned from the rear hill to the front. You might say, in general, our plans called for: if the Jap came in one direction, we would go in right behind him.

Q. In the night attack they made on the first night, did they knock out any of the machine guns you had placed there singly?
A. No.

Q. What plan had you made in the event that would have happened?
A. None other than normal replacement.

Q. Well, where you were at reduced strength with only 200 men in a battalion, how long would you estimate the biggest hill is where you had your first battalion?
Defense Committee (Cont'd):

A. The biggest hill is roughly 600 yards long and probably 300 or 400 yards across.

Q. In four-man foxholes, how much distance did you have between - 75 yards?

A. Within the company - about five or ten yards; between companies - as much as 30 yards.

Q. You had during the daytime some security out in front? 2-man foxholes?

A. Yes.

Q. Just at dawn this inner perimeter expanded to a daylight perimeter?

A. That's right.

Q. That reserve battalion, was it similarly organized?

A. Yes. You have to be so organized. There is no front line with the Jap.

Q. Your idea is then that at night everybody should just sit tight?

A. Yes. As long as the Jap continues the tactics he used in New Georgia.

Q. Would they stay awake?

A. One-half of the men remained awake.

Q. What about ammunition and other supply, where was it dumped?

A. The battalion came back to the regimental forward supply point. We would notify them when we had the breakdown complete. The battalion notified would send back a detail, carry it to the battalion area and break it down again for the companies.

Q. In your perimeter defense, did the battalion commander control the 60mm mortars?

A. He didn't need to. He sometimes put them on special detail but normally we left them to the company commander to use in his own sector.

Q. You made the statement before that you usually used single heavy machine guns. Did you split light machine guns too?

A. We found that the siting of machine guns was the job of the battalion commander and whenever he split his heavies, practically always he placed the lights similarly. Here we had a good many lights substituting for heavies. I would have had all lights except for the fact that when I first issued the order, numerous soldiers came to me and begged to keep their own guns that they knew how to fire, so I changed the order and made it optional.
Q. Did the lights stand up as well as the heavies?

A. We had no firing that could not be done with the lights.

Q. In placing machine guns, did you give priority to sectors or to final protective line, or did you consider them of equal importance?

A. Our machine guns like our rifles were rarely fired to the front on the defensive but always in front of the neighboring unit. If a machine gun, which in our SOP called for its position to be one place, could not fire in front of its neighbor unit, it was moved to such a position that it could fire in front of that unit (Demonstrated by diagram). It's sector of fire was always in front of the neighboring unit.

Q. In that terrain were you able to get final protective lines?

A. Yes. There is always a way to get fairly good grazing fire.

Q. How long was the average one?

A. They were very short. For final protective lines we considered anything over 50 yards very good.

Q. How do you feel about fragmentary orders in attack or defense? Do you feel that a full, complete order should be issued?

A. No. I think each of them has its place. I don't believe either of them can be used to the exclusion of the other. I issued on the initial days, to each of the two regiments, a complete field order but it would have been a waste of effort to assemble all the commanders and go through a complete field order every time we had some little changes in the disposition or plan of maneuver. I think we succeeded very well in keeping our troops informed both as to our situation and as to the enemy situation. If you do that as it occurs, the need for a complete order is, in most cases, eliminated.

Q. This SOP bivouac, when you took an objective, from the battalion commander's standpoint, that was in effect reorganization on the objective?

A. That's right.

Q. How effective was the use of your light assault wire, or did you prefer heavy wire for a fast moving situation on the offensive?

A. The assault wire, I think, is the only answer. It will not stand up under sustained combat and our experience was that on the first day, we laid assault wire forward. If on the second day we found we were still in that position and it looked as though we would be there another day, we laid 110 wire to the battalions. The division laid all lines to the regiment with 110 wire.
Q. This night attack that was stopped, what was it stopped by?
A. Primarily by automatic weapons.

Q. Did you have any Verys or illumination?
A. No illumination. However, it was moonlight and moonlight in the tropics is almost like daylight.

Q. Did you have any antitank guns?
A. We had antitank guns at the beachhead. We brought four of them up during our 145th defensive period.

Q. Did you ever use canisters?
A. We used canisters in training but we had no occasion to use them in New Georgia. We had no 37's during the big night attack. We found in firing canisters they were good for 40 yards or less. They make a wide sheaf and cover the near targets effectively but beyond that we don't believe they are effective.

Q. How wide a sheaf would that cover?
A. At 20 yards it covered a target that was approximately 10 yards wide. How much farther than that it went, I don't know. At 40 yards the strike was very thin.

Q. During the periods you were being subjected to mortar and artillery fire, what efforts were made to locate the direction of mortar and artillery fire?
A. Every effort.

Q. I mean, what is the most effective method of determining location?
A. We didn't find any effective method. We would think we had it located and send a patrol that way and usually find some old positions but no mortars. Airplane photos were good in locating dual purpose guns. That position is a good 15 feet in diameter, well dug, out and easily located from an airplane photograph; but for mortars themselves, we didn't find any effective way of locating them. Usually if we got three people to agree which direction they came from, we would have it photographed and would shoot Arty over the area, but we never did locate the mortars effectively.

Q. Did you have much trouble in keeping your weapons in operation in that climate over there... much rust?
A. Plenty. You must visualize a country where the ground is always muddy, where it rains several times every day, often all day and all night.
You can't keep rifles free from rust but you can keep the working parts clean and oiled. The Japanese have a little cover made out of something like celluloid which keeps the mud out of the bore. After the first couple of weeks most of our soldiers had one of those muzzle covers.

Q. The matter of photographs - did you request any photographic missions and did they get them forward to you?
A. Yes.

Q. How long did it take to get one and get the photograph back?
A. You asked for one one day, it would be executed the next day and you would get it the following day.

Q. Was any preliminary reconnaissance of the prospective area made by regiment before you moved in on ground that was Jap territory?
A. I used staff officers quite a bit in coordinating moves - usually the regimental executive officer and 3-3, but no reconnaissance was made of areas in Jap territory preparatory to moving in. We always moved in prepared to fight if necessary.

Q. What was S-3 doing?
A. I kept an S-2 and S-3 with me habitually. The S-3 was occupied mostly with keeping abreast of the situation as concerned us and our other troops.

Q. Outside of regiment?
A. Yes.

Q. The S-4 wasn't with you?
A. Never at the front line. He remained at the regimental dump. His assistant S-4 operated the forward supply point, usually inside the regimental area.

Q. The S-1, what was he doing?
A. He was up forward performing the contemplated functions of S-1.

Q. At the regimental CP?
A. Yes.

Q. What was the organization of your CP?
A. We had a standard set-up which the CP used in either the offensive or defensive. It began with myself or the executive officer or S-1,
pointing out the front and the location of my foxhole. The artillery went to the foxhole to my left. His detail went right in front of him (explained in chart). To the right went the S-2, S-3 and the operations sergeant. Just to the right of that went S-3 personnel or detail. I had a detail of four men, a body-guard just behind me. They were two drivers, one orderly and the stenographer. To the right front was the I&R. Platoon with its filter center, to the left front was the communications platoon and to the rear was the regimental headquarters company, the S-1, message center, aid station and the Asst. S-4 with the accompanying personnel of their sections.
General Committee:

Q. Initial security on the march, can you tell us briefly what steps were taken that you observed in the combat zone - with particular reference to AA and AT?

A. Marching in the South Pacific area is not a major factor of the operations; such marching as we did was along conventional teachings, outposts, flank patrol, with lateral security furnished by the different platoons down the column at each half. The machine guns of the heavy weapons platoon were hand-carried throughout the marching. On road marches all guns were set up for antiaircraft defense at each halt.

Q. What did they do on the march? How did you obtain distribution?

A. If you recall in my lecture, we worked exclusively on the idea of the combat team. A machine gun platoon followed each rifle company as a combat team on the move so that normally gave us a distribution of machine guns and AT weapons throughout the length of the column.

Q. Now then, the advance guard, what steps were taken to bring about artillery support while on the march?

A. During the road marches we made during the New Georgia operation, there was no artillery support. I believe I will elaborate on this a bit so that you will get the picture I'm talking about. I personally joined the New Georgia operation after it had commenced. It had been going on for almost a week before I personally arrived on New Georgia and they were in contact with the enemy. Any movements that we made were tactical moves rather than tactical marches up to completion of the first phase of the New Georgia operation. We then had quite a long march, but it was purely an infantry march. The artillery which had been stationary so far during the operation had withdrawn its liaison units preparatory to regrouping and moving into position for the next phase.

Q. You didn't have any roads, just trails?

A. Just trails.

Q. Could you get your organic transportation along trails or carry?

A. By carry - everything by hand. It was beginning to be possible to get 1/4 tons along the main trails.

Q. What did you do with prime movers?

A. Not until the Munda phase of the New Georgia operation was complete did we get any large vehicles forward of the beach head.

Q. During the movement to Guadalcanal from Rendova you were aboard ship? What steps did you take to protect yourself?

A. With the exception of personnel detailed to assist the Navy gun crews, we kept the men below decks.
Q. You didn't think it was wise to keep them on deck?

A. No. There were plenty of automatic weapons manned by Navy personnel, augmented by our machine gunners, to take care of any air attacks, and we felt that the best protection for the men - as well as providing necessary room for gun crews on deck came by keeping the men below. If you have in mind the effect of small arms fire on enemy aircraft, I can relate one incident which occurred during this one day's march which I mentioned awhile ago. During the halt, while we were awaiting orders, we went into an assembly position near the beach, using our SOP combat bivouac formation. While we were there we were hit by three bombing and strafing raids from low-flying planes in quick succession. The first one completed its run although our men fired on it. The second one got through although they drew more fire than the first run. They made one more attempt but the small arms fire was so intense that they turned away short of our position and disappeared.

Q. What security did you have on this march?

A. Typical advance guard. We were able to get flank patrols out approximately 200 to 250 yards. Our security on the march was a matter of SOP. March outposts and flank observers were sent out during halts, and advance guard with flankers on the march. Distances were adjustable according to terrain.

Q. Are there any sketches of your SOP available?

A. There are some being prepared now for General Bonesteele's use. I assume that if he approves, they will be reproduced and distributed.

Q. How did you manage with water on these moves? Did you have extra water cans to get water to the troops?

A. We carried extra water in five-gallon water cans. Each man was issued two canteens. We filled them at the beginning of the day and that was supposed to last all day.

Q. Two per man?

A. Two per man, one on his belt and one on his pack.

Q. Did the Japs make any effort to sabotage your route of march?

A. This particular route of march was made after we captured Munda Airport and moved toward Bairoka. The Jap was defeated and on the run. We had no trouble.

Q. Did you experience any air attacks at all?

A. The one I just described is the only one during this march. That consumed possibly one-half hour's time all told.
General Committee (Cont'd)

Q. How many planes did they hit you with and how low did they fly?
A. Very low - approximately 300 to 500 feet and in groups of three. They could have been the same three planes - or a total of nine.

Q. How did they hit your column?
A. They hit us during the halt at which time we were in our combat bivouac formation. They dropped about five bombs and completed two strafing runs but caused no casualties.

Q. What could you say about air supremacy? Did you feel you had air supremacy?
A. We had it without question. We had control of the air, but even if you have control of the air it doesn't mean that the Jap cannot come in on a run, and he frequently did. Our planes were coming from Segi and Guadalcanal, and the Jap usually came in when our planes were absent.

Q. Where did you make this march?
A. New Georgia Island proper - from north of Munda, to Munda, to Lambeti then north along the Munda Bairoka trail.

Q. In the jungle or in the open.
A. The plain around Munda and Lambeti was fairly open. The remainder was an intense jungle.

Q. When you made your attack across the peninsula north of the airport, were you in the jungle all the way?
A. All the way.

Q. When you were in support of the Bairoka attack, that was also jungle?
A. That was all jungle. We, as a regiment, didn't operate over any open grounds other than this march when we left the west coast and moved through the airport, through Lambeti Plantation and turned north.

Q. Was the plain of Lambeti cleared?
A. It was partially cleared in Munda because of the airport. It was cleared around Lambeti Plantation by the Naval and Air Corps bombardment.

Q. I am particularly interested in bivouac outposts. What changes do you have to make in the jungle? Any basic changes? Do you have sentry posts, outguards, supports and use of reserve like we have here?
A. Except as our SOP combat bivouac applied, we didn't use them. I do
not mean to say that they cannot be used. However, there is a question in my mind as to the ability of the American soldier to remain quiet as long as is required on an isolated sentry post. We found no need of that because there was no doubt when the Jap was coming. This was usually about fifteen minutes after dark. He announced his arrival with mortars and we could follow his progress, listening to his guide signals. There was no secrecy about the Jap approach. We placed hand grenade booby traps and trip wires to be sure that we were warned but we could usually tell from hearing the noise made by the Jap himself.

Q. How far from your sleeping bivouac would you place your security - 100 yards?
A. No. We pulled our listening posts into our perimeter, beginning at dark.

Q. Do your perimeters have organized reliefs as we know them?
A. Each little group had its own. As far as possible in the four-man foxholes, two slept while two remained on guard.

Q. Wouldn't they be full of water?
A. You soon get here you can sleep very nicely when you have the opportunity, even in water.

Q. Was there any depth to that defense?
A. An outer perimeter containing the automatic fires - the interior filled with smaller perimeters of riflemen.

(At this point Col. Holland drew a complete sketch and explained the defense in detail, including the system of sniper stalking to clear the area at daybreak.)

Q. In the meantime you stayed in the foxholes?
A. Until the "all-clear."

Q. How deep did you have to dig the foxholes?
A. From two to three feet. It varied.

Q. Did you have any night patrol?
A. No night patrol. That was due to the fact that the Japs were on the offensive every night, all night, and we agreed that none of us was to move outside the foxholes, so that anyone moving could be assumed to be Japanese.

Q. Did you find it necessary to set up a combat patrol to take care of the attacks?
General Committee (Cont'd)

A: If we had an attack in force, we stayed in place and depended on the covering fire of our automatic weapons, mortars, and artillery to take care of Japs outside the perimeter, and our rifles, knives and bayonets for any that got inside.

Q. You didn't plan to move at night at all?
A. Not at all.

Q. Did machine guns have final protective lines?
A. That's right. On fixed lines.

Q. If you had not been in the jungle, would you have adopted this cloverleaf formation?
A. Under any terrain, under any condition, at any place, until I was convinced that there is a better way, I would use it. I wouldn't use it in the open with the same close intervals as in the jungle. It would keep the formation of smaller units fairly close, with intervals between units much greater; depending on the effect of the cross fires of the automatic weapons and rifles; as well as artillery and mortars to cover the intervals between units. If you study this formation, you will find that an attack from any direction is met by the same fire with only the movement of half the automatic guns, which consists of moving from the primary to the supplemental position. Further, it permits perfect freedom of movement to attack when desired, under all conditions.

Q. Did you use that formation in terrain such as Fort Benning?
A. I did. The initial development of this SOP was made when I was with the Fourth Division here at Fort Benning.

Q. Would you recommend that we teach such a formation in defense of rear areas?
A. Yes—certainly, for rear areas in jungle operations. However, I believe that this formation is not to be limited to defensive situations. It is the best method I know of for organizing a quick defense on new ground. It is the best way I know for completing a quick and thorough reorganization of a unit after an attack; and also it is the best formation I know of for an assembly area or attack position. Every man in the unit knows where he belongs. I don't mean that the first squad is always on the right of a certain company or always in the lead. We used a counter clockwise order of units regardless of who was in the lead and as soon as the men got the picture, there was no question of confusion.

Q. What did you do with the service company?
A. They were split. We used a minimum number with the forward supply with-
General Committee (Cont'd)

in the area. Battalion sections were with their battalions. The greater number would be in the protected area of the beach head at the main supply point.

Q. Was the formation you describe ever subjected to artillery fire—heavy artillery fire? What effect did that have?

A. If the Jap had used artillery as we used it, we would have been forced to use larger intervals between platoons, companies and battalions. I don't believe the basic principle would have changed.

Q. Did you try to have them mutually supporting?

A. Each unit was self-sufficient. Even the platoon could place automatic fire around its own perimeter. However, terrain permitting, all units were mutually supporting.

Q. Can you give a rough estimate of how much area was covered by the battalion in this dense formation?

A. Three to five hundred yards in the jungle.

Q. What is the estimate when subject to artillery fire?

A. From eight hundred to a thousand yards—about double.

Q. That seems pretty dense to me. Are you talking about circumference or diameter?

A. Diameter. We took advantage of the Jap hesitancy in employing artillery and mortars in sustained concentration.

Q. Why did they go in for four-man foxholes rather than individual foxholes?

A. When a Jap commando raid is in your area you should remain very quiet. If you don't, he'll toss a grenade. If you have two men sitting at opposite ends of a foxhole with one observing in each direction, no movement is necessary. That was the principal reason; but then it has always been a belief of mine that a single sentry is almost as bad as none at all. If you put two individuals out there, they usually stay, whereas one is liable to get a little hysterical. Still another reason was that we found that the best way to deal with the Jap on these raids, was for one man to grab him while the other worked him over with a knife, bayonet or club.

Q. Did you use the bayonet very much?

A. We used the bayonet, but it has its limitations. If a Jap is moving by a foxhole, a man must rise up to use the bayonet, whereas a long
knife (machete) will go out a yard or a yard and a half without change of position.

Q. Were there any mines used in the New Georgia operation?
A. We used hand grenades as booby traps only.

Q. You could have used mines, couldn't you?
A. Personnel mines would have been fine. The only point is that by using hand grenades, we had almost the same effect, and each man on the perimeter knew where the grenades were, so that in the morning he went out and got them and used them in offensive action later on as hand grenades.

Q. Was the Jap attack preceded by artillery preparation?
A. By mortars and some dual purpose guns. Usually the Jap let us have about three volleys of mortar or dual purpose gun fire and then stopped for awhile.

Q. Did the Japs get up and charge without following close behind their barrage.
A. That's right. However, they weren't too far behind.

Q. Did the formation correspond to ours?
A. I couldn't see much of it. However, from the reports I gathered that the attacks were in groups, all coming at once.

Q. Outside of the close formation which you call SOP formation on the defense, did you have the units in contact with the enemy on a designated M. L. R. and a Reserve Battalion? A regular line? This seems to be an isolated defense, an all-round defense, say for a bivouac.
A. Personally, I make no distinction. (Drew chart) You will see by this placing on the chart of a M. L. R. and a Reserve Area around the other Battalion, with boundaries between units, you have an orthodox defense picture. I would insist that each unit including the squad, be capable of all-around defense.

Q. Did that include your command post personnel?
A. That included command post personnel.

Q. Did you organize them into combat groups?
A. We had a standard way for the CP to go into position, which provided all-around defense. (Drew diagram)

Q. Was the defense of the Regiment CP furnished by the Battalions?
A. By a security platoon within headquarters company, but not included in its T/O and drawn from the regiment at large.

Q. What was the average strength in that platoon?
A. The same as the rifle platoon.

Q. Did the battalion have a similar organization or did they depend on organic assigned personnel?
A. Organic assigned personnel. We believed that the battalion CPs should be up where the fighting was going on. If I found at any time the CP was back more than 500 yards I pushed it up at once.

Q. Where could you operate best with the regiment CP?
A. We kept the regiment CP close behind the battalions in contact with the Jap.

Q. It seems to me you could only control one battalion if you were with it.
A. I was usually right behind the leading battalion with the command group when on the march. Behind the second battalion came the CP personnel. During action, the regimental CP normally set up behind the center of the attacking echelon, with the unengaged battalion just in rear.

Q. You were just a few hundred yards behind then?
A. 600 yards was the furthest away. Normally not more than two or three hundred yards.

Q. You had wire?
A. That's right.

Q. You had a very narrow front, didn't you?
A. About 500 yards.

Q. What would you do if you were assigned to some of the zones of action such as Italy or Africa - a zone three or four thousand yards?
A. I would initially keep essentially the same formation, as close as enemy artillery would permit. I would not let my battalions get so far away that I couldn't control them. I believe the best way is to go ahead as compact as you are permitted by the situation, and when you do open out for maneuvers, always have a definite objective in view, where the regiment will automatically regroup.
Q. What use did you make of your I and R Platoon?

A. The I and R Platoon was organized along the line of the filter center. It was represented on most patrols, but it was mostly concerned with obtaining, evaluating, and disseminating information from all sources.

Q. Where did you get your liaison officers?

A. Our T/O provided for three liaison officers. We used them as assistants, S2, S4 and S1. They were trained in being assistants to the chief of section primarily, but in all cases where we were adjacent to another regiment, they were sent to the adjacent regiment headquarters as our liaison.

Q. You didn't have liaison officers with the Battalion Commanders?

A. No.

Q. I would like to ask about documents, did you keep a journal?

A. In the filter center we had the clearest and most complete diary of what happened you could imagine. Each section kept a daily log of its activity and at the end of each 24-hour period, this was sent to the S-1 for extracting and placing in the unit journal.

Q. You didn't keep a journal as such? You restricted it?

A. The journal was brought up to date each morning—-at the end of every twenty-four hours. We restricted it only in that each section kept its own diary in full detail for entry later in the regimental journal.

Q. They were submitted to S-1 as a section journal?

A. You might call it that, we considered it more as a section diary.

Q. You don't use the actual section sheet because much of the material is of no value. What is the objection to the way we teach it? We teach that a regiment and battalion keep only one journal. That may not be the best set-up. We have the Sergeant Major receive all messages and after the officers read them, they show what they do about them, and the messages are entered in the journal. If a commander issues orders we have someone enter them in the journal; also telephone calls of importance made by the staff. We are teaching that one journal is all that is necessary and that everything centers around S-1 section as far as recording copy goes.

A. One final journal is all that is necessary—however, let's take the S-4, from two miles to ten miles away, you will never get what he is doing.

Q. We also teach that S-4 has a representative who releases information
or requests information and gets it in the journal. The work that S-4 does while he is away he keeps notes of and brings them when he goes back to the command post.

A. I can't say why but in my own headquarters that wouldn't work. It would work after a fashion but it would be very incomplete. We found that very complete notes and records could be kept by command and staff sections as individual activities, without effort - and the routine breakdown of this into the regimental journal gave us an accurate and complete document which otherwise was impossible.

Q. The regimental commander will have someone with him most of the time who will keep a record of what he does while he is away and he will turn it in? You consider that feasible or unfeasible?

A. I had a stenographer keep a record of what I did - even to shorthand notes of official conversations.

Q. Your system is in effect the same then?

A. Yes.

Q. Were replacements requested through unit reports?

A. From unit reports. Based on daily strength.

Q. How did you receive replacements?

A. They arrived as a group - without roster or classification, just about dark.

Q. What happened if you lost a machine gun or jeep or something like that? How did you handle replacement?

A. We didn't get any jeep replacements. We did get all the machine guns we needed. I would tell the assistant S-4 that I wanted machine guns and he would call the S-4 by telephone and they were sent up with the rations.

Q. You had very little difficulty in getting replacements of that sort?

A. We had no difficulty.

Q. Did you have much transportation?

A. Ten jeeps. I would say one-third of those were on the deadline, continually.

Q. You had no opportunity to get replacements?

A. That's right, and no parts. We would take parts from a wrecked jeep.
General Committee (Cont'd):

to make repairs on others. This improved after we finished Munda, the early part of August.

Q. You spoke of using liaison officers as assistants to S-1, S-2 and S-4, did you have warrant officers in your T/O? How was time broken down in the work? How much time did the liaison officer have with other units?

A. The W.O. acted as assistant and took turns with the officers. However, I found that most of the time they were needed concurrently with their chiefs. The commissioned assistants, except for the assistant S-4, were used as liaison when necessary.

The assistant S-1 went out as liaison with the 172nd Infantry early in the operation. Sometime later the assistant S-2 went out to another regiment. Both remained on liaison until after Munda.

Q. How about the liaison to the rear with division headquarters?

A. When necessary, the assistant S-3 (not a regular liaison officer) was sent to the Division G-3.

Q. You would say that staff sections are undermanned rather than overmanned with the amount of work?

A. Yes, I used the minimum number of men I needed to do the job and it was over the T/O.

Q. Did your officer replacements come in the second lieutenant grade?

A. We had captains as well as lieutenants. No field officer replacements.

Q. How did the platoon that you organized around the command post work out?

A. Swell.

Q. It wasn't necessary to put out anti-aircraft observers?

A. This defense platoon furnished those observers for the command post and also furnished the CP patrols.

Q. Did the Bn CPs put out observers?

A. We required each battalion to furnish personnel for a regimental OP in their area and we designated the location. Each CP also had either single or double sentries, according to the SOP.

Q. Was that to guard against ground infiltrations?

A. Both ground and air.

Q. Was there only one 'phone in the filter center to handle outgoing information?
General Committee (Cont'd):

A. Not exactly. Information went out to OPs over the OP 'phone; to battalions over the S-2 'phone; and to the regimental S-2 over the sound power 'phone.

Q. Did you get air alerts from division?
A. Yes, but usually after we had received them from our filter center.

Q. Was all radio communication in the clear?
A. During the fight, emergency conversations by voice radio were usually in the clear if possible. Messages were coded when secrecy so demanded.

Q. You didn't have a particular code to broadcast, such as "balast, northeast"?
A. Yes. They had codes such as "Bogey, Angel 7, 225, closing."

Q. All the lateral communication tying in with other agencies was because you couldn't get satisfactory service from higher planes or down? The division wasn't tied in to give the information?
A. That's right.

Q. How many extra radios did you have to arrange for?
A. Four from commercial radio parts which we assembled.

Q. You didn't have 300 sets, did you?
A. Not that I know of, 245, 283, 284, 195, 436, 511 and one in the 600 series; I believe the 609.

Q. Did you receive from 150 miles away?
A. Usually anything that far away we received from other sources. We used one radio for searching for such messages, with more or less success.

Q. How many men did you have in communications?
A. The regular communications platoon at headquarters. In the companies, special men were trained to handle their company telephones.

Q. Did the I and R Platoon operate any OPs?
A. Only in a supervisory capacity, except for the establishment of a fourth regimental OP when needed.

Q. Did you get a chance to question any prisoners?
A. We had the opportunity, but couldn't talk to them because we had no interpreter.
General Committee (Cont'd):

Q. The information you got in the filter center indicates you got it through radio channels. There are quite a few wire channels involved in the operation of a normal filter center by the Air Corps. Did you have occasion to use the Air Corps filter center?

A. We received information by wire from CPs, OPs, etc., as well as what we received by radio. We had a line to the radar and a line to the air operations office of Munda Airport, after it was established.

Q. Have you any suggestions for the modification of our umpiring system - any particular phases of it which resulted from your experiences in combat?

A. I don't believe I can give you anything helpful. My impression of past umpiring on maneuvers in the U.S. was not so good - they were always far from the battle realism. Umpires seem to have no imagination, and most maneuvers sooner or later ended in a race from point to point.

Q. That has been one of our difficulties. The junior umpires didn't have background and their imagination is not sufficient to make up for it.

A. Most maneuvers are permitted to run entirely too freely. They get to be what we called the "rat race" rather than a process of instruction. In general, I am opposed to "free" maneuver. I believe the lessons to be taught should be studied by the instructors before they are presented and the whole exercise controlled so as to bring out those points.

Q. Our manual provides a system which has been utilized in many different ways. Some have been successful and some unsuccessful. Do you feel that this system is sound from your observation?

A. I used it in the jungles of the Fiji Islands.

Q. You do not think that system needs modification in the jungles?

A. As far as umpiring is concerned, no. You do have a problem of application of umpiring in the jungle, as opposed to open terrain. Your distances are closed in. You need more umpires. I used umpires down to every platoon, but all my exercises were severely controlled. We left a leader free to decide what to do, but if he made a decision which would throw the exercise out of line, some situation was brought in to make him change it.

Q. Did you have umpires down to platoons?

A. In the jungle, yes.

Q. I want to ask about the records set-up in the battalion. Did you attempt to keep the same records in battalion as in regiment.
General Committee (Cont'd):

A. Yes. Our battalion staffs were as nearly duplicates of regimental staffs as possible except that there was no filter center. They had less personal than regiment and naturally their set-up couldn't be as elaborate. Otherwise, it duplicated regimental set-up. We trained them all in the same schools.

Q. Did you, in setting up your training for staff groups, place any emphasis on keeping records of what went on?

A. We did.

Q. What was your training preparatory to combat? Did you follow FM 7-40 as now written? How about FM 7-20 & FM 101-5?

A. We followed them as closely as we could. We would read every article we could on jungle fighting. After such study, we would adapt the teachings of manuals to jungle conditions and try them out in jungle exercises, making such further adaptations as were indicated. I sent officers to Fiji commando units and they lived in the field with them. We held round table discussions of what they learned and the result of all this was a typed document, which we used as our training text. I borrowed two platoons of non-commissioned officers and officers who had been in service in Guadalcanal and used them to augment our school staff in the training during the last two months in Fiji. For this period our training was divided into three phases. For one phase, a battalion was actually in jungles on regimental controlled problems. The second phase was that of attending regimental conducted schools, much the same as here at Fort Benning. Subjects included: Scouting and patrolling, map reading, PME, weapons - to include actual firing of Jap weapons, anti-mechanized defense, communication, etc. The third phase consisted of battalion tactical exercises to include air, ground and overhead firing by all supporting weapons. I believe we followed the recognized training principles very closely.

Q. I think you were pretty close to it. I don't know whether this system should be included in our books. Is a copy of your SOP available?

A. I do not have one with me.

Q. We have a problem which runs in the school - runs for two days. We are now working up plans for map maneuver, preliminary to the other, and it will probably be a battalion right along. The plan in favor now seems to be at battalion level, to be staged in one of the Pacific areas. I want to get some ideas as to the most valuable thing to teach these officers. What do you suggest?

A. I'd get an airplane photograph of ground I knew was strange to them and give them two days' rations (to last three days), individual water purification equipment, and a pack. I'd draw up an exercise involving a directional advance and require the different groups representing a regiment and three battalions to move repeatedly, one group forward, the
General Committee (Cont'd):

other two on double envelopment and meet at successive objectives. I'd try to have a photograph of country where there is no easily recognizable terrain feature. This can be done in waves so as to include a large class. The advance should be about ten miles.

Q. You would do that on the ground?
A. Yes. On the ground.

Q. We are faced with the problem of giving them much preparation in mass order and a lot of that is just staff function—pretty much routine. Nevertheless there are quite a few instructions which would apply to the jungle problem.
A. I am speaking purely from a jungle standpoint.

Q. I have some questions on the pre-problem part of the build-up—a modification of organization and equipment—the organization for advance in the jungle, frontages and depths, the heavy weapons detachment to the rifle company. What I am getting at is that I gather from your talk that normally there was an SOP for the personnel equipment carried in jungle combat, which has a direct bearing on the supply question of what was the disposition and use of artillery. What was the use of the anti-aircraft automatic weapons from the landing stage to the advance in the interior, the use of the 75-mm or 37-mm anti-tank guns, the use of the 60-mm and 81-mm mortars, and the normal ammunition requirements for rifles for one day's fighting? It isn't a problem to learn how to read a map. We are using a map which is reasonably easy to read. The weapons, the personnel equipment, ammunition, etc. have a direct bearing on the supply plan. Take for example during Guadalcanal when the 35th Infantry advanced around Mount Austen. Movements of that kind, while reasonably short, have one definite objective. Would they have certain equipment for a mission of that kind?
A. When we were fighting on small islands with heavy jungle, the artillery was landed and held under group control at the beachhead where it supported the initial action. When the time came to move it, it was towed by prime movers to its new position more or less as contemplated over here. The 37-mm gun is a very nice weapon if you can get it up to the front, but that is a problem. The same thing is true in the cannon company. You seldom will be able to get the 57 or 105 up to where you could use them as antitank weapons. I believe that any weapon that needs a motor should be full track. Definitely not a half track. Our equipment is too voluminous for the jungle and should be modified. However, I believe this modification can be standard for all jungle operations.

Q. What modification in organization would you suggest for jungle combat?
A. I would cut down and modify the transport. I would replace the cannon company with a carrier or pack company. I mean humans, not animals. This should be an organic part of the regiment. The thought of innumerable natives being available is nice but does not work out for combat
General Committee (Cont'd):

units. Your initial advance into the jungle is by hand carry, and until the roads have been fairly surfaced and graded, you can't even take all your 1/4 ton trucks, both because of shipping limitations and the fact that only so many jeeps can occupy one trail.

Q. How did you get your supplies up?

A. Initially, by carrying parties altogether, drawn from the service company cooks, bandsmen, antitank, etc.

Q. You made coolies out of them?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you use any of your band to supplement the medical detachment?

A. Not the medical detachment. We had to call on the collecting company for replacements. The litter parties going to the rear were augmented by the carrying parties on their return trip to the beachhead.

Q. What was prescribed as your unit of fire up there?

A. I can only recall that it was 100 rounds for the rifle.

Q. How did you keep your records dry in the CP?

A. We kept them under our raincoats or inside special covers made for them.

Q. Did you have shelter tents?

A. No, not for use as pup tents. Initially each man had a shelter half - but during the fight no tents were pitched.

Q. Did you keep a situation map?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you have a map board, etc.?

A. We used improvised ones of all kinds and types.

Q. You don't recommend that those things be made articles of issue?

A. Yes, if it is simple, covered, and about the size of a desk blotter.

Q. Did you have mostly mosaics? Map photographs?

A. We had a half tone reproduction of an airplane photograph with a grid scale on it.

Q. You didn't attempt to keep coordinates secret?
General Committee (Cont'd):

A. Only in that we used all kinds of improvised codes in telephonic conversation with reference to locations.

Q. How were points designated on the map?

A. The grid was numbered on the bottom and at the side.

Q. Among your items of supply, you mentioned hand grenades. I believe the T/O prescribed 150 grenades per company. Did you use more?

A. We used all we could get hold of. We gave each man two grenades and carried extra boxes when we could.

Q. Any smoke grenades?

A. None of that at all.

Q. Is the grenade good at night?

A. We used them but a lot of times if you don't know where you are throwing them, the jungle growth is so dense, that they may bounce back to you.

Q. Do you think smoke grenades would have been desired?

A. No, we had no use for them.

Q. I mean the type that throws off a cloud of smoke.

A. We used smoke for screening but you don't get close enough for using smoke grenades offensively, and the candle is better on the defense.

Q. You didn't need smoke down in there, did you?

A. Yes. We used smoke for screening, ranging and air-ground target designation.

Q. Did I understand you to say that even though available you couldn't rely on native bearers?

A. I saw them only on a few occasions. Using them meant guarding them from snipers, but even then they dropped their loads and ran at the first sign of trouble.

Q. You recommend employing your own personnel?

A. That's right. The natives are best employed by the service command for labor to build warehouses, roads, etc.

Q. If the battalion was sent in, what would be the formation, generally speaking?
General Committee (Cont'd):

A. They would go in with an advance guard.

Q. How broad a front?

A. Usually very narrow column but still in the advance guard.

Q. Do patrols and units use existing trails if any?

A. That doesn't work out. A smart battalion will stay off the trail. A patrol will do the same thing. Flank patrols are unable to pace a column for any appreciable distance because they soon tire in making trail.

Q. You wouldn't have enough replacements there?

A. That's right.

Q. What do you think of taking a 60-mm tube only and leaving the base plate back?

A. We included that in our preparatory training before we went to the New Georgia operation, but in no case that I know of did they actually use it in that manner. They didn't use the 60-mm often anyway, but when they did they used base plate and all.

Q. Did you use the 81 more than the 60?

A. Much more. I don't say the 60 isn't effective. I believe the reason we used the 81 more was because in training we didn't have any ammunition to fire the 60 and the company commanders, whose weapon it is, weren't familiar enough with it to use it effectively. It was used, but not as much as the 81.

Q. Did you have any movements long enough that you had the problem of the heavy weapons company keeping up with the rifle troops?

A. None.

Q. In Panama we started with the battalion in certain formation with rifle companies ahead of the heavy weapons company. We never arrived at a successful manner of equalizing these.

A. We never had weapons marching other than as a part of their combat team. The going was hard but we didn't lose distance. We made the base of a march at the head of the support. All guiding by units ahead of the support was to the rear.

Q. Did you split your command post? Did you have forward and rear CP?

A. No, only during an advance forward - when the so-called "advance echelon" of each section went forward to establish a new CP.
General Committee (Cont'd):

Q. With the heavy weapons company on the move, what was the breakdown?
A. One machine gun platoon followed each of the two leading rifle companies.

Q. In direct support, or attached?
A. Attached during the move. They were actually in direct support but to all intents and purposes they were attached until initial development was complete.

Q. They were responsible for any supply of ammunition?
A. The machine gun platoon drew its ammunition direct from the battalion.

Q. What was the breakdown with mortars?
A. We kept the whole mortar platoon together under battalion control. It marched habitually behind the battalion headquarters company.

Q. All were employed as a battery?
A. Normally, yes. There might be some distance between sections on occasion, but the supporting fires of the 81-mm mortars was the chief duty of the heavy weapons company commander. The 60s were controlled by the rifle company commander in the same way.

Q. Were you able to keep all of your 81s firing?
A. There was no continuous firing; usually just preparatory and requested supporting fires.

Q. You took all those with you?
A. That's right. When we reorganized the two battalion regiment into three battalions, we left each battalion with only four mortars.

Q. What distinction did you make between the signalling for suspension of artillery fire and supporting infantry weapon fire?
A. At no time did we do either mortar or artillery firing when we couldn't handle it by telephone. We used no signals.

Q. You never had a special signal for one particular engagement?
A. We had it - a Very pistol of some kind. However, we never had occasion to use it.

Q. When you used artillery fire in your preparation for the attack, did you also supplement that by fire of your mortars and machine guns?
General Committee (Cont'd):

A. Yes. A very good example of that was at Bibilo Hill. Our 105mm artillery began about 300 yards out, which had it begin on top of the hill and include the forward slope. We used 81-mm mortar beginning at the top of the hill and including the near slope. We had the machine guns scissoring the top and sides of the hill.

Q. You were moving forward during that period?

A. We sat tight during most of the preparation but when we did advance, the supporting fire continued until the troops reached the safety limit.

Q. Who called for it to stop?

A. I did, based purely on my observation of the advancing troops and the strike of the concentration.

Q. In your talk the other day, you said that the intelligence officer operated much according to the SOP. Would you mind elaborating on that?

A. Our organization of the S-2 Section called for: Regimental OPs manned by battalion personnel at or near each battalion area, with one additional OP to be manned by regimental personnel and located as the situation demanded. It also called for, where possible, telephone liaison with nearby air operations, radars, and AA units. Special radios were assigned to listen in on air-ground and inter-plane communications. One radio searched the air freely to pick up stray information either friendly or hostile. Liaison officers were assigned to remain with adjacent regimental headquarters and also with any nearby division headquarters including our own. All information gathered from these sources plus our own patrol reports was assembled, evaluated, and disseminated by the S-2 filter center.

Q. Where did you get these men for regimental OPs?

A. From battalion and from companies. We didn't take them from battalion intelligence sections.

Q. Did you receive any information from the Air Corps?

A. When the Air Corps was within a few miles of us, we contacted them and made arrangements to have access to their information by stationing an OP at their operations office. I say all this was SOP. By that I mean, this net of information was established and maintained whenever possible without any specific instructions from me.

Q. In other words, you used the intelligence platoon as OP observers and not as patrols?

A. No, that is not correct. The I & R Platoon manned the filter center, sometimes manned one OP, often had representatives with front line units and other OPs, and on occasion performed special patrol missions.
General Committee (Cont'd):

Q. Did you have extra radios?
A. Initially we had about four extra commercial radios, adjusted for short wave reception.

Q. Did you make a practice of announcing essential elements of information?
A. Yes, but even that was in a great part standard in that all information of air raids or enemy movements which might affect us was sent in to the filter center and every effort was constantly devoted to getting that information. Some of our sources were illegal. A great deal was standard. Usually my directives for E.E.I.s were given informally to the regimental S-2.

Q. Did you use your S-2 to try to find out probable enemy intentions?
A. Yes. On many occasions, when we thought the Japs were trying to come around our flank, withdrawing, or reinforcing their positions, we made determined efforts to outguess them.

Q. Who ordered the patrols, etc., for obtaining this information?
A. I merely told the S-2 what I wanted to know, and he used his own methods.

Q. How did you decide what you wanted to know? In most situations wasn't it true the enemy had one of several things he could do and your problem boiled down to which one of those things it looked as though he were going to do?
A. I don't know that I can answer that. When I wanted to know something specific I called my S-2. During the initial steps we had fairly definite locations of two strongholds which affected us very much. The thing about the one on the south was that at times it seemed to be thickly populated and at times very quiet. As I recall my instructions to the S-2 were something like this, "Get somebody down there and find out what is going on." In other words, I usually had some indication as to the enemy action or capability. I do not recall any occasion where I actually called for the "three Willies." However, the S-2 worksheet had the three standard capabilities printed on it together with normal specific indications. It remained for the S-2 to select those applicable and designate the means for determination.

Q. When you told your S-2 to get somebody down there, what actually occurred thereafter? You mentioned a minute ago that patrols were generally rifle patrols headed up by senior non-coms. How did you get that personnel?
A. The S-2 called the battalion commander who was in position to furnish a patrol.

Q. The SOP of the regiment? Did the battalion commander have to comply with that?
A. Yes.

Q. Did you find it the practice that your senior officers were following out the prescribed teaching in giving field orders?

A. An initial order in each case with the 145th Infantry stuck as closely to that as possible. Usually it was a very good example of a five paragraph field order.

Q. What about battalions and companies?

A. The orders initiating the attack followed it pretty closely.

Q. Was it the practice to issue subsequent fragmentary orders?

A. Yes.

Q. How much reliance did you put on sketches?

A. Quite a bit. Initially things were so complicated that I wasn't able to get far away from the CP and most of my ideas of terrain came from sketches sent back, particularly panoramic sketches. Later I had the opportunity to go over the ground and I found that I had received a very good picture of the terrain involved.

Q. To start with did you have any maps?

A. We had no maps at any time. We used a half tone reproduction of an airplane photograph.

Q. How much was the scale? Approximately?

A. I believe it was approximately 300 yards to 1 inch, I don't recall exactly.

Q. You practically built up your own maps?

A. From observation, sketches, and from patrol reports, we contoured to show ground forms and ran straight base lines to verify locations.

Q. Were these sketches used in conjunction with field orders?

A. No. Those sketches were more for terrain studies. We used operation overlays entirely to accompany our orders.

Q. It just roughly gave directions and distances?

A. Yes. However, specific directions and distances were named in orders whenever possible.

Q. Do you know whether S-2 kept a work sheet?
General Committee (Cont'd):

A. He kept the most complete work sheet I have ever seen.

Q. How did you distinguish a task force from combat teams?

A. A task force, as we knew it over there, was a force of several arms and services set up for a particular operation. It usually included enough air, marines, army, service and base personnel to initiate, complete and consolidate a contemplated operation.

Q. The combat team?

A. The combat team as we used it in the regiment was a combination of a rifle unit and its supporting weapons. For example, a rifle squad with the BAR, a rifle platoon with the light machine gun, a rifle company with its caliber .30 MG platoon, a battalion with a battery of artillery, etc.

Q. That was standard for operating over a long period of time? I mean for more than one operation?

A. It was standard in all operations. The attachments were more apparent than real, because as soon as development was completed, the weapons went into direct support under the battalion and company commanders. The initial disposition of weapons depended entirely on the rifle company. Then as soon as possible - usually in a very short time - weapons units reverted to the control of their commander. His initial order always included the use of his weapons.

Q. You found it desirable in the jungle then to break artillery down further than anywhere else?

A. That's one exception to the SOP breakdown. All our marches were made with the combat team artillery marching as a unit. The present long range does not require its physical division.

Q. As a rough estimate, how much of your operation would you say became SOP?

A. SOP including everything except tactics which could lend itself to standardization to include development for combat. It covered such activities as:

1. Movement into route column with advance guard, giving normal order of units and distances in the column (subject to change by specific instructions), security, rates, halts, and control.

2. Movement into SOP combat bivouac (which was also used as the formation for the attack position or assembly areas, for reorganization upon capture of an objective, and the basis for organization of a hasty defense). It covered initial disposition of units, issuance and distribution of orders, CP arrangement, liaison; intelligence sanitation, communication, supply, use of vehicles when present, and security, including warning sentries and patrols,
General Committee (Cont'd):

3. Staging and embarkation.

4. Landing on hostile shores to include the establishment of the initial beachhead.

Q. Were prisoners of any use to you?

A. Initially there were two Neisi Japs sent with us to question any prisoners but unfortunately they were wounded and evacuated early so we had to wait until the division interpreter gave us the information obtained from prisoners. However, some prisoners could speak English and we obtained some information, not much.

Q. Where did you do that?

A. At the regimental CP.

Q. How much information did your OPs get for you or did you get most of your information from the division G-2?

A. We got most of our information from the OP and surrounding connections.

Q. This information from the OP, was that of actual enemy employment out there in different strong points?

A. Yes.

Q. You said you had a battalion OP and regiment OP also. Was the latter OP to supplement battalion or was that OP for regiment itself?

A. Our SOP called for regimental OP manned by battalion personnel and one by regimental personnel in locations designated by regiment. Each battalion was required, in addition, to have at least one OP reporting to the battalion CO and such information of importance was relayed on to us.

Q. The regimental OPs, did they report direct to regiment?

A. Direct to regiment.

Q. Did you have much difficulty with discipline among enlisted personnel and officers?

A. No.

Q. Did you receive replacements during action?

A. Yes. We received some 300.

Q. In what state was their morale?
General Committee (Cont'd):

A. They didn't have enough training, but their morale was O.K.

Q. What percentage of casualties resulted from sickness?
A. About 50%.

Q. And 50% by enemy action?
A. Yes.

Q. In regard to the use of light tanks, did you have anything outstanding?
A. Our only experience with tanks in New Georgia was with eight light tanks brought in by the Marines about the middle of the operation. Two of these tanks broke down immediately and six of them joined the Infantry in the southern sector in the attack of a dug-in Jap position. They were able to advance probably a quarter of a mile before they were turned back by Japanese resistance. At the time I was told the Japanese used flame throwers, I have no verification of that and do not know. I do know, however, that they did turn back. Four of them were sent up to help the regiment on our north flank over ground that was thickly jungled and quite wet and swampy. Two of these four mired down within 100 yards. The other two withdrew and were brought back. The two mired down were not salvaged until we passed on. The remainder of the tanks were assembled and used in the final stages of the clean-up of Munda Airport. This area was a low coral plain with very little woods and low marshy places that could be located quickly and avoided. The procedure was that the tanks went along just a few yards in advance of the infantry. Initially, it was very successful. It was funny to watch a tank get up to a little Jap pillbox, point the gun down its throat and fire about five shots. The only trouble was in the final stages, when tanks endangered our own troops who had advanced beyond them and the tanks had to be stopped.

Q. Do you think they could be used with small units, platoon or company, in areas like you described or in areas where there are connecting ridges?
A. I believe that the use of tanks in the South Pacific will always be limited. However, I believe that a small number of both medium and light tanks should be a part of each task force just for such places as Lambeti Plantation and Munda Airport. It will save the lives of a lot of men.

Q. Was the Jap antitank defense as good as ours?
A. The Japs had the magnetic mine which, if I understand correctly, is placed against the side of a tank and sticks there until it explodes. They also had their small artillery pieces and their dual purpose guns, either of which will stop tanks. However, I didn't notice any elaborate or intelligent placing of these guns with reference to antitank
General Committee (Cont'd):

defense. It seemed as though the Japs didn't expect any tank attacks. They used no antitank mines as far as I know.

Q. Changing the subject, how did you use the reconnaissance troops of the division? Were any given to you for use with regiments from higher headquarters?

A. The reconnaissance troops of our division were held for use at the beachhead and around the division command post. They weren't attached to the regiment for any purpose. However, part of the time, we had a section of the native Fijians with New Zealand officers and NCOs.

Q. Did you use any pack animals with the regiment?

A. We did not.

Q. Do you think they could be used efficiently?

A. I do not. We tried, before we went to New Georgia, some field exercises with the artillery pack unit stationed on Guadalcanal. We found that most places where you could get a mule and his pack you could get a jeep with its load, and some places you could get a jeep with its load where you couldn't get a mule with his. On wet, slippery hillsides especially, the mule would slip and fall. The jeep would slip but not fall. Practically speaking, in the jungle you have to clear the same space for a mule with his pack that you do for a jeep.

Q. How about vegetation? Was there any a mule could live on?

A. There is plenty of vegetation and grass to support practically any number of animals. I saw a number of semi-wild cows living on it, but whether or not our mules could digest it I don't know. I saw quite a bit of hay brought in for our animals.

Q. You spoke the other day of your SOP. Could you give any outstanding examples of things you took out that didn't work so well - anything regarding supply, bivouacs, marches or developments?

A. We used SOP to include development for combat, either offensive or defensive; from there on we depended on the situation and the decision of commanders. I don't recall anything prescribed in SOP which we eliminated. I do recall several things that we added; for example, the standard arrangement of the command post.

Q. How did a new officer fit into the scheme of the SOP? Did it take him very long to get on to it?

A. It takes a long time to perfect it but a short time to get enough of the fundamental principles so that you don't become lost.

Q. In other words, if you became a casualty, SOP would still function?
General Committee (Cont'd):

A. That's right but it's perfectly possible for enough of the key leaders to be replaced that it would gradually fade out.

Q. You didn't mention very much in your lecture, except indirectly, on liaison with air. On what ground was liaison maintained?

A. The liaison was maintained through division.

Q. Did the ground units maintain liaison with air units?

A. That was only down to include division headquarters both ways. Division would send liaison officers to air units, especially if contemplated air action was involved.

Q. How did you maintain communication? Did you use panels?

A. We had occasion to use panels for location only. We made no effort to mark the actual front line, but put up panels on several occasions marking the center of battalion areas. We had bomber support on several occasions and we found that the best method of marking the area for the aerial target was by the use of artillery. One particular occasion artillery was combined with a preparatory bombardment by dive bombers. We began artillery at 300 yards in advance of the leading riflemen, and walked it out 300 yards. The last volley was white smoke. The dive bombers circling overhead started peeling off and bombed the area just beyond the smoke.

Q. That goes for Navy planes?

A. Practically all our bombing close support there was Navy dive bombers. The heavy bombardment came from Army but that was limited to specific objectives such as an airfield itself or definitely located installations.

Q. Did you emphasize getting there as quickly as you could?

A. We moved as quickly as possible. That is the only way. Get in quickly. The Jap is scared to death of aerial bombardment. Even if planes just circle over him he runs around wildly.

Q. What advantage is bombing to a ground unit commander?

A. Other than the morale and the lucky direct hits, none. The morale angle works both for us and against the enemy. However, Infantry cannot cover the 600 yard distance in time to take advantage of it. That is why I said, my personal opinion is that bombs are better used on definitely located targets. One reason for the apparent ineffectiveness of the bomb is that the ground is practically a quagmire. Bombs would go down 10 to 15 feet in muck. The slightest delay on the fuse would bury them in the ground and the blast would go straight up. There was no side blast unless it hit a solid rock. I personally was within 20 yards of
General Committee (Cont'd):

- a 500 pounder when it exploded. It shook me up some but that was all.

Q. Did you use any depth charges?

A. Not that I know of. I understand they used them on Guadalcanal effectively.

Q. Did you have any reconnaissance planes?

A. The information we received from the air came through channels from division. It was possible for the regiment to call for a mission, and I did on two occasions. I called both for photographs and bombardment. Usually the call would go in one day, was executed the next and pictures received the following day.

Q. Some officers from the South Pacific found that sound of planes is good recognition. Did you find that out?

A. Yes. It is remarkable that after you have been there over a period of time, 90% of the time you pick out a Jap plane by the sound of the motor, due chiefly to the fact that the twin motor comes in high. I don't believe a single time did we miss recognition of the type of plane when we could hear it, but a good many times we got excited over our own twin motors.

Q. Were there instances when you fired on our own planes?

A. I have heard of them. I saw but one instance and that was an accident. The artillery was doing some high overhead firing and a couple of our pursuits flew across the area. One of our artillery shells hit a plane and destroyed it.

Q. What specific training did you have in airplane recognition?

A. We had silhouette charts such as were put out by the War Department on airplane recognition.

Q. Did they do any good?

A. They must have done some good but I don't believe that to be the answer to airplane recognition. Our men didn't begin to really recognize them until they saw them in the air. By the end of the campaign, our observers could identify every type and make of our own planes. They memorized the Army, Navy, etc., by sound and many times could name them before they could see any distinguishing marks. Once in the combat zone, it didn't take long to get an effective working knowledge of plane identification.

Q. You mentioned observers, did you have particular men specified as observers?
General Committee (Cont'd):

A. Our OP personnel and CP sentries were particularly trained in air and ground observation. Those men could not be rotated without my personal authority, which was rarely given.

Q. Did you see any use of smoke other than signals?

A. We used smoke with artillery and mortars for registration and to designate targets to dive bombers. On the day of the relief of the 169th by the 145th we used smoke as a screen.

Q. How was it delivered?

A. By 105s and 81-mm mortars. It worked very well. I didn't have a single casualty out of that daylight relief, and we were within 200 yards of the Japs.

Q. When the smoke would hit it would pillar?

A. That's right.

Q. Did you see any flame throwers used?

A. We used flame throwers but there's a lot to consider in that connection. It was hard to get a soldier to carry a flame thrower. Usually he signed his own death warrant when he took it toward an enemy position. A good use for it was to shoot a column of smoke up for location of units in the jungle. However, we didn't take a few up and send them against pillboxes. The last few yards you have to make is usually where the flame thrower crew gets killed. They're so obvious and clumsy, they're an easy target. One objection we had was that in about ten seconds it was emptied and keeping fuel tanks in reserve was a problem. Another objection was many failures to ignite.

Q. Was there any arrangement whereby artillery handled so many smoke missions and mortars certain other missions?

A. No, except for the day of the relief of the 169th Infantry. I don't recall any mission other than fire adjustment where smoke was handled by mortars. We might have used them more had the ammunition supply problem been less acute.

Q. As I understand, the other day you said the artillery was emplaced on surrounding islands.

A. That's right.

Q. Were they able to support the infantry from this position?

A. They were. The last mile shells began to wobble a bit, since we were over the maximum effective range.
General Committee (Cont'd):

Q. You still had 155-mm rifles that could help you?
A. The 155-mm rifles were not used in close support. They were used on distant bombardment missions; frequently on Villa, Arundel and Bangi.

Q. On that position did supply have any difficulty?
A. None.

Q. If that far away from you, did your particular artillery battalion commander attempt to maintain personal command? Did he try to stay with you?
A. He was within five yards of me at all times and he maintained command.

Q. He did personally stay with you and plan out your artillery support?
A. That's right. Toward the latter phase of the operation the artillery commander was called back to higher headquarters preparatory to shift of supporting teams and while he was gone my artillery support left a lot to be desired.

Q. He didn't leave a staff officer with you?
A. He did, but the staff officer was a captain part of the time, and a lieutenant another part of the time and the executive officer was a major. While there was no friction and no unwillingness on the part of the major, there still wasn't the product.

Q. It was going back as a request for artillery fire?
A. That's right, and the veto came from the executive officer and was definite.

Q. Can you give me any instance when he might give a reason for vetoing your request?
A. Usually troop safety.

Q. In other words, he didn't have front lines located accurately enough, is that right?
A. He felt that it was dangerous to shoot, or contrary to some instruction as he saw it, whereas if the battalion commander had been there he could have ordered fire.

Q. When that negative report came back to the staff officer, did he go to higher headquarters to see if permission could be given?
A. That I don't know. I know, from my angle, that artillery for two or more days was not working satisfactorily.
General Committee (Cont'd):

Q. Did he have a liaison officer in the section with each of your battalions?
A. That's right.

Q. Can you give me some idea of the forward liaison system used?
A. We had a forward observer with each front line company, usually two companies. Their lines came in direct to the switchboard of the artillery battalion commander. A liaison officer, with detail, was with the infantry battalion commanders. The artillery switchboard had lines direct to his battalion and also to the division artillery commander.

Q. Laid underwater with cable?
A. The wire was ordinary 110 wire laid along the bottom of the bay.

Q. Were they able to maintain wire communications?
A. Yes. There were very few instances when we had loss of contact in any direction longer than a couple of hours. Then the artillery used the infantry net.

Q. Did artillery in this situation have 600 series radios?
A. I am of the opinion that artillery had 284s and that was all.

Q. Did the battalion commander have one at your post?
A. Yes.

Q. The 284?
A. Yes.

Q. The forward observers didn't have radio communications?
A. No, not unless specifically provided in specific instances.

Q. Your liaison officers with battalion commanders, did their lines go back to the artillery switchboard?
A. That's right.

Q. Were those calls received by somebody so he knew what calls were going through from the various liaison officers?
A. Habitually. The battalion commander or his S-3 had a telephone at his ear twenty-four hours of the day, listening in on all calls concerning artillery.
General Committee (Cont'd):

Q. You say the S-3 was he with the battalion commander a great part of the time?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they have a fire direction center set up?

A. The fire direction center was back with this battalion.

Q. In placing artillery fires, how close did you place to infantry?

A. Entirely according to the terrain. I'd say an average of 200 to 300 yards out. However, I have seen 100.

Q. Did the troops have much fear of overhead fire at first?

A. Not appreciably.

Q. Had they had any opportunity of training in the states?

A. Yes. My regiment was trained in overhead fire and in air bombardment prior to leaving Fiji. They were placed in foxholes and the artillery fire placed in front of them. This is also true for bombardment by airplanes. They were pretty well prepared. The only trouble we had relative to the front-line troops was getting them to recognize the 90-mm mortar. The Japs have a trick of firing their mortars on a located troop position in our line and regardless of who fired the concentration, either your regiment or the neighboring regiment, they would put down this counter barrage immediately. Our troops would start yelling that our artillery was falling short. This applied to my regiment as well as others, and the call would go back to division artillery and they would stop all supporting artillery until a check could be made. That accomplished the result the Jap was after very effectively.

Q. Is there no way you could get around that?

A. It is a question of education. It was never fully stopped, and although it improved, it happened periodically throughout the campaign.

Q. By the Japs' firing it back, did it ever aid you to locate their gun positions?

A. It never did.

Q. Did they have any sound or flash ranging?

A. They may have had it but I never saw it. It would have been a great help to us if we had some means of locating the 90-mm mortars and dual purpose guns which were firing on us.
General Committee (Cont'd):

Q. I imagine it would be difficult to pick up from airplanes?
A. The dual purpose was easy, the mortars were difficult.

Q. Did you use much air burst?
A. We used fuse delay and fuse quick - 50-50; three volleys of each. The delay dug the Japs out and the quick caught them.

Q. Was the jungle such that you were getting air bursts from tree bursts?
A. Yes.

Q. If you used fuse quick?
A. That was answered by using delay first, until we "cut the grass" and dug a few out of their holes. When this concentration came down the Jap usually came out of his hole and started running around, and was a good target for fuse quick.

Q. Did you get pretty good fragmentation?
A. It was very effective. I am convinced that by far the greater number of casualties among the Japs came from artillery fire than from any other source.

Q. Was there any time when you wanted additional artillery?
A. Several times. Several times we had it and several times we didn't. It depended on the situation. It works just as we have been taught - without any trouble.

Q. Each time you did get it, did you get 155 Hows?
A. Several times.

Q. Did you notice any outstanding effect?
A. The outstanding feature was the greater affected area. We could locate by means of a photograph suspected bivouac or a dual purpose gun and we scored several successes with mediums.

Q. Did they have any gridded maps or photo maps?
A. Yes but it couldn't be used as a fire control map. As far as artillery commander was concerned he might just as well have a blank sheet of paper except for the value of the grids as reference points.

Q. Did this commander keep a survey officer up with him so they would have definitely located points? If the fire had to be adjusted, how would you fire on targets that couldn't be observed.
General Committee (Cont'd):

A. I would say that was more or less by sound and smoke adjustment. Also on azimuths and estimated ranges. Undoubtedly in distant artillery missions we wasted some ammunition, but we more or less figured that no round fired into enemy territory could be definitely classed as wasted.

Q. You wouldn't know artillery destroyed the position until after they cleared?

A. Not definitely. We could assume damage however, when the target continued to explode after the concentration.

Q. The artillery in this action, of course, had none of the organic liaison aircraft?

A. No.

Q. Did they ever get at any time, air observation?

A. So far as I recall, we never requested air observation for artillery. I doubt very much if we would have had any luck with it. Up until the latter phase, the Jap anti-aircraft was pretty effective. I know of one and probably there were more than one of our photographic planes shot down.

Q. I read a report on that operation which stated that at one time the service section was asked to help out the front lines. Did that happen with you?

A. No.

Q. You mentioned in your talk about your SOP in jungle formation - you might have had it on your chart but I don't recall it. Did you have your artillery figured in there?

A. No. The artillery positions were usually back in the protected area of the beachhead.

Q. Did the artillery commander plan with you the supporting fires for the bivouac formation?

A. That's right.

Q. As soon as he went in he knew what your formation would be?

A. That's right. Our barrage SOP called for one battery to the front and one on each flank. If our own troops were on either flank, that gave us another battery to put in on the front or other flank. The artillery CO starting about four in the afternoon would begin adjustments. As soon as complete, he would show them to me for an O.K., then he would order the night barrages.
Q. He knew what he needed to give you to fill out the gap?
A. That's right.

Q. In box barrage, do you have any idea of the amount of artillery ammunition necessary?
A. No, but it required quite a bit.

Q. Did it completely box you in?
A. We were not completely boxed in. The big gaps occurred normally to our right flank and left front. We tried to place artillery on what would be the Jap approach. Most times we got it right.

Q. In planning final protective fires, did you put your artillery in the gaps of the weapons?
A. Practically. There were two independent curtains of fire. Our automatic fire was close in around the perimeter. Probably no part of it was over 60 yards ahead of our troops. The artillery at night was never closer than 200 yards to our troops.

Q. Were the artillery observers pretty successful in adjusting by sound?
A. Very successful. However, if we wanted to box in a strong point, we would fire out at a safe limit and walk it in by sound. Then we did what we called "cut the grass." After the third volley or so, you could see fairly well and then our adjustment was by direct observation.

Q. What was the most effective Jap artillery piece used on you?
A. The 90-mm mortar.

Q. Did it bother you a lot?
A. Yes it bothered us an awful lot. If the Jap just used it in the same quantity we used ours it would have been serious.

Q. How about the dual purpose gun, was that effective against ground troops?
A. Yes. Very. And with the proper use it would have been more so. The Jap seemed to have certain areas he had targeted in and when he noticed any movement in that area, he would fire from three to six rounds and that would be all.

Q. Did you find the Japs were sufficiently stunned by artillery that they hadn't manned their weapons, etc.?
A. That's right. If we got proper artillery concentration and closed promptly we got on their strong point every time. However, many times
General Committee (Cont'd):

we were driven off by Japs supporting that strong point from a previously unlocated position.

Q. Would they drive you off by fire?
A. Yes.

Q. Later on did you work out protective fires by shifting artillery from the flanks?
A. Whenever we could we did, but usually those hills were too close to supported hill to permit us to fire without withdrawing troops first.

Q. Then would you send your reserve to knock out one of those hills?
A. That's right, usually supported by mortars and artillery.

Q. What was the effect of the 105 Howitzer on pillboxes?
A. Direct hit, no pillbox.

Q. Usually delay fuse, of course?
A. Yes.

Q. I imagine it required quite a bit of time and ammunition to get a direct hit?
A. We did not attempt to hit any one pillbox. The Jap pillboxes were close together and the forward observer handled it very much like area fire. It was very effective.

Q. Would he attempt to knock them out by having one gun or the entire battalion placed on a hill?
A. He usually arranged to have one gun from each battery adjust. He particularly did that when he was close to our troops. It was too dangerous to gamble, so each battery was adjusted in turn and fire for effect was from battalion.

Q. On area targets, you didn't try to take them out one by one? Could you give an estimate of how long it would take to get artillery concentration?
A. That depended on whether or not it had been previously fired. Usually we had registration points well enough in advance of our troops that we could go close to it right away. To adjust on a completely new field often took as much as an hour.

Q. What would your troops do then? Were they pinned down?
A. That's right.
General Committee (Cont'd):

Q. Were there extreme changes of weather between day and night that might affect artillery fire?

A. It didn't come to my attention. In night barrages we usually allowed 50 yards for the creep of the gun as it cooled.

Q. Was division artillery CP on New Georgia?

A. It was on New Georgia.
RESTRICTED

TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW OF COLONEL TEMPLE G. HOLLAND
BY MEMBERS OF WEAPONS SECTION

TRF-TIS GROUP:

Q. What use did you make of strictly reconnaissance patrols?

A. We kept out about eight patrols except during actual combat. These patrols were charged specifically with obtaining information, negative or positive, as to areas both on Guadalcanal and New Georgia. During combat our patrols were almost solely used to determine the strength and disposition of the Japanese forces. However, you can send a patrol to a known location, find it perfectly vacant, even find guns unmanned, at ten o'clock in the morning and then hit the position at three o'clock in the afternoon and find it full of men. That is due to the Jap practice of having a long arc of organized positions and moving rapidly from one to the other meeting what they think is your thrust.

Q. Would you say that the solution to this would be for you to send a patrol and then have that same patrol hold the position they have taken while they send a messenger back with the desired information.

A. Yes, that would be a way of solving that problem.

Q. How large were those patrols?

A. Mostly eight men usually with an officer in charge.

Q. Did you ever send them out on extended marches so that they stayed out over night?

A. Most patrols stayed out for a week except when we wanted information immediately during combat.

Q. What did they do at night? How did they function?

A. They took up a small perimeter defense and dug in. Those that did not take up a defense position and make arrangements for local security usually ran into trouble. They did no moving at night.

Q. How about the supply of air photographs?

A. We had airplane photos. We used more often the half tone reproductions of airplane photos upon which they had placed a grid scale.

Q. How small were the units you could get those down to?

A. We had ample for the battalion. There were enough available for the Company Commander. They were needed, but not universally. The squad and platoons didn't get much.
Q. How about Maps?
A. No maps.

Q. What formations did your patrols use?
A. In column. Scouts preceded the squad leader by usually 75 yards or less. Flankers stayed out 50 to 75 yards or less.

Q. How large were your combat patrols?
A. The largest one was the size of a rifle platoon. Usually they were approximately the rifle squad.

Q. What type missions did you give your patrols?
A. The usual mission was clearing the line of communications, or opening a new one. You might say that fifty percent of our combat patrols were accompanying wire parties, laying a new line of communication. The other fifty percent were re-opening lines of communications and supply which had been closed by enemy activity. The interior patrols, which I told you about, worked during the hours of daylight when we were stationary. At night they did not move.

Q. Did you find any use for scouts as platoon scouts?
A. We did not use the scouts in a single line preceding an advancing platoon. We would advance in either column or in what we called the SOP approach march and found it was impossible to handle a line of scouts but easy to handle them if they were assembled as a patrol. We took only the scouts from the leading platoon.

Q. Did you find that you lost too many well-trained scouts that way?
A. You lose scouts, yes, but it is not necessary to use the same men as scouts habitually.

Q. Did you have any men specifically trained as snipers?
A. Not in the sense that the Japs are reputed to have snipers. The nearest approach we had was the interior patrol. They were not specially selected men. All riflemen took a turn at it, and they usually got what they went after.

Q. Do you think that telescopic sights on the rifles would have helped?
A. Yes they would if they could be kept serviceable over there. I think field glasses will serve the purpose.

Q. Is a Jap sniper a highly trained sniper or is he just a run-of-the-mill soldier?
TRF-TIS GROUP (Cont'd):

A. I have read all kinds of stories on Japanese snipers, but I was unable to distinguish a sniper from what we ordinarily term a rifleman. The Jap in the tree was the exception rather than the rule. They had a practice of trying to slip men into our areas when we stopped for the night. Sometimes you would find them in a tree, or perhaps just in the brush. They would lie there very quietly until a good target was in view. I have known a Jap to lie quietly up until noon. The men would get careless by that time and some of them might group up and all of a sudden the "snipers" would cut down on them. The Jap will die but he usually takes several along with him, especially if he is armed with a light machine gun.

Q. In the rifle squad, is the squad leader able to control his men in that terrain?

A. Yes, he has to. If he loses control for a second, he loses his squad.

Q. How does he maintain his control?

A. By narrow frontages and successive limited objectives. This must be hammered on in our training. He must go from one close objective to another. It is the only thing to do.

Q. Did you find any need for distributed fire? Did you fire to keep the enemy pinned down or did you fire at definite targets?

A. Yes, however, we used a rifle very very little for this purpose. Rifle firing was done usually only at very close range. We used machine guns, mortars and artillery, quite often, particularly when we were to make a move. So on occasion to make a daylight distribution of ammunition or rations, we would use machine guns, mortars and artillery.

Q. When you got off in the attack, did you ever use your rifles or BAR as a base of fire?

A. Habitually we used the mortars and machine guns. The usual scheme for an attack, insofar as concerns the rifle battalion, is somewhat as follows: A base of fire was set up with the heavy mortars and the heavy machine guns as directed by the battalion commander. Then your rifle elements moved forward, complete with mortars and light machine guns. At the time they came under the first hostile fire or approached near enough to the objective that they should have been under hostile fire, mortars and light machine guns set up to form a company base of fire. (Always, of course, provided the terrain and visibility permitted.) The light machine gun more often than not, was unable to fire effectively at this time and one gun usually followed each of the maneuvering platoons. These machine gunners were particularly trained to be on the alert for targets of opportunity to lay fire down in front of the enveloping platoon and vice-versa. These light machine guns always took position before the assault was inaugurated. When the platoon developed for the final
TRF-TIS GROUP (Cont'd):

closing in on the position, the BAR worked exactly the same as the light machine gun. It followed the rifle squad until it was profitable to take position. The final assault on position was usually made by riflemen alone with the light machine guns and the BAR remaining in firing position until the beginning of organization on the objective, at which time they moved quickly to their new position and immediately took up a position in readiness for repelling counter-attack.

Q. What was your average range for grazing fire?

A. We felt that 50 yards or better was pretty good. Our direction of fire was always across the front of the neighboring unit. We didn't care what the range was to the front as long as we could fire across the front of the neighboring unit. If we couldn't see, we did a little clearing. Most of the time due to the effect of the artillery and mortar fire the visibility was fairly good in and around the position.

Q. How many rounds of ammunition did your riflemen carry?

A. 100 rounds.

Q. How about ammunition for the Browning?

A. They carried a full unit. We had no trouble keeping ammunition for the rifles and BAR as we had very little expenditure. An average of 30 to 40 rounds a day was a big expenditure.

Q. How many grenade launchers did you have?

A. We had one in a squad carried by the second in command, with an 03 rifle.

Q. What kind of targets did you use them against?

A. We used them against pill boxes. They were not effective unless we got a lucky hit.

Q. What are the comparative merits of the M1, the Browning and the carbine in the jungle?

A. Our experience with the carbine was very very limited. We had only one in the Regiment and I had it. I fired one hostile shot. It is a light, convenient weapon. The ammunition for it was a nuisance. I carried mine in a sock in my pocket. The M1 Rifle is definitely queen of the jungle. It is heavy enough to back up bayonet work. Except for use with grenades, I saw nothing desirable about the 03 at all.
TRF-TIS Group (Cont'd):

Q. How about the automatic rifle?

A. It is a wonderful weapon over there. You don't need long sustained fire. It is very maneuverable and very effective. It is very serviceable also and we had no complaints on it at all. If your unit knows how to use the Tommy gun, it is the handiest weapon in the world for assaulting a position or for defensive use on the interior of your position during a major Jap attack. I think our distribution was just about right. Each squad leader had one. Each platoon Sergeant had one, also the chiefs of various units such as the radio, wire, and so forth. I believe the clip had much in its favor over the drum for carrying ammunition.

Q. With regard to challenging, did you use the form set down by WD Circular?

A. We used a double challenge. The party challenged gave the first part of the countersign and the party challenging gave the second part. The party challenging was to wait ten seconds. If he didn't receive the second part he was to attack. However, we didn't move during the night in New Georgia so the second part didn't apply.

Q. Did you find it necessary to dig these challenging parties in so that when they spoke in the American tongue, the enemy didn't shoot at them?

A. All parties were dug in at night.

M1 Rifle Group

Q. Did you use any Hip Firing?

A. Practically all of the firing in the assault of a position was of a very hasty nature -- snap shooting. I do not recall seeing anyone use actual hip firing with other than the Tommy gun and the BAR.

Q. What were the most frequent stoppages encountered with the M1?

A. I don't know of any.

Q. Did you use more of the Thompson Sub Machine Gun or the M3?

A. Mostly the Thompson.

Q. Was the pistol used by any of your personnel?

A. Not insofar as I know, there were not many pistols present. A few of us carried them in addition to other weapons.

Q. Were there any unusual methods that had to be employed in cleaning or caring for the small arms, particularly the M-1?
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ML RIFLE GROUP (Cont'd):

A. The weapons were cleaned whenever the opportunity offered by field stripping and use of the thong. If we had any cleaning rods, I never saw them.

Q. Do you know whether or not the M1 had to be specially lubricated because of the salt spray or rain?

A. Yes, during the boat trips we issued special orders to put an extra coat of oil on them. However, during actual operations we kept them oiled about as we do here. The rifles did get rusty on the outside but the business parts were kept clean.

CT RIFLE AND WEAPONS PLATOON:

Q. Were these bunker positions or pill box positions initial defenses or did they have bunker positions on each of these successive positions?

A. They had them on each position. Each pill box was mutually supported and each pillbox was surrounded by from 4 to 6 riflemen each five or six yards away in a foxhole.

Q. What is the usual number of firing apertures in these pill boxes and what was the usual method of employment?

A. I have seen them with as many as three. I would say that most of them had only one. The Jap machine gunner in these positions has a bullet proof vest and he is stuck in that position to stay there until he is killed. We received something of the Jap procedure in these matters from some prisoners interrogated. For example, when Jap officers realized this position was fast going, they told the machine gunner to stay where he was and that they would go back to get some new troops. After the initial encounter we got very few Jap officers. That bullet proof vest was a canvas affair with six pockets in it. In each pocket fits a little sheet of steel, very similar in design and weight to our entrenching shovel.

Q. What weapons did you use for reducing those pill boxes?

A. 81mm mortars and the 105mm howitzers are the best. The flame thrower we used was a washout. In the first place, you can't keep the flame thrower's crew alive long enough. The rifle grenade was not particularly satisfactory. You have to have a lucky hit in order to get favorable results. There is not enough blast to it.

Q. What was the method used for locating those pill boxes?

A. Unfortunately, most of these pill boxes were located by stumbling upon them and having them open fire.

Q. Did the snipers in the perimeter defenses withdraw into the pill box when attacked? Or did they stand their position?
CT RIFLE AND WEAPONS PLATOON (Cont'd)

A. They generally stayed until blasted out.

Q. Did you use smoke to assist in the attack?

A. We used smoke for two purposes — adjusting and screening.

Q. Was the smoke projected by 81mm and 105mm?

A. Yes. We did not use smoke grenades.

Q. We have been given to believe that the Japs employed fixed fire with their automatic weapons almost exclusively.

A. They apparently used fixed fire. There are numerous instances of individuals being fired on by a Jap machine gunner and being able to roll two or three feet and be completely out of danger.

Q. What methods were used in reducing the pill box after the area was fired on by 81mm and 105mm?

A. Hand grenades, bayonets and flame throwers. This is an example which quite often occurred in the assault of a position. A soldier would go directly over a box without knowing it was there. After he went over, they would open up. It was then a very simple matter for that man to drop a hand grenade on it, use his bayonet or use his rifle. These pill boxes were manned by only one Jap in the first stages of the assault.

Initially, the Japs were continually on the offensive. They had two kinds of offensive action. One was harassing raids made by commando units composed of well trained men. They tried to create confusion and hysteria in our lines. They executed one night attack where they attacked in mass from several different directions. The attack began and ended in a mass charge toward our position. They had no finesse. The last offensive action was the attack somewhere around the 14th of July after which we buried 99 dead Japs. When you consider that the Japs had strict orders to carry away their dead and wounded, you can guess that they must have suffered quite heavily when they couldn’t carry them all away.

Q. Did they appear to use any SOP maneuvers or did they create maneuvers as they met the situation?

A. I think the only approach to SOP were those commando raids. After the third night, you could forecast just about what was going to happen next. The raid was usually preceded by a short burst of mortar fire and then you could hear them moving in, guided by the clicks of two sticks being struck together or of the clicking of two small nuts, very similar to our walnuts, which had been hollowed out. The clicking noise was made by striking them together. This was followed by hand grenades — then automatic fire and completed by individual cat calls, yelling, and calls for help, etc.
CT RIFLE AND WEAPONS PLATOON (Cont'd)

Q. Did they invariably use different methods of approach in order to gain deception as we are lead to believe?

A. In my area there was no choice. There was jungle in every direction.

Q. How did the Jap use the Machine Gun? It is reputed that they have a light machine gun in each rifle squad.

A. I think I have covered about all I know on the use of their machine gun. Each machine gun was mutually supporting and protected by four or five riflemen especially along trails and on the positions. Their little light Nambou machine gun was very mobile. Sometimes they would move in a single gun and set it up in your area during darkness. It would stay hidden the next day until such time as they could open up on a profitable target. Sometimes they would let the first of a party go by and wait for the main group. When they fought on hills, the defensive position on one hill was always covered by another group on another hill. It was a strict rule with them that they must organize positions so that other positions are covering it and able to fire on both the forward and reverse slopes.

Q. Is a normal Jap defensive position, with no shortage of personnel, organized with Platoons all around the position?

A. I can't answer in detail. Each position I saw was set up with complete all-around defense, usually around the military crest of a hill or ridge. But it was always completely all around. Most of those pill boxes were connected by trenches and often those trenches were covered.

Q. Are their positions echeloned in considerable depth or is the big picture one of linear defense?

A. In depth.

Q. Was the Jap defense on New Georgia one of mobile defense? Was the effectiveness a result of inflexible and strongly fortified positions or in their ability to execute rapid counter-thrusts?

A. It was mobile in that they had more prepared positions than troops to occupy them and they moved rapidly from one position to another.

Q. How did the Japs defend the reverse side of a hill?

A. In New Georgia the Japs organized a hill much the same as we do, using the military crest. The big difficulty in attacking these positions was that when we would get on top of one hill, the Japs would open up from another hill while we were still assaulting the first hill.
Q. In an attack on an island, how was the HW Company organized and how was it controlled?

A. I speak now only for the 145th Infantry. Our infantry unit combat teams landed together. The leading LCIs carried one rifle company and one machine gun platoon. When we executed an SOP landing operation, these HWs went right with the rifle unit in direct support. These machine gun platoons were attached to the rifle Co until the initial beachhead was completed at which time they reverted to the control of the battalion commander. The attachments were effective prior to the initial loading of the boat.

Q. Is the battalion commander given much choice in the selection of his weapons?

A. He follows strictly the T/O. However some modifications were made both by the Division and the Regiment.

Q. Do you think the inclusion of a light machine gun platoon in a rifle company would be warranted, or that the inclusion of a light machine gun section within a platoon would be warranted?

A. I do not. We have all the weapons we can supply ammunition for now. We, however, do need something for the jungle like the bazooka, capable of putting high explosive on a point target. I believe the present organization meets all requirements.

Q. Do you think the capabilities of the heavy machine gun make it a more valuable weapon than the light machine gun?

A. Yes, but I believe, for jungle operations, each combat unit should be furnished with a supplemental light machine gun for each heavy machine gun. In offensive operations, the light machine gun would be carried and the heavy machine gun left with the regimental transportation. Immediately when the offensive changes to defensive, the heavy machine guns could replace the lights.

Q. Did you have any experience with the pack 75mm howitzer?

A. We had no cannon company at any time. We did have experience in field exercises on Guadalcanal using pack artillery to haul supplies. It was unsatisfactory for the reason that a jeep can go in almost every place that a mule can. Also, there is no essential difference in preparing a mule trail or a jeep trail. Very often a jeep can operate where a mule cannot.

Q. Did you make any use of rockets?

A. I have never seen any of them. We did have the bazooka — but we had no ammunition for it.
Q. How was the antitank platoon constituted?
A. 37-mm.

Q. Have you had any experience with the 57-mm?
A. No.

Q. Are you in favor of a pack type light weight weapon like the 37-mm rather than the 37-mm?
A. For the New Georgia operation a portable 37-mm would have been preferable.

Q. Was the 50 cal. platoon included in HW?
A. No. The 50 calibre weapons remained with the regimental trains.

Q. Was the attachment of the HMG made in approach march or was that weapon retained in company control and attached to the rifle company for the defense of the rifle positions?
A. The HMG platoon, even in base camp, was closely associated with the rifle company to which it was normally attached. When the unit moved out, for any tactical reason whatsoever, the machine gun platoon moved with the rifle company. It was attached to the rifle company through the development for combat. Immediately upon completion of the development, it went in direct support of the rifle company but reverted to the control of the battalion commander through the HW company commander.

Q. How much battery fire was employed by the mortars?
A. We used the mortars in groups exclusively. However, it is not what I believe you mean by battery fire. We did adjust with one gun in a group by actual firing and making the corresponding corrections on the other guns. There was no effort made to either close or distribute the concentration. Covering the area target was done by shifting the entire group.

Q. Do you think the mortar platoon might be included in the battalion headquarters company to facilitate control by the battalion commander through the platoon leader of the unit?
A. I do not believe that is necessary. Our use of mortars might well have been accomplished in this manner but I am thinking of the administrative and the training angle, which I think is better met with the present set-up.
MORTAR-ANTITANK GROUP:

Q. How was your antitank company and antitank platoon used?
A. Mostly as carriers of supplies and ammunition.

Q. Did they drop their weapons?
A. The weapons were set up around the beachhead, and manned with a minimum crew. Purely defensive.

Q. How effective was the canister?
A. We had no opportunity to use a canister other than in instruction. Our conclusions as to the result of the canister were that it would be effective at ranges less than 40 yards. Extremely effective on a wide target.

Q. Can you tell me about sighting the gun?
A. I cannot. I do recall there was a correction to be made. On the sight something like 300 yards for a range of 40 yards.

Q. How about the new 37-mm that breaks down to 5 loads?
A. We did not have one. However, the 37-mm gun is a sweet little gun if for no other reason than its use in sniping at pill boxes. If you can get the gun forward it is certainly worthwhile.

Q. What was the average distance behind the front lines for firing mortars?
A. The average distance was probably 300 yards.

Q. What methods of adjustment did you use?
A. A Weapons Company commander aided and abetted by the battalion and regimental commanders usually did it by smoke, sound and observed adjustments. We found it a general rule that when the time came to use the 81-mm, we were using an area previously covered by the artillery which gave us some observation.

Q. How about the ammunition supplies? How did you get it up and what spoil did you have?
A. The ammunition supply for the 81-mm is a problem. However, under normal usage of the 81-mm, you can keep an ample amount up with you in offensive situations. You do have some trouble with your increments and you will drop one on your own troops occasionally. We had such an experience. For that reason, it should be a principle that whenever possible to avoid it, never fire over your own troops. I had a narrow escape myself along those lines. Fortunately it hit on its side. Whenever we could, we fired through gaps.
MORTAR-ANTITANK GROUP (Cont'd):

Q. Right now they are working on a new container which is water-proof, weighing approximately 50 pounds and holds 4 rounds of HE light. They tell us it is being used now. Do you think they will be carried up to the mortar position in the container or do you think they will take them out of the container at the dump?

A. We took the containers up to the position where they were to be used. We did not take them apart on the beach.

Q. On the firing you did with the 81-mm, do you think that some tactics could be adopted to fire by platoon?

A. We often fired them by platoon, that is, we assembled them all in one location and they were fired as a unit. At times we did fire a section alone but in strong preparation when we were trying to dig the Japs out of a hill, we grouped them.

Q. Were there ever any cases where you would employ indirect fire?

A. No, we used no indirect fire.

Q. Did you employ overhead fire at any time?

A. Yes.

Q. We have had considerable difficulty with the excessive amount of play in the light machine gun. It doesn't seem to get a very definite bite and after a little while, you get as much as 50 mils play. I was wondering if this would cause any inaccuracy.

A. It caused us no difficulty.

Q. Did you, at any time, use your guns in night firing?

A. Yes, but only in defensive work and the guns were coordinated for interlocking fire before dark.

Q. Did you make any use of tracer ammunition.

A. Yes. We had a standard loading of two tracers to five, both day and night.

Q. Did you have any occasion to engage aerial targets with small arms?

A. We did. Our SOP here called for the second section of each MG platoon to be set up primarily for anti-aircraft.

Q. Did you have any success?

A. We knocked down one zero, and broke up, for certain, one bombing and strafing raid.
MORTAR-ANTITANK GROUP (Cont’d)

Q. What was the primary use of your .50 cal.?

A. They were left at the beachhead for anti-aircraft. We had no regular mount so we improvised a Navy mount which was heavy and could not be moved easily.

Q. Did you have any success with them against aircraft?

A. We used them and somebody brought down the zero I mentioned. 30's and 50's were both fired at that time.

Q. Did you have any occasion to use a single shot with the machine gun?

A. So far as I know, they were all small burst. The gunners stayed pretty close to what they had been taught.

Q. If you had any incendiary bullets, would you have used them in place of the tracers?

A. No. Nothing on New Georgia would burn. Tracers answered the purpose very well.

Q. There is a new tree mount which is just out. Do you think it would be of use to the machine gun?

A. I don't know what it looks like. (Explanation) It clamps onto the tree and the machine gun is mounted on it. The weight is about 18 pounds. (Continued) Something should be done to reduce the weight of the heavy tripod, but I do not know if you will always have a tree at the place you want to put the gun. The gun itself is not the problem. It is the mount. I do not believe you need such a heavy MG base for the type of firing we did there.

Q. Do you think the A6 will be of quite some value in replacing the A4 in the light machine gun? The A6 is the light machine gun with the bipod and shoulder rest which can be carried by one man instead of two.

A. Off hand I would say, the tripod is the one I would prefer because you can set it up for night firing and leave it there. I can't see much advantage of the LMG with bipod over another automatic rifle.

CANNON GROUP:

Q. In your opinion, is there any place in jungle warfare for the 105-mm howitzer either towed or self-propelled?

A. Unquestionably there is a use for it, but I think it is going to be very different use from the contemplated one. Unless it can remain within the protected area of the advancing elements, it will have to be left back in a rear protected area. However, it will have a very important field of activity there, in that it can be used as a part of the beach-
CANNON GROUP (Cont'd):

head defenses and in most of the situations, as I saw them over there, from that position they can give some direct support to the riflemen. It should be full track, self-propelled. It definitely should not be a half track or towed weapon.

BAR, BAYONET AND GRENADE GROUP:

Q. Some reports have come to us that the BAR bipod has not been used. Can you tell us anything about that? What was your experience with them?

A. We used them. That is a question of discipline. Some soldiers will throw it away if you let them, because of the weight.

Q. The Jap bayonet manual teaches defenses against our parries and thrusts and butt strokes. I am wondering if you taught your men defenses against those strokes?

A. Yes. Before we went to Guadalcanal we borrowed all the veterans we could who had experience in Jap bayonet fighting and they showed us what was reported to be the Jap method of attack, which is more of a slice, usually coming from the bottom rather than as we do it. We did considerable training in combat fencing.

Q. Other than teaching our men disarming tactics for morale, do you believe these teachings have any practical use in combat?

A. They certainly do have an opportunity for practical use. There is especially a use and a need for that kind of knowledge when these Japs make a night raid on your position.

Q. Would you make any suggestions as far as changing our type of bayonet training or, perhaps, adding to it?

A. I am not familiar enough with the latest methods to say. If it covers the basic moves of bayonet fencing and eliminates the old mad dash down the qualification course and substitutes, therefore, a lot of fencing and combat bayonet work, I think it is all right. We stressed very much the "ganging up" on an opponent.

Q. Did you work out any special type of grenade throwing?

A. No. Our chief trouble with grenade was the enormous undergrowth, and they often required throwing up hill from the prone position but we developed no new or specific technique in this respect.

Q. Were any offensive grenades available?

A. I don't recall having seen any.
BAR, BAYONET AND GRENADE GROUP:

Q. What about the effectiveness of the fragmentation grenade?

A. It is effective if you can get it there. By that I mean that frequently the men had to climb up steep inclines with the result that when they reached the top they were too exhausted to throw accurately. Often they would have to rest under cover until they were able to throw the grenade far enough that if they missed, it would be sure to explode before it rolled back. At night, before we pulled in, from our daytime perimeter, we would leave out two or three booby traps made out of grenades. This would act as a warning and sometimes we got a few enemy casualties.

Q. A number of months ago one battalion commander told me he taught his men not to pull the pin on the grenade and allow the safety lever to fly off prior to throwing the grenade. Because of erratic fuzes he lost a great many of his men. Do you believe our fuzes have improved so that this can be avoided?

A. I don't know. We didn't have that trouble.
Training Management Committee:

Q. As a result of your combat experience, if you had to train over, what subject would you give more emphasis to? For example, would you put more time on booby traps or more on SOP?

A. I would like to have had more firing experience with the 60-mm mortar, the light machine gun and the BAR.

Q. Did you have an opportunity to rotate all your riflemen through the firing of all infantry weapons?

A. Yes. I believe that if I give you a rough outline of my training, you will have a better idea about it.

Initially, we specialized mainly on disciplinary subjects working gradually into standard procedure for practically everything that could be standardized at all. That included road marches, jungle marches and development for combat, reorganization and certainly everything that smacked of combat administration. We developed as much SOP in communications, liaison and combat intelligence as it was humanly possible to do. We became unorthodox in the use of two or three of our sections such as the security platoon, the I&R platoon, liaison, etc. I am not certain how close to the manuals we stayed in regard to communications, but we had an SOP distribution of our telephones, both sound power and EE8 and of our radios. In training for our SOP we increased our tempo gradually. The same is true of our jungle field exercises. About two months before we left for the Solomons, the regiment was divided into three training groups. Training was strictly under regimental control and organized about as follows: One battalion was designated as a school battalion. This battalion went through a miniature Fort Benning in that a percentage of the officers and enlisted men attended a weapons school, which included all infantry weapons of our own as well as the Japanese.

Q. These men came from all battalions?

A. They came from the school battalion. Other schools were: anti-mechanized defense, chemical warfare, communications, scouting and patrolling, combat intelligence, etc. The senior instructor at each of the schools was the regimental staff officer whose combat duty covered that activity. He was assisted by especially selected officers and noncommissioned specialists from the regiment at large and officers borrowed from other units and division headquarters. All schools lived on location.

Another battalion went on jungle combat training. This battalion would be moved into the jungle and lived therein continually during
Training Management Committee (Cont'd):

the period of the school. This course of instruction included a
46-mile round trip, cross-country march, carrying all weapons, one
unit of fire, and rations for the journey.

Q. Was that all by carry?

A. Yes, and working with this unit we used Fiji commandos
as instructors and to represent the enemy. The remaining battalion
went on regimentally controlled maneuvers. These maneuvers included
overhead firing by artillery, close support by infantry weapons, and
close support by air bombardment. We developed and perfected a means
of air-ground target designation for use in the jungle.

These battalions were rotated every two weeks. The schools remained
on location. The troops moved from one school to another in turn.

Q. Could you give the average size of these schools?

A. The different classes in the school battalion included all personnel
plus replacements whose activities were related to the subject
taught in the school. Some classes ran over 100 and some as few as
24. The weapons was the largest school and was split up into the
different weapons groups. Each student was given instruction in all
weapons and instruments. This also included nomenclature, functioning
and firing of all Japanese weapons that we could get our hands on. The
special units had their own schools for all key men and specialists.
This was not a part of the battalion set-up. When a battalion went on
the combat exercises, its complement of the regimental service units
went with them. That was SOP.

Q. How long a period did you have to put on these schools?

A. I had two months.

Q. Was that in Guadalcanal?

A. No, that was in Fiji.

Q. On the Suva side of the Fiji Islands it is hilly, but are there
jungles there also?

A. Yes, there are jungles—worse jungles than on Guadalcanal or
New Georgia.

Q. How many bands did you have in your division?

A. Each regiment had its own band.

Q. Did you give them any training in individual cooking?

A. I did not. I feel very strongly on that point. In the first place
I didn't permit individual cooking at the front, because it gets
Training Management Committee (Cont'd):

out of hand. They began to build fires, which gave our position away. I tried it at first and took it out. A column of smoke goes up and the Jap mortars come in. I do not believe hot food is essential in the tropics. Troops do not use as much food energy in maintaining body heat as they do in colder operations. Hot coffee, if conveniently handled, is O.K. Hot food cooked in the rear areas under the worst of sanitary conditions is not only a problem in distribution but is a health hazard. We were not bothered with dysentery until they started sending hot food up to the front. It seems to me that the answer is for the development of a can similar to the 'C' ration can with a false bottom filled with heat retaining material and a chemical which would give off heat when exposed to air or water. This could be accomplished by means of a key opening similar to the method of opening the can itself, and thus the individual ration could be heated in its own container with neither smoke nor flame.

Q. Did they cook up C rations or B rations, and did you have any fresh beef?

A. We had no fresh beef. We had a mixture of both B & C for the hot food sent up from the rear.

Q. How many of your men do you estimate were concerned with carrying up supplies when you moved in?

A. When I first joined the 169th Infantry regiment, I don't know what they had on the front, but it seemed to me that they had probably one-half of the available combat troops carrying supplies. That was the first thing I stopped.

Q. Where did they get the troops?

A. I was told that they were drawn from reserve elements.

Q. It would get out of control then?

A. My impression was that it was completely out of control. In the 145th Infantry, combat troops were not permitted to the rear except on combat missions. Our carrying was done by service elements, bandsmen, drivers, antitankers, etc.

Q. Did you bring the supplies up to a certain place, and then would the battalions come back for them?

A. Our main supply point remained at the beachhead. We started the first thing in the morning shuttling supplies forward to the advance regimental supply point. The Assistant S-4 at the advance supply point informed the S-4 as to what was needed in the forward area. We would not let the S-4 leave the rear area, and the assistant was required to remain in the forward area. By night we usually had one and one-half units of fire and two days' rations.
Training Management Committee (Cont'd):

in the forward area. This was brought to the center of the regimental area and broken down for battalions. Each battalion used its pioneer and AT Platoons to carry supplies to the battalion area. On occasions we would help battalions by augmenting their parties with regimental details. I would say that the distribution to battalions was usually taken care of between 4 in the afternoon and dark.

Q. What hours were from daylight to dark?

A. From approximately 6 to 6.

Q. Did you have many administrative troubles, paper work, etc? In combat, was there any interference?

A. No, our administration worked very satisfactorily.

Q. Coming back to that point of training men in weapons other than those with which they are armed, I don't know if it is true in the jungles, but we teach that they should be trained in all infantry weapons. Is that true?

A. I don't think it is especially necessary to make super mortarmen or machine gunners out of riflemen, but they should have a practical working knowledge of all infantry weapons.

Q. Is there a greater percentage of casualties from the mortar group?

A. The greatest comes from the Flame throwers and BAR men.

Q. You had the Bazooka, is that right?

A. Yes, but did not take it into action because of no ammunition.

Q. You were not bothered with tanks much, were you?

A. We saw no Jap tanks at all.

Q. If there are no tanks, are the mortars more important than bazookas?

A. I don't agree with that, provided that the bazooka proves to be effective on Jap pillboxes.

Q. How about the AT grenade?

A. No, it does not have enough blast.

Q. I have seen a demonstration of it, and I think the control is good.

A. You can't see these pillboxes any too well and can't tell exactly where the bull's eye is. If you had something with sufficient blast and as maneuverable as the bazooka, you would have a better answer.
Training Management Committee (Cont'd):

Q. Reference drinking water, I guess there was plenty, wasn't there?

A. Plenty. Even when cut off, we could always get water. Each platoon sergeant had a canteen with strong chlorine solution in it which was passed from man to man, each using one canteen lid full for a canteen of water. We used the iodine method on occasion but did not favor it when the chlorine solution was available.

Q. What did you do about company property before you went into combat?

A. We had no company owned property. We left all the TBA equipment not needed initially in Guadalcanal with the Division and Regimental rear echelons. This was later brought on to New Georgia.

Q. Did you make any inventory before you went into combat?

A. Yes - and packing lists were kept with the field desks. There was no property accountability from the beginning of combat until the end of actual fighting, but this actually affected only individual and unit combat equipment.

Logistics Committee:

Q. Will you give us a brief statement of your combat experience?

A. The first operation that I was connected with was Rendova. We moved from Guadalcanal to Rendova and thence to New Georgia.

Q. We are at present in the process of preparing a problem of supplying jungle operations. Wonder if you could give us your idea of what we should cover.

A. We landed with five units of fire and ten days' rations which we stored in a regimental supply point within the protected area of the division. We tried to keep a unit and a half of ammunition and two days' rations in the regimental forward area. The initial transport of these supplies forward was by hand carrier using all drivers not operating a vehicle, all spare cooks, cooks helpers, the band, the AT company, except for the minimum crew which we maintained on the beach defense, and such other similar personnel from the service company and other units as were available. Once or twice in the New Georgia operation we were given a few native carriers for specific trips. They proved unreliable, particularly as they approached the regimental forward area, where at the first shot, they dropped their loads and scattered. As the operation progressed, and certainly during the last phase of it, the engineers were able to keep a jeep road within an average of a half mile of the regimental forward area. This, of course, shortened the haul by hand the corresponding distance. The regimental S-4 was required to stay at the rear supply point where he was in charge of the local protection of our regimental rear area and the protection of every
Logistics Committee (Cont'd):

item of supply that was not tied down. He had an assistant S-4, the grade of lst Lt., who remained in the regimental forward area and supervised the actual breakdown of supplies to the battalions. He was also charged with keeping the regimental S-4 continuously informed as to the needs of the different items of supply. He had with him an AT platoon plus service company detachments who were available for guarding, sorting and aiding in the distribution of the supplies within the forward area. The delivery of the supplies from the regimental forward supply point was by means of the battalion ammunition platoon supplemented by men from the battalion such as drivers not operating vehicles, etc. In cases where an unusual amount of supply was to go to a particular unit, the battalion detail was supplemented by regemental details from the regimental carrying parties. That was the exception rather than the rule. It was continuously attempted to refrain from using combat troops for carrying. Under our particular situation, that was possible. However, other regiments that I came in contact with were using their reserve rifle units for carrying purposes. This resulted in losses of personnel who became lost or otherwise did not show up again on the return trip. In my own regiment, at the back or rear part of the forward area, we established a straggler post composed of non-commissioned officers from the AT Company. They would keep anyone from going to the rear of that point unless authorized. I believe that regardless of the division straggler line, the regiment must in addition have its own straggler post forward of the division line. It is not necessary to have a regimental line, because a post will suffice in the jungle. The men will follow the ration or supply trail. If they attempt to go around, they will run into snipers.

Q. What communication did you have between S-4 and assistant S-4 other than runners?

A. Telephone.

Q. How many additional telephones did you have?

A. We had our TBA originally. I am not certain what we had at the end of the operation.

Q. Radios were not effective at all?

A. The larger sets were effective.

Q. Where was the service company commander?

A. The service company commander remained with the regimental S-4 in the rear area. His chief duties along the lines of supply were those of assisting S-4 in the actual procurement and transportation of supplies. In a landing operation, his presence there is very necessary.
Logistics Committee (Cont'd):

Q. Our teaching varies in that we teach that S-4 should be forward. I am wondering if you thought that will function in the jungles?

A. No, the S-4 has the contacts necessary to procure supplies, and it is a full time job just locating supplies and seeing that they are assembled and dispatched to the front. I believe this applies also in other than jungle operations.

Q. Who delivered the supplies to the rear?

A. They were drawn from the division quartermaster.

Q. They deliver them at the beachhead?

A. Yes, our division quartermaster supply point was near by.

Q. What type of rations were the 10 days' rations that you started out with?

A. C rations.

Q. Were they satisfactory?

A. Yes. The only objection to the C ration is that it is in a round can and contains a little bit too much. I believe 2/3 of that amount would be sufficient and that it preferably should be packed in a square can.

Q. Did you use any other type rations during this operation?

A. We received several types exclusive of A and B. We received K and J, but we received these during the time that we were cut off and our supplies came by parachute.

Q. Was the 10 in 1 or 5 in 1 satisfactory?

A. It is a good ration, but there is too much wasted when used in the front line.

Q. Did you operate your company kitchens as kitchens in using the regular field rations?

A. The regular gasoline field range was brought up fairly early in the operation and left with the regiment rear supply point. They would cook up hot coffee and stew and send up to us by carrier.

Q. Did they ever get up to the front?

A. No.

Q. What type rations did you use for the hot meals.
RESTRICTED

Logistics Committee (Cont'd):

A. Modified B plus C.

Q. Did your men develop any method of cooking their C rations which was successful?

A. Yes. They used C ration cans with sand and a little gasoline or stay-way. We heated some of our rations with not much trouble because we had the Jap on the run most of the time. But where the issue is still in doubt, and the Jap on the offensive, any light or smoke is dangerous.

Q. What did you use for your convoy?

A. We had about 8 jeeps.

Q. With trailers?

A. Some with trailers.

Q. Did you use any big trucks at all -- one ton or 1/2 ton?

A. None at all forward of the beachhead until after the fall of Munda.

Q. Any horses or animals?

A. In Guadalcanal we tried a field exercise using animals from a pack artillery unit. We found that when we had cleared a trail in the jungle sufficient for a mule with his pack, we could use a jeep. Also, a jeep could go some places a mule could not. The mule is not the answer.

Q. On water -- where did you get your water?

A. We got the majority of our water from the engineer water points. During the time when we were cut off, we got it where we could find it -- in shell holes or streams. We used the following purification methods in this priority. Each platoon had one canteen chlorine solution which was passed from man to man to use in his canteen. In cases where the canteen of chlorine solution was lost, we would use the iodine method. We had no sickness caused by water to my knowledge.

Q. You made absolutely no use of transport for troop movements at any time?

A. No, the jeeps with super-structures for evacuation of casualties was the nearest approach to it.

Q. How did you do that Colonel? Did you double deck or carry them side by side?
Logistics Committee (Cont'd):

A. We put them side by side.

Q. With reference to that movement to the rear what coordination was effected in moving this battalion through the adjoining zone for the attack?

A. The coordination was done by the regimental commander through whose zone the troops passed. They did not come back under my control until the attack had started.

Q. Will you state briefly the method of movement used? What was your SOP for jungle movement?

A. The regular advance guard with such flank protection as was practicable.

Q. Any prescribed distances?

A. We depended more on a prescribed number of connecting files who each were to maintain a maximum of 50 yards from its base file or unit as the case might be. Our SOP called for three sets of connecting parties between the point and the advance party. They could get a maximum of 50 yds, but they must stay in sight of the next in rear. It, of course varied with the visibility. There were five sets of connecting files between the tail of the advance party and the head of the support. They also could get a maximum of 50 yds between connecting files, but were required to remain in sight of the next in rear. The support set the pace.

Q. Did you use the same procedure between the support and the main body?

A. That is correct except that the distance was doubled, and distance was maintained from the unit in front.

Q. What type of formation did you use?

A. Columns of files on each side of the trail. This trail was sufficiently wide, being an established jeep trail.

Q. In your SOP occupation, what type of ground did you look for particularly?

A. The ideal terrain would put each battalion on commanding ground, preferably a ridge or hill. I am, of course, primarily thinking of defense.

Q. Did you make use of an SOP advance quartering party?

A. Yes, we had a quartering party, with ample understudies, especially trained in the selection of the SOP bivouac area. Whenever possible this party left the column at the last halt and went ahead by motor.
Logistics Committee (Cont'd):

Q. What was the SOP composition of the advance party?

A. All S-1s, one non-commissioned officer from each company, and a medical officer. If it were necessary, we took part of the I & R platoon for guides, but this was unusual.

Q. About how long did your quartering group normally devote to reconnaissance of areas?

A. Not more than 30 minutes. The selection of the regimental area was made promptly by the S-1. The battalion groups departed from the S-1's location of the initial point of its area. We were chiefly interested in routes from the initial points to the unit areas.

Q. You used this method in going into bivouacs when you were not actually in combat?

A. Better to say we used advance parties where there was no probability of combat. We had only one occasion during this operation to use advance quartering parties. That was when we were moving north to position after the fall of Munda.

Q. When did you make your halts? Did you stop long before dark?

A. In the jungle we tried to be working on our position by 4 o'clock.

Q. How long did it take you to establish your SOP and bivouac?

A. Two hours.

Q. Will you give us briefly the types of foxholes you used?

A. The daytime, outside perimeter was composed of one and two-man foxholes with standard machine gun emplacements. The inside perimeter or the one occupied at night was normally the four-man type.

Q. What did you find a suitable area for your combat team? Could you give approximately the area?

A. In the jungle about 300 yards to 400 yards diameter for the battalion.

Q. What provisions did you have to curtail noise?

A. The Japs took care of that for us. At dark all noise, smoking, etc. stopped. If you violated that, you were apt to be hit with a rock from the surrounding foxholes, even if the Jap failed to notice you.

Q. Did you habitually have your bivouac together or did you have battalions bivouac separately?

A. Many times one or more battalions would be separated from the regimental bivouac.
Logistics Committee (Cont'd):

Q. Did they bivouac with considerable distance between the battalions or did they close up in order to get the all-around protection?

A. We closed up whenever possible. During the time we were in column of battalions, the battalions were separated by an average of approximately 500 yds.

Q. In connection with bivouac and CP installations, did you follow a trail or not?

A. You never follow an established trail if it can be avoided. In moving into an area, we preferred to move into a virgin jungle. Thus, our trail will end at the end of the regimental area just about where the supplies are brought in. Our communication was usually by wire and radio. No runners were used during darkness except in extreme emergency, and then the runner had about 50/50 chance of coming through alive.

Q. What tentage was used in the bivouac area?

A. We started out equipped with mess kit lid, spoon, shelter half and raincoat. The men were permitted to use their shelter over the rear half of their foxhole. There were no blackout tents, etc. brought forward during actual combat.

Q. Did they normally use the shelter half for cover?

A. When time permitted.

Q. Does the jungle afford sufficient protection against rain?

A. No, you get wet very early and stay wet. A great part of the time you are sleeping in from 1 inch to 2 inches of water.

Q. Did you try to set up latrines in this bivouac area?

A. You have to. We required them in each platoon area.

Q. Will you give us the security setup of the SOP for your bivouac?

A. In the daytime, each outside squad has two men posted as listening posts. Each command post beginning with the platoon has a CP sentry; a platoon posted a single sentry; each company a double sentry; each battalion three sets of double sentries. A system of interior patrols operated as follows: Platoon, 3-man patrol leaves the platoon CP, visits the CP of the platoon, of its company, next on its right; visits its right front line squad; its left front line squad; the CP of the platoon of its company on its left; returns to its own CP. The company with a 4 to 6-man patrol visits the CP of the company, of its battalion, next on its right; the CP of its right front line platoon, the CP on its left front line platoon, the CP of the company of its battalion on its left, and returns to its company CP. In a battalion
Logistics Committee (Cont'd):

A 6 to 8-man patrol visits the battalion CP of the battalion of its regiment on its right; visits the CP of its right front line company; CP of its left front line company; the CP of the battalion of its regiment on its left; the regimental S-2 and returns to its battalion CP. The rule of thumb, as to how often to send out patrols, was each CP would send out its patrols as often as required to prevent the unnoticed entry into its area, of a unit the same size as the unit furnishing the patrol. These patrols and sentries, in addition to warning, were charged with elimination of any snipers who might have infiltrated in the area, and with the enforcement of bivouac discipline. In New Georgia, they began operations just at dawn and ceased operations just at dark. No movement other than the patrols was permitted in the bivouac area at daybreak until the report of all clear came through channels to the S-2 office.

Q. Your patrols did not move at all at night?

A. No, but I don't believe that should necessarily be the final answer. It so happened in New Georgia and Guadalcanal that it worked. The Jap came to us. He came every night and he lost about 20 to our 1, and we figured we were doing all right that way. If the Jap ever gets to using artillery as we use it, the system won't work; intervals will have to be increased and patrols may have to be used during darkness.

Q. The bivouac area did not draw enemy artillery fire?

A. We received mortar fire, but the Jap only fired about three volleys and then would wait awhile.

Q. You spoke of being continually wet, which meant that your clothing, particularly shoes, went to pieces very often. How would you effect resupply of clothing?

A. Normal channels - just as we did guns which became unserviceable. We would tell the assistant S-4 we needed so much clothes or shoes of certain sizes. He telephoned back to S-4 who got them somewhere. They usually came up in a day or so.

Q. Did you try to salvage the old clothing?

A. Yes, old clothing was sent back to the rear along with other salvage.

Map Reading Committee:

Q. Did you ever use half tones?

A. Yes, we had similar maps.

Q. What maps were available and what scale was used?

A. I don't recall the scale. We had half tone photo maps with arbitrary grid.
Map Reading Committee (Cont'd):

Q. What grid was used on the photo maps?
A. It was the standard numbered grid.

Q. You don't know the scale of the photo maps?
A. No, I don't. I believe it was approximately 2" to the mile.

Q. Can you think of any particular instance where sketches were used or might have been used to advantage?
A. We used sketches in the New Georgia campaign continuously. Panoramic sketching pays big dividends. I found that my mental picture of the terrain, which I could not see in New Georgia, as gained from the airplane photographs and the panoramic sketches sent back by my commanders, was amazingly accurate.

Q. Were the aerial photographs available in advance of operations?
A. Yes, and also during that time. The only photo we wanted and could not get was an oblique photograph taken from over our position.

Q. Were the photographs you used contact prints or half tones?
A. They were both. We had half tone with the grid and also ordinary photographs.

Q. Were the overlapping pairs available for stereoscopic study?
A. The higher headquarters had the stereoscopic photos.

Q. Your headquarters did not have the stereoscopic photos?
A. No.

Q. Were vectographs used in your campaign?
A. No, but the vectographs would have helped a lot in the jungle.

Q. Did officers as well as the men have sufficient knowledge of the subject of map reading?
A. No.

Q. What in particular were they lacking in?
A. The ability to read aerial photographs.

Q. What was the role of the photo interpreter?
A. We had no special interpreter. The photo interpreter was at division headquarters.
Map Reading Committee (Cont'd):

Q. You think we could use these photos advantageously in teaching map reading in the school?
A. Yes.

Q. Should officers in that theater be acquainted with the metric system?
A. Not necessary in New Georgia.

Q. Were interpreters at regimental headquarters?
A. Yes. We had two Neisi Jap interpreters initially, but these were specially detailed. Normally they were not permitted below division.

Q. You would encourage that all officers be strictly familiar with foreign languages and foreign maps?
A. I think it desirable but not essential. I believe that there should be a section in the division - charged especially with rapid translation of foreign maps, symbols, etc. into maps and symbols which we are accustomed to using. It is obviously impossible to teach all of a wartime army to read and understand foreign maps, etc., and unless all understand alike, there is likely to be confusion.

Q. Do you know of any occasion where an operation failed because an officer was unable to read maps?
A. Yes. There was one outstanding example.

Q. You believe that aerial photo reading and sketching should be taught to all officers?
A. Yes, especially panoramic sketching, but don't stop with the officers. The noncoms should know it also.

Q. Do you believe all of this can be taught in the classroom and partly on the ground?
A. I believe the majority has to be taught outside the classroom. I would like to say here, however, that I don't believe you are going to be able to teach them to locate themselves on air photos by terrain features in the jungle.

Q. Is the answer to that land navigation?
A. Yes, that is right. However, we did a lot of location by intersection and resection using flares, smoke, etc. I don't believe the odograph will work in jungle because of the lack of trails and wheels spinning in mud. Every officer should know what his stride is and should be checked on frequently to see that he is not forgetting it.
Q. What use did you make of ridgeline and streamlining on your photos?
A. We didn't use the ridge line so much as the contour to show ground forms, but we streamlined and contoured complete as our information grew.

Q. Was the principle of elevation by profile used on the contour maps?
A. No, we could not contour with that amount of accuracy.

Q. Would it be wise for every officer to know something about celestial navigation?
A. No. If an officer can read his compass and follow or determine a base line, it will be sufficient.

Q. Did you come across many officers who couldn't use the compass?
A. Yes, but not in my regiment. We had very intensive training in that subject before we went in - both officers and enlisted men.

Q. Did you ever make an initial beach landing?
A. Not personally. Some of the battalions did.

Q. Could you state whether or not the first troops ashore had good aerial photographs of the beaches?
A. Yes, we had both vertical and off-shore obliques.

Q. Did you have to interpret photos like this?
A. We did what we could. However, higher headquarters made official interpretations and sent them to us daily.

Q. The map reading committee is called upon to suggest military symbols. The manual does not include military symbols covering all outfits. What military symbols did you use in your outfit? Did you use a language of your own?
A. No. We used the standard symbols.
Q. Where did you embark from when starting for New Georgia?

A. From Guadalcanal, landed on Rendova and from there to New Georgia.

Q. Did you have any action on Rendova?

A. Very little we ran into a few Jap riflemen and were attacked by air.

Q. Could you give us a picture of the initial landing?

A. I was not present at the initial landing. The 43d Division landed two regiments with antiaircraft and Navy base personnel.

Q. How was the unit loaded with respect to the number of transports used?

A. We moved from Guadalcanal in echelon, one battalion and regimental headquarters on destroyer transports. By that I mean the old destroyers which had been converted to carry troops. The remaining two battalions moved to Rendova on LCI's and LST's. Our standard loading where cargo space permitted, was one rifle company and one machine gun platoon with their rations, ammunition and other supplies per boat. This particular landing was effected by unloading from the transports at sea and going ashore in small Higgins boats. The transports remained a mile or more off shore.

Q. Where did the unit land with respect to Munda Airport?

A. Munda is on the southwest corner of New Georgia. The initial landing was on Rendova Island, from which we moved by small landing craft to Zanana Beach on the east coast of the greater New Georgia island.

Q. Approximately what was the distance from the point of landing to the strip?

A. Approximately 12 miles.

Q. What was the composition of the initial force going ashore?

A. Two infantry regimental combat teams.

Q. What was the setup for communication between elements ashore and transport?

A. Radio.

Q. What type radio?

A. I don't know.
Q. Did they use any flag signals?

A. No, the Navy used their blinker system between the mother ship and the landing boats.

Q. That was all that was used?

A. Yes, so far as I know.

Q. Approximately what was the distance from Rendova to the beach on New Georgia?

A. It is about 10 miles.

Q. About what was the lapse of time from first unit's landing on New Georgia until the entire regiment was on shore?

A. Between three and four days for both regiments and the advance division CP. It was completed on the fourth day.

Q. During that time, those three or four days, when did the headquarters of your regiment move from Rendova Island to New Georgia?

A. On about July 20th. My regiment belonged to the 37th Division. The initial landing was made by the 43rd Division. I was temporarily placed in command of one of the 43d regiments shortly after their landing on New Georgia.

Q. What was the setup with respect to communications as soon as you got ashore?

A. The 145th Infantry, in all amphibious operations, used an SOP, which placed battalions on what we termed an initial beachhead consisting of an arc of 180 degrees extending from shore to shore and approximately from 300 to 500 yards in radius per battalion. Our interior communications were laid as the troops advanced ashore. The initial communication during the charge ashore was by radio, distributed as follows: 536's - one with each battalion commander, one with each company commander, (each battalion on a separate channel); 511's - one with a regiment commander and one with each battalion commander. From the regimental commander to the division commander was a 609 radio. This radio communication was used, if necessary, during the initial minutes of the landing. Usually at the end of 10 to 20 minutes our wire communications were complete to include trunks from the regiment. We used EE8 telephones, through switchboards, in all CP's. Sound power to company CP's, and to each heavy weapons platoon CP. Sound power from regimental S-2 to each three regimental CP's. I think that covers it.

Q. Do you know the approximate manning of those 3 OP's?

A. The 3 OP's were manned by one noncommissioned officer and seven privates furnished and especially trained from each battalion.
The initial telephone line for this OP was laid by the regiment communications platoon.

Q. What type of wire was used from regiment to battalion?
A. Initially, it was always a 130 wire.

Q. What communication did you have with the next higher headquarters?
A. Initially, it was radio followed by the signal company's laying of two 110 wire trunks to the regiment.

Q. What communication, in addition to telephone, did the S-2 have with his OP's in the battalion area? In other words, did he have a radio, and if so, why?
A. He had the 195 radio which was, except for very short ranges, very unsatisfactory. We tried the 511 which also proved unsatisfactory.

Q. Why were they unsatisfactory?
A. As I understand it, a shortwave on these instruments would not follow the folds of the ground or the contours of the vegetation close enough to be practicable for use in this terrain.

Q. Did you have as much trouble with the 511's as the 195's?
A. Initially, we thought the 511 very good, but soon after the operation began we couldn't use them at all.

Q. Do you know the reason?
A. No, I don't. I am of the opinion that the same reason applies to that as to the 536. Initially, for short ranges they would answer our purposes wonderfully, but they soon became unserviceable due to excessive moisture and rough handling. The signal officer blamed it on our neglect of the radio. We gave our radio all the care you can expect soldiers to give them under those conditions. The small portable radios were never satisfactory except for distances of a few 100 yds.

Q. Did you know the condition of the battery used in those sets?
A. It was not the fault of the battery because we made quite an extensive investigation into interchangeable parts to try to keep them serviceable.

Q. Did any sets become wet going ashore and consequently become unusable?
A. No, not particularly for that reason. However, everything remained more or less wet in that climate.

Q. Could you tell us where the 195 was used with respect to your regiment?
A. They were used in New Georgia and Guadalcanal by the S-2 in his patrols and OP's.
C. What use was made of runners during this period of time?

A. Very little use of runners was made except in case of radio or wire failure or messages which required transporting. These uses were handled just as contemplated in our training.

Q. Did you have any vehicles ashore in the landing?

A. No. However, we later brought ashore about a dozen ½-ton C. & R. cars and the ½-ton C. & R. containing the 245 radio.

Q. Did you use light signals during that time?

A. No, these communications I have described to you answered our requirements fully; although, I don't believe that the distribution I mentioned is according to the TBA.

Q. How did the 130 wire stand up in wet weather?

A. We could count on it for 24 hours. If we stayed longer than a day or two, we had to lay either a new 130 frequently or replace 130 with 110.

Q. Was all of it laid on the ground?

A. Overhead when possible.

Q. Did you have regular patrols on any of these lines?

A. Not regular, but almost constantly patrols were out with wire parties on maintenance missions.

Q. Did you on occasion have to furnish patrols going with wiring parties?

A. Always.

Q. This setup going in -- were they more or less scattered all around?

A. They were scattered according to a very definite pattern.

Q. Were your wire parties trail bound?

A. They followed the unit.

Q. Your rifle company commander had no direct communication except by wire?

A. They had the 536 radio.

Q. How far did the 511 cut down to?

A. We could not use it over 1000 yds.

Q. What difficulty was experienced in supplying batteries for those sets?
A. None. We got everything we needed. Each operator had his own kit of batteries.

Q. Did you have the new type switchboards or the old boards?
A. We had the same one we used over here. We had two switchboards to a regiment and a single one to a battalion. I don't recall the nomenclature, but each had twelve drops.

Q. What method did you use in supplying wire?
A. We figured we needed 8 units for each unit of advance.

Q. What size elements, regiment or battalion?
A. This was the regimental average upon which the communications officer based his supply.

Q. Were telegraph instruments used?
A. Yes.

Q. Did you have any contact or knowledge of the training they had? You had no code sets beyond the regiment? Did they use code at all or was it all voice?
A. They used code on practically everything that went through message center.

Q. From the regiment to the lower units most messages were sent by telephone?
A. That is right. Most of the routine was given to the message center and delivered either by runner or handled by telephone, radio, and at times by messenger.

Q. Did you use any authenticator code?
A. Yes, we had a special code issued by Operation Headquarters.

Q. Did that change frequently?
A. It changed each day.

Q. Did you at any time encounter Jap interference?
A. We had no trouble on the radio, but you can be pretty certain he was tapped in on the telephone.

Q. Did you use any authenticator on the telephone?
A. We used the same thing as on the radio.

Q. Did you have any of the hand generators?
A. Yes.

Q. Did you find it disclosed your position?
A. Yes, but there was nothing we could do about it.

Q. Was any effort made to waterproof your radio equipment prior to making your move to the beach?
A. We made such improvised canvas covers as we could.

Q. What provision did you have for replacing communication personnel?
A. We trained as many spares as possible from all companies before the operation. I ran a continuous radio school for operators - a class, usually of about 50.

Q. Did all your officers feel they were qualified to speak over the radio and did they with confidence?
A. Yes, all officers had special training in this.

Q. Did you notice any tendency towards the officers' wanting to carry the messages that they had written? Was the message center used as designed?
A. The message center was used.

Q. Do you feel that in combat the message center is workable?
A. Yes, I know it is.

Q. Did the officers know how to write messages?
A. Yes, although they did not always have these nice printed forms to write on.

Q. Was there at any time need for moving the location of your CP?
A. Yes, we had standing operating procedure for that. When the time came to move an advance detail from each section and Headquarters Company moved forward and started the installations. They had the advance switchboard, four telephones and enough intrenching tools to commence operations. As soon as possible the remaining echelon was moved forward.

Q. Now, someone coming from the rear -- how could they locate it?
A. There were times when we needed a guide to be left behind. But most times it was easy to follow the wire lines.

Q. What method did you use in shifts of personnel to man your communications?
A. We put in enough extra men over and above the T/O to do it. This had to do chiefly with communications within the smaller units.
Q. About how many additional men did you have to have for the communications platoon?
A. We did not have any.

Q. In the battalion, did you have complaints of not having enough personnel?
A. No, not particularly.

Q. What use did you make of the signal projector?
A. We used it frequently. It was necessary to have signals for location of units, for tactical signals, as well as signals for dropping supplies by air on occasion.

Q. Do you recall what signal weapons you had besides the Very pistol?
A. The ground signal projector was all.

Q. Did you have any colored smoke of any kind?
A. We had the smoke candle. For example we used a pink smoke to mark the parachute drops.

Q. What was your signal for calling for artillery fire in color?
A. I don't recall. We followed the SOI.

Q. Do you recall men coding messages using any particular device?
A. They had the M94.

Q. What use did you make of smoke if any?
A. In addition to the pink smoke for parachute drops and adjustments of fire, we used them to mark airplane bombing targets on at least three occasions, and for screening during the relief of the 169th Infantry by the 145th Infantry.

Q. At no time did you have ground-air communication?
A. Yes, in the division, but not in the regiment.

Q. How did you use your liaison officers?
A. I made one assistant S-4, one assistant S-1 and assistant S-2 and when the occasion arose, they were used as liaison with neighboring regiments. I did not use them with the battalions.

Q. Did you have any air missions performed directly in support of your regiment?
A. Several, both photo and bombardment.
Q. How was that handled?
A. We would make the request to Division one day. The mission would be performed the next day. In the case of photos, we would receive the pictures the following day.

Q. How did it work?
A. As far as the mechanics are concerned, it worked perfectly.

Q. Was your regiment up to T/O in strength?
A. We went into the campaign approximately 100 men short per battalion.

Q. Did you have any replacements coming to you during the operation on New Georgia?
A. Once between the end of the Munda phase and the beginning of the Bairoka operation. They came in about the end of the day. No classification - no roster.

Q. What would you say was your best means of communication?
A. Undoubtedly the telephone. The 609 radio between myself and the division commander worked excellently.

Q. Could you give any estimate as to which of the two means, radio or wire, handled the most traffic?
A. The telephone.

Q. Do you remember using the W.D. code book to code messages?
A. I personally don't.

Q. Did you ever get any 300's at all?
A. The radio which I used on the channel directly to the division commander worked according to that principle.

Q. When you are moving forward, did you always maintain contact with that set?
A. Yes, we always maintained contact. When going forward in the underbrush, it was torn down usually but set up at stated times. Sometimes it was necessary to resort to relays, but at no time were the regimental commanders out of touch with the division commander.

Q. Did you have much trouble with your men in your regiment cutting your own wire?
A. Yes, we stumbled all over it. Usually when they laid a wire, a trail developed and then the carrying parties and runners stepped all over it if it was on the ground.
Q. Any tanks on that operation?
A. We had eight light Marine tanks.

Q. What did you do towards the recovery of the wire?
A. Nothing. It is not worth anything then except for salvage after the operation.

Q. Did you encounter any mines?
A. We encountered plenty of mines but they were not installed.

Q. How about booby traps?
A. As for booby traps, the only ones I know of were those we put out ourselves.

Q. Coming back to the talking on the radio - did you talk in the clear habitually?
A. Habitually in the clear. We used improvised codes for reference to locations and individuals. We had within our regiment an SOP variable code for all leaders and units.

Q. You don't know of any occasion when the Japs listened in on the radio?
A. I assume they did, as they listened on the telephone.

Q. Did you notice any jamming?
A. No,

Q. Did you do any jamming?
A. Yes, we did.
Q. Did you experience any trouble with salt water getting into crank cases while cars were being transported on boats?

A. We did not transport many vehicles on boats. We had no trouble with this in going to Guadalcanal. We did have some trouble with it later on for this reason: The plain on the East coast of Guadalcanal is almost sea level. Salt water of the tides moves inland up the streams for half a mile or so. When it was necessary to ford the stream, we often got salt water in chassis, but that was more or less eliminated as soon as we got bridges in and did not have to do so much fording. When we did have to cross streams, it was SOP for drivers (after fording streams) to deadline vehicles for repacking.

Q. Did you make amphibious landings?

A. No transportation was involved.

Q. Did you have much trouble with water in gasoline?

A. No water in gasoline noticed.

Q. In what size containers was gasoline received?

A. Gasoline was delivered entirely by 50-gallon drums.

Q. Did you have any trouble with vapor lock in gas lines?

A. We did not have any such trouble as that. There are no long hauls to be made there. There are many, many short ones. We had no trouble over and above ordinary operational troubles.

Q. Did you have any scheduled preventive maintenance or regularly scheduled 1000 or 6000-mile maintenance services?

A. We carried out the same preventive maintenance as you carry out here. We specifically emphasized first echelon. We enforced that in my own regiment by keeping three inspection teams on the road daily. The practice was anywhere, anytime except during emergency runs, to stop vehicles of regiment and make a spot check. These included all points of driver checks.

Q. Did you find it difficult to remove mud from vehicles after they had been in muddy operations in order to get to the fittings and properly lubricate?

A. During actual combat operation maintenance was carried on as best we could. However, the general rule was that as long as a vehicle would run, it ran. When in contact with the enemy, we had to make out as best we could, but otherwise, we had a very elaborate and strict check on maintenance.
Q. What was done about supplies, repairs, and spare parts?

A. The supply of spare parts was spasmodic and incomplete. Quite often it was necessary to salvage from several vehicles in order to keep one in operation. When the parts came, we replaced them. To get a better picture of Guadalcanal, you must remember that the transportation we used there had been through previous campaigns with American Division and was in pretty bad shape even when received.

Q. Were vehicles used mostly for transporting ammunition and casualties?

A. During operation the vehicles were used to transport supplies of all types forward and transport salvage and casualties to the rear.

Q. Can you describe the method of constructing the rack for supporting litters on 1/4-ton for transporting wounded used at Guadalcanal?

A. We had a superstructure built on several of the 1/4-tons which permitted the carrying of two litters (side by side) on top, and one litter on the body of the vehicle itself.

Q. Do you mean, two above the driver, side by side, and one below, directly alongside the driver?

A. Yes. It was a very simple arrangement. Very much like the top to an old surrey of the early days.

Q. Was it constructed in the field? Was it made of metal or of wood?

A. Yes, it was constructed in the field. It was made of metal—iron rods and such other material as could be found.

Q. Did you find the mechanics in your regiment capable of doing more than first and second echelon?

A. The mechanics in our regiment were very capable.

Q. Were they limited to second echelon work?

A. In general, they were. The majority of overhaul cases in my regiment were sent to the Ordnance.

Q. Was the Ordnance 4th Echelon shop back of you or with transportation?

A. It was with the transportation except during time of actual operation when we had only a skeleton fleet of 1/4-tons. The Ordnance repair shop stayed with the bulk of transportation and came forward when the operation had been completed.

Q. Did you find that you could carry sufficient supplies with 1/4-ton to maintain operations?

A. Yes. We had no shortages, but it required a lot of effort. We used trailers as much as possible.
Q. Did you operate vehicles 24 hours a day? Did you have different drivers?

A. We operated during the hours of daylight only. We had two drivers for each vehicle.

Q. Did assistant drivers always go along?

A. Yes, almost invariably. There were several reasons for this. It was desirable to have someone sitting there with rifle ready to shoot. Then, also, a large percentage of miles covered during operation is done by getting behind the jeep and pushing.

Q. You seem to be stressing the fact that driver maintenance was important. Did you let your drivers do much servicing on vehicles before phase of operations in order to make them familiar with their vehicles?

A. Yes. All of our drivers attended drivers! schools. They were continuously in schools. The assistant driver went for a term, then the chief driver went. Our standard procedure was that any time a vehicle went to the shop, the driver went with it. The assistant driver went also if he could be spared. In this way they picked up quite a bit of knowledge.

Q. Did your drivers do their own lubricating?

A. Yes, but only under the supervision of the service company section chief. Of course, during actual fighting, the drivers did whatever was considered necessary to be done.

Q. Where did you get your assistant drivers?

A. We stole them from companies. Each man was officially an assistant driver in addition to other duties.

Q. Were guns mounted on vehicles or were rifles used for protection?

A. Some machine guns were mounted. Usually they were only on vehicles used on the beachhead or when the vehicles expected to be stopped for long intervals. It was impracticable to operate vehicles in jungle with any kind of superstructure on them except for those we used for carrying casualties. In this case, six men went with the vehicle to guard and help it over rough places.

Q. What types of vehicles did the Japs have in there, if any?

A. They had old trucks that looked like models about 1935-37. There were foreign and American models. They did not compare with our trucks and modern transportation. I saw only one official sedan -- or what was left of it.

Q. Did you notice the makes of some of the transportation?
I believe some of them were Chevrolets. I am not sure.

During actual operations, did you find the 1-ton sufficient in number or would you have liked more?

I would have liked very much to have had more as it required two or three shuttles for each vehicle. We could have used twice as many.

Is it advisable to have full complement of vehicles?

No. You could not possibly operate a full complement of vehicles under the conditions of the New Georgia campaign.

Would you advocate one-half or one-third of full complement for regiment?

During the actual fighting, approximately six 1/4-tons per battalion is all you can operate. You have absolutely no use for 3/4-tons, 1/2-tons, 1 1/2-tons, or 2 1/2-tons. You could use some of them for hauling on the beachhead but roads elsewhere would not support them.

What was the tool situation? Did you have full complement of tools? What tools were carried? Regular Unit Equipment Sets or mostly screw drivers and pliers?

More along the line of screw drivers and pliers. However, the mechanics carried hand sets which did not take up much space. We were never able to bring drivers' sets up to what drivers really should have had.

When roads were impassable for 1/4-tons, if you had had semi-track or full track carriers, would they have negotiated the trails? Something like a bulldozer for carrying?

I think it would be quite an improvement. However, the jeep was quite satisfactory. There would be little use for them out of jungle where you would need wheeled vehicles for speed and long trips. The compromise I believe to be the 1/4-tons.

Are vehicles kept under battalion control?

All vehicles were consolidated under regimental control. Battalions never saw them except as used.

Was yours the only regiment in that area? Were there other regiments with same transportation as yours?

There were six eventually. Average transportation was about the same, initially. After the fall of Munda they began putting down roads and bringing in more transportation.

Were repairs and maintenance performed under blackout during actual fighting?
A. Nothing was done at night toward repairs during actual fighting. We made almost no trips after dark and made no vehicle movements except when necessary at beachhead. No lights were employed. Most of the maintenance was performed while vehicles were temporarily deadlined. As long as vehicles could run, they ran. There was no blackout equipment for men to work under, and we did not put blackout maintenance operations into effect.

Q. Assuming there is no use for vehicles forward, they would have to be left in rear area?

A. Yes. They are left behind with drivers.

Q. What lubricants did you receive? What types were they? Were they from Australia or from the States?

A. I am of the opinion that they and everything else were from the States. It is possible that the lubricants were from Australia. I do not know.

Q. Were penalties imposed on drivers as to just what they might or might not do with vehicles, or was their knowledge acceptable?

A. Nothing imposed. We stuck by driver maintenance, but when a vehicle went in for lubrication, the driver did the lubrication under supervision of service company specialist. When a vehicle went in for overhaul or repair the driver was required to be present and assist in whatever way he could. This was purely for education of driver, not because we needed him to make repairs.

Q. When it became necessary for drivers to make emergency repairs, for example, ignition trouble, which normally was not remedied by drivers, were the drivers allowed to go ahead and make repairs and attempt to correct trouble?

A. Yes, in cases of emergency it was left to the discretion of the drivers.

Q. Did bulldozers belong to the Combat Engineers? What were the names and weights of them?

A. Bulldozers belonged to Division Engineer Battalion. They were light bulldozers. I don't know the correct name or weight.

Q. In your experience with drivers and assistant drivers, do you advocate, generally, drivers and assistant drivers in normal T/O arrangement of an Infantry regiment? As it is set up now, about one-half of the drivers perform other duties, such as messenger, bugler, etc., with driving as a secondary duty. Do you not believe that driving should be their first duty in order to take proper care of vehicle?

A. There must be a compromise somewhere along the line. With the number of vehicles in the Infantry regiment, we would be over-
I think the present arrangement in the South Pacific is fairly satisfactory. Where the rifleman has little to do as a rifleman, he can serve as an assistant driver. The same is true with the machine gunner. In actual combat all the gunners were busy fighting and most drivers were busy carrying up ammunition. I don't believe I would advocate changing the present arrangement and system.

Q. Did you always have two drivers during battle? Was it in case one of the drivers was picked off?

A. During battle we always had two drivers, either an assistant driver or a rifleman acting as assistant. There were many cases where the Japs got both of the drivers and the passengers. If an assistant driver was needed, we picked him up from anywhere available.

Q. Who looked after the field range, the mechanics or the cooks?

A. We had a trained crew of mechanics on those things that went from kitchen to kitchen. They probably didn't get to every kitchen every day, but they were taken by rotation and all emergency calls were taken care of by them. In addition to this, the cooks gave one unit a pretty good overhaul or first echelon check every day. One trouble we had was due to periodical use of red gasoline.

Q. When the filters were changed regularly, you had no trouble then with the red gasoline?

A. We had no breakdowns in cooking. We managed to keep serving meals by exercising due care.

Q. How did you move kitchen equipment after being in operation a while and moving forward, say 15 miles?

A. The kitchen equipment was left back on Guadalcanal until after the initial operation in New Georgia, then it was brought up to the beachhead by boat. It remained at the beachhead until operation was half finished, then moved up as a group on 1/4-tons and set up again in the regiment's rear area. Food was cooked in bulk and sent up to battalion in cans. Companies never saw the kitchens from beginning to end of the operation.

Q. Did you use prepared rations?

A. Yes, a modification of B combined with C, etc.

Q. How much time elapsed between the time the meal was prepared and the time it was eaten?

A. The first delivery of breakfast began about one hour after daylight. The last delivery was about ten o'clock in the morning. It took approximately two or three hours. We only had two hot meals each day. As far as drivers were concerned, it was a continuous operation. After picking up empty cans from breakfast and returning them, it was time to take out suppers. All food was delivered by 1/4-tons up
to battalion areas and carried from there on up to companies. Ration cans or canteen cups were used in lieu of mess kits.

Q. Did you provide security for regimental train bivouac?

A. Initially it was provided by division troops. When we moved North, we provided our own (AT, Serv Co.).

Q. Do you recommend the system of taking over vehicles already there and leaving vehicles back?

A. This is done primarily to save shipping space. As far as units are concerned, receiving secondhand vehicles is an unsatisfactory arrangement.

Q. Is there much paper work done and are records kept?

A. Yes, but it is not done during actual fighting. After fighting, an immediate inventory is started, regular accountability begun, and maintenance and regular forms and records kept.

Q. Did your mechanics ever use W.D. A.G.O, Form #460 or were they familiar with it?

A. I don't know. I never heard of it myself so far as I recall.

Q. Was demolition practiced?

A. Yes, on one occasion in another regiment the ammunition dump was blown up along with the transportation.

Q. Did you have demolition equipment for this purpose?

A. No.

Q. Were drivers instructed to demolish their own vehicles?

A. Yes, the same as with weapons, vehicles, and other equipment.

Q. Was it left up to the discretion of the driver?

A. Yes. We made no restrictions on it but left it up to personnel in charge. There usually weren't many supervisors around at places where drivers might get into trouble.

Q. Was it a problem to get ammunition?

A. Initially it was 100% manhandled. After bulldozers were used, it was kept up to within 1/2 mile by jeeps. From there on it was easily handled.

Q. What do the men of the band do during actual combat?
A. They assist in evacuation of wounded, carry ammunition, supplies, etc.

Q. What became of enemy vehicles when captured?

A. Most of enemy vehicles were pretty well destroyed by bombs. I did notice some of them reassembled and put in operation by the C.B.'s and service elements.

Q. Would pack mules be to an advantage?

A. We tried them in Guadalcanal but decided to send them back to the FA. They aren't satisfactory. Where you can use a mule, you can usually use a jeep. A trail cleared sufficiently wide for a mule and his pack will be wide enough for a 1/4-ton. Also, you don't have to get up hay for a jeep, nor does a jeep admit defeat or balk. We only used mules for a short time and went back to 1/4-tons.

Q. Were half-tracks used or was there too much sand?

A. They were present but not used initially. Even tanks were getting bogged down going across country. The trails were so narrow and winding that the 1/4-tens had difficulty keeping two-way traffic going. The jungle is no place for large vehicles.

Q. What was the rate of progress in jungle?

A. Very slow. We could go through jungle unopposed at 2 or 3 thousand yards a day but usually made only 600 to 1000 yards a day when opposed. During training our regiment made 50 miles in three days with no vehicles, and using existing trails. In cutting trails, you cannot make more than 2 or 3 thousand yards.

Q. How was contact maintained with so much undergrowth?

A. We did it in a number of ways. Our chief reliance was ground navigation to keep accurately located on the photograph with lateral patrols working constantly. We kept one officer with each adjacent regiment. All information received was used to verify locations on the photograph map.

Q. Did you have radios? Could you use them?

A. Yes, and they worked fairly well.

Q. What type radio did you have, walkie-talkie, was it 195?

A. We had several kinds: 195, 511, 284, 536, 245, and 609.

Q. What is the range of 536?

A. We only expected it to function up to 400 yards at maximum. It was mostly used up in front and then only until a telephone
line could be installed. It was good for only a little better than shouting distance. The ones we had were not waterproofed. The canvas cases do not keep them dry, and they were not too satisfactory.

Q. What was the frontage covered by the battalion?

A. Initially 500 yards to the regimental front, or 250 yards for each of the two attacking battalions.

Q. Did the Japs use armor?

A. The nearest thing used were bullet proof vests. There were no tanks in New Georgia.

Q. Did you have a Cannon Company?

A. No Cannon Company.

Q. Did you plan to surprise Japs when attacking?

A. I don't know that the Japs were surprised. Most of our attacks were preceded by preparations. However, we did catch some Jap officers at breakfast one morning.
THIS SET OF DIAGRAMS ILLUSTRATES STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES WHICH WERE USED SUCCESSFULLY BY ONE INFANTRY REGIMENT IN JUNGLE FIGHTING. THE SET IS FURNISHED AS INFORMATION.
**Rifle Co (1st) in Bop Adv Go for the Bn**

- Scouts
- Column of files on each side of the road, easy marching distance between men
- Rifle
- Column of files on each side of the road, easy marching distance between men
- Platoon
- AT
- Rifle
- Column of files on each side of the road, easy marching distance between men

**Rifle Co Adv Go**

- Column of files on each side of the road, easy marching distance between men
- Rifle
- Column of files on each side of the road, easy marching distance between men
- Platoon
- AT
- Rifle
- Column of files on each side of the road, easy marching distance between men

**Bn on the March Bop**

1. 25 yds between platoons
2. 50 yds between companies
3. Connecting files maintain a maximum of 50 yds from and guide on unit next in company. The unit rests with right connecting file.
4. Leading platoon furnishes flank patrol to left. 2d platoon furnishes flank patrol to right. Each platoon change in direction calls for new patrol on out-side flank.
5. Each unit maintains a maximum of five members distance from and guides on unit next in rear.
6. Unless otherwise designated, units move out in one-two-three order.
7. With company acting alone, rate of march is set by 2d rifle platoon leader. All distances and intervals to front and rear are maintained from this guide.

**Rest on the March Bop**

1. Unless otherwise ordered, companies move out in one-two-three order.
2. All commanders except where otherwise specified march at the head of their unit. All seconds in command march at tail of unit unless otherwise specified.
3. Vehicles, if present, move by bound up center of column from tail, or on to tail of adv party. They join units without command upon development.
4. Connecting files and unit in rear of 2d rifle company guide on and maintain distance from the unit next in front.

**Column Halted Bop**

1. Individuals move short way off to right and left of road taking some interval between men.
2. Mgs are manned for 44.
3. Adv party takes march-outpost formation.
4. Each platoon sends observers to right and left.
1. UNLESS OTHERWISE DESIGNATED, UNITS GO INTO POSITION FROM RIGHT TO LEFT IN ONE-TWO-THREE ORDER.
1. Each platoon digs latrine within its area.
2. Holes are laid to run from root and to supporting weapons.
3. Normal area for each platoon is approximately 80 yards in diameter; size varies with terrain.
4. Each automatic weapon has a supplementary position on the opposite side of its own unit area. Two examples are shown by dotted symbols in upper right in area.
RESTRICTED

FOR DISPOSITION OF REGIMENTAL C.P. USED BY AN INFANTRY REGIMENT IN JUNGLE OPERATIONS. ALL ELEMENTS BASE THEIR LOCATION ON FOXHOLE OF REGTL C.O.

APPLICABLE IN PART TO BN AND CO CP'S
IN FEEDING HOT MEAL ALL CONTAINERS ARE SPACED 5 TO 10 YDS APART. ONE HALF OF PLATOON APPROACHES IN SINGLE FILE, EACH MAN 5 TO 10 YDS APART. GETS HIS FOOD AND MOVES OUT 50 TO 75 YDS BEFORE EATING. WAITING GROUP REMAINS 50 TO 75 YDS FROM FOOD. WASHING LINES ARE SIMILARLY CONDUCTED.

2. EACH AUTO WEAPON HAS IN ADDITION TO AN ALTERNATE POSITION A SUPPLEMENTAL POSITION ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE OF ITS UNIT. AN EXAMPLE IS SHOWN BY DOTTED SYMBOL IN UPPER RIGHT PLATOON.
S. O. P. RADIO COM. INF. REGT. ADMINISTRATIVE NETS

NOTE:
1. The radios shown herein are from the present T.O. which substitutes the SCR 300 for the SCR 511 and SCR 195 which were actually used, but were unsatisfactory. It is recommended that each commander has a net for his commanders.
2. Each commander, to include the company, has two radios at his own command net. This provides one replacement for emergencies and also permits him to remain constantly in touch with his own commanders or instructors.
3. The command nets are voice portables which may be put in operation at stated intervals or operated continuously as the occasion demands.
4. The administrative net operates as contemplated in the normal S. O. I.
5. The administrative net is not a substitute for wire communications.