MONOGRAPH
The Persian Gulf War

Unit: 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment (Mechanized)
      197th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) (Separate)

Captain Lee H. Enloe, III
IOAC 1-92
At 060700 Aug 90, the 197th Infantry Brigade (M) (S) was alerted for deployment to Saudi Arabia (Southwest Asia) for possible combat operations. The 197th was attached to the 24th Infantry Division (M) as its 3d Brigade. The 197th deployed to Ft. Stewart, Georgia, from Ft. Benning, Georgia, on 21 Aug 90 to conduct initial training while awaiting deployment to Saudi Arabia. On 30 Aug 90, the 197th deployed from Ft. Stewart to Saudi Arabia, arriving at the Port of Dammam on 31 Aug 90.

The brigade waited in the Port of Dammam one week for its equipment to arrive by ship. Once the respective battalions within the 197th collected their equipment, the brigade prepared to move into the desert to occupy the first battle positions in its sector. At this point, I will note that in the haste to get combat equipment on the ground in Saudi Arabia, which equated to combat power, the logistical base of the brigade was the last asset which arrived by ship. This mistake would have denied the brigade the ability to sustain combat at that point in time if Iraq were to have attacked into Saudi Arabia.

After only three weeks in its initial assembly area, the brigade moved into a second assembly area. This second position placed the brigade south of the Iraq-Kuwait border. In this location, the brigade trained until 11 Jan 91 for the Persian Gulf War.

On 11 Jan 91, the 197th Infantry Brigade (M) (S) moved some 50 kilometers northwest, where preparations were made for
movement to the Iraq border using flat bed trucks called Heavy Equipment Transporation Trucks (HETTS). Three days after arriving at this staging area, the air war started, convincing everyone that the ground war would soon follow. On 30 Jan 91, the brigade's assets were moved by HETTS to the brigade forward battle position two miles south of the Iraq border. On 2 Feb 91, all battalions within the brigade, which were organized into battalion task forces (TF), were in their respective TF battle positions, with the Iraqi border in sight. I was Executive Officer for A Co, 2/18th which was referred to as Team A (Tm-A).

At 231700 Feb 91, Tm-A of TF 2-18 crossed the Iraqi border, assuming a security zone mission for the brigade's left sector. Tm-A passed through Phase Line (PL) Cutter, which is the Iraqi southern border. The main mission of Tm-A was to ensure that the left sector of the brigade was secure and clear of enemy forces for the brigade crossing of the line of departure (LD) the following day. The sector was reported clear for the brigade crossing of the LD the following day after Tm-A cleared the area reporting no enemy forces in the zone.

On 24 Feb 91, the ground war began, and at 0921, TF 2-18 crossed PL Cutter marking movement into the country of Iraq. The line of departure was moved north from PL Cutter to PL Opus by Division Headquarters. The brigade was ordered to cross PL Opus at 241400 Feb 91, officially beginning the 197th Infantry Brigade's role in the ground war.
Task Force 2-18 moved along route X-Ray after crossing the LD in route to OBJECTIVE (OBJ) Brown 1. (See Map 1) The terrain leading to OBJ Brown 1 was mostly flat with some low lying areas, all of which which was covered by sharp rock. The TF encountered a sand storm in the early evening of 24 Feb 91, limiting visibility to 45 meters. Navigation was accomplished by Global Positioning System (GPS) and compass. The scout platoon leader, the Tm-D commander of the TF lead company team, and the battalion S-3 all used the GPS navigational system for the battalion. The GPS proved to be an outstanding navigational tool because without it, precise navigation would have been virtually impossible considering the visibility problem caused by the sand storms and heavy rains. The battalion TF conducted refueling operations on the afternoon of 24 Feb 91 and again at approximately 242100 Feb 91. The TF first objective, OBJ Brown 1, was only five hours away.

Task Force 2-18 moved through the late evening of 24 Feb 91 towards OBJ Brown 1. Intelligence informed the TF that OBJ Brown 1 was a series of enemy logistical bases. As TF 2-18 approached OBJ Brown 1, combat air support (CAS) missions were called in to initiate the attack on logistical bases vicinity OBJ Brown 1. As the CAS missions were called in, TF 2-18 crossed FL Lion at approximately 250200 Feb 91. At 250515 Feb 91, TF 2-18 began clearing OBJ Brown 1. Team-A came in contact with a small force on OBJ Brown 1 and quickly neutralized the enemy. The enemy was an Air Defense Artillery
(ADA) early warning unit, and Tm-A took all enemy personnel prisoner, marking the first prisoner's of war (POW) of the Gulf War for TF 2-18.

The prisoners consisted of eleven enlisted men and three officers. The POWs were held by 3d Platoon as 1st Platoon cleared the building the enemy had used as an outpost. After the building was cleared, CPT Scott Denney, the Tm-A commander, called me forward. As well as being the XO, I was also in charge of the company demolition team. I had four soldiers on my personnel carrier as well as demolition equipment. I led my team into the building, and the 1st Platoon Leader, 2LT Rick Vossman, led me to a small room which contained a large cache of various ammunition, mortars, rockets, and grenades. We set a charge, using C-4 which is a plastic explosive that comes in one pound blocks, detonation cord, and a two-minute time fuze. The cache of munitions was successfully destroyed, and Tm-A moved to its battle position on OBJ Brown 1. I remained at the enemy position and destroyed bunkers and weapons using the same type of demolition charges which I had previously used on the cache of munitions before linking up with Tm-A.

The remainder of the TF did not encounter much opposition on OBJ Brown 1, and the other company teams within the TF moved to their respective company battle positions on the objective. It was now 251000 Feb 91, and the TF began resupply and refueling operations. All units within the TF received intelligence
updates and prepared to continue the attack deeper into the country of Iraq.

At 231610 Feb 91, TF 2-18 continued the attack from OBJ Brown 1 moving toward Attack Position Kelley using route X-Ray through the Shamiga Desert. (See Map 2) A very heavy rain began falling at nightfall which significantly reduced visibility and march speeds. The 197th Infantry Brigade (M) (S) had moved 230 kilometers into the country of Iraq. Morale was high and equipment was operating well; a direct reflection of maintenance practiced daily by all companies within TF 2-18 and the 197th Infantry Brigade.

We moved through the early morning hours of 26 Feb 91 over very rough terrain in near zero visibility. At 260600 Feb 91, TF 2-18 secured Attack Position Kelley; there was no enemy contact, but the movement from OBJ Brown 1 to Attack Position Kelley was a very difficult 71 kilometers.

At 260830 Feb 91, after a brief refueling halt, the 197th Infantry Brigade was ordered to continue the attack deep into the Euphrates River Valley. At 261100 Feb 91, TF 2-18 began movement toward Battle Position (BP) Omaha to seize OBJ Guard in the northern sector of BP Omaha. (See Map 3)

The terrain was extremely difficult for maneuver from Attack Position Kelley to OBJ Guard. Weather further delayed the
progress of TF 2-18 due to a sandstorm with winds up to 35 knots. Visibility was less than 25 meters, and again the GPS proved to be an excellent navigational aide. As nightfall approached on 26 Feb 91, it began to rain very heavily again from 1730 to 1945. As the TF moved along its route, the trail which it had to use because of surrounding impassable terrain became very muddy and at times virtually impassable. The TF combat trains, which are the logistical base of the TF, had to take an alternate route to avoid being mired in the mud. The TF continued movement towards OBJ Guard.

At 261715 Feb 91, the TF commander, LTC Eric Olson, made the decision to continue movement toward OBJ Guard with the TF Scout Platoon; Tm-D, which consisted of one M1A1 tank platoon; two M113 equipped infantry platoons; and himself, accompanied by the battalion Fire Support Officer (FSO). LTC Olson made the decision that the remainder of the TF would not be able to continue behind the scouts and Tm-D without becoming mired in deep mud. The TF commander ordered the battalion S-3 to lead the remainder of TF 2-18 (-) using a cross country route to link up with the TF scouts, Tm-D, and the TF commander at OBJ Guard.

The battalion S-3, MAJ Kent Kingsley, selected a direct route cross country to OBJ Guard. Movement was faster even though the desert floor was thoroughly saturated due to the seasonal rains, making the cross country route slower than desired.
At 262225 Feb 91, TF 2-18 scouts reported up to 300
dismounted enemy and combat vehicles as they led the TF
commander and Tm-D onto the western sector of OBJ Guard. These
dismounts proved to be soldiers of the Iraqi 3d Commando
Regiment (Airborne) of the Republican Guard (RGFC), considered
the elite soldiers of the Iraqi Army. As the TF commander moved
with Tm-D to link up with the TF Scout Platoon, the scouts, the
TF commander, and Tm-D received fire from the northern sector of
OBJ Guard as their link up was made. Tm-D and the scout platoon
turned right and headed directly into the fire from the 3d
Commando right flank. Tm-D and the TF scouts returned fire on
the enemy positions as they maneuvered their respective elements
on line. TF scouts were on the right and Tm-D on the left as
the TF commander positioned himself behind Tm-D.

LTC Olson ordered Tm-D and the scouts to continue a slow
advance on the enemy as they continued to suppress enemy
positions. As enemy resistance intensified, including 120mm
mortar fire, LTC Olson ordered Tm-D and the scouts to pull back
from the effective range of enemy direct fire weapons. LTC
Olson then called for artillery fire on the enemy positions
through the battalion FSO. At 262230 Feb 91, the first fire
mission impacted, damaging four trucks followed by numerous
secondary explosions. All fire missions were fired by 155mm
howitzer batteries in the brigade artillery battalion, 4-41
Field Artillery. Type of rounds delivered were Dual Purpose
Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM) and HEAT rounds, high explosive rounds which detonate on contact with the ground and can be fused to explode in the air.

At this point in the battle, Tm-D and the TF scouts began moving toward the enemy slowly, once again firing on troops in the open as well as enemy vehicles attempting to maneuver. The M1A1 tank platoon attached to Tm-D proved to be most effective destroying enemy vehicles using its main gun which is a 120mm smooth bore cannon.

Tm-D and the scout platoon had now gained the upper hand with superior firepower. As the scout platoon continued to suppress the enemy with effective fire, Tm-D began to maneuver on the enemy, destroying enemy positions. A second artillery fire mission of DPICM was called for and delivered on troops in the open attempting to maneuver on Tm-D. This fire mission caused heavy casualties on enemy forces from the 3d Commando Regiment. As the TF scouts and Tm-D continued fighting, the resistance from the 3d Commando Regiment was rapidly failing. A third and fourth artillery fire mission of DPICM was called for and delivered, causing more severe casualties and destruction of enemy equipment. This round literally rips men in half, tearing body parts off and causing mortal wounds among a high percentage of its victims.

With the combination of infantry fires, tank fires, and artillery, the 3d Commando Regiment (Airborne) of the RGFC were
thoroughly defeated. The TF scouts held their position as Tm-D began clearing bunkers with its dismounted infantry. The enemy had lost his will to fight and surrendered to the dismounted elements of Tm-D. The final assessment was 49 enemy soldiers killed and numerous wounded, with six troop trucks, six jeeps, three buses, and one motorcycle destroyed. As Tm-D continued clearing bunkers and policing up POWs, TF 2-18 (-) arrived at OBJ Guard led by the TF S-3. Company teams A, C, C-Tank, and E immediately occupied assigned company positions given them by the TF commander. Companies began clearing the battlefield and collecting enemy equipment. TF 2-18 captured 56 prisoners on OBJ Guard and turned them over to brigade military police.

The deciding factors which enabled TF 2-18 to be successful against the 3d Commando Regiment on OBJ Guard was our ability to suppress the enemy and maneuver on his forces with infantry and tanks. Second was our ability to see the enemy during hours of darkness with our superior night vision equipment. Third was our ability to effectively call for artillery on the enemy and their positions. The capability of 155mm howitzer artillery battalions is awesome. The infantryman's success on the battlefield depends on his ability to close with and destroy the enemy. I strongly believe if an infantry leader cannot plan for and effectively call for artillery fires on the enemy, that infantryman and his men will not be successful in their mission, and they quite possibly may die.
At 270730 Feb 91, the clearing of OBJ Guard was complete. The company teams in TF 2-18 began refueling and resupply operations and anticipated receiving a follow-on mission from the TF commander. During the resupply operations, I took my demolition team to the Tm-E battle position and destroyed five large enemy ammunition supply points (ASPs) containing 122mm artillery rounds and 120mm mortar rounds. My team also destroyed a large cache of new AK-47 assault rifles.

At 271200 Feb 91, TF 2-18 received a message which read, "The 24th infantry Division's actions within the Euphrates River Valley were enough to unhinge the Iraqi defense. The Americans have flanked Iraqi forces and threatened Baghdad. Iraqi commanders have ordered troops to retire across the Kuwaiti theater of operations." We all knew we were winning the war, morale was high, and it was time to continue the attack. The entire Iraqi Army was taking a terrible beating, we all knew they wouldn't be able to last much longer. The mother of all wars was getting ready to be the mother of all slaughters.

At 271530 Feb 91, all elements in the TF were given orders for movement. TF 2-18 began lining up in assigned TF order of movement at 271700 Feb 91. The brigade mission was to move east along Highway 8, a four-lane east-west highway which led into the city of Basra, to continue the attack east past OBJ Orange. (See Map 4) TF 2-18 was the lead element in the order of march for the brigade. At 271800 Feb 91, TF 2-18 began movement along
Highway 8 moving east toward OBJ Orange. The TF moved at a steady speed of twenty miles per hour for five hours. This time frame included one thirty minute halt to refuel vehicles in TF 2-18, as well as vehicles in the rest of the brigade.

The movement along Highway 8 is forever focused in my memory because of the carnage which I witnessed mile after mile. The entire movement was conducted during hours of darkness. First Brigade and Second Brigade of the 24th Infantry Division had preceded the 197th Infantry Brigade along the same route on Highway 8. These lead elements of the 24th ID destroyed elements of the Iraqi Army with whom they came in contact throughout their entire movement east along this major and very important highway. For virtually the entire movement along Highway 8, the highway was littered with burning trucks, artillery pieces, infantry carriers, and dead Iraqi soldiers. Many of those soldiers were burning inside of vehicles in plain view, and many others were lying all over and along side the highway dead from a very violent attack by our forces from the 24th ID. This scene, along with others from the Persian Gulf War, will always be a reminder of how final war can be for a soldier. We, as leaders, must always ensure that the soldiers under our charge are trained properly and effectively so that if called upon to fight they will win, win effectively, and will be afforded the most optimum opportunity to return home alive.

At 272200 Feb 91, TF 2-18 arrived east of Jalibah Air Field and continued on to the eastern sector of OBJ Orange. At 272330
Feb 91, TF 2-18 arrived at the eastern sector of OBJ Orange and exited Highway 8 on its southern side and continued leading the brigade in a southeasterly direction across the open desert. At approximately 280200 Feb 91, First and Second brigades of the 24th ID were in contact with the AL FAW RGFC Infantry Division to the 197th Infantry Brigade's front.

TF 2-18 and the other elements of the brigade began maneuvering to gain the eastern flank of the 24th ID. As TF 2-18 continued movement to battle, Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) were continuously firing on the Republican Guard Infantry Division, turning the darkness of early morning into moments of bright daylight. MLRS have an effective range of over thirty kilometers, and are very lethal with the ability of destroying entire grid squares which are 1,000 meters by 1,000 meters. As TF 2-18 and the other elements of the 197th Infantry Brigade were closing in on the Iraqi forces, all elements of the TF received an order over the TF radio control net which took us all by total surprise. At 280515 Feb 91, all elements were ordered to stop all movement, a temporary cease fire was immediately in effect throughout the entire theater of operations. In absolute disbelief, we all came to a halt and formed into a Task Force Tactical Assembly Area.

TF 2-18 and the other elements of the brigade were on the threshold of what would have been a major battle of armored and mechanized forces. Our adrenaline was at a very high level, as
it always is shortly before battle: It is not that we had grown
to love the combat of war but simply we had prepared ourselves
mentally for a large battle which all of us believed in very
strongly. If one thinks to much or dwells on what may happen to
himself in combat, he will not be effective on the battlefield.
We were ready and prepared to destroy the enemy. We had the
entire Iraqi Army surrounded and cut off from supplies, most of
us believed that we should have continued the war, destroying
every last one of those soldiers from the Republican Guard
Divisions. The Republican Guard Divisions were Saddam Hussien's
favored ones, the very soldiers which carried out the atrocities
ordered by Hussien against the Kuwaiti people and against
innocent people in Iraq, primarily the Kurds. I believed, as
did many others that whatever happened to the soldiers of the
Republican Guard Divisions on the battlefield under the realm of
the Geneva Convention was well deserved, especially death. This
cease fire proved to be the last combat all elements of the
197th Infantry Brigade would face. The brigade now had a new
mission to conduct.

At 280600 Feb 91, the brigade was ordered to destroy all
enemy equipment and munitions in sector. Brigade level
engineers destroyed tons upon tons of Iraqi munitions using
demolitions. Much of these munitions carried markings from the
country of Jordan. This evidence proved that King Hussien, the
ruler of Jordan, was a liar when he claimed his country would
not and did not support Iraq during the Persian Gulf War.
TF 2-18 was given the mission at 011206 Mar 91 to establish road blocks along the 24th ID rear boundary to turn back displaced civilians and capture retreating enemy forces. Tm-A was given the mission from the TF commander to clear a series of enemy bunkers in the TF sector before assuming its portion of the TF road block mission. Tm-A began clearing the enemy bunker complex in the TF sector at approximately 011400 Mar 91. We found large amounts of munitions, again carrying markings from the country of Jordan. Much to our surprise, we found only two Iraqi soldiers in the bunker complex, both of whom did not give up to capture easily. Finally, after controlling these two prisoners of war, I transported these men to Tm-C which was in charge of consolidating TF POWs. I delivered the two POWs to Tm-C's XO, my good friend, 1LT Bob Białek. It was good to see Bob; we talked for a few minutes before I left. We both agreed on a few beers once back in the states, better known as "The World."

At 011700 Mar 91, Tm-A assumed its sector within the TF conducting road blocks. I was with half of the company in the southern sector, and CPT Denney was with the other half of the company in the northern sector. During this mission, nothing of great importance occurred, only routine civilian traffic was controlled.

At 031500 Mar 91, the official cease fire was announced. The 24th Infantry Division Commander, Major General Barry R. McCaffrey, anticipated no further engagements with enemy forces.
TF 2-18 was informed by brigade that all remaining enemy equipment was to be destroyed within the next 48 hours. Road blocks were also to continue during this time frame. At 061200 Mar 91, the 197th Infantry Brigade (M) (S) was relieved of duties and informed to prepare for movement to the Port of Dammam, Saudi Arabia.

After three days of recovery operations, the 197th Infantry Brigade (M) (S) conducted its final tactical road march beginning at 090530 Mar 91. TF 2-18 was once again first in the order of march. The TF led the brigade on its long journey home from the Euphrates River Valley in Iraq to the Port of Dammam, Saudi Arabia, where final preparations were made to redeploy home to Ft. Benning, Georgia.

The 197th Infantry Brigade (M) (S) attacked 267 kilometers into the country of Iraq. The brigade cut deep into the Euphrates River Valley, causing the Iraqi leadership to order its forces into retreat. The 24th Infantry Division threatened the security of Baghdad and the 197th Infantry Brigade, operating as the Division's 3d Brigade, played a very key role in the success of the 24th Infantry Division (M). The total distance the 197th Infantry Brigade traveled from 24 Feb - 9 Mar 91 was 763 kilometers, an amazing accomplishment when one considers that all personnel, including the dead, and all equipment including non-operational equipment, were accounted for and returned home to Ft. Benning, Georgia.
In conclusion, the 24th Infantry Division, the 197th Infantry Brigade, and TF 2-18 performed amazingly well under harsh conditions and accomplished what critics said could not be done. I hold the utmost respect for these men, especially those of TF 2-18 and Tm-A because I personally knew these men. Their bravery, their valor, their resolve will never be surpassed. These soldiers fought well and proud for their country and should always be remembered and thanked by all of America and the world. The 197th Infantry Brigade (M) (S) arrived home at Ft. Benning, Georgia, on 29 March 91 ending its role in Operation Desert Shield-Desert Storm, covering an eight month period of deployment in the Middle East. In a fitting ceremony at Ft. Benning, Georgia, on Friday the 21st day of June 1991, the 197th Infantry Brigade (M) (S) deactivated its colors and officially became the 3d Brigade of the 24th Infantry Division (M).
LESIONS LEARNED

Subject: Logistical base deployed after combat equipment.

Discussion: When the brigade deployed its equipment to Saudi Arabia, mainly combat equipment was deployed first for the obvious reason to conduct combat operations from the onset, if needed. Most logistical equipment deployed after the combat equipment, causing a very serious problem during our initial days in Saudi Arabia. The brigade would not have been able to sustain combat during the first seven days in country due to minimal support assets. We found that this was an Army-wide mistake, and it was quickly rectified for follow-on units deploying to Saudi Arabia.

Recommendation: When deploying a combat force, units must ship equal numbers of logistical equipment to that of combat equipment so that once that respective combat unit arrives at its location, it can fight and sustain combat operations.
Subject: Global Position System (GPS)

Discussion: The GPS is a primary reason why TF 2-18 navigated consistently well and to near perfection during Operation Desert Shield-Desert Storm. Navigation in the desert environment can be made terribly difficult because of the absence of significant terrain features, sand storms, and seasonal rains, causing very limited visibility. LTC Eric Olson would be the first to agree that without the GPS system, navigation during the war would have been at times near impossible.

Recommendation: Any unit deploying to the desert must be equipped with the GPS navigational system with a minimum of six systems per battalion. I do believe that the GPS should be considered as new equipment for every unit in the army. Combat units should be equipped with at least one GPS per company.
Subject: Night Vision Equipment's importance during night operations.

Discussion: The largest percentage of enemy contact which TF 2-18 experienced occurred during the hours of darkness. One of the major factors which contributed to our success on OBJ Guard against the 3d Commando Regiment (Airborne) was our ability to see the enemy and kill him. Without the aid of superior night vision equipment, our percentage of success without question would have dropped decisively resulting in a longer engagement with the enemy and quite possibly a number of our soldiers wounded and killed.

Recommendation: The Army must continue its research in the field of night vision to ensure our soldiers always have the best night vision equipment available, allowing them the opportunity to kill the enemy at night before the enemy kills them.
Subject: Importance of artillery to the infantryman.

Discussion: The number one killer on the battlefield is the artillery, and until one has witnessed this, its sometimes difficult to convey the importance of effective artillery fires on the enemy. Infantrymen, and most especially infantry leaders, must be proficient in their ability to call for artillery quickly and effectively on the enemy. An infantry leader who is deficient in his ability to call for artillery fires effectively on the enemy has a very high chance of not being successful and, worst of all, will probably get his men killed.

Recommendation: All infantryman must understand the basic skills needed to call for an artillery fire mission where it is needed. Infantry leaders must be proficient in this art and must ensure their subordinates are trained in the call for the artillery.
Subject: Training the infantryman.

Discussion: Everyone in the combat arms has heard the phrase "your soldiers will fight the way they are trained; therefore, train your soldiers the way they'll fight." Training the soldier effectively, realistically, and safely is the most important and toughest task for any infantry leader. The training which we conducted at TF 2-18 before the war thoroughly prepared the soldiers for war. These men performed brilliantly because they were ready. The infantry leader who has not prepared his men properly and takes those men into combat is derelict because some of those men may die simply because they were not trained effectively, realistically, and safely.

Recommendation: Form weekly, monthly, and quarterly training schedules which meet Army requirements incorporated with innovative and realistic training missions. Lastly, schedule as many live fire maneuver ranges as possible. This prepares soldiers for what they will need as combat skills on the battlefield.
Subject: Personal hygiene in the field.

Discussion: Soldiers of TF 2-18 lived and fought in the desert of the Middle East for eight months. The reason these soldiers were able to survive and go to combat is because they practiced effective personal hygiene daily. In WWI, WWII, Korea, and Vietnam, the biggest casualty producers keeping soldiers off the battlefield were not wounds received from combat, but from poor hygiene practices which cause numerous health problems among soldiers in the field. An effective fighting force must be a healthy force first.

Recommendation: Implement mandatory hygiene practices among soldiers and have company assigned medics monitor soldiers' hygiene practices to ensure their health in the field. Medics should also conduct classes at the company and platoon levels to educate the soldier on proper personal hygiene practices to ensure the soldier doesn't become a health casualty.
ATTACK TO OBJ ORANGE
AND CONSOLIDATION WEST OF BASRAH
27 FEB - 8 MAR '91

MAP

PL RIPPER
LOA
PL AXE

OBJ UTAH
197 X 1
BP
X 102
JAIsBAT AIR BASE
OBJ ORANGE

OBJ GUARD
BP OMAHA
PA 1
PA 2
AA JUNO
TAA HAMMER

3 ACR

TAC2415911.834
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1. Memorandum of the Chronology of the 197th Infantry Brigade (M) (S) Participation in the Persian Gulf War. Produced by 197th Headquarters

2. Actions on OBJ Guard conducted by Tm-D, Battalion Scouts, and the TF commander were gathered from the following individuals:

LTC Eric Olson, 2-18 IN Battalion Commander (TF Commander)
CPT Allen Edwards, TF Scout Platoon Leader
CPT Brian Maka, Tm-D Executive Officer