Rangers in Iraq

Task Force Ranger, 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry
in the
Persian Gulf War
10 November 1990 to 12 May 1991

written by
First Lieutenant Jay C. Mumford, 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment
A unit is made up of soldiers, and a unit's history is the sum of the experiences of its soldiers. Missions to execute, uniforms to wear, and equipment to fight with do not make a combat unit effective, and the simple reproduction of the facts of day to day movements do not make a history true. The truth is found when the stories and emotions of a fighting soldier are linked with the movements of his unit. My goal has been to assemble the stories and thoughts of the infantrymen, tankers, cooks, clerks, mechanics, medics and more that were Task Force Ranger, 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment from 10 November 1990 to 15 May 1991. This is a history of soldiers.

I have done my best to avoid writing a dry, stodgy history. To get the true impressions and stories of the men in the unit, I asked about 15 different soldiers to commit to paper a short, pithy, from-the-heart statement or story about various topics. Each piece, or precis, is placed in indentations. Read them in the visceral spirit in which they were written, and grasp what it was like to be there.

The military, like any profession, has its own distinctive language and jargon. For the uninitiated reader, a discussion of LDs, TFs, BRDMs, NCOICs, LOIs, HETS, and a host of other acronyms soon begins to resemble talk in a foreign language. A listing of the U.S. military rank structure is included on page 56 and I have translated as many of the military terms into plain English as possible, but in the interest of readability some do remain. Each is explained the first time it is referred to, and I apologize in advance for the strain they may put on your memory.

Finally, I must thank the many soldiers of the battalion who gave freely of their time and knowledge to make this document possible. From the privates to the field grade officers who shared with me their candid opinions and observations, thank you for helping me recount the story the way it was.

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July 1989 - August 1991
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First Call

10 November 1990 to 9 January, 1991

Late in the afternoon of Thursday, 10 November 1990, Second Lieutenant Doug Hughes, platoon leader of Second platoon, D Company Destroyers, was passing by his company dayroom. Glancing in, he noticed soldiers sitting around the TV watching CNN as they waited for the final formation of the day. Just as Lieutenant Hughes crooked his neck around the door, Wolf Blitzer of CNN stated that Pete Wilson, a Pentagon press secretary, announced 11,000 soldiers of the "Big Red One" would be deployed to the Gulf Region "in support of Operation Desert Shield" as part of a major buildup of force. There wasn't a lot of whooping and hollering - instead, a quiet mood fell over the room, as soldiers began to assess what the word, now finally out, would mean to them and their families.

Forty minutes later, as First Lieutenant Jay Mumford, battalion S-2, drove slowly past the division headquarters on main post, the 5:00 p.m. Retiring of the Colors ceremony began. Stopping the car, he got out to salute the huge flag not more than 50 feet away as the newsradio station played inside the car. As the flag descended, the newscaster declared the Pentagon had just announced the deployment of the First Infantry Division, of Fort Riley, Kansas. "It was on CNN. It has to be true," laughed the S-2. "We will be part of the greatest projection of military power in history." It had been inevitable, but was still a surprise to the soldiers of the division - and the Ranger battalion - wherever and however they heard the news. Like another November day 27 years ago, this day would always be remembered.

That evening, the officers and wives of the battalion met at a Manhattan restaurant for a previously scheduled "Hail and Farewell", and the talk was of deployment. As the group farewelled a good friend, Chaplain Jerry Owens, a sense of confidence and calm was discernable in the group, and a feeling that the test to come could be met and passed. The battalion, actually a task force due to the cross-attachment of tank assets to the battalion structure, had just completed a rigorous three month training cycle to prepare for a slated 25 November - 20 December National Training Center rotation at Fort Irwin, California. Training had started in August with vehicle and individual gunnery live-fire. Progressing through September from squad combat tactics and platoon mounted attack and defend mock battles to company versus company exercises, the field problem culminated with the 19 - 23 October task force external evaluation - EXTEV - known as Gauntlet.

Gauntlet pitted the 1000 men of Task Force Ranger's two infantry companies, two tank companies, one anti-tank company, 110 dismounts, scouts, mortars, mechanics, attached engineers, air defense, and artillery against a battalion strength enemy armed with laser firing simulated Soviet weapons. Both defensive and offensive missions were executed. This type of exercise was the standard "train-up" maneuver to prepare a mechanized infantry task force for the rigors of the NTC.

The task force as it stood on 10 November 1990 included two tank companies cross-attached from the 37th Armor Regiment, the Third and Fourth battalions of which joined with 2-16 Infantry to form the combat elements of Second Brigade, First Infantry Division. As a matter of definition, an infantry or armor battalion which has attached tanks or Bradleys, respectively, is called a task force. At the company level, an infantry or tank company that trades an infantry platoon for a tank platoon, or vice versa, is called a team. The name "task force" or "team" does not reveal how many of the subordinate elements are armor and how many are infantry, unless the word "heavy" is used. For example, a "Mech-heavy team" is a company sized element that has two mech platoons and only one tank platoon. A "tank-heavy task force" would be a battalion
sized element with more tank companies than infantry companies.

Many were asking the question of how the battalion would be task organized for the deployment and the subsequent missions in the Gulf. Tuesday, the 15th, brigade announced that deployment and vehicle draw in Saudi would be battalion pure, and re-task organization would occur in South West Asia. The tankers went home and our two line companies returned from their task-organized positions in 3-37 and 4-37 Armor Battalions.

On Monday, the 14th, the battalion staff and commanders held their first deployment meeting, and many of the issues which would soon become of paramount importance to the battalion were raised. The battalion commander, LTC Daniel R. Fake, announced the top priorities for deployment would be NBC (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical) defense training, maintenance and fixing deadlined vehicles, and painting of all vehicles and trailers. The date of deployment was not yet determined, but the Commanding General, Major General Thomas Rhame, had proclaimed that "I am optimistic we'll be able to spend Christmas with our families." The feeling in the task force at this statement was of optimism, and some took the line that they would be happier still to see it with their own eyes.

According to Ranger battalion custom, a custom reinforced through the hundreds of meetings we had held, the sequence of business went S-1 (administration), S-2 (intelligence), S-3 (operations) and S-4 (logistics), special staff, Command Sergeant Major Sumpter, and company commanders. The Executive Officer, Major Dennis Schoeppner, chaired the meeting. At this point, the decision to deploy pure had not been announced, and therefore the S-1, First Lieutenant Don Lannom, was unable to commence work on flight manifesting. The non-deployable list became a major priority for the Adjutant, as the battalion commander continually needed to know the unit's deployable strength, as well as the detailed story of each non-deployable soldier. Next, First Lieutenant Mumford gave a thumbnail sketch of Saudi weather patterns, with a focus on the January - February timeframe. Major Vernon Vollertsen, battalion S-3, discussed the outlines of several top priority missions the battalion would soon need to execute, such as vehicle painting, required predeployment training, loading the trains for shipment, and choosing the advance party, boat crew, and supercargo names. The S-4, Captain Mark Samson, covered bulk and individual draw of the myriad pieces of personal and unit equipment we would need to fight in the desert, from chemical-agent resistant Kevlar helmet covers to new 5-ton cargo trucks.

The Medical Platoon Leader, First Lieutenant Jeff Borland, was on the hot seat to provide a by-name list of soldiers non-deployable for dental reasons. The Support Platoon Leader, First Lieutenant Scott Clarke, was tasked to be ready to move in seven directions at once to support all the upcoming requirements for truck support. The Battalion Motor Officer, Captain Bart Bonn, Scout Platoon Leader First Lieutenant Frank Kubista, Mortar Platoon Leader First Lieutenant Daryl Nichols, and Chaplain Owens, still with the unit, briefed the issues they had which could affect the battalion. Next it was the company commanders' turn to talk. In turn, Captain Thomas Rouse of A Company "Outlaws", Captain Bennie Williams of B Company "Bushmaster", Captain Scott Rutter of C Company "Cobra", Captain Mark Hammond of D Company "Destroyer", Captain Kirk Schliefer of E Company "Eagle", and Captain Duane Riddle of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, asked for specifics on the laundry list of generalities the staff had just sketched. The mood in the room was again of quiet confidence in our ability to be flexible and execute the missions ahead.

While the soldiers of the battalion were busy preparing for the military aspects of deployment, wives and families were strengthening their defenses against the trials to come. Wives' clubs and support groups took on new life with activities to draw the spouses closer together. In Cobra, the wives held a children's Christmas party on 22 December, and a meeting in late November turned out 40 wives among only 60 married soldiers. A committee made of an NCO wife from each platoon constituted the planning board, and "the NCO wives were the root of
the success," according to Captain Rutter. Looking back on the entire time, the wife of one of the NCOs in the battalion wrote this precis:

I had a problem dealing with the stress and the anger I felt for having to take on so many responsibilities at one time. When he left I had to take on more stressing situations. I was a support group leader and all the meetings and activities we planned helped to take my mind off the things that were going on around me. I was really stressed out about my husband not getting his mail for such a long time. It was more important that he got our mail than us receiving letters from him. We loved hearing from him, but at least we had some other things we could do to take our minds off the war. He only had our letters to help him deal with where he was.

I was able to deal with the fact that our youngest daughter kept asking when her daddy was coming home, and the oldest daughter's school work suffered. Her grades went down and I had to continuously remind her that I understood and that I was not disappointed in her. That put a lot on me too, because she was really down on herself for making bad grades and not making the principal's list.

The stress mounted as the day drew near for the beginning of the ground war. Many times the girls and I yelled at each other. We had to leave the house a lot just to get away from the reminders that the man of the house was not here, and that he was somewhere getting ready to fight in a war. The stress didn't ease until the war was over and we knew he would be coming back, and it would not be completely gone until he was home.

I really became close to the other women in the support group and I was willing to discuss things with them that I couldn't talk with my own family about because I knew there was no way they would have understood fully what I was going through.

Stress fed on us like a regular diet, and we were consumed by it on a daily basis. Having someone to talk to and knowing that if we needed help in any way the whole community was there for us was a real comfort to me. I think we all worked well together at a time in our lives that it counted the most.

What the battalion needed now was details of when and where to pick up supplies, shoot live-fire ranges, load milvans (called military vans, there were actually just tractor trailer containers with no undercarriage), paint vehicles, conduct protective mask training in the gas chamber, receive SWA maps for issue, attend brigade operation order - OPORD - briefings, and allow soldiers to take leave prior to deployment. Since these details were constantly changing, the battalion was continually forced to "adapt and overcome". This is a commonly used military euphemism for more colorful phrases, many of which are physically impossible to execute.

The division staff, in conjunction with the Department of the Army civilians who run some vital parts of post operations, issued a preliminary battalion by battalion matrix showing who was to execute what predeployment training and when. The matrix was constantly becoming OBE - overcome by events. On 17 November, during a battalion plans meeting as we scheduled training and supply missions from the requirements on Version 3 of the matrix, Version 4 was delivered hot off the press by Lieutenant Lannom. The battalion commander broke off in mid-sentence and gave new orders based on Version 4, changing dates and times as necessary. This kind of constant adjustment became a specialty of the commanders and men of the battalion. Once in Saudi, things certainly didn't get simpler!

For the companies, the net effect of this flux at the battalion and brigade level was not an
impression of confused or disorganized leadership, but instead of impatience in the troops. Platoons knew what they needed to do - load conex inserts, load milvans, pack radios, inspect soldier and platoon gear, run NBC training, etc. etc. - but could not execute many of these tasks until they received the word from higher headquarters. The net result was troops "straining at the bit" - what Infantry Colonel Anthony Moreno, Second Brigade Commander, calls "leaning forward in the foxhole". Tankers call it "leaning forward in the saddle". Although the "old training schedule went out the window on 11 November," Destroyer still did their planned mattress inspection on Monday the 14th. Platoon leaders prepared their men to spring to action and then sent them home at 3:00 p.m. when the day's work allowed. Everyone knew there were plenty of 24-hour days ahead, and meanwhile, extra family time was important in building morale.

Top on the list of division training priorities was NBC defense. The known extensive Iraqi use of blister and nerve gas chemical warfare against the Iranians and the Kurds at Halabja, plus the availability to Hussein of Scud missiles which may have been modified to deliver chemical ordnance, combined to make chemical warfare defenses very important to the U.S. soldier. First Lieutenant Robert Houser, battalion Chemical Officer, was in charge of arranging NBC (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical) tear gas chamber training, and Staff Sergeant Thompson, battalion NBC NCO, supervised company NBC NCOs in fitting the entire battalion with properly sized NBC suits and masks. NBC was very serious business.

The next major mission the task force tackled was the painting of vehicles and trailers. Each line company is authorized by the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) 13 Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFV), one M113 tracked vehicle for the company executive officer, two M35A2 2 1/2 ton supply trucks, and one HMMWV (High Mobility Military Wheeled Vehicle - the ultimate 4-wheel drive truck) for the commander. Multiply this by four for each of the line companies, add in Eagle and HHC trucks, trailers, and tracks to arrive at the battalion vehicle total: 244.

Division divided the painting among sites around Fort Riley and Junction City. Humvees were painted at the Auto-Self Help shop, tracks at Building 8100 on post, and the rest of the wheeled vehicles in Junction City. Given the lack of firm dates for rail-, sea-, and air-deployment, the vehicle painting mission was given top billing to make sure that everything would be ready for train-loading on short notice.

Many companies worked 24 hours a day and weekends to complete painting - Destroyer finished their last track at 2 a.m. Thanksgiving Day. All through the painting process, the battalion commander kept close tabs on the companies' progress. After the vehicles returned from the paint racks with the fresh coat of Chemical Agent Resistant Coating (CARC) sand paint, Sergeant First Class Robert Freeman had the mission of getting bumper numbers and Allied vehicle markings painted on the otherwise generic vehicles. One of the privates on the paint detail remembers it this way;

We were told the equipment needed was on hand and waiting for us. Turned out it was out of order and the type of paint we were supposed to use was hazardous to humans!

It was obvious the people who wrote the instructions, or LOI, didn't try fitting the markings on a Bradley. The LOI said to paint a big V on the Bradley's left side with part of the V on top of the vehicle. This defeated the purpose of the marking. Higher headquarters insisted on placing the V in accordance with the LOI. Of course, we did what we were told.

We were finally given permission to modify the V markings and also use black spray paint. We got a new deadline: Sunday. We knew we had to pass the battalion commander's inspection, and even though our work was approved by the sergeant major, the colonel would be hard to
please. Company commanders and first sergeants saw the work and said the detail had done a very good job. Still, we had the feeling that few vehicles would pass the colonel's examination.

Well, the big inspection came. Sure enough, if the markings weren't perfect, we were instructed to repaint them. On one correction, no one but the battalion commander would have noticed such a change. One company commander said, "That man must have a calibrated eyeball!"

After the inspection and corrections were made, we all hoped never to be put on another detail like the paint detail. Some of us even bought material with our own money to make the mission a success. We don't know if our efforts were appreciated, but we do know we did a mighty fine job.

Maintenance was a main concern of the battalion commander when the unit was alerted. Through regular wear and tear, the strenuous three months field time ending in Gauntlet had taken a toll on the Operational Readiness (OR) rate of the battalion. In addition, the budget crunch had shrunk the dollars available to the entire brigade for buying repair parts, and this was felt at the task force level when purchases of 06 and 13 priority repair parts were put on hiatus in September. The net result was that we were only allowed to pick up parts essential to keeping vehicles "mission capable". This enforced shortchanging of maintenance and repair inevitably meant that vehicles broke down more often, with a resulting strain on the maintenance system. On 10 November, scores of vehicles were on the deadline ("2406") report as having various mechanical or safety problems serious enough to make them NMC (non-mission capable). A deadlined vehicle does not necessarily have a blown engine or a ruined transmission, and in most cases the right spare parts and a solid effort by the mechanics will bring the deadlined vehicle back "up". And this is exactly what happened.

With our alert on the 10th, Class IX repair parts funds were unfrozen and the Battalion Maintenance Technician, Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Yarbrough instructed his PLL (Prescribed Load List) clerks to drop requisitions for the hundreds of items the battalion fleet needed. As these parts came in, the 105 maintenance soldiers of the battalion went to work fixing and repairing the down vehicles, and by early December the OR rate was brought up to 98%. All but one or two vehicles moved to the railhead under their own power. This success was a direct result of the work of maintenance NCOs and men like Specialist Wright of HHC and Staff Sergeant Snow of Destroyer team.

The bulk of the troops' time in mid to late November was tied up in loading the many types of containers used to transport battalion equipment to Saudi Arabia. Each man could carry only a limited amount of weight on the military trans-Atlantic flight, and many tons of gear were packed in conex inserts (4' x 4' x 8' heavy duty cardboard boxes), in milvans (10' x 10' x 30' semi-truck trailers without undercarriages), and on vehicles as secondary loads. Deciding what to take was simple. Silver Star Medal Awardee First Lieutenant Chris Kelsey of the Outlaws used the following rule: "Everything you think you need, put in the milvan. Everything you think you don't need, put in the milvan too." Hundreds of thousands of dollars of equipment were inventoried, loaded, inventoried again, and sealed into the seven battalion milvans in the motorpool and then towed to the trains by Directorate of Logistics (DOL) trucks.

The railload operation was our next major task, and we were able to use the experience we had gained during countless NTC railloads to make the "real thing" go smoothly. Basically, the Desert Shield version of loading 240+ vehicles in a three day period on trains in five different locations was no different from the NTC version of the operation. The battalion Unit Movement Officer, Lieutenant Clarke, almost pitched his tent down at the Rail Operations Center to keep track of vehicles as they were coded and loaded. Individual vehicle crews were responsible for moving
their tracks onto the train and lashing them down with the limited number of chains, cinches, and tightening tools available.

With few other deployment operations ongoing, most of the soldiers in the battalion took part in the railloading, and troops from privates to the battalion commander were down on Camp Funston at the rail site. Occasional maintenance problems slowed the loading process down, as when an M106 4.2 inch Mortar Carrier broke a quill shaft halfway onto the train. Within an hour, the mechanics and crew had remedied the breakdown, and moved the vehicle into place on the train. Keys for the tracks and trucks were collected and consolidated for shipment with the special crew of First Lieutenant Robert Mitchell of Bushmaster, and Master Sergeant Kenneth Williams of S-2 who would ride the boat across the Atlantic. These two were jokingly given the title of "boat people".

With the completion of railloading in early December, the emphasis was turned to individual training. The entire battalion gathered in Normandy Theater on Custer Hill on 21 December, and received instruction in a bevy of deployment topics: Iraqi tactics and weapons, SWA weather, and hazards of the desert, Saudi Arabian customs and culture, counterterrorism techniques, and the law of land warfare. The U.S. Army is definitely thorough in its attempts to foresee every requirement or possibility which may come up, and train and prepare the soldier to meet it. As the mandatory training was concluded, soldiers made final attempts to draw hard to get items of desert equipment from the Central Issuing Facility (CIF). Most troops deployed without the full range of gear, short such things as Desert Camouflage Uniform (DCU) Kevlar covers or properly fitted Kevlar flak vests. Some troops deployed without DCUs because none were
available in a size that would fit. The shortages were inexcusable.

On 17 December, the Brigade Advance Party departed for the Gulf. The Ranger battalion slice was led by S-3 Captain David Collier and First Lieutenant Thomas "Super-T" Earls of Eagle, and included men from each company. The Advance Party mission was to establish the boundaries and Area of Operations (AO) of the task force in Tactical Assembly Area (TAA) Roosevelt, conduct coordination for the arrival of the battalion main body in approximately 2 1/2 weeks, and lay groundwork for the arrival of the combat equipment.

As the Christmas season approached, the word from the division command group was that soldiers could take leave through 21 December. This was subsequently extended through 2 January 1991 when the battalion air flow dates firmed up for 5 to 9 January. Many in the Ranger battalion took this last opportunity to go home and visit relatives and friends one last time, and "tie one on" for the last time, as well. It would be untrue to say that the theater-wide prohibition against all alcoholic beverages did not weigh on the minds of some soldiers.

A brief history lesson may have provided some chuckles over the whole topic. During the Civil War, the 16th Infantry Regiment was reactivated as part of the 11th Massachusetts, a regular army unit mustered at Fort Independence, on an island in Boston Harbor. According to "The Narrative of the 11th", a book by Gustaphus B. Hutchison, one day before the regiment shipped south to the war, "Company H marched up in a body to take a pledge of total abstinence for the duration of the war, officers and men, explaining that "Our business is to fight, not drink!" Right.

As the new year dawned, the battalion colors were furled for the trip to South West Asia and probable combat against the fourth largest Army in the world.
Al Khobar is a huge complex of five and eight story concrete buildings with expensive marble floors and cheap elevators, sprawling just south of the Persian Gulf city of Dhahran. Built ten years ago by the Saudi royal family to entice nomadic Bedouins from the deserts to a controllable central location, the Al Khobar towers were leased by the U.S. military. Because of a resemblance to the MGM Grand hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada, the towers were christened "MGM" by the 17,000 soldiers who lived there as of 10 January 1991. As the Ranger battalion waited impatiently for the ships bringing our equipment to dock, troops took time at MGM to get accustomed to the strange odors on the wind and the lack of moisture in the air. A fence encircled the 10 square kilometer compound, and permanent party troops and military police manned the lone entry point and patrolled the area with loaded M60 machine guns. The threat of terrorism was high, and the MGM security office had directed 2-16 to provide roving guards and a quick reaction platoon to respond to emergencies in our sector.

The battalion as a unit had new surroundings to adapt to and new missions to execute. The old hands of 2-16 had been preparing to deploy with the unit for months, but several members of the battalion had arrived just in time to deploy. One such troop was infantryman Charles Burrows, a captain assigned to the S-3 section. His precis:

After watching the developments of Operation Desert Shield unfold for three months, I learned in November that the 1st ID was to be deployed to the KTO. I called and spoke with the adjutant who confirmed that the Big Red One was indeed painting its vehicles sand-colored. There was a sense of urgency at Fort Benning in the training units as soldiers were training "for war" and, while no one wanted to be killed, no one wanted to be standing on the dock when the ship pulled away.

I settled my family in Beaumont, Texas, and flew to Fort Riley on 3 January 1991. I was relieved to find that the battalion had not yet deployed, but I had the task of inprocessing ahead of me. I inprocessed through division, drew CIF, got on the housing lists, and completed my financial appointments all in one day. After a weekend in the Holidome in Manhattan (a luxury I allowed myself and I'm glad, retrospectively, that I did), I got on a plane 8 January to fly to Saudi Arabia.

All of the typical concerns of a new officer in a unit were present: I didn't know who anyone was or what jobs they held, I was trying to get my bearings in a mechanized unit (I was from a light background), trying to not say "sir" to other captains (I was promoted on 1 January), and trying to get my job responsibilities defined. To paraphrase a Chinese saying, "There was great disorder under the heavens, and the situation was excellent."

That saying also described the situation at King Abdul Azziz Port, 26 km north of MGM, where the 1st ID G-3 and transportation sections were moving operations into full swing. All the equipment the division had railloaded six weeks earlier would be coming into theater through this single port, and pressures were great to achieve very fast debark and depart operations. Given the immense concentration of men, ships, and materials, we all knew the port to be an irresistible target for enemy sabotage and terrorism.

Maps of the port area were distributed and plans published as some troops from 2-16 moved into the infamous "Warehouse 18", a cavernous cot-filled sheet metal structure near one of
TF 2-16 DESERT STORM

AA ALLEN
20 MAR - 15 APR

SAFWAN
1-19 MAR

BREACH
24-28 FEB

FAA
15-23 FEB

TAA ROOSEVELT
16 JAN - 14 FEB

RAA HUEBNER
18-27 APR

ATTACK
RETURN

IRAQ
SAUDI

PERSONIAN GULF
the off-load points our ships would use. Company commanders and first sergeants scurried back and forth between MGM and port on the shuttle buses, one driven by Corporal David Bohan, a "hard-charger" from HHC. Other buses were driven by soldiers from 1st ID (Forward), which deployed over 1,100 troops to Saudi Arabia to make the VII Corps deployment possible.

The general theme of port operations was speed with safety. As ships docked, work crews would be on hand to off-load the military vehicles and move them to temporary storage areas. Convoys were formed as quickly as possible and vehicles were sent north to the tactical assembly area. Wheeled vehicles could drive on the highways and thus could leave at any time. Tracked vehicles, on the other hand, destroy paved roads in short order. The solution was simple; use heavy equipment transporters - HETs - to load and ship the heavy tracked vehicles up to the forward areas. The problem was simple too; there were not enough HETs in all of SWA to

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transport the number of vehicles the U.S. Army needed to move! Add to this serious reliability
difficulties with the HETs in service, and the result was delays in our getting out of port.

The single greatest difficulty we encountered during this part of Operation Desert Shield
was communication. The task force had no radios and only seven walkie-talkie "bricks" available.
Due to the limited range of the bricks, they were put to use by our MGM roving guards and QRP.
There was no telephone service or other means of speedy communication between the port and the
MGM; with battalion operations divided between the two sites, delays and mix-ups were
unavoidable. The situation would become yet more challenging once major elements of the
battalion began moving 300 km north to the division tactical assembly area.

The port was a scene of organized chaos, as Humvees, tanks, 5-ton trucks, cranes, buses,
"Haji" camel-burger vendors, odd engineer vehicles, M113s and every other type of armored
vehicle in the army inventory rumbled from point A to point B. Major Schoeppner and company
XOs checked with Captain Miller, assistant DTO, many times a day to track progress into port of
ships bearing our tracks and trucks. As a ship docked, crews were mobilized from MGM to the
port to prepare for offloading vehicles and lining up in the convoy staging area. Some leaders and
men, such as Staff Sergeant Armand Fish, Guard Force NCOIC, stayed at the port continuously.
Meanwhile, the battalion commander supervised all aspects of the port operation, giving guidance
on items from the guard force manning roster and requirements to making by-vehicle lists of all 2-16
tracks, trailers, and trucks in port.

As the ships came, the balance of the men shifted from their temporary home at MGM to
an even more temporary home in tents or on cots at the port. By late evening on 13 January, the
first vehicles of 2-16 were convoying up the Khafji road toward the desert, as the Improved TOW
Vehicles of Captain Schliefer's E Company were sent north to establish a position in the battalion
perimeter.

The brigade task organization called for 2-16 to cross-attach two infantry companies,
Captain Rouse's A Co and Captain Hammond's D Co, to 3-37 Armor. In return, we would pick
up A Co "Ironhorse", led by Captain Horatio "Tony" Schwalm, and D Co "Deathstalker",
commanded by Captain Kelly Morningstar. The brigade would thus be operating with a 2-16 and
3-37 as balanced - two infantry company and two tank company - task forces, and one pure armor
battalion, 4-37 Armor. The actual cross-attaching units was slated to occur immediately upon our
arrival in the tactical assembly area (TAA Roosevelt).

Like any military operation, the division and brigade plans for Operation Desert Storm
included objectives, routes, assembly areas, and a host of other "control measures" designed to
organize the violent and purposeful movement of 16,000 soldiers. The division plan, named
Scorpion Danger, called for 2nd Brigade to build combat power and gather its vehicles and men in
a barren 140 square kilometer area 35 km north of Tapline road and 65 km south of the Saudi-Kuwait border. We would operate in this area until ordered to "jump" westward to the FAA-forward assembly area - where final preparations for the attack would be made. On 17 January, few of us at the task force level knew just how far west the FAA was going to be.

Troops unloading ships in port and at MGM rehearsing actions in MOPP 4 (full chemical
protective suit plus mask, gloves, and boots) were tracking the death rattle of the diplomatic
process as the UN deadline neared. A Japanese-donated television set up in the HHC CP on floor
4, Bldg 317, was hooked into CNN and always had a crowd gathered (although some were there
to watch a tape-delayed replay of the 1990 World Series on Saudi English-language television). As
the deadline for withdrawal ticked past, speculation mounted. The question of "not if, but when?"
was quickly answered. At 30 minutes past midnight on the 16th, the brigade Emergency
Operations Center ordered all soldiers to don chemical protective gear at 1:30 a.m. The quick
reaction platoon leader, Second Lieutenant Rodriguez of 3rd Platoon, Cobra, mustered his men in
full gear in six minutes at the battalion command post and was given the mission of alerting the 29
Scud drills

separate buildings for which 2nd Brigade and 2-16 were responsible.

Meanwhile, at the port, news of the first waves of Air Force, Navy, Marine, and Army AH-64, UH-1, B-52, EF-111, A-6, A-8, A-4, F-111, EF-4, F-15, F-117A, and F-16 attack planes and helicopters was spreading through the warehouses and sleeping quarters. At 3:00, the night saw the first of many "Scud drills" both at port and MGM, as troops of all ranks went into MOPP 4 on the alert of possible incoming Scuds.

None of those 16th Regiment soldiers remarking about how uncomfortable the charcoal-impregnated hothouse suits were knew how far MOPP suits had come. Major General (Retired) Albert Smith, Jr., the Honorary Colonel of the 16th Regiment until 1990, once relayed the story of his scrambling ashore on Omaha Beach on D-Day, 1944, in a stiff, uncomfortable wool uniform. It had been saturated with wax to become a primitive protective suit in order to thwart gas attacks the Germans might throw to knock the Americans off the beach. A moment of cool reflection would have no doubt convinced every man present that the new suits were far better than those our former comrades of the 16th had to fight with. We did know the Patriot missile batteries were deployed nearby, but at that point the system had not yet had the chance to vindicate itself in the face of enemy fire.

Four hundred kilometers to the northwest, a serial of HETs transporting the rest of Eagle's ITV's pulled up at a nondescript turn-off of Tapline road. The road between Dammam and TAA Roosevelt consisted of vast empty spaces punctuated with vehicle wreckage from accidents. The terrible stories about the two lane road which accompanied the Trans Arabian Pipeline from the Gulf to the Red Sea were all true, and traffic flow was heavy and increasing as units of VII Corps moved to the TAAs. Two hundred kilometers west of the coast, a television tower rose into the dark night to the northeast of the turn. A dirt "road" snaked toward TAA Roosevelt, 30 km north.

Captain Collier, of the battalion Advance Party, walked down the halted line of dark vehicles to the "sweep" vehicle, whose job it was to round up lost or broken convoy vehicles, carried Eagle commander and the mortar platoon leader.

Captain Collier greeted them and said, "Welcome to the war zone. They're bombing Baghdad. George started it." "No shit!!" A few minutes later a shrieking flight of unlit jets passed over low and fast, and the newcomers began to believe what they had been told.

The first complete 2-16 company on the ground in Roosevelt, Eagle was given a brigade order to LD - move out - at 3 p.m. on the 17th and provide a screen mission eight kilometers north of the task force AA. This entailed a slight change to the plan devised in MGM. The defensive plan for the task force was to occupy the sector oriented north with our four line companies on line, Eagle screening the right flank, Scouts screening 2 - 4 km to our front, and the trains consolidated in an area around the TOC (tactical operations center). For the first days of the air war, Eagle and a section of mortars constituted the fighting power of the unit as Bradleys, tanks, and support vehicles of the other companies trickled in. The elements that were on the ground were not yet fully equipped with the ancillary stuff of war. When ordered 12 hours after arrival to form a screen line to the north, Eagle had 13 vehicles but only three machine guns, a few PVS-7b NVGs (Night Vision Goggles), and a few radios they scrounged from other units.

Back in November, a decision had been made not to ship radios, machine guns, and sensitive items such as voice scrambling COMSEC (communications security) materials in the vehicles, as the possibility existed that vehicles could be broken into and pilfered. Thus, small but vital sensitive items had been packed in the milvan, did not arrive in Roosevelt as quickly as many vehicles and troops did. The net result was that we had vehicles on the ground with their main guns systems ready but few of the accessories required to shoot, move, and communicate to battalion standards. Perhaps this decision was based on the valid point that the unit would not need to "fight its way out of the airport", and that the division would have adequate time to marry up vehicles, crews, and equipment before combat.
The battalion headquarters TOC vehicles arrived on the 17th, and the few staff personnel already in the TAA served tactical and administrative functions. As events unfolded, it became clear that the plan for TAA deployment should have pushed more staff officers forward first to help coordinate the arrival and placement of the companies. This could have relieved some of the command and control problems the task force experienced, but, at the time, several other factors influenced battalion decisions. One of these factors was the availability of buses.

Buses, like HETs, were in short supply throughout the Theater, and buses were the only practical way to move many of the battalion soldiers from port to Roosevelt. Wheeled vehicle crews rode on their vehicles where possible, and one or two tracked crewmen per track could ride in the front seat of the HETs that moved their vehicles. However, for the rest of the track crews and the over 220 dismounted infantrymen who in combat ride inside the Bradley and then dismount to do the hand-to-hand dirty work, buses were the only solution. When buses became available, Major Schoeppner divvied them out to the companies and about thirty dismounts per bus would load up and move out. Due to obvious space limits, they were not able to take tents, cots, or other paraphernalia with them. Upon arrival in the TAA, the two buses led by First Lieutenant Dana Taylor, XO of Destroyer, linked up with the task force CP and were given directions to their cross-attachment headquarters, 3-37 Armor. Bivouacking for the night with 50% security would normally have been very easy but for one factor which none of us had expected, and no plan could mitigate.

It rained. And rained. And rained. By 22 January, standing water deep enough to stall vehicles was collecting at the turn-off from Tapline road. Time and again, soldiers were heard to say "This is supposed to be the desert, but it rains more than Fort Riley!" We started to invent a Ranger - rain connection, and use the current weather as example of proof. Soon, no doubt like soldiers throughout the Theater, we were acting as though foul weather followed us around and we were the only ones it rained on!
Play it Again

**Practice Makes Perfect**

19 January to 13 February, 1991

On 19 January, the cross-attached tank companies of Ironhorse and Deathstalker moved into the task force perimeter and established defensive positions with Eagle. The battalion's Bradleys were still in port or en route as our northern elements watched Syrian and Kuwaiti units of the National Arab Coalition pass five to eight kilometers forward of our sector, moving from west to east. Their equipment included Soviet made T72s, BMPs, and BTRs. Deathstalker and Ironhorse were reminded that weapons status was "Hold". Also on that day, Major Richard Rachmeler joined the task force as operations officer, transferring down from G-3 Plans. In his previous job he had been part of the team that wrote the nuts and bolts of Scorpion Danger, and he knew the division plan inside and out. Two days after the new S-3's arrival, the Commanding General flew up to our location to discuss aspects of Scorpion Danger with the command group face to face.

Over the next 27 days from the arrival of the first combat vehicles to the division jump to the FAA, we prepared for war. No one could say for sure that war would come, but everyone vowed to be ready when it did. We all understood the paradoxical nature of this statement, but the one thing we were sure of was that when G-Day arrived, it would be a day of our own choosing. In the meantime, the task force mission from 20 January until shortly before the FAA jump is summed up in one word: Rehearse.

A fundamental part of every successful military operation is rehearsal, and the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) rehearsed. Rehearsals were held at every echelon from fire team to brigade. Companies rehearsed the movement techniques they would use to cross the vast stretches of ground before us, the final meters in front of the enemy lines and platoons rehearsed the fire commands that would be employed to mass long-range, accurate fires on enemy bunkers and vehicles. Lieutenant Kubista's scouts, LP/OPs, and C Company FIST rehearsed in a nighttime mounted practise run the sequence they planned to follow during the reconnaissance and surveillance battle before the main attack. Mortars and FIST teams rehearsed jumping, setting up and calling or executing fires, and jumping again.

On 26 January, Colonel Moreno issued the mission for the main attack. It read; "On order TF 2-16 conducts a deliberate attack in zone to penetrate enemy defensive positions along PL Wisconsin; establish four assault lanes (to be called M, N, O, P) through the enemy barrier simultaneously; attack in zone to destroy enemy forces initially to PL Colorado, then to PL New Jersey; be prepared to continue offensive operations." Over the next three days, the battalion staff began to formulate the outlines of a plan which would enable the companies to execute the mission.

The 130 minute task force OPORD was issued at 1200 hours on 29 January to a packed TOC. All commanders and staff were present, and the TOC was entirely full. Maps, overlays, and charts showing the enemy deployment were plastered on the wall abutting the S-3 M577A2, with light provided by incandescent bulbs strung from extension poles and powered by the TOC's 5 kilowatt generator.

The sketchy information we had said the enemy in the our sector would include at least two infantry divisions, the 48th due north and the 25th its the east. The Iraqi divisions were conducting a deliberate defense in sector north of the 37.5 north - south grid line. (On tactical maps, the ground is divided into grids and numbered from east to west and from north to south. The "37.5 north - south grid", then, is an imaginary line running from east to west 37.5 km north of the 00 north - south grid. In terrain with no distinguishable landmarks, using the grid lines or artificial phase lines is about the only way to get everyone on the same page.) Artillery and mortars would
be common, probably the 60mm size. We fully expected chemical weapons, if available, to be used on the breach site, and each enemy infantry company could have a section of recoilless rifles in addition to as many as 27 RPG-7s, weapons of limited range but lethal enough to kill a Bradley. In short, the Iraqis would have the capability to put up a fight.

The plan we devised to destroy this enemy was not simple. Bushmaster was to be the main effort and would clear the trench line which ran along PL Wisconsin. (Please consult the map) Ironhorse would breach two lanes on the left and then secure a support by fire position to ensure Bushmaster would not be attacked from their left flank as they turned east to move along the trench line. Deathstalker would breach two lanes on the right and then secure a SBF position to isolate the southern trench line, and Cobra would assault the northern trench line to ensure the enemy could not mutually support the southern trench line as Bushmaster cleared.

By design, the operations order for the assault was not a detailed document. The battalion commander felt that with the sketchy front-line intelligence we had received from G-2 and Corps it was important for us to rehearse application of our combat power against a worst case scenario Iraqi defense. We designed an ersatz Iraqi defense, and Captain Turner's combat engineer company dug trenchlines and emplaced a triple-strand concertina wire obstacle. We did not want to aggravate the maintenance problems we were experiencing, and left the actual penetration sites without wire.

Although the plan was formally briefed on the 29th, all the company commanders were familiar with it as early as the 25th. This enabled the battalion to conduct its first formal rehearsal on 30 January. Task force engineers prepared wire and trench obstacles in accordance with the best intelligence estimate to date. The daylight rehearsal indicated that not everyone understood their place on the battlefield, and night rehearsals showed that we must be prepared to execute without GPS (Magellan). These early battalion scale rehearsals revealed a number of lessons to be absorbed.

First was one we already knew - a plan must be practised on the ground, to the right scale, and going the same direction as the real attack. Walk-through rehearsals are useful, but when Lieutenant Nagasaki of 3rd Platoon, C Team, 3-37, can look over to Lieutenant Wilhelm of 1st Platoon, D Team, 2-16, five feet away and discuss the next move, it is not the same as when both are bouncing over open terrain at 20 mph in the Bradley turret, listening in one ear to the platoon net - trying to keep 32 in position, hey! where's 33 going? - and talking on the company net radio across 600 meters of terrain to the platoon leader on the left. There is no substitute for a mounted rehearsal.

An important lesson highlighted by the mortar platoon was that a rehearsal should be done in the same direction as the real attack. For example, if the attack will be from south to north, orient the terrain table from south to north. This way, the commanders and crews get accustomed to visualizing their movement in the proper frame of reference. Also, FIST teams and mortarmen can rehearse with the actual mils or degree compass bearings that will be used to fire the fire for effect (FFE) missions.

Over the next four days, the battalion rehearsed in daylight and in darkness, on foot with a 100m by 250m sand table at the TOC and mounted with an 8 km by 6 km sand table southeast of the battalion perimeter. The S-3 made sure through repetition and teaching that each company knew when and where it was supposed to be, with company commanders backbriefing their planned actions at each stage of the battle. The battalion commander quizzed platoon leaders with "Who's on your left? Who's on your right? Who's behind you? What do you do now? What do you do if this happens? If that happens?"

A tool which proved its worth time and time again during the rehearsals as well as during regular operations was the GPS (Global Positioning System) Magellan. Generally reliable, the GPS is a car-telephone sized $3,500 OD green "black box" which uses a small antenna to track...
navigation satellites in planetary orbit. The GPS correlates the input and reads out your eight digit location on the 3 by 5 cm LCD screen. In the trackless, barren, void terrain of the al-Dibdibah desert, the GPS proved invaluable. Land navigation by traditional, map-based means was all but impossible, due largely to the total lack of terrain features. Resection and intersection were not feasible, and the odometer and compass method of navigation proved an inadequate option.

The GPS saved time and lives; by making it possible to identify exact locations, link-ups were easy and cases of friend or foe misidentification could be lessened, and artillery target grids could be accurately checked for the presence of known friendlies. The only real problem with the GPS was simple: there weren't enough of them. The benefits of the GPS were felt in direct proportion to the number available, and platoon leaders, supply sergeants, and maintenance vehicles without them spent many extra hours bouncing over wasteland because it was impossible to otherwise verify a grid. The problem was perhaps most acute in the case of the Liaison Officer, First Lieutenant James "Ranger Bob" Biscardi.

As the company and battalion rehearsals were conducted, the brigade prepared for a single, unified full-up maneuver rehearsal on a division-constructed reproduction of the proposed breach site. This obstacle represented the extreme worst case scenario and included every type of hindrance the Iraqis could possibly employ: mines, wire, tank ditches, berms and infantry trench systems. Very little went according to plan. The plow tanks plowed until they reached the barrier and Team Charlie straddled the minefield. The maneuver units moved through the trench system at 10 - 15 mph. Units bottlenecked at the breach.
Despite all the practise time behind us, there was still much to learn, especially about coordinating the phased attacks of three separate battalions. This problem was predictable because maneuvers of this size are very rare. Only for eight days in the past two years had 2-16, 3-37, or 4-37 been able to maneuver together with another full-sized battalion, and those two four-day periods had been 12 and 24 months ago, with different commanders and on far different terrain. In fact, there probably had never been an opportunity for the mounted elements of the entire brigade to maneuver simultaneously. In any event, the lessons learned this time through included; 1) identify obstacle properly by lead elements, 2) organize weapon systems to clear trenches mounted, 3) move down trench system deliberately; 3 - 5 mph seems to be correct speed to insure trenches are completely cleared and the momentum of the attack is maintained, 4) proof trenches after clearing with direct fire, and 5) use plow tanks and ACEs (Armored Combat Earthmover) to bury trenches.

On 7 February, the brigade conducted a leaders-only rehearsal on a terrain table built near the brigade TOC. Platoon leaders were there, and final notes were taken for the second and last

The front side of one version of the psychological - warfare leaflet, courtesy of a Military Intelligence battalion and a flight of B-52s. These slips littered the desert like confetti.

brigade rehearsal scheduled for the 8th. The task force moved into position at night on the 7th, ready to launch at 5:30 the next morning. The operations officer stated "We finally are beginning to operate as the plan directs," and this rehearsal was indeed much smoother than previous iterations.

Confidence was the net result of all this rehearsal. Having run through the mission so many times they could recite the radio traffic by heart, platoon leaders knew they would be able to concentrate on fighting their platoons when the time came. The men knew their actions backwards and forwards. Companies practised their attack and movement techniques so many times "we were sick of it," reported a soldier in Team Delta. Another product of the rehearsals was maintenance problems, and on 9 February Colonel Moreno suspended all mounted training to give
the brigade time to "maximize the maintenance effort."

The vehicles were travelling hundreds of gruelling miles over rutted, soggy gravel, dirt and dust, over wire and ditch obstacles and at high rates of speed. In these conditions a certain number of mechanical failures were inevitable. While the Bradleys held up best, the M113 series vehicles - M577 TOC command tracks, FIST-Vs, M113 maintenance, company XO, and ambulance tracks, M106 "four-deuce" Mortar Carriers, M163 Vulcan Carriers, M113 Ground Surveillance Radar carriers - did well too, despite a Theater-wide shortage of M113 series replacement engines. Brigadier General Rutherford, the Assistant Division Commander for Support, was personally cracking heads to get the division more M113 engines to keep the units rolling. Humvees proved again what we already knew - except for the shabby doors and roofs, the always suspect generator mounting bracket, and the slipshod manual parking brake - the Humvee is almost indestructible.

As we had proven four months earlier, though, no piece of equipment can survive without repair parts. Viewed from any angle, Class IX was a major problem in the KTO. The parts were simply not available at the front. Mechanized divisions have a set of organic maintenance battalions to push resupply and maintenance efforts as far forward as possible. Each separate brigade has a Forward Support Battalion, 201st FSB in our case, to give front-line support, and the division has a Main Support Battalion, 701st, operating farther back near the Division Rear command post.

The 105-man permanently assigned maintenance platoon of the task force has six trucks dedicated to carrying on-hand the spare parts - PLL - the task force has proven likely to need during an FTX. By the book, these PLL items are replenished from 201st stockage on a one for one basis, with the objective of always keeping the current 2-16 balance above zero - the concept of "support forward". However, time and time again Class IX parts used at the task force level could not be replaced from 201st Authorized Stockage List (ASL) caches, because 201st either did not have the parts or could not locate them. When 201st requested replenishment from 701st, a similar problem often arose. 701st either couldn't find the parts or was out. The net result was a prolonged, debilitating shortfall of required repair parts at the front, and troops like Corporal Marvin Bigham of the PLL section could not get the parts their task force needed.

To surmount the bottlenecks, XOs and soldiers of the support platoon, supply sections, and maintenance platoon were scuttling around the division AO and beyond in search of parts. Troops even made almost a dozen trips all the way back to port looking for needed parts. Trucks, helicopters, and whatever was available were used to obtain the Abrams, Bradley, and wheel parts needed to feed the 244 vehicles in the task force. Controlled substitution, float vehicles, and parts rebuilding (taking two defunct widgets and making one operational widget) became standard practice.

During the four day period of maintenance and rest which followed the rehearsal cycle, soldiers took care of personal business. The only non-maintenance mission involved a 95 km road march to the VII Corps "Jayhawk" zero range. All main guns were zeroed, but ammunition contrictions limited tankers to five or less rounds per vehicle, and Bradleys to no more than 15 rounds each. In the meantime, the mobile PX truck, set up in the back of a cargo HEMMT (a 30 foot long 8-wheel drive cross-country vehicle) and administered by Staff Sergeant Michael Phillips of S-1, served hundreds of customers and went through $50,000 of merchandise.

The first large deliveries of mail were finally coming through. After the war, the shipment times lessened greatly, with some letters arriving from the states in as little as six days. KTO to home travel times were always considerably slower, though. Mail from home, any-soldier mail, and packages all started to break through the transit bottlenecks, and were we glad to see it! The task force record for the most mail received in one day was set by Specialist Edgar Bowdish of the TOC. He received 62 letters in one day, he is reported to have said, "What, no packages?"

The Ranger PX was in full operation, located in the bed of a cargo HEMMT. Keeping the PX stocked was a difficult operation, as HHC First Sergeant Stephen G. Hillyer, relays below:

-20-
From the beginning it seemed as though equipment that we only dreamed about was pouring into unit, and one of the most significant items was the Magellan GPS. Now, as the days went on it became a very important morale issue in the division that each unit have a PX. So important was it that the first question the Division Command Sergeant Major asked me was "Do you have a PX?" Even the corps commander had this as one of his priorities.

The only problem was the PX warehouse was on a military base 150 miles away cross-country over desolate desert, and the map that I had was a 1 over 1,000,000 scale, the kind of map a pilot in a very fast aircraft uses. The ironic part was that when it came time to go get the PX items, all the Magellans were given out. How did we get the 150 miles cross country to King Khalid Military City? Dead reckoning and a $3.00 wrist compass. It was a great boost to my morale when we managed to get there and back without getting lost. It's just ironic that the guys with the Magellans never went more than 5 miles from the assembly area and were able to use a $3,000 dollar navigation system every inch of the way. 150 miles cross country and back in a Humvee and I was forced to use a three dollar wrist compass and a map for a 747 pilot.

On 10 February, keen listeners to Theater-wide Armed Forces FM Radio, heard a "stateside special request" from "Dierdre in Texas to her brother First Lieutenant Thomas Earls in Saudi Arabia."

General Rhame again visited the task force area on 11 February and spent some time with the battalion commander and S-3, while the VII Corps CSM, Command Sergeant Major Wilson, spoke with soldiers as well. On the 11th, the mess served steak, a traditional meal for a night before a major operation LDs. On the 12th many soldiers travelled to Log Base Alpha just south of Tapline to use the phones before ATT privileges were cut. As General Powell and Secretary Cheney left the theater for Washington to brief the president, a mood of impatience grew with each passing day. We all knew the attack must be soon . . but when!? 
At 8:50 on the morning of the 14th, the Task Force 2-16 main body "hit the LD", leaving TAA Roosevelt and setting out west to cross the Wadi al-Batin (which runs from Hafir al-Batin northeast to Iraq), follow the brigade route due west for 70 km, and then turn sharply north and occupy Battle Position 12. We thus became part of the largest deception operation in recent military history. Scouts led, with the task force in a diamond formation, Team Delta forward, Ironhorse on the left flank, Bushmaster and Eagle on the right, Cobra in the rear, and the mortars traveling "split-section" with four tracks on each side of Cobra. The battalion's attached air defense assets were also divided and placed on the flanks. After 3 1/2 weeks of enforced captivity in TAA Roosevelt, the task force was finally moving nearer to its goal. Following the combat elements were the main command post, B/First Engineer Company, the combat trains and recovery assets, and the field trains. The trains elements proved their worth time and again on the many long, arduous road marches the task force executed.

Although sometimes referred to pejoratively as the "ash and trash" because they typically bring up the rear in a unit movement formation, the trains and maintenance troops of the unit are vital. Without mechanics, tanks don't kill and Bradleys don't move, a fact which the troops of 2-16 understood. Good-natured kidding between the "fixers" and the "breakers" is inevitable, but we had a better relationship than most units did between the mechanics and the fighters. This was in part because of the can-do attitude of men like turret mechanic Sergeant Michael Davey, generator mechanic Sergeant Frank Silva, wheel mechanic Staff Sergeant Artie Cameron, and tank mechanic Sergeant Carter.

During the movement, the BMO organized the maintenance assets according to METT-T (Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain - Time) factors to help make sure maintenance would be on site at a breakdown as quickly as possible. Each line company team had an assigned maintenance team of one M113, one M88, a tool truck and 11 mechanics who maneuvered, ate, and rested with the company. During tactical movement, the combat trains, or UMCP (unit maintenance collection point) travelled approximately two kilometers behind the combat elements. The UMCP included the Maintenance and Services M113s, their 24 soldiers, the rest of the battalion's seven M88 tracked recovery vehicles, and usually the tool trucks as well.

The concept was to push maintenance as far forward as possible, a mere mile behind the front line. Further back followed the battalion field trains; the rest of the maintenance platoon, the Maintenance Support Team (a 19 man slice cut from 201st FSB to help change major assemblies) and a missile team (also from 201st with the mission to repair and service the 46 TOW missile launchers in the battalion). A number of different names are used for these basic formations, but their missions are the same.

The battalion completed the 160+ km road march and pulled into position south of PL Carolina by about 5:00. Major Schoeppner in HQ 5 Humvee traversed the movement route, rounding up and coordinating repairs for lost or broken vehicles. Chief Yarbrough, Captain Bonn, and the company XOs, First Lieutenants Brian Cummings, Mark Wald, James Nells, Manuel Soto, Phil Koenig, and Kelvin Woodard, from HHC through E company, came into their own on the road marches. By nightfall, the unit was fully closed in position, with scouts three kilometers north of the main body and 35 km south of the enemy trench line. Only 16 km north of 2-16, the border ran east-west about 800 meters north of the "The Berm".

A leaders' recon at 8:00 the morning of the 16th revealed that the terrain north of the border became more undulating and broken than the basically flat ground we were presently on, thus giving enemy reconnaissance or anti-tank teams limited ability to hide outposts. Although the
berm was clear for the time being, we had no way of knowing what might lie over the intervisibility line to the north. True, Air Force recce birds had photographed the area and this information was available to us. Still, a groundpounder wants to know what the terrain and enemy ahead look like as reported by someone who has first hand knowledge of the situation through in-person, on foot reconnaissance.

Our ability to conduct the scout mission the battalion commander wanted to run was severely curtailed by higher headquarters. Brigade informed us that the perception at Corps was that 1st ID was leaning too far forward and might tip off the enemy to General Schwarzkopf's plan, and therefore aggressive recon which might tell the enemy about our location or intentions was prohibited. Our elaborate Reconnaissance and Counterreconnaissance Plan using scouts, FIST-Vs, LP/OPs, engineers, rotating line companies, and elements of Eagle was shelved. Despite the valid reasons, the task force did not feel comfortable with being unable to "verify the enemy template" and scout out enemy strength and dispositions.

For safety reasons, Colonel Moreno restricted night movement to LNOs only. Reported enemy activity in the division sector was increasing, with both mounted and dismounted contacts. However, some of these reports proved inaccurate. For example, a suspected platoon of tanks was engaged with A-10s, and the tanks later turned out to be a group of Bedouin tents. On the 17th a friendly fire accident took the lives of two Americans and injured six others. The accident involved a Task Force Iron reconnaissance OP, consisting of a GSR M113 (from a different section of the same GSR platoon which provided support to us), a Bradley, and the battalion commander of 1st ID's 1-1 Aviation Battalion.

The incident reminded us all that danger was near. Soldiers hustled to make sure the bright
orange VS-17 panels draped on the back of every vehicle were easily visible, and that SFC Freeman’s Allied vehicle markings were visible on the sides of all tracks. Shortly after the accident, a small surface-laid minefield was discovered near a freshly-cut breach lane in the berm - the enemy, although quiet, was present and close.

On 18 February, Task Force Ranger jumped the short distance to BP 22. Task Force Iron continued to screen to our front, north of the berm. Positioned in a sector five kilometers wide, we made final preparations for the attack, but the scouts, FIST-Vs, GSRs, and LP/OPs were not allowed north into Iraq. Before the screen was emplaced, Task Force Iron passed through 2-16 in a rearward passage of lines and for the first time since our arrival in Saudi Arabia, there were no friendly units between the task force and the Iraqis.

Task Force 2-16 arrayed itself in BP 22 with a screen forward, line companies three abreast (from west to east, A Tank, D Tank, B Mech) with C Mech tucked in behind A Tank and D Tank, and the mortars operating in split section. The CP and trains were pulled in tight behind the combat elements, and the entire formation filled a box approximately five kilometers by three kilometers. These were very close quarters indeed for a mechanized Bradley infantry battalion in 1991. By comparison, in 1863 at Gettysburg, the entire 16th Regiment - then known as the 11th Massachusetts - had been assigned a sector 75 meters by 150 meters and considered it large!

With the companies pulled in relatively close to each other, radio communications were not a problem. On balance, the vehicle powered radios in the task force fleet were rather old, and a continuous maintenance battle was fought to keep the radios operating. According to the MTOE, the battalion is authorized a CESO - Communications and Electronic Signal Officer - and a 24 man commo platoon. Due to garrison political wrangling, the battalion had no CESO and only 21 commo soldiers. Sergeant First Class Dennis Easley was asked to double as the commo platoon leader and CESO. For six months before deployment and the four and a half months in the desert, SFC Easley and his men did their best to keep the old equipment running. Troops like Private First Class Joseph Mosakowski and Corporal Michael Sample could be seen at all hours of day and night checking and repairing radios to keep our commo "up".

In tactical use, radios in a unit are organized into "nets", where all the different people who want to be able to talk to each other adjust their radios to the same frequency, called a net. Then each station on the net has code name, known as a call sign, made up of two letters and three numbers. These names changed routinely, and for brevity and simplicity, static call signs were established for some positions. For example, all commanders went by the number 6. Thus, Captain Williams, commander of Bravo Company, called himself "Bravo 6", or "Bushmaster 6". The battalion commander was "Ranger 6". All executive officers used the number 5, and so Lieutenant Soto, XO of Charlie Company, was "Cobra 5".

The same type of procedure was used to number the vehicles of the task force. Every vehicle from cargo trailers to the battalion commander's Humvee has its own bumper number, and if you knew the pattern, you could tell who a vehicle belonged to easily. For example, a commander's combat vehicle was numbered 66. Thus C 66 was Captain Rutter's Bradley. C 6 was his Humvee. HQ 18T is the trailer that belongs to HQ 18, the S-1 2 1/2 ton truck. The system was basically set throughout the brigade, so a track numbered A 21 belonged to the platoon leader of 2nd platoon, Alpha Company, no matter what battalion it was in.

As the 19Ks, 96Rs, 11Ms and 19Ds spent their first night on the line, many false spot reports were called in. Troops took time to adjust to the pressures of finally being where they had joined the Army to be! Radio traffic became a little strange, as one unit reported a "go" on the "Green-2" sensitive items report as "Green-2 green is green". A forward section notified its platoon leader that its readiness condition - Redcon - was 15 minutes or less as "Red count one". To add to the nervous energy, the enemy continuously fired basketball flares in bunches of 5 - 7 and cast a yellow-orange tint on the barren desert before us. This misguided technique actually
helped us to the extent that it improved visibility in the forward area and served to reveal enemy recon movement.

Over the next days, in a very tightly controlled operation, all main gun systems were brought up to the berm and test-fired. The mortar platoon conducted fire registration on 18 and 19 February to establish accurate ranges. By this date, a number of British and U.S. artillery units had established firing lines in BP 22 very near 2-16 elements, and in some cases within the battalion perimeter. Initially wary of the possibility of counterfire from photographed enemy artillery positions emplaced in the enemy main line 18 km north, we stood by and watched hundreds of rounds of high explosive ordnance "air-mailed" to the Iraqi lines. In artillery parlance, "the targets were continuously serviced". After it became clear that no counterbattery fires were coming, we welcomed and then cheered on the 155mm, 8", and MLRS crews firing from our doorstep. Terrain management issues were coordinated through brigade in a "working friendly" atmosphere as the raids continued day and night through G-day.

We had one more friend helping us soften up the Iraqi 48th Infantry Division: the U.S. Air Force. At 2:15 a.m. on 20 February, thunderous explosions shook the earth as a pair of 15,000 pound "Daisy cutter" bombs were dropped on the 48th directly across from our sector. Our Air Force Liaison Officer, First Lieutenant Phil Barks, explained that the Daisy-cutter is an anti-obstacle munition which utilizes a rod mounted fuze on the nose of the bomb. Impacting while the body of the bomb is still six feet off the ground, the fuze detonated the huge explosive charge at the optimal elevation for destruction of obstacles. Hearing this, one of the soldiers in HHC exclaimed, "Hell, let them drop 30 of those!"
As the date of the attack neared, the task force received additional troops to augment our current strength. These troops ranged from promotable captains to privates fresh from AIT - Advanced Individual Training. Captain (P) Logan Hickman, a ROTC instructor at the University of Tennessee, joined the task force on 11 February and was assigned to the S-3 section. He had arrived in theater 10 days prior and was in danger of being assigned as the division assistant Headquarters Commandant, but managed to find himself a slot working for LTC Fake, his old S-3. Captain (P) Kevin Smith joined the unit 22 February, just 36 hours before the attack. He had volunteered for the Gulf from his job as Operations Officer at the Defense Language Institute in Monterrey, California, and was also glad to be in a line unit.

The enlisted manning swelled as well as new infantrymen came to us straight from school after a one week inprocessing stint at Fort Riley. They were a welcome addition, but integrating them into the unit was made difficult by the details. For example, these soldiers had M16A1 rifles, an old model which fires different ammunition from the M16A2 rifles the rest of the task force used. Every company had more men than the MTOE authorized unit strength - HHC alone had 415 men, and Echo was at 105% - but no one was complaining! Of course, we realized that the reason we were being reinforced was that the mission we had been assigned might prove a very costly one to carry out.

As the date of the attack neared, the task force was allowed to thoroughly clear the area immediately north of the berm. At 2:00 on the 19th, Bravo moved out to clear berm lanes 12 through 15 to ensure that there were no enemy positions along the berm. A hand grenade and a few RPG rounds were found and destroyed, but no enemy personnel or positions were discovered. On the 20th, Ironhorse was given the mission to clear a portion of the border starting in front of their battle positions and continuing east along the border for seven kilometers. Ironhorse came upon two sets of ruins about 1200 meters from the border and found a blue Chevy truck with a big red box in the back. 1st platoon, which had been assigned security of the company left flank, fired a main gun round through the truck's driver side door just below and to the left of

Flip side of the psy-war leaflet. On 22 February, 3 Iraqi deserters surrendered to TF 3-37. They only had one leaflet, so they each held a corner.
the handle. 1st platoon also destroyed a bunker with a 105mm HE round. The task force had fired its first shots of the war. Score: Ironhorse, 1. Chevy, 0.

After Team Alpha passed the truck, their FISTer observed dismounted personnel in the small ruins a few hundred meters to the north. Artillery was called in and the structures that were once a border town were further demolished. This town was the target of numerous fire missions launched by LTC John Gingrich's 155mm M109A2 self-propelled Fourth Battalion, Fifth Field Artillery. In his honor, the ramshackle collection of corrugated tin huts was christened "Untergingrichheim".

On 21 February, we received FRAGO 8-91 containing the official notification of the date and time of the attack. A FRAGO is a fragmentary order that only changes selected parts of an already published OPORD. This FRAGO stated that Task Force Ranger's mission was to attack not later than 5:30 a.m. on the 24th, clear in zone, and secure BP 32 to facilitate offensive operations. Our follow-on mission, scheduled for the 25th, would be to continue the attack north, breach the obstacles and create four lanes, and subsequently clear in zone to PL Colorado. On the 22nd, another FRAGO was issued to the battalion which signalled a change in timing to the original plan. Instead of invading on G-Day, the 24th, and moving to an overnight position along PL Kansas to allow time for more artillery raids, we would now pull up short on a defensive line (PL Iowa) and then push out a patrol of M1s from Team Alpha to assess the situation at the breach point. If it proved clear and there were no surprises, then the rest of the task force would press on with the attack. If there were obstacles that we had not been aware of, then the patrol would return to PL Iowa and the situation would be reassessed.

Apaches flew night recon and screening missions in the brigade sector that night, searching for enemy vehicles or troops infiltrating to the south. Cobra had the on order mission to recover and secure any downed aircraft and personnel, but was not needed. Later that night, an ATACMS launch from inside the task force BP shook the ground below and lit the welkin above. The sight of MLRS and ATACMS ripple-launching thousands of pounds of high explosives into the night sky was stirring and heartening. There seemed no way we could be stopped. All the rehearsals, sweat, sleepless nights, and training was soon to be put to the test, and confidence and morale were running high. In 1986, General Smith had said in a brief to the unit "I tell the privates they are better trained, better conditioned, and better equipped than their predecessors in past wars. The only thing they lack is combat experience -- the confidence to be successful under fire. Based on our regimental history, I am certain they will do very well if they are called upon to fight." We were about to take the acid test.

At nightfall on the 23rd, Chaplain MacGregor made the rounds of the battalion, giving a final service before the assault. At the TOC, 15 or 20 soldiers gathered for a quiet mass held on the back gate of his Humvee as a light rain began to fall.
At 2 a.m. on the 24th, a light rain began to fall. By 4 a.m. a light misty drizzle remained, swirling in the breeze. BBC reports of major Allied aerial insertions and ground battles to the east filtered in at 4:30, and the ground war started for Task Force Ranger when Scorpion crossed the berm at 5:02 a.m. and established a screen line three kilometers forward of the main body. The scout mission was to identify enemy locations and disposition to prevent the main body from moving into a danger area without prior warning. At 5:38, tank heavy Team Delta crossed the LD as the advance guard of the task force and moved along two kilometers behind the security force to destroy enemy forces and prevent the enemy from placing direct fire on the main body. Team Delta was followed by Team Alpha, also tank heavy. The Ironhorse mission was to maintain visual contact with the eastern flank unit from Task Force 3-37 on our west, to make sure the task force maintained alignment, and to destroy enemy forces fixed in place by Deathstalker.

Team Bravo, Bradley heavy, crossed next with the mission to maintain visual contact with the western flank of 4-37 AR, to assure the task force maintained alignment, and to destroy enemy forces fixed by Team Delta. Team Charlie, also Bradley heavy, was the task force reserve and was prepared to follow and support Team Delta or Team Bravo in the destruction of enemy forces. One mech platoon from Cobra acted as the task force rear guard. Eagle crossed the LD behind Team Delta with the mission to destroy any enemy forces attempting to move to Team Delta's flank.

The task force attacked in a diamond formation approximately five kilometers in width and 10 km in depth. Initial movement was slow to allow each unit to pass through the narrow lanes at the berm. By 6:45 all the combat elements had cleared the berm and were moving in formation toward PL Kansas. At 7:30, Ranger 6 instructed Lieutenant Kubista to slow down in order to maintain a proper distance between the scout screen and the main body.

According to plan, the field trains and fueler HEMMTs under the control of Lieutenant Clarke moved up against the south side of the berm, prepared to move north when ordered. As the task force rolled north, spot reports of bunkers and dismounts began to flood the command net. The majority of the spot reports were transmitted on the battalion command frequency. Each message was thus immediately heard throughout the battalion. The front-line combat data was then sent up to brigade through two channels; the brigade command net and the brigade operations/intelligence net. The brigade command net was available for the battalion commanders and brigade commander to communicate orders and situation reports, and the battalion commander frequently summarized the combat situation for the brigade commander. At the same time, the brigade O/I net was used by the task force S-2s of the brigade and served as the link between battalion and brigade staffs. The S-2 monitored the battalion command net for spot reports and then transmitted them immediately to the brigade TOC.

At 8:20, the scouts reported scattered groups of Iraqi dismounts - foot soldiers - 500 meters to the fore. The mortar platoon, call sign Lightning, fired its first live missions of the war, as Scorpion platoon sergeant Sergeant First Class Harry Ennis observed and adjusted the fires. The task force continued to advance, encountering no heavy resistance. At 9:41, Ranger 6 directed us to advance to PL Kansas, and not to allow the surrendering Iraqis to slow our movement. As the enemy gave themselves up, they were taken in custody by the nearest unit, then passed off to the follow-on platoons. At 10:04, Team Delta reported a dismount with what appeared to be a Claymore type mine attached to his chest. A few minutes later, Sergeant First Class Ennis reported "nine dismounts in trench, huddling together." At 10:04, Captain Samson moved from his position in the combat trains to take control of a captured truck which we could later use for...
The Ranger Battalion in the Breach

1. At 5:30 a.m., Task Force 2-16 Infantry crosses its line of departure, PL Vermont.

2. By 9 a.m., the task force deploys into attack position and nears PL Iowa.

3. At PL Kansas, 2-16 assumes a hasty defense. The task force is to hold between Kansas and Birch for the night. However, resistance is light, and MG Rhame orders the attack to resume at 3 p.m.

4. A massive artillery preparation precedes the attack. More than 11,000 rounds are fired at Iraqi artillery, armor and bunkers in half an hour.

5. Tank companies A and D cut lanes in the trench line while Bushmaster and part of Eagle suppress nearby trenches with fire. Companies B and C race through the lanes.

6. B Company clears the front line of trenches while Cobra secures the support line. Deathstalker secures the task force left flank while Ironhorse is in reserve, prepared to reinforce as needed. By 5:45 p.m., the task force secures the area to PL Colorado.

7. The attack resumes February 25 and by noon the area to PL New Jersey is secure.

Sources: Radio logs, Maj Rachmeler, Army Times.
transporting enemy prisoners of war.

Not all of the Iraqis we engaged surrendered immediately. At 10:02, an enemy squad in the center of our sector sprayed small arms and machine gun fire at the task force lead elements. Their fires were ineffective, though, and they were soon captured. And after several tense moments, the report came back from Team Delta that the earlier EPW was not wired with a mine.

Bravo and Delta reported they were dealing with numerous EPWs. At 10:15, Team Delta reported "at least 25 dismounts moving south with hands in the air. We may be bogged down with EPWs!" Scorpion called in spotting 50 to 70 dismounts north near PL Wisconsin "standing around." There were no two-way direct fire engagements, but the enemy security zone troops who did not surrender immediately were engaged by long range Bradley and 105mm tank fires.

By 10:15, we had passed PL Kansas and were moving rapidly towards PL Birch, 1500 meters closer to the trenchline. Scorpion was north of PL Birch and holding at PL Plum, with one tank platoon from Ironhorse in support. To this point, the task force had moved much faster than anticipated. Ironhorse and Deathstalker passed through the scouts and moved into position along PL Plum at 10:58 and moments later the brigade halted. The remainder of the task force combat elements were stopped on a small crest at PL Birch overlooking the southern trenchline. The initial advance planned for 24 February was complete, well ahead of schedule.

Meanwhile, at 10:27 brigade ordered Captain Turner and his engineers to begin building large rectangular berms to act as a temporary EPW collection point for the many EPWs 2-16 and 3-37 were capturing. The site was selected on the boundary between 3-37 and 2-16, immediately
north of PL Kansas.

The task force stood still, poised between PL Plum and PL Kansas. The assembled might of the task force was awesome to see. Bradleys and Abrams spread out in each direction, and Apache attack helicopters squatted above each company team as OH-58D spotting birds a few hundred meters to their rear searched for targets. In the distance, long lines of Iraqi prisoners were being shepherded toward the brigade EPW pen, taking form to our south.

At 11:45 brigade issued a FRAGO to be ready to continue the attack to PL Colorado, LD 1 p.m. Team Alpha and Team Delta reported they could "make it to PL Colorado with the fuel already on hand," but to go without refueling would bring our fuel status dangerously low. Refueling had to be done before the brigade could move on but the fuel assets were still south. Meanwhile, the situation in the south was one of congestion and confusion. Positioned in relative safety south of the berm in command of the battalion combat trains and field trains with the wheeled vehicles, Captain Riddle monitored the task force progress north toward PL Kansas.

As commander of HHC, the battalion support company, Captain Riddle often joked, "I'm behind you all the way, men. About 10 kilometers behind you, that is." There was a good military reason for the support and fuel assets of the task force to remain at arm's reach, though. Fuel and cargo HEMMTs, 5-ton ammo trucks, and supply deuces are very vulnerable to fanatic enemy stay-behind troops, and machine gun fire and well aimed RPG-7 rounds could effectively cripple the task force by destroying our ability to refuel. To move a 62 ton tank or a 27 ton Bradley at 30 mph requires Horsepower, and to provide the acceleration and weight-to-horsepower ratio these combat vehicles need requires very large and very thirsty engines. The 13 fuel HEMMTs under Lieutenant Clarke's control were a vital but vulnerable part of the task force support structure and had to be protected from enemy fire.

At 10:00, Captain Riddle moved north of the berm to link back up with the battalion and conduct a personal reconnaissance of the terrain between the berm and the task force. At 10:30 he radioed to Lieutenant Clarke and Lieutenant Cummings in the trains, telling them to move north. They did so, but their progress was slowed by a horde of non-First Infantry Division vehicles moving through our appointed cuts in the berm. Traffic control at the berm was very poor and the chaos hindered everyone. Once clear of the berm, cross-country trafficability of the terrain also became a problem as the very heavy trucks moved across open terrain and soft sand. The trains worked their way north to the task force as fast as they could.

At 11:50, Eagle 6 came up on the command net and reported that his company had captured 127 Iraqi EPWs, the remnant of one of the front line battalions of the 48th Infantry Division. The battalion commander, a well-dressed Lieutenant Colonel who spoke halting English, was debriefed on site. He stated that his command post had been destroyed by artillery fires and aircraft bombing. Over the past five weeks, he had buried 250 of his men and seen most of the rest desert to the south or flee north. He also told Captain Schliefer that an additional 500 Iraqis were six miles east waiting to surrender.

At 12:58, as the EPWs were being collected, Colonel Moreno issued a FRAGO stating that an artillery prep would begin at 2:30 and ordering us to LD at 3 p.m. The task force conducted refueling operations as Team Alpha, Team Delta, and Scorpion observed PL Wisconsin for obstacles. According to plan, a platoon of Ironhorse moved forward to inspect the enemy defenses, and at 1:41 reported that numerous pickets without wire were in place along PL Wisconsin. By 2:20, the recon team reported no mines, wire, or tank ditches would hinder our attack through the area where breach lanes M, N, O, and P would be cut.

For the next two hours, the companies processed EPWs back to the collection point, refueled, and prepared for LD. At 2:25, the artillery prep began. The barrage lasted for half an hour and over 11,000 rounds were fired. MLRS launches were too numerous to count. For 30 solid minutes the earth shook as the thunder and concussive force of 4-5, 1-5, Divarty, an attached
British field artillery brigade and MLRS pouring high-explosive and DPICM (dual-purpose improved conventional munition) onto the enemy rolled over us like the beat of a demented metronome. Lieutenant Houser joked "Hell, I don't think we should ever attack again without an 11,000 round prep!"

Soldiers across the task force prepared mentally for what might lay ahead. The artillery was going in and the Apaches were on station, but the infantrymen would still be the ones to physically take the ground and throw the enemy from the objective. For Sergeant Haime Edwards, a dismount team leader of Cobra, the moment is still clear;

Exactly 3 p.m. February 24 was the most choking time that I have ever lived through. Rolling into enemy lines, I didn't know if I was going to survive or not. To see enemy artillery rounds landing two feet away from our vehicle / I felt like I would be sick. But on the other hand, I was in charge of numerous soldiers, and I couldn't let them see fear in my eyes. To our surprise we came to a dead stop with our Bradley running into a minefield. My eyes got big as they could, fearing we would get blown up / We had to back out and continue mission. I escorted 20 prisoners captured in bunkers and the long walk back through cluster bombs was devastating. Careful not to step on one / and got more more dreadful as dark fell. Found numerous weapons, eight crates of RPG rounds / two per position and important documents. Surely, I have seen the face of terror and felt the stinging cold of fear and lived times others would say were best forgotten!

At 3:08, Ranger 6 ordered the attack. Seven minutes later, Team Alpha and Team Delta began plowing their lanes through the enemy positions. By 3:19, Team Delta had cleared lanes O and P through the first trench and moved north to secure the far side of the breach in a support by fire position. As D 66 crossed the trenchline almost on-line with his breach tanks, Captain Morningstar centered his tank as the forward vehicle for his platoons to follow. The company advanced with the M1 breach platoon, Lieutenant Stephen E. Miller's 2nd Platoon, clearing lanes O and P, Lieutenant Hub's 2nd Platoon of Bradleys on the east, and Second Lieutenant Dan Redden leading 1st Platoon on the west, and Lieutenant Joel Miller's ITV platoon immediately behind Abrams D 66 and D 65. At 3:30, a dug-in BRDM 800 meters away fired at the breaching force and missed. D 65 fired back and easily destroyed the wheeled vehicle.

Four minutes later, Captain Rutter reported Cobra was through the breach and moving north into the second trench line in preparation for the right flank move. As Team Delta was fighting through the sporadic resistance from Iraqi vehicles, Ironhorse was breaching its lanes, M and N, 700 meters to the west. As Team Alpha maneuvered through the breach, gunner Sergeant Donald Lee Shively engaged and destroyed an enemy bunker to the front which could have held Iraqi dismounts. To Sergeant Shively's left, Specialist Kevin Miser lowered his plow and created lane N. The company continued moving north and then flanked right to follow Charlie Mech as Cobra cleared and buried their assigned trenchline.

As Team Delta advanced, an enemy Saladin armored car opened fire. From long range, Sergeant Godbold, gunner of D 66, returned fire and destroyed the vehicle with a turret kill. At the same time, another track spotted an EE9 Cascavel armored car much closer and destroyed it with direct fire. The company had difficulty spotting the small, dug-in enemy vehicles even with their Thermal Imaging Sights. At 4:07, Lieutenant Miller launched a TOW from his ITV and destroyed an enemy vehicle a mile and a half to the north. Team Delta made their right turn 3500 meters north of the breach at the third trenchline. Team Charlie turned right to clear the second trenchline.
with Second Lieutenant Dave "Luscious" Labo leading 3rd Platoon on the north, Second Lieutenant Terry Guild's 2nd Platoon on the south, and First Lieutenant James Booth's M1 platoon in the center. Cobra tied in with Deathstalker and Bushmaster to clear the trench lines in a echelon-right formation.

At 3:39, Cobra reported they were clearing bunkers by direct fire, pouring 25mm and MG rounds into the targets if the Iraqis refused to surrender. A minute later Eagle cleared the breach and moved into its SBF slot, protecting the task force left flank from a possible armor counterattack. The company tied in with Team Delta on the north side of the third trenchline, and subsequently destroyed one T55, one ZSU-23/4 anti-aircraft vehicle, an EE9, and two artillery pieces.
2nd section of the mortar platoon fired four missions to the east of the breach site in conjunction with Bushmaster. Each tube fired five rounds four times for a total of 60 rounds on target. The four tracks then followed Bravo through the breach and laid in a position north of the lanes. 2nd section in place, 1st section then moved through and reported clearance at 4:10. All the Ranger combat elements were now on the north side. We had forged the four lanes and already taken hundreds of prisoners with no friendly losses.

The lead companies continued to attack eastward, destroying artillery pieces, calling for fires, clearing bunkers and trenches, seizing ground and taking prisoners. Ironhorse found a surface laid minefield west of PL Oregon, and put out a warning on the battalion command net. By 4:59, the task force was on PL Oregon, five kilometers east of the turn. Eagle reported 15 EPWs near PL Oregon, and four minutes later Cobra had captured 20 more. As we continued toward PL Colorado, more and more prisoners weighted down the task force. The companies reported set on PL Colorado between 5:02 and 5:14 and began to post security for the night. A division intelligence summary - INTSUM - relayed through S-2 over the battalion net reported that over 5,500 EPWs were taken in the theater on the 24th. To many of Task Force Ranger, it seemed that we had captured all 5,500!

As night fell we counted our blessings. The task force had cleared in zone for 28 km, captured 600 enemy prisoners, and breached the enemy's main defensive line. Despite our skill and training, that we had done so with no loss of life or limb was miraculous.

Throughout the night EPWs were segregated, searched, guarded and transported to brigade collection points. Captain Samson, S-4, and Lieutenant Lannom, S-1, were in control of the EPW handling mission. They pressed onto service every type of vehicle they could lay their hands on, from 2 1/2 ton and 5-ton trucks to "low-boy" heavy equipment haulers. Mess hall deuces were used, and even a truck brigade had taken away from us was given back for the EPW mission. Lieutenant Lannom announced battalion intermediate EPW collection points, and the companies brought prisoners to those central locations. They were then carried further to the rear.

By the end of the first day, Bravo had taken an estimated 200 prisoners, Cobra 150, Deathstalker 150, Eagle 127, and Ironhorse 15. These men were in uniformly poor condition, some with no boots, some with no uniforms, and many without weapons. They appeared ill-fed and filthy. Many had surrendered without a fight and looked very relieved to be in American hands. Captain Samson distributed MREs and water to the pathetic lot.

All things considered, Task Force Ranger's first night in Iraq passed peacefully. Just after midnight, Cobra reported dismounts moving 1500 meters east of their position, but did not engage. At 4:21, Team Delta requested transport support for 120 EPWs at their company location, and 15 minutes later Cobra called in 10 more Iraqis stationary 500 meters to their front. The enemy was not making any aggressive moves.

At 5:45 a.m. on the 25th, Specialist Kevin Simon, battalion command net RTO, issued a net call. Movement east of PL Colorado to PL New Jersey would be on order, following a one hour artillery prep scheduled for 7:00. At 7:02, the rounds began to fall as they had the day before. The tempo was slower, but the effect was the same. Buoyed by the success of the previous day and preceded by another mighty artillery barrage, the troops were ready to press to PL New Jersey or beyond.

At 7:27, Second Lieutenant James Adams, assistant S-2, prepared and read the latest intelligence summary over the task force net. It consisted of two main points: 1) there had been no major enemy movement during the night in the task force sector, and 2) a reminder that as the task
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force crossed the 93 north - south grid line (five kilometers to our east) we would be passing into the 25th Infantry Division sector and leaving the 48th behind. Imagery showed that the 25th had built more advanced defensive positions than the 48th, and appeared to be more organized. The commander followed Lieutenant Adams with a warning to the teams to be watching for additional obstacles and more stubborn resistance in the 25th sector. This advice soon proved accurate.

Ranger 6 gave the command to ID at 8:02. From north to south the task force was arrayed with Eagle and Scorpion farthest north linked in with 4-37. Team Delta advanced to Eagle's south across the open terrain with Cobra moving approximately two kilometers north of the main enemy trench line. Captain Williams' company formed the southern prong of the attack, and Ironhorse followed Cobra and remained in reserve.

The task force advanced cautiously, looking for hidden Iraqi troops, unexposed minefields, and bunkers. 21 minutes after ID Ironhorse reported a bunker and destroyed it with direct fire. 10 minutes later, Cobra observed and destroyed two Quad 50mm AA guns, plus a large cache of abandoned 60mm mortar ammunition. At 8:36, Sergeant Stephen Harriau, squad leader and track commander of E32, 3rd Platoon Eagle, reported an Iraqi command bunker with antennas mounted on the roof. He requested and received permission to launch a TOW, and fired a missile directly into the bunker. Immediately after the projectile impacted, over 20 Iraqi soldiers came running out, heading toward another nearby bunker. About to shoot again, Sergeant Harriau saw a white flag and checked his fire. When they closed on the enemy, Eagle inspected the damage and the EPWs as they emerged from the other bunkers in the area. Sergeant Harriau's accurate fire had killed seven and wounded four Iraqi officers, causing the mass surrender of one brigadier general, one lieutenant colonel, one major, four captains, four lieutenants, and 127 enlisted men. The division command post of the 48th Division had ceased to exist.

The task force maintained a uniform front, with Eagle moving only 300 meters east, but seven kilometers north, of Bushmaster. At 8:52, Ranger 6 reported strands of wire running along the 93 north - south grid to his front, corroborating his analysis of the intelligence estimate.

The battalion crossed PL Hawaii at 9:02 and continued to advance. At 9:11, Cobra called in spotting three tracked vehicles and extensive prepared defenses 2500 meters to the front. The Fire Direction Net crackled with the immediate call for fire, but within eight minutes Cobra had destroyed one of the vehicles, an EE9 Scout Car, with a long-range TOW shot. Four minutes later, the remaining two vehicles pulled back. Cobra continued to move in, shrinking the 2500 meter gap between the lead Bradleys and the enemy position, engaging the enemy dismounts in the trenches. At 9:22, Captain Rutter reported the vehicles had pulled back farther to the east. Three minutes later, the artillery was on target, hitting the dismounts who still refused to surrender.

As Bushmaster continued to clear and cave in their trenches to the south, Cobra closed in on the enemy fortified position. Cobra 6 estimated the position to be manned by the remnants of a battalion, with the fighting strength of a reinforced company. Lieutenant Petersen, Cobra FIST, lifted and shifted the artillery fires on order as the team prepared to "get up-close and personal" with the enemy. Lieutenant Guild maneuvered his platoon north and hit the enemy from his right quarter while Lieutenant Labo and 2nd platoon came in from south. Lieutenant Booth and his M1 platoon attacked from the center.

The Iraqis' one way fight with the high-tech, highly trained professionals of Ranger was soon over as Cobra massed fire on the enemy. At 9:48, Cobra reported "using Vulcan (20mm six-barreled chain gun) to rout out dismounts." At 9:49 came the short message, "Dismounts surrendering." The NCOs of the company led the way in ridding the bunkers and trenches of the enemy. One of these NCOs was Sergeant Haime L. Edwards, awarded the Bronze Star with V Device for his actions. Sergeant Edwards systematically cleared a series of bunkers while Team Charlie seized its objective. Through his attention to the safety of his men, the mission was accomplished quickly, efficiently, and safely. Meanwhile, as the infantry were securing and
Outnumbered by the Enemy

consolidating on the objective, Lieutenant Booth's platoon posted 800 meters east of the site to provide security.

Ranger 6 ordered Team Alpha to take the lead in Cobra's sector, and Cobra subsequently fell in behind Bravo Company in the south. As Captain Schwalm moved east toward PL New Jersey, Ironhorse encountered more and more Iraqis surrendering. At 10:24, his report over the battalion net was that "they are coming out of their holes like ants!" Once again, EPW housekeeping duties were slowing the task force as we tried to maintain the momentum of the attack.

To the north, Team Delta engaged and destroyed a T55 well east of their position, following with a 10:05 report of 50 to 60 EPWs at the location. Captain Morningstar led his company from an exposed position in the turret of D 66 as the company captured another 150 to 200 EPWs 1500 meters short of PL New Jersey.

At 11:06, Lieutenant Colonel Fake reported to Colonel Moreno that Task Force 2-16 was set on the limit of advance. The task force had cleared in zone for 14 km, and captured an additional 700 EPWs. As the teams established their positions along PL New Jersey, soldiers were busy rounding up EPWs and preparing for the next mission. Specialist John W. Knapp, Abrams main gun loader of D 22 in 2nd Platoon, Team Delta, had been helping control the hundreds of Iraqi EPWs in his company perimeter. After turning them over to his first sergeant, he was double timing back to his vehicle when he inadvertently stepped on a dud DPICM round. The munition exploded and the shell fragments shredded his body from boots to helmet as the full force of the bomblet exploded into him.

The flak vest Knapp wore under his fire-retardant Nomex jump suit partially protected his vital organs from the shrapnel, but the wounds were extremely critical. The Medevac Huey was called immediately and battalion surgeon Captain Collatier and medical warrant officer Chief Alden Brown set out for the site from their positions in the battalion main aid station. Still, had it not been for the skilled hands and cool head of Team Delta medic Specialist Scott Earle, Knapp would have died before they arrived. Specialist Earle was credited with saving Knapp's life. To this day, Specialist Knapp is still recovering from his injuries. The sad medical truth is that he probably never will recover fully, but the men of the task force will always remember the sacrifice Specialist Knapp made.

Major Schoeppner sounded the all clear and directed Lieutenant Clarke to bring the fuel assets up to PL New Jersey to top off the task force. At 1 p.m., Ranger 6 ordered Scorpion to establish a screen forward of the task force as we consolidated our position and awaited further instructions. Lieutenant Kubista moved his platoon into place east of the battalion, being careful to stay west of the artillery free fire zone which began at PL New Jersey.

Meanwhile, Captain Samson and Lieutenant Lannom were again very busy organizing and running the EPW processing mission. Information came through from division stating that 20,000 EPWs had been taken in the past 18 hours across the KTO, and that the Big Red One had suffered but 10 casualties. At 7 p.m., the task force MOPP status was downgraded from MOPP 2 to MOPP 1, meaning we could remove our chemical protective overboots. A great a wave of foul air must have risen from damp, mildewing boots across the task force! Brigade reassigned Second Lieutenant Evan's ADA platoon with his Vulcans and Stingers to brigade support, effective immediately, and exchanged B/First Engineers for A/9 Engineers, a combat engineer unit from Germany.

At 11 p.m. the mission we had not hoped for was made official by a FRAGO; "Task Force 2-16 defends in sector along PL Utah to prevent enemy direct or observed indirect fire on the breach site. Team Alpha guards forward of Task Force 2-16 along PL Nevada. Task Force continued to destroy bunkers and munitions in sector. Task Force OPCON to VII Corps."
Outnumbered by the Enemy

Now, most of the FRAGOs came over the radio initially. Still, the American army has a fascination with paperwork and "hard copy". Lieutenant James Biscardi, battalion Liaison Officer, had the mission of driving from our TOC to brigade and back four times a day to pick up these papers. The trip wasn't always easy or safe, and the story of the hard copy pickup of our Reassignment FRAGO follows;

The Saudi and Iraqi desert at night reminded me of what the lunar surface might look like-miles and miles of endless dust and sand. With all the people that got a GPS no one needed one more than the LNO. I couldn't believe there were no spares.

The worst experience was on Night 2 of the attack when the TF advanced to PL New Jersey. I had received a FRAGO from brigade and was delivering it to the battalion TOC at 1 a.m. in zero visibility. I was relying on my compass and odometer to get the job done, and I knew we had to go 15 miles to hit the battalion TOC. When Specialist Kirk "Thrash" Nelms told me we had gone 16 miles I knew we were in trouble, and probably in enemy territory. I wanted to call the TOC and tell them I'd be a little late but could only reach First Sergeant Hillyer. Nelms shut off the Humvee so we could listen for the enemy but all we could hear was the rushing wind and sand. After about 30 minutes Nelms thought he saw a chemlite through his PVS-7s. We drove towards it for about a mile and ran into the TF trains where I asked for TOC directions. Though only 300 meters away, it took an hour to find. I arrived at the TOC at 4 a.m., just in time to deliver the 4 o'clock Commander's Situation report back to Brigade. No sleep for us!

On 26 February, as other units from 2nd Brigade continued to push north, Task Force 2-16 began moving back to PL Utah. The task force continued to destroy hundreds on enemy bunkers and trenches as well as abandoned equipment. From morning until night we destroyed, burned, detonated, caved in, demolished, and crushed Iraqi equipment. Over the next two days the task force destroyed approximately 15 vehicles, artillery pieces, weapons systems, pieces of NBC equipment and communications equipment, and recovered numerous documents abandoned by fleeing Iraqi soldiers. An additional 100 EPWs were rounded up. Tragically, two more task force soldiers, Sergeant First Class James Hardesty and Private First Class John Price, were injured by exploding Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition dud rounds.
On 28 February, Task Force Ranger was finally released back to division control. Plans had been developed over the past two days for the impending movement, and LD was executed at noon. By this time, the battalion was becoming quite proficient at long movements, and a corresponding brevity had developed in our road march OPORD briefs. The S-2 would start and spend 1-3 minutes discussing the terrain and distances involved on the proposed route. The S-3 would follow with a lengthy string of grids which were to be programmed as "way-points", or intermediate checkpoints, into the Magellan GPS that each company used for navigation. A short discussion of the movement formation followed, and then the S-4 hit the highlights on resupply and fuel support for the trip, usually reading another list of grids to be used as LRPs. End of brief; execute!

Four hours before our movement, President Bush's unilateral 48-hour ceasefire had gone into effect, but we all knew it might be abrogated at any moment. The battalion commander was anxious to reestablish contact between his 28 tanks and 34 Bradleys and 2nd Brigade. On the 28th we covered 89 km between noon and 5 p.m., our movement hindered by bad sandstorms that kicked up across the desolate Iraqi desert. Bushmaster captured 26 EPWs during the march as they came across a group of destroyed vehicles, but these were the only living enemy we saw that day. As nightfall came, the battalion formed a defensive perimeter with Eagle and scouts screening to the east. The sunset was unusually radiant, a stunning yellow and orange blaze. We didn't know it at the time, but there was a simple, savage reason for the colors: oil fires in Kuwait.

At 7 a.m. on 1 March we struck out on the second and last day of our 90 mile dash across enemy territory, covering 98 km before pulling into a temporary position inside Kuwait 25 km south of the Kuwait - Iraq border. While crossing through the western portion of Kuwait we worked our way through extensive quarries and abandoned mining operations. There were a few oil wells and derricks, but not nearly as many as we had expected to see. At 3 p.m., as the column wound along, three C130's flew eastward above us and discharged a series of huge bundles into the sky. As they fell, immense green parachutes emerged and deployed - the supplies were MREs being delivered to Allied units along our path. No one stopped, but there was some half-joking radio chatter about how nice one of those silk parachutes would be! Still, rumors persist that a certain first sergeant, now retired, managed to obtain one.

Burned out hulks of T72 and T55 tanks, trucks of every description, water purification equipment, BMPs, ZSU-23/4 anti-aircraft vehicles, and 2S1 122mm self propelled artillery pieces lay scattered across the terrain like discarded toys. Most of the enemy bodies had been removed, but otherwise the remains of decimated Soviet scrapmetal was strewn everywhere. Near the Wadi al-Batin, which marks the Western Kuwait - Iraq border the task force passed a still burning T55. As some vehicles moved a little closer to investigate, rounds began to cook off inside the tank, shooting orange and purple metallic flames out of the turret hatches. No one wanted to become a casualty at this point of the war, and we continued our march.

At 4:00, the battalion commander established radio contact with the heliborne S-3 of 1st Brigade, Major Huddy, who informed him that Task Force 2-16 would be attached to the Devil Brigade for the time being. This arrangement proved very short-lived, and by 5:40 we had received the order to jump due north into Iraq to the vicinity of the Safwan airstrip. Our new mission was to form the southern flank of 2nd Brigade's protective formation ringing the Safwan airfield. Task Forces 3-37 Armor, 4-37 Armor, 5-16 Infantry, and 1-4 Cavalry constituted the other perimeter units.
This night as the darkness came there was no spectacular sunset. At our temporary position, the task force was less than six miles from the nearest burning wells. To the east, spits of golden flame capped by billowing towers of black soot glittered in the dusk wherever the eye turned. At first glance, the flames appeared to be individual wells, but a closer look revealed many were double and triple jets. Many of us wondered what kind of twisted, vindictive, psychotic mind would have ordered this? And what kind of "soldier" would have carried out those orders? The air stank around us, depositing a film of soot on top of the coating of dirt the 98 km road march had already layered on us.

Task Force 2-16 rolled at 8:00 to make the 30 km hop north to the border. As units moved north, they continually came in contact with unclear situations and possible danger. This precis was written by Specialist Mark Andrews, an infantryman attached to the maintenance platoon.

It had been a long day and a half on the road for our 2-16 convoy that was transporting the downed vehicles to the new location further north. Contact was made with some soldiers that informed us they had been fired upon and had seen an Iraqi position a half mile further up the road. The trucks hauling the dead tanks were experiencing mechanical problems and had to stop and change several tires, and although it was growing dark the BMO set out with three or four MP vehicles that had joined up with the convoy to scout out the route ahead.

As our small recon force approached the reported Iraqi position, a light began to flicker in a window. Fingers tensed on triggers and selectors were rotated off safe. Behind the building, an APC
became visible. The BMO walked in front of the entry to the building and began motioning the occupants out. 10 or 12 Iraqi soldiers emerged from the building and made it very clear that they were not into the war anymore and would pose no threat. Handshakes were exchanged and the scout group was on its way.

The route was narrow and dark. Several destroyed vehicles were passed, each one a possible hiding place for enemy soldiers. Soldiers fallen in battle lay on the roadside. Our hearts raced until we found a main road to our destination.

We returned to the convoy and moved out shortly with the rest of the vehicles in tow. Back past the destroyed vehicles and the fallen soldiers to the main road where the two separate convoys, MPs and Task Force 2-16 Maintenance, split up and moved out to their respective areas.

At 9:30 p.m. the combat elements moved into the general area and established a south-facing defensive line, with Cobra and Ironhorse in the west, Deathstalker in the center, Bushmaster and Scorpion on the east and Eagle centered behind. Once all units were tied in, the order next came through for Bravo and Team Alpha to move north to the Safwan airfield to provide security for the cease-fire negotiations scheduled for 10:00 the next morning. One of the infantrymen recalls the situation, and shows that soldiers are soldiers. Everyone likes to get away from higher headquarters once in a while, and a platoon can never have too much food on hand;

We were in a defensive position, just outside Safwan after the four day ground war. The company had given us our platoon a mission to pull security at the U.N. Peace Talks with Iraq. What was supposed to be security instead turned into details. Putting up tents, unloading Chinooks full of supplies, and then putting up tents again that the Chinooks blew over. Mad didn't even describe how we felt. But we weren't going to go away with nothing. During the course of the night, we secured as much un-secured food as possible. It was good food too. We stayed as long as we could to avoid the company. In the end, it was rewarding as we didn't have to eat MREs for a few weeks.

Team Bravo's mission was to clear the route through the brigade sector that would be used to escort Iraqi officials to the negotiation site. Ironhorse was to provide security around the negotiations tent at Safwan airstrip. Once these company teams were in place, though, brigade announced that the talks had been postponed until 3 March.

The news of the day reported that the 24th Infantry Division, the first mechanized division deployed to the theater, had encountered a reinforced brigade of the Republican Guards and decimated it. The intelligence briefings we obtained from brigade and division listed a number of Iraqi battalion sized units reportedly located between Safwan and Basra, 24 km to the northeast. These units were in disarray as they regrouped and reconstituted, some trying to flee north across the Euphrates to escape the Basra Pocket, others trying to capture and execute deserters and hold the line. Iraqi internal unrest was reportedly on the rise, and a situation approaching civil war was obviously brewing. For 2-16, this meant extra care in checking refugees and keeping alert for Iraqi soldiers who had not heard of the cease-fire.

On the 3rd, the peace talks began on schedule. Second Lieutenant Jeffery K. Sanson, 2nd Platoon, Alpha Team, parked his tanks near the negotiation tent on the runway, adjacent to six Apaches. A flotilla of eight Apaches, two CH-47s, and three Blackhawks had flown from Kuwait City to the airfiled, passing over our battalion TOC at 9:15. A huge sign reading "Welcome to Iraq, Courtesy of the Big Red One" was placed in front of A 24 and subsequently seen around the world on CNN. South of the runway, Bushmaster's 13 BFVs lined the road the generals' route
would take.

The TAC - the battalion commander and S-3's BFVs and two M113s - had moved up to see the spectacle as well. The battalion commander, Sergeant Kerr, and Sergeant Dexter Jones, HQ 66 driver, proudly flew the battalion colors from the turret of their track, with Staff Sergeant Armenta in HQ 65 M113 - Captain West's track - and Specialist Perry, driver of HQ 32 - the ALO's vehicle - flanking them. At the north end of the runway, just short of the negotiation tent and Ironhorse, stood Major Rachmeler's BFV again representing 2-16. It was a day that Sergeant Raymond Winger, HQ 33 Bradley Commander, says he'll never forget.

General Schwartzkopf arrived at 10:00, flanked by swarms of body guards, aides, and press. Lieutenant General Franks, VII Corps commander, General Rhame, and many other high ranking officers from the division and corps were present. It was a day on which all the men of the division and Task Force Ranger, regardless of rank, celebrated the victory we had fought for.

For the next 10 days, the task force remained in place south of the airfield Task Force 5-16 pulled out and moved south to reestablish itself within 1st Brigade, and Eagle, Bushmaster, and

![TF 2-16 Command Post, Safwan](image)

MG Rhame talks to the troops from the ramp of HQ 171. He tells us, "I'm damn proud of you. That bastard picked the wrong fight!" HQ 171, the comma platoon radio-teletype M577, was the Jump TOC.

Scorpion relocated to the west side of the box. Ironhorse, Cobra, Deathstalker, and the mortars spread out to fill the gaps. As the reality that even though the peace treaty had not yet been signed the war was probably over began to sink in, soldiers began to relax. This was seen as a mixed blessing, though, as Lieutenant Sanson pointed out "The men are all happy that hostilities are ended. However, a majority of them believe the war is over. I fear this may become a problem. Many will let their guard down and may fall victim to enemy soldiers who do not know there is a cease-fire or who don't care. More importantly, they may not be mentally prepared for a resumption of hostilities."

The news coming through on BBC and Armed Forces Radio did not seem reassuring -
heavy fighting in Iraq between Kurds and Republican Guards, plus reports of possible chemical agent use - and we were, after all, positioned in enemy territory. If ordered to fight again, we were ready. Many factors combined to make the days of early March very strange. The war was over, or was it? The Pentagon had announced redeployment for the 82nd and 24th would begin almost immediately, but how would that affect us? President Bush said "No U.S. soldier will remain in the Gulf one day longer than necessary," but rumors were flying that a division would be picked to remain on station for a year. Would it be us?

Sensing the unsettled mood of the men, commanders reassured their troops that any news would be passed along ASAP. On the 6th, General Rhame came to the battalion CP to speak to a group of about 100 task force soldiers, and emphasized how proud he and the United States were of us and the victory we had won. He told us that the schedule for redeployment was uncertain, and that we should expect 90 to 120 days to pass before the division was back on U.S. soil. On the 9th, Colonel Moreno spent the entire day visiting the battalion and speaking to soldiers one on one. He showed that day what soldiers everywhere know - a leader who talks to his men, listens to what they have to say, and gives them the respect they deserve will, in turn, have the respect and loyalty of this unit. There is no other way to earn that respect.

One aspect of the Persian gulf we were all learning to respect was the weather. The desert had bloomed in January in Saudi Arabia, and now suddenly, the rains had begun anew. From about 5 a.m. on the 5th through the 6 a.m. on the 6th torrential rains drenched us. Our task force position was in low ground, with some parts actually below sea-level and streams of water draining off Jabal Sanam, the only mountain in all of southern Iraq, added to the problem. Many platoon tents and individual vehicle hooches were flooded out, and even the TOC had to move 25 feet to slightly higher ground to escape a quagmire. Instead of go through the cumbersome process of tearing down the four TOC extension canvasses and support poles, the M577s were inched forward one by one while soldiers hoisted the support poles and sodden canvas two or three inches off the ground.

A north-south dike over to our east served to keep runoff in the battalion area, but one positive result of the rain was that the battalion trains were able to establish a hot shower point. They pumped water from a huge drainage ditch through our sinator (a chemical decontamination water heating pump) and onto our filthy bodies. Few of the troops had been able to take a shower or bath since the 10th of February or earlier, and had the weather been warmer, hygiene problems would have surely developed.

The bloated, decomposing bodies of dead Iraqi soldiers also posed potential hygiene problems. When we first moved into the area, troops reported wild dogs eating corpses nearby. Permission to shoot the dogs was requested and denied. In one instance, the scout platoon was ordered to bury the dismembered, charred, and roting bodies and did so. The next morning, higher headquarters decided the Iraqis needed to be exhumed for identification purposes. The soldiers of the ALOC drew the duty. It was very unpleasant business and rigor mortis had set in. Specialist Michael Solano was one of the troops with the shovels and remembers how the Iraqis "were as hard as pork rinds."

At about 3:00 in the afternoon on the 5th, brigade notified the TOC that 2-16 had eight slots on the first plane home. We were to identify the men and present them at brigade headquarters at 3 a.m. on the 6th, 12 hours away. Before that time, all baggage had to be inspected for contraband and a myriad of other details attended to. Captain Collier of the original advance party and Master Sergeant Williams of the boat crew went from HHC, and each line company provided lucky men as well. The group mustered at 2:00 and left under the direction of LT Cummings. When they arrived at brigade, they were told that they needed to find their own way to the airport, 35 km south in Kuwait City. Lieutenant Cummings made it happen.
Great Big Flying Black Ones. Honest!
9 March to 15 April, 1991

Division gave our brigade three missions in the Safwan area; screen 25 km north of the airport on the south side of the 2.5 km buffer zone encasing the demarcation line, work on maintenance, and rest. To meet these requirements, the three battalions of the brigade were put on a three part, four-day rotation schedule. Task Force 2-16 was ordered to execute the demarcation line mission from 13 to 17 March and then stand down for maintenance. At 8:15 on the morning of the 13th we pulled up stakes from our home of almost two weeks and headed north through farmland subdivided by eight foot berms and tomato fields protected from the elements by plastic sheeting. We were very careful not to damage the tomato fields and irrigation systems that covered the landscape, and this slowed our movement considerably.

After we had been in place for a day, the locals started coming over from their rundown stone shacks to greet us, inviting many of the troops in for tea. Beggar children would stand by the roadside, arms outstretched asking for food. Although official instructions were to keep dealings with the locals to an absolute minimum, it was difficult to deny food, water, and some medical attention to these suffering people.

As the companies established their positions south of or straddling the highway, refugee traffic through the battalion increased. Some of the civilians were injured, and others were just seeking protection from the combat to the north. 101st Military Intelligence Battalion provided the task force with four interpreters to help us communicate with some of the hundreds of Iraqis moving through the battalion sector.

In one instance, a woman with huge blisters covering her mouth and lips wandered up to the mortar platoon with her husband and child. Concerned the wounds may have been caused by chemical agent that was reportedly being used by government troops against protesters in the nearby port of Umm Qasr, the mortarmen were very careful. They requested a medic from Eagle come over to examine the woman, and contacted the battalion CP to request an interpreter. An external speaker was slung across the back of the Fire Direction Center M577, and the Kuwaiti national interpreter spoke over the radio to the woman's husband and translated for the medic. The family was given help and then continued south to the Red Crescent/Red Cross base in Safwan. There were examples like this from every team and section that was stationed on the line.

In addition to our interaction with the civilians, both locals and refugees, there were limited incidents with Iraqi military forces still loitering north of the highway. On 16 March, Ironhorse sent an element forward of the team position to the cease-fire line. They encountered an empty Iraqi "motor pool" with nine BMDs (a small, air-droppable version of the BMP armored personnel carrier), a command and control vehicle, and a T62 tank. They destroyed the BMDs and C2 vehicle with thermite grenades and towed the T62 back to the company CP as a war trophy. Later in the day, about 30 Iraqi soldiers came back to the motorpool and saw what had happened, but made no hostile moves.

Eagle found what appeared to be an Iraqi military training camp. Various types of Italian mines, small arms, and ammunition were all found and destroyed. Other troops ventured into the remains of the town of Safwan and found abandoned equipment and huge posters of Saddam. These, too, were destroyed.

Our primary mission during the 20 days at Safwan was the destruction of captured Iraqi weapons and ammunition caches. The task force engineers, call sign Apache, did tireless work and destroyed hundreds of thousands of rounds of Iraqi purchased Soviet artillery and mortar ammunition. Bunkers of all sizes full of AK47s, RPG-7s, mortars, NBC equipment, machine guns, and so on were identified, primed, and detonated. Other Allied units to the east were doing...
the same mission we were, and there were several very large ammunition depots in their sector. Several times a day, giant black mushroom clouds of debris would spring into the air, and sound waves would roll over us 10 or 15 seconds later. At night, the explosions were as colorful as any fireworks display.

Abandoned Iraqi vehicles were rated for value as division war trophies and destroyed if not in acceptable condition. Eagle had found an operational T55 tank, bumper number E 66A, and Captain Schliefer moved up in weight class from 14 to 34 tons. Captain Morningstar of Deathstalker appeared at the TOC on 16 March with an intact SA-13 "Gopher" track-mounted Surface to Air missile launcher system that was snapped up by division G-2. Captain Samson delivered a new, holstered, Soviet 9 mm PM Makarov pistol he had liberated from an Iraqi major.

_Safwan, Screen Mission along the Basra - Nassariyah Highway_

*Old Glory waves in the foreground as 25,000 rounds of Soviet artillery ammunition turn into smoke in the background. The odd antenna on the left is an H-Adcock intercept antenna of a TRQ-32 Electronic Warfare system from A Co, 101 MI Battalion*

An SPG-9 recoilless rifle in pristine condition was captured by two privates in Delta and readied for shipment to Kansas.

In fact, the battalion CP was beginning to take on the appearance of a Kabul arms bazaar. A T55 mounted 12.7mm AA MG, 7.62mm electrically operated coaxial MGs, a 60mm mortar with
bridge and baseplate, AKs-47 folding stock rifles, a 7.62mm FMLN Belgian rifle, a cheap 26mm flare gun, and two new RPG-7 launchers were brought in by troops of the battalion. Eventually, all but a few of the weapons were burned and crushed.

On the 17th, 2-16 was ordered to pull south into the maintenance cycle as 3-37 took our place along the demarcation line. Complete 2404 crew level maintenance inspections were done and the mechanics were busy making repairs. The UMCP was located 500 meters northeast of the TOC and carried on changing major assemblies such as engines and transmissions, but the M113 engine shortage continued to hamper the task force. Some platoons saw their fighting strength cut in half as deadlined M1s and Bradleys could not be repaired fast enough.

We were expecting the division to be ordered to take up positions in RAA Heubner, the redeployment assembly area, within a fortnight. What developed was quite different. On Wednesday, 20 March, the task force moved out on the first half of a two day movement to AA Allen, a division assembly area approximately 60 km southeast of Al-Nassariyah and the ancient city of Ur. We were relieved to finally leave the Safwan area, if for no other reason than to escape the treacherous dud DPICM rounds lying all over the ground. Three of the task force's soldiers had already been injured by the "friendly" bomblets, and we were glad to leave them behind us.

As we moved due west through Kuwait 30 km to the north of the route we had taken due east 21 days before we saw many signs of destruction. The ground, pocked occasionally by funnel shaped craters blasted by Mark 84 2000 pound bombs, was cluttered with broken vehicles. In some spots, nothing more than a mangled turret ring, sheared drive sprockets, and a few strands of
Beetles from Hell

track remained of a tank or howitzer that had probably been annihilated by an infra-red, electro-optical, or laser guided Maverick air to surface missile.

We watched the terrain change gradually to a gently rolling sandy soil potted with waste-high stunted bushes and shrubs. As the task force stopped overnight near an abandoned Iraq army command bunker, a number of soldiers liberated various pieces of military office furniture from the warren of rooms and corridors. The battalion commander even found a nice desk to go in the captured Iraqi trailer he had obtained in Safwan! Just south of our position, a slice of 701st MSB was in place.

The 21st saw our arrival in AA Allen, a desolate place that was to be our home for 25 days. A few isolated Bedouin families with black tents, grey sheep, brown camels, and white Toyota pickup trucks were encamped here and there, but none gave us any heed. From our position in southcentral Iraq, the Dagger Brigade mission was to provide security if required by the political situation. There was a possibility that Second Brigade would move north to the Euphrates and relieve the Second Armored Cavalry Regiment in place near Al-Nassariyah, but this mission was subsequently ruled out. On the diplomatic front, the peace treaty had not yet been signed by both parties, and until this symbolic step was taken, the First Infantry Division would remain in Iraq to augment the strength of the American position. The troops began to grow restless, and everyone understood we were also waiting for congestion to clear at KKMC so we could move back to Saudi Arabia. The projected sequence of events was 1) clear and turn in all ammo, 2) jump to Tapline, 3) enter RAA Huebner and prepare vehicles for shipment at port while supply sergeants conduct required missions at KKMC, 30 km south of the RAA, 4) return to port, wash and turn in vehicles, and 5) fly home.

Meanwhile, the battalion assumed a wedge formation on the northern curve of the brigade salient, with Captain Williams and Captain Schwalm on the west, Captain Rutter and Captain Morningstar on the east, and Captain Schliefer and Lieutenant Nichols centered just behind Ironhorse and Cobra. The TOC and trains set up 700 meters south of the line companies, with the maintenance assets and ALOC (admin-log operations center, properly called the combat trains command post) 400 meters southeast of Eagle. This array curtailed the need to travel and simplified communications.

Starting 25 March, companies were required to submit five day training schedules. A lot of time was spent in sports and PT, as commanders tried to help soldiers burn nervous energy and keep their minds off going home. Troop morale was steadily declining as the weather heated up and the passage of time seemed to slow down. During the daily battalion command and staff meetings the topics of discussion included issues of repeated contraband searches, brigade sports tournaments, a brigade small arms and AT-4 range, weather data such an projected heat indices and wind speeds, and 100% organizational and sensitive item inventories. On 4 April, due to a poor brigade maintenance posture, maintenance was declared the battalion number one priority. The battalion commander suspended all training schedules and all sports activity from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. was prohibited.

As April passed the weather was heating up appreciably. The first week of the month in particular seemed very hot and dry, and on the 7th, shifts in the high altitude winds blanketed the entire area with a dense, stinking smoke. The sun was blotted out to the extent that it became hard to read without artificial light - at 3 p.m. ! Other traits of the desert began to endear themselves to us, including the incessant flies, bugs, and scorpions, but the single most maligned member of the flora and fauna was the dung beetle.

Big, black, and heavily armored, the dung beetle has but one mission in life - find dung. In a desert replete with wandering sheep and camel herds, dung beetles were also very successful at their implied mission; be fruitful and multiply. The average dung beetle in AA Allen was an inch long and half an inch wide, without wings locked and loaded. Large ones looked like miniature
Beetles from Hell

Blackhawks as they cruised through the air at a constant 10 to 15 mph, maintaining a mean altitude of two to four feet above sand level. With their keen senses, dung beetles were able to detect and DF a 10-digit grid to any latrine within three minutes. Latrines that had been in place for a day or two would quickly attract an entire clan of the beetles, making little balls of the stuff with their hind legs and wrestling among each for the juicy pieces!

By 2 April, the dates for our movement to RAA Huebner had been tentatively set for 19 April. The division would spend 10 to 15 days at Huebner, load tracked vehicles for HET shipment to port, load troops on C130s at KKMC airport, and fly to Dammam Airport 10 miles west of MGM. With only minor changes, we would follow the schedule outlined in March.

As the division RAA, Huebner had to be ready to receive thousands of troops almost overnight, and advance party soldiers of 2-16 had busily preparing the Ranger battalion's next temporary home for some time before the main body arrived. The original advance party had been led by Sergeant First Class Lloyd Tietje of the Maintenance and Services platoon, and had arrived in early March. They took Staff Sergeant Rodriguez of Cobra, Corporal Sample of the task force commo platoon and five others to begin coordination work. On 17 March, just prior to the division jump to AA Allen, Major Schoeppner took a number of broken vehicles to Huebner and left them with SFC Tietje for repair. In early April, Lieutenant Cummings, HHHC XO, and Sergeant First Class Buffy Sanders, S-4 NCOIC, also moved to Huebner to supervise preparation for the main body. Thirty General-Purpose medium tents and five GP small tents were pitched, and showers and latrines positioned inside the perimeter. A very shallow ditch encircled the compound, intended to keep the ubiquitous white Toyota pickup trucks out.

Meanwhile, in AA Allen, the task force was completing individual firing on the brigade small arms range and vehicle firing on the division range which had been built 35 km southeast of the Division Main command post. On 4 April, the mortar platoon and company FISTers, under direction of Captain Allan West, battalion FSO, travelled to the 4-5 FA range and took part in division artillery time-on-target exercises. 4-5 FA, 1-5 FA (1st Brigade's direct support FA battalion), a National Guard 8" battalion, and all six 4.2" mortar platoons of the division coordinated their fires to deliver a series of 90 round barrages on a single target simultaneously.

For diversions, the ATT phone center was in operation a mile from Division Main headquarters. The ATT phone tents followed the division on their specially assigned trailers, and were available for soldiers' use within 36 hours of arrival. For just $15 per 10 minutes, a troop could talk to his family, and some connections delivered "next-room" sound quality! 12th Chemical Company was given proponency over the security guard force and crowd control, while 2-16 provided nine soldiers to the cooking crew at the adjacent free "Wolf Burger" hamburger and hotdog stand.

Phones, ice-cold Pepsi, and real American beef hamburgers had a largely imperceptible effect on the morale of the soldiers. The effect was hard to notice because it was not so much a palpable change in soldiers' attitudes, but rather a slowing down of the negative effect living in that dustbowl automatically had on the men. Thoughts of home were never very far from the surface, but having a few of the amenities of life available was a major improvement. A paradox soldiers of every war have probably experienced became clear to us too - on one hand, letters, packages, and calls home make time pass quicker and buoy the spirits. On the other hand, the same letters and calls bring to mind the very things about home a soldier misses the most.
Over the 10 day period from 2 April to 11 April, Chaplain MacGregor visited every company, some two and three times, to talk with troops about the coming pressures of reintegration with stateside family and friends. He discussed the topics of new-found independence in wives and children, anger or hurt directed toward the father for his having left, the dangers of drug or alcohol abuse by troops who didn't use due caution, and what has been called the "Returning Veterans Syndrome".

The Chaplain wanted each soldier to understand that, regardless of how much combat the troop had seen, friends, family, and even strangers may treat him like a hero back home. This gratitude was based in the pride the country had for the men who were willing to risk their lives for the freedom of those at home. Whether these soldiers were cooks or ITV gunners didn't matter - the sacrifice they had been willing to make was the source of the pride.

The Chaplain held an Easter mass for the battalion on a small rise north of the ALOC. He describes the scene:

Easter Sunday, 5:45 a.m., 31 March 1991

As the brilliant desert sun rose in the east and the dimming full moon declined in the west, 91 soldiers gathered for the Sunrise Service. Each raised his voice in song, declaring the glorious resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead. As on 82 other occasions during the Persian Gulf War, I preached the message of God, this time from Numbers 21:4-9 and John 3:1-18. After the service, refreshments were served, prepared specially for this event by the Mess Sergeant, Sergeant First Class Rucker, and his section.

A single wooden cross yet marks the worship site, left behind as a lasting reminder that the good news of Christ's life, death, and resurrection had been preached in this barren land.

The discussions the Chaplain held at each company about home helped the troops mentally prepare for redeployment, but the task force was still awaiting the command to return to Saudi Arabia to continue the physical tasks of cleaning and packing equipment for shipment. The division received that clearance on 14 April, and the main body moved to Huebner was scheduled to take three days.

Brigade created a series of requirements that had to be met prior to the unit crossing back into Saudi Arabia. One of these "gates" was the registration of all war trophies and removal of all contraband. Here is the precis of one of the line company troops about his opinion of the whole affair:

The subject of war trophies or souvenirs is a rather outrageous subject. The restrictions on the items is so broad that very little will be able to be taken back. Some examples of items that are forbidden and considered contraband are; weapons or parts of weapons of any kind, notebooks, jewelry, etc., and ammunition. That leaves very little left. Each soldier has to fill out a form in triplicate or he can not take anything. First they said bayonets could not be taken, and a lot were thrown away. Now they change their minds but it's too late. The b.s. one has to go through makes
it not worth the hassle to bring anything back. They trust us to get shot at and possibly killed in combat but they won't even let us take a pair of captured binoculars home. It's ridiculous!

Second Brigade moved on the 14th to a staging position a few kilometers southeast of our previous location and made final preparations for the 8:00 LD on the 15th. The task force covered 110 km on the 15th, stopping to bivouac 25 km northeast of the breach lanes we had sliced through the 48th Infantry Division seven weeks before. Maintenance was a problem, as M1 V-pack air filters were totally clogged by the fine silt dust kicked up by the movement of over 200 vehicles. The fact that we moved in our standard battalion diamond formation helped lessen the concentration of choking dust.

This advantage was to be taken away on the 16th. Moving again at 8 a.m., we had to pull into a single file column for the movement back through the breach area. In fact, we crossed back over the 38 east-west grid line on the exact same lanes that Ironhorse and Deathstalker had plowed 51 days before. DPICM and unexploded cluster bomb munitions still littered the ground throughout the area, and we did not want to take any unnecessary risks with our vehicles or our lives. We remained in single file all the way south back through the same cuts our Captain Turner had made in the berm in mid-February, and only after crossing the border into Saudi Arabia did we spread back into the diamond.

By 9:30, the entire battalion was back on friendly turf. "It ain't American soil, but it feels a hell of a lot better to be out of that accursed country!", a soldier in HHC said, and he spoke for the whole battalion. We reached our appointed night position at 3 p.m. and cleaned air filters, adjusted track tension, and filled canteens. The 75 km we had traversed placed us only five kilometers north of Tapline road, 15 km west of Hafir al-Batin. Only minimal security was required as the brigade formed a tight laager for the night, with 2-16 farthest south, 3-37 north, 4-37 east, and 4-5 northeast. In the morning, we would cross Tapline and close on RAA Heubner.

Tapline road was still the Corps life-line for moving supplies and men from the western desert to Hafir al-Batin and beyond, and to simply close the road for two hours while the division crossed southward would be unacceptable. Instead, Tapline was closed for 30 minutes segments during which crossing units moved south. After the 30 minutes were up, the road was reopened to regular traffic for a set block of time and the cycle repeated.

The first iteration was set for 5:30 a.m., and to meet the deadline, the task force mustered at 3:00 and moved an hour later to the ready line immediately north of the road. In a formation that looked like the start of the Indy 500 we lined up in columns facing the six separate crossing points we were slated to use. At the 6:00 whistle, 200+ Bradleys, tanks, M901 ITVs, M577s, M113s, 2 1/2 ton trucks, M88s, tool trucks, fuel HEMMTs, various trailers, 5-ton tucks, cargo HEMMTs, water buffaloes, M106s, and Humvees lurched forward in a great cloud of exhaust and dust. 2-16 Infantry was across the road in four minutes and twenty seconds flat.

Twenty kilometers further south, the battalion lead elements were met by Captain Riddle and routed into the battalion area. The motorpool quickly filled and troops began moving their gear into the GP medium tents sent up by the advance party. For the first time in three months, 2-16 was again a pure infantry battalion. Upon arrival at Huebner, Ironhorse and Deathstalker moved straight to the 3-37 cantonement area, and Captain Hammond and Captain Rouse's companies fell back in on 2-16.

RAA Huebner was our home for 10 days and the task force got to work making preparations for the one thing first on everyone's mind - a quick, safe return home. Supply sergeants were very busy coding out thousands of dollars of tents, camouflage nets, and worn-out canvas. Troops cleaned and scrubbed personal gear and vehicles to make the upcoming washrack ordeal at port quicker and easier. Eagle conducted a change of command inventory, as Captain
Schliefer prepared to hand over the reins in late May to Captain Weinert from brigade S-3. All gear not to be shipped back in soldiers' personal luggage was packed in the seven milvans.

A rigorous customs inspection was promised (or threatened, depending on one's point of view), but in the end the customs official did not search every footlocker and every PVS-4 case. Guards were posted around the cantonement area perimeter to run off locals who were trying to steal metal and wood from the trash pits, as well as buy weapons or bayonets.

Two major events occurred during our time at Huebner. First was an official awards ceremony honoring the one Silver Star and 13 Bronze Star with V Device awardees in the task force. The division commander and brigade commander were present, and Colonel Moreno received a Bronze Star with V Device. The Silver Star was awarded to Captain Bennie Williams, Commander of Bravo Company. First Lieutenant Kelsey, Alpha Company, 2-16, was also awarded the Silver Star but was a part of Task Force 3-37. The Bronze Star with V Device was awarded to six officers and ten NCOs and men of Task Force Ranger.

After the ceremony, the battalion commander spoke to the assembled men. He said that the service of everyone present had been vital to the success of the task force mission, and that every single one of us would get the awards we had earned and deserved.

The second event was the strict accounting of all TA-50 items lost, broken, or destroyed over the last three months of field operations. Wartime accountability rules had never been put into effect, and thus "combat losses" did not exist in the battalion. The business concept of the "cost of doing day to day business" was ignored and nothing could be "written off". We had travelled several hundred miles over open terrain, trained and rehearsed for weeks, conducted a deliberate attack and trench/bunker clearing operation through two enemy infantry division sectors, destroyed
hundreds of pieces of enemy equipment, ammunition, and vehicles, and some items of our military issue equipment had been lost or ruined. The accounts had to be reconciled.

Every soldier from buck private up wrote a statement defending why they felt they should be excused from having to pay for equipment that had been lost, destroyed, or stolen over the previous 13 weeks in Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi. In fairness to the men, Lieutenant Colonel Fake read the hundreds of statements personally and adjudicated each case one by one with the soldier's company commander on hand to record the decision. The company commanders were reassured to see the amount of personal care and attention the battalion commander gave every one of their soldiers.

When the troops were done with daily inventory, PT, or paperwork tasks, they were free to go to "Dangertown". Division advance party troops erected huge fest tents, installed telephones, and constructed a berm to prepare the R & R center for the arrival of the soldiers. A pizza parlor, AAFES movie theater, giant PX, and Wolfburger stand were all part of the compound, located eight kilometers southeast of the Ranger motorpool. Most soldiers made the 10 mile trip in trucks or Humvees, some walked for the exercise, and couple of lunatics - Lieutenant Mumford and Lieutenant Nells - ran round trip cross country.

Word came down that the battalion would be given about 90 seats for an advance party to return to Fort Riley on 3 or 4 May, 10 days before the currently scheduled date for main body redeployment. The 90 troops were led by Major Rachmeler and First Sergeant Hillyer, HHC, and stayed behind in RAA Huebner until their homeward flight left from KKMC. On the 26th, the MGM advance party departed in convoy with six other 2nd Brigade vehicles, making the 12 hour trip east on Tapline and then south on the Kuwait City - Dammam highway.

The battalion main body moved the next day in two main parts. Wheeled vehicles convoyed to port on the same route the MGM advance party had taken. Meanwhile, the tracks road marched from Huebner up to a HET staging site just south of Tapline and loaded for the trip. As before, one or two crewmen rode in each HET cab with the native drivers. Everyone else was transported to KKMC, manifested, and flown by C130 to Dammam airport. Upon arrival, the troops prepared to unload the HETs as soon as they appeared. For example, to get ahead of the "power curve", Captain Hammond positioned his troops at the HET download site for the wait.
Once the vehicles arrived, the weary troops parked them in the makeshift motorpool, moved to MGM, and set up the last in a string of many temporary homes they had lived in over the past four months. This time, the battalion had an entire eight story building all to itself. This helped eliminate the difficulties we had encountered in January from having six companies spread over four buildings. After settling in, the companies began to prepare for the final "battle" of the deployment: washracks. Almost from Day One, rumors had been circulating about the horrors that awaited every vehicle crew at the washrack.

Our plan was to divide the vehicles by type and size and assign an OIC to both of the washracks the battalion would use. Captain Riddle, was put in charge of the "West Heliport" washrack where all wheels were to be washed. Originally, we had heard that the "Gas Station", a civilian-contract Humvee washpoint, would be available, but the decision was made not to use it. Captain Chuck Burrows, acting S-3, was LTC Fake's front man at the Desalinization Plant washrack, located 10 km south of MGM at the base of the Bahrain causeway. The company commanders were instructed to give all phases of washrack operations personal command emphasis, and they did so.

The procedure for washing and cleaning vehicles was relatively simple. First, vehicles were washed with high pressure hoses and scrubbed inside and out. While at Huebner, troops had removed all secondary loads and cleared out the crew and engine compartments as much as possible, and now the preparation time paid off. While other battalions had to remove all kinds of clutter and equipment from their vehicle before they could begin cleaning, we were able to get straight to work. After a vehicle was ready for initial inspection, it moved to the waiting line where a preliminary inspector would look it over. These inspectors ran in shifts and were available 24 hours a day.

Touch up cleaning was done as necessary and the crew next moved to the final inspection ready line. Vehicles queued on the final inspection line, awaiting their turn on one of the four ramps placed at the southwest corner of the washrack area. Before the final inspection, a documentation team made sure the LOGMARS bar code label, packing list, and customs form were properly posted, and the vehicle moved onto a ramp. What follows the story of one of the battalion's recovery vehicle, told by Lieutenant James Adams, Battalion Assistant S-2 and TDY to the desal documentation team:

The mission at the washrack was to thoroughly clean and inspect all tracked vehicles and trucks. In contrast to stories of scrutinizing inspections for contraband and dirt, vehicles were briefly checked, passed, and then moved to a sterile area. This was generally the case, but 2-16 had one vehicle sent back to the initial wash point.

SGT Robertson pulled his 50 ton M88 tracked recovery vehicle up onto the final inspection ramp. He, like all the other soldiers who had been cleaning non-stop for the past 24 hours, looked very tired in addition to being soaked and covered from head to toe with mud and grime. He was even dirtier than most, because his M88 had seen very extensive use, and was probably the hardest type of vehicle to clean. Still, SGT Robertson had a look of relief about him, anticipating a hot shower and lounging back at the MGM in a very short time. But his M88 did not pass inspection. The inspector told him to wash out the belly plate for ten minutes and then he would be finished. After five minutes, another inspector came by, checked out his progress, and then sent SGT...
Robertson and his M88 back all the way to the initial wash point. Of all the faces filled with anger and frustration during all of Operation Desert Shield and Storm, his was certainly the best example!

After a track passed final inspection, it moved around the western boundary of the washrack and was uploaded on a HET for the trip to the port. A Puerto Rican National Guard unit controlled access to the "sterile area", a fenced in region where the vehicles were stored. Once in the holding pen, 2-16 was relieved of responsibility for the vehicle and the Port Support Activity took charge. The washrack operation went well and rather quickly. The men worked hard, and although exhausted they understood that with every minute they got closer to home. Truthfully, though, many of the troops would probably say that having so many officers down at the washrack made them nervous!

With vehicles turned in, R & R time expanded and the troops took the opportunity to explore MGM and mall in nearby Khobar. MGM had changed in many respects, and all for the better. The telephone center, which had been opened on January 14 with 151 phones, had expanded to hundreds of phones in two different locations. New PXs were open and a pair of theatres showed six films per night. Licensed "Haji" gold, rug, and T-shirt vendors sprung up in the central mall, and AAFES fast-food trailers were doing a brisk business in overpriced hamburgers and cardboard pizza. The water pressure was now more reliable, the elevators less so. The air conditioning was an unheard of luxury, and a few enterprising souls learned to refrigerate
their otherwise tepid sodas by using "100-mile an hour" tape to hang the cola directly in front of the output vents. A TA-50 cleaning point with hoses and supplies was in operation, albeit at the opposite end of the complex. Rock and country music bands played nightly on a stage built on the west side of the compound, and the "Rec Center" ran 14 hours a day from Building 323, originally 2/3 ADA Battalion's residence in January.

The troops relaxed and counted the days until 12 May. Sergeant Davey Brown of S-4 obtained a limited number of desert boots and they were promptly issued. Soldiers who wished to take leave before 1 June were permitted to submit individual statements explaining why they felt it was necessary to do so. In fairness to the men, LTC Fake again personally reviewed every request.

As the battalion prepared to redeploy, volunteers were signed up for stay-behind duty as part of the Port Support Activity. TF 2-16 provided 20 men towards the division total of 600,

Chilling south of Building 406, at MGM near Khobar, Saudi

HHC troops absorbing some sun on their last afternoon in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

commanded by LTC Lingamfelter, the Divarty XO. The PSA mission was to load the division vehicles and equipment and load them for shipment home. (The last Big Red One vehicle was lashed down on 5 July and the PSA boarded planes to come back to Fort Riley.) 1LT Harold "Spike" Christy, Outlaw XO, was 2-16's senior man, and was placed in charge of the Equipment Accountability Team (EAT), consisting of 10 lieutenants and 10 senior NCOs. They inventoried the division fleet and created a database on a laptop computer, and then generated printouts of each day's vehicle load list to fax to Fort Riley. The other PSA men of the Ranger battalion worked in the driver company, shuttling vehicles from sterile areas into the ship, and in the lasher company, chaining the vehicles down in the ships' holds. Private First Class Winston Moore was one of the lashers. Here is his precis:
Redeployment of the 1st ID was one of the hardest jobs that some of us have ever done, especially for those of us who stayed behind in Saudi as Rear-Detachment to do the dirty work.

I was part of the lashing company. Our sole purpose was to make sure that the vehicles were lashed down for shipment. The job was hot and hard. Our days were spent inside the ships carrying chain and lashing vehicles down. The temperatures got up to 130 degrees inside the smell hulls. There is no way to really explain how hard our job was or tell you how much we hated it. I can tell you the operation was typical of any other military operation. No one could get their heads together on how they wanted to get the ships loaded. We spent a lot of time redoing what we had already done because someone would decide that the first vehicle that was put in needed to be moved or maybe the vehicles needed to have more chain.

All in all it was a long, hard job with little to no thanks, but that is typical. We got the job done as best we could with what we had. As the old saying goes "No mission too difficult, no sacrifice too great. Duty first." What a fine day to be in the Infantry!

On 11 and 12 May, 2-16 Infantry Battalion redeployed from the Gulf. The unit was split among three different flights, the first enjoying United hospitality on a Dammam - Brussels - Bangor (big celebration) - Forbes flight, the second taking Northwest Airlines ("one of those planes with no English writing inside", according to SSG Clifford Hanser of B Company) on a Dammam - Rhein Main - La Guardia - Forbes route, and the third riding Pan Am from Dammam - Rome - JFK - Forbes. Delta company and Echo left in the early hours of the 11th, while HHC left last, just after sunrise of the 12th.

After landing at Forbes, each flight moved to buses and rode the remaining 90 minutes to Fort Riley. Upon arrival at Marshall Army Air Field, we turned in our weapons to the waiting unit armorer (they had returned with the Fort Riley advance party) and formed up behind the hangar we had just left. It was 1145 p.m. and light was spilling from the hangar 300 feet in front of us. Our sweethearts, wives, and children were waiting inside. "File from the right, forward, stand fast, March!" We snaked in single file along the tarmac towards the building, battalion colors borne by CSM Sumpter at the front of the string. We were received with wild applause and tears of joy. Quickly we formed in front of MG Rhame's podium, with loved ones and friends pressing us on all sides. After his succinct speech, we all reverently observed a moment of silence for the 18 soldiers of the Big Red One who fell in the desert. The battalion commander released us to our families and pandemonium ensued. It was over, finally over.

As the men and families streamed from the hangar, there in the darkness stood a middle-aged man in a T-shirt and a baseball cap, backlit by the hangar behind him. His cap had patriotic buttons and little flag pinned to it, and he waved a huge American flag as we walked by. He did not know any of us personally - he owed no particular allegiance to us. But he was there, at midnight, to greet us and thank us for what we had volunteered to do. The man symbolized the welcome home we were going to receive from a grateful nation and a thankful world.

Somehow we knew that the parades we would see and march in over the next months would not be directed solely at us, Desert Storm Veterans. The gratitude and thanks soon to be given to us wasn't really ours alone, but was the way a nation was at last coming to recognize, appreciate, and acknowledge the sacrifices made a generation ago on another far away soil. The country, through the soldiers of Desert Storm, would be finally able to extend a hand of thanks and support that should have been offered decades ago. The men of the 16th Infantry and the soldiers of the entire armed forces had finally come home from a war we fought so long ago, not in South West Asia, but rather in South East Asia, in a place called Vietnam. Welcome home, Johnny Libs.
Honor Roll for Task Force 2-16, Operation Desert Storm

Awarded the Purple Heart:

Charlie Team  Private First Class John Price
Charlie Team  Sergeant First Class James Hardesty

Delta Team  Specialist John W. Knapp, Jr.
Delta Team  Staff Sergeant Lester Robinson

Headquarters  Specialist Anthony Newburey

Awarded the Silver Star:

Bravo Team  Captain Bennie Williams, Jr.

Awarded the Bronze Star with V Device

Alpha Team  Captain Horacio Schwalm
Alpha Team  Specialist Troy L. Alves

Bravo Team  Specialist Roberto S. Huie

Charlie Team  Specialist Luis A. Aguilar
Charlie Team  Sergeant Hai me L. Edwards
Charlie Team  Captain Scott E. Rutter

Delta Team  Captain James Kelly Morningstar
Delta Team  Specialist John W. Knapp, Jr.
Delta Team  Sergeant First Class Lauro A. Balladad
Delta Team  Second Lieutenant Stephen E. Miller

Echo Co  Specialist Charles E. Moore, Jr.
Echo Co  Sergeant Stephen P. Harriau

Headquarters  Sergeant First Class Ricky E. Hahn
Headquarters  Major Richard F. Rachmeler
Headquarters  Lieutenant Colonel Daniel R. Fake
A Few Serious Questions

The deployment to the desert forced us to put into practice many of the theories which the U.S. Army calls doctrine. And as we moved along, we found ourselves continually obliged to reassess and modify the doctrine to fit the contingencies of the situation. For example, we quickly learned the value of locating our battalion field trains, not in the 201st FSB area as called for by the book, but tucked in relatively close to the combat elements of the task force. True, this required some adjustments, but on the whole we were able to maintain more support forward. The list that follows is a general collection of some questions we came to ask about operations outside the task force. These are serious questions based on facts and our perceptions.

1. Given the conditions we were operating under, why was the combat zone OR Rate so high when compared to the garrison OR Rate?

2. Why did combat service support soldiers have Desert Boots to spare and front-line troops have to wait almost until we went home?

3. Why did these same support soldiers have soda and other luxuries and we didn’t?

4. Why were the division intelligence photos so rare and so bad?

5. Why didn’t we have accurate information about how weak the Iraqi defenses really were?

6. Why did some troops still have no DCUs at all after two months in theater?

These lists are provided to help the non-military reader make sense of the often confusing enlisted and officer rank structure.

From lowest to highest, ranks progress as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enlisted</th>
<th>Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private PV2</td>
<td>I Second Lieutenant 2LT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private First Class PFC</td>
<td>I First Lieutenant 1LT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialist SPC</td>
<td>I Captain CPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporal CPL</td>
<td>I Major MAJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant SGT</td>
<td>I Lieutenant Colonel LTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Sergeant SSG</td>
<td>I Colonel COL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant First Class SFC</td>
<td>I Brigadier General BG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master Sergeant MSG</td>
<td>I Major General MG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Sergeant Major CSM</td>
<td>I Lieutenant General LTG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A Few Not-so-serious Questions

The following questions are all tied to inside jokes.

Ask Cpt West about the 98 east-west grid line.
Ask Maj Rachmeler if there are any general officers he doesn't know personally.
Ask Cpt Rouse about Col Moreno's MGM leave policy.
Ask LT Mumford about the conversion factor between knots and mph.
Ask LT Nichols why he's Lightning 1 and not Lightning 6.
Ask for "Fat Girl", "Planethead", "Break break", "Horsehead", "Satellite Sam", the "Michelin Man".
Ask Cpt Cummings for directions to the Palace.
Ask Cpt Samson about four pairs of PVS-7b's.
Ask Cpt Schliefer what got him so mad he wanted to kill someone.
Ask most of the troops in HHC if they wanted to kill someone.
Ask Cpt Riddle about the Amazing Rubber Man.
Ask LT Labo about....
Identify the following:
Never trust your subordinates
Never compliment your subordinates
Always require volumes of administrivia of subordinates
Ask LT Kubista about MTLBs and RPG-7 rounds.
Ask Chief Thomas about prison.
Ask LT Borland about following directions.
Ask Cpt Brosch about doctrine (pack a lunch).
Ask anybody who the commander of HHC is.
Ask SSG Phillips about the meaning of this: "907 vs 1000+".
Ask Capt's Rouse, Hammond, Morningstar, and Schwalm what "This is it" means.

The following are some of the whacky rumors that made their way around camp;

20-30 JAN Iraqi paratrooper platoon landed on Tapline and fought it out with 3 ACR. Four KIA, 20 captured.

10 JAN Iraqi frogmen infiltrated port, were spotted by guards who sent a Bradley from the quick reaction force and blew them away.

20-30 JAN 5 -16 Infantry wandered into Iraq, got into a fire fight, and was half annihilated.

29 AUG Some of the Saudi HETs were equipped for fording operations.
Dramatis Personae

Rosters

The following name rosters were collated from old records. I have made every effort to include every soldier, but inevitably, some names must have been left out. If your name is AWOL under your company, please look for it under the others. If it is still MIA, please contact me at 1851 West 800 North, Salt Lake City, Utah 84116, (801) 596-3031, and I will correct the computer disk and try to get you a corrected copy of the book.

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, 2 - 16 INFANTRY

Maintenance
ANDERSON, JOEL D. SGT
ANDREWS, MARK A. SR. SGT
APLEY, DAVID J. PV2
BAYLESS, JERALD R. N. PV2
BERGMANN, RICHARD J. SPC
BETHUNE, DWAIN SGT
BIER, MATTHEW W. SPC
BIGHAM, MARVIN D., JR. CPL
BIRD, JOHN H. SGT
BISHOP, MARK E. III SGT
BLAIN, FRANK A. SPC
BLANKENBAKER, DONIVAN PFC
BONN, BARTON D. CPT
BOTT, JOSEPH E. SPC
BRONNER, DAVID J. SGT
BROWN, HUEY L. III PFC
BROWNE, TIMOTHY M. SPC
BUTTON, HARRY E. JR. SPC
CAMERON, ARTIE R. SSG
CAMERON, BRUCE E. III. PFC
COX, KENNETH T. SGT
CROWLEY, MICHAEL P. SSG
DAVEY, MICHAEL S. SGT
DAVIS, ROBERT E. SPC
FAIR, DAVID S. SPC
FERENCIK, TROY A. SPC
FOSEN, MICHAEL A. SPC
FULTZ, REX A. SPC
GARCIA, VIGILIO G. MSG
GILBERT, CHRISTOPHER L. SPC
GORDON, MICHAEL B. SPC
HAGERMAN, ROBERT R. SGT
HANSEN, ROGER M. SGT
HARRIS, GENE W. PFC
HASKINS, MELVIN T. SGT
HAUGEN, MALCOLM J. SGT
HERSHBERGER, TIMOTHY L. SGT
HOGAN, MELVIN J. PFC
Dramatis Personae

HOPKINS, RICHARD H. SGT
HOWELL, CHARLES L. JR. SPC
HUHNSTOCK, JEFFREY W. SPC
IOANES, MICHAEL J. SSG
JACOB, JOHN W. SPC
JAMES, JOHN P. III SPC
JUNGE, DONALD M. SGT
KIRKSEY, JEROME R. SGT
KITCHENS, DANNY R. SPC
KRULL, THOMAS W. SPC
LEE, JOHN K. PFC
LEECE, WESLEY J. SPC
LOGSDON, MICHAEL G. PFC
LOTT, JAMES L. SPC
LOVATO, STEVEN D. PFC
Mc CORMICK, ALBERT V. SFC
Mc GREW, LUCAS SPC
MCKINNEY, EVERETT D. SGT
MILES, DAVID A. SPC
MOORE, CHARLES E. SPC
MORALES, MICHAEL A. SPC
NEELEY, FRANK III SPC
NEWBUREY, ANTHONY M. SPC
PETERSON, KURT W. SPC
PETTIT, CLIFFORD L. PFC
POWELL, BARRY J. SPC
PUMPHREY, OSCAR S. SPC
QUILLEN, BRAD A. PVT
RAMSEY, ROBERT P. SGT
ROBERTSON, TYSON B. SGT
RODRIGUEZ, JUAN SSG
ROE, JON W. SPC
RULEAU, CHARLES E. SGT
SCHLUTERBUSCH, LYLE A. SGT
SCHULTZ, CARL S. II SPC
SEALS, TRAVIS O. SPC
SIEGERT, KYLE A. SPC
SILVA, FRANCIS R. JR. SGT
SMITH, ROBERT L. SPC
SNOW, JOSEPH R. SSG
SOALES, DONALD E. SPC
SPITZER, MARK E. SPC
STRINGFELLOW, JEREL E. SPC
TALKINGTON, WILLIAM B. SGT
TAYLOR, KELLY E. SFC
TENNELL, DOUGLAS K. SPC
THOMPSON, DOUGLAS L. SPC
TIEFIE, LLOYD R. SFC
TIPADO, JOSEPH III PVT
TRAHAN, MICHAEL W. PFC
TRIBBLE, VICTOR L. SFC
TUCKER, GERALD L. SSG
UPRIGHT, DAVID J. SGT
WESTERN, JAMES D. SPC

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Dramatis Personae

WHITE, DAWONE D. PVT
WILLIAMS, NATHANIEL JR. SPC
WITTMAN, MARK T. SGT
WRIGHT, DANIEL R. SPC
YARBROUGH, MICHAEL R. CW2
YOUNGBLOOD, EARL E. PV2

Scouts
ARMSTRONG, JAMES J. SPC
BALDRIDGE, TIMOTHY S. PFC
BLAND, BRIAN E. CPL
BUNCH, GILBERT L. CPL
CHIN, LLOYD V. SGT
CONLEY, RICHARD J. SPC
COPPIN, PHILLIP L. SPC
DAVIDSON, RONALD T. PFC
ENNIS, HARRY J. SFC
FULCHER, BRENT L. PFC
GARDNER, JEFFERY K. SGT
GRIFFIN, HENRY E. JR. CPL
INGLESBY, THOMAS P. SSG
KEARBHEY, JEFFERY L. SGT
KIMBALL, THOMAS G. JR SSG
KING, ERIC S. PFC
KUBISTA, FRANK G. 1LT
LAPLANTE, GENE E. SPC
LORAINE, JAMES M. SPC
MARBLE, CHARLES L. PV2
MCEACHERN, THOMAS D. SPC
MORAN, STEVEN P. PFC
MURPHY, JOHN D. SPC
PEACH, DONAVON P. PV2
RAMOS, MANUEL V. PFC
RARRICK, JEFFREY A. SSG
SAULS, RODNEY E. PFC
STEWART, JONATHAN W. PFC
TURTURRO, CHARLES J. PFC
UNDERDUE, KIRBY D. PFC
USSERY, RICKY L. SSG
VEASEY, THOMAS L. SPC
VIENS, SCOTT H. SGT
WILKINS, BRIAN R. PFC

Headquarters
SULLIVAN, JOHN P. SSG
BOYD, EDWARD J. SGT
CERA, FEDERICO M. JR. PFC
CUMMINGS, BRIAN P. 1LT
DAVIS, SCHANE N. PFC
DUNCAN, ROBERT P. SPC
FRANCOM, DALE PV2
HAMILTON, ROBERT L. SGT
Dramatis Personae

HERNANDEZ, MICHAEL K. SPC
HILLYER, STEPHEN G. 1SG
LESLIE, JAMES SPC
LOBIG, MICHAEL A. SFC
MASON, CARLAS W. SPC
Mc ADAMS, ALAN M. JR. SPC
MEARS, MICHAEL T. SGT
PETERTON, JAMES D. SSG
RIDDLE, DUANE H. CPT
SMITH, IVAN SGT
STAFFORD, RANDY D. CPL
TORRES, CHARLES F. SPC
WILSON, CORY SPC

Medics
BARGER, JAMES D. PFC
BARNES, LEROY SGT
BARTH, EDWARD R. PV2
BORLAND, JEFF 1LT
BROWN, ALDEN M. CW2
CHARLES, STEPHEN W. SPC
CHAVIS, EDDIE D. SGT
CROCKETT, JAMES E. SGT
DARBY, GARY L. PFC
DICKSON, MICHAEL W. SPC
EARLE, SCOTT H. SPC
EDELMAN, ROBERT W. PFC
FITCH, ROBERT S. SPC
FLETCHER, KELVIN C. SSG
FORGEY, RICHARD L. SPC
FRAZIER, SCOTT A. PV2
GAMEZ, HECTOR SSG
GRiffin, EMAS P. SSG
HANEY, WILLIAM P. SPC
HARKINS, JOSEPH J. PFC
HILL, LEONARD B. PV2
HOWARD, JAMES SPC
HURLEY, LARRY L. SPC
JEFFERSON, BARRY PV2
KEMPLIN, JAMES E. SPC
KILE, MICHAEL T. SPC
MONTALVO, HOWARD SPC
MORROW, TERRELL G. 1LT
POOLE, HERBERT K. SGT
ROLLISON, MARTY L. SGT
SANDERSON, CEDRICK SFC
SEARS, ANTHONY T. SPC
SOWINSKI, GARY L. SPC
SPENCER, WINSTON JR. SPC
STAFFORD, JEFFREY S. CPL
TASKER, RALPH O. SGT
THOMPSON, LAPIERRE L SPC
THOMPSON, PATRICK S. PFC
Dramatis Personae

TORRES, KEVEN SPC
TYLER, JEFFREY A. SPC
VAN DE RIET, DANIEL CPL
WATSON, DERRICK SGT
WILSON, DAVID J. SPC
WORKMAN, BREN K. SPC

Mess
FORTENBERRY, DERRIEL H. PFC
HARSHAW, ALAN L. SGT
KEITHS, WILLIAM L. SPC
LAMBERTSON, PHIL O. SPC
LAYNE, THOMAS L JR. SGT
MARK, EDDIE D. JR. SPC
MITCHELL, ELIJAH JR. SGT
NATAL, HECTOR H. M. SPC
PALMER, DANilo M. PFC
PETTY, ROBERT L. SSG
PRESTON, DARRYL A. SGT
REUTER, MICHAEL D. PFC
RILEY, ROBIN W. PFC
RUCKER, JOE A. SFC
SHARPE, LEANDER SSG
SIBOLIBAN, SIMON PFC
SMITH, JOSEPH M. SPC
WOODFORD, JOSEPH R. SPC

Mortars
ALBA, LUIS C. PFC
ALEXANDER, GEORGE A. PFC
ARROYO, PETE A. SGT
BECKER, MICHAEL W. SPC
BLOW, WILLIAM J. PFC
BUNTON, ROBERT D. PV2
CALLANDS, KEITH J. PFC
CHAN, RAMON SPC
DE YOUNG, ALEXANDER J. SPC
DELAROSA, ELOY SPC
DUCLERC, LOUIS A. SFC
ESPINOZA, ROBERT A. PFC
EVANS, JOHN M. SPC
FRANCE, MICHAEL E. CPL
FREITAS, JOHN A. SPC
GREENE, WENDELL SSG
GUTU, DANNY SGT
HAHN, RICKY E. SFC
HAHN, ROBERT J. SPC
HAHN, SCOTT A. PV2
HUTCHINSON, CHARLES SFC
HYCHE, RICKY G. SPC
KEARNS, ANTHONY L. PV2
KOCHER, BRUCE D. SGT
LYNCH, DALLAS JR. SPC

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MIDDLETON, DAVID L.  SSG
MOORE, EDWARD T.  SSG
MOORE, NATHAN A.  PV2
NEU, WILLIAM H.  SPC
NICHOLS, DARYL L. JR.  1LT
NIEVES, DAVID A.  SPC
NIXON, JOHN P.  SPC
ORTIZ, BEIMAN  SPC
PASCHAL, MARK A.  PFC
POTTS, JOHN D.  SPC
REEVES, CRANDALL L.  SPC
REEVES, JOEY D.  PV2
RUTLEDGE, RONALD S.  SPC
SAMUEL, PHILLIP  SPC
SCHREIBER, DONALD A.  SGT
WALES, JOHN D.  SPC
WILSON, GLENN R.  SGT
WILSON, JAMES D.  PV2

Commo platoon
BANKS, TIMOTHY J.  SPC
BOYD, KENNETH L.  PV2
CARTER, RODERICK S.  SPC
COOPER, JASON M.  SPC
DAVIS, EDDIE  PVT
EASLEY, DENNIS M.  SFC
FARRELL, STEVEN A.  SGT
GRANT, JOSEPH T.  PFC
GREEN, LEON  SSG
HILTON, BRIAN D.  PFC
HUDSPATH, JOHN C. IV  PV2
MOSAKOWSKI, JOSEPH D.  SPC
ROBERTS, DONALD L.  SPC
ROMINE, BRIAN W.  PFC
SAMPLE, MICHAEL L.  CPL
SMITH, CHRISTOPHER  PVT
ST. MARTIN, RONALD E.  PFC
WILLIAMS, KYLE B.  PFC

Support Platoon
ALLEN, PAUL P.  PFC
AVILA, VINCENTE JR.  PV2
BILLELLO, VINCENT J.  PVT
BOHAN, DAVID A.  CPL
BRADLEY, MICHAEL  SPC
BRADLEY, RICHARD E.  PFC
CHO, HONG M.  SFC
CLARKE, SCOTT  1LT
CROSS, JONATHAN H.  SPC
DEAN, KENNETH P.  PV2
DIAZ, LUIS  PV2
DUNCAN, IAN G.  CPL
GANDARA, MERCED R.  SSG
Dramatis Personae

GIBBS, BRIAN T. PFC
GRIBBLE, TODD E. SPC
HALLIBURTON, ELDON PV2
HAMILTON, BRYAN T. SPC
HANEY, RODNEY L. SPC
HASKINS, JAMES K. SSG
HIGNITE, ALAN M. PFC
HOFFMAN, RICHARD D. SPC
HUGHES, BRANDEN SPC
INGRAHAM, ROBERT PV2
JACKSON, LAMONT M. SPC
JONES, STANLEY L. SSG
KAHRIG, DONALD L. JR. PFC
MARRONE, DANIEL J. CPL
Mc ELANEY, KEITH M. PV2
Mc INTOSH, BROCK S. SPC
McELHINNEY, DENNIS J. SPC
MILLER, MICHAEL W. SPC
MOYER, ALTON K. PV2
MURPHY, THOMAS C. PV2
NOLL, TERRY PVT
OWEN, JAMES W. PVT
PETCOFF, RONALD J. SPC
PRECHT, LAWRENCE R. SPC
PRICHARD, STEVEN E. PVT
RANDALL, MICHAEL V. PFC
RASITETER, STEVEN PV2
RAYFORD, KEVIN D. SPC
REVELS, ROBERT L. SSG
RHODES, RICHARD W. PFC
RITTWEGER, BRYAN PVT
SEYMOUR, ROBERT PV2
SHELINE, JONATHAN D. PV2
SLABAUGH, MARTIN E. SPC
SLOZER, SCOTT A. PFC
SMITH, CLARK PV2
STAKE, TODD A. PFC
STAYTON, ANTONIO D. PFC
STOKKE, MARK A. SPC
STUART, ROBERT L. PFC
TEEUWE, TODD A. SPC
TETTERTON, DARRELL L. PFC
ULIBARRI, KEVIN F. SPC
VUOCOLO, THOMAS PV2
WADDELL, ROBERT W. PV2
WAGNER, SCOTT E. SGT
WEAVER, RYAN PVT
WILSON, MICHAEL B. PFC
YOUNG, BRADLEY L. PVT
ZIMMERMAN, BRIAN L. PVT
Dramatis Personae

S1, S2, S3, S4

S1
ARMENTA, RUBEN A. SSG
ASKEW, LEANDER E. PFC
BELL, ANTHONY P. PFC
BRASFIELD, RANDY L. SPC
FERNANDEZ, MARINO D. SGT
GRAHAM, VICKEY T. SGT
HITZFELD, MARK K. SPC
INGRAM, CHUVEZ M. SPC
KRAFT, JOSEPH W. SGT
LANNOM, DONALD A. 1LT
LUXFORD, JOHN A. SPC
MAC GREGOR, THOMAS A. CPT
PETTERMON, STANLEY E. SGT
PHILLIPS, MICHAEL A. SSG
RAINES, GARPEL SPC
RANKINS, NAVERIAL B. SFC
SCHOEPPNER, DENNIS W. MAJ
SUMPTER, TIMOTHY CSM

S2
ADAMS, JAMES H. 2LT
CULVER, BRUCE SGT
MOORE, WINSTON L. PFC
MUMFORD, JAY C. 1LT
SCHAEFFER, DAVID C. SPC
WILLIAMS, KENNETH R. MSG

S3
BEASLEY, CHRIS, PFC
BISCARDI, JAMES E. 1LT
BOWDISH, EDGAR S. SPC
BOYD, CHRISTOPHER PV2
BROSCH, SCOTT A. CPT
BURROWS, CHARLES L. CPT
COLLIER, DAVID L. CPT
DOYLE, DUANE F. SPC
ECTOR, TERRY SFC
FOSMIRE, MICHAEL A. SPC
HEARN, RONALD G. SFC
HICKMAN, LOGAN CPT
HOUSER, ROBERT P. JR. 1LT
HUYCK, JEFFREY H. SPC
INDERRIEDEN, CHARLES SSG
JONES, DEXTER B. SGT
JONES, RAYFIELD SSG
KERR, RICHARD D. SGT
KLARENBACK, ROBERT G. SPC
MAZE, PHILLIP D. SPC
NELMS, KIRK D. SPC
Dramatis Personae

PERRY, OLIVER D. PFC
RACHMELER, RICHARD F. MAJ
RATTERREE, JAMES V. SPC
SHOLTZ, GEORGE A. JR. SSG
SIMON, KEVIN T. SPC
SMITH, KEVIN CPT
THOMPSON, TIMOTHY D. SSG
WALTRIP, ROSS M. PVT
WHITE, MICHAEL P. SSG
WILKINSON, CECIL E. SGT
WINGER, RAYMOND L. SGT
ZUPKOFSKA, DAVID R. PVT

S4
BENNETT, BRUCE K. CPL
BROWN, DAVY A. SGT
HIGGINBOTHAM, R. 2LT
MASON, PHILLIP D. CPL
PEREZ, HERIBERT SSG
SAMSON, MARK A. CPT
SANDERS, BUFFY C. SFC
SOLANO, MICHAEL B. PFC

ALPHA COMPANY, 3-37 ARMOR
IRONHORSE

AGUIRRE, JESUS 2LT
ALSTON, MICHAEL SGT
ALVES, TROY SPC
AMULONG, NOEL SPC
BEAN, CLARENCE PFC
BEATTY, JEROD SGT
BIRD, SCOTT SGT
BAILEY, JEFFERY SSG
BOOTH, JAMES 1LT
BRINK, STUART SPC
BROWN, RALPH SPC
BROWN, WARREN SGT
BROWNELL, CLINTON SPC
UTLER, JERRY SFC B
CALLANDS, MICHAEL SGT
CASAS, FRANCISCO PFC
CHANDLER, LOYD PFC
COUNCE, KENNY PFC
DI KISH, JERE PV2
EASTHAM, DENNIS SGT
FISHER, CHRISTOPHER SGT
HARBAUGH, JAMES SPC
HAWES, CHARLES SPC
HENNING, JOHN SSG
HESKETT, GARY SFC
HOLCOMB, DAVID 1SG
HOUSE, TONY SSG
HUSSEY, FREDERICK SPC
IVERS, MALCOLM PFC
JONES, DANNY SGT
KEY, DANNY SPC
KLINE, TODD PFC
JOHNSON, BYRON PV1
KONOPACKE, BRANT SPC
KYLES, MICHAEL SPC
LEIFRIED, DARIN CPL
LINDSEY, CHRISTOPHER SPC
LINSCOMB, WESLEY SPC
LINSCLOTT, DUANE SPC
LOCKE, WILLIAM SFC
LONG, JERRY SPC
LOPEZRAMOS, JUAN PFC
LUCAS, MICHAEL SSG
MAGALLON, CARLOS PV1
MARSHALL, ANTHONY SPC
MARTINEZ, DAVID SGT
MATTEO, GARY SGT
MCCOY, JOHN SSG
MCKENDRY, EDWARD SGT
MISER, KEVIN SPC
MONTGOMERY, JAMES SPC
MONTS, JESSE SSG
MOSES, WILLIAM PFC
NEWMAN, TIMOTHY SPC
PELLETIER, GARY SPC
RATLIFF, DON PFC
REARDON, TOMMIE SGT
REMMENGA, PAUL SGT
RICHARDSON, DARREN SPC
RIVERA, CHARLIE SGT
ROSS, WILLIAM SSG
SADLER, JOE SSG
SANSON, JEFFREY 2LT
SCHMIDT, CHRISTOPHER PFC
SCHWALM, HORACIO CPT
SELLERS, JAMES PV1
SHIVELY, DONALD SGT
STEWART, CARL SGT
STEWART, ROBERT SPC
SWAIN, WILLIAM CPL
VANDYK, MICHAEL SPC
WALD, MARK 1LT
WALTERS, JAMES SPC
WILSON, ANDREW SSG
YOUNG, RAYMOND PV1

Dramatis Personae
BRAVO COMPANY, 2 - 16
BUSHMASTER

ALLEN, MARK SGT
ARMSTRONG, LOUIS SGT
ARRINGTON, ALLEN PFC
AUSTIN, LANNY PV2
BARKSDALE, MICHAEL SFC
BISHOP, CHRISTOPHER SSG
BLAKE, JERRY SSG
CADLE, JASON SPC
CHAPMAN, AUBREY SPC
COSSIBOOM, JEFFERY SPC
CREIGHTON, JAMES SPC
CROCKETT, JAMES SSG
CROWELL, BOBBY PFC
CULLINS, CHARLES SPC
CUMMINGS, HENRY SPC
DAVIS, LEGRAND SSG
DECK, DENNIS SPC
DENNENY, JOSE SGT
EDRADA, JAMES SGT
FRANKLIN, NEAL SPC
GIBSON, FREDDIE SPC
GOMEZ, JOHN PFC
GOODMAN, SCOTT SPC
GREEN, FRANKLIN SSG
GRIFFIN, ERIC SPC
HANEY, WILLIAM SPC
HANSEN, CLIFFORD SSG
HARVIN, CHRISTOPHER PFC
HATFIELD, MARK SPC
HUB, KEVIN 1LT
JAMES, DAVID SGT
JAMES, WALLACE SPC
JIMERSON, KEVIN SPC
JONES, RODNEY SGT
JOSEY, ANDRE SSG
KARPEW, MICHAEL SPC
KEEN, WILLIAM SSG
KEETON, JAMES SGT
KENNEDY, RICHARD SPC
KERR, DAVID SGT
LEE, MATTHEW PV2
LEE, BRIAN SPC
LEWIS, JEFFREY SSG
LONGINO, JOHN SPC
MABARDY, KARL 1SG
MANUEL, DENNIS SSG
MCCCLAIR, REVEN SPC
MILLS, BRADLEY PV2
MITCHELL, ROBERT 1LT
MOODY, WILLIAM SFC
Dramatis Personae

MOORE, GREGG JOEL  SPC
MORET, FELIX  SFC
MORGAN, ALFRED  SPC
MORIN, DUANE  SSG
MUGFORD, ROBERT  PV2
MULVANEY, MARK  PV2
NELLS, JAMES  1LT
NEWMAN, STACY  PFC
NORMAN, CHARLES  SSG
OLSON, ERIC  SPC
PAMPLIN, MARVIN  PV2
PEPPER, JOHN  PV2
PEREZ, DAVID  SSG
FERRY, ISAAC  SGT
FLICKERT, PATRICK  PFC
PRINDLE, JAMES  PV2
PRINE, WILLIAM  PV2
PROCTOR, THOMAS  SPC
PRUDHOMME, ABRAHAM  SGT
REED, JOSEPH  2LT
REVERON, MEDINA  SSG
RICE, DARRELL  SGT
RING, HAROLD  SPC
ROADEN, JEFFREY  PFC
ROBERTS, BRYAN  SPC
ROBINSON, RICKY  SPC
RODRIGUEZ, CLERY VICTOR  PFC
SCHAEDLER, SCOTT  PFC
SCHRAM, WILLIAM  SPC
SERRANO, DIEGO  SPC
SEWELL, CORD  PV2
SHAW, DAVID  SSG
SINGLER, MITCHELL  SGT
SOWINSKI, GARY  PFC
STEEN, KERRY  PV2
STURDEVANT, DONALD  SPC
STURGILL, KELLY  PV2
TARULARIVERA, SERGIO  SPC
TAYLOR, KELLY EMERSON  SFC
THOMPSON, HOWARD  SPC
TUCKER, ROBERT  SGT
VANBUSKIRK, PATRICH  PV2
VARGO, JONATHAN  PV2
WAPE, JAMES  SGT
WARREN, TAIT  PV2
WESTON, LEONARD  SPC
WILHELM, PETER  1LT
WILKENS, JACK  SPC
WILLIAMS, BENNIE  CPT
WILLIAMS, DARIN  SPC
WRIGHT, CAREY  SGT
YOLISH, SEAN  SPC
ZIRKELBACH, BRIAN  PV2
CHARLIE COMPANY, 2 - 16 INFANTRY COBRA

ADKINS, NORMAN SPC
ALCANTAR, RAFAEL SPC
ANDERSON, SHEFFIELD SPC
BARNETT, ROGER SPC
BEASLEY, CHRISTOPHER PFC
BESSIER, GARRETT SPC
BRYANT, JIMMY SSG
BUNCH, DERICK SPC
CAMPBELL, TOM SSG
CERNEY, RICHARD SGT
CHANDLER, CURTIS SSG
COLEMAN, DIMTRIUS PV2
COTTLE, DAVID CPL
CRAGER, WALTER PFC
CUNNINGHAM, ROBERT SSG
CURRY, DARRELL SSG
DANIELS, ROBERT SSG
DILLY, WILLIAM SGT
DUTTON, RICHARD SFC
EDWARDS, HAIMIE SGT
EDWARDS, STEVIE PFC
EHHRBAR, WILLIAM SPC
EULISS, TIMOTHY PV2
FENTON, FREDERICK SSG
FISH, ARMOND SSG
FITCH, ROBERT PFC
FORGEY, RICHARD PFC
FRAME, LARRY SPC
FULLER, RODNEY SPC
GIBBONS, WILLIAM SPC
GILBERT, CHRISTOPHER SPC
GILLIAM, DARRELL SPC
GRADY, WILLIAM SGT
GUERRERO, OSCAR SPC
GUILD, TERRY 2LT
GUEST, BILLY SSG
HANDA, ROBERT SPC
HARDESTY, JAMES SFC
HARRIS, BOB 1SG
HAWSEY, ROBERT SGT
HELLMAN, DANIEL SPC
HEMSTALK, KEVIN PFC
HENRY, GREGORY SPC
HERBASBERMUDEZ, RON SGT
HOLLMAN, ERIC SPC
HUNT, KEVIN PFC
IOAPO, JOSEFA SSG
IVES, JAMES SGT
JACKSON, MICHAEL PFC
JIMBOY, RAY PFC
JOHNSON, EDDIE SGT
JONES, DARRICK PV2
JONES, MARK SPC
KAPISE, RONALD SGT
KARPEW, MICHAEL SPC
KASTELIC, JAMES CPL
KELSO, JOHN SPC
KILE, MICHAEL PFC
KING, GREGORY SSG
LABO, DAVID 1LT
LITTLETON, ROBIN PV2
LONG, ROBERT SPC
LUGO, MARCUS SGT
MADDOX, GEORGE SPC
MADDOX, TARON SPC
MATHews, CHARLES SGT
MCVEIGH, TIMOTHY SGT
MEDFORD, MICHAEL PFC
MENCY, WAYNE SPC
MONTGOMERY, RANDY PV2
MOORE, GREGORY PFC
MOORE, NATHAN PV2
MOYER, ERIC PV2
MUSSETT, JASON PFC
OPPENHEIMER, RODRIGO PV2
PALMER, ANTHONY SSG
PAM, WALTER SGT
PARSONS, JOHN PV2
PEARCE, MIKE SPC
PRICE, JON SPC
PRUITT, JOHN PFC
QUILLEN, BRAD PFC
RAY, MAURICE SGT
REGIER, TODD SPC
ROBINSON, LEster SSG
ROCKWELL, JAMES SGT
RODRIGUEZ, JESUS ANGEL 2LT
RODRIGUEZ, JOSE MARIA SSG
ROGGE, WILLIAM PV2
RUTTER, SCOTT CPT
SALB, VINCENT SPC
SANDERS, SALLIE SGT
SANTILLANES, GILBERT PV2
SCHULTZ, CARL SPC
SLATER, TRENT PFC
SMITH, ALLEN CLIFFORD SPC
SMITH, JASON SPC
SMITH, TIMOTHY SPC
SOTO, MANUEL 1LT
SPENCER, JAMES SPC
STEUBER, DON PV2
SWARTZ, KRIS SPC
TASKER, RALPH SGT
THIGPEN, ANTHONY SGT

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DELTA COMPANY, 3-37 ARMOR
DEATHSTALKER

AGEE, PHILLIP PV2
ALICEA, CHARLES SGT
ARMOUR, CLEOPHUS PV1
ARRINGTON, ANTHONY SPC
BAKKEN, DAX PFC
BALADAD, LAURO SFC
BARRIOS, ELIEZER PFC
BRAEGER, KENNETH PFC
CASON, PURCELL SGT
COCKRELL, WILLIAM SSG
CRAWFORD, REGINALD SGT
CREASEUR, JOHN SGT
DINGMON, MATTHEW PV2
ECKERT, DANIEL SSG
EVERETT, TODD SPC
FADDIS, MIKE SGT
FALKNER, DOUGLAS SFC
FIGUEROA, IVAN PFC
GALLOWAY, LARRY SSG
GARMAN, DALE SPC
GODBOLD, CHARLES SGT
GREENWOOD, CLAUDE SGT
GREENER, JOHN SPC
GUILLOT, GREGORY PFC
HAMAN, JACKIE SGT
HANKS, JAMES SPC
HARDY, KELIUS PFC
HAYWOOD, COREY PV2
HODGE, MARIO PV2
HONEYCUTT, IVAN SGT
HUELL, DAN SSG
JOHNSON, MICHAEL PFC
JOHNSON, RICHARD SGT
JONES, HAROLD SPC
KEFFER, BERNARD SPC
KIMMEL, RONALD SGT
KNAPP, JOHN PV2
KOENIG, PHILIP 1LT
LASHUA, RICKY SGT
LAVY, COREY PV2
LEWIS, TERRY SPC
MARTINEZ, CESAR SGT
MCCAUSLAN, ROBERT SPC
MCKENRY, DAVID PV2
MCKENZIE, DONALD PV2
MIESNER, PAUL SPC
MILLER, STEPHEN 1LT
MORNINGSTAR, JAMES KELLY CPT
MORROW, JAMES 1SG
NEAL, JOHN SPC
NEWTON, TIMOTHY SGT
NICKERSON, MICHAEL SGT
NOBEL, EDWARD SGT
PHILIPS, WARD 2LT
PRECISE, PHILLIP SFC
RALLS, RODNEY SPC
RAMOS, DAVID SGT
RAMOSCLASS, LUIS SSG
REDDEN, DANIEL 2LT
RHYMER, WILLIAM PFC
RICHARDSON, MICHAEL SGT
RISON, ROBERT SPC
ROBINSON, WILLIAM SGT
ROOF, CHARLES PFC
SEAMAN, CHRISTOPHER SPC
SMITH, SHANNON PV1
SMITH, JAMES SFC
SUBLETT, MARSHALL PFC
SWINTON, ANTHONY SPC
THOMAS, KRIS SPC
THORNHILL, RICHARD SGT

ECHO COMPANY, 2 - 16 INFANTRY
EAGLE

ABRAM, TERRY SPC
ARMBRISTER, JAMES SPC
BRISCOE, CURTIS SSG
CROWLEY, MICHEAL SSG
DEWITT, TIMOTHY SPC

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EARLS, THOMAS 1LT
GALLOPS, BENJAMIN SPC
HANSEN, MATTHEW SPC
HARPER, CHRISTOPHER PFC
HARRIAU, STEPHEN SGT
HEADRICK, MICHAEL SPC
HENSON, HAROLD 1SG
HUETT, CHRISTOPHER SPC
JACKSON, PAUL SGT
JARVIS, FRANKIE SFC
KITCHENS, DANNY SPC
KLARENBACK, ROBERT SPC
LEONARD, TERRELL SPC
LESTER, MICHAEL SPC
MAUGA, PELETI 1LT
MCDONALD, SHAWN PV2
MEEKS, PERRY PFC
MILLER, JOEL 2LT
MILLWARD, SCOTT SPC
MOORE, CHARLES SPC
OEFFNER, STEPHEN SPC
ORBESON, LEE SPC
PAHSSEN, FREDERICK SPC
PAVALOK, RANDY PV2
PAYNE, JASON CPL
PERKINS, PHILIP SPC
PETERSON, KURT SPC
POE, SAMMY SSG
QUEREJETA, FRANCISCO SPC
REDDEN, DONOVAN SPC
REITER, MATT SPC
SCHADE, JOHN SPC
SCHILLER, TIMOTHY SGT
SCHLEIFER, KIRK CPT
SINCLAIR, ROGER CPL
SMOCK, WILLIAM SGT
STAFFORD, WILLIAM SSG
STONE, ROY SPC
TAYLOR, BRIAN PFC
TAYLOR, DENNIS SSG
TERRELL, PAUL SPC
THIBODEAUX, DWAYNE SPC
TORRES, JUAN SSG
VANARKEL, DAVID SPC
VELEZRIVERA, JOSE SSG
VILLALOBOS, FERNANDO SPC
WALLS, CHARLES SPC
WEAVER, JAMES SGT
WETHERALD, EDWARD SPC
WHITE, DURANCE PV1
WILLIAMS, DAVE SSG
WILLIAMSON, ERROL PV1
WOOD, ANDREW PFC
WOODARD, KELVIN 1LT
WORLEY, PHILLIP  SSG
YOUSON, BERNARD  SSG
ZEGARRA, MANUEL  SGT

ALPHA COMPANY, 2 - 16
OUTLAWS
ADAMS, MELVIN G.  SPC
ADAMS, ROGER D.  SSG
ANANEA, ANTHONY R., JR  SSG
AUSTIN, COLUMBUS  SFC
BARRY, JOHN  SPC
BAYLESS, JERALD R.  PV2
BETHUNE, DWAIN  SGT
BLACKBERG, SCOTT  SGT
BOYETT, RICHARD  SPC
BRANCH, CHARLIE  SGT
BREITENBACH, JAKOB  PV2
BRIDGES, TERRY  SFC
CHAMBERLAIN, DAVID  SPC
CHIPLEY, MONTI  PFC
CHRISTY, HAROLD A.  ILT(P)
COLLINS, CHRISTOPHER  PFC
CUMMINGS, WILBERT  PFC
DANIEL, LEROY  SPC
DAVENPORT, JASON  SPC
DEFFENSE, JEAN-GUY  SPC
DELANCEY, DOUGLAS  ILT
DELOERA, RAFAEL  PFC
DELONG, ANTHONY  SSG
DEMLER, ROBERT P.  PFC
DIXON, KEITH  PV2
DOWDY, CHAD  PV2
DOWNEY, RICKY  SSG
DUFFY, GEORGE  SSG
EDMOND, JOHNNY  SPC
ELLIS, WILLIAM  PV2
ELMORE, BRETT T.  PFC
ENGLISH, ERIC  PV2
FASSBENDER, WALTER  SSG
FETTERMAN, WADE  SGT
FETTERMAN, RAYMOND  SPC
FREEMAN, ROBERT  1SG
GAINES, MICHAEL P.  SPC
GAVERS, HENRY  PV2
GRIFTH, KEVIN SCOTT  PV2
GRIFFIN, DUANE SCOTT  SPC
GRIFFIN, HOWARD  SPC
GRIT, RANDAL  SSG

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GROSENHEIDER, CRAIG 2LT 
HANSON, RORY CPL(P) 
HARDY, KEVIN L. SPC 
HARRIS, GENE W. PFC 
HARRISON, CHRISTOPHER SPC 
HASTINGS, LARRY CPL 
HELMHOLTZ, KEVIN SGT 
HERNANDEZ, GUSTAVO PV2 
HOUSENICK, JAMES SPC 
HOWELL, CHARLES L. SPC 
HUDDLE, JOHN SGT 
HYDE, JEFFERY SGT 
JOHNSON, CHARLES SGT 
JOHNSTON, JAMES P. CPL 
JONES, IRVIN D. SPC 
KECK, FLOYD J. JR 
KELSEY, CHRIS 1LT 
KNOTT, GREGORY L. SPC 
LEECE, WESLEY J. SPC 
LINDQUIST, STEPHEN PV2 
LOCKHART, KEVIN SGT 
MACIEL, DANIEL SSG 
MANIGAULT, MAURICE SPC 
MARSHALL, JAYMES SPC 
MCCOSKER, ROBERT L. SPC 
MCKAY, ANTHONY E. SPC 
MEDLOCK, JERRY SGT 
MEYERS, JASON PV2 
MEYERSON, SETH J. PFC 
MILLER, ANDREW CPL 
MILLER, ROBERT CPL 
MORENO, MICHAEL CPL 
MUNCY, WILLIAM SGT 
O'TI, FATUATI SSG 
OWENS, MICHAEL PV1 
PAYNE, CHARLIE SFC 
PAYNE, DAVID SGT 
PEDACK, PHILIP J. SPC 
PEPPERDINE, ROBERT B. SPC 
PERETZ, ALLAN PV1 
PETTYJOHN, WILLIAM SGT 
PIPPIN, ALFRED SGT 
POE, SAMMY JR SSG 
POISSANT, REGINALD PV2 
PRICE, DANIEL J. CPL 
REYES, RUDOLFO PV1 
RICHARDSON, COREY SCOTT SPC 
RIDGE, MICHAEL J. CPL 
ROBERTS, SHERMAN S., JR SGT 
RODRIGUEZ, GEORGE LINO SPC 
RORRO, NICHOLAS A. CPL 
ROUSE, THOMAS CPT 
SINQUAH, DALE SSG 
STURDIVANT, HORACE SSG
RYAN, CRAIG SGT
SELLERS, RAYMOND SPC
SIMS, JOEL SGT
SINUH, DALE S. SSG
SLATON, CHRISTOPHER PV1
SMALL, ANTHONY A. SPC
SNODGRASS, RICHARD M. SPC
SOALES, DONALD E. SPC
STEWART, BRYAN E. CPL
STRATTON, GARY E. SPC
STRINGFELLOW, JEREL E. SPC
STURDIVANT, HORACE J., JR SSG
SUTTERER, KENT PV1
TALKINGTON, WILLIAM B. SGT(P)
TEETER, MICHAEL H. SPC
VALOAGA, MOLIGA SSG
WALTER, JAMES M. CPL
WEBB, TIMOTHY SSG
WELLS, GILLIE SPC
WIEBELHAUS, ROY PV2
WIEDERKEHR, GEORGE A. CPL
WILLIAMS, MICHAEL PFC
WILLIS, TIMOTHY PFC

DELTA COMPANY, 2 - 16 INFANTRY DESTROYER

ALI, WAHID SFC
ANAYA, ARMANDO PFC
ANDERSON, RANDY SPC
ANTHONY, RODNEY SPC
AUSBROOKS, BRETT PV2
BACA, MICHAEL SPC
BARNER, CHRISTOPHER SPC
BARNETT, ERIC PV2
BEAMON, LAFAYETTE PV2
BLEDSOE, MERLE 1SG
BLOW, HARVEY SGT
BORGGREEN, RAYMOND SPC
BOTT, JOSEPH E. SPC
BREWER, DARRYL SPC
BRONNER, DAVID J. SGT
BROWN, ANTHONY S. SPC
BROWN, MICHAEL W. SGT
BROWNE, TIMOTHY M. SP4
BUTSCH, RODNEY SSG
CARNES, SCOTT E. SPC
CHILDS, SCOTT SPC
CHRISTOPHER, DWIGHT D. SGT
CLEVENGER, BRYAN A. SPC
COLLICK, STUART SGT
COWLING, DANIEL PFC
CROKA, WILLIAM SPC
DAVIS, DWAYNE SGT
DAVIS, PAUL A., JR SGT
DELEON, ALBERTO PV2
DIXON, JOHN SGT
DORA, MARK SGT
ELLIS, MARVIN SPC
FARRINGTON, GARY SSG
FERENCIK, TROY A. PFC
FLASH, KEITH PFC
FONTIMAYOR, WILSON SGT
FRAUS, JOHN PV2
GARLAND, SEAN SGT
GILL, SCOTT SPC
GOULD, WESLEY PV2
GREAT, WILLIAM SSG
GREEN, DANNY SGT
HALL, COWAN SGT
HALM, STEVEN PV2
HAMMOND, MARK CPT
HARRIS, CHARLES SFC
HAUGEN, MALCOLM J. SGT
HENDERSON, JAMES SPC
HERNANDEZ, GUSTAVO S. PV2
HIGGINBOTHAM, JAMES 2LT
HOOD, JAMES R. PV2
HUGHES, DOUGLAS 2LT
JACOBS, CHARLES L., JR SPC
JENKINS, ERIC PURNELL SGT
JENKINS, ERIC SSG
JUMP, JAMES SGT
KING, ROBERT SGT
KOHL, DONALD SPC
KRXTON, TIMOTHY T. PFC
LOONEY, TERRY SPC
LOVATO, STEVEN D. PFC
LYNSKEY, VINCENT PV2
MARTINEZ, TONY SGT
MASSEY, RICHARD SPC
MATHEWSON, OSCAR PV2
MCALLISTER, BERNARD SGT
MCGARRY, LAYTON PV2
MCGILL, LEWIS PV2
MEDINA, JUAN SPC
MELVIN, JEFFREY PV2
MITCHELL, THOMAS G. PV2
MONDAY, BILLY K.J. SPC
MULLEN, TRACY SPC
NEWELL, RICHARD PFC
OWENS, TROY SGT
PEDERSON, HAROLD SPC
PEKKALA, DAVID PV2
PERKINS, JOHN C. PV1
PIERSON, WILLIE SSG
POWELL, BARRY SPC
PRUITT, HORACE SSG
REMLEY, ROBERT PV2
RENEY, ANTHONY SPC
RICHARDSON, COREY SPC
ROBERSON, PATRICK SGT
SALAS, ARTHUR SSG
SCHNEIDER, THOMAS PFC
SEAMANS, TERRY PV2
SELF, WADEUS SPC
SELLERS, WAYNE PV2
SHANNON, HERBERT PFC
SHANYFELT, JOHN PV2
SIMS, FRANKLIN PFC
Sims, RANDALL PV2
SLATER, CHAD PV2
SNEED, JOHN PV2
SNOW, JOSEPH R. SSG
STROB, PETER PFC
SULLIVAN, SHANNON PV2
TACKETT, HAROLD SGT
TAPSCOTT, RICHARD SPC
TAYLOR, DANA ILT
TOSTE, FRANK SGT
THOMASSON, JEFFREY A. PV2
THOMPSON, ANTHONY PV2
THOMPSON, TRACY DUNCAN PFC
THOMPSON, BERNARD SSG
TREVINO, ROY PV2
TUTTLE, JOHN PV2
VINSON, JOHNNY F. JR. SSG
WALTON, JODY SGT
WEISSINGER, RICHARD PV2
WESTERN, JAMES D. SPC
WEUBBLES, JEFFREY SGT
WEYER, AUSTIN PV2
WILHELM, PETER J. 2LT
WILSON, EARL SGT
WILSON, DAVID SPC
WOLF, BRIAN PV2
YARNELL, STEVEN D. PV2