TITLE
Multi-National Combined Arms Breaching (MOUT) in Somalia

STUDENT MONOGRAPH
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I am writing this monograph from a unique perspective. I served in Somalia from 17 August 1993 to 16 December 1993 as the assistant theater engineer for the United Nations Logistics Support Command (UNLSC). I was a member of the pocket staff for the UNLSC commander BG Norman E. Williams and served a dual role as the staff for the commander US Forces Somalia, MG Thomas M. Montgomery. In this capacity I interacted with the UN Engineer Staff daily and saw all aspects of mission development, from inception to execution. The staff I worked on controlled all theater engineer assets, Korean, German and U.S. In our four man engineer cell, we effectively served as all echelons of staffing from theater down to battalion for our subordinate units. This position allowed me to see a lot of the amazing things the United Nations is capable of doing.

INTRODUCTION

This monograph covers the planning and execution of the United Nations Logistics Support Command (UNLSC) Engineer Staff and the 382nd Engineer Company Combat Support Equipment (CSE) in Operation Red Sweep, the Battle of 21 October Road in Mogadishu, Somalia on 091340-091640 September 1993. This protracted ambush occurred on 21 October Road, the north-south connection between the two main supply routes out of Mogadishu. The battle occurred within two kilometers of the Pakistani brigade headquarters at the Olympic Stadium. This action pitted a United Nations combined effort of a Pakistani armored platoon plus supported by a U.S. engineer platoon minus against Haber Gehdir militia, augmented by local clansmen, overwatching roadblocks along 21 October Road. In this battle a technically superior UN combat force was defeated by a an ill-equipped Somali militia and civilian force, exemplifying the disastrous impacts of poor mission analysis and a lack of unity of command.
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ORIENTATION

GEOGRAPHICAL

Somalia is the shape of the letter seven and approximately the same size as the state of Texas. The location of the country on the Horn of Africa has influenced its history for over two thousand years. Despite limited natural resources, Somalia's strategic position near the choke point at the convergence of the Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea, made Somalia a natural crossroad in ancient and modern times. (See Tab A)

The terrain is distinctly different in the southern and the northern sectors of the country. The south is characterized by semi-arid steppe crossed by two predominate rivers, the Wehi Jubba and the Wehi Shabeelle. These river valleys are the breadbaskets of the region. The coast is subtropical with semi-dense vegetation a few kilometers inland, however, vegetation decreases the further you go inland to the west, diminishing to desert on the Ethiopian border. The northern coast is predominantly desert, and as one goes south rises into a central highland. This plateau produces crops such as coffee and livestock. The further south toward Ethiopia one travels the terrain becomes more desertified, resembling the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California.

Somalia is hot and arid for most of the year. The climate ranges from conditions of tropical heat to periods with sub-freezing temperatures in the highlands. There are
four seasons in Somalia, two wet and two dry. The seasons are marked by the NE and SW monsoon winds and the lulls that occur in between.

POLITICAL

The land now known as Somalia has been occupied by nomadic tribes for over two thousand years, serving as a melting pot of African and Arab culture. The ethnic make-up of the country is predominantly a mix of African and Arab, that has produced a distinct race of people unlike the rest of Africa. In addition to the Arabic physical features, nearly all Somalis are Moslem. The country of Somalia as we know it today has existed for a little over thirty-three years. The dissolution of the colonial powers, the Italians in the southern Somalia and the British in the northern Somaliland, in the late 1950's precipitated an autonomous and united Somalia in 1960. After the country's failures to establish a democratic system and the presidents assassination, Mohammed Said Barre established a military dictatorship in 1969 that lasted twenty-one years.1 During his rule he played cold war politics, courting both the Soviet Union and the United States. At different times, both superpowers provided extensive military and financial aid to Somalia. This explains the Somali defense base almost exclusively composed of Soviet and U.S. materiel. The final three years of President Barre's reign were torn by civil war. This clan-driven fighting coupled with severe drought was a tragic combination, producing casualties from guerilla
warfare and starvation. In January 1991, various warlords ousted Siad Barre and divided Somalia into clan sectors under their control. The civil war continued unabated for another fourteen months causing the already terrible conditions to spiral downward, producing horrific scenes of human despair. In the annals of history, few societies have sunk to this level of existence.

UNITED NATIONS INTERVENTION

On 20 January 1992, Somalia requested that the UN Security Council consider the deteriorating human conditions prevailing in their country, stating that the 'civil war was worsening day by day'. On 23 January, the Council implemented an embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia. The ball was now rolling for UN intervention.

The United Nations directly intervened in March 1992 after four months of intense fighting to control Mogadishu. The fighting was between interim president Ali Mahdi Mohamed and Chairman of the United Somali Congress (USC), General Mohamed Farah Aideed. The conflict arose because Aideed did not recognize Ali Mahdi as Interim President. The USC's Central Committee, with a majority supporting Ali Mahdi, ousted Aideed. In response to his ouster, Aideed created the Somali National Alliance (SNA) to oppose the USC. After numerous resolutions, on 24 April 1992 the UN established United Nation Operation Somalia (UNOSOM) to facilitate an
immediate cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of a cease-fire throughout the country, and to promote the process of reconciliation and political settlement...and also supported a 90-day plan of action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance.7 The plan sounded good on paper, but execution was slow.

The Pakistanis were given the lead in this operation and they deployed a 500 member force aboard U.S. aircraft in late September 1992.8 Over the next two months they attempted to increase the peacekeepers by an additional 3000 soldiers, however Aideed threatened to send any new UN troops home in body bags.9 By late November, the Pakistanis were essentially huddled in their compound near the airfield struggling merely to survive. They were barely providing their own security, much less protecting humanitarian relief. In kind words, the UN operation was struggling. The UN was losing face in a country no one knew about just two years earlier. The grand experiment of using the UN to police the world's problems was not going as planned. The UN needed help fast. The only country capable of providing this help, or more likely willing, was the good old United States.

The U.S. committed troops to Operation Restore Hope on 9 December 1992, as if conducting an all out invasion. The combat force was built around the 1st Marine Division, the Army's 10th Mountain Division, Air Force, and logistical support packages. The total troop strength reached as high as 29,000 soldiers.10 The U.S. plan was to initiate the UN's
plan for political and humanitarian assistance and quickly turn the mission back over to them. This would allow the UN to save face and finish the mission at the helm. Although this took a little longer than expected, the U.S. gave the controls of the mission back to the UN in late April of 1993, as Operation Continue Hope.

In a little more than a month of UN control the mission started to disintegrate. On 5 June, 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed while checking weapons caches in Mogadishu. The act was committed by militia loyal to General Aideed. This one act changed the complexion of the operation. The UN and U.S. peacekeepers were now well aware they were in a low intensity guerrilla war. Despite a US retaliatory attack on Aideed’s compound, the snowball was rolling. Aideed demonstrated to the UN he was willing to fight.

The UN started to focus on Aideed as the root of their problems. The issuance of a warrant for his capture exacerbated the growing tension. The intensity of the guerrilla warfare slowly intensified through September 1993, culminating on 3-4 October 1993 in the most intense urban combat in almost fifty years. This event caused the US to pull out of Somalia in March 1994. The UN is still conducting the operation in Somalia, however the chances of success diminish daily.

ENGINEER CONCEPT SOMALIA

As part of the initial U.S. Joint Task Force (JTF) deployment in December 1992, a large engineer element was
included to establish some infrastructure in Somalis. The primary missions focused on building 2000 kilometers of main supply routes, constructing airfields, building base camps, well drilling, port construction, mapping, and power generation. The two primary components of this package were Naval Construction Regiment 30 and the 36th Engineer Group (Army). These two elements managed an engineer effort, equivalent to seven combat heavy engineer battalions. Their mission was to be completed by 28 February 1993. The concept after completion was to leave one U.S. CSE Company to maintain the roads and airfields. This small effort would then be augmented by other coalition engineer units and controlled by the UN. The U.S. engineers executed this plan, departing in March and leaving the 63rd CSE until April 1993. However, the UN was slow to recruit other contingent engineers. The U.S. rotated the 56th CSE to replace the 63rd CSE in April. The Germans sent a CSE company-size element in May. In August, the Koreans provided a large company-size engineer task force for a one year period, and the 362nd CSE replaced the 56th CSE on 4 September 1993. This structure of one U.S. CSE company, a German company, and the Korean Task Force would change little until these countries pulled their support of the operation by February 1994.

TASK ORGANIZATION

The United Nations intended to assume operational control of the sustainment engineer effort after the
departure of the U.S. Joint Task Force. They did, but they did not. The U.S. contribution to the UN after the JTF pullout was that of logistician for all coalition forces in Somalia. The U.S. served as the United Nation Logistics Support Command (UNLSC) to provide this support. The CSE company fell under the control of this command. This was primarily a combat service support unit of 2,600 soldiers commanded by a U.S. brigadier general. This organization provided a lot of the priority projects for the theater engineers. In light of this, the UN made all theater engineer contingents subordinate to the U.S. commanded UNLSC. Effectively, the UN had avoided controlling the engineer effort, despite having a staff of seven officers and 18 soldiers strictly for this purpose. (See Tab D)

**ENGINEER STAFFING**

Placing the theater engineers under the UNLSC created some staffing difficulty. The UNLSC did not have organic engineers or an engineer staff. However, due to the quirks of the UN operation, the UNLSC now controlled all theater engineer assets. The commanding general requested an engineer major, Major Jerrold Johnson, to serve as his pocket staff engineer. The Germans and Koreans were retained under the commander’s direct control. The U.S. CSE company was attached to the Corps Support Group (CSG) supporting the UNLSC, and then subordinated to a Forward Support Battalion (FSB) for administrative control. Since neither of these units had organic engineer staffs, the CSG requested a staff
prior to deployment. This consisted of an officer and two NCOs. I was the officer. SFC Ralph Meyer and SFC Robert Welch were the NCOs. Early in the operation it was determined that this staff configuration was not adequate. So, the general pooled his engineer and my staff to serve as his engineer advisors. We now had a four man staff to control all three contingents of engineers. All command and control relationships remained the same. (See Tab C, D)

OPERATION RED SHEEP

THE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL SETTING

After U.S. forces established a semblance of security in Mogadishu, in early January 1993, the city was relatively open for coalition forces to move about freely. It was not uncommon for soldiers to go shopping in the big markets with minimal security. We used all the primary thoroughfares in the city for ease of movement. This would not last long.

The 5 June attack on the Pakistanis caused all UN forces to begin intense force protection improvement operations. All base camp security plans were reinforced and a base camp mentality began to set in, i.e. the idea of interacting with the Somalis was no longer popular. In late July, Aideed's SNA militia began using roadblocks to disrupt movement in and out of Mogadishu. Additionally, he started employing command detonated mines to attack UN vehicles, primarily U.S. vehicles. This started a pattern of UN forces moving behind their walls. On 8 August 1993, a command detonated mine
killed four U.S. military policemen on Jaalle Siaad Road between Hunter Base and the Mogadishu Airfield. General Bir put the road off limits to UN forces, causing the U.S. CSB company to construct a nine kilometer bypass around southern Mogadishu, called MSR Tiger. (See Tab H) On 22 August, SNA militia ambushed a convoy of engineer vehicles outside the main port facility on New Port Road. The road was closed to coalition traffic and the CSB company constructed a bypass along the coast to the airfield. This route ran behind coalition compounds, ensuring its security. In late August, Aideed's militia started denying convoy movement along 21 October Road from MSR BLUE to MSR ORANGE. There was no viable bypass, because the UN conceded the route straight from the port to MSR Orange to Aideed in early August. 21 October Road was the only route left to MSR ORANGE, which served as the life support for over half of the 26,000 member UN force. There were not many choices, either clear 21 October Road and supply the force or else. The only alternative was upgrading a river levee connecting the two MSR's between Afgooye and Balad. (See Tab F) Afgooye is a town 20 kilometers northwest of Mogadishu along MSR BLUE and Balad lies on MSR Orange 28 kilometers to the northeast. The levee upgrade would be 39 kilometers in length, and take five to six months of intense engineer effort to connect the two MSR's. The decision by the UNOSOM commander, General Cevik Bir, was to open 21 October Road. If the UN allowed Aideed to close this route permanently, he would have successfully
forced all UN traffic to completely bypass Mogadishu, with the exception of landing at the port or airfield; in effect, sealing off the entire city.

**THE MISSION**

On order, 362nd Engineer Co (CEK) links up with Pakistani security elements vicinity SWORD BASE and clears 21 October Road from grid 336271 vicinity Check Point 31 to grid 400304 vicinity Pasta Factory for follow-on convoys to pass unobstructed.

**THE PLAN**

The UN operations staff produced a daily Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) as the medium for relaying orders, more like taskings, to the various coalition forces. The typical lead time on a tasking was 48-72 hours, however the FRAGO averaged being two days late. So, if one received over a day advanced warning on any mission it was luck. Most missions were executed late based on this alone. The mentality of the UN staff was that of an eight-to-five job, with no real urgency in information flow. This stems from the highest levels of the UN Security Council, which just recently implemented a system to maintain twenty-four monitoring of their operations around the world.

My staff received a FRAGO dated 7 SEPT on the evening of 8 SEPT, specifying UNLSC engineers to provide the Pakistani brigade two dozers and operators for road clearing operations on 9 SEPT. Our immediate reaction was negative. Due to two previous missions in July and August of this nature with the
Pakistanis, our enthusiasm for supporting them was not good. In July we provided a dozer and operator to the Pakistanis to clear a side street near their compound. When the shooting started the security element left to evacuate a casualty, leaving the dozer to break contact alone. Fortunately, the operator was only hit by a ricochet. Despite the Pakistanis having a company of engineers, they did not bring any equipment to Somalia. The UN was supposed to provide it, however the equipment they were promised was still in Cambodia as part of UNITAC. After learning a lesson from July, we gave them a dozer without operator to execute their mission in August. They returned the equipment two weeks later in a deadlined status, beyond repair. These two incidents caused BG Williams to say we would no longer provide support to the Pakistanis. Additionally, the increasing mine threat coupled with these incidents prompted us to request some heavy divisional combat engineers. The request was denied when it went out of theater.

Upon reception of the FRAGO, I informed BG Williams of the tasking. Contrary to what I expected, he said we had to support the mission. We called the 362nd CSE, which had been in country four days, to give them the warning order at 082000 SEPT. Attempting to contact the Pakistani liaison officer proved fruitless. Since we were locked down at night no one could go to the Pakistani brigade headquarters. In our attempts to call their operations center, no one could be located with knowledge of the mission, because of some
ceremony they were conducting. We requested aerial photos, any night stalker footage of the route (a real time video surveillance system on 21 October), and a current intelligence update from our G-2.

After sunrise the company picked up the intelligence from our location at the Doughnut, identifying seven obstacles of miscellaneous debris and destroyed vehicles. (See Tab C) The U.S. company commander was briefed on the previous missions and given the frequency and call sign of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) aviation we coordinated for the mission. Our continual attempts to contact the Pakistanis the next morning were not much better. The Pakistani LNO was not around, and no one else spoke English. At 091000 SEPT a Pakistani, CPT Shaamil, entered our office wanting to pick up the equipment and start the mission at 1100 hours. I told him he could link up with the commander of the engineers, CPT Ken Crawford, at Hunter Base, however the mission was not possible at 1100. Although upset, he agreed to meet the engineers at 1300 at Hunter Base. CPT Crawford came back to our office for the final U.S. coordination. He would monitor his platoon and company nets, while maintaining communication with the Pakistanis on Motorola. We would monitor his net and the QRF net to provide him responsive security if the Pakistanis lost control of the situation.

CPT Shaamil met CPT Crawford at Hunter Base at 1300 and developed the plan for execution. This method of planning
and preparation was about per for many of the coalition forces. The plan was to move up 21 October Road with a
security element in the lead, the engineers in the middle to
clear the road, and a security element in the rear. The lead
security would move to the obstacles to provide flank and
frontal security, while the dozers moved to clear the
obstacles. The rear would be secured by the trail security
element. Upon clearing to the Stadium (See Tab K), the
Pakistanis would secure the route already cleared to the
south while the clearing progressed to the Pasta Factory.
(See Tab M) When 21 October Road was cleared of the seven
obstacles, the prime movers at Sword Base would move to the
Pasta Factory, up load the dozers and move back to Hunter
Base under security of the Pakistani armor. The entire force
would consist of the Pakistani’s four M48 tanks and four
M113A2 APC’s, plus the engineers two D-7G Dozers with Mounted
Cab Armored Protection (MCAP), two M1025 with MK-19’s, one
M35A2 gun truck with M-60 machine gun, and one command and
control HMMWV with M-60 machine gun.

EXECUTION

Keep in mind, this mission was the responsibility of the
Pakistanis and the engineers crossed
Checkpoint 31 at 1436 with lead security commanded by CPT
Shammil consisting of two tanks and an APC, while the
breaching element, commanded by CPT Crawford, consisted of an
M1025 with MK-19, CPT Crawford’s HMMWV, and two D-7 dozers;
and rear security commanded by the engineer executive
officer, 1LT Hansen, consisting of two APC’s, an M35A2 with M-60 machine gun, and two tanks. At 1445 the rear element received small arms fire from a building on the south side of the road. The unit kept moving. The lead element encountered the first obstacle about one kilometer up the road. (See Tab J) As the tanks and APC’s moved to provide security, CPT Crawford and SSG Brooks assessed the obstacle to be clear of mines and consisting of only rocks, tires, and a truck body. The dozers moved in to clear the road. At this time a small crowd started to build and a Somali opened fire on the breaching element from behind this crowd. He immediately jumped in a white truck and sped away down a side street. The gathering crowd prevented return fire. Upon reduction, the lead tanks moved to a second obstacle similar to the first about 300 meters up the road. Due to the gathering Somalis, CPT Crawford dismounted squads on each side of the street to secure the side streets being passed and to keep the crowds back.12 We reduced the obstacle without incident and progressed to the third roadblock about 500 meters up the road. It consisted of burning tires, large scrap metal, and an overturned trailer. At this halt the rear element reported increasing fire from a second story balcony on the south side of the road. Dismounted engineers and the Pakistani APC’s engaged the targets with N2, MK-19, M-60, and M16A2 fires. At this time, all elements were engaged from the north and south. The tanks in the rear moved forward to suppress the fires and effectively blocked
the road, preventing the dozers from clearing the obstacle. The entire element was now stopped and unable to move either direction. The fires to the front were too intense and the crowds were replacing the obstacles the unit just cleared in the south. At this time I called the QRF to get some aviation on the scene. COL Dallas, the QRF commander, whose call sign was "FALCON 6" immediately flew to the location in a UH-60 to assess the situation. He simultaneously dispatched a scout weapons team, an OH-58+ and an AH-1F Cobra, call sign "COYOTE 6". The team was on station in three minutes and observed 300-500 Somalis, most with weapons, on the north and south of 21 October Road. CPT Crawford jumped to the "FALCON 6" frequency and explained the situation. The communication with the Pakistanis on the Motorola was useless. The direct fires were escalating fast. RPG rounds were coming from all directions. The tanks, APC's and all weapons were suppressing the buildings where fires were originating. "COYOTE 6" dropped a smoke grenade to confirm the forward line of troops. Upon confirmation that no friendlies were on the south side of the wall running along 21 October Road, the Cobra began suppressing with 20 millimeter cannon and 2.75 inch rocket fires. By this time another scout weapons team was on station to aid in suppression. The enemy fires decreased enough to allow CPT Crawford to direct a dozer to the roadblock which cleared a hole to pass the element. On the third aviation suppression run, all dismounts were loaded and the element proceeded
northeast on the road. The objective now was to get to the Pakistani Stadium about one kilometer further on 21 October Road. Small arms and RPG fires began to increase, and then the lead tank exploded in flames after being hit by a 106 millimeter recoilless rifle round. This halted all vehicles temporarily, at which point the rear M35A2 gunship was engaged. SFC Christner, the M-60 gunner, was struck in the shoulder by small arms fire. At this time one of the dozers quit running. Attempts to restart it proved fruitless, so it was abandoned. The element still had suppression from the air, and was only 200 meters from the Stadium. The fourth and final obstacle was a large yellow metal object stretching completely across the road. It forced the vehicles to halt for about one minute while the dozer cleared the path. One of the M1025 took an RPG round during this halt, hitting SGT Malasig in the leg with shrapnel. All vehicles continued through the breach and turned to the south toward the Stadium. The APC's and tanks moved in the rear at this time to provide some cover, because the fires were still intense. All elements were in the compound around 1840.

Inside the Stadium, CPT Crawford quickly received an ammunition, casualty, and equipment report (ACE). There were three U.S. casualties, the two by direct fire and one heat exhaustion. The Pakistani's had one KIA and three WIA. All the U.S. casualties were loaded onto the waiting UH-1 and evacuated to the U.S. hospital at the Embassy compound.

'COYOTE 6' confirmed that all friends were inside the
compound. The Somalis were swarming the dozer and attempting to start it. The dozer and about thirty Somalis were destroyed with a salvo of two TOW missiles. The U.S. engineers were then transported by air to their compound, Hunter Base. They left all the vehicles behind in the Stadium, which was now effectively sealed off to any ground travel.

**ANALYSIS**

In retrospect, it is obvious the SNA was ready to deny the UN access to 21 October Road. This battle was the largest fight in Somalia up to that date. The quick escalation by the SNA forces from sporadic pot shots to planned fires covering the roadblocks, indicates they had a plan to keep the road closed. Intelligence reports after the incident indicated Aideed himself had been in the Cigarette Factory during a portion of the battle, rallying the militia. It was estimated over 100 Somalis died and hundreds were wounded in the protracted ambush. On the coalition side there was one KIA and five WIA’s. This proves that numbers do not always tell the story. In the final analysis, the SNA had dealt the UN a severe blow. The SNA achieved a tactical victory, be it at high costs, that had immediate operational impacts. The UN could no longer easily supply the northern portion of the theater by ground. The U.S. and Korean engineers now had to dedicate extensive assets to provide a bypass to link MSR Blue and MSR Orange. This resulted in the
construction of MSR Red along the Shabeelle River between Afgoye and Balad. The Pakistani’s were the force responsible for security in this part of the city. They failed to assess the situation and convey the potential threat we would be facing. The nature of UN operations and our unfamiliarity with this method of doing business doomed the engineers before the mission began. The multinational combined force was not prepared to execute the mission. The short lead time prevented any rehearsals by the two units. This greatly impacted the mission, because when communications broke down there was nothing to fall back on. We were well aware that the engineer assets we had were not ideal for clearing routes, which had prompted our request for combat engineers. Ten days after the battle, a platoon of U.S. combat engineers with Armored Combat Earthmovers (ACE) were flown into country for this type of mission.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. Engineer Staffing: The staff controlling the UNLSC engineers was inadequate. Due to the small size, missions were not developed properly before being given to subordinate units. If we are going to commit engineers to a UN operation we must assure that the appropriate staffing levels are maintained and that the UN does its job with regard to staffing. Although time was limited in this operation, a more thorough coordination between UN, U.S., and Pakistani higher staffs could have resulted in a better chance of success.
2. Combat Support Equipment Company as a Breaching Unit: This mission was a combined arms combat breach in urban terrain. There are few missions more dangerous than this one. We were using the wrong kind of engineers. The CSE is designed to build and maintain roads and airfields. In combat they may have to conduct some follow-on clearance missions, but this is a distant secondary mission. The UN and some U.S. commanders could not get past the 'Combat' in Combat Support Equipment. They thought this unit was capable of much more than it really was, based solely on the unit’s title. The easiest means of reducing the over zealous expectations is through staff advice. A second method is to change combat to construction, because in reality they are Construction Support Engineers.

3. Engineer Breaching Doctrine: Combined Arms Breaching Operations, FM 90-13-1, focuses on breaching in war. The tenets of breaching are applicable in operations other than war, however, they are not all encompassing. The Engineer School must focus on this subject and develop a method to clear and reduce obstacles when there are civilians in close proximity. The future will see more actions like Somalia, with engineers conducting these same type operations.

4. Tailor the Force: The expectations placed on the CSE Company were not compatible with its equipment capabilities. If the UN tasks a coalition force to provide security, like the Pakistani’s, then it should have the assets to do it. They had engineers, but no equipment. The only reason they
sent the engineers was because of the money their country would receive, not to provide a capability to the UN. If the U.S. is going to allow its forces to be utilized by other UN contingents, the unit should fit the need. Before we allowed any U.S. forces to work in combined breaching, we should have insured they were the proper type force with the best equipment we could provide.

4. Coalition Planning: The planning conducted by most other nations is not anything close to what we do. The Pakistani's are very poor planners. U.S. forces subordinated or working with another coalition must push our methods of preparation. Although this can be politically sensitive, the results will certainly outweigh any potential offenses.

5. Sense of Duty: Most coalition forces do what they feel like doing in a UN operation. Even though the FRAGO may direct execution, there is little concern for getting the job done. I am not saying we should be this way, however, if delaying an execution time will save lives, it might be considered.

6. Rules of Engagement: The ROE must be clearly understood. The varying degrees of hostility in this fight tested all soldiers. There were women and children all around, some acting as combatants. The hesitation of a soldier could have cost him his life. The ROE constantly changes, so an ongoing system must be in place to ensure every soldier has it internalized.

7. The value of rehearsals: This cannot be overstated.
A rehearsal would have eliminated a lot of the confusion that occurred on 21 October Road. The engineers rehearsed their portion, but this was independent of the security element. A combined rehearsal with all players would have been possible with more time. Due to the language and tactical differences, this mission should not have occurred without practice.

8. Combat Support units under Combat Service Support

Control: The U.S. had a combat unit, the QRF, and a CSS unit, the UNLSC, in Somalia. The engineers were supposed to be a theater asset to the UN, and since the UNLSC was under the UN the engineers fell under them. This was adequate if the operation had been less combat intensive. The CSS structure was not prepared to provide the necessary staffing to supervise the engineers. The engineers should have been attached to the QRF, if they were going to be used this way.

9. Close Air Support: The immediate suppression provided by the scout weapons teams saved countless lives. All leaders need to be trained on coordinating and controlling this asset.

10. The MK-19: This weapon system is exceptional in MCOUT. The fires coming from windows and balconies were easily suppressed with the weapon. The M203 is capable of the same effect, but obviously the rate of fire is much less.

11. The Mounted Cab Armored Protection (MCAP): This is an extremely valuable asset in Operations Other Than War. In the road clearing missions, this system saved soldiers' lives.
An equipment operator is vulnerable in any situation. The added survivability will allow the confidence, allowing the operator to concentrate on the mission. All engineer companies with 8-7/8 dozers should be required to maintain one system per dozer.

CONCLUSION

The failure of the combined Pakistani-U.S. engineer road clearance mission on 21 October Road is similar in a lot of respects to the failure of the UN in Somalia. We were using the wrong tools, controlled by too many contingents, but unlike the UN, we did have a defined goal. The mission could have succeeded with proper planning, preparation, and unity of command. The U.S. company commander was reluctant to place his men in the charge of another coalition commander. I fully support his reluctance. This same reluctance should be demonstrated by our elected officials.
FOOTNOTES


5. Ibid., 23.

6. Ibid.


15. Ibid. 99-100.


The Pakistani Stadium. This is where the breaching force ended up on 9 Sep 93 following the 2 hour engagement with hostile elements.
UNIVERSITY & EMBASSY COMPOUND Kordofan, Somalia. Home to the 507th Logistical Task Force, UN Headquarters, and the 46th CASH.
The "PASTA FACTORY" was our objective on 9 September. This intersection was well known for the storage and movement of ammunition and firearms. Our objective was to clear all roadblocks from SWORDBASE to the PASTA FACTORY intersection. We made it within 2.5 kilometers before receiving overwhelming fires from hostile elements.