Desert Storm Monograph

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Ms. Horton
Successful combat leadership in a heavy Task Force Scout Platoon is a culmination of proper soldier and subordinate leader training. As the Scout Platoon Leader for Task Force 3-5 Scouts, I sought to accomplish this through the use of aggressive, hands-on, combat skills training and forward-oriented subordinate leader training. Experience has taught that soldiers will inherently follow leaders who have competently and confidently trained them. Subordinate leaders must, in turn, be trained to “lead from the front” and aggressively set the example for their soldiers.

With the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, Iraq’s economy was near collapse due to the huge financial expenditures required to fight the eight-year war. Further compounding Iraq’s economic problems was the relative stability of petroleum prices brought on by the crude oil glut of the middle 1980’s. Unable to secure a quick influx of cash with high crude oil prices on the open market, the government of Iraq became irritated and began to affix the blame for its economic woes on its southern neighbor, Kuwait.

Iraq believed that Kuwait, despite offering loans totaling ten billion dollars during the Iran-Iraq War, was ungrateful to Iraq for standing up for the Arab cause. Kuwait, fearful of its strong neighbor, tried to defuse the situation through diplomatic efforts but was met with demands for money and a share of the huge Rumailiyah oil fields adjacent to their common border. Iraq continued to blame Kuwait for the depressed world-wide oil market, indicating that the tiny country was intentionally exceeding oil pumping quotas to further depress the Iraqi economy.

Iraq began to explore military action as a solution to its problems with Kuwait and, during July of 1990, initiated a military build-up along their common border. With other Arab leaders becoming involved in the diplomatic process, Iraq assured the rest of the world that it would not attack Kuwait and stated that it sought a peaceful resolution to the problem. However, by late July, “Iraq had 5,500 tanks, more than Hitler had on the eve of the Nazi invasion of Poland” assembled along the Kuwait border. (Badiansky 10-11)

Met with a desperate swirl of diplomatic pleas from several other nations, Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi dictator, continued to insist that peace was his main concern. He categorically denied any existence of a planned invasion, however, “just after midnight on August 2, the air temperature in the southern Iraq desert was 102 degrees but that did not prevent 120,000 crack combat troops from swinging into high gear” (Badiansky 20). The invasion plan that was denied for so long became a reality, and just eight hours later, Kuwait was in the hands of the Iraqi Army.

With Kuwait now firmly in the hands of Iraq, Saddam Hussein moved his massive army south to the Saudi Arabian border, raising fears that he would continue his aggression. Almost immediately, a coalition of Western and Arab nations began to form in protest against the invasion of Kuwait. Headed by the United States and Saudi Arabia, the coalition rapidly deployed forces into the Arabian Desert in an attempt to prevent further aggression by Iraq.
With United Nations involvement, coalition forces began enforcing a total embargo against Iraq in an effort to isolate it and encourage a withdrawal from Kuwait. Saddam Hussein, continuing his game of rhetoric, stated that the invasion was initiated at the request of the Kuwaiti citizens, and as soon as a provisional government could be established, he would withdraw his forces back into Iraq.

With the advent of hostilities, the United States deployed the XVIII Airborne Corps, consisting of the 82d Airborne Division, the 101st Airborne Division, and the 24th Infantry Division, into Saudi Arabia during the month of August, along with a contingent of Air Force fighter aircraft. The purpose of this show of force was to demonstrate resolve and convince Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait. The United States continued to deploy forces during September in the form of two Marine divisions, naval fighter aircraft, the 1st Cavalry Division, and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment. Satisfied that sufficient forces were arrayed to defend the Arabian peninsula against a further invasion by Iraq, the United States continued to try and resolve the problem diplomatically. As time went on, however, it became apparent that nothing short of military action would induce the liberation of Kuwait. This culminated in the largest coalition in military history and the largest American deployment since the Vietnam War.

Deciding to pursue an offensive option against the fourth largest army in the world, the United States set about to deploy more armored forces with M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles in the form of the 1st Infantry Division. Also deployed were more attack aircraft that were specifically designed to destroy armored forces. In addition, more naval carrier battle groups were sent into the Persian Gulf as part of the Navy offensive structure.

In anticipation of what would turn out to be the largest tank battle in the history of armored warfare, the U.S. 7th Corps stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany was deployed to Saudi Arabia in December of 1990. The deployment included the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 1st Armored Division, the 3d Armored Division, and the forward-deployed brigade from the 24th Armored Division. The 3d Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, serving as part of the 1st Brigade, 3d Armored Division, closed into Saudi Arabia on 29 December 1991 and began the process of receiving vehicles and occupying Tactical Assembly Area (TAA) HENRY in support of Operation Desert Shield. (See Map)

As a member of the Advance Party, I assisted the battalion operations officer in quartering our segment of TAA HENRY so that the battalion could occupy in an orderly manner once the combat vehicles had arrived in country. On 17 January, with the war raging, one-half of my scout platoon arrived in TAA HENRY. I immediately began an intensive training program designed to orient my soldiers to the desert environment. The most important tool of this training program was the dismounted combat patrol. Use of the combat patrol permitted the simultaneous training of numerous individual tasks, including desert navigation and establishment of
observation posts. In addition, it offered my soldiers an opportunity to get comfortable with live ammunition and get psychologically prepared for combat. By running both day and night patrols, my soldiers were able to quickly gain confidence in their abilities and skills, transforming them from a group filled with some uncertainty to a team mentally prepared to close with and destroy the enemy.

On 22 January 1991, the rest of my scout platoon arrived in TAA HENRY with our six M3A1 Cavalry Fighting Vehicles. With the platoon now complete, I was able to concentrate on mounted land navigation and cross-country movement. These skills were trained very quickly and effectively by using the zone reconnaissance as the training tool. In addition, I instituted three infantry-type battle drills to tailor our actions to the terrain on which we would be fighting.

On 15 February 1991, the 3d Armored Division moved west to occupy Forward Assembly Area (FAA) BUTTS in preparation for the impending attack into Iraq. (See map) As the lead scout platoon for 1st Brigade, I was responsible for conducting reconnaissance in zone and guiding the lead elements across two major Saudi Arabian highways. This movement offered the opportunity to conduct a full-scale rehearsal with my scout platoon under conditions very similar to those we would soon be facing in Iraq. During the movement of approximately 120 kilometers, I was able to rehearse the three basic movement techniques (traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch) to determine which techniques would be most effective and efficient for the various speeds we would move. But more importantly, we were able to operate at full-speed as three-vehicle sections to determine command and control capabilities and limitations.

This represented a change in my normal operational practice. In Europe, I had trained my scouts to operate as two-vehicle sections to take advantage of the cover and concealment afforded by the terrain. This decentralized control method allowed for more stealth and a wider scope of reconnaissance in a heavily vegetated environment. In a desert environment, however, the terrain may afford no advantage to reconnaissance elements, while additionally stretching command and control due to increased tactical frontages. I opted for the three-vehicle section concept not only to centralize command and control, but also to provide greater mutual support for fires and mass to a section that encountered the enemy.

At the completion of the movement to FAA BUTTS, all of my scouts were comfortable operating with the three-vehicle concept. I found that we could cover the increased frontage effectively, we could maintain a higher speed of movement, and we could execute battle drills much more quickly than we could as two-vehicle sections. I also believe that each scout section now wielded enough combat power to deal a serious blow to an enemy security force and would be able to extract itself from the situation without suffering friendly losses.

With the occupation of FAA BUTTS complete, I now set out to accomplish the final
preparations for combat. Over the next eight days, my element conducted daily maintenance of vehicles, communications equipment, and weapons systems. We also completed the integration of an engineer squad and a ground surveillance radar (GSR) crew into the scout platoon. Attached to my element prior to the movement from TAA HENRY, I opted to use these assets as a rear security force in an effort to protect them from the enemy armor threat and to take advantage of their heavy machine guns against enemy infantry that we may bypass during movement. Equipped with M113 Armored Personnel Carriers and M2HB Caliber .50 machine guns, one vehicle and crew were attached to each scout section.

On 20 February 1991 at 0900 hours, I received Operations Order 91-3 that would send my scouts to war in a ground assault against Iraq. Upon returning to my scout platoon, I issued the warning order for the attack and prepared for the mission. I was given the additional mission of moving forward to establish a link-up with the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment and coordinate for a subsequent recon of the Line of Departure (LD), an earthen berm located in the neutral zone between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. With the coordination accomplished, key leaders moved forward on 22 February 1991 and conducted the leaders' recon of the LD.

Upon returning from the leaders' recon on 22 February 1991, I issued my operations order to the entire scout platoon and attachments. Working from a sand table, I carried the order through from LD to Objective COLLINS (see sketch one), to include possible enemy courses of action and friendly contingency plans. After my order was complete, subordinate leaders used the sand table to brief squads and crews on individual actions. The following day was used for rehearsals and inspections. Rehearsals involved the entire platoon without vehicles in a walk-through that was designed to build on the earlier mounted rehearsal and reinforce actions at critical points in the operation. Engineers and the GSR crew were integrated into the rehearsal so that their critical actions during actions at halts and obstacle encounters could be refined.

Forces in the 7th Corps were originally scheduled to attack on the second day of the ground assault (G+1). The 3d Armored Division was to move to the LD and hold for the night and then attack through the berm on 25 February 1991. However, success by the Marine Corps and Arab Coalition forces to our east along the southern border of Kuwait required that 7th Corps move early to maintain the momentum that was developing. At H+7, while moving forward to the LD, I was informed by my Task Force Commander, LTC John M. Brown III, that the decision had been made to attack early and that I should move to the berm and establish guides to lead the Task Force across the LD. At H+10, the 3d Armored Division crossed into Iraq in pursuit of its mission to destroy the Iraqi Republican Guards.

With the crossing of the LD accomplished in a severe sandstorm, we moved approximately 20 kilometers into Iraq before holding for the night to allow the remainder of the 7th Corps to complete the crossing (see sketch two). The 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment who had quietly
crossed the LD on G-1, now lay 50-60 kms into Iraq, poised to destroy the enemy 26th Infantry Division. Despite being within range of several Iraqi artillery units on its flanks, the 3d Armored Division remained undetected throughout the night and was able to continue moving unimpeded on 25 February 1991. These same enemy artillery units were destroyed that morning with numerous strikes from division Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS).

On the morning of 25 February 1991, the division changed movement formations, going from a column to a wedge. I moved my scouts forward to accomplish a link-up with 3d Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, on the right side of 2d Brigade, the division point element. I established a connecting file to 3-8 CAV and guided my Task Force in to complete the link-up. With the division formation established, we continued to move throughout the day observing the destroyed remnants of the enemy 26th Infantry Division security force. At nightfall, the 3d Armored Division halted southwest of Objective COLLINS to allow the other elements in 7th Corps to catch up (see sketch three). The 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment lay poised to assault COLLINS and locate the Iraqi Republican Guards.

On the morning of 26 February 1991, the division movement formation was changed to a Vee formation to place two brigades forward and one brigade in reserve. The 2d Brigade assumed the left of the 3d Armored Division zone while 1st Brigade assumed responsibility for the right. This change in the movement formation now placed my scout platoon at the right front of the division. I was tasked with increasing the width of my zone to cover the entire Brigade frontage of approximately 10 kms. To accomplish this mission effectively, I moved forward of Task Force 3-5 approximately 12 kms and established short-term screen-lines, displacing forward in 3000 meter increments.

At about 1000 hours, I began passing through support elements of the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment as they were moving south to allow the passage of the 1st Armored Division and 3d Armored Division. During this time, a sandstorm began to build that would stay with us throughout the day and limited visibility to 300 meters with the unaided eye. As my scouts continued to establish short-term screen-lines well forward of 1st Brigade, they began to encounter fresh track marks from T-72 tanks and BMP-1 armored personnel carriers, indicating that the enemy units in this area were in the process of repositioning. This was further reinforced by the task force intelligence officer's statement that satellite imagery taken 24 hours earlier had shown numerous enemy armored vehicles in this area. These same enemy fighting positions were now empty, and the track marks indicated that enemy armored forces were moving in an attempt to cover the flank we were set to attack.

At 1530 hours, I received a call from LTC Brown informing me that he had closed to within 2000 meters of my scout platoon and that he should clear forward another 3000 meters and hold in place. I continued to execute his guidance and at 1600 hours started to report that I had
accomplished the task and was now atop the 73 grid line when I received a call from the Task Force Aer Liaison Officer. He stated that two A-10 aircraft had located three enemy artillery pieces to my front, and he needed my scouts to mark the front of our unit to identify friendly and enemy positions for the aircraft. Realizing that we would quickly come into direct fire range of these artillery pieces, I had my scouts turn on their smoke generators to mark our positions for the A-10s. While the A-10s were unable to immediately identify our smoke in the sandstorm, the alleged enemy artillery pieces were suddenly found to be, in reality, T-72 tanks (see sketches four and five). My Platoons Sergeant, SSG Lance Bedford, had unknowingly moved within 800 meters of the center tank before both he and the enemy tank commander simultaneously discovered each other's presence. The T-72 tank was unable to traverse its turret in time while SSG Bedford fired a TOW missile into its left front and destroyed it.

In an attempt to support SSG Bedford, I moved my vehicle around to provide fire against the enemy tank that was attempting to engage him. While doing so, the leftmost T-72 tank started moving forward out of his fighting position in an attempt to engage my vehicle with his main gun at a range of approximately 1800 meters. My gunner, SGT Alonzo Dargan, detected the enemy tank moving forward and began to raise the_TOW missile launcher. The enemy tank fired its sabot round, penetrating my M1A1 below the hull, destroying two road wheels and a shock absorber but causing little other damage. With enemy mortar fire also falling on my position, I began to maneuver to the right in an attempt to get behind the enemy T-72 tank and destroy him. The tank fired a second round that landed just in front of my now moving vehicle. Not wanting to offer him a third shot at me, I continued moving away from the enemy tank to get out of his main gun range. It was then that LTC Brown informed me that the lead Mechanized Infantry Team (Team Cheyenne) was established and for me to dispatch my scouts.

I gave my scouts the order to displace, reenter friendly lines on the flanks of the Task Force, and consolidate behind Team Cheyenne. Pulling all of my scouts together allowed me to conduct an After-Actions Review of the contact and engagement we had just incurred. It also offered my scouts the opportunity to look each other in the eyes and fully contemplate what we had just accomplished. The battle-damage assessment at this point was one T-72 tank, one BMP-1 APC, and an enemy mortar section destroyed, with no losses to friendly forces and only minor damage to my vehicle.

Over the next 16 hours, 1st Brigade continued to fix and destroy enemy forces with direct and indirect fire while attack helicopters (Apache) and division MLRS units destroyed enemy counterattack forces on the 1st Brigade right flank. At 0800 on 27 February 1991, with the overwhelming majority of enemy forces destroyed forward of the 1st Brigade and friendly losses limited to two soldiers killed in action, three soldiers wounded in action, and one Bradley Fighting Vehicle destroyed, the Brigade Commander, Colonel William Nash, ordered a local
cease-fire. He then sent a psychological operations team forward to offer safe passage to anyone wanting to surrender within the next 30 minutes. Approximately 95 enemy soldiers, all from the 9th Brigade of the Tawakana Division (RGFC), accepted this offer to surrender but informed the interrogation team that many others refused to give up and chose, instead, to stay and continue fighting.

At 0830 hours, Colonel Nash lifted the local cease-fire and began moving 1st Brigade forward to resume the attack. Task Force 4-34, on the right of the Brigade wedge, moved forward first to establish an overwatch position. Next, 4-32 Armor, on the left of the Brigade wedge, moved forward to establish an overwatch position. Upon creating a small rise, 4-32 Armor encountered the enemy forces that the prisoners of war had spoken about earlier. Facing it was an enemy T-72 tank battalion that was moving forward from a hide position that it had occupied during the night. With the enemy tank battalion in the open, 4-32 Armor used the crest of the hill as cover and engaged the enemy. Over the course of the next ten minutes, using A-10 aircraft, artillery, and direct-fire weapons systems, 4-32 Armor destroyed the entire enemy battalion consisting of 29 tanks.

Upon the completion of the 4-32 Armor battle, Task Force 3-5 was ordered to move forward and resume the Brigade lead in the attack. Moving between two friendly armored units, we encountered only light resistance from small groups of enemy infantry that had been cut off from their parent unit and had managed to survive the previous night’s destruction. Once Task Force 3-5 was even with the two other Task Forces in the Brigade, LTC Brown ordered me to resume the Task Force lead and continue the attack.

As my scouts moved forward to resume the lead, I was able to survey the destruction that the enemy had suffered during the battle. Most apparent was the T-72 tank that SSG Bedford had killed, now reduced to a burned-out hulk. On top of the tank turret were the charred remains of the enemy tank commander still grasping his 12.7 mm machine gun. We continued to move unimpeded through the destroyed remains of the rear support area for the 9th Brigade of the Tawakana Division.

At approximately 1230 hours, my scouts encountered the enemy second-echelon forces arrayed in a reverse-slope defense (see sketch six). On the left side of the zone, SSG Bedford came face-to-face with three T-62 tanks at a range of only 400 meters. He quickly destroyed the center tank with a TOW missile, despite the short range, causing the other two enemy tanks to begin withdrawing from their positions. On the right side, I encountered two BMP-1 APC’s in fighting positions. While attempting to fire on one of the enemy vehicles, my 25mm chain gun suffered a solenoid malfunction, resulting in a misfire. The enemy BMP then moved forward and fired at my vehicle five times with his 73mm cannon, missing all five times. My wing man then maneuvered into position and destroyed the enemy vehicle and crew with his 25mm chain gun.
With the enemy security element fixed, LTC Brown maneuvered the Task Force into position and began to assault the enemy unit. After handing the battle off to the lead team, I withdrew my scouts into a hide position and, once again, conducted an after-actions-review with my key leaders while the rest of the platoon conducted maintenance and security operations. The ensuing battle lasted approximately two hours and resulted in the destruction of an enemy tank company-plus sized element. (Task force log) After consolidation, the Task Force was ordered to begin moving forward and resume the attack.

After moving my scouts forward of the Task Force, I immediately began to penetrate the flank of an enemy motorized rifle company (MRC) (see sketch seven). Ordering my scouts to engage the enemy vehicles, we were able to destroy 11 T-62 tanks, BTR-50's, and BMP-1's. in rapid succession while suffering only one wounded-in-action. This allowed the Task Force to continue moving forward rapidly and exploit the penetration.

During this operation, I encountered an enemy anti-tank minefield as I was pursuing an enemy BMP. As I moved forward to a covered position from which to engage the BMP, I unknowingly passed through the minefield without detonating any of the mines. After destroying the enemy BMP, I turned to the rear of my turret in an effort to guide my driver back and realized that we had passed through the minefield. Without informing my driver of the situation, I cautiously guided him back out of the minefield. I then called LTC Brown and informed him of the location of the minefield while my engineers came forward to mark the bypass location.

As the sun began to set and visibility became limited, the brigade halted to establish limited visibility recognition symbols on all vehicles. With this accomplished, my scouts resumed the Task Force lead during the night attack. Within an hour, we began to encounter enemy dismounted infantry positions arrayed as flank security for an armored battalion. It quickly became apparent that the enemy infantry could not accurately locate our positions until we were within 100-200 meters of them. This kept the enemy soldiers from firing their RPG-7 anti-tank grenade launchers and machine guns until we were almost on top of their positions. I authorized my scouts to fire at any enemy fighting positions that they encountered but ordered them to continue moving in an effort to bypass the enemy security element. Continuing our movement, we destroyed approximately 40 enemy infantry soldiers including one RPG gunner who deployed less than 50 feet forward of my vehicle.

After clearing the enemy security element, my scouts detected the flank positions of the enemy mounted forces (see sketch eight). I issued the order to begin destroying armored vehicles in an effort to penetrate the enemy positions. Firing TOW missiles and 25mm chain guns, we destroyed 11 T-72 tanks and BMP's before I received permission to withdraw in favor of the Task Force. LTC Brown quickly pushed Team Cheyenne forward to exploit the penetration and continued to roll up the enemy flank. With Team Cheyenne in the lead, the Task Force destroyed
three armored battalions that were arrayed in a regimental-sized anti-armor ambush. (Task Force log)

The Task Force continued to move until entering the Kuwaiti western border and established a tarry defense at 0300 hours on 28 February 1991. At 0700 hours, LTC Brown informed me that a cease-fire may take affect at 0800 hours, so I was to move forward of the unit and recon in zone for remaining enemy positions. Upon informing my soldiers of the possibility of a cease-fire, I was greeted with a mixture of relief and satisfaction that we had done our jobs very effectively. The final battle damage assessment for the scout platoon was 26 enemy vehicles destroyed, including 13 medium battle tanks (T-62,T-72), and approximately 120 enemy soldiers killed-in-action. Friendly losses were limited to one soldier wounded-in-action and two M3A1 CFV's slightly damaged due to direct fire.

Throughout the movement to contact, Task Force 3-5 Scouts were opposed by dug-in armored and mechanized infantry forces. In every battle, my scouts were able to locate the enemy force and prevent the Task Force from being surprised. The battles with enemy security forces often developed very rapidly and required initiative and aggression on the part of subordinate leaders. Quick reaction was often rewarded with the destruction of the enemy force.

The application of reconnaissance doctrine required adaption for the prevailing conditions of the battlefield. Rather than operating solely as the "eyes and ears" of the commander, we were tasked to gain and maintain contact with enemy forces and develop the situation so the Task Force Commander could maneuver forces more effectively on a rapidly changing battlefield. Accomplishing this task required mental, as well as, hands-on training. By training to applicable standards in the desert environment prior to the ground war, I was able to assure that my scouts could make the transition and become an aggressive reconnaissance force.

The ability of any subordinate leaders to learn quickly allowed them to adapt rapidly to the multitude of changes required for operating in a desert environment. Operating in three-vehicle sections became second nature to them. Reacting aggressively to enemy security forces also became instinctive. Competence became the tool for succeeding in combat and my scouts were able to use this tool with great expertise, allowing them to fight, win, and survive.

A lesson learned during the operation is the necessity of major weapons systems for mounted reconnaissance elements. With the advent of the High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), battalion scout platoons have started converting from the heavily armed M3 series Cavalry Fighting Vehicles to the lightly armed HMMWVs. Part of the purpose for this transition was so that scouts could move quietly on the battlefield and become more effective as the "eyes and ears" of the commander.

While I initially agreed with the concept of HMMWV-mounted scouts, I have since changed my views based on my experiences during the war. While the HMMWV concept does offer
many advantages to the reconnaissance leader, such as a lower silhouette, quiet operation, increased accelerations, and lower maintenance requirements, the disadvantages become glaringly obvious during combat operations.

The detractors of the M3-series reconnaissance vehicle state that it has a high silhouette, is too noisy during operation, and has high maintenance requirements. These are valid limitations of the vehicle. However, detractors also note that the presence of the 25mm chain gun and TOW launcher on the vehicle cause scouts to shift their primary concern away from reconnaissance and towards destroying the enemy. This observation, if valid, is most likely a result of improper reconnaissance training, not an inferior vehicle.

The M3-series reconnaissance vehicle offers advantages that are crucial to mission accomplishment on the battlefield. It offers substantial armor protection to the crew against small arms, indirect, and some light anti-armor fires. It also provides an all-weather observation capability with the thermal imagery producing integrated sight unit (ISU). A properly trained crew can use the vehicles' high silhouette as an observation platform and detect targets out to a range of five kilometers during both day and night operations as long as line-of-sight is present. The M3 offers mobility that only a tracked vehicle can offer. It is can use avenues of approach that wheeled vehicles are not capable of using, thereby allowing the commander to more readily project reconnaissance assets against the enemy weaknesses.

Possibly the biggest advantage offered by the M3 is the ability to engage and destroy any enemy armored vehicle presently being produced in the world. This capability offers scouts the flexibility not only to disengage rapidly from an enemy force with direct fire, but also to destroy enemy elements within its capabilities. With enemy tactics often employing armored vehicles forward in the security zone during defensive operations, a lightly-armed reconnaissance element is at a distinct disadvantage during a rapid moving offensive operation. The M3 provides the reconnaissance element the ability to overcome this disadvantage.

It is my sincere opinion that the M3 provided my scout platoon with the best opportunity to accomplish our mission and survive on the battlefield during the war. I do not believe that this would have been the case if we had been equipped in a HMMWV scout platoon. The legitimacy of my opinion is boosted by the fact that soldier equipment confidence rose to 100% in favor of the M3 during the war. This is probably the single most important factor in favor of the vehicle. A soldier's confidence in his equipment will allow him to accomplish any mission with that equipment. Proper training with the M3 provides this confidence that is so critical to success during combat.
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