ADVANCED COURSE
1918-1919

COMPANY mote: INFANTRY
42ND DIVISION IN THE 2D AND 3D PHASES OF
THE MOVES - ARGONNE.
OCTOBER 13TH - NOVEMBER 10TH, 1918

(PERSONAL EXPERIENCE)

CAPTAIN RUSSELL BARN, INFANTRY
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April 11, 1919.


NOTE: Only those books marked with an asterisk (*) were found to be of value in preparing this personal experience monograph.
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The Forty Second Division was made up of National Guard units drawn from twenty-six states and the District of Columbia, the four infantry regiments coming from New York, Ohio, Alabama and Iowa, and being designated as the 185th, 186th, 187th, and the 122nd, respectively. The first commander of this division was Major General William A. Haan, who, at the outbreak of the war, was the Chief of the Militia Bureau of the War Department; he chose for his Chief-of-Staff Major General (at that time Major) Douglas MacArthur, who later commanded the 84th Brigade of the division.

The decision of the War Department to make use of the National Guard in the first line of the army, brought to the Ohio troops the order to assemble at their base stations on Sunday, July 15, 1917; from this time until August 5th, the 4th Ohio Infantry was recruited to approximately 150 men per company and on the latter date was drafted into Federal service and designated the 168th Infantry. A subsequent change in tables of organization required that rifle companies be expanded to a strength of 280 men each; to accomplish this expansion, each of the other seven regiments in Ohio transferred sixteen men per company to the corresponding companies in the 168th Infantry.

During the period August 12—September 7, the regiment trained at Camp Perry, Ohio. On September 8th, it moved to Camp Mills, New York, there to form a part of the Forty Second Division which was being assembled at that place. By October 13th, the regiment was embarking for France and by November 17th, all units were in the first training area, about eighteen kilometers.
southwest of Saulx. Rumors of a German drive near Saulx resulted in the division being moved by marching to a new training area in the vicinity of Belfort in order to make room for French reserves in the threatened area. The move was made between the dates of December 12–21.

Starting on February 16, 1918, the regiment moved by rail to the vicinity of Lunéville, in Lorraine, preparatory to taking over a trench sector, being attached to the 60th French Infantry. (1) The first experience of the regiment in the trenches began on the night of February 22–23d, when the 1st Battalion took over a portion of that sector. (2) The month spent in this sector, with each battalion serving ten days in the front line, was the beginning of our contact with the enemy, which continued with but very few brief rest periods until November 10, 1918. During this period the regiment saw service in:

- Bacourt Sector, Lorraine, March 31–June 31
- Fereux—Souain Sector, Champagne, July 4–14
- Champagne—Jarrey Defensive, July 15–17
- Alains—Verne Offensive, July 25–August 3
- Saint Mihiel Offensive, September 12–16
- Bassey—Parnes Sector, November 17–30
- Mothe—Argonne Offensive, November 5–10. (3)

SECOND PHASE
PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS

Upon being relieved from the Bassey—Parnes Sector, the division was moved by truck and marching to the area around Montfaucon, where it took up a reserve position on October 6th. Our regiment bivouacked in the Bois de Montfaucon during the next four days. See Special Map No. 1.
GENERAL SITUATION

The great Advance Offensive had started under way on the night of September 20th. In order to understand the part played by the 166th Infantry in this, the last great battle of the World War, it is necessary to understand the strategy of the movement. The official army bulletin is quoted here for that purpose.

"It is necessary, first of all, to call attention to the vital relationship of this operation to the general German retirement. The withdrawal of the German forces was a vast pivoting movement based on Metz, having as its object a very considerable shortening of the front. It depended above all else for its success upon the holding of the pivot, and of the line in the vicinity of the pivot. Further, the railroad line skirting the Argonne to the north through Montbouy and Souain, represented nearly one half of the supply and troop moving power of the German system of communications. Never during the war had an essential German line been so seriously threatened; and its eventual severance was one of the outstanding features of the operations on the Western Front.

"The front between the Meuse and the Aisne lies in very difficult country, heavily wooded, far from level, and with few and bad roads and narrow valleys along which the progress of any considerable body of troops is extremely difficult. Especially is all this true of the more westerly district in and on the border of the Argonne. This region is one of the wildest in France, its dense forests cut up by ravines and almost devoid of means of communication. Indeed, the whole front was peculiarly favorable to defense and correspondingly ill-suited to the Allied offensive tactics in which..."
the combination of tanks and infantry and played an
important role. Furthermore, the natural difficul-
ties in the way of the American advance were
intensified by the thoroughness with which the enemy
had prepared his defensive system in this area. The
Sindenburg Line stood virtually intact at the begin-
ing of the American operations, and offered a truly
formidable obstacle to an advance. Despite these
difficulties, however, the American attack launched
over a front of eighteen miles, after very heavy
artillery preparation, on the morning of the 28th of
September with nine divisions in line, made a very
considerable breach in the enemy's positions. On
the right, the Bois de Forges, a strong position on
the flank was taken in the initial rush and the
Americans pushed their way through a relatively thinly
wooded country to an irregular line running through
Dannevoux-Cercourt, Septagesse-Tantillois-Montmauron,
while in the west, advancing up the valley of the Aire,
they took Varennes and Montblainville—in each a
penetration of some seven kilometers. The natural
result of this success was the retreat of the German
center and by the night of the 27th the line ran fairly
straight from Dannevoux to Montblainville. Then
the initial attack carried our forces something like
half way to the famous Kriemhilde line (second with-
drawal line).

"In the days immediately succeeding, however,
the gains were small. The impetuosity of the American
advance had left much to be done in the way of mopping
up and consolidating the ground won. But still more
important, the Germans, thoroughly alarmed, and aware
to the importance of this part of the line, soon took
the strongest countermeasures." (4)

RELIEF OF THE FIRST DIVISION

During the night of October 10th the regiment moved to the southern edge of the Bois de Montrebeau north of Chaudron Farm, near Reumont, preparatory to taking part in the relief of the 1st Division. This march, while not long, was one of the most difficult we made. It was very dark, the roads were poor and the rain fell almost constantly as it had for the past several days. The congestion of traffic rendered progress extremely slow and difficult.

Reconnaissance by battalion and company commanders was made on October 11th and the relief completed that night; the 2nd Battalion taking over the forward position just south of Somerance, the 3rd Battalion in support near Hill 230 and the 1st Battalion in reserve in the Bois de Montrebeau. (6)

TERRAIN

Major Wolfe describes the area in which we found ourselves in the following words: "The terrain in which the Rainbow found itself was singularly rugged, exceptionally arduous, and during this particular season, peculiarly water logged. For nearly two weeks it had been almost constantly rained upon. Proceeding on the extreme left of the division's sector, the roads were rudimentary, at times no better than tracks, feet deep in mud, along which the water seeped itself as though they were canals. On most of these paths it was impossible for animal transport—even machine-gun carts—to pass. Rarely, and then only through Herculean effort could an ambulance be brought to the aid of the dressing station. The ground was of that remorselessly wetly nature, which, insomuch as water, seems to be
OCCUPATION OF POSITION

Each regiment of the division in the order from right to left, 188th, 187th, 105th and 186th, had one battalion in the line. The 22d Division was on our right and the 86th Division on our left. The 2d Battalion, 305th Infantry (33d Div.) occupied Sowerence during the night of the 11th and 12th and maintained liaison by patrols with the left of our 2d Battalion on Route de Waldes. Before midnight of October 14th a patrol from our 2d Battalion relieved the troops of the 2d Battalion, 305th Infantry in the north of Sowerence and gained contact with that division at a point practically on the division boundary northwest of the town. Contact between this patrol in Sowerence and the rest of our 2d Battalion on Route de Waldes was maintained by patrols.

OPERATIONS OCTOBER 13-19

October 13th was devoted to re-adjustment of lines and preparations for an attack. A weak counterattack against our regiment was repulsed at about 1145 PM. Just before midnight orders were received for an attack the following morning. The 8th Division, which
The operations of the 158th Infantry on October 14th, 15th, and 16th are set forth in its diary as follows: 16th October 1918. Regimental HQ. at Bic Montre田au. The 158th Infantry in conjunction with remaining elements of 426 Division attacked on the morning of 14 October 1918. Pursuant to F.O. 28, Sq. 46th Div., Oct. 13 and F.O. 16 Nov. 22d Inf. Brig., Oct. 17, the division formed a part of the 5th Army Corps and the 1st American Army. The 84th Inf. Brig. attacked at 9:30 AM, purpose being to advance the line to position on line with 83d Brig. attack at 9:30 AM. Our artillery fire was very heavy and the barrage was well laid down. At the beginning of the operation the enemy artillery fire was comparatively light. All units in position and ready on line of departure for attack. There was little counterbattery work from the enemy and rather light shelling on our lines. There was considerable fire, however, upon SOMENAEIES. 8:25 AM, Caterpillar rocket seen to come up just on right of our Brig., which indicated that the 8th Brig. had attained its first objective. 8:30 AM, regiment advanced to attack. 9:15 AM, enemy machine-gun fire increased. Enemy artillery fire combing our rear area. 9:37 AM, hill 230 (southern hill) taken. 9:50 AM, gun shelling in and around SOMENAEIES. 9:55 AM, report from Division that 84th Brig. in keeping along side our Brig. in advance. The 296 Div. on our right is in the rear to a considerable extent. 10:00 AM, O.P. reports that resistance had been met on Hill
10:10 AM. Elements of 116th Inf. on left in liaison with us and contact daily on our line. 10:30 AM. Report that 185th Inf. is making good progress and is now south of Landres St. Georges. 10:45 AM. Aeroplanes firing on our front line and dropping signals. None of our planes seen. 10:50 AM. Indications are that our leading battalion has reached wooded area at east corner of 165th Inf. second objective. 3d Bn. (support) has reached SORRENCE. 10:55 AM. Heavy fire on our lines from Mill 252. 11:00 AM. Brigade Commander directs that we keep on proceeding after reaching 4th objective. 11:15 AM. Prisoners reported to have been taken (later found that 90 prisoners were taken by Co. H and sent to rear by landing waves with thought that guards would be sent by support platoons. In some way they became mixed with prisoners taken by 3rd Division and were taken to the rear by 3rd Division). 11:20 AM. Enemy artillery fire on practically our second objective. 165th Inf., slightly to our rear. 11:50 AM. P.O. of assault battalion in SORRENCE. C.O. 3d Bn. reports that our lines are forward from second objective and moving carefully. Elements on right and left up with our lines. 12:15 PM. Meeting with stubborn resistance. Considerable number of casualties in assault platoons. 12:20 PM. C.O. reports that roads north of Landres-st-Georges crowded with traffic. Some enemy troops also leaving town. 1:35 PM. Machine-gun fire from nine enemy avions near SORRENCE. 1:14 PM. Advance elements reaching St. Georges meeting with very stubborn resistance from enemy P.G. Fire. 1:40 PM. Reports from 155 Inf. that they have passed left of Landres-st-Georges and reached third objective at
2:15 PM. (Point cut at 2:00 PM to be incorrect.)

2:00 PM. Enemy shelling very active. 3:00 PM. Division Commander very anxious to get brigade across river between Landres-ct-St. Georges and gain heights beyond, thence to exploit to fourth objective with patrols. 2:40 PM. Barrage to be put down on trenches between St. George and Landres-ct-St. Georges commencing at 3:20 PM and lasting one hour, maximum rate of fire. It will then lift to stream north of St. Georges and continue with maximum fire of 100 rounds per minute per hour. Forward patrols to be withdrawn to zone of safety and necessary precautions to be taken. Assault battalions to be ready to move forward at 4:30 PM. 5 battalions light artillery (1 on trench systems and one each on troops) on 22nd Prig. front. 3:40 PM. Two enemy detachments seen coming into Landres-ct-St. Georges from north.

4:08 PM. Barrage will be continued until 5:00 PM. 4:50 PM. En. commander reports companies will be cut. 5:00 PM. Patrols were sent to make successful progress. neareast elements of 165th Infantry scattered and officers trying to round them up. 5:30 PM. 165th Inf. did not advance but attempt is being made to do so by infiltration. 6:40 PM. Lt. Crewe, Brigade Aid, reports that 165th Inf. was sending forward patrols and suggested that we do likewise. This has already been done. 6:50 PM. Reports received to effect that 36th Brigade was going to try to break through, using "cold steel". 7:21 PM. Fixed liaison position right consisting of elements from Co. "E", 165th Inf., and Co. "C", 165th Inf. 7:30 PM. Our patrols again sent out with instructions to go as far as possible until resistance is met. 8:30 PM. Barrage line arranged.
for 500 meters in front of our lines about 0700 on 1st Oct. 10:10 AM. P.O. 17 Sq. 33d Inf. Brig. 15 Oct. 16 received from I.C. 33d Inf. Brig., to relieve 3d Br. by 10 In. during night. 10:10 AM. 3d Sq. to be relieved also presumably by 3d Sq. 15th I.C. En. 3d En. will then form part of brigade reserve. Let En. move up to support positions. Four casualties were reported in Machine-Gun Company, all slight.

15 October 1918 1:30 AM Field Order 17, Sq. 33d Inf. Brig. 15 Oct. 19 received ordering continuation of attack commencing at 7:30 AM. Barrage to start at 7:15 AM, on enemy wire and continue for 15 minutes. At 7:30 AM, it will lift 500 meters for change of enemy wire and at 7:40 AM move forward at rate of 100 meters every six minutes. Sixteen tanks will be used during the attack for the brigade. 3d Sq. in support of Co. L. and M. as assault companies. (2 platoons each forming a single wave and 2 each in support) and L. and L. Co. in support. Orders were immediately sent out to En. Command, but were also in writing to them. 8:40 AM. Relief as ordered in P.O. 17, Sq. 33d Inf. Brig. (received at 10:10 PM same night) had not been completed. P.O. 15th, 3d, and 3d En. in SCHERARD. No tanks had been seen at this hour. 8:20 AM. Enemy W.V. and gas shell fire active. Enemy is attacking our lines, barrage piercing. 7:10 AM. Tanks reported to be on way to front. 7:50 AM. Our attack went ahead according to schedule without regard to counterattack. Tanks on way up. 8:10 AM. Lt. Honnatt, commanding Co. L reports that he sent patrols into woods which had been entered to clean it out. 8:45 AM. Captain Grove reports that he can see enemy dragging a field piece over the ridge toward our lines. 8:55 AM. All tanks were pulled back on account of mechanical.
trouble and casualties among personal. Tank Co. Capt. stated that he saw company at point 51.2-35.0 who seem to be getting the better of the infantry. Tank Co. Capt. stated that he had standing orders to withdraw and reorganize if at any time he was reduced to less than five tanks. 9:00 AM. Report from brigade to effect that 158th Inf. was advancing slowly through enemy wire and into shallow trenches. 9:20 AM. L Co. held up by machine-gun fire, and lines about 150 yards south of trench system. 9:35 AM. Message from H Co. states that they are having hard fighting in woods, having lost 25 men and enemy still in woods. Also reports that 2nd Div. on left is held up. 9:35 AM. 158th Inf. requests zone fire on their front on line 285.0 and 168th Inf. requests that fire be extended over whole brigade front. Colonel Belly orders fire for one half hour, now fire sweeping, commencing at 10:15 AM in order to allow H Co. to adjust their lines accordingly. Following approximate casualties in 2nd Div. on Oct. 14th., 1918:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>KILLED</th>
<th>WOUNDED</th>
<th>MISSING</th>
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<td>E</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-Co.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
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10:50 AM. Casualties light in other battalions on that day. L Co. Capt. reports that he cleared out woods killing a considerable number of the enemy and the balance running to the rear. 10:50 AM. Artillery fire will be continued until noon and then leading battalion will attempt to push ahead. 1:25 PM. Report from Co. L that 158th Inf. line is a considerable distance in his rear, and with exposed flank, they cannot advance until the 168th Inf. moves forward. 1:35 PM. C.O. Co.
A report that he had order four attempts to advance, but cannot do so due to heavy fire coming entirely from the right. States that he has lost 30 men since noon. He reports that they are held up also by machine-gun fire. 11:30 P.M. Our attempts to advance unsuccessful. 4:30 P.M. Considerable shelling on our front line. 5:15 P.M. 39th Div. going to lay a barrage 300 meters north on account of heavy fire on their front lines. 6:00 P.M. Order from brigade adjutant that a detail of 50 men under command of commissioned officer will report to liaison small of 117th Fys. at the main road junction in south of Brigade at 6:00 P.M. as carrying parties for Bangalore torpedoes. They will be carried forward to leading companies who will furnish covering parties to the wire where the torpedoes will be exploded by the Fys. 6:10 P.M. Pioneers designated as carrying detail, and Major Emery (cong, 3d Bn.) instructed to provide covering patrol. SUMARY: Enemy attack during morning failed. In hand to hand encounter in woods enemy was routed and forced to retreat. All of our own attempts to advance during the day were also unsuccessful. 18 Oct. 13. The relative positions of units of the regiment at the beginning of the day were the same as upon the preceding day. We made no attack during the day but sent out strong patrols for the purpose of attempting to enter St. George's from the flank. 4:50 A.M. Nothing of importance happened during the night. The attack which had been scheduled for early in the morning this date was changed in order to allow units on our right and left to attempt an advance and bring their lines on line with our lines. The weather conditions were very bad, it being exceedingly dark.
One raining during the night. 11:50 A.M. Information received from the 77th to the effect that enemy on our left would attack during the day. He also stated that the enemy was holding less strongly and that we should hold ourselves in readiness to attack if so ordered. 9:05 A.M. There was fairly heavy shelling during the early part of the evening upon our front lines which gradually slackened during the night and at this hour had practically ceased. 9:00 A.M.

Unconfirmed report received to the effect that organization on our left had made material advance.

C.O. Co. K instructed to send out liaison patrol immediately to ascertain the facts in the case. 9:45 A.M. Enemy planes again flew over our lines firing on the infantry and directing their artillery fire.

10:45 A.M. Instructions given that in one division on the left has made advance, our patrols will be sent forward and attempt to get through enemy lines. 10:55 A.M. Report received that regiment on our left has advanced. C.O. 3d Bn. instructed to send patrols forward at once. 12:00 X. Weather has been very unfavorable all morning, it being rainy and cloudy. Capt. Hutchcroft, comdg. Co. K, is attempting to gain entrance to St. George's from the western edge. In case he is successful with his patrol, town will be entered by remainder of his company and Co. K will attempt to take line of trenches from the flank.

12:15 P.M. Capt. Buck ordered to take command of Co. I as soon. 1:00 P.M. Report received from brigade that 88th Division is not making the gain attack, but is instructed to keep up with the division on its left. 1:05 P.M. Heavy shelling in addition to 79's will be used on Hill along St. George's in case town
In town.

Lt. Col. Tupman returned early, the following report having been made. The troops moved up to left to effect junction with 28th Division elements and found that latter were a considerable distance from St. George on road running from same. We accordingly came back this same direction and attempted to catch on. An aeroplane overhead located his and directed machine-gun fire in his direction. He had two men killed and four wounded and realizing that he could not gain entrance to town withdrew his patrol. 8:00 P.M. Several changes in commissioned personnel of 7th Brig. General Jenison relieved from command of 8th Inf. Brigade. Colonel Heil successfully succeeded. Colonel Mitchell commanding 128th Inf. was relieved by Lt. Col. Bravao. 9:30 P.M.

Town of St. George will be gassed from 4:00 A.M. to 8:00 A.M. 17 October 1918. (6)

There was very little activity during the next few days other than patrolling to maintain contact with the enemy who were still in Sommevance.

FIRST BATTALION 309th III

On October 29th, the 1st Battalion relieved the 2d Battalion with Companies A and F in the line and C and D in battalion reserve just south of Sommevance. The following day our battalion extended its line to the right, taking over part of the line held by the 185th Infantry in order that the latter could take over the line held by the 84th Brigade which went into division reserve. The division on our right extended its line to the left about 300 meters, leaving our brigade to hold about 4,000 meters. See map facing page 11. (10)

During the afternoon of October 29th, while on a reconnaissance of the front line with some of the
other officers of my company, the enemy subjected our reserve position to a brief but violent bombardment, inflicting several casualties in spite of the fact that the troops were well dug in. We were unable to account for this sudden activity on the part of the enemy as there was no indication of a counter-attack nor of his withdrawal; however, upon our return, I learned that an enemy observation plane had been flying very low over our position for some time; the pilot became so bold and flew so low that a few of the men, being unable to resist the temptation any longer, left their holes and fired at him with their rifles; this noise brought the rest of the company out of their holes, giving the enemy observer just the information that he was seeking; the plane left immediately and in a short time the enemy artillery opened on us; judging from the casualties inflicted, the firing sites given the enemy artillery were very accurate.

No change in the location of our lines occurred during the period October 22-30th, although we continued to keep contact with the enemy who showed no signs of withdrawing. The officers and noncommissioned officers of Company 'B' made frequent and thorough reconnaissances of the forward position with the view to leading an attack which it was believed would be ordered within the next day or so.

RELIEF OF THE FIRST BATTALION

During the night of October 24-25 our battalion was relieved by the 2d Battalion in order that we might have an opportunity to reorganize and rest a day or so before the next attack.
On October 26th, the Regimental Commander announced to the officers of our battalion his plans for this attack; in this plan Company "F" was to attack St. Georges from the west, going into the zone of the 5th Division for this purpose, while the remainder of the battalion was to attack from the front. Following this conference I went to the command post of the right brigade of the 92nd Division to arrange for the message of my company through their zone; we completed our plans, familiarized ourselves with the terrain over which we were to advance, and awaited the announcement of D Day.

RELIEF OF THE 92ND BRIGADE

Division Field Orders No 43, received October 26th, announced plans for the relief of the 92nd Brigade by the 2nd Brigade (2nd Division); this was immediately followed by Field Orders No 44, revoking the former. On October 27th, 28th and 29th orders were received from the Division announcing plans being made for an attack to be launched on a date to be announced later; however, on October 30th, other orders were received directing the relief of our brigade as announced in Field Orders No 45; command of the sector was to pass to the 7th Division at noon the next day, October 31st. Our front line elements were to remain in position until passed through by the Marines. (11)

The relief was carried out as ordered and by evening of October 31st, the 168th Infantry, less the 5th Battalion still in the line, found itself bivouacked in the vicinity of Chauny, about three kilometers southeast of Freumont, where it remained for three days before again taking an active part in forcing the
enemy back to the Meuse River.

It was with mixed feelings of relief and keen disappointment that we listened to the terrific bombardment that preceded the successful attack of the 2d Division on the morning of November 1st: relief at being out of range of enemy machine-gun and artillery fire for the first time in nearly a month; disappointment at not being permitted to participate in smashing the line in front of which we had been held for over two weeks. Our best wishes went with the Marines that morning.

**ARTILLERY SUPPORT ON NOVEMBER 1ST**

In this attack the 2d Division had the direct support of 234 pieces of artillery, plus the general support of seventy-two 155-mm guns from the corps reserve and the machine guns of three divisions. (12) Compare this with the two brigades (1st and 67th) which supported the numerous attacks of our division.

**THIRD PHASE**

(Special Map No. 5)

**42D DIVISION TRANSFERRED TO I CORPS**

At this time (Nov. 1st) the 42d Division was relieved from further duty with the V Corps and assigned to the I Corps which was on the left of the First American Army. Our regiment, as part of the division in corps reserve, remained in the vicinity of Charchpenny until November 3d on which date we again put under way, marching north to Verpel where we spent the night. The following day the march was resumed with Brieulles-sur-Bar as the objective; however, owing to heavy shelling of that place, the regiment spent the night in the vicinity of Authe; Company D bivouacked in a railroad cut southwest of Brieulles.
Pursuant to orders received late the night before, our division moved from the position
of November 8th with the mission of relieving the
77th Division and continuing the pursuit of the enemy.
Our regiment was to relieve the 514th Infantry.
The division advanced with regiments abreast in the order
from right to left: 166th, 167th, 168th and 169th.(1)
Our regiment advanced in column of battalions with the
1st Battalion leading, followed by the 2d and 3d
Battalions in the order named. The 1st Battalion had
companies "C" and "D" in the lead with companies "A"
and "B" in reserve.

The body of the report of the Commanding Officer,
1st Battalion, covering this relief is quoted below:

"1. Pursuant to verbal orders, Commanding Officer
168th Infantry, this battalion moved from its position
south of Tricullas-sur-Bar at 9:30 AM, November 9, 1918,
with orders to relieve the 514th Regiment of the 77th
Division at 16:00 noon, November 9, 1918, on the line
of departure: Les-Petites-Armoise-Terrillers.

2. This battalion halted on the Les-Petites-
Tricullas-sur-Bar road, its officers going forward to
reconnoiter the line of departure with guides from each
company of the 514th Infantry who had met the battalion
at the halting point.

3. The Battalion Adjutant located Lt. Col. Bode
of the 514th Infantry at Teunay but was unable to
secure any information from him concerning dispositions,
relief, etc. He (the Adjutant) did state, however,
that he believed a relief that afternoon impossible,
also that if the Battalion Commander desired any in-
fomation, he, personally, could secure it from Lt.
Col. Judd at Tannay.

4. Instructions were received at 12:00 M to proceed with the relief and pass the lines of the 8th Infantry. The advance lines of our elements passed through the 8th regiment from 2:30 P.M. to 5:00 P.M., in the vicinity of Tannay and south of the Bois de Mont Dieu.

5. The relief was made approximately three hours after the stipulated time owing to the fact that the elements of the regiment to be relieved had moved forward from the line of departure.

6. This battalion was in regimental reserve during the day of November 7, 1918, coming in contact with the infantry of the First Division, on the Sedan road only. 14

Just north of Trieuille-sur-Bar there was a causeway several hundred yards in length crossing a marshy creek drained into the Bar River. In places the fill on which the roadway was built was some fifteen feet high. The Germans had done a most thorough job of destroying this roadway as they retreated, rendering it impassable for transportation and delaying the progress of the foot troops for about two hours. Passage was eventually made over a plank road constructed by our Engineers. It was in this area that we saw a number of dead horses, whose appearance led to the conclusion that someone had taken advantage of their presence to replenish their meat supply.

While crossing over the high ground northeast of Tannay we were subjected to heavy artillery fire and suffered some casualties. We continued our advance, clearing the Bois de Mont Dieu of the enemy, and
nother for the night along the northern edge of the
where we met about 300 pesos in the north.
about midnight we made contact with the 165th
infantry on our right. That night in fields de haut
Dieu was one never to be forgotten by those who were
there; in addition to the heavy artillery fire, we
had to contend with the elements, cold, darkness,
rain and severe electrical storms. Due to the bridges
and roads being destroyed by the enemy it was well
past midnight before any parties were able to
get any food up to us. Division Field Orders No 55
were received during the night; extracts of this
order are quoted below:

1. The enemy is retreating rapidly across the
channel. The 40th Div. (French) is in liaison on our
left. The 1 Army Corps continues the pursuit with
the object of defeating the enemy's rear guard and
capturing or destroying his troops and transport be-
tween a crossing is affected.

2. The 42nd Div. will continue the pursuit to-
morrow at 5:20 hrs., will reach the enemy and secure
the bridgehead at Saden.

3. (d) The pursuit will be pushed with the
utmost vigor. The OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED TO THE
DIVISION IS ONE OF THE MOST BRILLIANT OF THE WAR.
Brigade and regimental commanders will by personal
example and leadership, inspire the rapid progress of
the front line battalions." (15)

OPERATIONS OF NOVEMBER 6th

Our advance was resumed the next morning (Nov.
6th). That the enemy resistance was stiffening was
evidenced by the number of his machine-gun crews, who
remained with their guns until they were either
captured at kilovo. there guns were skillfully placed and rendered our advance slow and difficult, necessitating frequent use of our own anchor guns and 37-mm gun; in many instances it was necessary to hold
the advance and wait for our patrols to capture these positions. due to the condition of the roads and shortage of ammunition, our artillery was unable to afford us the desired support. between the hours of
5:00 and 11:30 AM our patrols entered the village of
chesary, reporting that the enemy had just evacuated
that place and were withdrawing to the north. our
advance was halted temporarily just north of the
town due to some misunderstanding as to our left
boundary, which was also the left boundary of the
American army. however, this was soon adjusted and
our advance was resumed, becoming more difficult as
it proceeded until finally it was halted late in the
afternoon along the road running east from chesary
where we were ordered to dig in.

about midnight, November 5-7th, division field orders
No 81, quoted below, was received at our regimental
command post in chesary:

1. the enemy is still in retreat. the 1 American
Army Corps continues the attack. 2. the 4th Division
will continue the pursuit at once and will continue it
day and night without halting. the front will be
reached and ceased will be taken to-night. (Nov.7th)²

(16) Ohiz.
p. 270

(17) Ohiz.
p. 276

operations of november 7th:

immediate steps were taken to resume the advance;
the 3D Battalion, which had been in rear of the 1st
Battalion, set under way by 8:30 AM. (17) and passed

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through the lines of the latter. The 6th battalion followed the 26th. The 1st battalion was reorganized and followed the 6th, marching along the Chéhéry-Seune road. Then began the day of November 7th: the day when there were two armies (French and American), three corps (17th French and 1st and 11th American) and three divisions (40th French, 26th and 1st American) represented in the hills southwest of Seune, each one staring at the presence of the other, and each one intent upon capturing the city.

The Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, stated in his report, dated November 10th, that the advance elements of his battalion reached a line about one and one half kilometers north of the road running east from Chevres, and about one kilometer north of the line held by the 26th Infantry, lst Division.)

The 1st Battalion remained along the road about 2 kilometers southwest of Chéhéry until about noon when orders were received for us to extend the right of the 6th battalion; we also learned at the time that the 3rd battalion was to extend the left of the 3rd Battalion. This maneuver was done under day and we moved northeast as far as Ruou Château where we received orders to remain in that position. It was later learned that the extension of the flanks of the 3rd battalion had to be called off due to the 26th Infantry being in our zone, creating such confusion and confusion as to render maneuvering practically impossible.

ARRIVAL OF THE 1ST DIVISION

Before leaving our reserve position we witnessed a rather unusual scene; a division commander, staff, field officers, evening and staff, engineers, and engineers, engineers, engineers, engineers.
along the Senna road in close formation in the area occupied by our assault battalion which was at that time having difficulty in advancing; the command post of this division was established in Chevry. The natural result of this unusual activity on the road was a material increase in enemy artillery and machine-gun fire from which all units suffered. Although this division is to be commended for making a most difficult march under adverse conditions, it is my firm conviction that its presence there seriously impeded the advance of our own troops and resulted in excessive casualties in both divisions.

The withdrawal of this division late that afternoon was followed soon after by orders for the relief of our own Brigade. The boundary of the Fourth French Army was moved to the right (east) in order to include Senna in its zone of action. There ended the race to Senna so far as the American troops were concerned.

Our battalion had orders to move back to a bivouac site about one and one half kilometers south of Chevry. When I arrived at Chevry at about midnight with my company, I was met by a regimental staff officer who said: "The rest of the battalion is going to bivouac south of town; your company is to remain here tonight as the Regimental Commander has a job for you tomorrow morning; I will guide you to your billets."

COMPANY "C" STARTS FOR SENNA

About 3:15 that morning (Nov. 26th) I was directed to report to the Regimental Commander; upon reporting to him I was informed that the Brigade Commander wanted to see me; I stepped into an adjoining room and reported to Colonel Henry J. Reilly,
...and was in command of our troops at that time. He gave me the following information and instructions: That our Corps Commander had authorized him to send one company each from the 168th and 169th Regiments to report to the Commanding Officer, 321st French infantry to represent the American Army in the capture of, and entry into, Sedan; that my regimental Commander had designated my company to represent his regiment; that I would leave Chemery at 7:30 o'clock that morning (Nov. 3rd); that if my kitchen, and ration and water carts were not ready to start when I did, they would overtake us sometime in the forenoon; that the regiment would get rations to me if necessary; that the 321st French Infantry was some place between Chemery and Sedan; that I would meet the company from the 168th Infantry some place, some time that day; that I would proceed at once to the command post of the 40th French Division in Comrnage for a conference with their staff—it will be noted that I was not to have the rest of my train which meant that we would have only the ammunition and equipment which we carried on our persons. After leaving the Brigade Commander, I went to Comrnage in search of the command post of the 40th French Division, which I located with considerable difficulty; it would have been better had I spent this time getting some much needed sleep as the information received was of little or no value to me. I got back to Chemery in time to make preparations for the day's march.

At 7:45 o'clock that morning we moved out of Chemery accompanied by the Regimental Operations Officer and Battalion Intelligence Officer. Although the men were in poor physical condition, badly in
and of rest and a chance of eating, their morale
was high due to the prospect of a good time in town.
In fact, they were in high spirits they did not
worry much over the fact that they had not had
breakfast, and did not know when they would, as our
kitchen had failed to resort. I had decided that if
it did not overtake us by the time we arrived at
Chevry, I would halt at that place and attempt to
buy sufficient food of some kind for breakfast;
however, inquiry there disclosed the fact that an
American kitchen was halted just north of the town.
We soon located it and found a hot breakfast waiting
us. There had been some miscalculation of time
and space which resulted in the kitchen leaving
Chevry ahead of the company.

While we were eating an automobile load of war
correspondents drove up; they told me that they had
been informed of our mission at Corps Headquarters and
would like to get the story and some pictures. After
convincing me of their identity and getting such
information and pictures as they desired, they pro-
ceeded toward Taza; they returned in a short time,
however, with the information that the Germans were
shelling the road north of Chevrens, and that the
31st French Infantry was near Fresnois.

Upon arriving at a point about one and one half
kilometers north of Chevrens, and noticing that there
was occasional shelling along the road ahead, I halted
the company and had the men take advantage of such
cover as was available, taking two runners with me I
proceeded across country to Fresnois where I reported
to Colonel Ludovic Abel Seville, commanding the 31st
French Infantry. After a most cordial greeting, he

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called a staff officer and directed that arrangements to send a man to billet by evening. At the conclusion of our conference, I asked if I might visit his forward position; he readily agreed to take me with a runner to guide me to the commanding officer of the leading battalion. I found him in his observation post which was situated in an old building located on commanding ground about 1000 meters northeast of Frenais; from this point we had an excellent view to the front and could plainly see the city of Sedan.

After a brief conference with the Battalion Commander, I returned to the regimental command post and sent a runner back to the company to guide it to Frenais. The company from the 16th Infantry which was supposed to be with me had not reported and no word as to the location had been received.

PATROLS ATTEMPT TO ENTER SEDAN

About 9:30 o'clock that evening Colonel de Ville informed me that he was sending out a strong patrol with the mission of entering Sedan, and asked if I would care to send one of my troops with it; I readily accepted the invitation and detailed the 3rd Platoon, commanded by First Lieutenant Calvin H. Teed, to accompany the French patrol. The 4th Platoon, commanded by First Lieutenant George H. Crottinger, was detailed under similar circumstances to accompany a second patrol sent out with the same mission as the first. Judging by the written reports submitted by these two officers, as well as by their oral reports at the time, it appears that Lieutenant Teed's patrol entered the village of Forges and the one led by Lieutenant Crottinger entered the village of Pt. Torrey, both of which are suburbs of Sedan on the west side of
Lieutenant Focx's report: "The patrol was halted by a French Lieutenant who was familiar with the territory. He proceeded at 0:50 AM, November 9, 1:01, about 6 kilometers northwest of Fresno; change bearing slightly to the north for a considerable distance, probably 1.5 kilometers until the outskirts of Forés were reached. Several buildings were passed. The patrol encountered shell and heavy machine-gun fire, and the French officer, seeing that further progress was impossible, without serious losses, ordered the patrol to return at 2:50 AM. No prisoners were taken." (18)

Lieutenant Gertinger's report: "After leaving chateau we proceeded in the direction of Sedan, along secondary road for a distance of about three-quarters of a mile, and were there halted by the French officer. There was continuous shelling of the road and occasional bursts of machine-gun fire, but none of which appeared to be directed on us. We passed several houses along the road after being hailed by the French officer. We lay along road till about 3:50 AM, when the French officer said that further progress was impossible and ordered patrol to return by same route." (22)

COMPANY "D" RETURNS

The next morning (Nov. 9th) the Commanding General, 40th French Division, came to Fresno and informed us of the fact that armistice terms had been given to the Germans and that the date of acceptance had been set 11:00 AM, November 11th; also that in view of the expected acceptance of terms of the armistice, his