THE INFANTRY SCHOOL
FORT BENNING, GEORGIA.

ADVANCED COURSE
1924-1925.

THE BATTLE OF BELLEAU WOODS.

CAPTAIN HENRY L. LARSEN
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS.
INDEX.

Bibliography 11
Introduction 1
General Situation 4
Special Situation 5
Operations 8
Analysis and Criticism 35
Lessons and Conclusions 42

---------------------

ILLUSTRATIONS.

Organization, Fourth Brigade (Chart I) 45
Situation Map, Battle of Belleau Woods (Plate I) 46

APPENDIX.

Citations and Commendations 47
BIBLIOGRAPHY.


Daniels, Josephus; "Our Navy at War", George H. Doran Co., N.Y. copyright 1922.


"Literary Digest, February 22, 1919", "What the President Saw at Belleau Wood".

Ludendorff, Erich von; "Ludendorff's Own Story", Harper and Brothers, 1919.


Michelin's; "Illustrated Guides to the Battlefields", Michelin & Cie, France, 1920.


Peixotto, Ernest; "The American Front", Charles Scribner's Sons, 1919.


Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Ass't. Sec'y Navy; Report to Secretary Navy, October 15, 1918.


Upton, L. S., Col.; "Notes of a Regimental Commander on Recent Fighting in Chateau-Thierry Distriict", (Confidential).


"History of the Second Division", Coblenzer Volkszeitung, Coblenz, Germany, June, 1919.

"History of the Sixth Machine Gun Battalion", Neuwied an.

"History of the Third Battalion Fifth Regiment Marines", Waldbreitbach, Germany, May, 1919.


"Diary of Fourth Brigade, Marine Corps, Am. E. F., May 30, 1918, to June 30, 1918."

"Summary of Information", June, 1918.

"Summary of Intelligence", June, 1918.
THE BATTLE OF BELLEAU WOODS.

INTRODUCTION.

When the news of the signal success of American troops in Belleau Woods in June, 1918, their stopping the overwhelming onslaught of the German Army and their vigorous counter-attacks, was flashed around the world it thrilled and inspired all Allies alike. Renewed hope replaced near despair. The name "Belleau Woods" became familiar to every household, a symbol of our effective entry into the World War and a source of great pride to every American. Many military critics have designated it as the turning point in the war. Here, Germany reached her high-water mark. General Pershing called this battle the "Gettysburg of the War".

By what circumstance did Fate place a handful of Americans at this most critical point at such a psycho-logical moment as that which brought such glory to American arms and forms so brilliant a page in our history? How was the engagement brought about and executed? What did it accomplish and what lessons may we draw from its procedure? That is the scope and purpose of this monograph.

On June 26, 1917, the Fifth Regiment, U. S. Marines, accompanying units of the First Division of Regulars, arrived at St. Nazaire, France, the very first troops of the American Expeditionary Forces to land on French soil and a part of the vanguard of the millions who were to follow. (1) The Sixth Regiment and the Sixth Machine Gun Battalion, all Marines, arrived shortly afterward and joined the Fifth Regiment, forming the Fourth Brigade, U. S. Marine Corps, under the command of Brigadier General Charles A. Doyen, an integral unit of the Second Division.

(1) McClellan Page 30.
It was altogether fitting that the Marines should have been among the first to reach France, because they represented an organization which has ever been in the fore of all military operations in our history, the oldest and proudest branch of the service. They symbolized many another victory. They stood for the unfurling of the American flag for the first time above an Old World fortress, in Tripoli, in 1803; for a share in the defeat of the "Serapis" by John Paul Jones, commanding the "Bonhomme Richard"; for the storming of the fortress of Chapultepec in the days of the Mexican War; for achievements at Guantánamo, Cuba, during the Spanish-American War; for glorious devotion to duty in innumerable engagements in scores of countries in all corners of the earth. The Fifth Regiment, withdrawn from the West Indies where they had had their baptism of fire in many encounters in the rebel infested countries of Haiti and Santo Domingo.

Among the first troops to land in France in June, 1917, we find these Marines just one year later, in the dark days of June, 1918, called upon to form the barrier that would stop the great German advance on Paris and change it from a victorious drive to a disastrous defeat culminating in the dissolution of Germany's powerful military machine and her hopes for world dominion. The call came at a very threatening moment, when the morale of the Allied armies and peoples was at its lowest ebb, when their hope of effective and timely assistance from American troops was nearly abandoned.

For several months following their arrival overseas the Marines performed many varied duties altogether necessary in organizing the A. E. F. but somewhat contrary to their choosing. They were scattered along the -two-
Line of Communications from the Base Sections in St. Nazaire and England to the Gondrecourt area. At Gondrecourt the Marines underwent an intensive course of training in trench warfare with the First Division, under the able instruction of the best troops of the French Army, the Chasseurs Alpin. This continued until October 23 when they were moved to the Bourmont, or Second Division, training area. After only one month's training as a unit the Brigade took over a sector of the front line trenches guarding Verdun. It was here the Marines first met the enemy in France, and it was here also, in several minor engagements, the Germans first tested the mettle of the Marines and gave them the title "Devil Dogs".

On May 13, 1918, the Brigade was withdrawn from this front and proceeded to the vicinity of Vitry-le-Francois, and shortly thereafter to the training area around Gières-Chaville-en-Vexin, northwest of Paris, where intensive drills, exercises and maneuvers in open warfare were conducted. Our men were told that the rest of our fighting would be in the open and that thereafter the American style of warfare would be utilized in contradistinction to the Allied methods and our special training with the French a few months before. All were indoctrinated with the offensive spirit under the inspiring leadership of General Pershing, whose vision reached far beyond the trenches. This method of fighting required little encouragement in these typical American troops; they had been constantly held in restraint in the trenches at Verdun and now eagerly re-adopted their native tactics.

On May 30, under orders of the French higher command, the Brigade, with the Second Division, made
preparations for a march to a position along side the First Division near Montdidier. The movement was scheduled to begin at six o'clock on the morning of May 31; every detail in the accomplishment of this move had been completed except the actual placing of the troops in motion.

GENERAL SITUATION.

But at this moment events of the greatest importance were occurring in rapid succession. The Germans had made their great Somme offensive beginning on March 21 and within eight days had swept everything before them to a depth of some fifty-six kilometers, seriously threatening the British flank. This operation had hardly come to a close when the German Army made another great successful attack at offensive came as a great surprise on May 27 between the Oise and Berry-au-Bac on a front of twenty-two miles and met with such remarkable success that they advanced no less than thirty-five miles in four days. After the Marne had been reached the Germans planned to use that river as a defensive flank and to direct their advance to the westward on Paris. (2) This last offensive was developing a desperate situation for the Allies. Under Field Order No. 4, the Second Division, which was preparing to relieve the First Division, was hastily diverted by motor truck to the vicinity of Meaux, a distance of about fifty miles and only about twenty miles east of Paris, the city so seriously threatened.
was almost at the gates to Paris and guarded the route to the heart of France at the most vital point of attack. It was on the Battlefield of the Marne, which from her earliest days had played so important a part in the military history of France. The country-side here is generally hilly, covered with numerous patches of heavy woods, and has many small villages connected by roads leading in all directions. The terrain naturally constitutes the powerful central defensive system in the valley of the Marne where Attila and his Huns were defeated, where Napoleon won many notable engagements, and where after success elsewhere in 1870 the Prussians required months of difficult fighting before victory was theirs. (3)

To the German troops on the Marne, victory seemed complete, and there was no apparent reason for stopping. (4) Otto H. Kahn, who was in Paris during this crisis, says that this was probably the most serious and gloomy period of the entire war, notwithstanding that it was estimated that one million people had left Paris during the spring of 1918. (5) It was in this grave crisis facing the Allies that American troops including the Marine Brigade were thrown into the line in "stopping perhaps the most dangerous of the German drives". (6)

The twenty four hour camion trip took the Marines through the outskirts of Paris and through Meaux—a city crowded with refugees, in turmoil and under heavy aerial bombardment by the Germans—where Divisional Headquarters was temporarily established. It carried them eastward over the Paris-Metz Highway. This road
was congested with traffic of every possible description. It was a most impressive but pathetic sight. There was the French Army in retreat. And crowded in with this seemingly disorganized mass were the civilians, mostly women and children, from hundreds of square miles who had abandoned their homes upon alarmingly short notice, all hurrying to the southward with what few belongings they had grabbed in their haste. Some were fortunate enough to get out with their families and a bull-cart; others were leading cows, pushing baby carriages or wheelbarrows, and some poor unfortunates seemed to be plodding along as in a trance, alone, with nothing. Scattered French soldiers, on their way to the rear, without arms, looting the homes of their countrymen, made light of the Americans moving forward, saying, "We are with army trains with heavy machine guns coming immediately behind them and the war would soon be over.

Through such a conglomerate mass of transportation and humanity, reaching for many miles to the rear, the French camions with their sleepy Anamese drivers carrying the Marines wended their way to the front. The Second Division having been placed at the disposal of the 7th Corps of the French 6th Army on May 30 was given the mission "first to bar the Cut Ru d'Alland, then to counter-attack as soon as possible in the direction of Passy en Valois Marizy-St. Mard (Duchene)".

At 7:40 P.M., May 31, 1918, Field Order No. 5, of the Second Division was issued, stating in part:

"A strong enemy attack has developed on the line Epieds-
Maj. H.
Barry Ltd. - Sainte-Courbevoie. The division passes from the Adjutant.

-six-
Seventh Army Corps (French) to the Twenty-First Army Corps (French) as reserve. "It will be concentrated at once in the area Montreuil-aux-Lions."

The rapid advance of the Germans within the preceding few days and the exhausted condition of the French troops made it imperative that the Division go into the line immediately. General Degoutte, commanding the French 21st Corps with his headquarters at Coupru, a short distance west of Chateau-Thierry, briefly outlined the situation in his immediate front on the morning of June 1 as follows: "His Corps had retreated before greatly superior numbers for five days; he had saved his artillery and transportation. The Germans held Chateau-Thierry and Hill 204, which gave them command of the Paris road and of the Meuse Valley to the south and west. Their first line ran through Vaux and along the railroad to Bourges, through Belleau Woods, Torcy, Bussieres, and Chezy. The German advance toward Meaux was being opposed by his two depleted French Divisions worn out after their five days' battle. He had no infantry reserves but his artillery was keeping up the fight with fine spirit."

The Second Division was ordered to go into position as rapidly as possible along the line la Nouette, the southern edge of Bois de la Marette, le Thiolet, Bois des Clerembauts, Lucy-le-Bocage, and Hill 142, north of Champillon. The Third Brigade was ordered to hold the right of this line, south of the Paris road, the Fourth Brigade, that part of the line north of the Paris road.

Field Orders No. 6, Second Division, issued at 6 P.M., June 1, 1918, read in part as follows:

- seven -
1. The enemy attacks in force on the line Chateau-Thierry-Boursesches-Monthiers. The Division forms part of the 21st Army Corps, whose Headquarters are at Charmigny. The 164th Division south of Lizy-sur-Ouroq, Chateau-Thierry road holds the line Essomes-Bonneil-Le Roche. Hqms. Ferme de Beaurepaires. The 43rd Div. north of Lizy-sur-Ouroq-Chateau-Thierry road holds the line La Roche-Boursesches-Chateau Belleau. Hqms. La Loge.

2. The Division will occupy and hold the line Bonneil-Le Thiolet-Chateau de Belleau.

3. (a) Third Brigade, Sector Bonneil-Le Thiolet (Both incl.) Hqms. Vantelet Ferme.

(b) Fourth Brigade, Sector Le Thiolet (excl.) Chateau-de Belleau (incl.) Hqms. Pyramides.

5. Headquarters (Division) Montreuil-aux-Lions.

The Marine Brigade accordingly established a line immediately in rear of the French units which had orders to drop back through the American lines. At 5:05 P. M., June 1, the following message was sent to Commanding General, Second Division:

"Second Br. 6th Marines in line from Le Thiolet Boursesches-Chateau Belleau are instructed to hold the line. 1st Br. 6th Marines going into line from Le Thiolet through Hill 142. 3rd Br. in support at La Voie du Chatel which is also P. C. of the 6th Marines. 6th Machine Gun Br. distributed at line. No instructions as to the evacuation of the wounded. Harbord."

(9) Brigade Diary, Page 3.

The operations of the Brigade in this sector naturally divide themselves into two phases. The first includes taking up hasty defensive positions in rear of the French troops, the retirement of the latter through our lines, and a period of continually repelling repeated determined attacks against our lines by the enemy. The second phase includes the counter-offensive operations launched against the enemy positions begun on June 6, just two days after the sector had been taken over, and continuing almost incessantly until June 26, after which date the lines remained constant until July 5-6, when the Brigade was relieved by the 5th Brigade of the 26th Division. While the hard fighting was continuous throughout the whole period of occupation of the sector, the Marines were attacking almost daily from June 6 to June 26.
ing this period no less than seven main formal attacks, besides several minor attacks in straightening the lines, were made by our troops, while the enemy made equally as many attacks against us.

During the night of June 1-2, the 1st Bn. 5th Regiment reinforced the 23d Infantry in filling a gap in the French lines from Bois-de-Veuilly, Premont, towards Gandelu. This battalion was withdrawn on the night of June 3.

Thus we find the Brigade in its original positions at the outset of this operation:

Second Bn. 6th Marines from Le Thiolet through Clerembaux Woods to Triangle, to Lucy.
First Bn. 6th Marines from Lucy through hill 142.
Second Bn. 5th Marines from hill 142 to N. W. corner of Bois-de-Veuilly.
First Bn. 5th Marines, in position covering La Loge, 7th Regiment, in the Bois-de-Veuilly. Fifth Regiment.
Third Bn. 6th Marines as Brig. Reserve at La Voie du Chatel.
Third Bn. 5th Marines Corps Reserve near La Loge Farm.

The 15th and 23d Companies of the 6th Machine Gun Bn. in position covering the left sector of the Brigade. The 77th and 81st Companies of the 6th Machine Gun Bn. covering the right half of the sector from the Paris Road to Triangle Farm.
The 5th Infantry on the right of the Brigade and the French 167th Division on the left.

The field trains, coming by rail, had not yet arrived and the supplies were transported by the motor trucks of the division. The serving of cooked or hot food was a difficult problem because no fires could be built near the front and because of the extreme danger of movement during daylight. The enemy air force was very active with its sausage balloons in observation and its airplanes constantly over our lines, making concealment during the daytime absolutely necessary. Accurately placed enemy artillery fire immediately followed any ex-
posure. The kitchens therefore were kept several miles back of the lines and the food carried to the front at night, giving the men one cooked or warm meal in twenty-four hours if the carrying party was fortunate enough to miss the shelling, which was not always the case. No extra ammunition had been taken with the troops, but an emergency requisition on General Headquarters was filled and one half million rounds of small arms ammunition were placed in rear of each brigade and ammunition dumps were established in Lucy and on the road between La Voie du Chatel and Champillon. The 12th Regiment of Light Artillery, coming by rail, arrived two or three days after the Marine Brigade and supported it throughout the operations following. After its arrival in the area one battalion of Engineers was assigned to duty with the French artillery, and these troops performed combat duty with front line companies in a most commendable manner.

On June 2 the enemy made two attacks on the Brigade front, both of which were repulsed, principally by the fire of the machine gun companies. In the attack near Bouresches and Triangle Farm a perfect target was presented and the machine gun companies of the right group opened a terrific and deadly fire at mid range on the enemy advancing in thick waves. (10) On the next day the enemy made a serious effort to penetrate the left of the line at Les Mares Farm House, which marks the nearest point the Germans reached to Paris on their last successful offensive. (11) This attack was held up by effective rifle and automatic rifle fire. The French McClellan, troops 'davened back and exterm the Marines to do like-wise, but the order was refused by the battalion commander in his well-known manner, "Retreat, hell, we..."
just got here". (12) It was reported that the enemy was also massing troops in the vicinity of Bouresches. Small patrols were immediately pushed to the front to locate the enemy. By Field Order No. 7, Second Division, dated June 3, the French troops were formally relieved in the sector, Brigade Headquarters moved to La Loge Farm, and the 3d Bn. 5th Regiment was restored to the Brigade.

Early on June 4 the enemy made two more violent attacks on the front held by the Second Battalion. Again these were repulsed and heavy losses inflicted on the enemy. General Pershing, who honored the Brigade with a visit the same day, expressed his entire satisfaction with the conduct of the Marine Brigade. On the night of June 5, after the units of the Brigade west of Champillon (excl) had been relieved by the 2d Division and that portion of the line south of Triangle Farm (incl) by the 23d Infantry, the following order of battle existed:

Sixth Marines; Triangle Farm (excl), to Lucy-Torcy Road (174.8-261.0) (excl).
Fifth Marines; From (174.8-261.0)(incl) to the Champillon Brook which rises near Champillon, and the village of Champillon.
Third Bn. 6th extended from Triangle Farm (excl) to Lucy-Bouresches road; 3d Bn. 5th from that point to unimproved road running southwest from Torcy; the 1st Bn. 5th joined at this point and occupied line west to road Bussieres-Champillon.
Brigade P. C. was at La Loge Farm; 5th Regt. P. C. at La Voie du Chatel and that of the 6th at Mon Blanche Farm on the Paris Road.
Second Bn. 5th was Brigade Reserve in woods N.W. of Lucy and 1st Bn. 6th was Corps Reserve located at point 170.0-229.0.
Companies of the Machine Gun Bn. were distributed along the line. (13)

The Brigade Commander estimated the situation to his front as follows: Reports confirmed the accumulation of troops and supplies in the vicinity of Bouresches. -eleven-
and Belleau Woods. Belleau Woods had been seized by
the enemy and was a position of great tactical value
from which he could operate in a southerly or westerly
direction. In front of the Brigade lay the Woods,
which extends about two thousand yards north and south
and is about one thousand yards in width. A view of
the map does not reveal the real importance of this
position. For the Germans, its occupation was essen-
tial, since it afforded not only cover to the Chateau-
Thierry-Soissons Road, but also for the concealment of
the assembly of troops on a direct route to the Paris
Road and a pivot of maneuver for a movement southward
through Gandelu, which appeared to be a most serious
threat to the Allies. The Germans had promptly appreci-
ciated the value of this tactical locality, immediately
occupied it with a regiment of infantry and numerous
machine guns and additional accompanying weapons, and
organized it with characteristic method and rapidity.
A more ideal situation for machine guns on commanding
ground could not be found. The dense woods covering
the high rocky ground rising abruptly from the surround-
ing fields under the protection of their artillery in
concealed positions to the north presented an ever
present menace to our line and an attack which could
easily be launched from that position would, if success-
ful, force us off the Paris Road, our main line of
supply, and compel us to fight with our backs to the
Marne. (14) The Brigade Commander realized this and
immediately made plans to take this strong position from
the enemy and gave orders accordingly. This estimation
of the situation and plan were concurred in by the

-twelve-
Divisional Commander and General Degoutte, the French Corps Commander. (15) The French, realizing the importance of Bois de Belleau, Bouresches, and Hill 142, issued orders to advance the lines whenever opportunity offered. While General Harbord considered the capture of these positions absolutely necessary, the original orders came from the Headquarters Sixth French Army.

In preparation of this offensive Brigade Order No. 1 was issued at 10:25 P. M. on June 5, ordering an attack by the First Battalion, Fifth Regiment, supported by the 8th and 23d Machine Gun Companies, in conjunction with the French 167th Regiment on the left. The attack was between the brook of Champillon, inclusive, hill 142 and the brook one kilometer east which flows from Hill 142. The 3rd Bn. on the right was directed to advance its left to conform with the progress of the First Bn. The Field Order No. 1, Fourth Brigade, ordering the attack, is quoted below:

Headquarters, 4th Brigade, Marine Corps, Am. E. F.
5 June 18, 10:25 P.M.

FIELD ORDER NO. 1

MAP: MEAUX 49
1:50,000

1. The enemy holds the general line Bouresches-Bois de-Belleau-Toroy-Bussières-Gandelu-Chezy-en-Orxois. The French 167 D.I. is on the left of this Brigade and attacks June 6th in the direction of the Bussières Wood.

2. This Brigade will attack on the right of the French 167 D.I. Objective from the Little Square Wood 400 meters S.E. of the Calvaire to the brook crossing 174.8-263.4.

3. (a) The attack between the brook of Champillon, inclusive, Hill 142, and the brook which flows from 1 kilometer N.E. of Champillon, inclusive, will be made by the 1st Bn. 5th Marines, supported by the 8th and 23rd Co. Machine Gun.

(b) The 3rd Bn. 5th Marines, will advance its left along the brook which rises 1 kilometer N.E. of Champillon to conform to the progress made by the 1st Bn. in its attack.
(x) The artillery preparation will be made in accordance with orders from the 2nd Brigade, F.A.
(y) The advance will be timed with the attack of the French 167th D.I.
(z) Aviation will be as ordered by the C.G. 167th Division.

4. The objective when attained will be at once organized to be held against counter-attack.

J. G. HARBOURD
Brigadier General, N.A.

Orders for the attack did not reach Battalion Headquarters until midnight. The objective was the forward slope of hill 142, the prominent high ground to the north covered with alternating wheat fields and woods and providing command of the enemy positions on the hills beyond. The two companies of the 1st Bn. which were to be relieved in their sector on the left by units of the French 167th Division at nine P.M. were not relieved until 3:00 to support the attack had not been relieved in time and the attack was made with the only two infantry companies available in the battalion and without the machine gun support as ordered. The assaulting companies advanced only a short distance when they came under a machine gun barrage which did not subside until noon. (16) By seven o'clock the objectives of the 1st and 3d Bns. were reached, but the French troops on the left had not advanced, thereby leaving the left flank of the First Bn. exposed. The enemy laid down heavy artillery and machine gun fire and were attempting to counter-attack by infiltration up the ravine on the left. This situation was met by the timely arrival of the other two infantry companies and the machine gun company. One company was used to strengthen the front line companies weakened by heavy
losses and the other used to clear the ravine of the enemy and take position there protecting the left flank. Late the next day the French advanced to position by the assistance of our machine gun fire which relieved the delicate situation on the left.

Testimony
Capt. K. E. Hockey
U.S.M.C.

Inspired with confidence by the success of the attack in the early morning of June 6, Field Order No. 2, Fourth Brigade, was issued:

Headquarters, 4th Brigade,
Marine Corps, Am. E. F.
6 June 1918, 2:05 p.m.

FIELD ORDER
NO. 2

MAP: MEAUX 49
1:50,000

1. The enemy holds the general line
Bouresches-Torcy-Montecourt.

2. This Brigade attacks on the general line
Bouresches-Torcy.

3. The attack will be in two phases:

(a) Disposition of troops for the first phase. The Bois de Belleau will be taken by the 3rd Bn., 5th Marines (less 1 co.) on the left and the 3rd Bn., 6th Marines on the right. The attack, first phase, will be commanded by Colonel Catlin, 6th Marines.

(b) Sector limits, 1st phase, left battalion:
Northern: 262.8
Southern: 261.2

(c) The 2nd Bn., 6th Marines will advance its left to conform to the progress made by the battalion on its left.

(d) Disposition of troops for the second phase. The position R.R. Station Bouresches; Bouresches Village; brook crossing (173.9-264.1); Hill 126; Hill 133, will be taken by the 3rd Bn., 5th Marines, (less 1 co.) in the center, and the 1st Bn., 5th and 1 co. each of the 2nd and 3rd Bns., 5th Marines.

(e) Sector limits, 2nd phase:
3rd Bn., 6th Marines,
Northern: Hill 181; R.R. Bridge,

(fifteen-
Southern: Hill 138—southern end of Buresches village.
3rd En. 5th Marines (less 1 co.)
Northern: Hill 133 to Buresches—Torcy Road at intersection with Y line 176.
Southern: Hill 181; R.R. Bridge, (177.0-261.3) exclusive.
1st En. 5th Marines and 1 co. each of 2nd and 3rd Ens. 5th Marines:
Northern: Square Wood to brook crossing (173.9-264.1) and Hill 125.
Southern: From right at present position to Hill 133, exclusive.
(f) The attack at the center and right of the second phase will be commanded by Colonel Catlin, 6th Marines. The attack of the left of the second phase will be commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Feland, 5th Marines.
(g) The attack on the Bois de Belleau and on the village and railroad station of Buresches will be supported by the 77th (M.G.) Co. The attack on the brook crossing (173.9-269.1) 126-133, inclusive, will be supported by the machine guns now with the 1st En. 5th Marines.

(x) The artillery preparation will be made in accordance with orders from the C.G., 2d Army Corps (French).

4. The 2d En. 5th Marines (less 1 co.) will constitute the Brigade Reserve in the woods northwest of Lucy-le-Bocage.

5. The position when attained will be at once organized to be held against counter-attack.

6. Trains will remain in place.

7. Brigade and Regimental P.C.'s remain in place.

The order was received very late in the afternoon; some companies not having sufficient time to get into assault position at the designated hour, but the attack was launched shortly after five o'clock, notwithstanding. The attack was preceded by a nominal artillery preparation which was very short and altogether ineffective because of the limited supply of ammunition during the early

—sixteen—
days in June. The short time available before the jump-off prevented a properly coordinated machine gun support, and the attack was made without hand grenades and mortars.

It is seen that the attack as ordered consisted of two phases, the execution of the second depending entirely upon the complete success of the first. The first attack was delivered by the 3d Bn. and two companies of the 2d Bn. of the 6th Regt. on the right with the mission of capturing Bouresches and the southern tip of Belleau Woods, and the 3d Bn. 5th, less one company, on the left, with the mission of capturing the major portion of Belleau Woods.

While crossing the open spaces west of the woods, the units of the 3d Bn. 5th encountered annihilating machine gun fire in enfilade and suffered very severe casualties. Some elements of this battalion on the right reached the woods, continued to their objective, its eastern edge, and consolidated their position in conjunction with and on the left flank of the 3d Bn 6th which had also reached its objective. By the authority of the Brigade Commander two companies of the 2d Bn. 6th were designated to assist in the attack on the right of the 3d Bn 6th. Accordingly, at 4:45 P.M., June 6th, the 96th Company was ordered to attack the south end of the objective, regulating its advance on the 3d Bn., 6th Marines, that attacked on its left. At 5:00 P.M. from a position about 600 meters southwest of Bouresches the company attacked the town from the southward and after severe fighting in the streets with only a few men left of the company captured the town. Later in the night they were supported by another company and connected.
with the 2d Bn. on their left and proceeded to organize the position for the several counter attacks the enemy was to make in a determined effort to retake the town. It should be noted that the enemy still held the railroad station just outside of the northern limits of the village which made this position particularly sensitive always.

Colonel Catlin, the officer in charge of the first phase, was wounded about one-half hour after the attack got under way, and Major Berry, commanding the 3d Bn. 5th was wounded shortly thereafter. The casualties in officers and men were very heavy. A Doctor and three stretcher bearers and an officer who had been wounded and for whom the four were caring were all killed by one shell. It appeared that the Germans were using direct fire with their artillery from commanding ground north of Bouresches.

The positions of the line that night were as follows:

Triangle Farm, in liaison with the 23d Infantry, north to Bouresches, inclusive (R.R. station in possession of enemy), then practically a line due west from the northern edge of the town Bouresches, through the Bois de Belleau, to about hill 181, thence northwest to north edge of woods about two kilometers north of Lucy and continuing to the left, as preceding the attack. This line was held by the 2d Bn. 6th, 3d Bn. 6th, 3d Bn. 5th less one company, 2d Bn. 5th less one company, and 1st Bn. 5th plus one company each from the 2d and 3d Bns. 5th, and two machine gun companies.

The second phase of the attack never materialized owing to the limited success of the first phase, but a foot-hold in the woods had been gained and a position secured from which the future operations in the woods could be inaugurated. In consideration of the success of this attack the Commander in Chief sent the follow-
ing message to the Commanding General 2d Division:

"Please accept for the Division and convey to Brigadier General Harbord and the officers and men under him my sincere congratulations for the splendid conduct of the attack on the German lines north of Chateauneuf-Thierry. It was a magnificent example of American courage and dash. Pershing."

On the morning of the 7th the Colonel commanding the French 167th Division was requested to take a little patch of woods on our left and in his sector just south of Bussières; it contained Germans and was the point at which it was desired to connect up with the French. It will be observed that at this time all units available to the Brigade were in line, with no regimental or brigade reserve, the 1st Bn. 6th Marines still in position as Corps Reserve at point (170.0-259.0). It was evident, therefore, that the position needed to be reorganized more in depth, and on the evening of June 7 the Brigade Commander made changes accordingly. The companies of the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 5th which had been with the 1st Bn. 5th under Lieutenant Colonel Logan Feland were ordered to rejoin their respective battalions. The remnant of the 3d Bn. 5th was withdrawn to a position about one kilometer northeast of La Ferme Paris constituting the Brigade Reserve. The Engineer companies which had been with the left group were also ordered to Brigade Reserve at Maison Blanche.

At 5:20 A. M. on the 8th, the 3d Bn. 6th Marines attempted another advance northward in the woods, but it was held up after only slight progress. The enemy seemed very nervous as the result of the aggressiveness

-nineteen-
of our troops. At this time a new German gas appeared between Lucy and Bouresches. Much activity was observed in rear of the enemy lines and reinforcements were seen moving toward their front. The attitude they took toward our offensive actions and more especially the importance they placed upon their holding of the woods is indicated by an order issued by General Boehm commanding the 28th German Division, at 9:30 P.M., on June 8, which later came into our hands. In this lengthy order the German General directed in minute detail the organization of the defenses of Belleau Woods, even to the extent of indicating several possible plans we might have had for attacks on the woods and the defensive measures adopted for each. He ordered that the machine gun nests be arranged in three mutually supporting lines and that the 28th (Division) Trench-Mortar Company should be attached to the 55th Brigade, which was charged with the defense of the woods. By his detailed plan of defensive fire, including all the infantry weapons and the artillery also, a well coordinated strong defensive system was organized. The same order directed that all their officers, non-commissioned officers and men in the woods be made familiar with those plans. (18)

Some Marine replacements with less than two months' service, reporting to units of the Brigade at this time, took their places in line under heavy shell fire and, by their soldierly conduct, caused most favorable comment from commanding officers. During the 8th and 9th plans for a renewal of the attack in the woods were completed. After changes in dispositions were made as directed the
following order of battle existed:

3d Bn 5th Regt., less 20th Co., from Triangle Farm (excl.) to Bouresches (incl.)
3d Bn 6th Regt. from Bouresches through lower end of Bois de Belleau.
2d Bn 5th Regt. and 1st Bn 5th Regt. continuing the line to left.
20th Co. of 3d Bn in woods S.E. of Lucy as 6th Regt. Reserve.
2d Bn 6th Regt. in woods S.W. of Lucy in reserve.

At 6:30 P.M. on June 9, Field Order No. 3, Fourth Brigade, was issued. A copy of this order follows:

HEADQUARTERS, 4th Brigade,
Marine Corps, Am. E. F.
9 June 1918. 6:30 p.m.

FIELD ORDER
No. 3
MAP: MEAUX 49
150,000

1. The enemy holds the general line Bouresches, exclusive, Bois-de-Belleau-133-Torcy-126.
The French on our left hold the southern end of Bussieres.

2. This Brigade will attack the southern end of the Bois de Belleau June 10th.

3. The attack will be made by the 1st Bn. 6th Marines.

4. (a) Limits of Sector: Eastern: 176.5-261.0 to the Bouresches-Torcy Road, connecting with the Marines now holding Bouresches.
Western: 175.6.
Objective: X line 261.70.
(b) When the objective is attained, liaison will be established on the right with the Marines of Bouresches and on the left with the 2d Bn. 5th Marines.
(c) The 2d Bn. 6th Marines will constitute the Brigade Reserve in the woods S.W. of Lucy.
(d) The support by machine guns will be as follows: 12 guns of the 6th Machine Gun Battalion to be assigned sectors by the C.G. 6th M.G.Bn. At H Hour M.G. group at Bouresches will lay a barrage from Bouresches 400 meters east of Bois de Belleau in the direction of Chateau Belleau.
(x) The artillery preparation will be made as ordered by the C.G. 2d F.A. Brigade.
(y) The attack will begin at 4:30 a.m.
June 10, 1918.
(z) Aviation as ordered by the C.G., 21st Army Corps, French.

5. The position when attained will at once be organized to be held against counter-attack.

6. Trains will remain in place.

7. Brigade and Regimental P.O.'s remain in place.

J. G. Harbord,
Brigadier General, N.A.
At 3:30 A. M. on the 10th the 1st Bn. 6th Regt. made the attack as ordered with the result that our line was rectified across the narrow part of the wood. The artillery preparation seemed sufficient, but owing to the nature of the terrain in the woods, offering the enemy such shelter, the fire was not entirely effective. Some prisoners, considerable material, including two large seven-inch Minnenwerfers, and many rifles were captured. The 20th Company which had been acting as reserve for the 6th Regiment was moved to a position in the line north of Lucy relieving a portion of the 2d Bn 5th Regt in that section of the line.

But the woods were not yet ours, and with his characteristic determination the Brigade Commander continued his efforts in Belleau Woods. At 5:45 P. M., June 10, 1918, Field Order No. 4 of the Fourth Brigade was issued, as follows:

FIELD ORDER No. 4

MAP: MEAUX 49 1:50,000

1. The enemy holds the general line Bouresches, exclusive; Bois de Belleau; 133; Torcy; 126. The French on our left hold the southern end of the Bussiâres Triangular Wood.

2. This Brigade will attack the northern end of the Bois de Belleau June 11th.

3. The attack will be made by the 2d Bn. 5th Marines.

4. (a) Limits of Sector:
   Eastern: 175.4-261.7 to 176.3-262.3
   Western: 175.0-261.9 to 175.5-263.0
   Objective: Northeastern edge Bois de Belleau; Hill 133.

(b) When objective is attained, liaison will be established on the right with the 1st Bn. 6th Marines which will advance its left to conform to the progress of the attack.
(c) 2d Bn. 6th Marines will constitute the Brigade Reserve in the woods S.W. of Lucy.
(d) The support by machine guns will be as follows: 12 guns of the 6th Machine Gun Bn. to assigned sectors by the C.O. 6th M.G. Bn. For 30 minutes after H Hour machine gun group at Bouresches will lay a barrage from Bouresches along the Bouresches-Chateau Belleau Road.
(x) Artillery preparation will be made as ordered by the C.O. 2d F.A. Brigade.
(y) The attack will begin at 4:30 a.m. (H hour) June 11th.
(z) Aviation as ordered by the C.O. 21st Army Corps, French.

5. The position when attained will at once be organized to be held against counterattack. The left flank will be slightly refused, along the Lucy-Chateau Belleau Ravine.

6. Trains will remain in place.
7. Brigade and Regimental F.C.'s remain in place.

J. C. Harbord,
Brigadier General, N.A.

The attack caught the 40th German Division in the process of relieving the division in our front.

After an artillery preparation lasting one hour the 2d Bn. 5th Field jumped off at 4:30 A.M. By the middle of the forenoon the line had advanced to about the X line 262 and about 400 prisoners, 30 machine guns and three more Minnenwerfers were captured. This was the largest capture of prisoners by the American Expeditionary Forces to date. Simultaneously with the attack by the Marines in Belleau Woods the Germans made an unsuccessful attack, with machine guns and infantry, on Bouresches. Our own machine guns in position in Bouresches were used effectively on enemy seen withdrawing from Belleau Woods. Good liaison was established between all units of the line. Another thousand Marine replacements joined the Brigade the same day. By Brigade order, the 2d Bn. 6th proceeded to point (170.0-259.5) as Corps Reserve, relieving the 3d Bn. 6th, which
took position in the woods N.W. of Lucy.

Again the next evening after a two hour preparation by artillery which was extended to three hours because of the apparent ineffectiveness of the fire, the 2d Bn. 5th made another attack in the northern end of Belleau Woods pushing the line only slightly farther northward, capturing 42 prisoners, more machine guns and Minenwerfers, making a total of fifty-nine machine guns and ten Minenwerfers taken in the Bois de Belleau to date.

From several sources it was ascertained that an enemy attack was planned on the northern end of the woods from the northwest on the next morning, the 13th. To meet this move the 2d Bn. 6th under authority of the Division Commander was moved up two companies in the southeast of Lucy in support of the lines in those positions. An attack on the woods from the northwest was made at 1:30 A. M., but this was repulsed by our troops. At about 3:20 A. M., the enemy laid down a terrific bombardment and barrage on Bouresches-Belleau Wood line lasting for twenty-five minutes, which was followed by another attempt to retake Bouresches. Some of the Germans succeeded in entering portions of the town but they were quickly driven back, the Marines not giving a foot of ground. On the night of June 13-14 the front of the Brigade was reduced by order of the Division, that part of the line from Bouresches (incl.) to the right to be taken over by the 23d Infantry.

Field Order No. 5, Fourth Brigade, follows:

-twenty-four-
Gobert valley with Yperite gas and high explosive, causing many casualties in the 1st and 2d Bns. 6th Marines and necessitating a change in relief of the 2d Bn. 5th Regt. by the 2d Bn. 6th. In order to get the men out of the gassed area all troops except one company were withdrawn from the southeastern edge of Belleau Woods and placed on the open ground west of that place. At the same time the 23d Infantry was requested to have its troops in Bour-esches observe that portion of the line closely and give us machine gun support in case enemy appeared in that sector.

On June 14 Lieutenant Colonel Feland received oral orders from the Brigade Commander to assume command of all troops in Belleau Woods for the purpose of reorganizing the lines there and making them more tenable. The troops in the woods at this time consisted of the 2d Bn. 5th Regt., 1st and 2d Bns. 6th Regt., and one and one half companies of the 1st Bn 5th Regt. The plan of operations provided for holding our lines and at the same time exerting a steady pressure on the enemy, finally forcing him out of the woods, with the support of interdiction artillery fire on all the approaches which he was using in entering the woods.

Although the report of the Brigade Commander, on June 10, strongly urged the relief of the Brigade after ten days of almost constant fighting, on June 14 he wrote to the Divisional Commander, "I am very glad to report that notwithstanding their physical exhaustion, which is almost total, the spirit of the Brigade remains
FIELD ORDER
No. 5
MAP: MEAUX 49
1:50,000

1. The enemy holds the general line Bouresches, exclusive, Chateau Belleau-Torcry.

2. The front held by this Brigade will be re-divided effective at midnight June 13, 1918. The 3rd Brigade under Division Orders takes over the sector Triangle Farm-Bouresches inclusive, effective the night of June 13th-14th.

The Brigade sector on the conclusion of the transfer of the Triangle-Farm-Bouresches line will be from Bouresches, exclusive, along east front of Bois de Belleau, and northwest to the Champillon brook inclusive.

3. (a) The sector Bouresches, exclusive, Bois de Belleau to 175.9-262.9 will be known as the 5th Marines sector, under command of the Commanding Officer, 5th Marines. The sector 175.9-262.9 to Champillon brook, inclusive will be known as the 6th Marines sector, under command of the Commanding Officer, 6th Marines.

(b) To carry out the foregoing arrangement of sectors, the following movement of battalions will take place as soon as darkness permits, tonight, June 13th.

2d Bn. 6th Marines to relieve 2d Bn. 5th Marines in Bois de Belleau.
2d Bn. 5th Marines to woods 170.0-259.9 as Division Reserve.
3d Bn. 5th Marines to woods northwest of Lucy as Brigade Reserve.

(c) Details as to guides, etc., in the Brigade Sector will be arranged by Regimental and Battalion Commanders concerned.

(d) Command in Bouresches will pass upon completion of the relief and statement in writing of the relieving officer to the officer relieved that he is satisfied with the dispositions made. Telephone report to be made to Brigade Headquarters upon completion of relief. Code word: "Appomattox".

(e) Machine guns in Bouresches pertaining to this Brigade will remain in Bouresches until after dark night of June 14-15, 1918, and will then be assigned station by the C.O. 6th Machine Gun Battalion.

J. G. Harbord,
Brigadier General, N.A.

During the night of June 13-14 the enemy shelled the southern end of Belleau Woods, Bouresches, and the...
unshaken." The only reserve, either Brigade or Division, at this time was the Third Battalion Fifth Marines in the woods northwest of Lucy. (19)

The 7th Infantry, a part of the 3d Division, was behind the lines as Army Reserve, and application was made to General Degoutte, who had been promoted to the command of the 6th French Army, for the use of this regiment for six days. This request was granted, and the 7th Infantry took the place of two battalions of Marines, with one of their battalions south of Torcy. (20) Under instructions from the 21st French Corps Commander a slight change in the left of the Brigade sector was directed. The following Field Order of the Brigade was accordingly issued:

**FIELD ORDER**

No. 6

*Headquarters, 4th Brigade,
 Marine Corps, Am. E. F.
 15 June 1918, 7:33 P.M.*

1. **The enemy holds the general line Bour esches, exclusive, Chateau Belleau-Torcy.**

2. The front held by this Brigade is provisionally modified by orders from the Commanding General 21st (French) Army Corps. The 167th (French) Division has been ordered to temporarily occupy the ridge running north from Hill 142. The small valley between this ridge and the ridge east of it will be exclusive to this Brigade. The 7th U. S. Infantry has been provisionally added to the 4th Brigade.

3. **(a) The relief of the 3d Bn. 6th Marines north of 142 by the 167th (French) Division will take place the night of June 15-16. The 3d Bn. 6th Marines relieved will take station in the wood about 170.0-259.5 as Division Reserve.**

   **(b) The 1st Bn. 7th Infantry will relieve the 2d Bn. 5th Marines and 2d Bn. 6th Marines as soon as possible after dark tonight. The 2d Bn. 6th Marines, when relieved, will take station in the Bois Gros Jean, north of the Paris Metz Road. The 2d Bn. 5th Marines will take station in the vicinity of Mery.**
(c) Orders will be given later for the disposition of the 2d Bn. and 3d Bn. 7th Infantry.

(x) The Marine battalions which go to the station vacated by the arriving 7th Inf. battalions will exchange with them temporarily their transportation, rolling kitchens, ration and water carts, etc. Details of this temporary exchange will be arranged by Battalion Commanders.

(y) Command passes when relief is completed.

(z) Artillery plans remain as ordered.

4. Trains remain in place.

5. Brigade and Regimental F.C.'s remain in place.

J. G. Harbord, Brigade General, N.A.

During the period the 7th Infantry occupied part of the sector no changes of any importance were made in the positions held.

Company B of the 4th Divisional M.G. Bn. relieved the 2d Company of the 6th M.G. Bn. (Brigade) for a few days beginning on the 19th. At noon June 21 the following Field Order was issued:

FIELD ORDER
No. 7:

1. The relief of the 7th Infantry from this Brigade will be made June 21-22-23, 1918.

2. (a) The 3d Bn. 5th Marines to relieve the 1st Bn. 7th Infantry, night of June 21-22.

(b) The 3d Bn. 6th Marines to relieve the 2d Bn. 7th Infantry, night of June 22-23.

(c) The 2d Bn. 5th Marines to relieve the 3d Bn. 7th Inf., night of June 23-24.

(d) Each Bn. 7th Inf., when relieved will march to former station at or near MERY.

(x) Reliefs will take place as soon as practicable after dark on nights indicated. Command passes when relief is completed.

(y) Reconnaissance by Bn. and Co. Comdrs. during day preceding entry into line.

3. Movements of 4th Brigade preliminary to relief of 7th Inf.:

(a) 3d Bn. 6th Marines to wood n.w. of BOIS-BOIS-BOIS as Brigade Reserve, night of June 21-22.

(b) 2d Bn. 5th Marines to BOIS GROS JEAN as Division Reserve night of June 21-22; to
arrive in time to be of any assistance. As our troops approached or overran the enemy position, the latter withdrew to alternate machine gun positions, in each case having another gun covering such movement. One of our machine gun officers estimated that there were sixteen machine guns in the front of a single company. As the formation of the ground, especially in the northern end of the woods, lends itself so excellently to machine gun defense these positions were most difficult to reduce. The brush and trees were so thick that movement could be made only with great difficulty; men could pass within a few feet of each other unnoticed, and it was almost impossible to exercise control even over the smallest units or to maintain formation and contact. Without the active support of all available fire power and depending entirely upon surprise and the shock action of infantry troops, obviously the attack did not succeed, and no material progress was made.

After a conference of the Division Commander, the Artillery Commander, the Regimental and Battalion Commanders another attack by the 3d Bn. 5th was ordered on June 25, in accordance with the following memorandum issued to all members of the command:

"The 3d Bn 5th Marines will be withdrawn from its present position to the X line 262 before three o'clock tomorrow morning, June 25th. The artillery will be free to fire from that hour anywhere north of the line 262 as far east as the railroad and as far west as the road with the double row of trees which runs just west of the Bois de Belleau. It is desired that the fire be intense enough from 3 o'clock on to prevent the entrance of any Germans and that for a period of about an hour before 5 P.M. June 25th it be made of maximum intensity. It will
wood n.w. of LUCY-le-BOCAGE as Brigade Reserve, night of June 22-23.
(d) 1st Bn., 6th Marines to BOIS GROS JEAN as Division Reserve, night of June 23-24.
(e) 1st Bn., 5th Marines to BOIS GROS JEAN, night of June 23-24.

4. Medical and sanitary personnel of 7th Inf. to be relieved with the bns. to which attached. Regimental Surgeon and personnel of dressing station to be relieved on night of June 23-24.

5. The utmost care will be taken to avoid aerial observation in making the changes required in this order.

6. The sector Bouresches, exclusive, Bois de Belleau to road with double row of trees running N.E.-S.W. near 133, inclusive, will be the 5th Marine Sector under the C.O. 5th Marines. The sector from west limit of 5th Marine Sector, exclusive, to west limit of 2nd Div. Y. line 174 will be the 6th Marine Sector under the C.O. 6th Marines. This division of sectors effective on relief of the 3rd Bn. 7th Inf., night of June 23-24.

On June 22, about one thousand more replacements reported to the Brigade. Wire entanglements were constructed through the woods and along its eastern edge. Trails were cleared by support companies to front lines for rapid movement of supports to the front, but these trails were quickly filled with fallen timber from constant shelling. Persistent pressure was applied against the Germans in the woods, and according to directions of the Brigade Commander the 3d Bn. 5th Marines, with two companies in assault and two in support, made an attack at 7:00 P. M. on the 23d without artillery preparation, it being impracticable to provide such support. It was intended to use hand and rifle grenades, but the carrying parties got lost in the woods and did not

-twenty nine-
be the intention to follow the artillery preparation by an attack with the 3d Bn. at 5 P.M. on the 25th. The rate of advance of the infantry will not exceed 100 meters each three minutes. The objective of the advance is the north edge of the Bois de Belleau.

"Harbord."

By this time the Brigade sector had been reduced to a reasonable limit and extended as follows:

Brigade Sector: The line running approximately from 174.0-263.4 to 175.1-262.7 held by the Second Bn. 5th Regt. That part of the Bois de Belleau, with the exception of the northern tip upon which the attack was being made, held by the 3d Bn. 5th Regt. The line running approximately from 175.4-261.2 held by the 3d Bn. 6th Regt.

Battalions in Reserve: 2d Bn 6th (Brigade Reserve) in Woods N.W. of LUCY, 1st Bn 5th (Division Reserve) and the 1st Bn 6th in the Bois Gros Jean.

At 5:00 P.M. the two assaulting companies jumped off from the line of departure, the 47th Co. on the right and the 16th on the left, with the 20th and 45th Cos. in support. The company on the right made excellent progress and succeeded in gaining its objective by seven o'clock. The 16th Co. on the left made headway very slowly against the most stubborn resistance, and further advance was made possible only by the success of the 47th Co. on the right which was given orders to move to the left around the northern edge of the woods, thereby encircling the enemy which were holding up the 16th Co. The 20th Company was ordered to occupy the edge of the woods on the right of the 47th Company. The strength of the enemy positions lay in their reinforced machine gun organization. Prisoners captured said that they all had been told and most of them believed that Marines took no prisoners, which thought compelled them to fight desperately for their lives to the end. During the progress of the action, it is interesting to note, the 47th Company re-
ported that they had surrounded about one hundred Ger-
mans who wished to give themselves up but that the
Germans' own machine guns shot into their midst as
they tried to surrender. Private Lenhert of the 16th
Company, who got ahead of the assaulting lines, cap-
tured seventy nine prisoners, including four officers,
single-handed, by his quick wit and ingenuity and
took them back to Brigade Headquarters without assis-
tance.

The fierce struggle in the woods continued until
nearly day-break when the Battalion Commander reported,
"the Woods now U.S. Marine Corps entirely". In this
attack seven officers and three hundred and two men of
the enemy were taken as prisoners. Also, nineteen
machine guns and much other equipment and material were
captured.

After nearly a month of continuous fighting the
Marine Brigade had finally taken the Woods. The Marines
had captured over eight hundred prisoners from six of
Germany's best divisions, nearly a hundred machine guns
and trench mortars, and had inflicted severe casualties
in the enemy ranks. The long struggle had finally
resulted in complete success.

Few if any other American engagements in the World
War have been described more than the Battle of Belleau
Woods. It was a splendid test of American methods in
open warfare against those of the Germans. Our troops
proved their superiority and gained a strong tactical
position with far greater loss to the enemy than to
themselves. (21) Theoretically, the strong positions
of the Germans were impassable, and, practically, the

- thirty two -
would have been for any troops that hesitated in their attacks. It was the vigor of the attacks which prompted the German intelligence officer's report, captured later by the French, which said: "The American 2d Division may be considered a very good division, perhaps even an assault division. The various attacks of the two regiments upon Belleau Woods were executed with dash and intrepidity. The moral effect of our fire was not able seriously to check the advance of the infantry. The nerves of the Americans are not yet worn out."

The effect of the American victory in Belleau Woods on the Allied Armies and peoples was electrifying as indicated by the flood of congratulations and messages from all corners of the globe. The Brigade was cited in General Orders of the French Army and by the 6th French Army Commander under whom it had been operating. Complimentary messages were received from Marshal Foch, General Pershing, the French 3d Corps Commander, the 1st American Corps Commander, the British Royal Marines, and others. M. Clemenceau personally visited the Division immediately after this victory for the purpose of congratulating and thanking the Marine Brigade for their achievements. Another spontaneous tribute from the French was the order issued by the Army Commander officially changing the name of the Woods from "Bois de Belleau" to "Bois de la Brigade de Marine", which name appeared on all official maps issued within four days after the victory. (See "Appendix" for copies of citations, etc.)

From June 26 to July 5 there were no material changes in the line. In accordance with Field Order No. 10 of the Second Division the Fourth Brigade was

-thirty three-
relieved by the 52d Brigade of the 26th Division on
the night of July 5-6.

During all the operations herein described,
the Brigade was commanded by Brigadier General James
G. Harbord, U.S.A. The Fifth Regiment was commanded by
Colonel W. C. Neville, U.S.M.C., the Sixth Regiment by
Colonel A. W. Catlin, U.S.M.C., until he was wounded,
when Lieutenant Colonel Harry Lee, U.S.M.C., took
command, and the Sixth Machine Gun Battalion by Major
E. B. Cole, until he was mortally wounded on June 10,
after which time Captain H. E. Major, Captain C. H.
Osterhout, and Major L. W. T. Waller commanded the
battalion in turn.

But great as was the victory it was not without
its terrible toll in life and limb. None but troops
with indomitable courage, determination and
maneuver could have continued under such trying circumstances,
consistently and successfully contesting all the ad-
vantages of terrain and position initially held by the
Germans. The casualties of the Brigade in these opera-
tions were 126 officers and 5073 men. (22) Of this num-
ber, 1026 were killed. (23)

The Marines had again upheld the highest traditions
of their Corps but at this staggering cost. A quiet
cemetery immediately north of the Bois de la Brigade de
Marine, now an American shrine, marks the final resting
place of the heroes who gave their lives on this field
of honor, a perpetual reminder of the valor of these
brave men, an inspiration to Marines who are still
carrying on, and a stronger call for the fulfillment
of their Corps motto, "Semper Fidelis".

-thirty four-
ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM.

The purpose of the study of military history is to analyze operations critically with a view to determining why they are successful or unsuccessful and to draw therefrom conclusions as guides for our future conduct. It is not an easy task to find fault with an operation which has been imminently successful. It is indeed no less difficult, with all the information at hand several years after the war, to criticize the actions of a leader executed under the stress of battle; the mission he has to perform, the information in his possession at the time, and the actual situation which confronts the commander all affect his decisions. But, finally, it is success in battle, the ultimate object of all military training and operations, which con-

Until June, 1918, the American Army, an untried Ally, had been passing through a period of testing. It was because of the demonstration of the 1st Division under the French at Cantigny, and the unqualified success of the 2d Division after a far ruder test at Belleau Woods, confirming the impression that the Americans were superior troops, reliable in any situation, that Marshal Foch built his counter-offensive operations which brought the war to a close within four months. (24)

If for no other reason than for the moral effect upon her Army and people it was necessary that Germany demonstrate her supremacy over the Americans. German authorities had repeatedly asserted that the United States could never get sufficient troops to France to
The battle of Belleau Wood, as it has been often referred to, was a single engagement, and in the roughest of country, formed not only a brilliant chapter in the history of the Marine Corps, but an event of high importance to the whole Western Front. (26)

In 1918, Pershing's U.S. 2nd Division, under Major General Simonds, officially called the Marines, participated in a single engagement, the Battle of Belleau Wood, one of the most notable battles of the war. (26)

Fighting in the face of enormous odds, the soldier at the front, in answer to General Simonds' question, 'Do you think you can hold on?' replied, 'Yes, sir, we will hold on until the last man falls.' In consequence she exerted every effort to gain victory in the front of the Fourth Brigade, and was retaken important positions in turn defeated by the Marines but had counter-attacked and retaken important positions gained. In all six of her best divisions, including some guards placed in the lines to stop defeat were overwhelmed and were overwhelmingly defeated wherever they appeared on the front. (25)

In the month of June, Pershing placed upon the battle of Belleau Wood to gain victory in the front of the Fourth Brigade, indicated by his remark: 'One night in June when he was at Division Headquarters, and a message came in from Headquarters.'
"To hold your line, attack the line of the enemy - on that principle the battle of Chateau Thierry, possibly the turning point in the war, was won by American troops." (30) After taking up a defensive position and stopping the German drive one might question whether it was necessary or proper to take any aggressive action in Belleau Woods, since the mission in general was defensive. "The Offensive" is a principle of war but not necessarily a principle of tactics. However, in the situation which confronted the Commander early in this operation, it was absolutely necessary that he attack in order to deny to the enemy the woods to his front which provided such an ideal position for a concentration of troops, dangerously threatening our line of communication and troops essential which controlled the entire section of the enemy line. Therefore, his decision to attack was correct.

The disposition of the troops of the Brigade might be criticized for its failure to provide organization in depth; but it must be remembered that when the Fourth Brigade took over the sector its front extended for a distance of over six miles, all of which had to be defended against an enemy who was attacking on all parts of the line. With the assignment of so extensive a front, all of which had to be held at all costs because these troops alone stood between the enemy and Paris, and, with only four battalions available to the Brigade, it was impossible to organize the line in greater depth.

As was experienced by so many, if not all, other organizations in the A. E. F., in the earlier attacks it was found that sufficient time was not given for -thirty seven-
proper distribution of attack orders to subordinate units. A notable example of this occurred in the evening attack on June 6th when company commanders did not return to their companies with the attack order until fifteen minutes after zero hour. (31)

This necessarily caused a failure to properly disseminate vital information to subordinates and to a degree limited the cooperation and concerted effort of adjoining assault units, both of which are so essential to success in battle.

The earlier attacks were not supported by all the fire power at the disposal of the Commander; the artillery support amounted to nothing, practically, but this is explained by the fact that sufficient

Regimental Machine Gun Companies, no elements of which were attached to the infantry battalions, and also the short time before zero hour that attack orders were received, as above described, precluded the most effective plan of fire support by this important weapon. In the earlier attacks battalion commanders repeatedly called for the support of howitzer weapons which had not been ordered attached to or in support of assault battalions and were too far in the rear to render timely assistance. During the progress of the operations this faulty practice was corrected. Greatest dependence was placed upon shock action instead of upon a combination of overwhelming fire power and shock action.

Besides being too hastily organized, the attack
on the evening of June 6 might have been much less complicated. Consisting in reality of two attacks, the second depending entirely upon the success of the first, the plan was not simple. It appears also that the principle of "Economy of Force" was violated in the disposition of troops for this attack. The main objective and surely the decisive point in this attack as planned was Belleau Woods, and to this task was assigned one infantry battalion less one company, that is, three infantry companies. This three-company organization was given a front of about 1800 yards in attacking the strongest sector in the enemy's defense. Meanwhile, the First Battalion, to which had been attached two additional infantry companies and two machine gun companies, remained in the vicinity of hill 142 to take part in the second phase which never materialized because of the physical impossibility of the three companies mentioned above to succeed in their phase of the attack. The enemy strength in the woods may have been underestimated, but there was nevertheless a failure to concentrate superior numbers at the critical point of the attack as ordered.

The attack on the night of June 23d without artillery support of any kind depended almost entirely upon the element of surprise for its success and failed as a result. It proved that success in battle depends upon the proper employment and combination of all the means available to a commander. On the other hand in the attack on June 25, notwithstanding the intense artillery preparation, the assaulting troops found the enemy in force manning their battle positions. It is

-thirty nine-
true that the terrain lent itself ideally to the pro-
tection of the Germans during the artillery bombard-
ment, but the fact was proven that fire power alone
will not overcome an enemy.

These may be considered the faulty criticisms,
but the operations abound with illustrations of
masterly technique and the proper application of
tactical principles. These operations are a splen-
did example of a case in which a commander decides
upon a logical plan of action and "sticks to it"
with unflinching determination until its accomplish-
ment.

In his final report, General Pershing, after care-
ful and deliberate study of all these facts, and with the
assistance of a highly trained staff, stated: "The Second
Division # # # early on the morning of June 1, was de-
ployed across the Chateau Thierry-Paris Road near Mont-
reuil-aux-Lions in a gap in the French line, where it
stopped the German advance on Paris. # # # In the very
severe fighting in Belleau Woods and Bouresches the bri-
gade met with the most desperate resistance by Germany's
best troops." (33)

To accomplish the task before the Brigade re-
quired troops who were well led and of the highest
morale and training. The courage and spirit of the
Marines who charged the machine guns in Belleau Woods
through annihilating fire has never been surpassed
in the annals of war. No military organization in the
world, it is believed, enjoys a greater Esprit de
Corps, and notwithstanding the overwhelming difficulties
which had to be overcome, it was the morale of these
troops which carried them forward. This impresses one
as being the outstanding feature of these operations.
Without discounting the value of the material aids in combat, the maxim, "the moral is to the physical as three is to one", is strikingly exemplified in the conduct of our troops in this engagement.

The Second Division, in its training and methods, was distinctly an American Division, with American characteristics and spirit. It was organized overseas, under the command of a Marine officer, General Charles A. Doyen, and during the many operations after Soissons and until demobilization it was under the command of General John A. Lejeune, U.S.M.C. It comprised forces of the three branches of the service—Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. Brigadier General James G. Harbord, an Army officer, commanded the Fourth Brigade, Marines, during the Battle of Belleau Woods. Attached to and serving with the Brigade were many Army and Navy officers and men. Detachments of the signal corps serving with the several battalions throughout the engagement displayed the highest degree of courage and endurance. Companies of engineers were attached to the regiments at various times during the combat and deserve great praise for the fighting efficiency and bravery of their men. The medical personnel of the Brigade was of the Navy. The success of the operation is a monument to the teamwork demonstrated by the officers and men of the three branches of the service constituting the Brigade, and the Marine Brigade itself as part of an Army Division. No better example of cooperation can be found in the history of the war than that displayed in this organization.

-forty one-
LESSONS AND CONCLUSIONS.

The history of every war teaches us that ultimate success is not bound to any certain form of tactics or strategy, that the greatest victories are gained by the commander with capacity to design those lessons of past experience which apply in a given situation and to perceive those lessons which must be modified to meet new conditions and those principles of combat which must be discarded altogether. However, each war and each individual engagement is more or less characterized by its own manner in the application of certain military principles. The Battle of Belleau Woods is the first operation of considerable magnitude in the war in which American tactics of the Sixteenth Offensive served as an example of persistent offensive spirit and determination to conquer.

The unusual sight of the retreating French Army during our entry into this sector made a deep impression on attentive observers. As the basis of our training is the attack, naturally this other possible phase of combat is not stressed, but it is well for officers to give it thoughtful consideration. A successful retreat or withdrawal when forced by hard pressing superior forces requires the highest skill in command.

The telling effect of the superior marksmanship of the Marines displayed in every encounter with the enemy indicates the importance of this phase of our training.

Operations in open warfare and especially those
in heavy woods where constant communication between
and control over groups, or even individuals, is im-
possible, places such individuals in many instances
absolutely upon their own initiative. The value of
this military quality of initiative was exhibited to
a marked degree in the close fighting in Belleau
Woods.

"Infantry fighting power rests upon the basis
of morale. Superior morale furnishes the impulse
that carries the infantry forward in attack and the
staying power that holds it to positions in defense."

(34) It was morale which had an overwhelming influence
in the success of the operation.

The U. S. Marine Corps is an integral part of the
Navy with certain recognized missions to perform in
peace and war. Because of the situation in which we found ourselves upon entering the war,
the President of the United States ordered certain units
of the Marine Corps detached from the Navy for duty with
the Army. Such employment of this highly trained and
experienced force was, in its broadest sense, the proper
application of the principle of war, "Economy of Force".
This course has not been uncommon in our history, and,
as in the past, we may expect to see it repeated in any
future war. An Army General commanded the Marine Brigade
in the Battle of Belleau Wood; the World War also saw
Marine officers commanding Army Divisions, and, in fact,
officers of each corps or branch of the service command-
ing elements of others. This experience promoted a better
understanding of the characteristics of all branches, their
powers and limitations, their relationship to one another

-forty three-
and to the whole, and encouraged a greater mutual sympathy and appreciation among the several branches of the service. Each Corps or separate branch of the service has its own particular mission and responsibilities in the fundamental plan of national defense. Although each branch must have its special form of training peculiar to its own requirements, there must be agreement in those doctrines which are essential to the success of a combined force, all under the principle of war, "Simplicity".
## CHART ONE
### ORGANIZATION

### THE FOURTH BRIGADE OF MARINES.

The Fourth Brigade of United States Marines was composed of the Fifth and Sixth Regiments of Marines, and the Sixth Machine Gun Battalion of Marines as follows:

#### Fifth Regiment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Battalion</th>
<th>Second Battalion</th>
<th>Third Battalion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17th (A) Company</td>
<td>18th (E) Company</td>
<td>15th (I) Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46th (B) Company</td>
<td>43rd (F) Company</td>
<td>20th (K) Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66th (C) Company</td>
<td>51st (G) Company</td>
<td>45th (L) Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67th (D) Company</td>
<td>55th (H) Company</td>
<td>47th (M) Company</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 8th Machine Gun Company,
- Supply Company,
- Headquarters Company.

#### Sixth Regiment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Battalion</th>
<th>Second Battalion</th>
<th>Third Battalion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>74th (A) Company</td>
<td>78th (E) Company</td>
<td>82nd (I) Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75th (B) Company</td>
<td>79th (F) Company</td>
<td>83rd (K) Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76th (C) Company</td>
<td>80th (G) Company</td>
<td>84th (L) Company</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 23rd Machine Gun Company,
- Supply Company,
- Headquarters Company.

#### Sixth Machine Gun Battalion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15th (A) Company</th>
<th>77th (C) Company</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23rd (B) Company</td>
<td>61st (D) Company</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

"fifty five"
THE BATTLE
OF
BELLEAU WOODS:
JUNE, 1918

1000 METERS
APPENDIX.

CITATIONS AND COMMENDATIONS.

The order changing the name of Bois de Belleau reads as follows:

VI ARMEÉ, ETAT-MAJOR,
au Q.G.A., le 30 JUIN, 1918.
6938/2.)

ORDER. (Translation)

In view of the brilliant conduct of the 4th Brigade of the 2nd U.S. Division, which in a spirited fight took CURECHES and the important strong point of BOIS DE BELLEAU stubbornly defended by a large enemy force, the General Commanding the 4th Army orders that henceforth, in all official papers, the BOIS DE BELLEAU shall be named "BOIS DE LA BRIGADE DE MARINE".

Division General DeGOUTTE
Commanding 4th Army
(Signed) DEGOUTTE.

---------------------

The second recognition by the French of the Marines’ work in the Chateau-Thierry sector were the General-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces in France, by the Commanding General in Chief of the French Armies of the North-and North-West, in Army Orders.

ORDER. (Translation)

The Fourth Brigade, American, under the Command of Brigadier General C. Harbord, consisting of the 5th Regiment Marines, Commanded by Col. Wendell C. Neville, 6th Regiment Marines, Commanded by Col. Albertus W. Catlin, 6th Machine Gun Battalion, Commanded by Major Edward E. Cole:

Was thrown in battle on a front violently attacked by the enemy. Immediately from the start proved itself an excellent organization. From the beginning when it entered the line, and in liaison with French Troops, broke a violent enemy attack on an important point of the position, and on its own initiative undertook a series of offensive operations. In the course of these operations, owing to the brilliant courage, vigor initiative and tenacity of these men, who did not let themselves be stopped by fatigue nor by their losses, owing to the activity and energy of its officers and at last to the personal action of its chief, General James G. Harbord, the 4th Brigade has seen its efforts crowned with success. In close liaison with each other, its two Regiments and its Machine Gun Battalion realized after twelve days of continuous fighting from the -forty seven-
2nd to the 13th of June 1918 over a very difficult area, a progress varying from 1500 to 2000 Metres on a four kilometre front capturing over 500 prisoners, inflicting on the enemy considerable losses by taking from him two points of support of first importance, the village of BOURESCHES, and the fortified "BOIS de BELLEAU."

C.H.Q. the 22 of October 1918.
The Commander in Chief.
Signed: PETAIN.

French civilian sentiment expressed itself in the following letter from the Mayor of Meaux and Resolution from the assembled mayors of the Meaux District(Arrondissement). This letter and the resolutions were published on July 10, 1918, in General Orders No.43, of the Second Division "as indicating the appreciation of the efforts of the Second Division by the French inhabitants for our share in stemming the recent German advance in this sector."

Meaux, June 26, 1918.

General: On behalf of all the Mayors of the Meaux District (Arrondissement), assembled yesterday in congress at the city hall, I have the honor to send you herewith a copy of the resolution they have taken in order to pay homage to the Second Division and its troops under your command and to the French government for the part they have rendered us.

The civilian population of this part of the country will never forget that the beginning of this month of June, when their homes were threatened by the invader, the Second Division victoriously stepped forth and succeeded in saving them from impending danger.

I am personally happy to be able to convey to you this modest token of their thankfulness and I am, General, Yours, respectfully,

(Signed) J. Lugol.

Mayor of Meaux, Depute de Seine et Marne.

Voted in a Congress of the Mayors of Meaux District on the 25th of June, 1918.

The mayors of the Meaux district, who were eye-witnesses to the generous and efficacious deeds of the American Army in stopping the enemy advance, send to this Army the heartfelt expression of their admiration and gratitude.

(Signed) J. Lugol.

President of the Committee.

Meaux, June 25, 1918.

---

COMMENDATION OF CORPS COMMANDER.

General Orders No. 37, June 17, 1918, of the Second Division reads as follows:

1. The Commanding General takes great pleasure and is much gratified to publish to the command the following extract from a letter from the Corps Commander, commanding the accomplishments of the division during the recent operations:

"The movements and operations of the 2d Division from May 31st to date have been followed by the Corps Commander with great pride and satisfaction. During this
period the Division has not only accomplished 'a
successful march', including forced and night marches
under extremely difficult conditions, but has repelled
concentrated attacks delivered by a highly trained
every and has counter-attacked with signal and un-
tried success. Only trained and well-led troops of
high morale could accomplish so much in so short a
period of time with relatively small losses.
"Please convey to the soldiers and officers of
your command my keeneest appreciation and heartiest
congratulations."

COMMENDATIONS OF GENERAL PERSHING.

A copy of the following telegram from General Persh-
ing, addressed to the Commanding General, Second Divi-
sion, referring to the attacks on June 6th, was received
at Brigade Headquarters on June 9th:

"Please accept for the Division and convey to Briga-
dier General Harbord and the officers and men under him
my sincere congratulations for the splendid conduct of
the attack on the German lines north of Chateau-Thierry.
It was a magnificent example of American courage and
dash. Pershing."

The Commanding General, Second Division,
referring the above telegram, added the following endorsement:

"The Division Commander takes this occasion to renew
his expression of gratification over the fine conduct
of all units of the Division during the past week."

General Order No. 13, Fourth Brigade of Marines, June
30, 1918, reads as follows:

"The Brigade Commander takes the keenest pride and
pleasure in publishing to the command the correspondence
which appears below. In addition the American and French
Corps Commanders, and the Commanding General, 2d Division
(Regular) have personally called and expressed their
pride and satisfaction in not only the events referred to
in this correspondence, but in the achievements of the 4th
Brigade, U.S. Marines, A.E.F., throughout this month of
practically continuous fighting. The Brigade has been
fortunate in rendering this service at a fateful moment
of the war. It is believed that the history of the U.S.
Marine Corps will write the 'Bois de Belleau', 'Bour-
esthes' and 'Hill 142' on the tablets which already carry
Tripoli, Mexico, China and other names immortalized in
our traditions.

"By command of Brigadier General Harbord.
"H. LAY,
"Major, Adjutant."

HEADQUARTER FIRST ARMY CORPS.

From: Chief of Staff, 1st Army Corps.
To: Commanding General, 2d Division, American E. F.
Subject: Recent operations.

June 29, 1918.

-forty nine-
1. The following communication has just been received from the Commander-in-Chief:

"Commanding General First Army Corps, A.E.F., Le Ferte. Please congratulate in my name those officers and men who took part in the action in the Chateau-Thierry region on the afternoon of June twenty-fifth when two hundred forty prisoners and nineteen machine guns were captured from the enemy.

"Pershing, "General".

2. The Corps Commander will extend these congratula-
sations in person this date.

3. The Corps Commander desires that in addition to his personal action, the foregoing congratulations of the Commander-in-Chief be extended by you with a view to insuring that the interests and satisfaction of higher authority may reach all concerned.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

1st Ind.
Hqrs. 2nd Division, A.E.F., 29th June, '18-To C.G.,
4th Brigade.

The Division Commander takes great pride in transmit-
ting the above and in again expressing his thanks and congratulations to the officers and men engaged in the
first offensive at the Chateau-de-Balleau, operation with gallantry and alacrity of which he feels a great pride.
A telegram, from the Commander-in-Chief, reach all officers and men who took part in this brilliant action.

PRESTON BROWN,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

CONGRATULATIONS OF GENERAL PERSHING AND GENERAL FOCH.

Brigadier General Harbord issued the following order
to the Fourth Brigade on June 9, 1918:

The Brigade Commander takes pride in announcing that
to the Commander-in-Chief's telegram of congratulation
to the 4th Brigade published in an endorsement from the
Division Commander dated June 9th, General Pershing has
today visited Division Headquarters and sent his personal
greetings and congratulations to the Marine Brigade. He
also added that General Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the
Allied Armies in France, especially charged him this
morning to give the Marine Brigade his love and con-
gratulations on their fine work of the past week.

COMPLIMENTS OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH DIVISION.

The following communication was received June 12,
1918, by the Fourth Brigade from the Second Division:

To: Commanding General, Fourth Brigade.

The Division Commander takes pleasure in sending you a copy of the following letter received today:

-fifty-
succeeded in opening for their advance upon Paris—

had already turned the tide of battle back toward the
Frontiers of France and begun the rout that was to
save Europe and the World. Thereafter the Germans
were to be always forced back, back; were never to
thrust successfully forward again. # # #

PREMIER CLEMENCEAU COMMENTS

During the latter part of June, 1918, Premier
Clemenceau visited Second Division Headquarters for
the purpose of congratulating and thanking the Marine
Brigade for their achievements. The newspapers of
this period contained full accounts of this visit. In
an indorsement to the First Army Corps, American Ex-
peditionary Forces, Major General Bundy, on June 29,
1918, stated as follows:

"M. Clemenceau was informed of the gallant and
successful work of the Fourth Brigade and was invited
to visit the Brigade Commander which the shortness of
his stay prevented. # # # It is desired that it be
brought to the attention of M. Clemenceau that the
Division Commander and all others who have knowledge
of the subject are unstinted in their words of praise
of the gallant conduct of the Fourth Brigade in the
Bois de Belleau and elsewhere on this front during the
weeks prior to and following the battle."

COMPLIMENTS OF FRENCH THIRD ARMY CORPS.

General Order No. 12, Fourth Brigade, June 26, 1918,
reads as follows:

The Brigade Commander takes the keenest pride in pub-
lishing to the Brigade the following messages from the
Commanding Generals 3rd Army Corps (French) and the 2nd
Division, A.E.F. (regular), regarding the engagement at
the north end of Bois de Belleau on the night of
June 25-26, 1918.

"11,25 p.m.—June 25, 1918.

"From the Staff, 3rd Army Corps (French), to the Staff,
2nd Division, U.S.

"The Commanding General, 3rd Army Corps, sends to the
Commanding General, 2nd Division, U.S., his compliments
for the very fine success won by the Commanding General
4th Brigade. He begs him to transmit them to the infantry
troops and artillerymen who cooperated in this splendid
success.

"To the C. G., 4th Brigade, with the compliments of the
Division Commander."

The organizations participating in the artillery pre-
paration were the 12th and 17th U.S. Field Artillery and
the French Groupement Couvy. The unit that made the
attack was the 3rd Battalion, 5th Regiment, U.S. Marines.

THE COMMENDATION OF THE DIVISION COMMANDER.

General Orders No. 41, Second Division, July 10, 1918,
reads as follows:

1. After more than a month of continuous fighting, the
Headquarters, 26th Division,  
Am. E. F., 10 June 1918.

Major General Omar Bundy,  
Second Division,  
American Expeditionary Forces.

Dear Bige:  
Accept the congratulations of the 26th Division  
as well as those of its commander for the fine work  
of the Second Division. We are all proud of you.  
Our compliments to your brigade commanders and  
colonels.

Faithfully yours,  
C. R. Edwards.

---------------------------------------------

HEARTY CONGRATULATION OF THE BRITISH MARINES.

General Order No. 14, Fourth Brigade, July 5, 1918,  
reads as follows:

The following telegram and reply thereto are pub- 
lished for the information of the Brigade:  

Received at: London Jul 4 18  
Brigadier General Hdqrs Marine Brigade  
La Ferte Sous Jouarre;  

On behalf of the Royal Marines I send you and all ranks  
of the United States Marine Corps our heartfelt con- 
gratulations. In the hope that the years yet to come  
shall bring us still closer together.

David Meyer, Major General, Adjutant General  
Royal Marines, London. 8:11 p.m.

---------------------------------------------

Headquarters, Fourth Brigade,  
Marines, Am. E. F.  
5th July 1918.

My dear General Myer:  
I acknowledge the receipt of your congratulatory tele- 
gram of July 4th, and thank you on behalf of the 4th  
Brigade, U. S. Marines, for your good wishes. The wish  
of the Royal Marines for closer relations between our two  
Corps finds an echo in our hearts. It has given me great  
pleasure to publish your telegram to my Brigade, and to  
forward a copy to our Major General Commandant in America,  
who speaking in behalf of the whole U. S. Marine Corps,  
will no doubt concur in our thanks and good wishes to you  
and the Royal Marines.

Sincerely yours,  
J. G. HARBORD,  
Brigadier-General, N.A.,  
Commanding.

---------------------------------------------

COMMENTS OF PRESIDENT WILSON.

President Wilson, in presenting the Peace Treaty and  
the League of Nations to the Senate, spoke, on July 10,  
1919, in part as follows:

That first never-to-be-forgotten action at Chateau-  
Thierry had already taken place. Our redoubtable Soldiers  
and Marines had already closed the gap the enemy had

--fifty one--
division has been withdrawn from the first lines. It is with inexpressible pride and satisfaction that your commander recounts your glorious deeds on the field of battle.

2. In the early days of June, on a front of twenty kilometres, after night marches, and with only the reserve rations which you carried, you stood like a wall against the enemy advance on Paris. For this timely action you have received the thanks of the French people whose homes you saved, and the generous praise of your comrades in arms.

3. Since the organization of our sector, in the face of strong opposition, you have advanced your lines two kilometres on a front of eight kilometres. You have engaged and defeated with great loss three German divisions, and have occupied the important strong points of the Belleau Woods, Bourseaux, and Vaux. You have taken about fourteen hundred prisoners, many machine guns, and much other material. The complete success of the infantry was made possible by the splendid cooperation of the artillery, by the aid and assistance of the engineer and signal troops, by the diligent, watchful care of the medical and supply services, and by the unceasing work of a well-trained staff. All elements of the division have worked together in perfect harmony as a great machine. Amid the dangers and trials of battle, every officer and every man has done his part. Let the stirring deeds of the past month remain forever a bright spot in our history. Let the sacred memory of our fallen comrades spur us on to renewed efforts to add to the glory of American arms.

TRANSLATION OF A GERMAN DOCUMENT—EXTRACTS FROM AN INTERROGATORY BY THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER OF GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE 7TH ARMY OF AMERICAN PRISONERS CAPTURED IN THE SECTOR BOURSESCHES, FROM 6TH TO 14TH, JUNE, 1918.

COMBATIVELY VALUED:
The 2nd American Division must be considered a very good division; even an attack division. The different attacks of the two regiments on the BOIS DE BELLEAU were executed with courage and dash. The moral effect of our fire could not seriously stop the advance of the infantry; the morale of the Americans has not yet been sufficiently tried.

The personnel of the troops must be regarded as remarkable. They are very healthy men, physically well built, from 18 to 28 years of age, who at the present time lack only proper training to make them very serious adversaries. The esprit of the troops is fresh and naive.

The statement of one prisoner is characteristic: "We kill or we are killed." # # # # #

MORALS:
In general the prisoners make a good impression; they have a wide-awake air.

For the moment they still consider the war from the point of view of the Big Brother who is shining in the eyes of his present brother and sisters and who is received everywhere in a friendly manner. Their feelings, however, have a certain moral basis; the majority of prisoners, explaining this with an understandable simplicity, declared that they came to Europe to defend their country.# # #

-fifty three-