THE INFANTRY SCHOOL
FOURTH SECTION
COMMITTEE "H"
FORT BENNING, GEORGIA

ADVANCED COURSE
1926-1927

3d BATTALION 140th INFANTRY, 35th DIVISION
IN THE MEUSE-ARGONNE,
SEPTEMBER 26 - OCTOBER 3, 1918.
(Personal Experience)

Captain John V. Stark, Infantry
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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Stark, John V. "Personal Experience"
These experiences are from memory and notes that I made and have kept.

This book was no doubt written by these two officers from reports they had. Too these two officers had commanded the First Army and were on the ground and had first had information as to what took place. Nothing I could use, but I think it is a very good book.

This book gives a very good history of the travels, battles and fighting done in the Argonne. I was with the division up to 28 September 1918, and I find up to then what the writer said to be true.

Edwards, Evan A. "From Doniphan to Verdun." Official History of the 140th Infantry. The World Company, Lawrence, Kansas.
Chaplin Edwards was in the midst of everything that was going on in the regiment, and knows of what he is writing. His book is very good, and a good history of the regiment.

Kenmore, Claire "The Story of the 139th Infantry. Guard Publishing Company, St. Louis, Mo.
Little history of the regiment. Mostly pictures. No historical value.

Palmer, Frederick "Our Greatest Battle, the Meuse-Argonne." Dodd, Mead & Company, New York.
A very good book of the battle of the Meuse-Argonne.

Information File 300.4 "Battle Orders and Secret Order #4 with Battle Plans for the 35th Division."
A copy of the original from the historical section of the War Department.
File 322.13 - 35th

"The 35th Division, 1917-1918." (Confidential) Issued from the Army War College.

This is a study made by the War College of the 35th Division in action, and is very good history of the division from a military standpoint.

MARGINAL ABBREVIATIONS USED

Stark "Personal Experiences"

Edwards "From Doniphan to Verdun"

Hoyt "Heroes of the Argonne"

File 300.4 "Battle Orders and Secret Order #4 with Battle Plans for the 35th Division"

File 322.13 35th "The 35th Division, 1917-1918"
INTRODUCTION

On 6 April 1917, the United States declared war on Germany, and at once started getting ready for the fight that was to come.

The 140th Infantry was made up of the 3d and 6th Missouri National Guard Regiments. The 3d was one of the oldest regiments in the state and was from Kansas City except for two companies. The 6th had seen service during the war with Spain and had been mustered out since 1899. It was reorganized 28 July 1917, and was recognized by the War Department. The companies of this regiment were from the southeastern part of the state. At Camp Doniphan, Oklahoma, these two regiments merged and became the 140th Infantry.

The regiment then became part of the 70th Brigade of the 35th Division. During our stay here, we were trained in both open and trench warfare. 11 April 1917 found the regiment on the way to Camp Mills, New York, where we stayed until we sailed. The 3d Battalion was divided into sections for this trip; I and K Companies made up the first section, and L and M with Battalion HeadQuarters the second. The stay at Camp Mills was short and on 26 April 1917, the regiment sailed for duty in France. The 3d Battalion sailed on the "Aeneas"; it was on the trip over that the Overseas Literary Society was formed. This society became the by-word of the officers in the battalion during their stay in France. The battalion landed in Liverpool, England early in May and went at once to Winchester. After a short stay there, we went to South Hampton, and from there set sail across the Channel for Havre, France. It was here that we lost our Springfield rifles and received the British Enfields.
The stay in Havre was short as we were sent to the British as reserves back of Amiens. Again, we did not stay long but left for the American area—which was now down in Alsace. On 23 June 1918, the 3d Battalion was holding a line in the Vosges Mountains. We were the first battalion in the line of the regiment, and among the first of the division. We spent two months there in trench warfare and left it for the St. Mihiel sector. While in this sector, we were held in reserve for the first American drive. From there, we find ourselves hiking to Camp Marquette.

**CAMP MARQUETTE**

**PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS AND ORDERS**

On 21 September 1918, the three battalions of the 140th Infantry were at Camp Marquette, France. This was the first time that the regiment had been together since it left Camp Mills in the United States. It was at this time a great mystery as to why we were all together again. But it was a pleasure, for we had friends in the other battalions and were glad to see them.

On arriving at Camp Marquette, we did not have a regimental commander, the regiment being under the command of Major Fred L. Lemon of the 1st Battalion. On the following day, Lieutenant Colonel C. E. Delaplane was assigned and assumed command. Major Lemon, later in the day, presented Colonel Delaplane to the officers of the regiment as their new commander. Some of the officers knew the Colonel as he had been the division Ordnance Officer, prior to coming to the regiment. Colonel Delaplane told us that we could expect to be in a new drive soon.
The same day, we heard that the division had lost both brigade commanders and that the senior colonel in each brigade would take command, also that he would command the brigade during the drive that was to follow. Colonel Kirby Walker of the 139th Infantry at once took command of the 70th Brigade.

The 3d Battalion of the 140th Infantry was commanded by Major Murray Davis. He had a complete staff of both officers and enlisted men. Two companies were short captains; all companies were short officers.

On 24 September 1918, we learned that the drive would start on 26 September 1918 and that we would be in the front line. (1)

26 SEPTEMBER 1918

Early on the morning of 25 September 1918, as Battalion Adjutant, I went with the battalion commander to Brigade Headquarters, where Colonel Walker issued verbal orders for the coming attack. The 35th Division would be a part of the I Corps of the First Army. The I Corps was made up of the 28th, 35th and 77th Divisions with the 92d Division in reserve. (2)

The attack will start with the 77th Division on the left, the 28th as the center division and the 35th on the right. The 91st Division which is in the V Corps will be on our right. (3)

Our objectives were given as follows:

Corps Objective: The heights southeast of Charpentry.

The Combined Army First Phase Line: East of Fleville. (4)

The division will attack in column of brigades, regiments abreast, each with a battalion on the firing line, one in support and one in reserve.

The 70th Brigade less one battalion will be used as the reserve and will follow the leading brigade at not more than two kilometers.

Regimental Limits: Right regiment (east) limit - right limit of the division. Left (west) limit western edge Vauquois Hill 207 to right regiment - La Forge Mim-Cheppy to right regiment, heights east of La Baunthe – Rau – Charpentry to left regiment – Exermont to right regiment – Sommerence, to right regiment. (5)

On the return to the regimentoal area with the commanding officer, he announced that he would hold an officers' meeting at 10:00 AM. At this meeting, they were told about the coming drive, when and where it would start and the H hour.

On one occasion in the Vosges Mountains, the men were forced to use their reserve rations and now with a big battle only a matter of hours away, found the 3rd Battalion without reserve rations. The mail from division headquarters came to us and in same was a letter wanting to know why the ration had been used and on whose authority. The letter went back and forth during the day three or four times, and it was not until an hour before leaving for the front that the rations were received. (6)
MEUSE-ARGONNE

Promptly at 8:00 PM on 25 September 1918, the 3d Battalion in the lead left Camp Marquette on the way to their first big battle of the war. We had two months of trench warfare in the Vosges Mountains, and were held in reserve during the St. Mihiel drive. And now the regiment was considered ready to take its place alongside of the other divisions in the drive. The morale of the battalion was high, and the men were ready and anxious to help end the war so they might get home. About two hours before we started the mail from home came in and this helped the morale also. (7)

Our destination this night was the town of Aubriville. Just as we were leaving camp we received more rifle ammunition, hand grenades and rifle grenade, also our pyrotechnics. It was but a short hike to Aubriville, but the roads were all cluttered with troops, guns and ammunition carts, and on account of this it took us about three hours to get there.

The town of Aubriville was in ruins, and as we hiked through the Germans let us know they knew troops were on the move in the town. We camped on the hillside just a short distance beyond the town. The hillside was to be our camping ground for the night. Also for what rest the men could get before the battle started the next morning. About 11:30 PM the artillery started to shell the enemy area, and they were assisted by the big 14-inch naval guns which were in the valley below our billets. (8)

About 2:30 AM the irregular fire of the artillery blended into a huge and deafening volume of sound.
The barrage was on.

The first thousand shells fired by our artillery on the front were to be gas shells. To those of us who had heard the barrage of the St. Mihiel drive, and knew that it was the biggest thing of its kind that we had ever known, were now seeing one by far more elaborate and preponderant than the one at St. Mihiel.

26 SEPTEMBER 1918

Then suddenly quiet, a strange terrible silence. A gray misty dawn. It was 5:30, the "zero hour." Light packs, and ammunition bandoleers were adjusted, bayonets were fixed and breakfastless, cold, stiff but feeling suddenly young, strong and victorious, the men stream "over the top." There was little evidence of excitement and none of fear. (9)

It was 5:45 AM when the 3d Battalion formed and started on the march toward Germany. K and L Companies were the leading companies, and were in squad columns, I and M Companies were in support, and in section columns. The battalion commander and his staff were between the companies.

The weather was foggy, and the men could see only about 25 yards ahead of them. The smoke, fog and the unevenness of the ground made travelling hard and some trouble was encountered in keeping proper position, but this was soon overcome. The battalion saw no actual fighting until just past Vauquois Hill.

Vauquois Hill had been a German Stronghold since the drive for Paris in 1914, and the French had been unable to take it. But this same hill was now in our path and up to us to take. The artillery during the early hours of the morning poured lots of shells on the hill.
and by the time we reached it it was well torn up. We found one to two dugouts left; we could see from those left that both officers and men had been very comfortable while there. They had been constructed out of concrete. Just as we passed Vauquois Hill we received heavy artillery fire from the enemy, but it did not last long. Just past the hill were some machine gun nests which had to be cleaned up. This we did with very little trouble, as the men that were left made little or no fight. (10)

While Cheppy was being taken, the regiment was advancing back of the attacking troops in case of unexpectedly strong opposition by the enemy. (11)

About 3:00 PM the 3d Battalion still in support passed through Cheppy. A few kilometers past the town the battalion stopped to eat, as the regiment, and battalions ahead had been held up; this was the first food since early morning. It was not for long for we were soon on the march again; about 5:00 PM we were halted and ordered to dig in for the night; this was a welcome sound to hear, for the men as well as the officers were good and tired. The day had been long and the excitement of being in a battle had gotten on the nerves of the men and they were ready to stop for the day. Just as dusk started falling the mail from the rear was brought up, and just at this time it had a wonderful effect on the men. It helped to raise their morale. The night was cold and dreary, for there was a fine rain falling, and it continued.

27 SEPTEMBER 1918

Colonel Delaplane had moved his headquarters alongside of the 3d Battalion; about 2:00 AM a message
was received from brigade headquarters that the attack would start that morning at 8:30 AM. But before the H hour there would be a barrage by the artillery.

At 5:10 AM another message was received that the hour had been changed, and that the start would be at 5:30 AM. Further there would be a 5-minute barrage by the artillery, followed by a rolling barrage. 5:30 arrived, and there was no barrage from the artillery.

The first day of the fight the 3d Battalion was in regimental support, and the first night of the fight we were in divisional reserve. On starting that morning we were to be in support of the 1st and 2d Battalions of the regiment. For the regiment to get on the firing line, it was necessary for us to play leap frog with the 138th Regiment, which we did. The 1st Battalion was on the left, the 2d Battalion on the right, and the 3d Battalion in support. (12)

The crest of Hill 218 was boiling under enemy fire; high explosives and shrapnel kept the death song continuously above the men's heads. The hill seemed to crumble before the artillery and machine guns, and Colonel Delaplane decided each foot of ground was being bought at too precious a price. (13) The men were ordered to dig in. If we only had had some support from the artillery at this time we could have moved on, but with no support the lines held where they were.

Many attempts were made in the afternoon to advance, but each attempt failed. The shelling from the enemy continued as it did early in the morning. Just about noon the engineers came up with some mortars to see
if they could be of any help in clearing out some machine gun nests. There were many on the Very-Charpentry Road, and these were giving us a lot of trouble. Early in the afternoon some tanks came up to help out, but they did very little good. They seemed at that time-to-draw fire from enemy artillery, and to do very little good in getting rid of the machine gun nests. Up to 5:30, however, orders were received to advance at once. The advance had started when another message came from regimental headquarters that there would be a barrage for 15 minutes, and then we would follow a rolling barrage. There was no barrage of any kind, and we did not stop after we had once started to see if the artillery would fire a barrage. We stopped at dark in a ravine south of the Charpentry Eclisfontaine Road. The scouts of the battalion were sent out to gain contact with the enemy, and try and locate the 1st Battalion. It seems they were lost in the latter part of the drive that afternoon. The scouts found them late that night about 1000 yards northwest of where the rest of the regiment stopped for the night. It was in this advance that we received the first casualties in the battalion. Some very good men were lost. Thus did the 2d day of the battle end for the 3d Battalion. (14)

26 SEPTEMBER 1918

The dawn of 26 September was cold and with a fine drizzle filling the air. (15)

Orders were for us to advance at 5:30 AM on this morning. The 1st Battalion which the night before was lost was still some distance to our left, and not with the regiment when we started. The 3d Battalion was supporting the 2d. We had gone only about 1000 yards when
we were held up by rifle, machine gun and artillery fire from the left flank and the front. It was very evident at this time that the 28th Division on our left was held up, and had not advanced as far as we had. The 2d Battalion after the advance started moved to right, and we moved up on line with it. When we halted battalion headquarters was established behind a knoll where we spent about two hours before we were able to advance. The knoll protected us from machine gun and rifle fire, but the shells from the artillery fell all around us. At this time we had in the battalion 20 officers and an average of about 300 men per company. The companies had dug fox holes, and were in fair shape. It was while digging in M Company lost Captain McFadden, the first officer in the battalion to be wounded. This left the battalion with only one captain. (16)

At 9:45 AM twenty tanks reported and we were ordered to advance following the tanks at 300 yards. I and K Companies were the front line companies, and L and M were in support in squad columns. The advance had just started when the sergeant major of the battalion was killed, also the interpreter; both were very good men, and a less to the battalion. The sight of the tanks seemed to arouse the ire of the enemy, for they turned loose all of the guns that they had in that part of France on us at that time. There was frontal and flank fire, but none from our own artillery. As the day before we had no artillery fire to support our advance but had to depend on the tanks to help us get through the machine gun nests and strongholds of the enemy.
When the battle began we had orders from headquarters that a message would be sent back to those headquarters every half hour during the fight. The message would state where we were, how far we had gone and how much opposition we were meeting from the enemy. At 10:00 AM Major Davis directed that I send a message back, which I did and in doing so became separated from the Major. After sending the message back I started to advance, and caught up with Lieutenant Ritcher, Bn 2; while advancing with this officer he was wounded, and I went on, leaving him with a man from the medical corps.

On entering Montrebeau Woods I found that the battalion had lost very heavily during the advance. I found also that the two battalions, the 2d and 3d were mixed. The enemy planes all of the time during the advance were overhead giving information to their gunners of the range and we surely felt the effect of the information they sent back. No American planes were around. At times the planes flew low enough to shoot the men down on the ground; we received many wounded and killed in this manner. The woods too were full of machine gun nests, and the fighting in the woods was fierce for a while. In the woods I met Lieutenant Holt of I and some of his men. While moving with him from one position to another he was wounded, and I was also a few minutes later. I knew Holt very well as I had served with him in the old third. He was a good officer, and all of the men in his company liked him. After being wounded myself I spent the next twenty-two hours where I fell. During the daylight I saw the battalion moving forward. Several of the men who had been attached to battalion headquarters were wounded nearby; some badly and
(17) Stark

the others not so bad that they could not help put

bandages on those the worse for wear. (17) Lieutenant

Harrison of Company I passed during the morning, and

later in the day he brought Major Davis to see me; I was

more than glad to know that he was up and going again for

I had heard that he had been killed. He had been badly

wounded in the head, but insisted in going on, which he

did against my wish, for he was in no condition to do so.

(18)

The 3d Battalion in its advance past Chaudron

Farm to Montrebeau Woods between nine and nine thirty had

lost about fifty per cent of its men, and a larger per

cent of officers. Holt of I Company was killed, leaving

Harrison to carry on. K Company had Lieutenant Smith

left, Captain Kenady and Lieutenant Miller being casual-

ties; Slaughter, Denham and Stinson of L Company were

casualties also. Most of battalion headquarters were gone;

McFadden and Nottingham were wounded, and M Company was

without an officer. (19)

(19) Edwards, p 77

From where I lay I could see the planes over-

head but they were enemy planes, and none of our own. If

we could have had some that morning, and again in the

afternoon we would not have had the casualties that we

did. Late in the afternoon a few shells were heard to go

over toward the enemy line, but mighty few. (20) What was

left of the battalion was badly shot up, and was holding

the line with the 1st Battalion. They had won a little

over a mile — a costly mile. And every yard of the way

(20) Stark

was spotted with crimson. (21)

(21) Edwards, p 77
a blow to the battalion, for it seemed to take the heart out of the men. At the death of the Major there were only two young Lieutenants left to carry on. Captain Smith from the 2d Battalion was sent to take command of the 3d.

The messages sent back by the regimental intelligence at 12:30 PM, and at 4:30 PM show the state of the regiment. Message No 23 sent at 12:30 is as follows: Our troops now occupy Exermont. It was taken under a fierce artillery and machine gun fire. Our losses were heavy in killed and wounded. Our artillery gave little support and on several occasions fired short as much as one kilometer, causing losses to our troops. Muddy ground. Truman RIO

Message 24 is as follows: Our troops started to fall back in accordance with orders received from the Brigade Commander to retire back to the position gradually, that was held last night. Instead of doing as ordered by the officers and NCO's they started to run, it almost turning into a stampede. Men of all regiments, officers and NCO's were headed for the rear. It being a critical moment, I gathered a few of NCO's and observers about me and stopped about 300. We are organized now in line of trenches as shown. Everything is quiet at present with exception of heavy shelling and machine gun fire. Truman RIO. (26)

Men of the 3d Battalion no doubt were in the 300 that were stopped for with their leaders gone, and many of NCO's also gone, too being tired and in need of food they started for the rear. They were stopped, however, and did what they had done before held. (27)
29 September 1918

All night long they shelled us, and plenty of gas was sent over. Sunday morning we looked on a wet and gloomy world. (22)

At 5:25 AM orders were received to attack at 5:30 and for the 138th Infantry to leap frog the 140th, and lead the attack on Exermont. (23) It was at this time that the officers who were in command of the two brigades, and the regiments knew not just what they were going to do next. Orders were issued, and not carried out. The higher commanders were in a state of confusion and excitement and to this cause was undoubtedly due much of the confusion of the troops. (24) While the troops were trying to get into formation orders were received to advance. Colonel Delaplane at this time asked the brigade commander if the 140th should advance and he was told to advance at once. Colonel Hawkins in the meantime ordered Major Murray Davis, and the 3d Battalion to move out, which the Major did. At this time there was less than 1200 men in the regiment. As had happened the two previous days there was no artillery support. The enemy fire was heavy, and there was still some fire from the left flank near Apremont. The fight had started this morning in column of battalions, 3d leading, 2d and 1st following. By 9:00 AM Exermont was taken, and what was left of the 3d Battalion was now mixed with the other battalions of the regiment. Major Davis of the 3d Battalion was killed at 10:00 AM. He had been wounded the day before, and again early this morning before he was killed. Major Davis was a wonderful man, and loved by all who knew him. He was a real leader and the men followed him wherever he went or where he wanted them to go. His loss at this time was...
30 September 1918

Morning finally came. The men were wet and their clothing was heavy with rain and mud, although the rain had stopped. There was no protection for the men except fox holes, these gave no protective from the weather.

The 91st Division on the right had come up to Eclisfontaine, and the 28th Division of the left had taken Apremont. With these two divisions up with us the artillery fire from the flanks was stopped. (28)

The men that were left in the 3d Battalion were still in the line mixed with other companies. They repulsed counterattacks of the enemy during the day. They all were too tired to try and advance, but were able to hold the position they held. (29)

At 6:45 PM the following message was sent by the Division Commander to I Corps: Can't advance beyond crest south of Exermont, thoroughly disorganized. Request that we be replaced with fresh troops. (30)

1 October 1918

At 3:00 AM the 1st Division relieved the regiment, during the relief they were shelled heavily and continuously, but with few losses. The regiment was reorganized and marched to a point south of Cheppy on the Vernays-La Forge Road. (31) The men started fires, and for the first time in nearly a week they could get warm. Too they had some warm food.

In reorganizing the regiment it was found that the 3d Battalion had left 2 officers and 627 men.
ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

The morale of the battalion was high, and in fact it was very high. The battalion had good officers, and the men were all loyal.

While at Camp Doniphan we were trained in both trench and open warfare, but more time was devoted to open warfare than trench. The men realized that to win the war, they must work hard and they did. They all took a pride in what they were doing, and did it well.

The two months that were spent in the Vosges Mountains was all trench warfare, and except for holding the line a part of the time it was a waste of time for what was to follow. Too we had some training in the open game.

The loss of our Colonel just after arriving in France hurt the morale of the regiment for a time, for we received a man in his place that the officers did not like, and in turn none of the officers ever did anything that pleased him. Just before the Meuse-Argonne we had no commanding officer, and then two days before the drive Lieutenant Colonel Delaplane took command of the regiment. Colonel Delaplane prior to taking command, and during the Doniphan days had been the Division Ordnance Officer. The officers and the men hardly knew him, and he too did not know the men he was to lead into battle, but he did the best that he could.

The loss of General Martin, the Brigade Commander, was at a very bad time and hard to take. General Martin had been with the brigade since it was formed, and the officers and men had a lot of faith in his ability to lead them.
Again on 28 September the artillery did nothing to help the battalion or the regiment in any of the advances. The main advance made that morning was made without any help from the artillery, but with some help from the tanks. It was very evident early in the morning that it was going to be hard sledding. For the enemy artillery fired from the left, and from the front at will. The division on the left had not advanced as far as we had, and too our artillery was not bothering them, so with the help of their air service they fired, you might say, point blank at us. The men of the 3d Battalion knew that they should have some artillery help in all of their advancing, in fact, they had been taught they would have it; knowing this, they felt that when they were ordered to advance they were going to certain death, and lots of them were killed and a great number wounded. The infantry is the basic arm of the service, and at times it needs help and this was a time it needed it, but did not get it from two branches that should have helped, namely, the artillery and air service.

On 29 September the higher commanders were in state of confusion and excitement and to this cause was undoubtedly due much of the confusion of the troops. Here was the time when General Martin was sadly needed, he would have been thinking neither of himself nor his reputation. There was no friendly barrage, and the enemy gave us everything from the front. (32)

LESSONS
(1) The Principle of the Offensive is brought out in the very first day of fighting, and continued the next two but not as it should. The second day the offensive
Using of the reserve rations in the Vosges was something that could not be helped; it was due to the loss of the cable that brought the food up the mountains. The cable had been hit by the enemy artillery and put out of use. The men had to eat and the battalion commander ordered the rations used. Then with the battle only a matter of hours away to have some one at Division Headquarters stir up a fuss over the use of the rations was a mere trifle.

27 September was the beginning of the mixed orders. First we received orders that we would advance at 8:30 AM behind a barrage, then out of a clear sky orders were received to advance at 5:30 AM behind a 15-minute barrage. The barrage never came, and we were held up all day long by the enemy. Several attempts were made to go ahead, but without any support from the artillery it was impossible to do so. Tanks and mortars were used to help the advance, but it was still impossible to move against strong machine gun nests which needed artillery to clear them out. Why the artillery fell down is not known, yet they claim they gave plenty of support, but being there on the ground I failed to see any, and I know the advance was held up. At 5:30 PM verbal orders were to advance, and to advance at once. 5:35 a message was received to advance at 5:30 behind an artillery barrage which will last for 15 minutes. Again as in the morning artillery failed. The advance had started, and was not halted by lack of fire from our own artillery, but by darkness. The battalion had some losses and the regiment many, which would not have happened if we had had the proper support from the artillery as the order said we would.

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was lost by the artillery failing to give any support, and causing the brigade of which the 3d Battalion was a part to fail in their objective of the day.

(2) The Germans were expecting an attack, but as late as the 22d September they did not know where the main blow was to be struck. Later they expected the attack to be launched on Metz. The above illustrates the Principle of Surprise.

(3) There was no cooperation between the artillery and the infantry, and from this their lines were held up, and too many lives lost needlessly.
QUESTIONS

1. Who commanded 3d Battalion 140th Infantry?
   A. Major Davis.

2. On which side of the Vauquis Hill did the battalion cross?
   A. Left.

3. What day were orders from brigade badly mixed?
   A. 27 September.

4. Was there lack of cooperation between the artillery and infantry?
   A. Yes.

5. Was Colonel Delaplane justified in stopping the advance over hill 218 on 27 September?
   A. Yes.

6. Was there an artillery barrage after 26 September?
   A. No.

7. What day did the battalion suffer the most losses?
   A. 28 September.

8. Was Division Headquarters justified in raising the disturbance over the used rations?
   A. No.

9. Was the Air Service of any help during the drive?
   A. No.

10. Who brought the battalion out of the fight?
     A. Captain Smith.