THE OPERATIONS OF THE 6TH TANK DESTROYER GROUP, AS PART OF TASK FORCE "A", IN THE MARCH THROUGH BRITTANY PENINSULA TO BREST, FRANCE, 3 AUGUST - 9 AUGUST 1944
(NORTHERN FRANCE CAMPAIGN)
(Personal experience of the Group S-4)

Type of operation described: A TASK FORCE OPERATION WITHIN ENEMY-HELD TERRITORY CONFRONTED WITH DIFFICULT AND HAZARDOUS RESUPPLY

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THE OPERATIONS OF THE 6TH TANK DESTROYER GROUP, AS PART OF TASK FORCE "A", IN THE
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INTRODUCTION

This monograph covers the operations of the 6th Tank Destroyer Group, as a part of Task Force "A", in the lightening-like advance made by the American forces in the race for Brest, France.

In order to orient the reader and show him why a mission of this nature, at this time, was wise it will be necessary to briefly look at the overall picture in France from a high level viewpoint.

For almost two months, since the landing in Normandy, 6 June 1944, steady and ever increasing quantities of men, material, and supplies had been poured onto Omaha and Utah beaches. This necessitated the use of small landing craft to navigate in the shallow water near the beaches. Supplies and equipment arriving from the United States either had to be unloaded in England and reloaded into smaller craft for cross-channel journey or transferred in mid-channel from ocean going vessels to smaller craft. These methods were extremely unsatisfactory as well as being expensive and time consuming.

Cherbourg had fallen into Allied hands in July 1944 but not before extensive destruction of the harbor facilities had been accomplished by the Germans. This destruction meant that much work and considerable time would be necessary before these facilities could be repaired and made of service for large ocean going cargo ships.

The British to the north continue to encounter determined resistance from the Germans and gains were slight. This made the prospects for any port facilities to our north look gloomy.
To the south, at a distance of approximately 160 miles lay Brest, the second largest harbor in the whole of France. (1) (Map A) Brest, located at western tip of Brittany Peninsula, was capable of accommodating the largest vessels with excellent facilities. A good railway and highway system linked Brest with the interior of France. If Brest could be obtained in such a manner as to prevent the Germans from destroying these harbor facilities and several long highway and railway bridges it would greatly facilitate the supply problem of the allies.

In the meantime the concentrated effort of the American forces at St Lo had been successful and the American Divisions were now starting what was later to become one of the most successful exploits in the history of war. This success, along with the opportunity now at hand, placed an even greater burden upon our already overburdened facilities at Cherbourg and the beaches (Omaha and Utah). The task of supplying our rapidly advancing armies through the existing ports might soon equal the task of filling a storage tank through an inverted funnel.

PHASE I. ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE "A"

The Third United States Army, Commanded by General George S. Patton, Jr., became operational on the continent on 1 August 1944 (2). General Patton immediately conceived that a task force highly mobile, strong in armor and armament, and capable of sustained shock action could break through the enemy resistance and once behind the enemy lines into Brittany Peninsula could seize important objectives and prevent their destruction by the enemy. General Patton wasted no time in putting his idea into an order for only a few hours had passed from the time his army had become operational before orders were issued to the units who would comprise Task Force "A" (3).

(1) A-7, P. 4; (2) A-7, P. 2; (3) A-9, P. 3
Units comprising Task Force "A" would assemble in
the vicinity of La Rupes not later than 020700 August 1944
and would consist of: 1st Tank Destroyer Brigade, Commanded
by Brigadier General Herbert L. Earnest (now Major General),
6th Tank Destroyer Group, 15th Cavalry Group, 705th Tank De-
stroyer Battalion, 159th Engineer Combat Battalion, and the
509th Engineer Light Ponton Company (4).

Prior to the time the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion
had been with the 5th Armored Division but was specially
selected for this mission. This selection was based upon
the desire of having an additional Tank Destroyer Battal-
on equipped with the M-13 chassis and the 76 mm Gun,
a vehicle especially adapted to high mobility either on
a highway or across country (5).

The 6th Tank Destroyer Group closed in the assembly
area, near La Rupes, (Map A) by the prescribed time,
020700 August 1944 (6).

PHASE II. PREPARATION FOR THE TASK FORCE MISSION

Immediately after the deadline for closing into the
assembly area, Colonel Logan C. Berry, Commanding Officer,
6th Tank Destroyer Group, received notice to report to
task force headquarters at 0730 this date for a meeting with
General Earnest and that members of his staff, not to ex-
ceed these in number, could accompany him if desired.
Colonel Berry selected his S-2, S-3, and S-4 to attend the
meeting with him (7).

This was a meeting of all Task Force "A" unit commanders
to explain the mission and issue preliminary instructions.
General Earnest explained that the task force had the mission
of advancing through Brittany Peninsula, securing key bridges
along the Rennes-Brest railroad line, key highway bridges
along the same general route (Map A) and destroying whatever

(4) A-7, P. 5; (5) A-9, P. 5; (6) A-7, P. 5; (7) A-7, P. 6;
enemy forces encountered without causing excessive delay in reaching Brest and the objectives enroute. He further stressed the importance of the mission, explaining that without these key railway and highway routes the port of Brest had little value, since if damaged, several of these bridges were of such length and construction as to require weeks to repair. Certain bridges were earmarked as being especially important, including three railway and two highway, located at St. Brieuc, two highway and two railway in the vicinity of Guincamp, and three each in and near Morlaix (8) (Map A).

All units were directed to draw six days emergency rations, sufficient gasoline and oil for 250 miles, and as much ammunition as could be carried, using every available vehicle. Barrage and impediments would be left under guard in the assembly area (9).

All units were ordered to be prepared to move from the assembly area by 030100 August for the start of the mission.

The meeting ended at approximately 0900 hours and Colonel Berry immediately held a meeting with his own command. The supply personnel had a tremendous amount of work to be accomplished and with only sixteen hours remaining prior to jumping-off time. Ammunition releases had to be obtained, road priorities had to be arranged, gasoline and lubricants had to be drawn in extra quantities, and six days emergency rations had to be obtained. To make the situation even more difficult the 75 MM ammunition and the emergency rations had to be trucked from Omaha Beach over roads that were damaged and much overcrowded (10). Releases were obtained as rapidly as possible and supply (8) A-10, T. 6; (9) A-10, P. 6; (10) A-10, P. 6;
vehicles dispatched to the various depots as rapidly as possible. Supply personnel worked day and night and by 0300 August the 6th Tank Destroyer Group was ready for the jump-off (11).

In the meantime, there had been a few last minute changes. These changes included orders that all task force personnel would wear impregnated clothing, also that the task force would operate under VIII United States Army Corps, commanded by Major General Troy H. Middleton (Now Lieutenant General). All troops had impregnated clothing in their possession, therefore, no special supply problem was encountered (12).

By 021500 August final orders had been issued for the leading elements of the main column to cross the IP at 030130 August and proceed by way of Avranches and Dol , (13) (Map A). Information received from higher headquarters indicated this sector of our route was clear and considered to be generally free of enemy since the 6th Armored Division was advancing along the same route as far as Dinan at which point they would turn south. This information further stated that the 6th Armored Division would occupy an assembly area midway between Dol and Dinan on the night of 2 - 3 August and that this same assembly area would be occupied by Task Force "A" on the night of 3 - 4 August (14).

PHASE III. THE JUMP-OFF

The leading elements of the 6th Tank Destroyer Group passed the IP on schedule and everyone seemed to breathe a sigh of relief for at last the turmoil of the past 24
(11) A-10, P. 7; (12) A-10, P. 7; (13) A-7, P. 7; (14) A-5, P. 4
hours was now history. This feeling of complacency was
doomed to be short lived, for after traveling a distance
of approximately 15 kilometers, and reaching a point just
north of Avranhes, Task Force "A" encountered its first
enemy action. Enemy planes suddenly dropped flares in the
sky that appeared to be directly over our heads. Following
this we underwent considerable bombing and strafing. We
suffered no losses but an extra large bomb crater in the
road plus extremely heavy traffic delayed our advance for
about an hour and a half (15). This loss of time coupled
with a 30 minute loss in Avranhes, due to a mix-up in
the time of road priorities, delayed the column a total of
two hours by the time Avranhes was cleared (16). Based
upon orders received by task force headquarters that speed wa
of the utmost importance, and endeavoring to regain some of
the time previously lost, the rate of march was increased
to 35 or 40 miles an hour. This appeared to be a wise de-
cision since the route was considered clear and all Tank
Destroyers were M-13 vehicles capable of maintaining this
rate of march (17).

The column continued to move at a rapid rate with
the point, consisting of a platoon of Cavalry and a platoon
of Tank Destroyers, leading the column at a distance of
only two hundred yards. Vehicles within the point main-
tained approximately fifty yards interval (18). Here again
the reader is reminded that the task force commander was
operating under the belief that the 6th Armored Division
had advanced over this route within the past twenty-four
hours.

The leading elements of the column cleared Baguer-Pican,
(16) A-10; (17) A-9; (18) A-7, P. 6;
A tiny village about 4 Kilometers east of Doi (Map A), at 0630 hours and continued to roll down the highway at a speed of 35 to 40 miles an hour. At this time the Command Officer, 15th Cavalry Group, was riding in a jeep up with the leading elements of the point. The point moved over a long stretch of straight highway, rounded a curve in the road that was flanked on both sides by trees and the usual hedgerows, and then came head-on into a heavily defended road-block (19). Immediately the enemy opened fire on the column with machine guns, mortars, A T guns, and dismounted foot troops that were scattered on either side of the road for a distance of several hundred yards along side the column. Those men not killed in the first burst of fire jumped from their vehicles into the ditches where they were pinned down by the heavy machine gun, mortar and rifle fire that seemed to cover the entire stretch of road. Some men had left their weapons in their vehicles and were unable to fight back at the enemy, however, those with weapons did return the enemy fire wherever possible. The heavy fire that raked the column and the hedgerows along side the road made it almost impossible to get the vehicles off the road (Map B). The result was chaos and control was difficult to regain (20).

The only thing to do was to extricate the Tank Destroyer and Cavalry troops that were still alive and make every effort to remove the dead as soon as possible. Two platoons of Tank Destroyers maneuvered into firing positions along the crest of the ridge where the column was halted and opened fire on known and suspected enemy gun emplacements with HE and smoke. Cavalry, Engineers, and Tank Destroyers were organized into battalion combat teams and started mopping up enemy foot troops on either side of the column.

(19) A-5, P. 4; A-7, P. 7, and A-10; (20) A-5, P. 7;
By 0800 hours several of the A.T. guns and machine guns had been destroyed and our troops had advanced under the cover of smoke to close in positions. Soon thereafter the enemy started withdrawing into the wooded area to his rear. Immediately Task Force "A" started reorganizing and checking its losses. Of the point, only three men remained who were not casualties. The Commanding Officer, 15th Cavalry Group could not be found although his driver was found dead and his vehicle burned near the road-block (21). Losses in personnel were heavy and eleven vehicles within the task force were damaged to such an extent they could no longer be used (22). A special party was arranged by task force headquarters to evacuate the dead and wounded to the rear.

By 0900 hours the dead and wounded had been recovered and reorganization accomplished. At this time orders came from task force headquarters that the column would not continue on the present route but would by-pass to the south using an alternate route (23). This decision was based upon reports from the civilians in Baguer-Pican that the Germans forces ahead was estimated to be two Infantry Battalions reinforced with armor (24). The exact strength and composition of the enemy force was never determined.

Later, this same day, it was learned from higher headquarters that the 6th Armored Division had received a change of orders and had turned south at Pontorson (Map A). Had this most vital information reached task force headquarters in time it might have saved the loss of lives and equipment and prevented the loss of much needed time.

Here, less than 12 hours after our initial jump-off, we were faced with a sizeable supply problem. We needed the men and vehicle replacements badly for now the task force was separated from friendly forces and the line of supply was (21) A-5, F. 4; and A-10; A-7, F. 8; (23) A-10, (24) A-7, P. 9;
stretching rapidly and certainly none too safe to travel.

The task force commander decided that resupply of
the losses suffered should be effected as soon as possible.
He also issued orders to the effect that all supply ve-
hicles going to the rear would be in convoy and under control
of task force headquarters. The 3-4, 6th Tank Destroyer
Group was designated as the officer to be in charge of all
supply convoys (25).

The first task force supply train was organized during
the night of 3 - 4 August. The territory to the rear was
known to be infested with enemy which had been by-passed in
the rapid advance the previous day. This necessitated that
the convoy be carefully defended with special vehicles and
armament scattered throughout the column. To do this, one
jeep with a .50 caliber machine gun mounted was used as a
point, next was an M3 Armored car, then the 2-1/2 ton Cargo
trucks with a .50 caliber machine gun, ring mounted, on
each vehicle, a half-truck with one .50 caliber and two .30
caliber machine guns located near the middle of the column,
and an M3 Armored Car in the rear. At daybreak the column
departed from the bivouac in the vicinity of Miniac, a
small town approximately 20 kilometers south of St Malo (26).

Enemy activity consisted of only an occasional sniper
and the convoy reached Avranches ahead of the anticipated
time. The protective vehicles were dropped in a rendezvous
point to await the return of the supply vehicles. The re-
mainder of the convoy continued to VIII Corps Headquarters
after obtaining releases for the items to be drawn. The
trucks were regrouped and dispatched in accordance to de-
pots upon which releases were effective, irrespective of
(25) A-7, P. 10; (26) A-10;
the unit having requested the supplies. This was done to conserve time and distance traveled. Replacement vehicles and 75 mm ammunition had to be picked up at Omaha Beach (27).

By 050500 August all vehicles had reached the rendezvous point near Avranches although some of the personnel had had no sleep during the night. The departure was held up until 0545 hours allowing everyone time for breakfast (26).

The convoy rolled along smoothly and everything was uneventful until a spot about 7 kilometers from Dol was reached. The lead jeep observed what appeared to be a road block to his front and immediately signaled the convoy to halt. At about the same instant an enemy machine gun opened fire. However, no damage was inflicted and the jeep reached cover safely. All vehicles were moved off the road under cover and observers sent forward to determine, if possible, the extent of defenses that confronted us. Little could be obtained from observation, therefore, it was decided to organize two teams and feel out the enemy strength. Two .50 caliber machine guns were removed from the trucks and set up on ground mounts in a position that provided fields of fire to the enemy obstacles. While this was being done two teams were being organized using two M-13 Tank Destroyers, drawn as replacements, as our primary weapon with truck drivers and replacement personnel comprising the crew members and foot soldiers. The teams took up positions on either side of the road and started advancing cautiously forward while firing upon the target with the machine guns and the 75 mm guns, still endeavoring to determine the nature of his defense. During this time the enemy continued to return our fire with machine guns (27, 28) A-10;
and rifles but no A T guns were in evidence. Considerable machine gun and 76 mm fire had been placed upon his position when a white flag appeared. Firing was halted and immediately twelve Germans came forward and surrendered. They stated there were no other enemy troops in the vicinity and that they had hoped to be able to capture an American vehicle and rejoin their forces in the direction of Brest. After considerable discussion it was decided to take the prisoners along and turn them over to task force headquarters for interroagation. No casualties were suffered by our troops and after having lost one hour and forty minutes the convoy was once again on the road and everything going well. A good rate of speed was maintained and no further enemy encountered during the remainder of the trip. (29).

The task force had cleared the enemy from Meneac (30) where we left them the day before and was now held up just outside St. Malo by bitter resistance from enemy forces occupying high ground behind and on both sides of the city, (31). Task Force "A" had received orders on 4 August to move north toward St. Malo, feel out the enemy and if possible determine the extent of defense and enemy activity.

Enemy defenses were determined to be strong and a great deal of activity in and around the city. Upon reporting these facts the Commanding General, VIII Corps, the task force commander was ordered to contain the enemy at St. Malo until relieved by the 3d Infantry Division which would probably be during the night of 4 - 5 August (32).

General Barneett had decided that the task force, to have maximum effectiveness, should have one battalion of (29) A-10; (30) A-4, P. 10; (31) A-2, P. 33; (32) A-9;
motorized Infantry troops. This recommendation was made to higher headquarters and at the same time a request submitted for at least one battalion (33).

Task Force "A" was relieved from St Malo (Map A) on 5 August by the 33d Infantry Division. At this time the request for Infantry was granted and the 3rd Battalion, 330th Infantry, with sufficient trucks provided by VIII Corps to motorize the battalion, became a part of the task force, (34).

Units of Task Force "A" were now acquiring the feeling of all being members of a particular organization rather than a group of separate units associated with other strange units. A more or less unwritten S&F was now in effect, for example, the S-4, 6th Tank Destroyer Group would be in charge of all supply convoys operating to the rear. This was known by all units and the resultant cooperation was gratifying. Each unit had become to know what vehicles and personnel it would provide for convoy security. An M8 armored car would be provided by the 6th Tank Destroyer Group and one from the 15th Cavalry Group, a jeep, with a .50 caliber machine gun mounted, from the 199th Engineer Combat Battalion, a half-track from the 1st Tank Destroyer Brigade, gunners from various units, and so on until a supply convoy equipped and capable of operating through enemy infested territory was a reality. Replacement vehicles, personnel, and equipment drawn while on resupply missions would be organized into fighting teams for the return trip, (35). Here it may well be said that a well balanced organization had been the outgrowth of what had been, only three days hence, a group of disorganized units (33) A-9; (34) A-10; (35) A-10; (36) A-8.
susceptible to surprise and ambush as had been our ex-
perience, (36).

At daybreak of 6 August, Task Force "A" moved out on
what might be termed the second lap of its journey, the
dash to Eredt. This time no reasonable caution was left
unheeded. Units of the Cavalry preceded the column
several miles to the front while others screened the
flanks. A sizeable point or advanced guard, consisting
of Cavalry and a platoon of Tank Destroyers moved well
ahead of the column. Furthermore, contact had been made
with the French and arrangements made for a civilian warn-
ing system to be in effect. Members of the French under-
ground were to contact the lead Cavalry troops and also
the task force headquarters, prior to reaching key objectives,
with any information of importance pertaining to enemy de-
fenses, approximate strength of enemy in that locality, de-
fended areas, and extent of enemy troop movements. As will
be verified, this civilian warning system proved to be and
did save time, personnel, and equipment on several occasions,
(36).

Rapid progress was made throughout the day with enemy
activity limited to snipers and lightly defended road blocks,
(37). In most cases the enemy, although capable in numbers
of delaying longer, seemed ready to take the easy way and
surrender. The number of prisoners taken was so great that
it was necessary to turn them over to the civilians to guard,
giving the civilians the captured rifles and machine guns for
weapons. The three railway and two highway bridges at St
Brieuc were each defended by a detachment of troops, two
machine guns, and an A T gun with seemingly no support from
other troops. Sufficient warning was given the task force
(36) A-10; (37) A-1, p. 21;

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prior to arrival at St Brieux along with the information that none of the bridges were equipped to be blown. The 6th Task Destroyer Group, with the Infantry battalion attached, was given the mission of seizing the bridges and immediately the group commander formed two forces for the attack. These units closed in on the bridges from different directions and within two hours all five had been taken. The group losses consisted of one M-13 vehicle knocked out by A T fire, one M8 armored car damaged by A T mines, and six casualties; (38). Since all bridges were located within the same general area, only one platoon of Tank Destroyers and some Cavalry troops were left as security. Prisoners and captured weapons were turned over the Forces Francaises de l'Interieur who were to assist in securing the bridges and mop up pockets of enemy troops that had been by-passed during the day, (39).

A bivouac area for the night was selected about 3 kilometers west of Guincamp (Map A). Immediately after closing into bivouac the 3-4, 6th Task Destroyer Group was called to task force headquarters and told that all units had been instructed to prepare to send back supply convoy early the next morning and that the group 3-4 would again go as convoy commander.

Vehicles comprising the convoy assembled at 070500 August and the departure was made fifteen minutes later. The formation and protection was the same as that used for the previous trip, which was, a jeep in the lead with a .50 caliber machine gun mounted, one M8 armored car, supply vehicles with a .50 caliber, ring-mounted, machine gun on each truck, one half-track mounting two .30 caliber and one .50 caliber machine guns located about the center of theprobably

(38) A-7, p. 11; (39) A-1, p. 23;
convoy and an M3 armored car in the rear.

The day's journey was uneventful except for occasional enemy dodger activity and by 1200 hours the convoy had reached Dol. Here, as previously done in Avranches the security was dropped in a rendezvous point and the supply vehicles continued.

The drawing of supplies was routine and by 081230 the last vehicle had returned to the rendezvous. Immediately the convoy was formed and once again the return trip was underway. All went well until approximately 1630 hours, at Plouegat, a town about 25 kilometers east of Morlaix, where a group of excited civilians halted the convoy and reported that Plouegat had been recaptured by the Germans, estimated to about an Infantry Company, who were now in the process of constructing roadblocks and fortifications but had no anti-tank weapons. They further stated there were no by-passes that would not involve considerable extra distance to travel and also necessitating some back-tracking. It was also learned that a group of the Forces Francaises de l'Interieur about fifty strong, approximately half of which possessed arms, had organized outside the town and would be glad to assist in driving the enemy out. This assistance was readily accepted and the French troops assembled at our location. Three teams were formed consisting of: team number 1, one M-18 Tank Destroyer and ten foot soldiers, team number 2, two M3 armored cars and ten foot soldiers, and team number 3, one M3 armored car, one half-track and 10 foot soldiers. Team number 2 and 3 moved to positions on either side of the town while team number 1, took position along the highway (Map 3). When the teams were in readiness all weapons opened fire simultaneously upon what the French had designated as enemy strong points. Only small arms fire was returned so based upon this plus the information that the enemy had no anti-tank weapons it was decided to close
in on the town slowly. After approximately twenty minutes a white flag appeared and the cease fire order was given. The Germans appeared and continued down the road to our position. The spokesman, an officer, stated that his troops would be willing to surrender providing we would not turn them over to the French. We told him this could not be guaranteed since we were the advanced unit of a much larger force only a short distance behind and that the commanding officers would not accept a conditional surrender. Seemingly the officer believed our statement and sent his companion back to bring the other troops into the open, have them stack their weapons and march to another open area. Their weapons, as had done in previous cases, were given to the French forces and the one hundred and eight prisoners left in their custody. In this action there were three French and one American casualties. It was now 0530 hours and the task force was thought to be a considerable distance away, (40).

Upon reaching Morlaix, the security detachment, left at the bridges, was contacted and their radio used to call task force headquarters. They gave their location as being 30 kilometers east of Brest and ordered that we bivouac in our present location for the night and continue the trip next morning. After a most appetizing supper, consisting of fresh eggs secured from the civilians, everyone settled down for a good night of sleep, for some it was the first since our departure at 070515 August.

At 070530 August the supply convoy departed from Morlaix in the routine formation and at 0715 hours made contact with the task force near Lanesen, thus ending a supply trip totaling more than four hundred miles of which almost half was (40 - .41), A-10;
through territory infested with enemy troops.

Task Force "A" advanced to the vicinity of Brest and by noon, 9 August, made contact with elements of the 6th Armored Division who had been on a similar mission, advancing down the southern route of the peninsula, (L2).

Thus, on the seventh day, Task Force "A" succeeded in accomplishing its original mission in such a manner as to bring credit to each individual unit. True, the soldiers were weary and tired but not unjustifiably for few, if any, had eaten a hot meal or had a bath during this period. Rest and sleep had consisted of a short nap here, another there. Clean clothes had not been available, for ammunition, gasoline, and rations had replaced shirts and underwear on the baggage trucks. For some there had been no opportunity to undress; rest intervals had been too uncertain and short.

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

After making a study of this operation it is my opinion that many of the mistakes made were due to the lack of combat experience where the situation is fluid and fast moving. Prior to this mission the combat experience of units comprising the task force had consisted of close hedgerow fighting and limited gains. There the tactics very sharply with those used in an operation of this nature which, in many respects, hedges upon guerrilla warfare.

Some criticism may well be directed at higher headquarters for failure to notify the task force commander that a change of orders had been given the 6th Armored Division and that beyond Pontorson no friendly forces would precede the task force. I believe it is within reason to assume that a different formation would have (L2) A-1, P. 25;
been in effect had this been known. However, it is not
believed that all criticism for this mishap should be
laid to higher headquarters. The responsibility remains
with the commanding officer of any unit to provide local
security. Knowing that some enemy did remain in the area
between Avranches and Pontorson would justify the placing
of adequate security ahead and to the flanks.

I consider a speed of 35 miles to 40 miles an hour
to be excessive in cases where enemy action might be pre-
sent. This speed does not allow screening personnel ade-
quate time to accomplish what is expected of them.

The omission of motorized Infantry from the task force
at the beginning proved to be a mistake. The Armor, Cavalry,
and Engineer combination is excellent for a fast moving mobile
situation where resistance is light, however, this sit-
uation cannot always be expected when opposing the enemy.
The addition of motorized Infantry provided a force capable
of engaging any type enemy.

The crux of this operation was the difficulties en-
countered with supply and evacuation. The group and task
force commanders had cognizance of these difficulties well
in advance. Because they did realize and study the serious-
ness of this situation in advance the supply convoys con-
sisted of the necessary armor and armament for self protec-
tion and at no time was any supplies lost enroute due to
enemy action. Had the Germans succeeded in destroying any
of these convoys, or prevented them from getting through to
their destination, then the task force units might well have
found themselves in a desperate situation. Because the
commander realized and assumed the responsibility for
supply there was always protection provided whenever the
supply vehicles moved independent of the task force.

A great deal of credit is due the Forces Francaises
de l'Intérieur and the French civilians for their loyalty
and assistance, without which, the accomplishment of this
mission might well have been much costlier in men, material,
and time. This affords an excellent example of the advant-
ges favoring the side operating in the territory of a
friendly populace.

LESSONS

1. Supply is a command responsibility.
2. Protection for supply vehicles must not be neglected.
3. Supply personnel in combat must be aggressive.
4. Supply installations should be pushed as near the front
line troops as safety permits.
5. Success in combat is dependent upon successful re-
supply.
6. All troops should be taught supply discipline.
7. A road bound mechanized column, without adequate security
is extremely vulnerable to ambush.
8. When enemy is near, a tactical march formation is nec-
essary even when it is believed the route of advance
is clear.
9. When advancing in a combat area the commanding officer
should never ride with the leading point of his column
except in cases of necessity.
10. Reconnaissances and continual planning is essential.
11. When time and speed is imperative alternate routes of
march must be planned ahead.
12. Rapid dissemination of information to combat troops is
imperative.
13. A friendly populace can greatly assist combat troops.
MAP "A"
ROUTE OF ADVANCE, 6TH TANK DESTROYER GROUP AS PART OF TASK FORCE "A"

BRITTANY PENINSULA
MAP "B"
THE AMBUSH OF TASK FORCE "B"
AT BAGUER-PICAN

[Map diagram with various symbols and annotations]

Trail of dirt road
Advance by task force troops
Task force positions
Hedges
Enemy positions
Trees

[Legend with symbols and yard measurements]
ACTION OF TASK FORCE "A"
SUPPLY TRAIN AT PLOUEGAT
MAP C