Advanced Infantry Officers Course
1949-1950

Operations of the 1st Battalion, 337th Infantry (85th Infantry Division) in the attack on Terracina, Italy, 21 - 24 May 1944. (Rome - Arno Campaign)
(Personal Experience of a Battalion Adjutant)

Type of operation described: Infantry Battalion Attacking a Seacoast Town Bordered by Mountains.

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Advanced Infantry Officers Class No I
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Introduction

This monograph covers the operations of the 1st Battalion, 337th Infantry, 85th U. S. Division in the attack and capture of Terracina, Italy, 21 - 24 May 1944, during the Spring Offensive.

To orient the reader it will be necessary to briefly discuss the preceding Italian Campaign leading up to this action.

In September 1943 the U. S. Fifth Army landed at Salerno while the British Eighth Army landed farther south and together they successfully pushed north on the Italian Peninsula. (See Map A) (1) On 22 January 1944 the Fifth Army made another successful landing at Anzio and established a beachhead. (2) By 1 April the Fifth Army held a narrow 13 mile strip in central Italy, extending from the Liri River to the Mediterranean Sea; in addition to the Anzio Beachhead. (See Map A) (3)

The 85th Division landed in Africa in early 1944 and after an extensive period of training and re-equipping, sailed for Italy landing at Naples and on 10 April 1944 were committed to action for the first time, taking over the west flank of the Fifth Army sector. (4)

(1) A-1, p. 31
(2) A-1, p. 68
(3) A-2, p. 2
(4) A-3, p. 60
The Fifth Army was facing the strongly defended GUSTAV LINE and during the period 10 April to early May the time was spent patrolling and gaining all possible information about the enemy positions. The enemy facing the 85th Division consisted mainly of the German 95th Infantry Division. (5) Plans were made and orders were issued for an all out offensive on the entire front to begin on 11 May with the Fifth Army on the left and the British Eighth Army on the right. This offensive also included those elements of Fifth Army at the ANZIO BEACHHEAD. (6) (See Map A)

THE GENERAL SITUATION

The plan of Fifth Army for the Spring Offensive was divided into three phases. In phase one the 85th Division was to take SAN MARTINO RIDGE and part of S RIDGE. The 88th Division's main objective was SANTA MARIA INFANTE. During phase two the 88th Division would continue the attack and swing right taking MOUNT I CERRI and MOUNT ROTONDO then head for SPIGNO, while the 85th Division supported the attack by fire. Again in the third phase the 85th Division was to become active and take CASTELLONORATO and MOUNT SCAURI. The 38th Division in reserve was then to pass through the 88th Division, after the latter had taken SPIGNO, with the mission of taking MOUNT SANT ANGELO then move on and cut the ITRI-PICO ROAD ending phase three. (7)

The terrain to the front of Fifth Army presented many difficult features. On the right flank the hills were high and many almost impassable terraces were on the slopes of

(5) A-5, p. 6
(6) A-1, p. 78
(7) A-2, p. 56
those hills. There were many wide drainage ditches on the left flank and the gaps between these ditches were infested with mines. (8)

On 11 May the Spring Offensive pushed off. II Corps led the Fifth Army attack with the 85th Division on the left and the 88th Division on the right. The attack was successful and by 19 May the attacking elements of II Corps had pushed into ITRI and still had the enemy on the run. (9) Thus phase three of the attack plan had been completed without committing the 36th Division, and new plans had to be made. The German Army to the front had reorganized at the HITLER LINE. This line ran from TERRACINA on the coast extending east over the high mountains through the LIRI VALLEY to AGUINO and PIEDMONT. (10) (See Map B)

The new plan of Fifth Army consisted of a quick strike at TERRACINA to break the HITLER LINE which would open HIGHWAY 7 enabling Allied troops to move through, join the forces at ANZIO and continue the attack to the north. Details of the plan were, first to move the 36th Division by water to ANZIO, then the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion was to drop in the AUSONI MOUNTAINS to aid the move of II Corps at TERRACINA. The main effort of the attack on TERRACINA was to be made by the 85th Division. The 88th Division was to continue pushing forward through the high mountains on the right flank of II Corps. (11)

The soldiers of the 85th Division were inspired by their previous successes and were anxious to continue the attack. All was in readiness, the supply situation was excellent, and

(8) A-5, p. 2
(9) A-2, p. 55
(10) A-7, p. 423
(11) A-2, p. 95
On the morning of 21 May 1944 the 337th Infantry was moving up HIGHWAY 7 with one battalion astride the road, another in the edge of the mountains on the right flank and the other, motorized, following close behind the retreating Germans ready to take advantage of any break through. (16)

The regimental plan was for the 1st Battalion, reinforced, to strike and take TERRACINA by speed and shock action. The 2d Battalion, motorized, was to continue through TERRACINA and make contact with the ANZIO BEACHHEAD. The 3d Battalion would continue on the right flank and keep contact with the unit on the right. (17)

THE BATTALION SITUATION

From position on HIGHWAY 7 the 1st Battalion moved out at 0515 hours, 21 May 1944 on foot to support the motorized 2d Battalion, but at 1100 hours, orders were received to move into an assembly area about two miles south of FONDI for a new mission. At about 1400 hours new orders were received directing the 1st Battalion, reinforced, to attack TERRACINA, about 7 miles southwest of the original position. The 2d Battalion was to hold up and after the 1st Battalion had taken its' objective, continue the pursuit. (18)

The reinforcements joined the 1st Battalion in the assembly area, they were the 91st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and a company each of tanks and tank destroyers.

The Battalion Commander, Major Arnold Sanders, immediately

(16) A-6, p. 3
(17) Personal knowledge and statements of Capt Cecil Cates, then S-2, 3d Battalion, 337th Infantry, 18 October 1949
(18) A-8, p. 28
the weather was mild and dry, making the ability to move troops and equipment easy and observation good. (12) The enemy situation was about the same, in addition the HITLER LINE had been prepared in advance. To add to the already strong defense around TERRACINA the Germans had brought down from ROME the 15th and 71st Grenadier Regiments of the 20th Panzer Grenadier Division and these fresh troops were now facing the 85th Division. (13)

The terrain approaching TERRACINA was in itself a definite disadvantage to the attacking forces. The only possible entrance from the south was HIGHWAY 7, this highway ran through a series of corridors with hills on the right and low marshy land and sometimes water on the left. At the entrance to TERRACINA the mountains came down abruptly to meet the sea, the road ran on a narrow strip less than 100 yards wide between the sea on the left and cliffs on the right. (See Map C) (14)

The 85th Division's plan to take TERRACINA was to move elements of one regiment by water from GAETA, another up HIGHWAY 7 and the third to protect the Division's right flank by moving through the mountains to the east of the objective. Elements of the 388th Infantry did move by water from GAETA but landed short of TERRACINA and were pinched out by the other advancing units, so this regiment was assembled as Division Reserve. The 337th Infantry was to continue advancing up HIGHWAY 7 in a frontal attack on TERRACINA while the 339th Infantry continued through the mountains on the right flank. (15)

(12) Personal knowledge
(13) A-2, p. 85
(14) A-2, p. 61
(15) A-3, p. 94
briefed the attached unit commanders and gave them orders as to the part they were to play in the coming attack. All vehicles were brought up to the vicinity of the battalion assembly area, the drivers and maintenance personnel were busied adding fuel and checking vehicles for the attack. (19)

Orders were issued by the battalion commander for a perimeter guard to be placed around the assembly area, ammunition be distributed and for the men to get as much rest as possible. The men took this opportunity to eat rations and get a little sleep. Ammunition and rations were issued, weapons were checked, packs were made and all was in readiness for the move.

During the time that the troops were eating, resting and being re-supplied, the battalion commander took the company commanders, the battalion staff and the attached unit commanders to the high ground just in front of the assembly area to make plans for the advance. Observation was good as far as could be seen. The highway to the front was in good condition and no enemy activity in sight.

Very little was known about the enemy situation to the front but it was assumed that TERRACINA would be the next strong defense. Advance aerial reconnaissance and G-2 information stated that activity in and around TERRACINA was slight.

The commanders returned from their reconnaissance and made final preparations for the attack. (20)

(19) Personal knowledge
(20) Personal knowledge
THE BATTALION PLAN OF ATTACK

Since an advance reconnaissance of the entire area was impossible the battalion commander planned to send reconnaissance groups ahead to keep him posted on the terrain and enemy situation to the front.

The time for movement from the assembly area was to be 1730 hours, 21 May 1944. Company A would organize a motorized patrol consisting of three jeeps, each jeep was to be mounted with a heavy machine gun with the gunners to come from Company D. Following the jeeps the 91st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron would move at a distance enough behind so the enemy could not reasonably observe both and place fire on them at the same time.

Company A was to lead the foot elements furnishing the advance guard and flank guard on either side of the road as far as observation and terrain would permit. Attached to Company A was the remainder of the machine gun platoon not sent with the motorized patrol. Immediately in rear of Company A would be the battalion advance command group consisting of the Battalion Commander, S-3, S-2 and members of the Battalion Intelligence Section. Following the command group would be Company B with the other machine gun platoon from Company D attached. Then behind Company B would be Company C, the support company, with no attachments. Following Company C would be the rear battalion command group, then the tanks and tank destroyers followed by the mortar platoon and finally the battalion supply vehicles with additional ammunition. Communication was to be maintained primarily by SCR 300 radios.

Each company was to furnish its own flank security and in addition Company C would furnish security for those elements to
the rear. The formation on the road was to be a march column on either side with the vehicles of the machine gun platoons moving along with their platoon to carry the guns and ammunition.

(21)

NARRATION

THE APPROACH MARCH TO TERRACINA

The motorized patrol led by First Lieutenant Edward E. McDermott moved out of the assembly area at 1730 hours, 21 May 1944. There was no advance artillery preparation because the idea of the whole operation was speed and surprise. The patrol was followed in about ten minutes by the reconnaissance squadron and the foot elements.

The advance was without incident until the motorized patrol reached the cemetery at the foot of MONT BIAGIO where the Germans opened fire from the mountain and knocked out two jeeps and forced the members of the patrol to take cover in the ditches along the sides of HIGHWAY 7. The reconnaissance squadron and the foot elements did not have knowledge of exactly what had happened to the patrol because a curve in the road obstructed observation, although the enemy fire could be heard. (See Map C)

Since the enemy had let the motorized patrol pass its position and opened fire at the last possible moment before observation was obstructed, the remainder of the column was even with the enemy position before it was realized. Company A had just passed parallel to the summit of MONT BIAGIO and Company B was just opposite the enemy position when fire was opened again. Several members of Company B, including their

(21) Personal knowledge
commander, First Lieutenant R. M. Spina, were killed, First Lieutenant James M. Doyle assumed command.

The battalion commander ordered Companies A and B to deploy along the road and for Company C to move off the road to the right to extend the line around the enemy position. (See Map C) The tanks and tank destroyers were brought up even with the rifle companies and the mortar platoon went into action. Fire was exchanged between the enemy forces and the 1st Battalion until darkness, with very little additional damage being done to the 1st Battalion. Just after darkness the battalion commander ordered a strong combat patrol to be organized by Company C, to move around to the right of the enemy positions. This patrol moved out at about 2100 hours. It took the patrol at least an hour to maneuver into position, but once in position it took the enemy completely by surprise and met with success. The patrol returned at about 2330 hours bringing 31 prisoners and reported that the remainder of the enemy had either been killed or had withdrawn. The battalion reformed on the road and led by the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron continued its advance toward TERRACINA. (22)

THE FIRST NIGHT IN THE VICINITY OF TERRACINA

The reconnaissance squadron was able to reach the outskirts of TERRACINA and by 0230 hours, 22 May, the foot elements were within one mile of the city limits. It seemed as though the attack plan was about to meet with success, but the enemy had other plans. As the advance elements of Company A moved down the corridor formed by the mountains on the right and the sea on the left, on the outskirts of TERRACINA, the

(22) A-8, p. 28; Personal knowledge
enemy greeted them with point blank automatic weapon and 88 mm artillery fire. These enemy weapons were well placed in houses and caves just beyond an abrupt turn in the road. (See Map C) It was necessary for the reconnaissance squadron to withdraw. Due to darkness the remainder of the column closed up before word was received as to what had happened. Several members of Company A were killed and many others wounded, including the advanced guard Platoon Leader, First Lieutenant Peters.

The battalion halted and tanks were called forward, but due to the well dug in enemy weapons there was no chance for the tanks to get into position to fire. The battalion medical corps personnel, working under direct fire, evacuated the wounded.

Orders were issued for the companies to spread out along the road to the rear. Continued efforts were made by the tanks to advance, but it was impossible due to the point blank antitank fire placed on them. Small patrols attempted to surround the enemy strong points, but due to the sea on the left and the cliff on the right, movement was restricted to the road and its edges. This meant that any move forward would be under direct observation and into the face of all enemy weapons. Supporting fire from the mortars was placed on the enemy positions with no effect because the positions were so well dug in.

Finally just before dawn the battalion commander ordered the battalion to withdraw to the foot of MOUNT CROCE. (See Map C) The companies reorganized, replaced key personnel and put outpost on the slopes of MOUNT CROCE. The mortar platoon
and the battalion supply section set up in the open field west of MOUNT CROCE.

Major Sanders called the company commanders together and planned an attack across MOUNT CROCE. The attack plan consisted of Companies A and B moving up the nose while Company C moving up the center of the mountain. These orders were given from the foot of the mountain facing HIGHWAY 7, this meant that Companies A and B were to move directly off the road, as the mountain ran perpendicular to the road, and Company C would move around to the right off the road and up the steep slopes. (See Map D) Commanders returned to their companies and final plans were made.

THE SECOND DAY AND NIGHT AT MOUNT CROCE

Just before dawn the companies moved out and by daylight all elements had reached Knob 1 of the mountain and started to organize positions. As the sun came up over the mountains from the east the members of the 1st Battalion found that their position was not as stable as they thought. Enemy fire started to rain down on them, it seemed that snipers were behind every rock and tree on the mountain. German long range machine gun and artillery fire was placed all over MOUNT CROCE and HIGHWAY 7 from positions on Knob 2 of MOUNT CROCE and MOUNT STERPANO. (See Map D)

Many individual fights broke out, hand to hand in many cases, control was hard for the leaders to maintain as they moved about trying to organize squads, platoons and companies. Many individuals of the 1st Battalion performed almost unbelievable feats of heroism. The Commanding Officer of Com-
pany B, First Lieutenant Doyle, and his radio operator captured an enemy company command post. First Lieutenant Frances J. Moore, Commanding Officer of Company D was killed as he moved bravely about, disregarding the sniper fire, attempting to organize the men, First Lieutenant Paul E. Gorrell assumed command of that company.

Tanks were moved up to the base of the mountain to fire on the enemy positions on MOUNT CROCE. The mortars started to fire on Knob 2 and in rear of the mountain, cutting off enemy replacements and supplies. The tank fire would have helped considerably if the 1st Battalion soldiers had not been so intermingled with the enemy, that the tanks had to withdraw.

Close range fighting continued throughout the remainder of the morning and by noon neither side had won a decisive victory. The enemy managed to move most of his forces to Knob 2 of MOUNT CROCE and the 1st Battalion was organizing on Knob 1. (See Map D) The battalion commander realized that the battle was a stalemate and due to the nearness of the two forces, artillery and tank fire was of little advantage; therefore the S-2 and S-3 were sent to guide the companies back down to the foot of MOUNT CROCE. (23)

By this time artillery had moved into position and was able to place well observed fire on MOUNT CROCE and harass the enemy beyond the mountain and in TERRACINA. (24) Tanks were again moved up to the foot of the mountain and started firing all weapons at the enemy. Behind this artillery and tank fire the foot troops moved back up MOUNT CROCE and completely routed the Germans from both Knobs. During this attack Major General

(23) Personal knowledge
(24) A-9, p. 3
Coulter, Commanding General of the 85th Division and Lieutenant General Keyes, Commanding General of the II Corps arrived at the Command Post of the 1st Battalion and emphasized to Colonel Hughes, Commanding Officer of the 337th Infantry who was already there, the importance of taking TERRACINA.

The rifle units of the 1st Battalion pushed the Germans completely off the summit of MOUNT CROCE and set up positions on the line originally occupied by the enemy. The members of the 1st Battalion were almost completely exhausted having had no rest since 1700 hours, 21 May; now it was about 2200 hours, 22 May. The positions were consolidated and fire was exchanged between the two forces. The remainder of the night passed without incident and just before dawn word was received that the 2d Battalion would relieve the 1st Battalion. The 1st Battalion was to reorganize in an assembly area just south of MOUNT CROCE and be prepared to assist in the final attack on TERRACINA. At 0500 hours, 23 May, the relief was completed and the 1st Battalion moved into the assembly area. (25)

THE THIRD DAY AND FINAL ATTACK ON TERRACINA

The 1st Battalion spent the entire day, 23 May, resting and reorganizing. The men were so tired they slept without eating until late afternoon. In the afternoon everyone began to move about, wash themselves and eat, by darkness all were rested and prepared to continue the attack if so ordered. Throughout the day the mortar platoon of Company D continued firing to assist the 2d Battalion attack. The supply vehicles went back to the regimental supply point and returned with ammunition and rations. (26)

(25) Personal knowledge
(26) Personal knowledge
the men dispersed and took cover. The dispersed soldiers were finally assembled and the move was continued in the direction that was thought to be toward the remainder of the battalion, but instead, due to confusion, it was headed directly toward the enemy lines north of TERRACINA. This group continued in the wrong direction until it received small arms fire from the immediate front. Realizing his mistake the platoon leader halted and attempted to orient himself. The battalion commander fearing that some of the battalion might have been cut off by the barrage sent the S-2 and S-1 back along the route to check. These two officers, after considerable searching, found the missing elements and guided them back to the remainder of the battalion.

Just before dawn, 24 May, contact was made with the 2d and 3d Battalions. Companies B and C moved up on a line between the two battalions and were ready to continue the attack. As dawn came it was realized that the enemy had withdrawn during the night, probably because of the intense artillery and the many casualties suffered during the past two days. All that was left for the 337th Infantry to do was to move in and occupy TERRACINA. Now HIGHWAY-7 was open and troops began to speed through to meet the troops at ANZIO BEACHHEAD, and another phase of the Spring Offensive was history. (30)

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

1. INTELLIGENCE

The entire attack on TERRACINA and MOUNT CROCE was conducted with very little knowledge of the enemy situation or (30) Personal knowledge
The 2d Battalion had been fighting hard all day and by mid-afternoon were deadlocked with the enemy in the vicinity of the cemetery, about 800 yards from their starting position. (27) (See Map D) The 3d Battalion had been swung left across MOUNT CROCE and were now extending the right flank of the 2d Battalion. (28) During the time the foot elements were fighting, the tanks were attempting to maneuver into position to assist. The tank commander requested that engineers, who had come up from the rear, clear a passage around the north of MOUNT CROCE. Using bulldozers, dynamite and hand labor a trail was cleared and just before dark a light tank company was able to move up with the 3d Battalion. (See Map D) Together the tanks and foot troops pushed the Germans back to a position about 1000 yards east of TERRACINA as darkness fell. (29)

At dark, orders were received for the 1st Battalion to move around the north of MOUNT CROCE along the newly made tank trail and take up position between the 2d and 3d Battalions to continue the attack. The battalion was organized with Company B leading followed by battalion forward command group, Company C, Company A, the battalion rear command group, and the mortar platoon. The battalion moved out, leaving the supply vehicles in the assembly area, and reached the north slope of MOUNT CROCE without incident.

The night was dark and contact was maintained by the men walking very close to each other. Just after rounding MOUNT CROCE the trail ended. A few hundred yards from the end of the trail an intense artillery barrage landed on the last platoon of Company A and the forward elements of battalion rear command group. Several men were wounded, contact was lost as

(27) Personal knowledge; Statement of Capt. E.H. Livingston
(28) Personal knowledge; Statement of Capt. Cecil Gates, then S-2, 3d BN., 337th Infantry, 7 November 1949
(29) A-10, p. 2
position. Although the 1st Battalion Commander realized the situation, there was no time for obtaining the needed information. It is true that the weather was good but the objective was at such a distance and the terrain was so mountainous, observation was limited. Since the success of the attack was designed to hinge on speed and surprise, it was not practical to send patrols and feel out the enemy's strength and positions. It is my opinion that enough advanced elements were sent in advance of the main body but due to the crooked road and the enemy's well selected positions, these elements were of little assistance in obtaining the desired information. After the first contact on HIGHWAY 7 the enemy knew the 1st Battalion's position and approximate strength. Not until after the prisoners were captured and interrogated did the 1st Battalion have any knowledge whatsoever of the enemy.

Reports had been received before the attack that activity in TERRACINA was slight. Due to the well dug in camouflaged positions occupied by the enemy, aerial observers probably could not detect their strong points. Another consideration probably accounting for some of the enemy forces in TERRACINA is that new units were moved in from the north just before the attack.

After consideration of this operation it is my belief that the lack of intelligence and incorrect intelligence was the biggest factor in the delay and the large number of casualties caused in taking TERRACINA, but had time been taken to gain the intelligence the enemy would probably have put up an even stronger defense and the outcome might have been just as costly.
2. SUPPLY AND EVACUATION

Very little can be said about supply and evacuation in this operation except that it was excellent. The battalion supply vehicles moved with the battalion, and when new supplies were needed these trucks made a quick trip and returned in ample time with the necessary supplies. The medics, working continuously under enemy fire, did a fine job of caring for and evacuating the wounded. No person was left to suffer long before a medical corps man was giving him first aid and making arrangements for evacuation.

3. THE OBJECTIVE

In my opinion, TERRACINA, because of size and distance, should have been a regimental rather than a battalion objective. There was only one good approach to the objective and the fact that it would take a battalion to occupy the objective, no elements were left to maneuver, if that battalion was held up. If the 2d Battalion had attacked over MOUNT CROCE on the night of 21 May, it is probable that TERRACINA could have been taken much quicker. When the 2d Battalion was finally committed it moved up against the same resistance that the 1st Battalion was meeting. No attempt was made to hit the enemy from the flank until the 3d Battalion joined the attack.

The enemy could observe every move the 1st Battalion made and took advantage of this factor, particularly at the entrance of TERRACINA. The terrain in the vicinity of the objective did not lend itself to the use of tanks and only after engineers had cut a trail were tanks used to a good
4. COMMUNICATIONS

Communications throughout the operation were mostly by personal contact. Two instances where communication could have improved the situation were, first when the motorized patrol was pinned down and again when the battalion was stopped at the entrance of TERRACINA. In the first instance the members of the patrol were pinned down and unable to send a messenger or reach the radio in the jeep. The second instance occurred so fast that little thought was given to contacting the rear until it was almost too late.

5. ENEMY POSITIONS

The Germans had well organized positions, since time was on their side, full advantage of the terrain was taken. The entrance to TERRACINA was so well dug in and protected from opposing fire that it was impossible to enter the town from HIGHWAY 7. The enemy also took full advantage of observation, selecting the critical features, he was able to see the 1st Battalion at all times. Again using time and terrain to his advantage the enemy camouflaged his positions so well that attacking meant paying a large price. The enemy definitely had the advantage as far as positions were concerned and if he had had the will and strength many more bloody days would have been spent in the capture of TERRACINA.

6. THE CONDUCT OF THE ATTACK

The entire success of the attack on TERRACINA was due to the untiring effort of the soldiers of the 337th Infantry and the will and quick thinking of their officers. Initially
the plan to capture the objective by surprise-and-shock was good. At the beginning, support both in reserve and fire was lacking, but in the final assault coordination between the various arms was achieved. The nature of the terrain and the formation of the 1st Battalion at the beginning did not lend itself to maximum utilization of maneuver. The final phases of the attack was well organized and by use of reserves and supporting fires the objective was obtained.

LESSONS

1. In attacking any position, particularly in mountainous country, ample time and consideration should be given to obtaining adequate intelligence.

2. Reserve units in a surprise attack should be near enough the attacking echelon to maneuver or flank an enemy strong point in the event the attack had been stopped or slowed down.

3. In attacking a comparatively unknown position a unit should keep its support and rear elements at such a distance so as not to overrun the lead element should maneuver or reorganization become necessary.

4. In moving into an organized position, terrain permitting, armor and infantry should move together so that if a penetration is affected the advantage can be exploited.

5. The use of support fires can greatly assist attacking troops to advance if followed quickly and the enemy is assaulted before reorganization is achieved.

6. A maneuver or a flanking attack on a position already under attack is much better than a reinforced frontal attack.
MAP 'A'
LANDING IN ITALY TO THE
SPRING OFFENSIVE
MAP "D"
THE ACTION ON MOUNT CROCE

LEGEND
TRAIL
ROUTE OF FRIENDLY TROOPS
ROUTE OF ENEMY TROOPS
FRIENDLY POSITIONS
ENEMY POSITIONS

MOUNT STERPAND
MOUNT CROCE
KNOB 1
KNOB 2
Cemetery
Highway 7

Mediterranean Sea
Terrasina

SCALE IN YARDS
1000 500 0 1000
N