THE OPERATIONS OF THE HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, THIRD BATTALION, 511th PARACHUTE INFANTRY, (11th ABN DIV) IN THE ATTACK ON MANILA, 3-13 FEB, 1945 (THE LUZON CAMPAIGN) (Personal experience of a Company Commander)

Type of operation described: PARACHUTE BATTALION HEADQUARTERS COMPANY IN THE ATTACK

Captain John A. Coulter, Infantry
BIBLIOGRAPHY

A- Eighth Army Report, Nasugbu Operation
B- Report of the Luzon Campaign, 6th Army Report
C- Japanese defense of Cities: Manila
D- After action report- Final Phase of Luzon Campaign, Sixth Army.
E- General Orders #69 dated 14 August 1945
F- General Orders #71 dated 21 August 1945
THE OPERATIONS OF THE HEADQUARTERS COMPANY,
THIRD BATTALION, 511TH PARACHUTE INFANTRY, (11TH ABN DIV)
IN THE ATTACK ON MANILA, 3-13 FEB, 1945
(THE LUZON CAMPAIGN)
(Personal experience of a Company Commander)

INTRODUCTION

This monograph covers the operations of the Headquarters
Company, 3rd Battalion, 511th Parachute Infantry, 11th Airborne
Division, from the parachute descent on Tagatay Ridge on 3 Feb.,
1945, to the attack on Fort McKinley, 14 Feb., 1945.

A parachute battalion organic to a parachute regiment was,
at the time of this action so differently organized than a line
infantry battalion that it seems well to explain further its
organization. The battalion consists of three rifle companies,
G, H, I, and a Headquarters Company. Each rifle company consists
of three platoons, each platoon of three squads, two squads with
a light machine gun, one squad with a mortar. The Rifle Company
has no weapons platoon. The Headquarters Company consists of
a light machine gun platoon, a mortar platoon, a communications
platoon and a headquarters platoon. The Headquarters Company
combines the functions of the Headquarters Company and Heavy
Weapons Company of a line battalion. This organization is here
set forth in order to show the extreme lightness of the organization
120 per Rifle Company, 165 per Headquarters Company.

In order to understand why this unit was committed to an
airborne task, or even why an airborne mission was indicated,
it will be necessary to look briefly at the situation on Luzon, P.I.
in January 1945.

Landings had been effected by the 6th and 43rd Divisions in
the Dagupan - Malusao area in Northern Luzon on 9 January 1945.(B)

3.
The 40th and 37th Divisions had landed at Luigayen Gulf and had pushed south almost to the gates of Manila by 31 January 1945. These units were to strike southward and force a crossing of the Ogno River after having secured a beachhead and airstrips on Luigayen Gulf. (B)

Due to underestimation of airfield construction difficulties on Leyte, because of the extreme wetness, it was necessary to push back the target date for the Luzon operation. Likewise, the target dates for Mindoro operation had been pushed back because of lack of airfields for short range fighter aircraft.

In our informal discussion with two junior members of the 511th Parachute Infantry at Taclobon, Leyte, P.I., in December, 1944, General Douglas MacArthur had indicated that the 11th Airborne Division was to get a jump mission. (See Footnote) On 26 December 1944, the Commanding General 11th Airborne Division was alerted to an airborne mission somewhere on Luzon after 1 January 1945. (B)

The operation was to be a diversionary attack on Southern Luzon to distract the Japanese defenders of Luzon who had an estimated force of from 150 thousand to 235 thousand troops. During the first 27 days of fighting in the North, Sixth Army troops had killed 17,724 and captured 179 of the enemy. It was estimated the enemy would make a determined stand for Manila.

In order to cut off reinforcements for Manila and to retain the enemy forces in Southern Luzon, General MacArthur ordered General Robert L. Eichelberger, 8th Army Commander to create such a attack. As originally conceived, this was to be a small joint operation, a reconnaissance in force, a raid led by the 8th Army Commander.

Footnote: Cpl. Charles Feureisen, Headquarters Company 3rd Battalion, 511th Parachute Infantry, and Pfc. Henry Marisichi “H” Company, 511th Parachute Infantry had, by a move so audacious as to dumbfound the personnel at General MacArthur’s headquarters, secured an audience with the General. These intrepid soldiers had carried a highly prized document (Taken from a Japanese Officer at Takin, Leyte, P.I.) thru some twenty miles of jungle on December 1, 1944 to 11th Airborne Division Headquarters.
As the target date grew nearer, it became apparent that the force must be increased in size in order to properly accomplish its mission. As finally brought about, the force was to consist of elements of the 8th Army striking across Bataan and joining forces with the fast moving Sixth Army Troops pushing south toward Manila. Simultaneously, the 11th Airborne Division was to land at Nasugbu, amphibiously, with the 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment who were alerted for a drop anytime after 31 January, the target date. (A)

The 11th Airborne Division had participated in the Leyte campaign 18 November - 25 December 1944. The amphibious assault at Nasugbu by the 188th and 187th Parachute Glider Infantry Regiments followed naval gunfire on known enemy positions on 31 January 1945. The enemy retreated to defenses in the hills overlooking the beach and roads around Nasugbu. Bridges, communications, buildings were left intact. The attack was pushed vigorously and the beachhead was secured. The 188th Infantry Regiment then passed thru the 187th Infantry Regiment and continued the attack. Meanwhile, on Mindoro, the 511th RCT which consisted of the 474th Field Artillery Battalion (Parachute) and the 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment, had been alerted for a drop on Tagaytay Ridge. (A)

Before continuing this narrative, I should like to describe terrain over which the action was to take place. Tagaytay Ridge rises some 2100 feet abruptly between Nasugbu and Laguna De Bay in southern Luzon. Its southern face is a sheer cliff dropping to Lake Taal while its north sides slope gradually to Manila, some 30 miles to the north. The terrain affords a command of all the area from Nasugbu to Laguna De Bay.

THE DROP

The parachute drop on Tagaytay Ridge consisted of two lifts of C-47 aircraft. The first lift was composed of 51 planes carrying the second battalion of the 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment plus
regimental headquarters personnel. The second lift consisted of the 1st and 3rd Battalions and elements of the 474th F.A. Battalion (Prcht). This lift consisted of 47 planes. The flying time from take off to drop was approximately 45 minutes. Planes flew in V of V's with jump altitude designated as seven hundred feet. Belly racks were not used because of Air Corps restrictions, so all bundles were door dropped. The first lift was dropped at 0830, the second at 1220.

The check points enroute were to be Lake Taal on the downwind leg with a sharp 180 degree turn just past this check point. This placed the jumpers about 90 seconds away from the Drop Zone. The red light was given over Lake Taal. Door loads were prepared and troops stood by for the pilots green light. However, due to lack of time for proper coordination with the Air Corps, the green light was given approximately four miles off the Drop Zone, which considerably disrupted organization after landing. (A)

At this point (immediately after the drop) all resemblance to a tactical situation ceased. Troops gathered in small groups and wandered along the road from Mendez to Tagaytay Ridge. Considerable interference was encountered when hundreds of Filipino civilians swarmed in the area and along the roads, carrying the soldiers weapons, packs, parachutes, etc. Maintenance of control was difficult. After one hour, most troops of the second lift had been assembled along the Tagaytay Ridge road. At about 1330 Lt. General Robert L. Eichelberger, Commanding General, 8th Army, Major General Joseph M. Swing, 11th Airborne Division and Col. Haugen, Commanding Officer, 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment, arrived at Tagaytay Ridge, having come thru from the beach at Nasugbu as soon as the road was cleared. (Col. Haugen had jumped with the leading elements of his regiment) Col. Haugen directed the writer to place security for this group of about 300 men. The light machine gun platoon, Headquarters Company 3rd Battalion established a perimeter defense at this time. A few minutes later,
the S-2, Major Faulkner, directed that the entire unit be marched to a large concrete house where headquarters would be located. We had not yet located the battalion commander and the battalion executive, since our assembly had not been as planned. This homogeneous group had scarcely started for the house when a messenger arrived saying the troops were to reverse their direction and join other elements about two miles distant. After a brief questioning, it was learned all 1st battalion personnel were to follow the messenger to the 1st battalion positions which had been established near the west end of the ridge. The remainder of the regiment was to establish positions around the concrete house on the east end of the ridge as had been directed by Major Faulkner. Groups continued to arrive at this large house, (which had been a hotel) until late in the afternoon. An aid station was set up to care for the jump injuries by the regiments medics. A perimeter defense was organized and the light machine gun platoon went into position at the extreme last end of the ridge. Thus far the unit had seen no enemy.

FIRST CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY.

At about 0500, 4 February firing broke out in the direction of the machine gun platoon area and at daylight, Private Morris, Headquarters Company 3rd Battalion, came into the aid station and reported a small force of the enemy had attacked their positions with bayonets and that all of them had been killed. Private Morris was wounded in the attack. This action was typical of the Japanese tactics; suicide attacks in small numbers against well dug in and defended positions. Nine of the enemy were killed. It should be emphasized at this point that it was absolutely mandatory that the SOP of no movement at night be followed. It became an established policy to shoot, without challenge, any person walking at night. So closely was this followed that not until 10 January while occupying positions adjacent to the 1st Cavalry at Manila that an enemy penetrated the lines by stealth.
THE APPROACH TO MANILA

On 4 February, the 2d Battalion entrucked and moved without halt to the town to Imus where light opposition was encountered. The Japanese had prepared positions for road blocks but did not have time to complete them. After forcing a small river crossing, the 2d Battalion pushed onward to the town of Paranaque where they were held by strongly defended system of pillboxes and other mutually supporting positions at the Paranaque River.

Meanwhile on Tagaytay Ridge, the 3d Battalion of the Regiment was moving by foot towards Manila along Highway 17. At about 1800, 4 February, trucks which had transported the 2d Battalion arrived and were used to transport the 3d Battalion by shuttling. This move was made without lateral reconnaissance and no flank guards were employed at any time by the 3d Battalion, although the situation was obscure.

THE ATTACK ON MANILA

The night of 4-5 February was spent in huddled groups with walking guard posts to protect the sleeping men. Less than 500 yards to the front, the enemy was strongly defending his position by the light of fires of burning Paranaque. Japanese artillery fired spasmodically. We were later to find this was six inch and eight inch naval rifles firing from Nichols Field positions. At about 0700, 5 February, the battalion was formed in column at five pace intervals and moved towards the Paranaque river bridge in Paranaque. Enemy artillery fire was sporadic and ineffective since air bursts were too high. Engineers were already at work on the stone bridge which had been damaged by shellfire. The column see-sawed back and forth, rushing forward toward the bridge on one order which was countermanded minutes later. At about 1100 contact along the column was broken. Units of the 2d Battalion, who had now been engaged for about 24 hours became intermingled with the
3d Battalion. Japanese small arms fire was heavy. The situation was confused since no order had been issued for an attack. There were no units on the right. The troops formed an inverted ell with the 2d Battalion in contact to our left front and the 3d Battalion in column stretched to the rear. At about, 1300, 5 February, the column marched again to the right and on line with the 2d Battalion. Contact again being broken in marching. The Paranaque River was crossed and the 3d Battalion established a line across mud flats and dikes bounding these flats. Supply lines were now one hour long altho the battalion was but some 500 yards from Paranaque proper. At 1600, while attempting to move forward, the battalion came in contact with the enemy who had employed his machine guns and small arms to fire the length of the dikes, the only means to traverse the waist deep water and mud.

Small enemy counterattacks continued nightly, by small groups of the determined enemy. These attacks were characterized by stealth, lack of concerted action and no mortar or artillery support.

On the morning of 6 February, an air strike was called for at 0900 hours to be flown parallel to the most forward established line of both 2d and 3d Battalions. The attacking companies were to wait for this air strike before launching an attack. The air strike was to be the only support for the attacking companies. At 1400, after no aircraft had arrived a half hearted attempt was made to locate Japanese positions in order that 81mm mortar fire could be placed thereon. These patrols sent forward all along the line withdrew and an elevated perimeter defense along the dikes was set up. The attack was to be continued at 0700 hours the next morning 7 February.

At approximately 0700 the air strike, scheduled for the previous day but unscheduled for 7 February occurred. This strike was wholly unexpected and caught the battalion displaced forward. The SOI was quickly consulted in order to determine proper signals to mark friendly front lines. The planes, A-26's, were approaching the lines at an angle so that a person on any position in the battalion, found the guns of the
planes apparently pointed in his direction at least once during the bombing and strafing run. Para-frag bombs were dropped very close to friendly units. The enemy comprehended the situation quickly, and while troops were executing a strategic withdrawal to escape the effects of friendly aircraft fire, he laid an accurate concentration along the dikes, the only means of retreat. Casualties were heavy from the knee mortars. The mortar concentration ran down the dike along which the main attack had been launched, and after a few extra rounds at the battalion Command Post, stopped as suddenly as it had begun.

Evacuation by Filipino bearers to Paranaque began at once.

The decision was then made to abandon positions in this area and attempt to flank the enemy by moving in single file along a tortuous route bordering the Paranaque River and terminating at the Nichols Field Service Road which bordered the south side of Nichols Field.

This maneuver would leave the regiment's left temporarily exposed, but, if successful, would not only by pass the enemy positions but trap the defenders.

This maneuver was completed without any concerted effort to deny its success.

At about 1700 hours the battalion had reached and was deployed along the Service Road bordering Nichols Field to the south. Any attempt to cross this service road was met with well aimed and devastating fire. Flanking action failed. Headquarters Company, third in line suffered several casualties from enemy machine guns. The machine gun platoon was placed on the battalion's left and attached to "I" Company. The machine gun positions were protected by the ammunition bearers of the several squads. Its left rested on the Paranaque River, the left section covering a half burned out wooden bridge. The service roadway was of rock which prevented digging in. The right of the platoon protected somewhat behind the shoulders of the road rested on "I" Company's right which in turn was followed by "C" and "H", the right
flank being exposed and not covered by any natural obstacle. All companies were on line along the road. A salt storage shack approximately 100 yards behind the service road line and along the River served as aid station and battalion Command Post. At about 1830 the artillery which had heretofore been quiet in our sector because we were too far to the right for them to support both the 2d and 3d Battalions, now fired one registration volley on the salt shack. The soft mud of the salt flats contained most of the shrapnel upon detonation of the projectiles.

During the night 7-8 February the enemy launched an attack in strength. He was repulsed all along the line, the machine gun platoon of the battalion accounting for the enemy who had launched the attack with the greatest effort across the wooden bridge. Our casualties were light. For this action and others to follow in the campaign, 2d Lt. Mills T. Lowe (then Tech Sgt.) received the DSC, a battlefield commission, the Silver Star with cluster and the Bronze Star. It was largely due to coolness in command he exerted over this machine gun platoon that the attack was repulsed. It was now determined that the enemy with which we were engaged were Japanese Marines.

During this attack the Japs attempted to enter our positions by boat drifting down the Paranaque River passed the bridge which marked the front line. Filipinos who had carried the wounded awoke the personnel along the dike and in the Command Post. Fire was withheld to almost point blank range. A second attack never developed.

On 8 February, General Swing, 11th Airborne Division Commander, visited the front lines, and directed that the attack be continued. (During the fighting in Paranaque Col. Schimmeltenig, Chief of Staff 11th Airborne Division was killed as was Lt. Col Crawford, G-4 for the Division). It was due largely to this aggressive type leadership that the attack was pushed against the enemy in such a relentless manner.

During the period 8-9 February, almost 500 rounds of 75mm
ammunition were fired in an attempt to dislodge the enemy from his position. Due to the narrowness of the sector, maneuver was confined to small unit (squad) infiltration and penetration. The Japanese could not be located. At this time his defenses consisted of dual 20mm cannon, anti-aircraft fired terrestrially, dug in machine guns, snipers and pillboxes. Later reports showed that he had expected our heaviest attack to develop from the south and had prepared his positions accordingly. Casualties in the battalion now amounted to 50% from wounds, those killed in action, and sickness.

**NICHOLS FIELD TAKEN**

The attack on Nichols Field started under the personal direction of General Swing. The attack had no artillery preparation and no machine gun or mortar fire preceded the first move crossing the service road which had proved the maximum limit for previous efforts. At about 1300 hours the battalion was split in three parts, "H" company on the extreme right constituting a separate column, and the majority of the troops being split in two when contact was broken on the left. Evacuation by Filipino civilians continued during the movement. This maneuver actually constituted a movement thru enemy held positions rather than a reduction of the enemy. If a position could be by-passed, it was. The enemy was especially camouflaged and targets were difficult to locate. Since all emplacements were of a mutually-supported system, once the gun was passed, it could not be turned to fire into the rear of the troops unless it was removed from the emplacement. On one position the enemy withdrew his guns and fired into the rear of Headquarters Company. Pfc. Olson and Lt. Clark T. Ames left the column and unaided proceeded to reduce this threat to our supply and evacuation lines. At about 1600 after reconnaissance to both flanks and to the front had been made, the decision was reached to push ahead and attempt to join the rest of the column from which we had become detached. Enemy small
arms fire increased and any movement forward had to be made by crawling.

At approximately 1700 the tail of the lost column was reached and it was found they had not known that nearly one-third of the battalion's strength had fought several small actions of its own. A small concrete blockhouse on the Nichols Field main runway was selected as aid station and battalion Command Post. Approach to this position could be made only by keeping the blockhouse between a Jap 20mm cannon and yourself. This gun was firing explosive ammunition at individuals at a range estimated at 1000 yards.

This gun constituted the chief block to the advance of "H" Company on the right since they had neither the foliage and uneven terrain to give them cover, but had to cross barren Nichols field with this cannon firing into its right rear. The mortar platoon of Headquarters Company could not fire at this time since its personnel were used to fill in gaps in the perimeter. There were less than 150 riflemen in the three rifle companies and Headquarters Company strength was approximately 98 able bodied men.

The 2d Battalion on our left was able to overcome resistance in its sector and had advanced to the north creating a gap of some 400 yards. The Paranaque River had become an effective barrier to communication and liaison had been abandoned. Contact by radio with regimental was fair to good. Supply continued to function with the aid of Filipino bearers who now took about two and a half hours for a round trip to the battalion supply point, carrying wounded and the dead back and ammunition and rations on the way up. The battalion mess personnel were used as guards for this fearless help.

A perimeter defense around the concrete Command Post on the night 8-9 February had no action except sporadic fire when groups of the enemy who had been by passed withdrew to new positions to oppose us the next day.

3d BATTALION JOINS FORCES WITH 2d BATTALION

The battalion commander issued his attack order for 9 February which included a joining of forces with the 2d Battalion and necessitated
an advance of some 600 yards. The mortars were to go forward as far as possible to the first enemy engaged and fire at any target that presented itself. The battalion was to recross the Paranaque River over the concrete bridge immediately west of the north edge of Nichols Field. The terrain now changed to streets and closely packed houses and buildings. The enemy elected to abandon the houses, but had fallen back to still another line of mutually supporting pillboxes at critical intersections. An artillery concentration failed to dislodge the enemy from his earthwork emplacements and at 1400 hours the Battalion Commander moved forward to contact the 2d Battalion Commander. While standing near a recently captured pillbox, the entire emplacement blew up. Examination showed that the Japanese were using 200 pound aircorps bombs with a delay action fuze for booby traps.

Firing from the 1st Cavalry Division and 37th Infantry Division in the north of Manila could be heard plainly altho no liaison existed to determine where or when that unit would join us. The men were nearing exhaustion altho morale was high, despite the loss of Captain Pat Wheeler of "G" Company in the mornings actions.

It was decided at this time to complete all the rest of the high angle fire by 81 heavy ammunition since the light artillery and 81 HE ammunition was not producing the desired effect. Subsequently orders were issued to the battalion supply officer, Lt. Specking, to bring up 200 rounds of HE heavy. Supply at this time was simple since no river crossing was necessary. The mortar positions were selected some 75 yards in rear of the foremost positions and firing started under the direction of Lt. Ames. Only two guns were used and firing continued on all possible targets during the remainder of the day. More than 200 rounds were fired from each gun at ranges from 200 to 300 yards. The units of the battalion advanced about 100 yards on 9 February before again being stopped by enemy fire. During this advance the machine gun platoon was again used as a development force. Enemy mortar fire was sporadic and not in depth.
and his artillery fire had ceased.

On the night of 9 February reflection from fires several thousand yards to our front lighted the area so that individuals could be recognized at a few paces. There was no enemy activity this night. The attack was to continue on 10 February.

S.O.P. early morning reconnaissance to our front early in the morning of the tenth indicated the enemy had withdrawn from the area. Further extended patrols brought back reports of no enemy and questioning of civilians who were returning to the area revealed that large numbers of Japanese had gone north during the night in groups carrying their wounded.

After hasty consultation with Lt. Col. "Hacksaw" Holcomb of the second battalion and advice from regiment, the third battalion moved forward in route column for a triumphal entry into Manila. Civilians lined both sides of some streets proffering wines, liquors and other refreshments.

At about 1400 all units of the battalion less "G" Company were on line in some 400 yards of buildings with the left houses tied in with two companies of the 187th Parachute Glider Infantry whose left flank rested on Manila Bay. "G" Company had been detached on a special mission to Cavite. Contact with the 1st Cavalry Division had not yet been made. Later in the afternoon, a representative from the 12th Cavalry Regiment coordinated the actions of his units with the 11th Airborne Division via Lt. Col. Julin L. Strong, Battalion Commander, Third Battalion, 511th Parachute Infantry. At this time the 1st Cavalry Division was under the Sixth Army, the 11th Airborne Division was under the Eighth Army.

The Regimental Commander, Col. Oren D. Haugen, was fatally wounded this day 10 February 1945.

Control of the 11th Airborne Division passed from Eighth Army to Sixth Army on 10 February 1945. During the ten days since the Division
had gone into action, four eight inch and six five inch naval guns and several machine guns had been captured, 24 pillboxes had been destroyed in the Nichols Field–Paranaque area and 1650 of the enemy had been killed. Our losses for the period were 110 killed and wounded, most of the casualties occurring in the 511th Parachute Infantry lead battalions, the Second and Third.

On 11 February, Headquarters Company scraped together all available personnel: cooks, S-2 section, battalion headquarters special personnel, communication platoon were all pressed into service. The mission: Headquarters Company, due to shortage of troops was to take that portion of the line now held by two companies of the 187th Parachute Glider Infantry. The line extended some 600 yards across the north end of the Polo field to the sea wall on Manila Bay. Fields of fire were cleared by blowing down concrete walls which paralleled the line held by the troops.

Enemy fire at this time consisted of sporadic medium artillery with no apparent defined target. Manila was in flames.

Patrol action was held to a minimum, civilians blocking most lines of traffic in fleeing from the butchery of the Japs. One Japanese was killed 11 February by "I" Company personnel. No other enemy action was reported.

On 12 February, the battalion was ordered to move to support the attack on Fort McKinley. No action developed this day and on 13 February, the battalion was again moved this time to a so-called rear area where the remaining non-coms of the mortar platoon were either hospitalized or killed by several rounds of 20mm cannon fire.

This ends the action of this unit in its attack on Manila.

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

The unusual maneuvers hereinbefore described have as their basis three unusual circumstances: the personalities of the several
individuals who controlled or were controlled by an unorthodox defense by a fanatical enemy, the excessive demands made on these units and the unusual maneuvers themselves. Had any one of these three factors in this combination been lacking or involved to lesser degree, the results might have been disastrous.

Tactically there is little to learn. This operation from the standpoint of the Headquarters Company Commander, consisted of a series of unnatural although successful attempts to drive a strongly entrenched and fanatical enemy from a well defended position. The support company, as such, was not used. The battalion commander found it necessary to use the Headquarters Company as a rifle company on many occasions.

Artillery support because of the smallness of the caliber was not as successful as was the two 81mm Mortars used by the battalion.

The doctrine of withholding a reserve was not practiced here because it was not feasible. Night operations, except defensively, had never been practiced by this unit. Therefore, it's logical to assume that nothing would have been gained by holding out one-fourth to one-third of the fighting strength of a battalion already undermanned for its mission, the success of such a reserve being doubtful.

The choice of lightly armed, lightly manned organization for a sustained attack without tank or artillery support against a determined enemy might at first glance seem ill advised if not foolhardy. What factors prompted this choice is difficult to determine. One may say, if not with correctness then certainly with reason, that the esprit de corps and morale of this particular unit.

The success in the attack in the face of violation of the principle of artillery support for an attack which the enemy expected must certainly be considered as something more than calculated risk. The daring of the
plan as originally conceived can be easily justified on the grounds that the enemy was disorganized, that he was defeated, that all indications pointed toward such a maneuver. (i.e. an airborne operation) Continued use of the raiding force on a mission of this nature cannot be as easily explained.

The effect on morale of this sustained attack against odds was not good, as evidenced in the later fighting efficiency of the members of the units who participated. A deserved explanation to the soldiers who had made the attack successful as to the "why" of such action is difficult.

It is believed that this action is an outstanding example of the success of U.S. Army training methods which places so much emphasis on individual initiative.
LUZON OPERATIONS
ATTACK PLAN

MIKE ONE

LINGAYEN GULF

MIKE SEVEN

BATAAN

XXXX EIGHTH

MANILA

LAGUNA DE BAY

MIKE SIX

TAGAYTAY

NASUGBU

51ST SPEARHEADS
DRIVE ON MANILA

LAKETALA

1" = 10 MILES
APPROX