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PATROL ACTIONS PRIOR TO AND THE OPERATION OF
THE 2ND BATTALION, 7TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
(3RD DIVISION) IN CROSSING THE
VOLTOURO RIVER, 13 OCTOBER 1943
(NAPLES-FOGIA CAMPAIGN)
(Personal Experience of a Battalion Executive Officer)

Type of operation described: INFANTRY BATTALION ATTACK
IN A NIGHT RIVER CROSSING

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ADVANCED INFRANY OFFICERS CLASS NO 2
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RATROL ACTIONS PRIOR TO AND THE OPERATIONS OF THE 2ND BATTALION, 7TH INFANTRY REGIMENT, (3RD DIVISION) IN CROSSING THE VOLTURNO RIVER, 13 OCTOBER 1943

INTRODUCTION

This monograph deals with the operations of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry, 3rd US Infantry Division during the crossing of the Volturno River, 13 October 1947 in the Naples-Foggia Campaign. It deals with my personal experiences and observations as Battalion Executive Officer during a night attack and crossing of a river.

Following the breakthrough at Salerno the Fifth Army vigorously pushed its attack north, with the British X Corps following the coast line and American VI Corps pushing north through the mountainous country inland. (1)

The enemy action during this period was to delay and harass our forces in order to gain time to prepare the winter defense line at Cassino. The enemy made extensive use of booby-traps, demolitions and natural obstacles. Heavy rains and generally inclement weather also caused considerable hardship. (2) Aggressive leadership brought elements of the Fifth Army to the high ground overlooking the Volturno River on 6th October.

Obviously this was an ideal position for the German to defend, or at least to delay extensively. High level intelligence indicated that the Germans would exert sufficient effort to delay at the Volturno until early winter. (3)

The push was "going" and the desirable thing was to keep it moving; however, there were no fresh troops to commit and if the advance were to continue it meant that the same troops would be used. This fact was appreciated by all commanders and tentative plans were made along these lines.

Fifth Army initially anticipated that the main effort would be made in the X Corps (British Sector). (4) This plan was abandoned due to the fact that the necessary equipment was not available to make the major effort in that sector. (5) For the next several days the plan was changed frequently, but 9 October it was decided that the attack would be on the entire front of the Fifth Army. (6) The main effort was to be made by the Third Infantry Division at Triflisco Gap. The mission of the Third Division was to cross the Volturno, secure the bridgehead and assist the advance of the X Corps. (7) Opposing this crossing was the elite German Hermann Goering Panzer Division. (8)

Extensive troop movements were required to get into position for the attack, but finally plans were completed and the jump-off set for the night of 12-13 October.

The plan of the 3rd Division, which consisted of the 7th, 15th and 30th Infantry Regiments, was to put on a heavy fire demonstration in the Triflisco Gap using all of the organic weapons of the 30th Infantry, with the main effort to be made by the 7th Infantry just to the east of the gap. Coincident with the main effort, the 15th Infantry was to attack on the right of the Division sector. An hour artillery preparation was to be fired prior to H-5. The crossing was scheduled to begin at 0200 hours, 13 October 1943.

At the time of issuance of the Division order the 15th and 30th Infantry Regiments were holding the high ground overlooking the Volturno from the Triflisco Gap to the Calore River junction. The area between the mountains and river was actually "no man's land", and patrols frequently engaged with groups of enemy in this area.

The Volturno River is not an imposing river. (10) In many respects it resembles the Chattahoochee River; about one hundred fifty to two hundred feet wide, high steep banks, rapid rise in level and swift flow following a rain. From the Gulf of Gaeta to the Triflisco Gap the river twists for about twenty miles through flat, cultivated land which was reclaimed from the marshes. (11) In this area canals, sunken roads, a few orchards and the farm buildings furnish the only cover or concealment. (11)

The Triflisco Gap is a narrow cut in the mountains separating Mount Trifata on the south from Mount Grande on the north. The adjacent slopes of these two mountains were within effective small arms range. From each of these mountains the observation was excellent for about ten miles into the other's territory. (13) From Mount Trifata one could see that all bridges along the river had been completely demolished.

East of the Triflisco Gap, a valley, perpendicular to the direction of the river, extended about two miles south and five miles north of the river. In the center of this valley the river made a sharp horseshoe bend. The main effort of the Third Division was to be made in the vicinity of this bend.

Beyond this small valley on the south of the river Mount Castellone extended its steep slopes almost to the river. The ground opposite on the north side of the river was quite flat for about two miles where Mount Majula arose abruptly out of the cultivated land to a height of almost 1700 feet. This imposing piece of terrain was destined to be the key objective of the Third Division. The terrain to the east along the river followed this same general pattern.

(10) Map B; (11) A-4, p. 22 (12) Personal Observation; (13) Personal Observation.

Read not not covered. 5
Map B only fair for terrain.
Heavy rains had been falling for the past month and the river was swollen nearly to flood stage. (14) The ground was water soaked to such an extent that jeeps could not effectively operate off the roads. The entire flat lands were a sea of mud.

The 7th Infantry was in Division reserve upon reaching the Volturno and was ordered to bivouac in the village of Genturano about eight miles south-east of our proposed crossing site. (15)

General Truscott had anticipated that the Third Division would be ordered to make the crossing and on the morning of 7 October ordered the 7th Infantry to make necessary reconnaissance and preparations. A hasty check revealed that no normal river crossing equipment or boats could be counted on for this operation. The Battalion A & P platoon was put to work improvising and using field expedients to construct rafts and floats. The battalion commander immediately prepared to go on a personal reconnaissance, and in addition alerted a patrol for that night. (16)

Accompanying the battalion commander on his reconnaissance were three rifle company commanders, the battalion S 2, the battalion S 3, an engineer platoon leader and a squad of riflemen. They moved out early in the afternoon, riding in vehicles to the top of the divide between Mount Trifata and Mount Castellone. (17) Proceeding down the trail toward the river they passed through the outposts of friendly forward elements. It was still about two and one half miles from the river. On passing through this outpost they were cautioned not to expose themselves in open areas and to be alert for enemy patrols. Due to the dense underbrush, movement was restricted to well beaten paths. Little or nothing was learned in the first hour that the group was out, so they moved on down the hill hoping to reach the edge of the fields where a good view of the area was possible. On approaching the edge of the woods the rifle squad was sent off to the flank to cover the officer group. The distance to the open area proved to be further than was estimated and the rifle squad became separated from

(15) Map B; (16) Personal Knowledge; (17) Map C.
the officers. At the same time that the officers realized the riflemen were no longer giving them cover they stepped into a clever enemy ambush and were all taken prisoner without a shot being fired. The officers were stripped of their weapons and the march to the rear with three German guards began. After moving along a trail for about a mile the guards led them down toward the river. While pushing through the heavy underbrush, a hand grenade was pulled from the belt of one of the guards. The grenade exploded injuring or killing the guard. During the resulting confusion all of the officers except the F company commander, the battalion S-2 and the engineer platoon leader made their escape. (18)

The loss of these officers was a hard blow to the battalion but the hardest blow was to learn that reconnaissance would be extremely difficult.

That night 7-8 October the reconnaissance patrol of seven men ran into a strong enemy patrol about a mile from the river. In the fire fight that ensued the patrol expended all of its ammunition and returned with no information. (19)

On the following morning, Lt. Sandler, Battalion Anti-Tank platoon leader, volunteered to lead a patrol to locate a crossing site. Lt. Sandler was a very courageous leader, had lots of ingenuity, had a deep hatred for the enemy, spoke German fluently and was an exceptionally good swimmer. These were all desirable qualities for this mission. Two other good swimmers and a platoon of F Company were made available to him for his patrol. That day he and several key members of the patrol went to an observation post on Mount Trifata and studied the terrain carefully. Heavy rain fell all that day and it was decided not to send the patrol out that night. He spent all day of 9 October briefing his patrol, assembling equipment and studying photomaps. Just before dusk the patrol moved out by motor following the same route taken by

(18) Statement Major Duval, Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry, 8 October, 1943; (19) Personal Knowledge.
the battalion commander on his reconnaissance. (20) The patrol consisted of twenty-two men, each armed with an automatic weapon; one light machine gun, three BARs and eighteen Thompson sub-machine guns. All members of the patrol had been instructed to open fire immediately if challenged or fired upon by the enemy.

(21)

The night was black and the rain fell in torrents as the patrol passed through the friendly outposts. They proceeded down the hill and out on to the flats without incident. About one thousand yards from the horseshoe in the river, they were fired on by an enemy outpost. The fire was returned by the entire patrol. The enemy fire ceased and the patrol continued toward the river. Several efforts were made to get near the river in the horseshoe, but each effort drew heavy enemy fire. The patrol moved three hundred yards to the east of the horseshoe and reached the river without drawing enemy fire. Here the patrol took up covering positions while Lt. Sandler removed his clothes and stepped out into the river. The water was high and after moving about twenty feet into the stream he was swept off his feet by the current. He struck out for the other shore as he was carried down stream and reached the other bank about fifty yards below his starting point. The far bank of the stream was about fifteen feet high, almost perpendicular and thickly covered with blackberry bushes and vines. He pulled himself up the bank and reconnoitered the far bank back to the open fields and for about one hundred yards upstream. No enemy were encountered but a fairly well beaten path along the upper bank indicated recent use. On returning to his patrol Lt. Sandler made several soundings, determining that the north side of the river was about eight feet and that it gradually tapered up to the south bank. He also determined that with the aid of a rope, the average man could walk at least half way across the river. (22)

The patrol then moved down stream below the horseshoe and took

(20) Map O; (21) Personal Knowledge; (22) Statement of Lt. Sandler, Patrol Leader, 10 October 1943.
up covering positions while the two enlisted men crossed the river. Their crossing also was successful, but the river was found to be swifter and deeper at this point.

Just as dawn was breaking the patrol moved back through the outpost line and hurried back to Battalion to make its report and get some well earned rest.

Not being satisfied that he had accomplished his mission, Lt. Sandler requested that he be permitted to take his patrol out again that night with particular effort toward reconnaissance in the horseshoe bend. During the day the weather cleared off and as night fell the indications were that it would be clear. The patrol moved out as the night before and proceeded into the river flats. Here it was first appreciated that the moon was bright and that a man could be seen for over a hundred yards in the open fields. They took advantage of the small drainage ditches and reached the horseshoe without being fired on. Leaving most of the patrol to cover their movements, Lt. Sandler and a picked group of men moved cautiously into the horseshoe and down to the river bank. Enemy activity was heard in several sectors of the area. The two enlisted swimmers and Lt. Sandler quietly slid into the river and swam toward the other bank. The two enlisted men reached the other bank while Lt. Sandler was sounding the river bottom for depth. As the two enlisted men climbed out on the far bank they were challenged and fired on. They plunged back into the stream amid a hail of bullets. Lt. Sandler and one man returned. The patrol then had to fight its way out of the horseshoe and back across the open fields. During this action several more casualties were inflicted. By 0400 hours 11 October the patrol was back at the Battalion bivouac, having learned only that the enemy strongly occupied both banks of the river at the horseshoe. (23)

Only one night remained for reconnaissance. Information so far (23) Statement Lt. Sandler, patrol leader, 9 October 1943.

10
indicated one small crossing site and this far from desirable. Ultimatums were being issued by Regiment and tension around the Battalion OP was high. The battalion commander decided to accompany the patrol the night of 11-12 October to locate a route of movement from the assembly area to the river and to select forward co-ordinating lines. He did not plan to accompany the patrol to the river but did want to observe any fire that they drew while moving to the river. That night the patrol moved out as usual through the outpost line, then swung off to the right into the open valley between Mount Trifata and Mount Castellone. (24) The battalion commander accompanied the patrol until it was within a thousand yards of the river. At this point he waited as the remainder of the patrol moved down to the site at which the successful crossing had been made two nights prior. (25) Again Lt. Sandler swam the river and determined that it had fallen slightly and was not as swift. Other efforts were made to cross further east but met with enemy fire. At this point Lt. Sandler amazed his entire patrol by taking them back to the vicinity of the horseshoe and placing them fifty yards from the river bank while he moved forward alone. Standing on the river bank he shouted in his best German (heavily accented with Jewish) that he could lick half of the German army himself. As he concluded he pointed his Tommy-gun in the air and fired a burst. The air was immediately filled with the familiar blue and white tracers of the enemy machine guns. A few minutes later he returned to his patrol and led them back to the bivouac area. Not until they were finishing their hot cakes did some of the members of the patrol recover enough to ask why he had done such a foolish thing. He replied, "Now I know where all of the enemy guns are located." (26)

(24) Map 0; (25) Statement of Major Duval, Commanding Officer 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment, 12 October, 1943; (26) Statement of Lt. Sandler, patrol leader 12 October, 1943.
THE BATTALION PLAN OF ATTACK

D-Day was on hand and only a few hours remained for final formulating of plans and issuing of instructions. All personnel of the battalion had been kept posted as to developments and were prepared to meet their toughest engagement. Information was received that six engineer ponton rafts would be available in the assembly area, but the battalion would be responsible for getting them to the river. A small detachment of engineers was also available but their primary mission was to salvage the rafts at the river so as to have them available for bridge construction. The battalion assembly area was in the vicinity of the forward outpost through which the patrols had been operating. This assembly area also served as the true line of departure.

At about 1000 hours, 12 October, the battalion commander assembled his company commanders and his staff, reviewed all previously discussed plans and issued his attack order: (27) "The battalion objective is Mount Majulo. Our mission is to cross the river, clear the ground, contact the 15th Infantry on our right and secure the southeast portion of Mount Majulo. (28) Weapons will be moved by carrier to the divide between Mount Trifata and Mount Castellone. (29) From this point forward they will be hand carried. Troops will move by marching from the present area to the assembly area, starting at 1700 hours. Order of march:

F Company with one platoon of machine guns from H Company, E Company and one platoon of machine guns from H Company, G Company, H Company (mimis) and Battalion Headquarters Company. All units will pick up their equipment at the vehicles and proceed to the assembly area. In the assembly area all units will be responsible for their own local security.

"At this point, E and F Companies will each pick up three inflated engineer ponton rafts and three coils of rope and carry them to the river. The reconnaissance patrol from F Company will act as guides for the leading

(27) The order is reproduced as I recall having heard it issued; (28) A-8, p. 18; (29) Map C.
companies and join F Company at the river.

Lt. Sandler and three men will precede the battalion to the river and stretch a rope across at the point of crossing then join their respective units as they arrive at the river.

One platoon of F Company with the light machine gun section will move with the company to the river, detach itself on this side and clear the south bank from the site of the crossing down to and including the horseshoe bend. The H Company machine guns with F Company will set up on our side of the river and cover the crossing of the assault companies, joining F Company after the crossing. F Company will then move west along the river bank clearing the enemy as far as the horseshoe tip. From this point they will move north to Mount Majulo guiding their left flank on the small stream line.

E Company will cross behind F Company and quickly reorganize in the vicinity of the crossing, then push straight north guiding on the right of F Company to Mount Majulo.

G Company will follow E Company, reorganize in the vicinity of the crossing and protect our right flank. Upon reaching Mount Majulo, send a patrol to contact the 15th Infantry on our right.

The remainder of H Company will follow G Company. Battalion Headquarters Company will follow H Company. I will accompany F Company with my OP group. The wire team will go with me to the river, lay wire across the stream and join the OP group when it comes along. A field artillery forward observer will be with E Company. Company areas for the objective are indicated on the map. (30) I will contact companies on the objective to assure co-ordinations.

The battalion will move out of the assembly area at 2330 to the first co-ordinating line. At 0030 F and E Companies will move out for the river, co-ordinating again at the second line. G Company followed by the remainder of the battalion will move forward one hour (30) Map C.
later. This should prevent jamming up at the river and give F Company a chance to clear the banks."

Many other points were discussed and many last minute coordinations made. The company commanders then left to return to their units and issue final instructions.
The battalion closed in the assembly area by 2100 hours without incident. At 2330 hours the units began moving out toward the first co-ordinating line. By 0015 all of the battalion had cleared the wooded area and was out in the valley. The diversionary effort of the 30th Infantry was in progress at the Trilfisco Gap and heavy firing could be heard further west in the X Corps sector. By 0100 hours the battalion was in the general area of the first co-ordinating line and the artillery preparation had begun. The fire fell far beyond the banks of the river and everyone knew that it would have no effect on the enemy in the vicinity of the crossing. The assault companies had cleared as the remainder of the battalion stood in the darkness watching the artillery fire. (31)

Not a single shot had been heard in the sector as the remainder of the battalion moved out at 0130 hours. After moving about a thousand yards north "all hell" broke out to the front and right front. It was obvious that the crossing had been detected. Following a brief pause at the second co-ordinating line the group pushed forward into the river flat lands. The tracers of grazing machine gun fire were cutting patterns over this entire area. Taking advantage of drainage ditches, furrows and any slight depressions in the ground, the advance continued toward the center of the inferno. Approaching the river the enemy fire became more diverted and it was apparent that units on the flanks were drawing some of the fire that had been directed at the Second Battalion crossing. While moving forward several of the pontoon rafts were observed abandoned in the fields. When within a hundred yards of the crossing site, Lt. Sandler met the OP group and reported that the river had fallen enough to permit crossing without rafts. The platoon leader from "F" Company who was (31) Personal Knowledge.
responsible for clearing the enemy in the horseshoe, reported that he had not been able to accomplish his mission, that he had suffered heavy casualties and his platoon was very low on ammunition. He was ordered to cease attacking the position and to remain in position to cover the remainder of the battalion's crossing, then to follow the battalion. At the river there was considerable confusion among the troops. Only one rope had been strung across, the others had been abandoned with the rafts.

Mortars and artillery were registering in on the crossing site as the men scrambled up the banks of the river. The heavy loads of the Mortar Platoon and OP group proved to be a serious obstacle. It was 0500 hours before the OP group had crossed the river and all of the assault elements had long since pushed on toward the objective. A heavy fire fight was taking place to the left rear, in the First Battalion Sector, and many enemy guns were firing from sectors which the forward elements had previously passed through. The OP group, consisting of headquarters section, communication platoon, medical detachment, artillery liaison party, ammunition carrying party and remnants of the platoon of "F" Company, were no match for the strong enemy resistance in their direction of advance. Elements of the Third Battalion were crossing and it was decided to wait and move forward with them.

At about 0545 a messenger reported stating that elements of the assault companies were on Mount Majulo but that friendly artillery fire was holding up their advance. He further stated that the artillery forward observer was unable to make contact with his fire-direction center. The artillery liaison officer immediately set up his radio and had the fires lifted. Shortly afterward he was able to contact his forward observer and establish communication with the forward elements of the battalion. By daylight the Third (32) A-2, p. 4.
Battalion completed its crossing and pushed off toward its objective on the west side of Mount Majulo, the Second Battalion OP group moving out with them. Movement was slow and the enemy stubbornly resisted the advance. By 1400 contact was made with the forward elements of the battalion and reorganization on the objective was soon completed.

By this time the enemy on both flanks were beginning to yield ground, but a tank counter attack was moving down the valley toward the First Battalion. Tank-hunting teams from both the Second and Third Battalions were sent out to engage them. Three of the tanks were immobilized and the enemy withdrew. (33)

The engineers were attempting to construct a bridge in the vicinity of the crossing but were not meeting with much success due to well aimed enemy fire. A smoke screen was placed in the vicinity and construction proceeded. By late afternoon a bridge was completed permitting tank destroyers to cross. (34)

The resistance in the First Battalion sector collapsed late in the afternoon and the bridgehead was secure. During the night of 13-14 October the remainder of the Third Division crossed the bridge as the engineers constructed two more bridges. (35)

The organizations on the right of this sector had met with success and were on their objectives. On the plains, west of the Triflisco Gap, the British 56th Division had met with bad luck. Their crossing was planned and co-ordinated in an orthodox manner with the employment of tanks and close supporting weapons on the near side of the river which had previously been secured by their troops. In spite of their determined and co-ordinated effort the Germans had repelled their attack. Arrangements were quickly made for the British to cross behind the Third Division and to move into their assigned zone. (36). Thus the scenes were set for the next phase of the Fifth Army's advance. (33) A-6, p. 56; (34) A-7, p. 92; (35) A-4, p. 15; (36) A-3, p. 3.
ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

From a higher commander's viewpoint this operation was a complete success. "Their mission was so successful that General Clark called Colonel Sherman the next morning and personally congratulated him on the achievements of his regiment." (37) In addition Major Duwell, Commanding 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry, received a battle field promotion. (38) Success cannot be criticised, however, from my own personal viewpoint and that of subordinate leaders this operation warrants careful analysis.

The basic principle of securing one side of the river and supporting the crossing by all available fire power was violated. These violations may be justified when the value of surprise and secrecy are taken into consideration. In our sector prepared key enemy positions were unoccupied initially at the time of the crossing and enemy resistance was a minimum of what was expected. In the British sector where surprise and secrecy were not employed the crossing met stiff resistance and was unsuccessful.

Crossing a river in column on a narrow front is normally considered poor tactics, but with good reconnaissance and surprise this method was successfully employed. Reorganization on the far bank is very slow and difficult when crossing in column. Complete reorganization of the battalion at this point was impossible and plans should have been made to continue the advance piecemeal instead of planning to attack as a complete battalion. Failure to plan for a piecemeal advance left the battalion CP group without adequate security.

The battalion commander had a choice of either assuring that all enemy in his sector were mopped up or to clear only those necessary for him to reach his objective. He chose to clear only those in his path. This left many enemy to harass rear and succeeding elements. Had he

(37) A-4, p. 18; (38) Personal Knowledge.
chosen to clear all enemy from his area, there is no assurance that he could have prevented them from infiltrating back. Furthermore it would have delayed reaching the objective until after daylight. Pushing through to the objective disrupted the enemy's lateral lines of communication, denied the enemy an ideal successive withdrawal position, disrupted the enemy counterattack, and gave the Regimental Commander freedom to employ his supporting weapons to assist the 1st Battalion.

The preparatory artillery fire was not successful from the viewpoint of the attacking troops. A minimum of fire had been placed on the enemy river defenses and most of it was directed to what was believed to be enemy rear areas. Since the enemy defense was not organized in depth the largest part of our preparatory fire was ineffective.

The enemy obviously over-rated the value of the river as an obstacle for he was completely surprised in our sector. His defenses were strong in the sectors where he had anticipated an attack but uncoordinated in the sectors where he did not anticipate a crossing. His counterattack plans were based on lateral lines of movement close behind his forward lines and did not include plans for a penetration in depth.

Serious situations developed which completely disrupted the prior planning and which called for radical changes in our actions. The planning was flexible enough to meet these situations and to permit the accomplishment of the mission. Some of this success may be attributed to "luck", whereas better planning would have assured the security of the battalion rear elements.

Credit for success of the operation should go to the reconnaissance patrols, both for their location of crossing sites before the attack and their serving as guides during the crossing. In every detail the information which they obtained was accurate and the site chosen was
ideal. For his actions as leader of this patrol, Lt. Sandler was awarded the Silver Star.

The employment of many automatic weapons with the patrol gave it a feeling of confidence and security in accomplishing its missions.
LESSONS

Some of the lessons learned or emphasized in this operation are:

1. Achievement of surprise and secrecy in an operation can justify the temporary violation of many sound military principles such as: prior occupation of near side of river, assembly areas in covered position, line of departure in friendly held area, crossing rivers on a broad front and obtaining fire superiority to support the crossing.

2. In a night river crossing it is desirable to have your organization divided into groups capable of providing their own security.

3. Automatic weapons are of great value in night patrols and night attack operations because they impress the enemy with the large amount of fire power that the attacking force has available.

4. Plans for a night attack must be flexible enough to meet any situation.

5. Ropes stretched across the stream are of great help to the crossing. It prevents the troops from being swept down stream, leads them to the proper position on the far bank and gives the crossing units a feeling of security.

6. When attack plans call for extending beyond radio range it is necessary to provide for a relay station.

7. Artillery preparations should be placed on known enemy locations and lifted on call rather than on a time plan, because the rate of movement of the troops cannot be estimated and indiscriminate firing in rear areas is frequently wasted.

8. Reconnaissance, thorough briefing of all personnel and detailed planning are essential to a successful river crossing.

9. Commanders must exert all possible effort to accomplish their
assigned missions and not permit themselves to be diverted by actions in other areas.

10. Night attacks are very confusing to both the attacker and the defender. Frequently forward elements pass enemy positions without being fired on and later elements receive strong resistance from these positions. At times the enemy will take advantage of darkness to recoup positions from which he has once been ejected. Rear elements in a night attack must always be alert to engage in close combat.

11. Whenever practicable rehearsals for river crossings are highly desirable.

12. Deception in any operation pays dividends.

13. Flexibility of planning and alertness of all leaders to exploit successful penetrations are essential.

14. When efforts to accomplish reconnaissance missions by stealth are not possible, leaders should be prepared to fight for the information.