ADVANCED INFANTRY OFFICERS COURSE
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THE OPERATIONS OF COMPANY D, 192ND TANK BATTALION
AT ASCHAFFENBURG, GERMANY, 28 MARCH - 3 APRIL 1945
(CENTRAL EUROPE CAMPAIGN)
(Personal Experience of a Company Commander)

Type of operation described: TANKS IN SUPPORT
OF INFANTRY IN TOWN FIGHTING

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ADVANCED INFANTRY OFFICERS CLASS NO 1
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INTRODUCTION

This monograph covers the operations of Company D, 191st Tank Battal-
ion - a separate tank battalion attached to the 45th Infantry Division - at
Ascheffenburg, Germany, 28 March - 3 April 1945.

To be able to follow an operation involving a separate tank battalion
one must first understand its organization and employment. Separate tank
battalions like the 191st were composed of one light and three medium tank
companies of three platoons each. They were normally assigned to a Field
Army which attached them as the situation demanded to various infantry di-
visions. Too frequently these battalions were shifted so often from one di-
vision to another that they came to feel like orphans and seldom was much
esprit de corps built up between the infantry and its attached tanks. In
some cases, however, a tank battalion would remain attached to one infantry
division for an appreciable length of time and there would be built up a
mutual respect and esteem based on friendships, associations and hardships
shared. Such was the case of the 191st Tank Battalion and the 45th Divi-
sion to which it was attached from the break-out at Anzio until the end of
the war.

Normal employment of the 191st Tank Battalion by the 45th Division was
to allot one medium tank company and one light tank platoon to each infan-
try regiment. Employment was very flexible, however, and these normal attach-
ments were frequently changed to meet different situations. Further subdivi-
sion of the tanks by the regiments to their subordinate battalions necessarily
resulted in large proportions of infantry with only a small proportion of
tanks to support them. It is easy to see that any operation by such a unit would be primarily an infantry operation with tanks playing a closely coordinated supporting role. Because of this unity of action of the tanks and the infantry it would be impossible to describe the actions of one without going very deeply into those of the other. For that reason much of the operations of the tank company in this monograph will be described in relating the actions of the infantry unit since the tanks were an integral part of the infantry organization.

January 1945 found the American armies in the European Theater of Operations again on the move across Western Europe after having been delayed by the German counter-offensive in the Bastogne sector. (See Map A) The next two months were devoted to a concerted push into Germany proper. Because of the resistance encountered, however, it was March before American troops drew up along the Rhine River on all fronts.

In early March the 1st Army captured a planked railroad bridge intact at Remagen and swiftly poured troops across the historic Rhine for the first American crossing. (See Map A) The other armies were not slow to follow and after their assault crossings a large bridgehead was quickly built up across the Rhine in Germany itself. (1)

The 7th Army crossing was made on 26 March in the vicinity of Mannheim by the XV Corps on the Army left flank, just south of the 3d Army. (See Map A) It was a two division crossing with the 45th Division on the left and the 3d Division on the right. (2)

The XV Corps plan after the crossing was for the two divisions to attack northeast to protect the right flank of the adjacent 3d Army. (See Map B) A glance at the sector of the 45th Division on the Corps left flank suggested that the first resistance of any importance would probably come in Aschaffenburg, a town about 30 miles northeast of the Rhine on the Main.

(1) A-6, p. 43; (2) A-3, p. 745.
River. Unconfirmed reports from the 31st Army, however, indicated that a task force it had sent out had "cleared" the city. (3)

It was later discovered that General George Patton, 31st Army commander, had sent a small armored task force to liberate some American prisoners reported nearby and the task force had merely bypassed the town. A combat command of the 4th Armored Division was subsequently sent out to relieve the pressure on the task force when it was cut off and surrounded. This combat command rapidly swept toward Aschaffenburg and prepared to attack but were withdrawn into their own sector before the actual assault was launched. Their swift move caught the Germans by surprise, however, and they captured a railroad bridge intact over the Main River about one mile southwest of the city. They left a force of about company strength behind to hold this prize for the 45th Division. (4)

Despite the possibility of little or no resistance, the city was approached by the 45th Division as though prepared defenses were expected. By 27 March when the Main River just west of the city was reached it was found that all of the highway bridges across the river into town had been blown. It was a particularly valuable windfall, therefore, to find a railroad bridge over the river intact and being guarded by men from another unit until the division arrived. (See Map D) Although not as famous as its "big brother" at Remagen, this bridge was just as useful in the attack on Aschaffenburg. (5)

In preparation for the forthcoming operation, planks were rapidly placed in position on the bridge to permit traffic to cross. In addition, the division readied itself for the impending town fighting by increasing the supply of grenades and automatic weapons where possible. Maximum quantities of wire were assembled to enable the maintaining of communication under the unfavorable conditions found in a city. Tank maintenance and supply personnel (3) A-1, p. 100; (4) Personal knowledge; (5) Personal knowledge.
quickly performed the servicing and resupply necessary to prepare the tanks for further action. Thus by nightfall of 27 March the 45th Division was drawn up along the west bank of the Main River ready to cross on a specially prepared bridge and attack Aschaffenburg. (6)

THE GENERAL SITUATION

Aschaffenburg had a peace time population of approximately 35,000. Situated on the Main River it was important to the attackers chiefly because it lay astride the Frankfurt-Nuremberg highway. Prior to the war Aschaffenburg was relatively unimportant to the military but with the growth of the German war machine the army utilized it extensively as a replacement and convalescent center. (7) At the time of the approach of American troops, this replacement depot consisted of 15 battalions containing about 7000 troops with ranks up to and including the rank of Colonel. (8)

In addition, one of the largest officer candidate schools in Germany was operated in Aschaffenburg and this added several hundred youths of officer caliber to the defending forces. The knowledge of the terrain that these candidates had gathered during their training in the area was later to prove a very valuable aid in their all-out defense. (9)

The initial report that the 34 Army tank force sent out by General Patton had "cleared" Aschaffenburg had been welcome news to the American troops. As they drew nearer to the city increasing reports from civilians and patrols alike dispelled this myth, however, and brought the realization that another fight—possibly a very bitter one—lay in store for them. The most consistent report was that the German commander in Aschaffenburg—a Major Lambert—had determined to conduct an all-out defense of

the city. Although possessing little artillery and no air support, he
was reported busily organizing a motley force composed mostly of replace-
ment personnel even as American troops were approaching. (10)

40TH DIVISION PLAN OF ATTACK

The unexpected seizure of the railroad bridge over the Main River
made it possible for the division attack plan to be implemented sooner
than had been anticipated. The plan was for all three regiments to move
across the river and then attack abreast. (See Map C) The 157th Infantry
Regiment was to push north along the river and conduct a frontal attack on
the city while the 179th and 180th Infantry Regiments were executing an
enveloping movement to cut the main highway east of Aschaffenburg. (11)
Since the 157th Infantry was the only regiment attacking Aschaffenburg,
this study may now be limited to the actions of the 157th Infantry Regi-
ments and its attached and supporting troops.

The attack plan of the 157th Infantry called for the 2d Battalion to
attack the city frontally from the south while the 3d Battalion maneuvered
through Schweinheim, a suburban town southeast of Aschaffenburg, to flank
the city from the east. The 1st Battalion was to remain in regimental re-
serve. (12)

In support of the 157th for this operation were Company A, a medium
tank company, and Company D, the light tank company, of the 191st Tank
Battalion. Also in support were Company D of the 64th Tank Destroyer
Battalion and a company of the 2d Chemical Mortar Battalion. One platoon
of medium tanks and one platoon of light tanks were allotted to each infan-
try battalion and the tank destroyer company placed a platoon in direct
support of each battalion. The chemical mortar company was directed to
give priority to requests of the 2d Battalion since it was anticipated
that it would meet the strongest resistance. (13)

THE ATTACK

The crossing of the Main River was made on 28 March with the assault troops running into resistance from enemy in foxholes and concrete pillboxes. The attack continued pretty much according to plan primarily because of the enemy's lack of high velocity anti-tank weapons. Tanks were thus able to overrun these positions and spearhead the infantry advance. The 2d Battalion began its approach march to Aschaffenburg and by nightfall when it reached the edge of the city the regiment owned a 5 square mile bridgehead over the Main. (14)

The command post of the light tank company was located near that of the 2d Battalion and the medium tank company command post was placed near that of the 3d Battalion in order to establish and maintain better tank-infantry communication.

To the majority of the troops the most noteworthy incident in the days fighting was the capture of a huge liquor warehouse in the outskirts of the city. It was apparently a storage point in which the Germans had collected intransigents from many countries for it contained a wide variety of liquors and great quantities of each. The division thus obtained a "Class VI" supply point which enabled it to maintain its level of supply for quite a long period. (15)

In a slight drizzle the attack to expand the bridgehead jumped off at 2300 hours. (See Map D) The 2d Battalion began its push into Aschaffenburg but resistance was so fierce that the attack disintegrated into a slow, methodical action in which it was necessary to clear each building separately. Tanks moved slowly from house to house as the infantry cleared.

(13) Personal knowledge; (14) A-1, p. 73; A-2, p. 161; (15) A-1, p. 151; Personal knowledge.
them and furnished high velocity and additional machine gun fire for the infantry. The smoke mortar on the tank turret was found to be very useful for dropping smoke shells a short distance ahead to screen both infantry and tank movement. (16) The bulk of the resistance was from replacement personnel and unattached civilians. Many of the civilians were teen-age boys, probably from the Hitler Youth Organization, but they had apparently been thoroughly indoctrinated in Nazi philosophy for they waged a bitter fight and many refused to surrender even when overrun. (17)

Meanwhile, the 3d Battalion had begun its enveloping move through Schweinheim and had reached its first street by 0630 hours. (See Map D) Company C had been committed by the reserve 1st Battalion on the left of the 3d Battalion to protect it against any attack from Aschaffenburg and was advancing along with the 3d Battalion. (18) The resistance which was encountered upon entering Schweinheim soon made it evident that a quick envelopment of Aschaffenburg through Schweinheim was impossible. Here, as in Aschaffenburg stubborn resistance was put up by both soldiers and civilians, making a separate fight necessary to clear each building. To make matters worse, it was discovered that in many cases underground tunnels had been built from one cellar to another and when one house was rendered untenable by our troops the defenders simply moved back through the tunnel to the next. Again the tanks moved forward with the infantry house by house and, in spite of infantry close-in protection, two medium tanks were lost to enemy panzerfausts - a weapon closely resembling our bazookas. Another medium tank hit a mine and a total of three tanks were now out of action from the day's fighting in the 3d Battalion sector. (19)

A good foothold had been obtained in Schweinheim by evening when defenses for the night were established. In Aschaffenburg, however, little...
forward progress had been made although a great volume of fire had been directed into the city. In the center of town a huge castle, believed to be the enemy's command post had been subjected to tremendous direct and indirect fire but little apparent effect had been obtained. (See Map B)

The tanks were at a definite disadvantage in town fighting in that they had no room for maneuver, their vision was restricted, they were very vulnerable to enemy tank hunters and because of the narrow streets could not furnish each other ample fire cover. These disadvantages were minimized by assigning certain infantrymen specific missions of protecting the tanks, thus forming closely knit teams which moved as a unit. This system had been proven sound before by these same troops so it was quickly put into operation again in Aschaffenbourg and Schweinheim. (20)

Two counterattacks were launched against the 34th Battalion in Schweinheim in the early morning hours of 30 March. (See Map B) One of about company size hit at 0100 hours and was easily repulsed but the other at 0520 hours was one of battalion size and required considerable fighting to turn back. Putting to use their familiarity with the town, the enemy got a petrol in back of L Company and attacked it from the front and rear when the counterattack was launched. At 0520 March Lt. Colonel Dolvin, CO of the 101st Tank Battalion, ordered his D Company assembled in Schweinheim to aid the embattled 34th Battalion. This move was easily accomplished since the town's defenders had little or no high velocity weapons with which to prevent tank movement in the rear areas. Taking the light tanks from the 1st and 2nd Battalions did not hurt them materially for the 1st Battalion was still in reserve and the 2nd Battalion was not moving enough to require more than the medium tank platoon which was attached to it.

Additional tanks were a necessity now in Schweinheim to provide replacements for the tanks already lost and also to provide armor for an all out (20) Personal knowledge.
attempt to eliminate all remaining resistance in the town. Although light tanks do not have the fire power of medium tanks, their 37mm gun and machine guns could provide the infantry in Schweinchheim with sorely needed mobile fire power. (21)

At about 1400 hours as the troops were preparing for an attack another counterattack of about company size struck them. Being on the alert and about ready to "jump off" the 34th Battalion was able to repulse this attack with vigor and deal a death blow to the hopes of the defenders. The back of German resistance in Schweinchheim was broken when this last counterattack was beaten back and the "mop up" was started immediately. (22)

Tank-infantry teams moved down every street in the town cleaning up as they went and by night all resistance had been cleared from Schweinchheim except for an isolated group in the northeast section of town and another in the northwest section.

Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion had been ordered at 1300 hours to move around the right flank of the 34th Battalion and seize the high ground to the northeast of Schweinchheim. (See Map F) After a great deal of difficulty due to the fire it was drawing from Aschaffenburg, Company C was able to withdraw from its position on the left of the 34th Battalion and join the 1st Battalion for its flanking movement. G Company was committed by the 2nd Battalion into the blocking position that C Company had been occupying. The 1st Battalion quickly moved around the edge of town and by night had reached a position from which it could attack the high ground the following day. (23)

In Aschaffenburg the 2nd Battalion continued its tedious forward movement but, with the exception of the committing of G Company on the left flank of the 34th Battalion, had made no major change in position.

Every effort was made to relieve the maneuvering 1st and 34th Battalions

(21) A-2, p. 162; Personal knowledge; (22) A-4, p. 77; (23) A-4, p. 77; Personal knowledge.
of any pressure from Aschaffenbourg by placing all available fire on the city. Tanks, tank destroyers and chemical mortars added their fire to that of the artillery and the result was a tremendous volume of fire. An air strike had been called for but it was not until 1800 hours that visibility was good enough for the planes to attack. From then until dark however, planes of the XII Tactical Air Force really "plastered" the city with rockets, napalm bombs and strafing attacks. Particular emphasis was again placed on destroying the huge central castle which the troops were beginning to refer to as "another Cassino abbey" but as before little visible results were produced. (24)

On VI March the 3rd Battalion began an operation to clear the remaining resistance from Schweinhelm. Tank-infantry teams moved on the two sections still holding out and slowly began to pry the defenders from the houses. (See Map II). They were hampered considerably by constant enemy mortar fire for an estimated 1500 rounds were poured on them during the day - around 300 in one concentration. One D Company light tank began to draw fire from an American medium tank as it moved toward one of the isolated groups so the tank commander hastily radioed his company commander for a check-up. Investigation revealed, however, that the tank was manned by Germans and it was thought that it had probably been captured from the 3rd Army tank force. The destruction of this tank and a German Mark VI Tank also in the vicinity permitted the infantry to move in and reduce the two isolated sections. The Mark VI tank had no oil in its crankcase and only a few miles on its speedometer so it was assumed that it had been driven out of the small tank factory in Aschaffenbourg and put into the fight by untrained personnel. Either this was the only tank in the factory that was operative or there were no available personnel capable of operating them for this was the only tank from the factory that was encountered in

Aschaffenburg. About this time numerous small groups of Germans began infiltrating back into town and it became necessary to keep a continuous "mopping up" process going. By the end of the day the 3d Battalion had cleared Schweinheim and advanced a short distance along the road to Aschaffenburg. (26)

Good weather had brought our air support out again and 176 sorties were flown dropping thousands of pounds of bombs and firing innumerable rockets of 4.5 inch size into Aschaffenburg. This apparently served only to drive the defenders underground and flatten more buildings for the 2d Battalion met the same suicidal resistance as before when it renewed its attack. (26) It was learned after the town fell, however, that these poundings by the Air Corps had achieved a terrific effect on the mental attitude of the defenders and reduced greatly their desire to defend further.

The maneuvering 1st Battalion ran into difficulty as it began its attack for the high ground northeast of Schweinheim. It encountered a force which had probably been driven from Schweinheim and had positioned itself firmly on the forward slope of the high ground the battalion was to take. Another slow, uphill fight was commenced and when defenses for the night were established little forward progress had been made. (See Map F)

The cause of such determined resistance was rapidly becoming apparent to the American troops. They saw some civilians trying to evacuate the town shot down by German guns and found a German lieutenant hanging from a rafter with a sign around his neck reading as follows:

"Cowards and traitors hang! Yesterday an officer candidate from Alsace-Lorraine died a hero's death in destroying an enemy tank. He lives on. Today - there hangs a coward in officer's garb because he betrayed the Fuehrer and the people. He is dead forever." (27)

Indications from prisoners and civilians were that many of the town's defenders were in favor of surrendering but the commander, Major Lambert, with a small group of SS men was preventing them from doing so. "A Luftwaffe officer sent word to Lambert that as an Air Corps officer there was no reason for him to remain in Aschaffenburg. Lambert promptly had him executed." (29)

Such was the situation confronting the regiment - an obviously beaten enemy trapped in a battered town but forced to conduct a last ditch, all out defense by a fanatical commander - when an order was received from IV Corps changing the division direction of attack. (29) Since it appeared that the defending force in Aschaffenburg was going to fight to the very last man, the decision of the division commander was to leave the 157th Infantry Regiment behind to reduce the city while the rest of the division moved on in the new direction.

On 1 April the 157th Infantry continued its attack of the city but with a slightly different perspective and plan. The emphasis now was to be placed on completing the encircling movement and then containing the city while placing heavy fire on it so as to bring about its ultimate surrender with a minimum loss of American troops. Since the town was already badly battered and without means of resupply it obviously could not withstand much pounding long. (30)

For the first two days of April, therefore, all possible fire was brought to bear on the city and the 1st Battalion completed its movement to flank the town from the east. (See Map 7) American bombers again showed up and flew 48 sorties to supplement the fire of the ground weapons. The 34 Battalion, confronted with a large Engineer barracks which continued to put up stiff resistance, used self-propelled 155mm guns to demolish the structure with point blank, direct fire. (31)

This firing in combination with the direct fire of tanks and tank destroyers and indirect fire of the artillery soon had its effect. At 0730 on 20 April Major Lambert, the commander who had men executed for even thinking of surrendering, agreed to surrender the town. (32)

Thus ended a fight which in one week's time had produced over 3,100 prisoners and killed 1,500 more Germans. (33) Although more attention was paid to the fights for Nuremberg and Munich because of their position in German tradition, "a chart representing resistance encountered in Germany, taking 100 percent as the figure for Aschaffenburg, would by analogy show only 75 percent for Nuremberg and 10 percent for Munich." (34)

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

The rapid initial advance on Aschaffenburg was due primarily to the defenders' violation of one of the most important principles of defense—the organization of key terrain. Their failure to destroy or defend the railroad bridge provided the attacker with a quick, easy means of approach. In addition, the defender was denied time which was sorely needed in the preparation for the defense of the city.

The aggressive action by the 4th Armored Division in seizing the bridge and the use of initiative in pummeling it enabled the attacker to gain partial surprise by launching the attack earlier than had been anticipated.

Actually, the attackers were fortunate that many other principles of defense were violated or overlooked for had they been adhered to the fight would have been considerably tougher. The German commander's lack of air support, even though not his fault, allowed American air to operate at will—limited only by the weather. Possessing only a small amount of (32) A-4, p. 61; Personal knowledge; (33) A-4, p. 61; (34) A-2, p. 154.
artillery, he was unable to make a coordinated fire plan to take the
enemy under fire at longer ranges than his mortars would allow, or to
interdict the railroad bridge and deny its use to American troops. Also,
his lack of tanks and anti-tank weapons other than the bazooka-like pan-
erfausts denied him a means of successfully combating armor or prepping
an anti-tank defense. All these factors merely point up a defense based
on fanaticism alone and not a well rounded defense based on accepted prin-
ciples such as would have been necessary in this situation.

The plan of attack to be used after the river crossing was made con-
tained all the accepted elements necessary for a successful attack on a
city. It provided for an attempt to reduce by fire, a frontal attack and
an enveloping movement to cut off and surround. When it became apparent
that neither reduction by fire nor a frontal attack would succeed, the
main effort was quickly and correctly shifted to the enveloping maneuver.

This enabled the reduction of the town with minimum losses.

The enveloping move which originally was a large scale one by two
regiments was very flexible and, as the situation demanded, smaller units
were used for smaller moves. First a battalion was committed and, when
its attack stalled, another battalion was sent around its flank to complete
the enveloping maneuver.

✓ The maneuverability of armor is limited when used in town but this
disadvantage may be offset by judicious employment in the places most needed.
This was exemplified by the assembly of the light tank company in Schwein-
heim to be used by the infantry to form tank-infantry teams with which to
clear remaining resistance from the town. When tanks are used in town fight-
ing, however, the infantry must supply ample close-in protection or the
highly vulnerable tanks may be destroyed.

✓ Light tanks are designed primarily for maneuverability for reconnaissance.
work and as a result have only light weapons. Medium tanks with their more powerful weapons are therefore more desirable for town fighting.

The use of direct fire for reducing strong points proved most effective. The tanks, tank destroyers and even the 155mm self-propelled gun moved up to point blank range and fired away. This blasted holes and enabled the infantry to be in on the defenders before they were able to recover.

The value of air support should not be measured only in physical facilities blown up or buildings destroyed. Here, as in many other cases, constant air pounding helped destroy the very will of the people to resist and shortened considerably the length of the fight.

The German commander used the threat of execution to frighten the defenders, both civilian and military, into putting up resistance entirely out of proportion to the importance of the town. This merely emphasizes the knowledge that a leader with a choice circle of strong men or "Gestapo" whether a Hitler on a national level or a Lambert in a small town can sometimes force a people to unwillingly wage a fierce battle or war.

The successful cooperation exhibited by the tank-infantry teams in this fighting shows clearly that where a separate tank battalion is "married" to an infantry division for a period of time, as was the case here, a mutual confidence is built up which makes for superior teamwork. Such unions as this one did much to eliminate the oft-quoted infantry saying, "four inches of steel and me with my field jacket", and laid the foundation for the present day incorporation of tanks into each infantry division as organic vehicles.
LESSONS

1. A defender must destroy or defend all possible avenues of approach into the area he intends to organize.

2. Aggressiveness and initiative on the part of an attacker can provide many unexpected windfalls.

3. A defender cannot violate the accepted principles of defense and hope to conduct an effective campaign.

4. A maneuver to outflank is far more desirable in the face of an impenetrable defense than a continuous and costly frontal attack.

5. An attack plan must be flexible and the commander quick to adjust his plan to an altered situation.

6. Judicious employment of tanks will minimize many of the disadvantages that they will encounter in town fighting.

7. Tanks in town fighting require additional close-in protection by the infantry.

8. Medium tanks are better in town fighting than light tanks since they possess greater fire power.

9. Tanks, tank destroyers and even 155mm self-propelled guns may be used very effectively for point blank fire in reducing strong points.

10. Air strikes in conjunction with a ground attack can destroy not only an enemy’s physical facilities but also his mental composure.

11. A determined commander by severe enough measures can compel his defending force to put up a fanatical resistance.

12. Well coordinated tank - infantry teams can be used very successfully in attacks on built-up areas and cities.
MAP D
ATTACK ON
ASCHAFFENBURG

LINE HELD 292400 MARCH