755th Tank Battalion Supporting the 3rd Algerian Infantry Division of the French Expeditionary Corps during the advance on Rome 11 - 20 May 1944 (Rome - Arno Campaign) (Personal Experience of a Tank Battalion Operations Officer)

Type of operation described: Tanks supporting infantry in mountainous terrain.

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Advanced Infantry Officers Class No II
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INTRODUCTION

This monograph covers the operations of the 755th Tank Battalion, supporting the French 3d Algerian Infantry Division for the advance on Rome during the period 11 - 20 May 1944.

In order to understand the situation on 11 May 1944, let us review the major events leading up to this operation.

On 3 September 1943 the British Eighth Army had landed on the Italian Peninsula and was followed by the U.S. Fifth Army at Salerno on 9 September. (1)

Since the drive on Rome from the south had become practically stalemated, the VI Corps made a landing at Anzio on 22 January, 1944, in hopes the enemy would weaken his defensive line on the southern front, thus making it possible for a breakthrough -- but not the case. The enemy detained both the Anzio Beachhead and the Southern Front. (2) For the situation of the Italian campaign as of 31 March 1944, see Map A.

TERRAIN IN FRENCH CORPS SECTOR

The Aurunci Mountains extended from the Garigliano

(1) A-1, p. 31; (2) A-1, p. 65. * Hereafter referred to as 3 DIA and FEC.
River to the Itri-Pico road with heights over 1500 meters. The roads have sharp, winding curves and shoulders at many places reinforced by stone masonry to prevent erosion. Narrow valleys with intermittent streams prevent the use of armor on any large scale. Stone terraces over small cultivated areas are barriers to cross country movements. Deep gullies and soft stream beds in addition to the mountainous terrain make it impossible to operate tanks in mass.

The French saying, "No mules, no maneuver", explains the terrain clearly.

Sparsely scattered olive groves and grape vineyards are common throughout the sector. (See Map C)

**GENERAL SITUATION**

Since the winter operations by the Allied Armies had not brought about the desired results, General Alexander, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in Italy, called a halt to the hitherto piecemeal attacks and made plans for an advance on Rome. Early in April he outlined the following Allied plan:

1. Destroy the right wing of the German Tenth Army.
2. Drive its remnants and the German Fourteenth Army north of Rome.
3. Pursue the enemy to the Rimini-Pisa Line, inflicting maximum losses on him in the process.

To carry out the directives of the Allied High Command, a great metamorphosis resulted on the Southern Front. (See Map B)
General Alexander assigned the British Eighth Army the main attack with the mission of breaking through the Gustav Line in the vicinity of Cassino into the Liri Valley and advance generally along Highway 6.

The U. S. Fifth Army was given the mission to break out of the Garigliano River bridgehead with its axis of advance parallel to the British Eighth Army, but to remain south of the Liri and Sacco Rivers.

The Air Corps was to isolate the battlefield and give close ground support. (3)

The VI Corps was to attack from the Anzio Bridgehead on twenty-four hours' notice after D plus 4. D-Day was 11 May, 1944, with H-Hour at 2300. (4)

General Clark, commanding the U. S. Fifth Army, decided to divide his mission into two phases, as follows:

1. Phase I with Corps missions as listed:
   a. F.E.C. to secure high ground around M. Maio and to cut the Ausonia road north of Ausonia.
   b. II Corps to seize M. Damiano, move along the "S" Ridge toward Colle S. Martino and cut the valley road in that vicinity.

2. Phase II with Corps mission as listed:
   Continue the advance through the Petrella Hill Mass to secure the Itri-Pico road and break through the Hitler Line. (5)

SPECIAL SITUATION

General Juin, commanding the F.E.C. broke his Corps.

mission into three parts - namely,

1. Breakthrough Operations.
2. Push across the Aurunci Mountains.
3. Attack the Hitler Line and enter Pico with the main body. (6)

F.E.C. missions were assigned to each unit as follows:

1. 1st Free French Infantry Division - motorized attack S. ANDREA.
2. 2d Moroccan Infantry Division attack M. MAJO.
3. 4th Mountain Moroccan Infantry Division and General Guillaume's Gourniers operate on general axis M. RUGA - M. REVOLE-PICO.
4. 3 DIA capture CASTELFORTE and advance on axis, Castelforte-Corena-Ausonia-Esperia-Pico. See Map C.
5. 755th Tank Battalion supports the 3d DIA. (7)

ORIENTATION ON THE 755TH TANK BATTALION

The 755th Tank Battalion was activated at Camp Bowie, Brownwood, Texas, in May 1941, where it trained for desert warfare. It landed in England in August 1942; arrived in North Africa January 1943; entered the Italian campaign at Venafrò, supporting the U. S. 45th Infantry Division; joined the F. E. C. on 3 January 1944; operated with the 3d D. I. A. and the 2d Moroccan Infantry Division against the Winter Line northeast of Cassino during January and February; reverted to the F. E. C. reserve for reorganization.

(6) A-6, p. 78; (7) A-3, p. 34.
24 February 1944. On 19 March the 755th Tank Battalion moved from the vicinity of Venafro to the British X Corps sector, and relieved the 50th British Tank Regiment in the Garigliano bridgehead near Castelforte. During the period 20 March to 9 April the 755th Tank Battalion was in a defensive role supporting elements of two recently arrived U. S. Divisions, the 85th and 88th. The Assault Gun Platoon six (M-7's) 105 Howitzers grouped together was attached to the 88th Division Artillery during this period to reinforce their fire.

Extensive preparations were made for the coming offensive which everybody anticipated in the near future. Tank crew personnel accompanied Infantry patrols into the Ausente Valley for terrain evaluation for tank employment. Several officers of the battalion had made numerous reconnaissance flights in cub planes of the 88th Division Artillery over the front line from Gaeta to northeast of Castelforte for terrain study. Aerial photos and maps were carefully studied for Tank Going Operation in all sectors of the Fifth Army.

The 760th Tank Battalion relieved the 755th Tank Battalion which moved to Prata and came under the control of the F. E. C. on 9 April, 1944. (8)

THE FRENCH TROOPS

Most of the officers of the French troops were Europeans, who trained their colonial troops to be professional
soldiers by means of strict discipline in French doctrine. The Goums, natives of North Africa, were among their most skillful fighters, particularly in night operations. The non-commissioned officers, as well as the commissioned, were determined, aggressive and most courageous.

Life in the French army was cheap, and the attitude of the troops was "live off the land if possible". Forceful leaders, a deep personal hatred for the enemy, vinc, and a great many troops got the mission accomplished. A detachment of Arab women was kept for the sexual satisfaction of the colonial troops.

The Moslem religion predominated among the troops. There were peculiar individuals who possessed certain beliefs contrary to the American traditions. The Goums would refuse to be relieved of pain by the hypodermic needle. One unit carried a wild tiger along as a mascot.

**PREPARATION FOR THE ATTACK**

Three weeks prior to D-Day extensive training and rehearsals for the attack on Castelforte were carried on by the various Task Forces assigned specific missions.

Foreseeing the probable communications difficulty, our battalion commander secured from Fifth Army four SCR 245 radios for this special breakthrough operation.

Command Post Exercises were held daily. A rehearsal was held on 5 May by the Infantry-Tank team at Rocca Monfina, a town situated similarly to Castelforte our initial objective. (9) Eating and drinking parties were

(9) A-8, p. 1.
numerous among our battalion officers and the 3d DIA officers. During 25-26 April the command group went to Teana, in southern Italy for a rehearsal to make sure that every minute detail was in order. (10) During the night the French gave a big party in the school dormitory in which we were billeted. This was a gala affair -- plenty of vino, cognac and good food. Drinking, singing and "dumping" officers out of bed covered the program of entertainment throughout the night. Everybody returned to his respective unit with one purpose in mind -- To kill as many Drauts as possible and get to hell away from the deathly area around Cassino.

Fifth Army granted overstrength on personnel for the drive on Rome. The replacements, both officers and enlisted men, had one month's time in which to get acquainted and prepare themselves for combat.

Also additional tanks were made available to the battalion for immediate replacements of losses. Every officer and enlisted man had been to Fifth Army Rest Camp in Naples. The Morale was extremely high mainly because of rest, good food and good weather. It was quite a contrast to the winter which was spent in the mountains northeast of Cassino in the fight against the Winter Line.

Reconnaissance of the forward areas had been made by all officers and key non-commissioned officers by 10 May.

The following of The Standing Operating Procedure

(10) A-7, p. 2.
were in effect:

Battalion headquarters operate advance Command Post; Service Company operate rear Command Post; Battalion Aid Station stay forward, centrally located; one 1/2 ton ambulance Jeep accompany each tank company; Battalion maintenance section operate forward echelon to assist company maintenance; "B" rations served if possible and if not, 5 and 1 or "C" rations; fresh bread and extra coffee supplement all rations except "B" rations; cigarettes issued with rations; bedding rolls strapped on rear of tanks; supply vehicles remain loaded at all times with fuels and lubricants, and ammunition for replenishments; twenty-four hours' communication be maintained; 50 cal. machine guns removed from tanks and stored; tanks permitted to carry into combat 50 rounds extra ammunition on floor of tanks; Personnel Officer act as graves registration officer; Mortar Platoon supply tanks with ammunition and fuel whenever it is extreme danger to 2 1/2 ton trucks.

The battalion moved from Prata to Lauro during the night of 10-11 May. At 1600 hours on 11 May the Orders of the Day by General Alexander and General Clark were read to all the men.

General Clark's message praised the men of the Fighting Fifth for their victories in the past, their present achievements, and inspired them onward to greater victories.
which were to follow. (11)

General Alexander stated that the enemy was about to be struck from four directions thereby bringing victory and peace to Europe once again. "To us in Italy have been given the honor of striking the first blow". (12)

**COMBAT OPERATIONS**

The 755th Tank Battalion less Company B was attached to the Lembilly Task Force which operated under Colonel Guillebaud, commanding officer of the 4th Infantry Regiment of the 3d D.I.A.

The attack on the Gustav Line (See Map C) began at 2300 hours on 11 May with a coordinated attack by artillery and infantry. Our artillery opened up as if all guns were fired by remote control. The bulk of the artillery was concentrated on rear areas such as enemy known gun locations, command posts, enemy assembly areas and routes of advance. This type of fire was delivered in order to allow the infantrymen to advance immediately so as to gain surprise and capture initial objectives before reinforcements could arrive. (13)

The coordinated Tank-Infantry attack on Castelforte was to begin at first break of light on 12 May. The battalion moved from its assembly area to the attack positions during the night 11-12 May. (See Map C) Lt. Col. Clyde L. Layne, 755th Tank Battalion Commander, was responsible for the movement of the Lembilly Task Force (which

included over 150 vehicles) from assembly area to attack position. The move began with the opening of the Artillery. English and French speaking drivers all in one column moved into battle as the dust flew and the engines roared, but all one could hear was the roar of Allied artillery. The pontoon bridge across the Garigliano River was temporarily put out of use by enemy shelling during our crossing, but the engineers quickly repaired it and all vehicles reached the attack position on schedule.

At 0615, Company A, one company of French Tank Destroyers and the 2d Battalion of the 4th Infantry Regiment supported by a platoon of French engineers began the assault on Castelforte. The tank destroyers took up firing positions to the south while the tanks of Company A closely followed by French infantrymen advanced on Castelforte from the west. The advance was slow because of fierce enemy resistance and mines. Company A lost one tank by an AT mine even though the road had been swept with mine detectors. The tank destroyers fired into every likely spot where the enemy would deliver fire on the advancing tanks and infantry, such as streets, windows, doors, and hedges.

Co. B tanks were attacking Castelforte from the northeast with the Guilleband Task Force.

About 1000 hours an enemy strong point was encountered as the attacking force came within 100 yards of the town. Enemy machine gun fires delivered cross flanking fire on the attacking forces; also enemy AT fire knocked out one
Company A tank. This tank did not burn, as is the usual case of tanks when pierced by AP shells. There was very much confusion caused by enemy artillery, mortar and small arms fire in the area in addition to having one of our own tanks burning in a restricted area of advance. Mortar platoon half trucks delivered ammunition to tanks near Castelforte. After some two hours of reorganization and regrouping, another attack began. The Assault Gun Platoon fired on enemy positions behind Hill 335 (G841006) destroying one mortar and inflicting several casualties on the enemy. The enemy gun positions were difficult to identify because of language difficulty between the tankers and infantry; but by using the sign language the enemy guns were located. As the tank fire neutralized the area, the infantry started entering the edge of Castelforte and everything seemed to be working fine, when suddenly, the enemy opened fire from positions within the town and pinned the infantrymen down. Orders were issued to hold present positions as plans were made for a coordinated Tank-Artillery-Infantry attack to jump off at 1600 hours, assaulting the town from three directions. The attack jumped off as planned; and after a bitter battle the French Infantry entered the southern edge as darkness approached, capturing 324 prisoners as compared to 250 casualties, in both Task Forces.

Company B tanks from the northeast delivered the knock-out blow as the tanks after 12 hours maneuvering had final-
ly worked into a position which the enemy thought impassable to armor. Company B lost one tank which threw a track and the enemy artillery knocked the gun barrel off. The enemy continued suicide sniping within the town during the night. Also heavy enemy shelling arrived soon after the town's capture, as is always customary with the Germans. Tanks could not enter the town because of rubble and prepared road blocks. There was a cry for tanks to get through Castelforte and chase the enemy as he fled toward Gorena.

General de Monsabert, Commanding General of the 3d DIA who observed the attack on Castelforte called Lt. Col. Clyde L. Layne, our battalion commander to his Command Post and expressed personally his appreciation for the splendid tank support in aiding his infantrymen to capture Castelforte, the strong point along the F.E.C. sector. (14)

The town of Castelforte had the smell of dead humans, mules, and burned flesh and hair. The Germans lived underground like rats. The German prisoners said they could not stand that direct fire coming in so fast.

One bulldozer with an Arab attached worked all night to clear the path for tanks. During the night at intervals planes dropped parachute flares over the town.

By 1100 hours, 13 May Company C had moved through the town and occupied the high ground north of the town where the tanks fired into enemy positions to assist the French Infantry capture M. Geschito (G836019). Over 700 prisoners

(14) A-9, p. 2.

15
were taken during its capture. (15)

At 1700 hours Company C tanks fired with excellent results on enemy positions in rear of M. Rotonda (G830005) at the request of the 350th Regiment of the 88th Infantry Division (U.S.). (16)

In less than two day's hard fighting the 2d Moroccan Division captured M. Majo, the key terrain feature in the French Corps sector. (17)

The armored drive with Company C in the lead continued toward Corena during the 14th of May while enemy strong points on the high ground to our right were being mopped-up by the 2d Moroccan Division.

After the capture of Castelforte, the opening was clear for the special mountain fighting group, approximately 12,000 men and 4,000 animals, to pass through and cut across the Ausente Valley for their objective in the high peaks of the Petrella Hill Mass. (18) The advance by tanks on the road was slowed down considerably by demolition and enemy dead horses and destroyed equipment. Also the road toward Corena and Ausonia was narrow with sharp curves, many culverts and dangerous shoulders. Three tanks were lost by the road caving in and the tanks rolling down the mountain side.

On the 14th of May Company B as part of an armored detachment under the command of Major Dodelier moved from Castelforte through San Lorenzo and up through the Ausente

Valley toward Ausonia, while Company C moved through Corena which the enemy had abandoned without putting up a fight. The armored advance was halted while the engineers replaced a bridge at (G803053) which the enemy had destroyed during his hasty retreat. (19) Corena was an enemy supply installation as stores of Class I, II, and V supplies were left without any attempt to destroy them. This was an indication the enemy was in a hasty retreat.

The tanks of Company C entered Ausonia on the morning of the 15th of May without opposition as the French Infantry occupied the town during the night. The French Infantry was adept at night fighting. The situation was very fluid by this date. A German command car with three officers reported into a building in Ausonia which they thought was a German Command Post, however, the French happened to be operating the Command Post. The Germans were quickly disposed of as they attempted to escape.

Company C tanks passed through the town of Ausonia toward Esperia. Enemy resistance was encountered in the vicinity of S. Antonio (G780083).

The enemy was determined to hold RJ (G774092). After all day's fighting the enemy still held the road junction and as a result the French Infantry had suffered heavy casualties and Company C had lost two tanks by AT fire. (20) This was the hottest spot encountered since the attack on Castelforte. Company A tanks supported French Infantry.

(19) A-8, p. 3; (20) A-8, p. 3.
fantry in mopping-up enemy strong points which had been
by-passed in the vicinity of Castelnuovo. The enemy suf-
fered heavy casualties during the day's struggle.

The Dodelier Task Force, which Company B was under,
arrived in Ausonia in the late afternoon without meeting
any resistance in the Ausente Valley. (21)

Four fighter planes bombed and strafed the road west
of Ausonia in the afternoon of 15 May; however, no damage
was done. Plans were made to push the Dodelier Task Force
through Company C to capture Esperia on the morning of 16
May. Company B tanks were to lead the attack.

Just before the attack began on Esperia word came to
Colonel Lambilly's Command Post that Esperia had been
abandoned by the enemy during the night and to rush the
armor to Esperia at once, without delay. Lt. Pullman,
Platoon Leader of Company B, with his platoon of five tanks
was the point. No infantry support was planned in the move.
The advance on Esperia got underway.

Lt. Pullman's five tanks passed the RJ at (G774021)
at approximately 0830 without encountering any resistance.
This had been the "Hot Spot" during the bitter struggle
on the 15th. The advance continued with about 100 yards
distance between tanks. Lt. Pullman was riding in the third
tank of the column and everything was moving smoothly when
all of a sudden all hell broke loose from the right front.
Four AT guns dug in and perfectly camouflaged had let four
tanks advance within range when they opened fire. Lt. Pull-

(21) A-8, p. 3.
man was the only man of four tank crews to return. "Life" magazine, 29 May 1944, carries a picture in color of Lt. Pullman's driver as a dead German. His fifth tank in the column took cover beside the road bank. Lt. Pullman crawled back to the fifth tank and sent a radio message to Captain Thorpe, his Company Commander, giving him the situation. The remaining Company B tanks and a company of French Tank Destroyers moved up and covered the suspected gun locations with fire, inflicting severe casualties on the enemy, causing him to abandon his positions.

The AG Platoon fired in the area north of RJ (G774091) as the enemy withdrew. (22) Fighting was taking place on the high ground to our rear on both flanks. On the morning of 17 May Company A tanks accompanied by infantry moved into Esperia against little resistance. Captain Bonneheurre, G-2 of the 3d DIA, informed General Juin, F.E.C. Commander, that the enemy was in full retreat. It seemed this message opened the gate, because in a very short time a traffic jam developed around Esperia. The enemy opened up with heavy artillery shelling, causing many casualties and destroying several vehicles of the French. The traffic jam caused quite a confusion. General De Monsabert personally directed traffic in order to keep vehicles under control. (23) Colonel Lambilly moved his Command Post into the town of Esperia during the afternoon of 17 May. Company A had advanced beyond the town of Esperia toward San Olivia and was stopped by enemy demolition, enemy tank

(22) Personal knowledge; Statement of Captain Milton Pullman on 28 November 1944; (23) A-9, p. 5.
fire, and road blocks made of trees felled across the road. German equipment-personnel which evidently had been knocked out by artillery was scattered all along the road north of Esperia. Evidently it must have been reserves moving up, for they were headed south when destroyed. Two enemy tanks were abandoned in Esperia and left booby trapped.

Company B was reorganized at Ausonia during 17 May. Plans for the 18th called for the capture of San Oliva. Company A tanks moved toward San Oliva and supported the infantry in capturing Monticelli. The enemy counterattacked in the afternoon from San Oliva but after suffering many casualties he withdrew. Company A lost two tanks by AT fire. The enemy during his withdrawal lost four tanks by his own AT mines. The infantry captured Mount d'Oro in the late afternoon. Company B was to carry the brunt during the attack on San Oliva on the 19th but during the final formulating of plans Colonel Lambilly was killed. Excitement was running high as to what move would take place now. The situation was fluid. The only good news of the day was that Cassino had fallen.

Company D's light tanks were used in the San Oliva Valley to assist the French Infantry clean-up Germans who had infiltrated during the night. The French Artillery had the enemy closed in by a box barrage. Company D lost three tanks during the mopping-up phase. One tank hit a prepared demolition and the tank with crew members disintegrated.
French Infantry captured M. del Mandrone making it possible to advance on Pico. The Goums had reached the Itri-Pico road but could not advance beyond it due to enemy tank fire. On the night of 19 May the 755th Tank Battalion was attached to The Bonjour Task Force for the attack on Pico.

The enemy resistance had stiffened. Reserves had reached the lines and artillery tempo increased tremendously.

The battalion operating under Bonjour Task Force attacked toward Pico. Companies C and D supported French Infantry to cut the Pico-Pontecorva road and capture Mt. Leucio (G671179). Two tanks were lost by AT fire, however the enemy suffered heavy losses in personnel, tanks, and guns. Companies A and B moved toward Pico but by late afternoon enemy reserves from the veteran 26th Panzer Division arrived so with Mt. Leucio in our hands the battle for Pico begins—and with that I say "C'est La Guere-Finis".

The Unit Citation was awarded the 755th Tank Battalion by the F. J. C. on 23 July 1944, for action during the period 3 January through 22 July 1944.

Phases I and II as outlined in Fifth Army Orders had been accomplished on 20 May.

SUMMARY

From the capture of Castelforte the battalion in eight days had advanced some twenty miles through rough,

(24) A-8, p. 4.
rugged mountainous terrain which would have been very difficult even without any enemy interference. All orders except the initial attack order were fragmentary and oral.

Our battalion losses were 19 tanks and 51 in personnel. Casualties inflicted on the enemy were as follows:

Killed: 696; A.T. Guns: 34; Tanks: 8; Trucks: 5; Mules: 20; Halftracks: 3; and assisted in the capture of prisoners: 1235. (25)

Had not we had communication from the front line tanks to the rear areas it would have been impossible to maintain supplies over the scanty one way road net at many places.

By the Infantry taking the high ground and the tanks assisting the infantry clear the low ground the enemy was rapidly pushed back.

The French did a wonderful job during this drive. Competition, seeking individual revenge and glory kept the Fighting French moving toward the enemy even when physically exhausted.

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

The success of this operation was due principally to detailed planning from the highest down to the lowest echelon. Cooperation and coordination among units were exhibited to a high degree, with the Artillery and Air Corps rendering great support and only the Engineer support being insufficient. Traffic discipline, it might be added, was poor. Traffic control is essential when operating on poor

(25) A-8, p. 5.
roads.

In mountainous warfare such as we were encountering, key terrain was the master key to the situation. Air superiority, which we had, was also essential as the movement in our area was restricted to roads. Direct fire by the tanks lent wonderful support to the infantry in assaulting Castelforte and other fortified positions, and gave moral support at all times.

Information was not reliable. Language difficulty slowed down the operation.

Overstrength in personnel and extra equipment kept the fighting efficiency normal throughout the period.

Competition was keen during this period between the American II Corps, French Corps and British XIII Corps.

LESSONS

Some lessons learned from our operations were:

1. Liaison is a difficult among troops not speaking the same language.
2. Tanks and Infantry must work together, as a team. Separation means losses.
3. Armor requires good engineer support on a poor road net.
4. Good weather is essential in mountainous terrain for armor success.
5. Terrain is a great factor in tank warfare.
6. Competition among nationalities plays an important
7. Rehearsals pay dividends.
8. Extra ammunition carried in tanks, against fortified positions, helps the supply problem.
9. Armored half-tracks provided excellent vehicles for re-supply of gasoline and ammunition to tanks in forward positions.
10. Receiving replacements and extra equipment in advance of combat were beneficial.
11. The four SCR 245 radios were instrumental in providing communication within the battalion which was necessary in providing supplies.
12. Information not carefully evaluated can cause disastrous results.
13. Time is so valuable in a rapid advance that oral fragmentary orders are sufficient and will work satisfactorily.