General Subjects Section
ACADEMIC DEPARTMENT
THE INFANTRY SCHOOL
Fort Benning, Georgia

ADVANCED INFANTRY OFFICERS COURSE
1946 - 1949

OPERATIONS OF THE 2ND BATTALION, 511TH PARACHUTE INFANTRY
(11TH AIRBORNE DIVISION)
IN THE BATTLE FOR SOUTHERN MANILA, 3-10 FEBRUARY
(LUZON CAMPAIGN)
(Personal Experience of a Battalion Intelligence Officer)

Type of operation described: PARACHUTE INFANTRY BATTALION
IN AN ATTACK OF A FORTIFIED ZONE

Captain EDWIN B. JEFFRESS, Infantry
ADVANCED INFANTRY OFFICERS CLASS NO.1
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OPERATIONS OF THE 2ND BATTALION, 511TH PARACHUTE INFANTRY
(11TH AIRBORNE DIVISION)
IN THE BATTLE FOR SOUTHERN MANILA, 8-10 FEBRUARY 1945
(LUZON CAMPAIGN)
(Personal Experience of a Battalion Intelligence Officer)

INTRODUCTION

By 1 February 1945 Allied Forces in the European Theater of Operations had succeeded in liberating the nations of FRANCE (with the exception of the COIMAR pocket), BELGIUM, POLAND and a major portion of ITALY. (1)

In the Southwest Pacific Area, forces under the command of General DOUGLAS MACARTHUR had retaken the greater portion of NEW GUINEA and the many small islands in the ocean areas contiguous thereto; they had moved northward to secure MOROTAI and to liberate the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS of LEYTE and SAMAR and had launched amphibious assaults against the western coast of LUZON as a preliminary to the eventual liberation of "The Pearl of the Orient" - Manila. (See Map A)

The liberation of Luzon and the subsequent utilization of the Port of MANILA were vital for future operations into the RYUKYUS and the home islands of JAPAN. In addition it would effect the release of large numbers of American prisoners of war and allied internees.

ENEMY SITUATION

In late 1944, General YAMASHITA, commanding the 14th Area Army, which was charged with the defense of LUZON, was faced with the choice of a battleground. He could choose a decisive

(1) A-1, p. 80-81
action in the CENTRAL PLAIN of LUZON, loss of which would mean an end to organized resistance in LUZON, or he could sacrifice MANILA and the CENTRAL PLAIN with its numerous airfields and withdraw to the mountains for a long delaying fight. (2) Influenced by the preponderence of American armor, he chose the latter of these courses and by early December 1944 had commenced the redeployment of his forces into the mountains east of MANILA and the hills west of FORT STOTSENBURG. (See Map B) (3) Identified units contacted by US forces on LUZON to 30 June 1945 contained a total strength of 257,890 exclusive of an estimated 13,000 laborers also present on LUZON. (4)

Our landings at LINGAYEN GULF caught the enemy still in the process of redeployment. The landings were unopposed, due to the fact that the Japanese considered landings in this particular area impossible. (5) The subsequent rapid advance of the Sixth Army units to sever HIGHWAY 5 effectively isolated the garrisons of MANILA and of SOUTHERN LUZON from enemy forces in the north. (See Map B)

Early Japanese estimates resulted in the anticipation of major landings of the LUZON invasion in the BATANGAS BAY or NASUGBU BAY areas. (6) Consequently, forces in the southwest were concentrated and defensive works were organized to defend against attack from the south. Similarly, defenses in GREATER MANILA, south of the PASIG RIVER, were positioned facing south.

Japanese forces found within the 11th Airborne Division's sector of responsibility were grouped under two major commands: the FUJI GROUP and the MANILA NAVAL DEFENSE FORCE. (7)

The FUJI GROUP was commanded by Colonel (later Major General) FUJISHIGE, Masatoshi and was composed of approximately 8,000 troops of the 8th Infantry Division (less the 5th Infantry Regiment) plus numerous attachments. (8) They were disposed in the area south of a line LIMBONES POINT - CALAMBA - SAN JUAN - MAUBAN. (See Map C) Their specific missions, as stated by their commander were: (9)

"(1) To face US troops frontally and prevent them from advancing on MANILA.

(2) To keep American airborne troops committed in LUZON for as long a period as possible in order to prevent their use in OKINAWA or farther north.

(3) To prevent American reinforcements moving from southern LUZON to northern LUZON thereby making it less difficult for the major Japanese forces in northern LUZON."

The MANILA NAVAL DEFENSE FORCE was charged with the overall defenses of GREATER MANILA. It was under the command of Rear Admiral IWABUCHI, Mitsuji who, in addition, personally commanded the forces located south of the PASIG RIVER. (10) This force was of heterogeneous composition, containing units of the 31st Special Base Force (Naval), personnel from Army Field Replacement Units and some recently inducted civilians. (11)

Japanese forces located south of the PASIG RIVER as of 31 January 1945 consisted of:

Southern Unit:

3rd Battalion (Naval) (Reinforced with Naval AA)
4th Battalion (Naval) (Reinforced with Naval AA)
4BE Battalion (Army) (Reinforced with AT Company and 2nd Company, 5th Medium Mortar Battalion)

CAVITE Sector Unit:

11th Fishing (Gyoro) Battalion (Reinforced with 3rd Battery, 20th Independent Medium Artillery Battalion, one Company, 107th Fishing Battalion, and one company, 120th Fishing Battalion.) (The "Fishing Battalions" normally were assigned the mission of constructing, maintaining and defending the "Q-Boat" bases from which operated the "Fishing Squadrons", which were groups of pilots trained for suicide ramming tactics in defense of the coastline against our seaborne assaults. The total strength of a Battalion was approximately 900.)

In organizing the provisional defense forces in MANILA the Japanese found it necessary to augment their comparatively few infantry weapons. This was done by removing all serviceable weapons from the numerous ships in the harbor and the planes on the air fields which had become casualties from our air strikes. (12) As a consequence, the number of automatic weapons encountered was far in excess of those to be expected from the numerical strength of the defender.

(12) A-5, p. 3.
In organizing the ground for the defense of SOUTHERN MANILA the Japanese decided upon a broad defensive belt extending from the mouth of the PARANAGUE RIVER, across NICHOLS FIELD, to the northwest tip of LAGUNA DE BAY. Its northeastern base was FORT WILLIAM McKinley and it extended northward along the shores of MANILA BAY to the vicinity of the POLO CLUB. (See Map C) (13)

This defensive zone was known as the GENKO LINE. Within the area the Japanese occupied a total of more than 1200 pill-boxes. By actual count, 44 heavy artillery pieces (120 mm Coastal Defense and Dual Purpose AA), 164 AA guns (20 to 40 mm, single, double, and triple barreled), and a great number of machine guns, 13mm or smaller caliber, were encountered. To further bolster the defense, the area was sown with aerial bombs ranging in weight from 100 to 1000 pounds and anti-submarine depth charges, all rigged with trip wires or pressure activated fuses. (14) Barrieades of wire were erected across open areas connected to road blocks composed of machinery, tractors, road rollers, steel rails, wooden beams, old vehicle bodies, etc., imbedded in concrete, and invariably covered by fire. (15)

The responsibility for the main positions of the GENKO LINE was given to the 3rd and 4th Naval Battalions while the ABE Battalion outposted the line in the areas KAWIT - IMUS - LAS PINAS - PARANAGUE. (16)

Although the defense forces in SOUTHERN MANILA were somewhat hastily organized, provisional units, it is not to be

(13) A-4, p.29; (14) A-4, p.29; (15) Personal knowledge; (16) A-4, p.29.
inferred that they lacked the stubbornness and fatalistic tenacity characteristic of the Japanese as is evidenced by the following captured document: (17)

"Ultra Secret Central Op Order No. 4

15 Feb 45

Central Force CO, Iwabuchi, Mitsuji

Central Unit Order

1. The city has fallen into hand-to-hand fighting since this morning, and 5 tanks and 9 armored cars are appearing and disappearing at every turn.

2. This unit will make preparation for an all-out suicide attack to annihilate the enemy to our front. On the night of the 15th each unit will carry out as many daring suicide attacks on the enemy to our front as possible. Although the time of the all-out suicide attack will be indicated in a separate order, preparations will be completed beforehand.

   a. In addition to annihilating the enemy to the front, the suicide unit will plan to wipe out the enemy in the MALACANAN PALACE.

   b. Prior to the all-out suicide attack, wounded will be made to commit suicide and documents and material will be burnt.

   c. In the all-out suicide attack every man will attack until he achieves a glorious

(17) A-5,p.15
death. Not even one man must become a prisoner. During the attack friends of the wounded will make them commit suicide.

d. The Suicide (Nikko) Section will be at the head of the attack and will destroy the enemy tanks.

e. Personnel will be lightly garbed in the attack and carry as much ammo as possible. Personal belongings and unnecessary articles will be burnt."

Although the enemy did not evince full compliance with the letter of the order above, he did participate in numerous "Banzai" attacks and attempt a tenacious hold upon the positions which he occupied. (18)

GENERAL SITUATION ON LUZON

After landing in the LINGAYEN GULF area on 9 January 1945, Sixth Army units (I Corps: 6th Div. and 43rd Div.; XIV Corps: 37th Div. and 40th Div.) had by 2 February pushed south and east beyond PLARIDEL, MALOLOS, and CABANATUAN. XI Corps, composed of the 38th Infantry Division and the 34th Infantry Red Arrow landed in the vicinity of LA PAZ on 29 January 1945 under Eighth Army control and after passing to Sixth Army control on 30 January had, by 2 February completed the opening of SUBIC BAY by the capture of SUBIC TOWN, OLONGAPO, and GRANDE ISLAND and were engaged in the battle for ZIG-ZAG PASS on HIGHWAY 7. (See Map B) (19)

(18) Personal knowledge; (19) A-7, pp.32-34.
PLANS FOR OPERATION MIKE-SIX

Operations Instructions No. 86, General Headquarters, SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA, in mid-January 1945, directed the Commanding General, Eighth Army, to support the operations of the Sixth Army by diversionary operations in the BATANGAS-TAYABAS area in order to isolate hostile forces south of MANILA BAY and LAGUNA DE BAY.

Specific missions assigned were: (See Map D) (20)

"(1) secure two beachheads in the coastal sector of NASUGBU-PACBILCAN (TAYABAS) at times and places later designated, in order to contain hostile forces in CAVITE, BATANGAS, and TAYABAS PROVINCES;

(2) conduct subsequent overland and minor overwater operations as required to restrict enemy movement in the BATANGAS-TAYABAS area;

(3) occupy and defend sites for light radar and air warning installations as required; and,

(4) employ the 11th Airborne Division (reinforced) in the assault, concentrating the 511th Para-chute Infantry at SAN JOSE, MINDORO, (prior to 30 January 1945) as task force reserve."

(Earlier Operations Instructions, issued in the initial planning stages for the LUZON operations had assigned the 11th Airborne Division to Sixth Army who envisioned their use for the seizure of one of several objectives by airborne assault; or their movement into the LINGAYEN GULF area by air or water. Subsequent instructions deleted the 11th Airborne Division from the Sixth Army troop list.) (21)

(20) A-8, p.9; (21) A-7, p.6.
On 22 January, 1945, Eighth Army, in Field Order No. 17, directed: (22)

"**the 11th Airborne Division (less the 511th Parachute Regimental Combat Team) to execute a reconnaissance in force in the NASUGBU area by overwater movement from LEYTE, with 31 January designated as X-Day."

The detailed plan (See Map D) was as follows:

(1) One regimental combat team was to seize and defend a beachhead in the objective area (NASUGBU);

(2) a second regimental combat team was to land later at NASUGBU as directed by the Commanding General, Eighth Army;

(3) the south flank of the landing was to be secured by blocking the approach of the enemy from the BALAYAN BAY-SANTILAC PENINSULA area (Phase I);

(4) the 11th Airborne Division was to drive inland and effect a juncture with the 511th Parachute Regimental Combat Team on TAGAYTAY RIDGE (Phase II); and

(5) the 511th Parachute Regimental Combat Team was directed to move by air from LEYTE and MINDORO bases and land by parachute on TAGAYTAY RIDGE in order to secure the approaches to the north and to deny the enemy access to its objective area. Following the juncture with elements of the 11th Airborne Division driving eastward from NASUGBU, the advance to the north was to continue as rapidly as the situation would permit."

(22)A-8, pp.9-10.
In addition to the instructions above, GHQ, SWPA had restricted the commitment of the 511th Parachute Infantry until such time as the Division could guarantee ground contact within twenty-four hours. (23)

PREPARATIONS FOR OPERATION MIKE-SIX

On 13 January 1945 the 11th Airborne Division was relieved of tactical duties in the LEYTE operation and alerted for the coming Mike-Six Operation.

Subsequent Division orders directed a portion of the 511th Parachute Regimental Combat Team to move by air to the vicinity of SAN JOSE, MINDORO, P.I. The remainder of the Combat Team would move by water transportation to the same area where the entire Combat Team would engage in preparation and briefing for the coming airborne assault in SOUTHERN LUZON. (24)

Prior to the departure from LEYTE, Terrain Studies of SOUTHERN LUZON and aerial photographs of the drop zone area were made available to the Regiment in sufficient quantities to permit distribution to battalions. In addition, Terrain Handbooks of BATANGAS PROVINCE (the objective area) were available down to company level. (25)

On 27 January 1945, the 2nd Battalion, 511th Parachute Infantry boarded LCI 746, LCI 962 and LCI 633 at BITO BEACH on the eastern coast of LEYTE ISLAND. At approximately 1700I hours on this date, a large convoy composed of LCI’s, LCMs, LSTs and APDs sailed southward around the southern tip

(23) A-4, p.3a; (24) (25) Personal knowledge
of Leyte and thence northward through the many islands of the Visayan Sea. (See Map E) The Battalion Commander accompanied the Regimental Commander to Mindoro Island by air and subsequently engaged in aerial reconnaissance of the drop zone on Luzon. (26)

Upon nearing the southern tip of Mindoro, the ships carrying the 511th Infantry elements veered eastward, while the main portion of the convoy continued northward for the sea-borne assault at Nasugbu. On 30 January at approximately 1100I hours the 511th Parachute Infantry began disembarking at St. Augustine, Mindoro moving from there for a short distance inland to the vicinity of San Jose. (See Map E) (27)

Shortly after arrival on Mindoro, tactical maps (1:50,000) and large scale photographs (1:9,800) of the drop area were received. From these, and with the assistance of the Commanders' aerial reconnaissance, large and detailed sand tables were prepared and briefing of the troops began. Later developments proved this detailed briefing to be of prime importance. (28)

Concurrently, aerial delivery containers were being packed with crew-served weapons, ammunition, bulky communication equipment, and medical supplies. These containers were to be dropped, as door loads, with the troops. (29)

Initial Mission of the Second Battalion

The Regimental order, issued on Mindoro, directed that the 2nd Battalion would jump from the initial lift over Tagaytay Ridge (less Planes 1-5, reserved for Regimental Command and Operations group); assemble and move to the east to establish (26) (27) (28) (29) Personal knowledge
a road block at the junction of Highways 17 and 25B; patrol north on Highway 408 to ALFONSO to determine presence and dispositions (if any) of the enemy; and be prepared to advance toward MANILA on Regimental order. (see Map F) (30)

LANDINGS ON TAGAYTAY RIDGE

On 1 February, the 511th Regimental Combat Team received instructions postponing the jump on LUZON, originally scheduled for 2 February, for twenty four hours. This was done to insure compliance with the GHQ directive for juncture with other elements of the Division within twenty four hours.

At 0300I hours on 3 February the 2nd Battalion entrucked at their bivouac area and moved to the SAN JOSE airstrip. Here personnel and cargo parachutes were issued and fitted. The troops moved to the parking area, boarded the planes and after a flight of some forty five minutes, at 0615I hours, descended on TAGAYTAY RIDGE, LUZON. (31)

The selected drop zone lay north of HIGHWAY 17, from its junction with HIGHWAY 408, westward to a point where HIGHWAY 17 turns sharply to the northwest. This gave a satisfactory dropping area of about 2000 yards in width and 4000 yards in length. (See Map F)

A "V of V" Flight formation was selected in order to get the maximum number of troops on the ground in the shortest possible time. Jump altitude was 800 feet above the contour. The flight path ran northward across MINDORO, the VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE, BATANGAS BAY, and LAKE TAAL with its VOLCANO ISLAND,

(30) Personal knowledge; Statement of Lieutenant Colonel FRANK S. HOLCOMBE, then commanding 2nd Battalion, 511th Parachute Infantry; (31) Personal knowledge.
to TAGAYTAY RIDGE where a turn of about 110 degrees to the west carried the formation over the long axis of the RIDGE. (See Map E) (32)

As the formation crossed LAKE TAAL, a heavy bank of cumulus clouds could be seen lying about 400 feet above the RIDGE. This cloud layer obscured the drop zone, the ground being visible, occasionally, through holes in the clouds. Consequently, determination of the actual "go point" (just west of HIGHWAY 408) was extremely difficult. (33)

The Platoon Leader and a portion of the Regimental Demolition Platoon (Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 511th Parachute Infantry) had landed at NASUGBU on 31 January with the waterborne elements of the Division. Subsequently, they moved inland, passed through the Japanese lines, and reached TAGAYTAY RIDGE. Here this group contacted the guerrillas in the area, coordinated their activities, pending the arrival of the parachute elements, and marked the drop zone with panels and smoke on the morning of 3 February. (34)

Although the plane loads of the first elements landed accurately on the drop zone, the succeeding elements were dropped early with such cumulative error that the final pattern extended about 6000 yards east of the "go point". This error can be laid (even allowing for the increased difficulty due to the cloud bank) to the lack of experience of the pilots in dropping parachutists. Following the accurate placement of the first V of Vs on the drop zone, the pilots of the succeeding Vs, quite obviously, signalled for exits when they observed the drifting parachutes of the preceding elements pass beneath the planes ahead. (35)

(33) (34) Personal knowledge; (35) Personal opinion; Personal knowledge of conversations with jumpers in rear elements; A-4, P-4.
Personnel jumping in the first lift consisted of the Regimental Command and Operations group, the 2nd Battalion, and a portion of the 3rd Battalion, 511th Parachute Infantry. The 2nd Battalion's strength, jumping, was 502 officers and men. Reports after assembly showed an effective strength of 500 officers and men. (35)

The Battalion, jumping in the order: Headquarters Company, D Company, F Company, and E Company landed on TAGAYTAY RIDGE without incident. The assembly of the Battalion was delayed only by the over extension of the jump pattern and no enemy resistance was encountered. (37)

Immediately upon landing, D Company dispatched a platoon to ALFONSO while E Company, moving from their landing area east of the drop zone, proceeded to establish the road block at the junction of HIGHWAYS 17 and 25 B. Meanwhile, the Battalion Command Post was established on HIGHWAY 17 about 1200 yards east of HIGHWAY 408. (See Map F) (38)

At approximately 1215I hours the second lift of the 511th Combat Team, consisting of the 1st Battalion and the remainder of the 3rd Battalion, landed on TAGAYTAY RIDGE. As ordered, the 3rd Battalion secured the drop area and the 1st Battalion moved westward to establish a roadblock at the junction of HIGHWAYS 17 and 414 and continued along HIGHWAY 17 to make contact with the 188th Glider Infantry. (See Map F)

At 1600I hours the CP of the 2nd Battalion was moved to the road junction of HIGHWAYS 17 and 25B. All elements of the

(36) Statement of Lieutenant Colonel FRANK S. HOLCOMBE, then commanding 2nd Battalion, 511th Parachute Infantry;
(37) (38) Personal knowledge.
Battalion closed in this area and made preparations for the occupation of the position for the night. (See Map E) (39)

MISSION FOR 4 FEBRUARY

At approximately 2100I hours on 3 February, the Battalion Commander, 2nd Battalion, was ordered to report to the Regimental CP to receive instructions for operations on the following day. He directed his Battalion S-2 to accompany him to receive the order.

Following the establishment of contact with the 186th Infantry, the Eighth Army Commander and the Division Commander had moved forward to the 511th Infantry's position. The Army Commander now directed a full scale advance to the CITY of MANILA. (40)

The Division Commander directed that a sufficient number of the vehicles which had been landed across the beaches at NASUGBU, be given to the 511th to permit the motorization of one battalion. (41)

The Regimental order directed the 2nd Battalion to move at daylight by motor via HIGHWAYS 17 and 1 to MANILA. (See Map G) In addition, it was directed that a motorized patrol, mounted on nine ½ ton trucks, would precede the Battalion by one hour. One NCO and two men from the 127th Airborne Engineer Battalion and one NCO of the CIC detachment would accompany the patrol.

The Battalion S-2 was directed by the Battalion Commander to formulate plans for and prepare to lead the patrol on the following morning. He was advised that the Battalion would move in the order: D Company, E Company, Headquarters Company, and F Company and that sufficient personnel of one of the rifle companies would be provided to augment the patrol. At this time (39)Personal knowledge; (40) A-6, p. 82; (41) A-4, p.4.
the S-2 requested that he be furnished with three SCR 300 radios for intra-patrol communication and an SCR 694 and two operators from the Battalion Communication Platoon for communication with the main body. This request was granted after coordination with the Regimental Communication Officer.

The S-2 evolved the following plan, which was approved:

**Personnel**

- Battalion Intelligence Section - 7 men, 1 officer
- Battalion Communication Platoon - 2 men
- 2 Rifle Squads (Company P) (understrength) - 17 men
- 127th Engineer Battalion - 3 men
- CIC Detachment - 1 man
- Drivers - 9 men
- Total - 39 men, 1 officer

**Transportation**

- 9 - ½ ton trucks

**Communications**

- 3 - SCR 300
- 1 - SCR 694

From a map reconnaissance of the route, points were selected and given code names in order to permit reference to these locations in clear text in radio transmissions. Reports were to be made upon arrival at each of these points or upon the occurrence of any unusual incident.

Subsequent instructions directed that the patrol would examine all bridges along the route and would contact Filipino authorities and guerilla leaders for any available information of the enemy. Information was also received that the Division Reconnaissance Platoon (Provisional) had patrolled HIGHWAY 17
as far as the junction with HIGHWAY 441 without making a contact with the enemy. (42)

**ACTIONS ON 4 FEBRUARY - IMUS (43)**

At 0530I hours the patrol departed from the Battalion bivouac and proceeded east and north along HIGHWAY 17. (See Map F) Filipinos throughout the area were aware of the arrival of the Americans and now lined the road to greet them. At SILANG a brass band had been assembled and was playing merrily as the patrol entered the town. Guerillas, equipped with an assortment of arms, both Japanese and American, and displaying a large American flag, were drawn up at Present Arms along the roadway.

At this time, no reports of definite locations of the enemy had been received and the patrol had proceeded without incident. Some delay was experienced from the necessity of halting and dismounting the generator unit of the SCR 694 in order to transmit reports to the main body.

At DAS MARINAS the first report of definite location of the enemy was received. While the 3-2 was interviewing the mayor of the town at approximately 0850 hours, a Filipino arrived by bicycle to report that he had just completed the journey from IMUS at the greatest possible speed, that the Japanese still occupied the town, and that the Japanese planned to evacuate the town and destroy the one remaining bridge across the IMUS RIVER at 1000 hours.

The patrol immediately remounted their vehicles and departed for IMUS. Some 2000 yards south of the town the 3-2 halted the

(42) Personal knowledge; (43) The entire description of the Patrol action in this section is given from personal experience.
patrol and directed the Battalion Intelligence Section leader to take approximately half of the patrol, reconnoiter a secondary road leading into the town and rejoin in IMUS. (See Map C) The S-2 with the remainder of the patrol proceeded along HIGHWAY 17 to the IMUS RIVER. Here, after determining that the highway bridge had been destroyed, and being unable to establish radio contact with the main body, the S-2 dispatched a motor messenger to the Company D Commander, informing him of the situation, advising that the patrol was moving into IMUS in an effort to make contact with the Japanese, and requesting that he move forward as rapidly as possible to support the expected contact. Following this, the remainder of the patrol was dismounted, the vehicles placed under cover with their drivers, and the movement, on foot, into IMUS was begun. At this time some difficulty was experienced with the numerous Filipinos who gathered around the patrol, and whom it was feared, would disclose the arrival to the Japanese.

Moving into the town, the patrol came to a heavy stone wall surrounding an old Spanish church on the bank of the IMUS RIVER. Observation over and through this wall disclosed several Japanese soldiers engaged in loading supplies on trucks. The S-2 directed that the light machine gun of the depleted rifle squad accompanying him be implaced to fire through an aperture in the wall but to fire only upon order or upon being discovered and fired upon by the Japanese. (See Map C) The remainder of the group then moved around an angle of the wall and observed several Japanese soldiers entering the church yard from the town.

The S-2 then disposed the available men along the west wall
and instructed them as to his intention of attacking across the church yard, under cover of the supporting fire of the machine gun. He moved back to the machine gun position and instructed the two men there to begin firing when the first man scaled the wall on the adjacent side and to lift fire only when the riflemen were endangered by the machine gun fire.

The reason behind this plan was to engage the Japanese so as to prevent their withdrawal and destruction of the remaining bridge.

Just as the S-2 returned to the position of the riflemen, Company D arrived in the town. Thereafter, the attack upon the position was relinquished to the Company D Commander.

After a short personal reconnaissance, the Company D Commander emplaced a 60 mm mortar, a light machine gun, a BAR, and a portion of the riflemen of one platoon behind the southern wall of the church yard. The remainder of this platoon was positioned at the northwest corner of the wall to cover the street and approaches to the bridge over the IMUS RIVER. (See Map G)

The two remaining platoons, which had been disposed behind the western wall, were then committed in a double enveloping attack around the northern and southern sides of the church. (44)

The supporting weapons group at the south end of the church yard opened fire on the court yard on the eastern side of the church and on several wooden buildings in the southern portion of the church yard just as the first men of the attacking echelon scaled the west wall. They maintained this fire until signalled to lift by the bursting of a WP grenade in the eastern courtyard.

(44) Statement of Captain STEPHEN E. CAVANAUGH, JR., then commanding Company D, 511th Parachute Infantry.
After completing the encirclement of the church, one platoon was ordered to move into the church and evict the defenders. The platoon entered the church through a small opening in the wall at the Altar end of the church, moved through the building, killed four Japanese and emerged through the front entrance, supposing that they had cleared the building. This supposition proved erroneous due to the fact that subsequent movement around the church drew fire from the basement windows and also from the main entrance.

One of the two self-propelled 75s, M-8, which had been attached to the Division and were accompanying the leading elements of the Battalion was brought forward to fire into the openings and against the walls of the church at a range of about twenty yards. Although creating a great amount of dust and a small amount of fracturing of the walls, this fire was generally ineffective.

After the encirclement of the church building, Japanese began to appear from numerous "spider holes" in the eastern and southern portions of the church yard. These inflicted several casualties on our forces, but seemed mainly concerned with attempts to escape across the IMUS RIVER.

After reducing all external resistance at IMUS, Company D was ordered to leave one platoon to complete the mopping-up and rejoin the Battalion advance on MANILA.

While Company D was engaged in the fire fight for the church, the Engineer detail, attached to the Battalion patrol, moved through the streets of IMUS and into the river bed, thence up river to the bridge, to determine that the bridge had not been mined below the span. In so doing they encountered and killed two Japanese in the river bed. After Company D completed the encirclement of the church and while the bridge was still under
sporadic fire, this detail moved out onto the bridge and removed
the fuse from a large aerial bomb, buried in the roadway arch of
the bridge.

As soon as the bridge was determined to be passable, the
Battalion S-2 was ordered to locate a by-pass route over the
bridge and back on to HIGHWAY 17. Such a route was found over
a dirt road running along the east bank of the river to the
highway - a distance of about 700 yards. The securing of the
only remaining crossing of the IMUS RIVER by the 2nd Battalion
permitted the uninterrupted advance of the Division. (45)

The platoon of Company D which remained at IMUS continued
to eliminate the remaining Japanese. In an effort to clear
the building, the Platoon Sergeant climbed to the roof, tore
a hole in the roof and poured gasoline through the opening
and ignited it with a WP grenade. The resulting fire drove
the remaining defenders from the building, permitting their
destruction by the platoon. A total of 86 enemy dead was
counted at this position. (46)

ACTIONS ON 4 FEBRUARY - LAS PINAS

While Company D was engaged at IMUS, Companies E and F
were proceeding up HIGHWAY 17 under the control of the Battal-
on Executive Officer. Upon reaching the destroyed bridge over
the IMUS RIVER they were ordered to dismount and cross the
river via a small dam near the bridge site. Company E was
ordered to continue the advance up HIGHWAY 17 while Company F
was directed to occupy the east bank of the river and prevent
escape of the Japanese from IMUS. (This order, from the Army
(45) Personal knowledge; (46) Statement, Captain STEPHEN E.
CAVANAUGH, JR., then commanding Company D, 511th Parachute
Infantry.

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Commander, was transmitted to the Battalion Executive Officer by the Division Chief of Staff without prior information to the Battalion Commander, who was with Company D and the Regimental Commander in IMUS.) (47)

After crossing the IMUS RIVER, Company E proceeded along HIGHWAY 17 for about 2800 yards to the junction of a road running northwest to join HIGHWAY 25 in the vicinity of MABOLO. As they approached this junction, they observed a Japanese truck approaching HIGHWAY 17 from the west. Quickly setting up a light machine gun, they opened fire and killed the eighteen occupants of the truck. (See Map C) (48)

Company E continued the advance along HIGHWAY 17 without further opposition and secured the junction of this highway with HIGHWAY 25. Continuing along HIGHWAY 25 they secured the junction with HIGHWAY 1B running south to the shores of LAGUNA DE BAY. (See Map H) To the north, HIGHWAY 1B led straight to MANILA.

The highways of this area are lined with native houses of nipa construction, interspersed occasionally with more modern light frame buildings. The terrain is very flat and large areas of the tidal flats have been made into fish ponds and evaporating pools for the production of salt from sea water.

As Company E approached the highway bridge at LAS PINAS they observed several Japanese running back across the bridge. Deploying, they moved toward the bridge and were met by intense fire from a pillbox located at the northwest corner of the bridge and from positions in a school building and the school yard located on the north bank of the river.

(47) Statement, Major JOHN M. COOK, then Executive Officer, 2nd Battalion, 511th Parachute Infantry; (48) Statement, 1st Sergeant (then Captain) HOBART B. WADD, then commanding Company E, 511th Parachute Infantry.
The Battalion Commander ordered Company E to move to the right of the highway and committed Company F to the attack on the left of the highway. After these two companies had maintained the fire fight for a short time without gaining sufficient fire superiority to force a crossing of the bridge, the Battalion Commander ordered Company F to continue the holding attack while Company E was directed to execute a wide enveloping maneuver across the salt flats, cross the river and enter the town of LAS PINAS from the east. Artillery support was requested against the enemy positions adjacent to the bridge and shortly thereafter fires from the 75 mm pack howitzers of the 674th and 675th Glider FA Battalions were delivered against these positions. (See Map II)

Company E entered the center of the town of LAS PINAS without meeting opposition and Company F, following closely upon the artillery concentrations, crossed the bridge and disposed of all resistance north of the river.

After entering the town, Company E continued the push to the north. As Company E approached PARANAQUE, the Regimental Commander commenced a passage of the 1st Battalion through the 2nd Battalion. He attached Company E to the 1st Battalion and directed the continuation of their advance.

Although Company E passed through the southern part of PARANAQUE without opposition, their advance to the bridge across the PARANAQUE RIVER was halted by a heavy volume of fire from the north bank of the river. Leading elements succeeded in reaching the mid-point of the bridge but were driven back by the enemy fire. (49)

(49) Statement of 1st Sergeant (then Captain) HOBART B. WADE, then commanding Company E, 511th Parachute Infantry.
As darkness had now fallen, Company E dug in on its position at the southern of the bridge. The 1st Battalion was concentrated in the area of the church and market place, (See Map E) while the 2nd Battalion was halted in the streets in the southern part of PARANAQUE.

**ACTIONS ON 5-6 FEBRUARY — PARANAQUE**

During the night of 4-5 February, in preparation for a continuation of the attack, the 674th and 675th Glider FA Battalions delivered more than 1000 rounds in precision adjustment against the Japanese fortifications located behind the concrete breakwater wall along the north bank of the PARANAQUE RIVER. (50)

The Japanese reacted to these preparations with heavy fire from naval rifles of five inch and larger calibers. Although this fire was, to some extent, harassing to the artillery and the Division installations which were moving up, its effect upon the forward Infantry elements was negligible beyond the psychological effect of heavy shells screaming overhead through the narrow streets of PARANAQUE.

The Regimental Commander decided to commit two battalions, on 5 February, against the now located right flank of the GENKO LINE. His plan placed the 2nd Battalion on the left and the 3rd Battalion on the right with the PARANAQUE RIVER as the boundary between battalions. (See Map E)

The Battalion Commander ordered Company F to effect the crossing of the river and in the hazy, gray light preceding dawn, the company crossed the half demolished bridge and secured the area around the north end of the bridge. With a (50) A-4, p. 4
battalion zone of 250-300 yards in width and closely built-up with Nipa shacks and occasional frame structures, the Battalion Commander decided to employ Company D on the right of the main road (MANTILA SOUTH ROAD) and Company E on the left of the road. This employment, on reduced frontages, proved to be a wise decision since the Battalion advance was dependent upon the minute search of every structure and the elimination of the enemy located inside the houses, in holes underneath the houses and in sniper positions hidden above the rafters of the Nipa shacks.

The Battalion advanced, slowly, by hand-to-hand combat with the enemy. When particularly stiff pockets of resistance were encountered the 81 mm mortars, using white phosphorus, were employed to burn out the Nipa shacks concealing the Japanese positions. Advance across the open areas was generally difficult as most of these areas were approaches to the better class of residences in the district which were surrounded by stone walls. These walls provided adequate cover for the defenders and protection for automatic weapons which fired through holes broken through the walls. Artillery fires were utilized to assist in the reduction of these positions, however, the problem of supply of ammunition limited the use of artillery fire to definitely located targets. It was remarked at this time that the 11th Airborne Division had secured a beachhead 200 yards wide and 70 miles in depth.

During the day of 5 February, the Battalion advanced some 600 yards north of the PARANAQUE BRIDGE, with advance elements about 200 yards farther north. (See Map H) During the morning, one of the M-8's accompanying the Battalion ran over an aerial bomb emplaced in the roadway and was disabled. About noon, a
flight of A-20's, supposedly striking against Japanese positions to the front of the Battalion, made two strafing runs on the Battalion CP, disregarding completely the colored smoke displayed by the front line units. No casualties were suffered in this attack. (51)

Early in the afternoon, an officer-led patrol from the 3rd Battalion forded the PARANAQUE RIVER and reported to the Battalion Commander that the 3rd Battalion had reached positions generally abreast of the 2nd Battalion. (52)

Due to the increasing number of stone and stucco houses, obstacles and emplacements on the west side of the MANILA SOUTH ROAD, the Battalion Commander decided to commit Company F on the left of Company E in order to cover the Battalion zone to the water's edge. This beach area was heavily covered with wire entanglements and gun emplacements designed to defend the shore line of MANILA BAY and is exposed to observation around the arc of the bayshore as far as the harbor area near the main part of the city. Because of the narrowness of the zone, Company F was initially forced to follow Company E in echelon to the left. (53)

During the night of 5-6 February a Japanese suicide group, estimated to have been composed of about twenty men and led by at least one officer, succeeded in penetrating our positions on the left. They continued to the vicinity of the Battalion CP where they attacked a squad of the Battalion light machine gun platoon which was providing local security for the Battalion installations. They succeeded in killing about half of the LMG squad and wounding others. One of the wounded survivors lay beneath the dead body of a fellow soldier until daylight.

(51) (52) Personal knowledge; (53) Statement of 1st Lieutenant RALPH E. SEWATINGER, then Executive Officer, Company F, 511th Parachute Infantry.

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In attempting to return to their own lines, the Japanese encountered a platoon of Company F and a majority of the enemy were destroyed. (54)

On 6 February the Battalion continued the attack and succeeded in driving the enemy some 700 yards north to a position approximately 150 yards south of the SOUTH ACCESS ROAD leading to NICHOLS FIELD. (See Map H)

The terrain in the right of the Battalion zone was now generally open, but covered with grass 3½-4 feet in height which provided excellent concealment for numerous foxholes, most of which were occupied. On the left, in Company E's sector, the area continued to be built up with rows of houses, perpendicular to the axis of advance and separated by open areas which varied from 50 to 100 yards in width. On the extreme left, Company F continued to battle through the stone and stucco residences facing the bay and the wire entanglements on the beach. (55)

In the early part of the afternoon the Battalion CP was moved northward some 600 yards to a large white house on the right of MANILA SOUTH ROAD. This building had been recently occupied by the enemy and was used as a supply point. Large quantities of canned and dried foods, cigarettes, bottled soft drinks, and several cases of Japanese rum were found. Several anti-boat mines and a large quantity of "Molotov cocktails" and lunge mines were located in the lower story of the house. (56)

An incident occurred at this location which clearly portrays the value of the prompt and proper handling of intelligence documents. A rifleman of Company F removed a sketch covered with military symbols from the body of a dead Jap. Noting its content, (54) (55) (56) Personal knowledge.
he promptly turned the sketch over to his Company Commander who, in turn, immediately sent it to the Battalion CP. Here, the Battalion S-2, without the aid of translators, was able to orient the sketch to the ground and fix its position from the location of obstacles and emplacements indicated on the sketch and through which the Battalion had passed. After explaining his interpretation of the document to the Battalion Commander, who noted the locations indicated which had not been reached, the S-2 personally returned with the document to the Regimental CP and explained to the Regimental Commander and Regimental S-2, his interpretation of the document as being the plan for the defense of the area in which the Battalion was then engaged. Subsequent translation and examination of the ground proved this interpretation to be substantially correct and use was made of the document by assisting in the location of concealed positions. (57)

**ACTIONS ON 7, 8, 9 FEBRUARY - BACLARAN**

On the night of 6-7 February the Battalion was subjected to its first experience with Japanese timed artillery fire. This fire, which burst about 30 to 40 feet above the ground, covered the Battalion CP and rear areas as well as the front lines. In addition, the Japanese continued to employ their heavy naval rifles to harass Regimental and Divisional installations further to the rear.

During the day of 7 February the Battalion by continuous hand to hand combat slugged its way about 150 yards north and secured the SOUTH ACCESS ROAD to NICHOLS FIELD. Physical contact was made with the 3rd Battalion by making use of the wooden bridge over the PARANAQUE RIVER which had been sufficiently demolished to permit only foot traffic. (See Map H)

(57) Personal knowledge.
After remaining in this position all night, the Battalion resumed the advance at dawn. After crossing the SOUTH ACCESS ROAD, Company D was soon held up by intense rifle and machine gun fire coming from behind a stone wall about 200 yards north of the road. This wall was about five feet high and extended from the MANILA SOUTH ROAD to a point about three quarters of the distance to the river. On the left, Company E was faced by positions located in the stables of the LAS TANAROS POLO CLUB which extended from the MANILA SOUTH ROAD, westward, for about 150 yards toward the bay. (56)

Adequate artillery support was not available at this time due to a shortage of ammunition. Being unable to attain fire superiority with the fires available, the Battalion was forced to remain facing these positions throughout the night.

Due to the proximity of the units of the XIV Corps in the north and east of the city to the 11th Airborne Division in the south, it became necessary to coordinate artillery fires. On 8 February a NO FIRE LINE, to limit the fires of both elements, was established. This line ran from MANILA BAY, northeast along CAIPE LIBERTAD to CULI-CULI thence southeast along the MANILA RR (LAGUNA EXTENSION). (See Map B) (59)

Early on the morning of 9 February, Company D sent a patrol along the river bank and into the rear of the Japanese position. This patrol, although suffering casualties, definitely located the Jap emplacements and upon returning were able to point out these targets to the Artillery FO. Artillery fires were brought to bear against these positions and generally across the Battalion front, following which Company D took the wall by storm. (56) Personal knowledge; (59) A-7, p. 38
Moving forward, Company D now could bring enfilade fire to bear upon the stables across the road, and with this assistance, Company E cleared the enemy from this position. (60)

Advancing beyond the stables, a platoon of Company E occupied the POLO CLUB building facing the bay. Soon after their entry, the Japanese counter-attacked and succeeded in gaining the northern end of the building. When the platoon requested 81 mm mortar fire on the north end of the building they were ordered to report their own location. They reported that they were in the south end of the building while the Japs were in the north end (building was about 100 feet long) and renewed the request for fire. This incident is included as being indicative of the confidence which the entire Battalion placed in the accurate gunnery of the 81 mm Mortar Platoon. The platoon of Company E was subsequently ordered to withdraw to the stables. This was accomplished, with some difficulty, due to Japanese fire, and after firing of an artillery concentration the advance was resumed.

During the day the Battalion advanced about 1600 yards to the southern ends of DEWEY BOULEVARD and the TAPT AVENUE EXTENSION. The NORTH ACCESS ROAD to NICHOLS FIELD was secured and contact with the 3rd Battalion was renewed. (See Map H)

**ACTIONS ON 10 FEBRUARY - RELIEF OF THE 2ND BATTALION**

At dawn on 10 February, the Battalion renewed the attack and advanced a short distance to the north. Meeting a continuation of the organized positions, a withdrawal of about 100 yards was ordered and artillery concentrations were requested. While these

(60) Statement, Captain STEPHEN E. CAVANAUGH, JR., then commanding Company D, 511th Parachute Infantry
fires were being delivered, the Battalion Commander received a
message ordering him to remain in his present position and to re-
vert to Division reserve upon relief by the 1st Battalion, 187th
Glider Infantry.

This relief was accomplished during the early afternoon and
the Battalion moved south to occupy positions at the mouth of the
PARANAQUE RIVER. (See Map H) Subsequent instructions from Division
directed the protection of the Division rear installations and
Company E and a platoon of Company D were dispatched to the vicin-
ity of LAS PINAS and BACOOR to accomplish this mission.

Although the area through which the Battalion had been fight-
ing was inhabited, the troops had not been confronted with the
problem of dealing with large, moving masses of civilians. At
this time the MANILA SOUTH ROAD became flooded with civilians,
pushing, pulling and driving every conceivable form of conveyance,
bearing on their backs their personal belongings and the aged
and infirm. These refugees stated that the Japanese were burn-
ing the city by sections and were setting up machine guns at the
street intersections to prevent inhabitants from leaving the con-
demned areas. In an effort to prevent the infiltration of Makap-
pilis (native collaborators) and Japanese into our rear areas,
the Battalion established a guard, composed of the Battalion
Intelligence Section assisted by Filipino guerrillas, on the
PARANAQUE BRIDGE. This guard proved generally ineffective, due
to the difficulty of identification among the horde of native
Filipinos, Asiatics, Eurasians, and Europeans. However, some
measure of success was achieved in containing the mass on the
main road and directing them to the Division collecting point

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where they were screened by operatives of the Counter Intelligence Corps. (61)

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After remaining in Division reserve until 14 February, the 2nd Battalion relieved the 3rd Battalion in the vicinity of CULI-CULI and was subsequently employed in the assault on FORT WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

In analyzing the preparation for, and execution of, the foregoing operation, the following points appear pertinent.

Within twenty days after being relieved of tactical commitments on LEYTE ISLAND, and within eleven days after receiving the Army order for Operation Mike-Six, the 511th Parachute Infantry regrouped and re-outfitted, planned and executed a strategic operation into enemy held territory. This operation involved an over-water movement of almost three days duration and an air movement of approximately 140 miles from the departure airfields to the drop zone. It is felt that this ability to disengaged a unit from ground operations, re-equip, plan for and commit in an airborne assault within a limited length of time, reflects favorably upon the commanders and staff officers of the unit. It is to be observed that the development of sound Standing Operating Procedures during training materially assisted in the conduct of the movement.

After arrival on MINDORO ISLAND, adequate maps and aerial photographs of the objective area were provided. From these, and with the assistance of the Commanders' visual reconnaissance (61) Personal knowledge.
large scale sand tables were prepared. Schedules were set up to provide for each platoon of the Battalion and each individual soldier was briefed on the general situation, the Battalion mission, his Company's initial mission, his Company assembly area, and a general orientation on the terrain in the objective area. This detailed briefing paid off on the jump, for although the jump pattern was over-extended the companies assembled without undue delay and after contacting Battalion by radio, moved out to accomplish their initial company missions. Although a Battalion assembly area had been originally designated, this change in plan permitted the rapid accomplishment of the overall Battalion mission.

Regardless of counter claims, it is the firm opinion of the author, after personal participation in, and observation of the jump, and after discussions with numerous jump masters in rear elements of the Battalion lift, that the error causing the over-extension of the drop pattern was a fault of the pilots of the aircraft. The error is an understandable one when pilots who are inexperienced in the dropping of parachutists are concerned. When planes flying at speeds of 100-120 m.p.h. are following preceding jump planes at a distance of 1000 yards, the pilots tend to watch the opening parachutes emerging from the preceding planes rather than the marking signals on the drop zone. The observation from the pilot's compartment gives the illusion that the parachutes are drifting under the following plane with the consequent result that the following pilot signals for an exit too early. When this error accumulates through several successive V of Vs, over-extension of the drop pattern is inevitable.
The Battalion S-2's action at IMUS, in deciding to attack an emplaced enemy of unknown strength with a very meager force, may be felt by some to have been a hasty and ill-considered decision. In making his estimate, the S-2, realizing that a calculated risk was involved since he did not know the exact location of Company D, felt that the mission of the Battalion could best be assisted by immediately engaging the enemy. Such an action also offered the possibility of success by immediately killing the few Japs in the church yard, executing a rapid circuit along the river bank and seizing the bridge. From this position the enemy could have been prevented from leaving the north and west sides of the building until additional forces arrived. Needless to say, the prompt arrival of Company D provided a more efficient means for the accomplishment of this same plan.

When senior commanders direct the employment of elements of a subordinate command without prior notification to the subordinate commander, it places the subordinate commander in the position of being unable to fight his command as a unit. Although speed was of prime importance in the movement toward MANILA, the delay in the commitment of Company E would have been negligible had the Battalion Commander been directed to commit a company in a continuation of the advance. The Battalion Executive Officer promptly dispatched a messenger to the Battalion Commander advising him of the action that had been taken, however, this would not have prevented an awkward situation if some other employment of the Battalion had been directed by Regiment during the intervening period.

The Battalion Commander's decision to commit two rifle companies in a zone whose width would not normally prove excessive
for one company proved to be well founded. The natural limits of the zone dictated a frontal attack with the only flanking action being that of fire when one company was able to push ahead in its zone. In addition, the employment of two companies permitted the necessary minute search of each building within the densely built-up sector. This was further borne out when it became evident that Company E could not adequately cover its widening zone and it became necessary to commit Company F to eliminate the beach fortifications.

✓ The prompt and proper action of a rifleman in the handling of a captured document illustrates the value of an adequate intelligence training program. Intelligence training was conducted by Division, Regiment and Battalion during the unit's training period in the Zone of the Interior and while staging in the Theater of Operations. This training included all elements of the command and in the rifle companies stressed collection of information and proper handling of captured documents and matériel.

✓ The action in SOUTHERN MANILA provided the Battalion with its first opportunity to fight under close-in artillery support. In compliance with established principals of troop safety, forward rifle units were normally withdrawn 100 to 150 yards before artillery concentrations were placed on Japanese positions. It was believed, at first, that the artillery fire was ineffective since the volume of fire from the Jap positions was seldom reduced following the preparations. This was proven erroneous when it was discovered that the Jap was employing the tactic of following the American withdrawal so as to be between the American lines and the artillery fire, then, following the preparation, retire to the former position. This type of action substantiates the theory

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that the Infantryman derives the greatest benefit and protection
from his supporting artillery by staying well forward, seeking
such cover as available, and risking the possibility of a short
round. It is felt that since neutralization exists only during
the period when the artillery is firing, a lesser percentage of
casualties will be suffered from the supporting artillery than
would be caused by having to assault across a greater distance
without the protection of artillery fire.


It is to be noted that when the zones of advance of two
friendly units approach intersection, detailed coordination is
imperative. This is illustrated by the westward drive of the 1st
Cavalry Division into MANILA meeting the northward drive of the
11th Airborne Division. The problem was further complicated by
the fact that the two units were under two different major com-
mands - 1st Cavalry Division being under XIV Corps of Sixth Army
and the 11th Airborne Division being under Eighth Army. The sit-
uation was resolved through direct coordination between representa-
tives of XIV Corps and the 11th Airborne Division, however, the
problem would probably never have arisen had control of the 11th
Airborne Division passed to Sixth Army a few days earlier. This
control actually passed to Sixth Army on 10 February.

The problem of dealing with large numbers of friendly civi-
lrians had not been anticipated by the Battalion prior to the time
it reverted to Division reserve on 10 February. This mass exodus
not only effectively blocked the only available supply route but
also provided an excellent opportunity for Japanese nationals or
subversive Filipino elements to infiltrate our rear installations.
As a result, heavy guards were required to prevent enemy or enemy
inspired damage to our rear installations.

Throughout this operation it was noted that once the enemy was driven from a position he experienced a great difficulty in reorganizing on his successive positions as long as he was steadily and heavily pushed. Had the Battalion been supported by the heavier artillery, and possibly armor, organic to the standard Infantry Division the weight of the attack and the speed of advance would undoubtedly have been greater. The advance of the Battalion, using, principally, only Infantry weapons demonstrates the ability of these weapons when aggressively and imaginatively employed.

LESSONS

1. Training and ability of commanders and staff officers are essentials in the efficient accomplishment of the movement of units by several means.

2. The development of sound Standing Operating Procedures will assist in the rapid movement of a unit, however, they must be flexible enough to provide for movement by any of several different means.

3. Detailed briefing is an essential in the initial employment of an airborne force and is most desirable in employing any force.

4. Extensive combined training of Air Force units and Airborne units is essential if accurate placement of the Airborne unit on the drop zone is to be achieved.

5. The primary mission of any unit is to assist the accomplishment of the mission of its parent unit. In achieving this, small units may find that bold tactics, weighted by the advantage of
surprise, will prove successful.

6. It is most desirable that instructions to subordinates follow command channels.

7. Heavily built-up areas require the employment of units on reduced frontages.

8. The front line rifleman can be one of the most valuable collecting agencies provided he is properly trained.

9. The safest and most efficient method of Infantry assault is by following closely, within fragmentation radius, upon supporting artillery fires.

10. Coordination is vital in the operations of adjacent units. This coordination is simplified when the adjacent units are under the same major command.

11. When combat operations take place in populated areas provision must be made for dealing with the inevitable civilian problem.

12. The Principal of Mass: ability to place combat power at the proper place at the proper time is definitely portrayed by this action. Once an enemy has been dislodged he must be relentlessly pushed until his disorganization is complete and his will to resist is destroyed.