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ADVANCED INFANTRY OFFICERS COURSE
1947 - 1948

THE OPERATIONS OF TASK FORCE BRAVO
(REINFORCED 40TH INFANTRY DIVISION)
FROM ST HILAIRE TO HAMOUP TO LE
RINS FRENCH, 5-7 AUGUST 1944
(FRONTIER FORCES CAFEHAGE)
(Personal experience of Task Force Provost Marshal)

Type of operation described: Task Force in the Attack

Major Francis S. Kelly, Infantry
ADVANCED INFANTRY OFFICERS CLASS NO II
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THE OPERATIONS OF TASK FORCE SEABECON
(ASSIGNED NOT 90TH INFANTRY DIVISION)
FROM US AT HARBOR TO HARBOUR TO LE
MIRF FRANCE, 5-7 AUGUST 1944
(HORNET FRANCE CAMPAIGN)
(PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OF TASK FORCE PROVOST MARSHAL)

INTRODUCTION

This monograph covers the operation of Task Force Seabed, a reinforced
regimental combat team of the 357th Infantry, 90th U.S. Infantry Division,
from US at Harbor to Harbor to Le Mire, France, 5-7 August 1944, during the
Northern France Campaign.

In order that the reader be better oriented, a brief picture of the
activities of this division will be given leading up to this action.

The U.S. 90th Infantry Division was activated at Camp Barkley, Texas
in March 1942. (1) Basic training and unit training took care of the period
up to January 1943, at which time the division moved to the Louisiana
maneuver area and participated in maneuvers against the 77th U.S. Division.
(2) April 1943 found the 90th back at Camp Barkley going through a period
of specialized training, such as attack against fortified areas, river
crossing exercises and street fighting. In August 1943, the division moved
to the California-Arizona maneuver area at Camp Grant, California. (3)
From August to 20 December, the division maneuvered against the 29th U.S.
Infantry Division. At this time, it was evidently felt by the War Depart-
ment that the division was ready for combat against our enemies. On 20
December 1943, the division was enroute by train to Ft. Dix, N.J. for final
staging and preparation for a move to an overseas theater. (4) By the
middle of April, the division had closed in seven widely separated camps
in England and Wales. Senior officers and their staffs were immediately
briefed on operation Neptune, which was the plan for the Invasion of France.
Some special training was undertaken during this period and the D-Day
landings of the division in France.
After the completion of the Normandy Campaign and on 26 July 1944, the 90th Infantry Division was assigned to the recently activated U.S. Fifteenth Corps of 3rd Army, commanded by Lt. General George S. Patton. On 30 July 1944, the Division was assigned two new General Officers; Brig. General Raymond W. McLain, as Division Commander and Brig. General William G. Jenevier, as assistant Division Commander. (5) This made the fourth General Officer to assume command of the Division since its activation.

Morale was low after a succession of grueling battles and very heavy losses during the Normandy Campaign. Another reason for lack of esprit de corps and morale was the holding of the 90th in obscurity and not releasing them to the press until late in the Normandy Campaign. (6) Generals McLain and Jenevier immediately set about to raise the general morale of the Division. All officers and non-commissioned officers of the Division were assembled and given short talks and a foretaste of what to expect in the future. Both of these fine officers personified confidence and trust in the 90th and “caught on” with the officers and men at once.

At this point, the 90th was situated just south of Rennes, France, awaiting orders. Its first mission, under the Fifteenth Corps, was to move south to St. Hilaire du Harcouet, to seize and secure bridges over the Selune River and to protect the dam over the Selune. After lighting a stubborn German rear guard in the vicinity of St. Hilaire, this was accomplished on 5 August 1944. (7) The 90th was then ordered into a defensive position to await further orders. This set the stage for the operation I am about to describe.

**GENERAL SITUATION**

At 0115 on August 8th, the Fifteenth Corps Commander received oral orders from General Patton to move without delay to the south and east and to seize and hold a bridgehead over the Mayenne River at Mayenne, until relieving the 1st U.S. Army to seize a bridgehead at Laval and to secure...
the Bayonne River between these two points; 90th Infantry Division on the left, 79th Infantry Division on the right and 5th Armored Division echeloned to the right rear. (9)

At 0600 5 August 1944, the 90th received orders to move on Bayonne, in its zone, and to secure a bridgehead across the Bayonne River and hold until relieved by elements of the 1st U.S. Army, then to advance and capture Le Mans, France. (See Appendix A)

3rd Army Op-2 report 5 August: Enemy situation continues too fluid to define an established front line. Estimated Battalion of Infantry reported at Ernne. (10)

At this time, the Commanding General 90th Infantry Division felt he needed a hard hitting, mobile striking force that could move with speed and still be large enough to take care of itself, if it ran into stiff German resistance. Le Mans was 90 odd miles behind the German lines. The decision was then made to form a Task Force. This force became the famous "Task Force Weaver" and was composed of the following units: (11)

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(For organization of the Task Force see Appendix B)

**SPECIAL SITUATION**

For this operation 50 tanks each, from 5th Armored Division and 3rd U.S. Army, were made available for the Task Force. Reconnaissance elements were to cross the initial point in St. Hilaire at 0630 5 August, and the rest of the Division to follow by marching at 0600. (See Appendix A)

Task Force Weaver was responsible for its own flank security and orders were, "Advance be pushed at all costs and resistance enroute be promptly bypassed." Task Force Weaver was also given a warning of 48hrs from
XIX Tactical Air Force for day light air cover. Reconnaissance elements of Task force Seaver moved out promptly at 0630 and met little resistance, initially. (See Appendix C)

The rest of the Task Force was not so fortunate, as 50 of the allocated trucks failed to show up. The Division Commander ordered the kettles of all three regiments unloaded for the Task Force. The column finally got under way at about 0900. (12) In the interim, the covering screen met resistance in the form of roadblocks at Yanner, Paille and Brisse. These were quickly reduced and the column turned to the east, on the main road running into Mayenne, the first big objective.

To the Doughboys, this first advance was almost too good to be true, for previous to this time, every inch of ground had been hotly contested and gains had been measured in yards and hedge rows, not in miles. French civilians lined the streets of towns and villages and cheered, threw flowers and proffered cider and wine. Morale was definitely rising to the sky, even as these few villages were liberated.

**ATTACK ON MAYENNE**

About 1115, the reconnaissance elements had reached the western outskirts of Mayenne. Here, about a mile and half from the city, two M-8 armored cars were hit with high velocity shells and immediately caught fire. All crew members were casualties. About noon the advance guard, under command of the 1st Battalion Commander, passed through the reconnaissance elements, detracked and started deploying. The 1st Battalion Commander requested the 3rd P.A. Battalion go into position, and support the attack. He also knew that it was essential to secure a bridge over the Mayenne River and that speed was paramount. (13) At this time, General Seaver ordered the remainder of the 357th under the Regimental Commander to cross the river to the south end to cut the south and south eastern approaches to the city. In order to more clearly portray this action, I will describe each attack separately.
of Bayonne in face of small arms fire. (See Appendix C) B Co. led the
attack with two platoons of tanks from Co. A, 712th Tank Battalion and a
squad of engineers from Co. A, 315th Engineer Battalion, attached. After
house to house fighting, B Co. reached the western edge of the river at
1630 and reported one of the three bridges was still intact, but that they
were receiving heavy mortar and artillery fire. During this period, several
German vehicles entered the western half of Bayonne from the north and were
promptly destroyed by the Anti-Tank Platoon of the 1st Battalion. The "Krerets"
had no idea we were even close to Bayonne. (14)

Observation was now the main problem, as the eastern portion of the
city was on the high ground. Mortar observers and the Battalion Artillery
Liason Officer located an observation post on top of a building facing
the bridge. The tanks were now ordered up the side streets close to the
river. The plan for assaulting the bridge was as follows; artillery was
to fire a ten-minute preparation from 1730 to 1800, then shift fires to
cover roads leading into Bayonne from the north; mortars to cover the
main road leading to the bridge from the east; tanks to support the attack
from positions on the west bank and shoot at anything that moved; B Co.'s
machine guns to support the attack from windows in buildings on west bank
of the Bayonne River. The attack was to start at 1800, with the 1st Platoon
of B Co., leading, followed by a squad of engineers, that would sweep the
bridge with mine detectors for the attached platoon of tanks, that would
follow. The 2nd and 3rd Platoons, with tanks, to follow the 1st Platoon.
The artillery preparation opened as scheduled, shortly, a very loud ex-
pllosion was heard on eastern side of the river and a resulting blanket of
smoke. The Battalion Commander immediately seized this opportunity to cross
the bridge. He ordered the 1st Platoon across the bridge as soon as he could
lift the artillery preparation. (15) Two minutes later, the 1st Platoon
reached the bridge, led by the Company Commander. Several riflemen were
killed, i.e. the platoon advanced into eastern Bayonne just in time to kill
the enemy, who were to blow the bridge. They were followed by a squad

(14) Personal knowledge (15) Personal knowledge. Statement of factual
of Engineers. Immediately, the Platoon of Tanks wheeled and followed the Engineers, their 75's belching hot lead as they advanced. Those who saw this action, realized they had witnessed a classic example of coordination of Infantry, Tanks, Engineers and Artillery. B Co., fought their way through town to the east and made contact with 3rd Battalion of the main body, who had crossed the river from the south. Many houses, that had been prepared for defense, were by-passed by rushing tanks and accompanying riflemen passed them. These houses were mopped up by A Co. which followed and then turned to the north. C Co., stayed in western Mayenne and protected the northern approaches—the bridge was swept. Engineers immediately destroyed the bridge and found it had been prepared for demolition with eight 500 pound aerial bombs. (16) The attack had been so swift and carried out with such dispatch, that the Germans had not been able to blow the bridge.

While this action was taking place, the remainder of the Regiment was unatched and marched to an assembly area to the south and west of the river. The Regimental Commander, 3rd Battalion Commander and part of their staffs worked their way down to the rivers edge. Only spasmodic snipe fire was coming from the other side, so the Regimental Commander ordered an immediate crossing. A skiff and an old leaky boat were pressed into service and a nearby picket fence was torn down for use as a ramp. The Regimental Commander accompanied the first boat load of Infantry across the river, as the men seemed somewhat doubtful of the make-shift equipment. (17) By the time the engineer rubber boats arrived, I Co. was across the river and the rest of the crossing went very rapidly. By 0300, both the 3rd and 2nd Battalions were across and the 3rd Battalion had fought its way to the main road to the south east of the city. Many prisoners were taken as 1st Battalion was driving the Germans to the east into the 3rd Battalion. By 0600 the town had been completely mopped up and the Task Force Command Post had located in the south eastern part of the city. (18) General
weaver disposed the force in a perimeter defense and all roads leading into the city were blocked. All night long German vehicles approached the town from all directions, only to be blown to bits. (19)

On the morning of 6 August, the Division Commander visited the Command post of Task Force Weaver and informed General Weaver that the 1st U.S. Infantry Division, of 1st U.S. Army, would arrive in Mayenne sometime during the day to relieve the Task Force, so it could proceed on Le Mans. (20) General Weaver made the decision to split his forces, to save valuable time. The plan was for two columns along different routes. He directed that the Regimental Commander with 1st and 2nd Battalions, 357th Infantry, proceed to the south as soon as the troops could be assembled. (21) For purpose of clarity, I will refer to this column as Task Force Barth. The force, to stay in Mayenne, will be referred to as Task Force Weaver. (See Appendix 2 and 3 for organization of the columns) Task Force Barth was to proceed via Montours, St. Suzanne, L'Arche on Le Mans. Task Force Weaver would proceed via Avron, Evron, St. Suzanne, St. Dennis, L'Arche on Le Mans.

This meant the columns would cross at St. Suzanne, but the timing would be such that the Barth column would clear St. Suzanne, if only slight opposition was encountered. If stiff resistance was met, the two columns would converge like pinners on St. Suzanne.

**The Advance on Le Mans**

**Task Force Barth**

6-7 Aug

The column got under way at about 1400. The column was now on foot, as the attached vehicles had been released the previous afternoon. Additional trucks for the Task Force had been released and these trucks reported to Task Force Barth, 6 miles south of Mayenne, at about 1600.

At this time, Barth's column was again completely motorized. Slight resistance was encountered in Montours and was brushed aside and the column again turned east toward St. Suzanne and Le Mans. By 1930, the 1st Battalion and a platoon of tanks, the Advanced Guard, were in Viviers. Colonel Barth and the Command Group were in St. Suzanne awaiting the 2nd
Battalion to close. At this time, Colonel Deych decided to stop for the
night. (22) Through some misunderstanding, the 2nd Battalion had stopped
just east of Montargis and was being attacked by strong German forces.

Realizing that the column had been cut, Colonel Deych ordered 2nd Bat-
talion Commander to attack at day light and close up on St. Suzanne. (23)
Shortly after dark, St. Suzanne was attacked from the south and south
west. The Regimental Defense Platoon and the A.T. Platoon, which were with
the Command Group, put up a gallant fight. Two houses were prepared for
defense and withstood the German attacks. About 2000, it was evident,
that the Germans were refusing to take the town, so the Regimental Commander
made the decision to recall the 1st Battalion from Viviers. When 1st Bat-
talion Commanding Officer received this message, he was engaged in a fire
fight with the enemy who was attacking piece meal from the east, and he
could not break contact immediately. His column, with tanks, finally moved
into St. Suzanne about 0600 7 August, and none too soon, as they immedias-
tely opened fire on large numbers of attacking Germans and drove them to the
west. This enemy was encountered between the 1st and the incoming 2nd
Battalion, whose attack had started at day light. By 1000, the column
was reunited and the advance again resumed. Soon after leaving St.
Suzanne, a force of 15 to 20 tanks was spotted in the woods, to the south
of the road. The 369th F.A. was placed in position and fired on them,
DRiving them deeper into the woods. The road to the east was in plain
sight of the woods, but the 369th, then disposed forward and finally the
2nd Battery dislodged, as fast as the trucks could go. (24) The next
resistance was encountered in Dernay. The 1st Battalion attacked with
armor and a company of Infantry and drove the enemy to the north of town
and held them there, while the rest of the column continued on to La
Quinte. These Germans were surrounded and many were killed and 23 prisoners
taken. (25) The column was again closed at Le Quinte at 2100 and an all
around defense was set up for the night.

Task Force Weaver
6-7 Aug 1944

Shortly after Task Force Bartti departed Mayenne, elements of 1st
U.S. Infantry Division started to arrive, to effect the relief. (26) At this time, Mayenne was being heavily shelled from the east and south
east and reconnaissance reported German tanks in vicinity of Aron. Air
reconnaissance reported enemy in the woods just north of Aron. General
Weaver decided to attack Aron, while reconnaissance was probing to the
north and south. The advance guard (1 company of Infantry) met stiff
resistance at Aron, so 3rd Battalion (-) was ordered to by-pass Aron to
the north. The by-passing force met such stiff resistance, that it es-
tually became an enveloping force. (27) Progress was steady, but slow
and was hindered by enemy tank attacks. Prisoners that were captured,
said that they were part of a force sent to recapture Mayenne. Task
Force 6-2 consolidated the force to be 2 Battalions of Infantry with support-
ing weapons and tanks. The decision was now made to withdraw under cover
of darkness and proceed south along the route Montours, Vaiges, St. Dennis
on Le Mans. The withdrawal was accomplished, but not without incident.
The 16th Infantry of the 1st U.S. Division fired into the withdrawing
troops and several casualties in both units were taken before the firing
was stopped. The men were then rested for three hours, the column reformed
and proceeded to vicinity of Vaiges by morning of 7 August. (28) Here
Task Force Weaver met elements of the 359th Infantry Regiment, which was
advancing by foot. The 359th was in contact just east of Vaiges and was
waiting for their column to close. General Weaver decided to proceed to
the north east through Chamues and thence to St. Dennis on Le Mans. The
advance guard company ran into very stiff resistance just to the west of
Chamues. Chamues fell by mid-afternoon and the advance had again stalled
in the heavily wooded area to the east. F-47's dive bombed and strafed
these woods and the attack again got under way. Progress was steady, but
very slow, as numerous tank-infantry attacks were beaten off. Captured
prisoners stated that there was a Battalion of Infantry, three Companies of

Engineers and some tanks and self-propelled weapons in the woods. It was felt that the attack had "bogged down", (22) no decision was made to again withdraw at darkness and do the task through Valges and pass through the 359th Infantry, which had stopped for the night about four miles east of Valges. The same tactics were used, that had been employed the previous night and by 2300 the column had passed through the 359th Infantry Regiment.

Fierce resistance was encountered at St. Jean and St. Ganis and these towns were quickly secured. Here, the column stopped for the night to reorganize and replenish ammunition supplies in preparation for the advance on Le Hene the next day. (30)

Task Force Darto
3 Aug 1944

Next day, Task Force Darto started their advance, from La Fumée about 0900. The plan for the operation was for the Advance Guard battalion to turn to the west when it reached the main crossroad in L'Arche and block the road on which Task Force Darto would be advancing, thereby squeezing any delaying forces in front of Task Force Darto between the two forces.

No resistance was encountered, until L'Arche was reached. Here, the Advance Unit ran into enemy coming from the west trying to escape into Le Hene. This enemy turned out to be about 15 vehicles of an anti-aircraft unit.

The lead tanks immediately opened fire and destroyed all the vehicles as the infantry riding on the tanks killed 30 Germans, who tried to escape.

This action completely blocked the crossroad and the rest of the 1st battalion was deployed to the west. At this time, the Regimental Intelligence and reconnaissance platoon and a Platoon of Tanks were detached from the 1st battalion and attached to the 2nd Battalion who continued to the east in the direction of Le Hene. This Battalion was aided by German enemy positions, that employed self-propelled guns just over each rise on the way into Le Hene. (31) The column was also surrounded by our own 9th Airborne Division, which was coming up on our right. (32) The 9th was evidently mistaken for Germans, fleeing to the east, and brought artillery down on our column. This fire was finally stopped with the reporting German.

(27) personal knowledge (28) regimental intelligence (29) personal knowledge (30) personal knowledge (31) personal knowledge (32) personal knowledge
resistance was reduced and our forces entered the city of Le Mans.

**Task Force Weaver**  
8 Aug 1944

On the 8th, Task Force Weaver was destined to encounter a typical German delaying action. In Charnie they ran into a heavy road block in the vicinity of a mined bridge. Our engineers demined this bridge under fire and then the Advance Guard pushed the enemy into the woods to the east. Up to this time I have said little about the cooperation of the R-2's, which were attacked and in constant communication with Task Force Weaver by radio. As the column left Charnie, the Artillery Landscape Plane reported four Mark IV Tanks about two miles ahead of the column, traveling due east. The R-2's were immediately given this information and came out of the skies on the tanks. A few minutes later, the planes reported mission accomplished: when the column arrived at the scene of the tanks, the lead tank was in a crater, that had been blown just in front of it. The short of its long gun buried in the soft dirt of the bottom of the crater. The other four tanks were all afire and cooking. (33) Here were 6 tanks, the doughboys wouldn't have to bother with. It wasn't quite so simple for the engineers as they had to fill the craters and repair the road.

Enemy resistance was met at both Brains and Collets, in the form of mined roads and road blocks covered by a few riflemen. The Advance Guard cleared those two points and then advanced on Chauflour de Notre Dame. Here, the Advance Guard was greeted by strong rifle fire and some mortar fire. The village was attacked frontally by the Advance Guard Company and enveloped from both the north and the south by the remaining two rifle companies. Just after dark, the village and its garrison fell and the Advance Guard continued to the east. At about 2200, the Advance Guard reported the link up with Task Force Barth. (34)

Our forces entered the city of Le Mans shortly after mid-night, on...
occupying the northern portion of the town with one regiment disposed to the north and east. (36) Actually, we were on the right flank and to the rear of the German Seventh Army, poised to continue the advance to the east or to turn north and cut into the flank and rear of the Germans, which we later did.

During this operation, General Head's motto was "Kill them where they ain't." (37) This motto was followed and so many of the enemy were bypassed, that the columns were continually subjected to high velocity and small arms fire from the flanks. This was offset by the air protecting our flanks and striking anything they observed and by the use of the company of tank destroyers. The tank destroyers would push off the main routes one fire to the flanks an then advance by bounds after the tail of the column had cleared.

In something this action of four days, we find that this Task Force advanced some ninety odd miles through enemy held territory, made a river crossing, captured the large city of Myano by street fighting tactics, established a bridgehead, fought a meeting engagement with a superior enemy force in the vicinity of Awa, made two successful night withdrawals to deceive the enemy and fought numerous small engagements. Pursuit was continuous and speedy and any captured position was considered just another line of departure. On many occasions, enemy vehicles were found standing with their motors still running. Communication between organic units and elements and all subordinate were continually kept abreast of the situation and therefore could carry out their assignments with dispatch.

Our main losses in this operation were in the reconnaissance troop and the Tank Battalion, but these material losses were compensated for by the relative small loss of men. The Task Force sustained less than 300 casualties of all types and no 90th soldiers were taken prisoners. To contrast this, the enemy lost an inestimable amount of matériel, such as tracks, tanks, artillery pieces and self propelled weapons. Prisoners taken were over 3,000 and an estimated 950 were killed and wounded. (38) Mission Accomplished!

(36-37-38) Personal Knowledge
ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

In making a study of the Task Force Operation, it becomes immediately apparent that the Division Commander of the 90th made a correct estimate of the situation on 5 August, when he made the decision to organize a Task Force. This Task Force contained all of the attached fire power of the division and over half of the organic artillery fire power.

If the attack had started with the division as a unit, it may not have been so successful, because it would have lacked the necessary mobility and have given the Germans additional time to organize the defenses of the Siegfried Line. If a regimental combat team had been used, it would have lacked the necessary fire power to reduce the existing German defenses.

The principles of mass and surprise are very prominent in this operation. At all times the force was sufficient in strength to have the required mass at the decisive point. Surprise was attained throughout by mobility of the force and by excellent leadership in all echelons. In all operations, coordination is essential, but coordination is only attained by leadership from the top. The decision to place this Task Force under the able leadership of the Assistant Division Commander brought about the coordination necessary for a successful operation.

Throughout this action, plans were very simple and orders clear and concise. At no time did plans or orders add to the confusion or combat as they sometimes do.

In all phases of this operation, security of the Task Force was not neglected. On several occasions, the Germans could have cut into the column and impeded our progress, had not flank security in the form of anti-tank weapons, tank destroyers and the air force been on the alert to protect the flanks. At night, security was particularly important and either a perimeter or all around defense was employed and found to be very effective.

Reconnaissance was continuous and thorough, that in our opinion it...
reconnaissance platoon of the 357th Infantry were continually probing to the right, left and in front of the column and as soon as resistance in strength was met, they would immediately initiate finding routes around the flank of the enemy. In many cases the reconnaissance echelon closed with fire on small delaying forces and neutralized them, thereby not delaying the column.

Points to be criticized are not as numerous as one would expect, considering the magnitude of the operation. Essentially, our cooperation was lacking, when fifty of the allocated trucks did not arrive in time to start the operation.

Communications broke down at an essential time, when the 2nd Battalion, 357th Infantry, stopped and was attacked outside of Baccara. But generally, radio played an insignificant part in maintaining communication as it was impossible to lay wire in an operation of this sort.

On two different occasions, coordination with adjacent units was lacking: first, in the withdrawal from Aro to Hayma, several lives and trucks lost, if the correct coordination and been effected and disseminated down to the troops. Again, on the road from Ars to the link, several casualties were taken because our troops were mistaken for enemy, by the 79th Inf. Division. On both occasions, liaison officers were used and were aware of the situation, but the break down seemed to be in the dissemination of information to the leading elements of the units, the individual troopers. In situations such as these, time must be taken into consideration as a factor.

Supply was sometimes lacking, because of the extended supply lines; gasoline was short on the morning of 3 August and was the reason task force waited out such a late start, but generally, under the circumstances, supplies such as ammunition and food were prompt.

Lessons

Lessons brought out in this operation were:
2. Adequate staff planning for an operation of this type is a necessity.

3. Communication is essential to gain the desired degree of coordination.

4. Reconnaissance and intelligence are two outstanding factors for successful operations.

5. Supply plans must be in consonance with the mission to be undertaken.

6. Leadership is the deciding factor in the success or failure of any operation.

7. Special organizations can be constituted from an infantry division to gain mobility and to perform specialized types of missions.
APPENDIX A

SECRET

APPENDIX A

SECRET

90th INF DIV
VLC MADAY
0300005 AUG 44

PART I

Maps: 0005, 1/50,000.

1. a. See Intelligence Annex.

b. XV Corps attacks 5 Aug to seize and secure crossings of Maynas H from LAMN to HAMAN, both inclusive. 99th Inf Div attacks on right of the 90th Div, securing that part of the corps area indicated by the map. 99th Inf Div at Liulac which is a corps reserve position, is to support either of the 99th or 90th Div.

2. 90th Inf Div:

Korea: 173rd FA Cp
10 FA Cp
693rd FA Bn
712th TD Bn
537th AAA (AA) Bn (2)
607th TD Bn

Attacks 5 Aug to seize and secure crossings of the Maynas H within its zone extended to the 5 and 6 to HAYAN inclusive.

Route: Okja, Byo - See overlay.

3. a. Task Force Weaver - Brig Gen Wea, CEE. Weaver, Comdg.

Troopers: 315th Inf Bn
90th Rct Tr
1st Co, 607th TD Bn
712th TD Bn
357th Inf (H)*
315th FA Bn
Go A, 315th FA Bn

(1) Move by motor via route indicated on overlay. Seize, secure and bridge all the crossings of the Maynas H from the Div right boundary to HAYAN inclusive.

(2) Reconnaissance elements will cross Tr (in HAYAN) at 0600.

(3) Task Force Weaver will provide own flank security throughout the advance.

(4) 50 trucks each from 5th Arm Div and from Third Arm Div are available for this move and will report to 35 MIL dominance at 0600.

The 50 trucks from 5th Arm Div will be released to that unit immediately. 35th Inf detrans.

b. 315th INF

(1) Will advance by marching within its zone via route

-1-

SECRET
indicated on overlay

(2) will initiate movement by 050000 and will make such preliminary dispositions as necessary to ensure that its columns will not interfere with the movement of Tank Force Weaver.

(3) For march obj and alternate - see overlay.

d. M'n 2
(1) will advance by marching within its zone via route indicated on overlay.
(2) will initiate movement by 060000.
(3) For march obj - see overlay.

d. M'y Arty (less 3d echelon):
About: 1/3rd Fd gp
15th Fd gp
623rd FA Bn
537th Mn Bn (-1 plcy)
607th Td Bn (-1 cp)

(1) Art'y has to be prepared to move by bounds in the same
of either 07 0 or 07 9 on opnry 0600

(2) 1 to 07 80 to support the advance of 07 6
and 07 9 respectively.

de. 15th Arty Bn (less 3d echelon):
be prepared to move on orders this hr.

f. (1) Foot elements will not be delayed for the passage of
artillery elements through the columns.
(2) Cfs are responsible for security to both flanks.
(3) Advance will be pressed at all costs; resistance on
route will be promptly up-placed.

h. Arm 6 / 35

j. a. (1) Cul Index - 01-10.
(2) armored vehicles will display service fluorescent panels

b. M'y Arty 8 opens in Armored (L7022)
Time of opening - 050000
M'ch 0800 - 300 or main body.
Arm 0900 - Route of advance.

أتيلن

/2/ Stillwell
/2/ Stillwell
G-1

DISPOSITION: "T"
TASK FORCE WEAVER
ORGANIZATION OF COLUMN
(FOR MARCH ON HAVENNE
(TOTALLY MOTORIZED))

AIR SUPPORT □ SQUADRON P-47's (DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS)
DISCOVER ENEMY TO FRONT AND FLANKS REPORT CLOSE IN ENEMY ATTACK ON ORDERS IN CONJUNCTION WITH GROUND FORCES.

□ 90th RECON TROOP
ADVANCE ON ROUTE AND PARALLEL ROUTES. WHEN PRACTICAL, OR OUT AND BACK AT ROAD INTERSECTIONS, ON MEETING RESISTANCE, CLOSE WITH FIRE. DISCOVER ENEMY POSITION IMMEDIATELY FIND PASSAGES AROUND FLANKS OPERATE ON FOOT IF NECESSARY.

□ CO 112 TK BN

□ 1/4 TK BN

□ ROUTE MARKERS AND GUIDES, DETACH 90th H.P. IMPLEMENTED BY 112 TK BN

□ FORWARD COMMAND GROUP TASK FORCE

□ 1 CO 357 INF CO A 112 TK BN FOR DIRECT ASSAULT AGAINST ENEMY RESISTANCE

□ DETACH CO A 315 ENGR BN WITH BULLDOZERS

□ 1st BN 327 INF (-)
ASSIST DIRECT ASSAULT-EMPLOY INITIATE BT-ASSISTING

□ 351st FA BN AND DETACH A 317 AAA BN

□ REMAINder 357 INF (LESS ADV. GD.)

□ REMAINder 112 TK BN

□ CO A 315 ENGR BN (-)
ASSAULT & RUBBER BOATS. BRIDGING MATERIAL ON CALL TO DIV. ON SHORT NOTICE

□ CO A 315 MED BN

□ 315 FA BN FOLLOWED ROUTE IN DIRECT SUPPORT

□ CO A 607 TD BN

1. RE-ARM AND RE-LOAD. EQUIPPED AND SERVICED, FOOD, WATER AND EXTRA AMMUNITION CARRIED ON VEHICLES.
2. RE-FUELING ACCOMPLISHED ENROUTE BY DIV.
OPERATION of a TASK FORCE
90th INF DIV 5-9 AUG 1944

1st Bn 287th Inf
CotKS, direct attack

Attack and capture of Mayenne by entire
Task force 5 Aug.

TF Weaver attack on enemy
Near Aten Withdrawal to by-pass
6 Aug.

Situation and action
TF Barth night 6-7 Aug.

Location TF Barth
Night 7 Aug

Evron

Le Mans: Task force dissolved as such, it
entered Le Mans 3 Aug.

TF Barth secured
L'Arche by afternoon

Road blocks
lightly held

Evron

35th Envelop south

Situation and action TF Weaver
Night 7 Aug
Withdrawal to by-pass

Advance elements
329th Inf morning 7 Aug.

Montsurs

345

Elvres

Ste. Suzanne

128357

128357
APPENDIX E

TASK FORCE WEAVER COLUMN

MAYENNE TO LE MANS

☐ SQUADRON P-47'S
☐ COVER BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH COLUMN'S
☐ ORDERS AS BEFORE

☐ 90TH RECON TROOP. ORDERS SAME AS BEFORE

☐ LT TK CO 112 TK BN

☐ ADY. CO CO CIBR
☐ LEADING CO 3RD
☐ BN 357 INF

☐ DETACH. CO A 315 ENG BN

☐ BTRY 343 FA BN

☐ COLUMN COMMAND GROUP

☐ 3RD BN 357 INF (-)

☐ REMAINDER 343 FA BN

☐ 112 TK BN (-)

☐ CO A 315 ENG BN (-)

☐ CO A 315 MED BN

☐ CO A 607 TO BN (-)

☐ SUPPLY AS BEFORE

COMUNICATIONS AS BEFORE

AIR SUPPORT

RECON ECHELON

ADV. CO CO CIBR

LEADING CO 3RD
BN 357 INF

MAIN BODY
APPENDIX F

TASK FORCE BARTH COLUMN
MAYENNE TO LE MANJ

AIR SUPPORT
SQUADRON P-47'S FURNISHED FROM SOUTH COLUMN
RECON ECHelon
1st R PLAT.

ADV. GD.

CO. A 712 TK. BN.
1 INF. BN.
COLUMN COMMAND GROUP
1 INF BN.
1 CO. MED. TKS.

MAIN BODY
Detch. 315 Engr.
1 PLAT. CO. A 607 TD BN.
345 FA BN.

SUPPLY AS BEFORE