ADVANCED INFANTRY OFFICERS COURSE
1949-1950

THE OPERATIONS OF THE 2D BATTALION, 336TH INFANTRY, 84TH U.S.
INFANTRY DIVISION, IN THE BATTLE FOR HIGH GROUND IN THE AREA
NORTHWEST OF THE ROHR RIVER IN THE LINDERN, BRECK, LEIPPERL
TRIANGLE FROM 29 NOVEMBER - 2 DECEMBER 1944
(RHINELAND CAMPAIGN)
(Personal Experience of Battalion Executive Officer)

Type of operation described: ATTACK OF INFANTRY BATTALION
IN OPEN TERRAIN

Major O. M. Lamb, Infantry
ADVANCED INFANTRY OFFICERS CLASS NO 1
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MAP A - Disposition of American Armies

MAP B - Disposition of 34th Division, 27 November 1944

MAP C - Regimental Plan of Attack

MAP D - Battalion Plan and Attack
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THE OPERATIONS OF THE 2D BATTALION, 335TH INFANTRY, 84TH U. S.
INFANTRY DIVISION, IN THE BATTLE FOR HIGH GROUND IN THE AREA
NORTHWEST OF THE ROHR RIVER IN THE LINDERN, BEECK, LEIPFARTH
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ORIENTATION

INTRODUCTION

This monograph covers the operations of the 2d Battalion,
335th Infantry, 84th U. S. Infantry Division, in the battle
for high ground in the area northwest of the ROHR RIVER in the
LINDERN, BEECK, LEIPFARTH triangle from 29 November - 2 Decem-
ber, 1944, during the November offensive of the Ninth U. S.
Army.

In order to orient the reader and bring him up to the time
and point of this operation, it is necessary to discuss the
major events that led up to this action.

Early in June, 1944, the Allies had successfully invaded
the continent of EUROPE. The Americans had 4 Armies on the
continent disposed from left to right as follows: Ninth U. S.
Army, First U. S. Army, Third U. S. Army, and Seventh U. S.
Army.  (See Map A)

The Ninth Army which was on the left of the First Army
was a new army. It had just been tried at BREST and then
placed on this front on 22 October 1944. It consisted of the
XIX and XIII Corps. The XIII Corps consisted of 2 newly ar-
rived Divisions in the theatre - the 102nd Infantry Division
and the 84th Infantry Division.

The 84th Infantry Division had landed across the beach
at OMAHA, and arrived in the Ninth Army Area on 10 November 1944, when it joined the XIII Corps. (1) Meanwhile the Ninth Army had received orders to attack "in zone to the Rhine" not later than 16 November. (2)

The Ninth Army plan for the coming attack was for the XIX Corps to advance to the RHINE in its current zone on order making its main effort on its right and protecting the north flank of First Army.

The XIII Corps was to assume control of the zone on the Army's north from vicinity of IMMERNSDORF to MARSEZUK until relieved by the British XXX Corps on or about 15 November 1944.

After relief by the British, the XIII Corps was to be prepared for further operations to the east on the left of XIX Corps. (3)

The XIII Corps was ordered to attack on the left of the XIX Corps with the mission of securing the crossing sites at LINNICH, and the expansion and protection of the Army's left flank. (4)

The 84th Division had been placed under operational control of the British XXX Corps, and had made the main effort in the attack on GEILENBERGH. It had driven to the line as shown on Map B where it was stopped on 27 November 1944. (It came back under XIII Corps control on 21 November.

XIII Corps plan - To attack in the corps zone with the 102d Division on the right with the mission of capturing LINNICH. The 84th Division was to attack on the left with the mission of capturing LINDBERN and clearing of enemy in its zone. (5)

(1) A-2, p. 5
(2) A-1, p. 82
(3) A-1, p. 77
(4) A-1, p. 96
(5) Personal Knowledge
The 34th Division was occupying forward positions along a 6000 yard front. Confronting the Division were elements of the 10th SS Panzer Division in the ERECK Area and elements of the 9th Panzer Division in the LINDEHN Area. (6)

Since arriving in the Ninth Army the 34th Division had been engaged in combat 11 days. Casualties had not been heavy. The fighting spirit and morale were excellent. No serious problems had as yet arisen in the Division. The Division was well equipped and no serious shortages existed. On the other hand the enemy morale was low due to repeated defeats and forced withdrawals, but he was fighting in his homeland and was determined to make the Allies pay for all of their advances. The supply situation of the enemy was good. He had withdrawn to prepared positions where it could be assumed he had supplies stockpiled for a defense. In general the Americans combat efficiency was higher than that of the enemy it was opposing.

In accordance with the Corps plan, the division planned to attack with 2 regiments abreast to capture the towns of WURM, LEIPFARTH, and LINDEHN. The 335th Infantry would attack to the northeast to capture LINDEHN and the high ground between LINDEHN and ERECK. The 335d Infantry to initially support the attack by fire on the left with the mission of attacking in the evening to capture the town of ERECK. The 334th Infantry was in Division reserve. (7) The basic problem facing the 34th Division was that they had tried twice during the period 18 - 24 November to break into the WURM LINDEHN ERECK Area without success. (8)

(6) A-2, p. 68
(7) A-2, p. 51
(8) A-2, p. 60
DISPOSITIONS AND PLANS OF 335TH INFANTRY

On 27 November, the 335th Infantry was in Battalion assembly areas. (9)

The regiment planned to have the 2d Battalion seize and capture the high ground between LINDERN and BRECQ which was given the name TOAD HILL. The 3d Battalion was to capture the Town of LINDERN, the 1st Battalion was to remain in present position in Regimental reserve and to be prepared to attack in the 3d Battalion zone. (See Map C)

THE BATTALION SITUATION

The Battalion was located in an assembly area in the town of PRUMEN, on 27 November, when the regimental order was received. This being a distance of about 5000 yards from its objective and about 500 yards from its line of departure, no time was wasted in moving the Battalion to an initial assembly area.

The Battalion Commander felt that no reconnaissance patrols were necessary in that information could be obtained from the units now in contact and through personal observation over the area. It was learned through these reconnaissance and by contacting our units now in contact with the enemy, that between our position and our objective was a small hill which the enemy had well organized to defend. Also on the forward slope of the Battalion objective was an anti-tank ditch approximately 3 feet deep with a 3 foot trench dug in the center. Rear and forward of this Anti-tank ditch were trenches and emplacements which had been dug. These were known as "community diggings"

(9) Personal knowledge
which had been prepared by the civilian populace. The
trenches were a type of communication trench approximately
5 1/2 feet deep and 2 1/2 feet wide. On the objective itself
were 2 pillboxes of concrete construction.

The terrain was generally rolling farming land which
had been planted in sugar beets. On the left of the Bat-
talion sector was a small draw which led into the town of
BEECK. This draw afforded very little cover. Due to the
continuous rains during the month the fields had become a
sea of mud and all vehicles were road bound.

Due to the fact that two attacks had been made against
the town of BEECK one from the southwest and one from the
south, it is likely that the Germans expected us to attack
again in this area.

During this period the Division Artillery was firing
into the towns of BEECK, WURM and LEIPFARTH. (10)

THE BATTALION PLAN OF ATTACK (See Map D)

The line of departure was to be the line now held by
friendly forces in the Battalion's zone; H-Hour, 0630 hours,
29 November 1944.

The 2d Battalion's plan was to cross the line of departure
without an artillery preparation move as rapidly as possible
with the plan in mind of reaching the anti-tank ditch before
it became bright daylight. Company G to attack on the right
and capture the right pillbox and be prepared to continue the
attack on order to capture the right portion of the town of
LEIPFARTH. (The Battalion Commander felt that if the Battalion

(10) Personal knowledge
objective was captured on the 29th of November that the Battalion would continue the attack probably to take LEIFFARTH so plans were made and orders issued to this effect.)

Company F to attack on the left and capture the pillbox in the left sector of TOAD HILL and protect the Battalion's left flank, after the capture of the Battalion's Objective be prepared to continue the attack, on order to capture the left portion of the town of LEIFFARTH.

Company E to be in reserve in the area as shown on Map D to be prepared to move on order of the Battalion Commander.

Company H, 1st Platoon of machine guns to be in direct support of Company F, 2d Platoon of machine guns in direct support of Company G, 81 mm Mortar Platoon to be in general support in position's behind HILL A. (11)

The Battalion Command Post to remain in PRUMMEN. The Battalion Anti-tank platoon to remain in PRUMMEN and be ready to move on order.

The Aid Station was to remain in its present location and to establish a casualty collection point on the trail behind HILL A in the center of the Battalion zone and to follow the Battalion as far forward as possible with their jeep ambulances. The Battalion's ammunition dump was to be located in a building in the southeast corner of PRUMMEN.

MOVEMENT TO THE LINE OF DEPARTURE

The Battalion moved out of PRUMMEN on the morning of the 29th of November at 0530 in a column of Companies. Order of march: Company G, 2d Platoon machine guns of Company H, Com-

(11) Statement received from Major Dick VonSchilitz, former Company Commander of Company E, January 19, 1950
pany F with 1st Platoon machine guns of Company H, Company H minus and Company E. As the head of Company F arrived at the edge of the town of PRUMLNEN some spasmodic machine gun fire was received from the vicinity of SCHLACKEN HILL. No casualties were received but this caused some confusion thus causing a short delay before the movement was resumed. All units were in position on the Line of Departure at 0600 hours when last minute checks were made in preparation for the jump off. (12)

NARRATION

THE ATTACK ON TOAD HILL

Companies F and H crossed the Line of Departure at 0630 hours and advanced to the base of SCHLACKEN HILL where they came under grazing machine gun fire, rifle fire from SCHLACKEN HILL, and mortar and artillery fire. Company G was held up and unable to maneuver due to the intensity of the fire. Company F had two Platoons committed, but its third platoon had become lost from the Company and was just catching up with it. At this time it was getting light, and two pillboxes could be seen on SCHLACKEN HILL which were causing some of the trouble. Also causing trouble were machine gun emplacements on the forward slope of the Hill. (13)

Company Commander of Company F committed his 3d Platoon around through a small draw on his left with the plan of flanking the pillbox in his zone. This Platoon after advancing up the draw a short distance came into machine gun fire from two pillboxes and was stopped. The Germans in this pillbox sur-

(12) Personal Knowledge
(15) A-3; G-3 Journal, 29 Nov. 44
rendered after approximately an hour’s fighting, when the platoon leader worked 6 men up near the entrance, and they talked the Germans inside into surrendering.

At 1100 hours, artillery fire and mortar fire were brought in on the pillboxes holding up Company F and G. They were able to advance to the top of SCHLACKEN HILL where they were brought under intense artillery and mortar fire, also tank fire from top of TOAD HILL, and small arms fire from positions on the forward slope of TOAD HILL. Artillery concentrations and 81 mortar concentrations were fired on the positions, but Company F and G were unable to advance.

Casualties had been high and the Medical Detachment had been unable to move its litter jeep forward as originally planned, due to the muddy conditions of the fields. The PREMKEN-BEECK road could not be used because it was under enemy observation from the town of BEECK and anything moving on this road was brought under fire. This caused the litter bearers to have a litter haul of approximately 1500 yards, and they were not able to evacuate the casualties. A request was made to Regiment for additional litter bearers which were made available the next morning. (14)

The Battalion Commander reported to Regiment the situation of his two assault companies and informed Regiment that he was going to commit his reserve Company around the right flank from a position near the GERBONSWEILER-LINDERN Road against TOAD HILL. (See Map D) The attack was to jump off at 1400 hours.

While this movement was being ordered the regiment at-
tached Company E of the 40th Tank Battalion to the 2d Battali
on. The Battalion Commander then delayed the time of at-
tack of Company E with the plan of attaching the tanks to Com-
pany E. The Battalion Commander ordered the tanks to move up
through GERKONSWEILER where a guide from Company E would pick
them up, and take them to the point where Company E was to jump
off, its attack. The Company Commander of Company E was to se-
lect the time of attack and notify the Battalion Commander.
This was done, and after a 10 minute artillery preparation on
TOAD HILL, the Company jumped off at 1630 hours. The tanks
followed the infantry. When Company E was about 300 yards
from the anti-tank ditch, the right tank was hit and the tank
company refused to move farther. Company E continued to move,
and arrived at the anti-tank ditch at approximately 1715 hours.
They were stopped by small arms and tank fire from the top of
TOAD HILL.

Companies F and G were then able to scramble over the top
of SCHLACKEN HILL, but only one platoon of each company moved
up to the anti-tank ditch with Company E. The Company Com-
manders of F and G were ordered to move their Companies for-
ward. This was about 1730 hours, and after a short forward
movement by Companies F and G they were ordered to prepare an
all around defense and remain there for the night. Company E
with the platoons of F and G Companies at the anti-tank ditch
were to do the same thing. (On the attack across to the anti-
tank ditch Company E had suffered only 2 casualties and had
captured 52 Germans.) (15)

During this time Company E, 40th Tank Battalion withdrew

(15) Personal statement of Major Dick Von Schrils received
19 January 1949

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to refuel and resupply their ammunition loads. They were detached from the Battalion.

During the day the forward observer parties with Companies F and G had been lost. Company G's party had all become casualties, and Company F's had lost its communication equipment. A member of Company F's observer party had returned to the artillery to obtain some additional equipment. (16) This had necessitated the firing of all artillery since early in the morning over the battalion's communication and caused considerable delay in receiving of artillery and issuing of instructions to Companies.

Plans were made and orders issued for the defense of the position for the night, Company F on the left to protect the left flank, Company G in the center and Company E on the right. 1 platoon of machine guns attached to Company F and one platoon attached to Company E. (17)

THE NIGHT OF 29-30 NOVEMBER

At 2130 hours orders were issued for the continuation of the attack the following morning. These plans were for Company E to attack on the right and capture the right pillbox on "TOAD HILL", Company F to attack and capture the left pillbox on "TOAD HILL" and protect Battalion's left flank, Company G to continue the attack and capture that ground lying between the two pillboxes on "TOAD HILL". Time of attack 0730 hours, 30 November to be proceeded by an artillery preparation of 1/2 hour. This order was given to the Company Commanders of Company E and Company H who happened to be in the Battalion C.P.

(16) Personal knowledge
(17) Personal knowledge
at the time the plans were being made. The Company Commander of Company E was to deliver the order because he stated he knew exactly where the other Company C.P.'s were located on the ground. He then returned to his Company and issued his order for the next morning. While moving to Company F's C.P. he was captured. The radio operator he had with him heard the order when issued at Battalion and escaped capture and delivered the order to Companies E and F. (18)

At about 2400 hours the night of 29 November a strong counterattack was launched against the right flank of the Battalion. This consisted of an estimated 100 enemy infantry supported by 5 tanks. This was repulsed mainly by heavy concentrations of artillery fire. A short time later a counterattack was launched on the left of the Battalion at Company F position from direction of the town of BEECK. This was made entirely with infantry, and they succeeded in penetrating Company F position and destroying one of its Platoons. This counterattack was stopped mainly by the machine gun platoon of Company H supporting Company F. The Battalion didn't get much rest the remainder of the night due to the harassing of the enemy. Although no more counterattacks were launched against the position, the enemy continued to annoy the Battalion by moving single tanks with three or four infantry up on the flanks of the position and raking the troops with machine gun and tank fire. On the Battalion's objective there were from 4 to 6 tanks delivering spasmodic fire on the position. Artillery fire was placed on these tanks from 8" howitzers but was not effective in as much as the tanks would continue to shift.

(18) Personal knowledge
their positions after firing a few rounds from their tanks. (19)

The Anti-tank platoon had been ordered earlier in the even-
ing to move on the position, but due to the condition of the
terrain were unable to get their guns near enough to the posi-
tion to be of any value. The entire night was spent in an at-
tempt to get tank destroyers and tanks attached to the Bat-
talion to be used on the position, but to no avail. Fortunate-
ly for the Battalion, the Anti-tank ditch existed as this pre-
vented the overrunning of the position by the enemy armor.

ATTACK 30 NOVEMBER ON TOAD HILL (20)

At 0700 hours the morning of 30 November the artillery
began firing 60 tons of ammunition on TOAD HILL and the draw
to the left of TOAD HILL. At this time F and G moved up to
the Anti-tank ditch as the last volley, a round of white smoke
fell, and the Battalion jumped off. They were immediately met
with small arms and machine gun fire and artillery. Very short-
ly 6 enemy tanks appeared on the objective and delivered tank
and machine gun fire on the Battalion. It was necessary for
the Battalion to give up what little ground it had gained which
was about 200 yards and fell back to the Anti-tank ditch to
keep from getting cut up by the tanks. The enemy fire was so
intense that many of the men in the Battalion were buried in
the Anti-tank ditch and communication trenches by the artillery
fire. It was estimated that 3 German batteries were firing on
the position.

During the night of 29-30 November the Regiment had at-

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(19) Personal knowledge
(20) Personal knowledge
tached to it the 1st Battalion, 354th Infantry which had been moved to PREMKEN and planned for it to be committed through the 2d Battalion to capture TOAD HILL if the 2d Battalion failed to capture its objective. The 1st Battalion, 354th Infantry in a column of companies moved up through the area which the 2d Battalion had attacked across the previous day and was brought under heavy artillery fire from the time it reached SCHLACKEN HILL until it reached the 2d Battalion position.

At 0950 hours 30 November, the lead Company of the 1st Battalion, 354th Infantry passed through Company G position and was brought under intense small arms and direct tank fire from the top of TOAD HILL and was stopped, this being the extent of its advance for the day of 30 November.

The Battalion Commander of the 2d Battalion then pulled Company G back, moved it around the shoulder of the hill which overlooked BECK from the east in order to take the left pillbox. This move was executed, but Company G was stopped by what?

This was reported to Regiment, and Regiment ordered the Battalion to remain in its position for further orders until the situation in BECK was cleared up. (The attack on BECK at 1930 hours on 29 November by a Battalion of the 335d Infantry had been unsuccessful. On the morning of 30 November at 0700 hours this same battalion had launched another attack on BECK with little success.) (21)

(21) A-2, p. 69
THE NIGHT OF 30 NOVEMBER AND 1 DECEMBER

The night of 30 November and 1 December was spent in re-supplying the Battalion. The troops were low on rations, water and ammunition, having received very little during the previous two days, except some ammunition which they had hand carried to their respective units. Rations, water and ammunition were moved forward and a Battalion supply point established in the draw northwest of BERCK.

Occasional artillery fire and spasmodic small arms fire was received on the position from the enemy during the entire time which was of a harassing nature and caused little damage.

THE THIRD DAY AND NIGHT OF THE ATTACK

The Battalion remained in its position throughout the day. The only action which took place was a patrol from Company C which worked its way up to the left pillbox and found it empty but well defended by machine guns and riflemen from positions near the pillbox.

(By the evening of 1 December the 1st Battalion, 353d Infantry with Troop C of the 125th Cavalry had captured the town of BERCK. The way was now open to continue the attack on "TOAD HILL".) (22)

The Regimental Commander ordered the 2d Battalion Commander to attack the morning of 2 December and to capture the Battalion objective. Upon capture, they were to support the 1st Battalion, 354th Infantry, by fire when they would pass through the 2d Battalion.

(22) A-2, p. 68
The night of 1 December was relatively quiet on the Battalion Position except for occasional round of mortar and artillery.

Orders were issued for the attack on the morning of 2nd December. They were as follows: Companies E and G to continue attack in their zone and capture that portion of the Battalion objective and upon the capture of assigned objective be prepared to support by fire the 1st Battalion, 354th Infantry when they pass through their position. Company F to support the attack of Companies E and G from present position and revert to Battalion reserve. Company H support attack with one platoon machine guns in direct support of Companies E and G respectively. Time of attack 0800 hours proceeded by 10 minute artillery preparation on the objective. (23)

2 DECEMBER, 1940

At 0800 hours Companies E and G jumped out of their holes and moved forward against small arms and mortar and artillery fire. Company G was stopped. Company E moved on the double through this fire and by 0820 hours had captured their portion of the objective with very few casualties. (24)

To show the intensity of the artillery fire on this position, 260 some odd rounds of all types of artillery were fired in the vicinity of the pillbox in Company E area's during a four hour period.

Company G after reorganizing again pushed forward and by noon had captured the pillbox in their area.

At 1205 hours the 1st Battalion passed through the Bat-

(23) Personal Knowledge
(24) A-2, p. 69
talion's position and continued the attack to LEIPFARTH which it captured by 1235 hours. (25)

The 2nd Battalion was then pulled out of the line and taken to PALENBURG about 5 miles to the rear for a rest and some hot food which the troops had not had for four days. (26)

To sum up the results of this battle:
The 2nd Battalion, 335th Infantry failed to capture its objective the first day of the attack, did succeed finally on the fourth day. Viewed from a Division level the capture of this piece of high ground gave observation into the town of LEIPFARTH and WURM and the highway running northeast to the RGER RIVER. It also gave due to this observation a marked advantage to the Division for attack on LEIPFARTH and WURM which it later captured.

Possibly one of the most important features of this attack was that it caused the enemy to commit and keep engaged troops which he could have used to counterattack the remainder of the Regiment which had captured the town of LINDEN on the 29th of November, 1949, which was not finally secured until 1 December 1949 due to continued counterattacks.

**ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM**

1. THE ATTACK

In making a study of this operation, it is my opinion that the attack of this Battalion should have been launched from a position northeast of GEHRONWEILER, this would have placed the Battalion in a position where it would have been

(25) A-2, p. 59
(26) A-4, p. 75
able to hit the enemy's flank of his first line of positions on SCHLACKEN HILL once his line was penetrated as proven by the flanking action of Company E.

Since the approach of the position was under observation from the northwest portion of BEECH, it is my opinion that the attack of this town should have been made simultaneously with that of the attack on "TOAD HILL" to prevent the enemy from being able to shift his reserves and concentrate his fires against the 2d Battalion.

Company E flank movement I believe is an excellent example of a commitment of a reserve at the proper time to influence the course of action. It is further felt that if the tanks had been able to remain on the position and support by fire, Company E would have captured the right portion of the Battalion objective the first day.

2. FAILURE OF UNITS

(a) Upon the commitment of the Battalion reserve, Companies F and H did not press forward in the manner they should have there by causing the Battalion to be echeloned to the left rear, rendering it unable at the critical time when Company E was moving to bring its maximum power against the objective.

(b) The tanks stopping at the point which they did merely because of the loss of one tank caused the attack of Company E to lose momentum. Also the rapid withdrawal of the tanks from the area when known enemy tanks were present made the situation on the hill very critical, though the lack of anti-tank protection, the presence of the anti-tank ditch is only thing that saved the Battalion from being overrun by enemy armor.
(c) The lapse of time between the time of the loss of forward observer's parties and the replacement of them was entirely too long approximately eight hours, thereby not permitting the Battalion to obtain the maximum efficiency of the supporting artillery fire.

3. COMMUNICATIONS

In planning this operation adequate attention was given communication but the overload forced on it by the necessity of using it to fire artillery mission, taxed it to its maximum and caused the communication within the Battalion to be slowed down considerably.

4. ENEMY POSITIONS

(a) The enemy positions throughout the Battalion's zone took full advantage of the natural defense of the terrain. The positions on SCHLACKEN HILL enabled the enemy to obtain good grazing machine gun fire in front of his position. The deep communication trenches and connecting gun positions on TOAD HILL permitted the enemy freedom of movement without being observed during the entire time of the attack. The terrain afforded the enemy observation over the entire route of advance of the Battalion and permitted him to adjust fires on the Battalion during its attack of the position. The strength of the enemy's defense on TOAD HILL was due to the effective use of the natural terrain augmented by man made obstacles and the maximum utilization of his fire power.

The only mistake the enemy made in his defense was the failure to protect his left, on SCHLACKEN HILL or have an ade-
quate warning system.

5. COORDINATION

(a) The coordination throughout this operation was poor, mainly in the attack of the 1st Battalion, 334th Infantry through the position on the 2nd day of the attack. I believe rather than trying to have this battalion push through the 2nd Battalion if a coordinated effort had been made against the position by both Battalions the position would have fallen and one battalion could have been relieved and used some where else.

(b) It should have been coordinated between the Battalion Commander and the tank company that at least a portion of the tank company would remain on the position to provide some anti-tank protection. It is felt if this had been done the tank company would not have been detached from the Battalion so quickly.

6. SUPPLY AND EVACUATION

Due to the number of casualties during this operation and the long litter haul casualties were held under fire on the battle field for excessive periods.

7. SUPPORT OF HIGHER HEADQUARTERS

It is not felt that sufficient support was given this Battalion during its attack of its objective after the 1st day. The regiment and division both knew that enemy armor was in the area yet after the 29th of November, no friendly armor was made available to the Battalion, resulting in the fact that
everytime the Battalion attack until the 2nd December, enemy armor appeared on the objective and caused the Battalion to drop back to the anti-tank ditch because of the lack of anything with which to fight the tanks.

It is true that the anti-tank ditch could have stopped our armor from crossing to the objective, but it is felt that with some pick and shovel work or the laying of some materials across the anti-ditch at night our tanks could have crossed. If the tanks were still unable to cross at least they could have supported the attacks by fire and cut down some of the tank fire the infantry was receiving each and every time it attacked.

LESSONS

1. Mutual supporting objectives should be attacked simultaneously so as to prevent the enemy from shifting his reserves and supporting fires.

2. Commanders at all echelons must be imbued with idea of pressing the attack at all times especially when an opportunity presents itself to seize vital terrain.

3. Replacement artillery observers must be made readily available to Infantry so that maximum use of artillery fire can be gained.

4. Tanks when attacking with infantry tend to regulate the speed of attack. Therefore they must be aggressive and not stopped by intermittent anti-tank fire.

5. When enemy tanks are known to be in the area, Infantry must be protected from them by some type of anti-tank weapon, preferably the tank.
6. The attack of Infantry against positions defended with armor in open terrain is sure to fail.

7. The attack of units through units, when the leading unit is held up by well placed defensive fire, is a waste of manpower.