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THE OPERATIONS OF COMPANY E, 180th INFANTRY
(45th INFANTRY DIVISION) IN BATTLE OF NUREMBERG,
GERMANY, 17 - 20 April 1945.
(Personal Experience of a Company Commander.)

Type of operation described: A RIFLE COMPANY
IN THE ATTACK OF A CITY.

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ADVANCED INFANTRY OFFICERS CLASS NO 1
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THE OPERATIONS OF COMPANY E, 180th INFANTRY
(45th INFANTRY DIVISION) IN BATTLE OF
NUREMBERG, GERMANY, 17-20 APRIL 1945
(CENTRAL EUROPE CAMPAIGN)
(Personal Experience of a Company Commander)

INTRODUCTION

This monograph describes the part taken by Company E, 180th Infantry Division in the attack upon Nuremberg, Germany. This action took place on the 17th, 18th, 19th and 20th of April 1945.

By the latter part of March 1945 the allied troops in Germany were maneuvering into position to embark upon what proved to be the last great offensive of World War II in Europe. The American First Army had established a bridgehead on the eastern side of the Rhine River at now historic Remagen. The Third American Army had crossed this same river on 23 March near Darmstadt. The 9th U.S. Army had reached the famous river at Duisberg. (1)

Seventh U.S. Army, Commanded by Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch had successfully crossed the Rhine River on 26 March 1945 and continued the offensive into the German heart of Bavaria. (See Map A) (2) Early in April it became known that the 3rd and 45th American Divisions had been chosen to attack the Shrine City of Nuremberg. (3) General Patch's Army was entering the German Heart. This may best be explained by quoting Millers, History of World War II. "With its entry into Nuremberg, Patch's Seventh Army scored one of the dramatic victories of the campaign, as this city had for years been the shrine of the Nazi Party." (4)

In introducing the reader to this city it may be well to first of all relate some information on its history and location.

(1) A-6, Part 8 p. 1; (2) A-1, p. 778; (3) A-1, p. 792; (4) A-9, p. 884;
Nuremberg is geographically located in a broad valley of picturesque Bavaria, Germany. With a prewar population of
400,000, (5) Nuremberg was an important city to the German Reich as a commercial, industrial, political, art and communication center. As a communication center the city acted as the connecting link between Munich and Berlin. The North-South Railway, the Autobahn (super-highway), and other first class roads passed through this urban area. Also found within the city were natural and artificial waterways, represented by the Pegnitz River and Ludwig's Canal, respectively. The city is divided into two parts by the Pegnitz River. Approximately one-third of Nuremberg lies north of this river. (See Map B) Located in the geographical center of the city is the "Castle of Nuremberg". This was the first portion of the city to be erected. Mention has been made in historical documents that the Old Walled City existed as far back as 1050 A.D. In the battles of the City States, down through the centuries, this fortress was the scene of much military activity. Included among the great monarchs that inhabited the castle were such as the Hohenzollern Family, Charles III and Charles IV. The fortress itself consisted initially of a wall 22 feet in height surrounded by a dry moat 30 feet deep and 90 feet wide. (7) From time to time the fortifications were changed somewhat but basically remain the same today. (See Map B)

It was in spacious Nuremberg Stadium (See Map B) that the Nazi Party formulated its notorious racial laws, and held their big political rallies. Therefore it is no wonder that Adolf Hitler held this city forever in his favor and in one instance called it "the most German of all German Cities." (9)

(5) A-2, p. 74; (6) A-1, p. 792; (7) A-8, p. 134; (8) A-12;
THE GENERAL SITUATION

The enemy in front of our 7th Army during this latter part of March and early April 1945 had been driven out of the strong defensive positions he held west of the Rhine River. In less than a month the key terrain consisting of the Rhine River, the Maine River, the large cities of Worms, Aschaffenburg and Bamberg were lost. (See Map A) Now the retreating enemy was fighting with his back to the city of Nuremberg. (10)

The German Divisions listed as maintaining the ring around Nuremberg at this time consisted of the 246th, 198th, 553rd, 9th, 212th, Alpen, Von Hobe, 416th, 256th, 36th and a battle group of the 2nd Panzer Division. The 2nd Mountain Division and the 17th S.S. Division were to be brought from positions south of Nuremberg, but the two divisions arrived too late to be of any assistance to the German cause. (11)

The above divisions were in a deplorable state. In every case the units were understrength. In some instances the Divisions were so depleted in manpower that subordinate elements were without a parent organization until gathered in by the commanding officer of a larger force. (12) Reenforcing the Infantry Divisions were nondescript Artillery Battalions, anti-aircraft Battalions, Service Troops, Training Troops, and Civilians including children barely of teen age. (13)

Enemy morale, military and civilian, was low. Yet, because of the party members fanatical love for the Fuehrer, the resistance encountered was strong. (14)

The city had been reduced to a mass of ruins because of allied bombing. This served to make the fighting for the Infan-

tryman more difficult. The ruins provided the enemy additional unpredictable positions from which to wage his defense. (15)

Enemy aircraft, that had been almost non-existent for weeks, again strafed and bombed our supply columns and supply routes. (16) The warm spring weather with very little rainfall was one redeeming feature in our favor. (17)

7th U.S. Army then consisting of VI, IX and XII Corps had assigned the XX Corps the mission of reducing the hostile City of Nuremberg. This Corps, commanded by Major General Wade Haislip, included the 3rd Infantry Division, the 45th Infantry Division, the 14th Armored Division and the 106th Cavalry Group. (18) After 18 April 7th Army reinforced the XX Corps with the 42nd Infantry Division to facilitate unity of command in taking the city of Fuert. (See Map C) (19) XXI Corps on the XV Corps right flank was to assist in the cities' capture by a screening action outside the city. (20) The American Divisions encircling Nuremberg on 15 April 1945 consisted of the 3rd Infantry Division in the north, the 45th Division on the northeast, the 14th Armored Division plus the 106th Cavalry Group in the south, and the 42nd Infantry Division with Combat Command "A" of the 12th Armored Division on the west. (See Map C) (21)

PLAN OF ATTACK

CORPS

Instructions issued by XV Corps directed that Nuremberg be attacked by an enveloping action. The 3rd Infantry Division on the right and 45th Infantry Division on the left were to approach the city from the north and southeast. (22) The Pegnitz River

(15) A-12; (16) A-2, p. 75-76; (17) A-12; (18) A-1, p. 792; (19) A-11 p. 45; (20) A-1 p. 793; (21) A-1, p. 793; (22) A-10 April, p. 33;
would divide the two assault Divisions. When the envelopment was complete the Divisions would be attacking in an almost due west direction. The 3rd Division responsibility was all of the city north of the Pegnitz River. The 45th Division zone was to be all of the city south of this same river. (See Map C) The 14th Armored Division assisted by the 106th Cavalry Group were to provide the flank protection outside the city in the south and southeast. The 14th Armored Division was to cut the Autobahn south of Nuremberg. (23)

DIVISION

The 45th "Thunderbird" Division had just captured the city of Bamberg 25 miles north of Nuremberg. (See Map A) This veteran division was now ready to comply with XV Corps Operations Order #176 dated 14 April 1945. This plan ordered the division, "To continue the advance in zone, forcing a crossing of the Pegnitz River and the capture of that portion of Nuremberg in the Corps zone south of the Pegnitz River." (24) The decision of 37 years old Major General Robert T. Fredrick, 45th commander, was a three Regiment attack. The 179th Infantry Regiment on the right, the 180th Infantry Regiment in the center and 157th Infantry Regiment on the left. (See Map C) (25) Support for the attack consisted of the 45th Division Artillery, which had fired its millionth round near Nuremberg, the 191st Tank Battalion and 645th Tank Destroyer Battalion. (26)

REGIMENT

Regiment, placed the First Battalion on the right, the Second Battalion on the left and the Third Battalion in reserve for the first day's action in Nuremberg. (See Map C) (27)

BATTALION

Attack plans of the Second Battalion, 180th Infantry placed Company E on the left and Company G on the right with Company F in reserve. One platoon of tanks and one platoon of Heavy Machine Guns were attached to Company E. Company G was given a platoon of Tank Destroyers and a platoon of Heavy Machine Guns. The Battalion's initial objective was the Stadium and Congress Hall areas. (See Map D) Company G was to clear the enemy in its zone and capture the Stadium. Company E was directed by the Battalion Commander to attack an "intermediate" objective consisting of a Prisoner of War Camp called Stalag 13. (See Map D) Upon the capture of the Prisoner of War Camp the company would continue on to the initial objective. (28)

LOCATION

On the afternoon of 16 April 1945, Company E, 180th Infantry Regiment, received orders to be ready to move from the town of Lauf. (See Map C) Company E, with other elements of the regiment had been in division reserve for the past two days. At 1430 hours, following a hot meal, the battalion moved out of the city in a column of companies, Company E being the second company in the formation. By 1730 hours the village of Fischbach (See Map D) had been cleared of all enemy by the lead company. Company E had taken up defensive positions for the night at the

(27) A-5, Chapt. 10, p. 9; (28) A-12
north edge of the village in a wooded area. The Company Commander was called to the Battalion C.P. in Fishbach where the attack order was issued. City plan maps with the objectives and check points placed on the maps were distributed to the Company Commanders by the S-3. There would be no reconnaissance before the attack. Upon return to the company, the First Sergeant was given a short resume of the situation and told by the Company Commander to let the men sleep. The "order" would be given at 0530 hours. (29)

STRENGTH

The approximate front line strength of the company was 115 privates, 15 non-commissioned officers, and 4 officers. 95% of the company could be termed as replacements. Over 1600 men had been placed on the morning report since the company landed in Sicily on 10 July 1943. The company had turned over eight times in the twenty-two months it had now been overseas. (30)

MORALE

Morale was generally excellent. The individual soldier was proud of his unit, from squad through division. It was no trouble to keep a division patch on any man in this company. (31)

SUPPLY

All supply was always very closely supervised. The constant change in leadership, especially in the rifle squads and platoons made this a necessity. Of all supply however, the ammunition supply had to be personally checked by the Company Commander most (29), (30), (31) A-12;
frequently. In attack orders of late this statement was included, "each man will carry, in addition to the normal cartridge belt load, 1½ bandoleers of M-1, two white phosphorus grenades and one fragmentation grenade. Each rifle platoon will carry, regardless of strength, ten anti-tank grenades and ten bazooka rounds." To supply hot food to the company while engaged in combat operations the ½ Ton Jeep and Trailer were used whenever possible. In the attack upon Nuremberg the company organic ½ Ton Jeep and Trailer brought food as far forward as possible in marmite cans. Usually within a block of the company C.P. In the Jeep's load was included mess kits as well as any other class supply that was needed. Small groups from the platoons, no larger than a squad went to the designated mess location, where each soldier obtained a mess kit, ate his meal, turned in his mess kit and returned to his front line position. 75% of the meals consumed by Company E while in Nuremberg were served hot. (32)

COMMUNICATION

Communications differed from the T/O and E that allowed one S.C.R. 300 radio for a rifle company. The S.C.R. 536 had proven inadequate in many cases in the past because of its limitations in certain types of terrain and difficulty in keeping the set in proper operating condition. Included, therefore, in the communications of the company was three S.C.R. 300's. These radios were used by the Company Commander and the two lead platoons. Communications to the other platoons was by S.C.R. 536 or by one of the four platoon runners in Company Headquarters. (33)

(32), (33) A-12;
OFFICERS

Officer personnel consisted of three platoon leaders and a Company Commander. The 1st platoon leader, 1st Lieutenant Ray C. Fee, joined the company on 6 February 1945 (34) and had proven his ability to lead a platoon. The 2nd platoon leader, 2nd Lieutenant Louis Callico was a battlefield commissioned officer from Company B 180th Infantry Regiment who joined E Company on 20 February 1945. (35) This officer had been a rifle platoon sergeant since Sicily. He was exceptionally cool under fire. The 4th platoon leader 1st Lieutenant Paul Franz was a member of the company before the Company Commander joined as a 2nd Lieutenant replacement officer in October 1944. Lieutenant Franz was the morale builder of the company. (36) A new officer was received on April 17, 1945, the day of the entry into Nuremberg. The 1st Lieutenant, a replacement, had spent two days in Battalion Headquarters for the purpose of orientation. While the Company Commander was in the Battalion C.P. receiving last minute instructions, the officer asked the Battalion Commander if he could go with E Company. The Battalion Commander consented. The officer was oriented on the company situation while going up to the company. Included in this orientation was a statement by the Company Commander which in substance was, "this is a good time for you to join the company as combat conditions have been fairly easy of late. If this continues, which I think it will, you will have a good chance to get to know your men." This advice later proved to be erroneous. The lieutenant was held in Company Headquarters for the time being to allow further orient-

(35) A-3; (36) A-12;


The attack order was given at 0530 hours after the platoon leaders had finished breakfast and were still near the Company C.P. At 0700 hours the company moved on foot to the southern edge of Fishbach. (See Map D) Here the platoon of tanks were picked up. While the unit walked to this position the Company Commander was at Battalion receiving additional instruction from Lieutenant Colonel Joseph C. Sandlin, the Battalion Commander. (38)

The company moved toward the Prison Camp by use of the road from Fishbach. (See Map D) The formation was a column of platoons. Order of march being 2nd platoon with one section of tanks attached; 3rd platoon and one section of tanks attached; Company Headquarters; 4th platoon, machine gun section; 1st platoon; Heavy Machine Gun platoon from Company H and 4th platoon, 60 m.m. mortar section. (39)

As the north corner of the Stalag was reached the 2nd platoon came under fire. (See Map D) The firing was sporadic and was coming from towers located along the edge of the P.W. Camp. The tanks were employed to knock down the lightly constructed fence while the 2nd platoon riflemen engaged the towers with rifle fire. Once the fence had been flattened by the tanks the Infantryman poured through the openings behind the tanks. Once through the fence the platoon spread out in fan shape. Resistance was light and within an hour approximately half of the mile

(37), (38), (39) A-12;
square prison area had been captured. At this point the German
Commander of the Stalag, a Medical Colonel, surrendered the camp.
Among the 13,000 prisoners released were 250 Americans and 450
British. (40)

Before the company could be gathered together and extricat-
ed from this phase of its assignment it was necessary to request
other troops from Battalion. A riot almost resulted when 5,000
Russian P.W.'s in one compound witnessed a change from German
guards to American guards. The Russians were infected with ty-
phus and could not be released. Interpreters were used to go to
the edge of the enclosure and pass the word to small groups in-
side that American medical authorities would be along shortly to
insure that adequate medical attention was received. The reserve
company arrived at 0945 to release Company E of it's P.W. Camp
responsibility. (41) ➔

The company continued on its mission using the highway from
the P.W. Camp to the objective to guide upon. Because of the
open nature of the terrain 100 yards distance between platoons
was maintained. The movement for the next half hour was rapid,
and no resistance was encountered. (42)

By 1030 hours the forward elements of the company were with-
in 200 yards of the wooded area south of the Stadium. (See Map D)
The 2nd platoon started to receive rifle fire from the woods. Two
enemy were noticed leaving positions at the edge of the woods and
going in the direction of the city. Lieutenant Callico directed
one squad to move toward the woods. When they were not fired upon
the remainder of the platoon and the tanks section continued to
follow. The wooded area on the left of the highway was reached

(40) A-2, p. 177; (41), (42) A-12;
and by 1130 hours the lead platoon had cleared half of its zone and taken 6 prisoners. (See Map D) Their progress was stopped by heavy flanking fire from the right side of the highway. (43)

When the 2nd platoon entered the woods the 3rd platoon had been employed to clear the wooded park area adjacent to the stadium. (See Map D) The progress of this platoon was checked by the Company Commander. The platoon had been given to the new Lieutenant after the Stalag was captured. This unit of Company E was engaged in an assault when the Company Commander arrived. The sight he witnessed was very gratifying. The new officer was leading his platoon in assault fire across a 50 yard fire break straight up on enemy prepared positions. The fire distribution and marching fire was perfect and every man advanced quickly toward the stubborn Germans. The operation witnessed indicated prior preparation and excellent leadership. Here was surely a good leader. However, on reaching one of the first positions the Lieutenant lost control of his platoon. The officer suddenly had stopped and stood looking at a very much dead enemy soldier. The Lieutenant then kept repeating, "I killed him, I killed him." As the Company Commander was right behind the officer a little assistance was given. Effort was made to properly impress the Lieutenant with the fact that his platoon was continuing to clear the position and that his men should never be forgotten, and that his place now was with the platoon. The officer then went on with his platoon. The entire area was now cleared on the right side of the highway. 15 prisoners were taken and an estimated 6 enemy had been killed in the initial assault. A 20 m.m. gun that had held up the 2nd platoon was also taken. (44) (43), (44) A-12;
Battalion was notified of the company positions. It was learned from Lieutenant Colonel Sandlin that the left flank would be open for sometime as elements of the 157th Infantry Regiment were engaged with the enemy south of the Stalag. Company G was called by S.C.R. 300 and informed of conditions south of the Stadium. The 3rd platoon would remain in that position until the Stadium had been cleared by Company G. (45)

By 1430 hours the 2nd platoon was within 100 yards of the lake to its direct front. (See Map D) Heavy automatic fire, 86 m.m. fire and small arms began to land on the company positions. While the fire was being returned by the lead platoons 60 m.m. mortar fire and artillery fire was registered in on Congress Hall and the Arena. (See Map D) A frontal attack upon Congress Hall was an impossibility. When the heavy firing subsided the 2nd platoon was sent around the left side of the lake. The lake itself served as the right boundary for the platoon. (See Map D) By 1500 hours the first group of houses at Check Point 94 (See Map D) had been cleared and the platoon was meeting moderate resistance from enemy located around Check Point 99. Tanks were used to full advantage with the platoon and in this instance it seemed to be their very presence that prompted the enemy to fall back. (46)

As Company G was now in the Stadium in strength it was safe to move the 3rd platoon of Company E from its positions on the right of the highway. The platoon was then placed in the line on the left of the 2nd platoon near Check Point 99. Lieutenant Callico's 2nd platoon was to attack in the direction of Congress Hall while the 3rd platoon led by Sergeant Challberg cleared the left portion of the Battalion objective. (See Map D) (47) (45), (46), (47) A-12;
Plans formulated were for the 2nd platoon to attack the Congress Hall strong point at 1600 hours. Artillery, 88 m.m. mortar fire and 60 m.m. mortar fire would lift at 1600 hours and the assault on the position would take place. The platoon reached the edge of the wooded park area adjacent to Congress Hall by 1540 hours. The structure was a massive 4 story building not yet completed. The scaffolding was still around the outside of the huge U shaped building. There was no cover or concealment for the platoon to use. The area that was to be crossed was flat and solid pavement for 75 yards between the park area and building. (48)

T/Sgt. James Sheridan 4th Platoon Sergeant had moved the mortars to positions south of the C.P. which was now in the buildings at Check Point 84. The Sergeant was adjusting 60 m.m. fire on the 2nd platoon objective. One round seemed to have gone directly into the center of the large building and for a fraction of a second it appeared to be perfect mortar fire. In reality it was not. The smoke that raised from the thunderous blast was a 250 pound airplane bomb. The Battalion Commander was promptly called by the Company Commander and a request was made that he "raise hell with someone. The bomb had been within 100 yards of the 2nd platoon and they were going into Congress Hall in 5 minutes." Action was taken and no more rounds of this weight and type were received. (49)

The Company Commander found it necessary to move the 1st platoon into positions between the two lead platoons. Heavy Machine Guns Section still remained under company control in positions at the south edge of the lake. Company Headquarters Group (48), (49) A-12;
was used to protect the very exposed flank. The trolley car line embankment was used to advantage to defend this flank. The tanks with the 3rd platoon were placed half way between Check Points 84 and 99 to provide both flank and frontal protection for the company. (50)

The 2nd platoon attacked into Congress Hall at 1600 hours. From the moment Lieutenant Callico led his men from positions in the park, that contained large granite building blocks, the enemy poured in heavy fire. When about eight men had gone from the covered position the last man stopped after running about 20 yards. The man turned around and started back toward the covered area. The Company Commander, watching the conduct of the assault from the safe granite block area saw that the other men of the platoon had not followed after the soldier broke. The remainder of the men in the platoon were told to follow the Company Commander. Upon passing the man that had stopped the enlisted man raised his Browning Automatic Rifle to indicate that it had jammed. Enemy positions in front of the building were over-run and occupants either killed, wounded or signaled to go toward our lines. The objective was almost reached with only three casualties thus far when a Panzerfaust shell landed between the Platoon Leader, the Platoon Sergeant and the Company Commander. The shell exploded close to Staff Sergeant Mike Hartzel, the Platoon Sergeant. The Sergeant was blown two feet in the air, landed flat, raised his head once and then died. The company had lost one of its best leaders. Sergeant Hartzel was being considered for a commission because of his leadership ability. The building was finally reached and the squads started clearing each

(50) A-12;
room. The enemy was holding out under the supervision of two or three fanatical S.S. Troopers so placed to insure that each person remained to defend the position to the last. Congress Hall was found not only to be four stories high and very wide but eight to ten rooms deep. By darkness the building was only one-third cleared of enemy. Over one hundred prisoners were taken and at least thirty-five had been killed. Litters were called for from Battalion. The company’s four wounded were hand carried on the litters back to the Company C.P. (51) From this point the casualties were transported by Jeep to the Battalion aid Station. (52)

At 1830 hours the left flank came to life. A German Combat Patrol made an attempt to come over the trolley line tracks near Check Point 99. The chief threat was just to the rear of the 3rd platoon positions. In this action Corporal Manes, a Browning Automatic Rifleman, on the 3rd platoon’s flank selected an alternate position for himself on the reverse slope of the tracks. The Corporal waited until the Germans had approached within 25 yards of his position before he opened fire. After killing two of the enemy and causing the remainder to take cover the aggressive soldier moved to the enemy side of the tracks and placed additional fire on other members of the patrol. Because of Corporal Manes’ action the enemy did not learn that the left flank of the company was actually weak. The enemy did not try to exploit this flank again that night. (53)

Company G had progressed as far as Check Point 97 (See Map D) but would not be able to reach the north side of Congress Hall before tomorrow. Therefore it was necessary to reluctantly remove

(51) A-3, 17 April 1945; (52) A-12; (53) A-12;
the 2nd platoon from the Hall. Lieutenant Callico was instructed by the Company Commander to occupy the old positions of the enemy near the Hall and dig new positions from this point to the edge of the lake. The building would be reentered just before daylight. (54)

The Company Commander checked the front line positions. Automatic Weapons were placed to afford the best possible defense for the night and the tank platoon was deployed along the left flank and near the Company C.P. Defensive Artillery fires were planned by the Forward Observer. A hot meal was fed. Individual rolls were stacked near the C.P. Wire lines were laid from Battalion to Company and from the Company C.P. to the Platoon C.P.'s. (55)

The earlier part of the evening was spent in reorganization. The days action had netted a P.W. Camp captured, 175 prisoners taken and an estimated eighty killed. This was at a cost to the Company of 7 men wounded and one killed. (56) Three of the eight casualties were N.C.O.'s and two more were privates acting as assistant Squad Leaders.

The 2nd platoon of course was the hardest hit. The morale was especially low because of the loss of Hartzel. The guide, T/Sgt. McLaughlin, a veteran of 18 months at Attu was made 2nd Platoon Sergeant. The Sergeant had no previous combat experience however, before joining Company E a month prior to this action. He was a very able leader. (57)

S/Sgt. Challberg requested that the new officer be taken from the 3rd platoon as the officer was excitable and had the men all on edge. The Sergeant was told by the Company Commander that some action would be taken. The Officer and other men in

(54) A-12; (55) A-3, April 17, 1945; (56), (57) A-12;
the platoon were talked to by the Company Commander. Conditions were not strained between the officer and the men. The officer contended that in the day's action he had not given the German a fair chance when his platoon assaulted the position. The Company Commander assured the officer that the entire platoon and its new leader had performed very well and to forget about "the German." The officer needed help to restore his confidence. It was very definite that changes had to be made. The next day found Lieutenant Callico as Executive Officer, Sergeant Challberg leading the 3rd platoon and the new Lieutenant with the 2nd platoon. T/Sgt McLaughlin was informed of the new officers good qualities and the fact that his tendancy to get excited was still present because of the officers inexperience. If this weakness appeared again the Company Commander should be notified at once. (58)

2nd Day--April 18th

As planned the night before the 2nd platoon continued its job of removing the enemy out of Congress Hall. The building was reentered at 0500 hours. By effective use of white phosphorous and fragmentation grenades the Hall was practically cleared by 0630 hours. Another 75 prisoners and 300 civilians were taken out of the building. (59)

Company F had replaced Company G as the lead company in the right sector of the Battalion. (See Map g) The first objective for the day gave Check points 104 and 106 to Company E and the Arena to Company F. (See Map E) (60)

Company E was ready at 0645 to push with the 1st platoon on (58), (59), (60) A-12;
the right and 3rd on the left. The 2nd platoon was in support. Other attachments remained the same with exception of one Section of Tank Destroyers replacing a Section of Tanks. This provided the company with one section of each for the day's action. Five minutes before time to attack a heavy concentration of enemy time fire was placed on the company positions. Immediately following the heavy shelling a fanatical group of enemy about the size of a platoon tried to penetrate between the 1st and 3rd platoon positions. The attempt was unsuccessful. Battalion and Company were notified at 0705 that the company was moving as planned. (61)

The left flank of the company was still open. The rear elements were to continue keeping a careful watch on this flank. Lieutenant Callico was fully oriented by the Company Commander on his new duties. One specific duty in addition to the regularly assigned jobs of a rifle Company Executive was that of checking the platoon leaders and platoon sergeants as to their position. Map reading was a weak point in all three rifle platoons. Another "must" for the Lieutenant was to keep Battalion informed of the situation. (62)

About 0900 hours the lead platoons were slowed because of increasing resistance. The enemy had been driven to positions north of Check Points 104 and 106. (See Map E) This section of the city had been formerly a very pretty residential part of Nuremberg. Now it was a mass of jagged ruins with only an occasional house that hadn't been entirely gutted. The defender used this rubble to the fullest extent possible. The enemy further started at this time, to use children and old men to do the ob-
serving. The man or child would be noticed walking up to a corner near front line positions, stand for a while and then slowly amble away. Shortly thereafter artillery and mortar fire would pinpoint the company positions. Orders were given to the platoon leaders by the Company Commander to fire on any future "observers" of this type. (63) During the next three hours both lead platoons made deliberate methodical advances in their assigned sectors. Block 3, 4, 7 and 9 were taken. (See Map E) Orders from Battalion halted the company until Company F finished clearing the Arena. The morning's advance had been difficult at certain strong points. Located in Block 5 was an 88 m.m. position protected by 25 or 30 enemy rifleman. (See Map E) The position had been rendered inactive by tank fire and small arms at one time, but a few minutes later the very much respected weapon was operating again. Positions for the tanks to fire on the weapon could not be secured. Both platoons held its position near Check Point 106 and placed frontal fire on the strong point. Lieutenant Fee and the 1st platoon cleared buildings in the right section of Block 1. (See Map E) The buildings were only lightly held and in thirty minutes the platoon was ready for further action. The platoon was to assault through an open area in Block 1 and come into Block 5 in rear of the gun position. The Platoon Leader called on the S.C.R. 300 to the Company Commander, with the 3rd platoon, that he was ready to "Jump." The 3rd platoon held its fire. Lieutenant Fee was given the word to go ahead as planned. Shortly thereafter the 1st platoon could be seen coming (63) A-12;
from between two buildings in Block 1, then straight across the narrow street to Block 5. The enemy gun position was taken by surprise. The artillery piece still had its barrel pointing toward the American lines. The position was taken with the loss of one man wounded. The 20 or 25 enemy were all killed with the exception of three or four men near the gun that were still showing some signs of life when observed by Lieutenant Colonel Sandlin a short time later. The Colonel sternly asked if Company E had quit taking prisoners. The reply by the Company Commander was that the medics had been notified and that enemy wounded would be cared for. The reason for so many dead was also explained. (64) At 1400 hours the attack was again resumed. The men had eaten onethird of a K ration during the "break". By 1430 hours both platoons were engaged against the strongest resistance yet encountered. The advance had progressed to a point one block south of Check Points 111 and 110. (See Map E) In Lieutenant Fee's platoon area the enemy was occupying two story buildings, on both sides of the street, which had to be cleared room by room. This had to be done in Block C before a road block in Block D could be cleared. At 1445 the Lieutenant indicated by radio to the Company Commander that Block C was taken and that the platoon was assaulting the road block. Ten minutes later Lieutenant Fee was killed and a squad leader, Sergeant Benefield was wounded. (65) The Lieutenant had been attacking the road block with his platoon. An enemy machine gun waited until the Lieutenant was 20 yards from his position before opening fire. The Lieutenant had tried to throw a white phosphorus grenade. The grenade had exploded after the Lieutenant was hit, and the grenade burned the map the Lieu-

(64) A-12; (65) A-3, April 18th;
tenant had with him. This left only two city plan maps in the company. The veteran 1st platoon Sergeant, 2/Sgt. Harry Chazin was again in command of the 1st platoon. The Sergeant was noticeably moved by the loss of the Lieutenant. The platoon continued its advance and cleared the remainder of Block D by 1330 hours.

3/Sgt. Challberg and the 3rd platoon during the same period had been able to advance with only light resistance, with one exception. The platoon in this instance by-passed unintentionally about 15 Germans. This enemy group set up a position in Block 9 after the 3rd platoon progressed to Block 10. (See Map E) When a runner tried to go from the Company C.P. in Block 7 to the platoon position he was killed. The support platoon was moved into Block 9 and Sergeant Challberg's attached Tank Destroyers were told by the Company Commander to proceed from their position in Block 9 to Block 10. The Germans were then taken without much difficulty. (66)

At 1845 the Company Commander was checking positions on the objective (Check Points III and 110) with plans of defending from this point during the night. Hopes were high throughout the company that tomorrow the company would be in reserve. A call was received from Battalion. The Battalion Commander directed that Company E make a night attack in its zone as soon as ready and advance to Check Point 118. (See Map E) The platoon leaders were called by radio and instructed to continue the attack. At 1915 hours the company fighting was resumed. (67)

With the company since its capture of the prison camp was a South African officer, 1st Lieutenant James W. Low of Johanne-

(66), (67) A-12;
burg, South Africa. The Lieutenant, an Infantryman had been freed from Stalag 13 and desired to accompany Company E into Nuremberg. The officer had been marched through Nuremberg three days before the American attack on the city. The Lieutenant was told that it was strictly forbidden and that the South African officer had surely carried his share of the burden by spending three years as a Prisoner of War. The officer contended he knew many of the gun positions and begged to stay. Each of the four days it was mentioned that Lieutenant Low should leave but the Lieutenant always managed to stay "one more day." The former Prisoner of War rendered valuable service to the company, especially after the loss of some of the leaders. Lieutenant Low was intelligent, spoke fluent German and was constantly assisting wherever possible. (68)

The attack was continued with the platoons fighting house to house. The 3rd platoon in its zone on the left and the 1st on the right. Lieutenant Callico was instructed to keep the supporting elements of the company close behind the lead left platoon. The Company Commander spent the greater share of time following the lead platoons and checking their positions. The 1st platoon needed the most assistance. The platoon sergeant did not have a map and would have been unable to accurately read one under these conditions if there had been one available. (69)

By 2230 hours the attack had progressed through Blocks 16, 17 and 18. (See Map E) The resistance seemed to have lessened. The Company Commander with the 1st platoon at this point called by radio to Sergeant Challberg to discontinue clearing houses and go straight to Check Point 118. The Tank Destroyer Section (68), (69) A-12;
was to give close support. Any small groups of enemy were to be by-passed. The 1st platoon would do likewise in its zone. Lieutenant Callico was to check Sergeant Challberg's support platoon and use them to clear any by-passed enemy. Progress was rapid in both platoon zones through Blocks 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24. (See Map E) Many obstacles in the form of rock and brick slowed up the tank section with the 1st platoon. About 1130 hours the 1st platoon was held up by stubborn resistance in the right portion of Block 25. While this strong point was being reduced heavy firing could be heard on the left in the 3rd platoon sector. Sergeant Challberg and Lieutenant Callico could not be contacted by radio. The fire fight seemed to be coming from near the objective, possibly in Block 27. Ten minutes later the firing had ceased and the 1st platoon had reduced the resistance and approached Check Point 118. Heavy firing from positions north of the objective and 20 m.m. fire from Check Point 124 (See Map E) greeted the 1st platoon. A near miss by a German Panzerfaust was scored before the accompanying tanks could get out of the street. The enemy then counterattacked with a small fanatical force in an effort to drive the platoon off the objective. This attack was beaten off. The presence of the supporting tank section at the edge of Blocks 26 and 27 was very instrumental in driving off the attacker. The confusion that was in evidence made the issue one of doubt for a few minutes during the fight on Check Point 118. (70)

After the attack had been quelled the Company Commander was a very much confused person. The 2nd platoon was on the objective, the 3rd platoon could not be found; the Tank Destroyer Section

(70) A-12;
was absent and Lieutenant Callico was not present. The new officer related that the Executive Officer was present at the start of the fire fight on Check Point 116, but that Lieutenant Callico had not been seen since. One of the older men in the 2nd platoon related that the missing Lieutenant had been seen just before a "bazooka" round landed. Since then the Lieutenant had been missing. Sergeant Challberg and Lieutenant Low were located near Block 26. (See Map E) and the platoon was intact. How the 2nd platoon got ahead of the 3rd platoon has never been explained to the satisfaction of the Company Commander. During the 3rd platoon's action the Tank Destroyers took positions five blocks to the rear in Block 21. (71)

Battalion was notified that the objective was taken at 0130 hours. Defensive positions were complete by 0230 hours. During the remainder of the night contact patrols were sent to Company F located four blocks short of Check Point 117. Patrols were sent to the left but could not contact the 3rd platoon, 157th Infantry Regiment. (72)

Lieutenant Callico was found at daylight. The Lieutenant had been killed instantly. His body was laying in the street in front of the objective.

In this day and night action the company had taken 130 prisoners and an estimated 35 were killed. The company casualties consisted of 2 officers killed, 3 privates killed and 7 enlisted men wounded. (73)

(71), (72) A-12; (73) A-3, 18 April;
3rd Day—April 19th

The company spent this day in Battalion Reserve. At 0600 hours Company G passed through Company E at Check Point 118. Company continued to attack in the right sector of the Second Battalion. During the day the main railroad station in the city was taken and in a night attack, Company G cleared Blocks 28 to 34 inclusive. (See Map F) The 3rd Battalion, 157th Infantry tied in with Company G about 1300 hours. (74)

For Company E the day was spent to good advantage. The much needed rest was obtained. Two hot meals were fed. The platoons were again reorganized. Weapons were cleaned or replaced and bearded faces were shaved. (75)

4th Day—April 20th

Orders were received at 0530 hours on 20 April 1945 instructing Company F to attack from Company G positions in Block 34. (See Map F) Lieutenant Colonel Sandlin's order dictated that Company E would attack in the left sector of the battalion with the west wall as its left flank. Company F would be again on Company E's right. (See Map F) The objective of both companies was the Pegnitz River. (76)

The coordinated attack jumped off at 0730. This first attempt to get across the wide street between Block 34 and Block1 was stopped cold. (See Map F) Grazing automatic and small arms fire was placed on the attackers. The heavy automatic fire was coming from the direction of Company F's area of responsibility. The E Company Commander did not desire to expose the lead platoon of (74), (75), (76) A-12;
Company E to this flanking fire until Company F neutralized some of the fire to its direct front. The Company F Commander contended this could not be done. The Battalion Commander was asked by the E Company Commander to attach one platoon of "Fox" Company to Company E. After the plan was heard by Lieutenant Colonel Sandlin the request was granted. The 3rd platoon was designated to gain a foothold in the castle area for Company E and the 1st platoon of Company F was to do the same for that company. Both of the platoons were placed in Block 34 and the platoon leaders were oriented. White phosphorus grenades would be thrown into the 40 yard wide street adjacent to the Walled City. (See Map F) When the street was sufficiently smoked a squad from each company would cross the street and gain a foothold in the Walled City area. The E Company squad was to enter the corner building on its right boundary and the F Company Squad would enter the corner building on its left boundary. (See Map F) The first squads made it across the much clouded street without a shot being fired. Two or three minutes later after only sporadic fire was heard the 2nd squads of each company were released. In ten minutes time both platoons were in their assigned areas in strength. The light machine gun section of Company E was next fed into Block 1 of the old city area. One man in this section considered conditions so much under control that the soldier stopped in the middle of the street and gave a dead German a fast check for items that were apparently of no military value. The soldier was sent on his way before completing this act. (77)

The attached tank section followed the platoon into the castle area. Movement was slow because of the ruins in the streets. By 0930 hours Block 1 had been cleared of all enemy. (77) A-12;
Prisoners were being brought out of cellars, towers, and partially fallen buildings in the area. The prisoner count had already reached about 75. A company prisoner cage was set up guarded by 2 privates. Because of the unusually large amount of prisoners being taken lately it was found best to hold the prisoners until a large number were taken. This system was a necessity as the company strength was low and the front line soldier could not be spared too frequently for this job. (78)

The high buildings located in Block 34 provided excellent observation posts for the 60 and 31 m.m. mortar observers. Artillery could not be used as the encirclement ring had now narrowed to less than a mile. Resupply of ammunition to the company, especially the 60 m.m. was ideal. Throughout the days action the mortars remained in Block 34 and the 1 Ton Jeep with Trailer was able to transport the ammunition directly to the position. (79)

About 1100 hours a sketch was sent to the company from the Company Commander of Company F. The sketch had been made by a prisoner, and indicated that there were underground rooms and tunnels under the Company E area. The sketch was vague and not much could be made from it but Lieutenant Low was given the job of getting all the information possible out of the prisoners. (80)

By 1200 hours the company had advanced to Block 3. (See Map F) The prisoner count had reached 250. Approximately 50 of the more persistent enemy had been killed. Occasionally found was an S.S. Trooper, usually a 16 or 17 year old fanatical soldier who would not be taken prisoner and would not allow those under his control to be taken. About 1230 hours a German Colonel (78), (79), (80) A-12;
was captured by the 3rd platoon. The Colonel indicated that 200
enemy desired to give up in what was marked as Block 7 on the
map. The Company Commander told the Colonel to go back and get
them. The German would not consent to do so initially. Later
the enemy officer desired to make an effort. The Colonel with
white flag held high returned to Block 7 with full instructions
on how to surrender. The group had been given until 1300 hours
to come out. If this order was not heeded all fire available
would be concentrated on their position. At 1255 the German
Colonel returned to the 3rd platoon in Block 3. He requested
the concentrated fire to be held until after 1315 as the "prison-
ners" could not gather all their equipment together before that
time. This request was granted.

Promptly at 1315 hours a solid line of 200 odd enemy filed
out of the right side of Block 7 and marched straight into the
Company F sector. The Company F Commander was called by radio
and told that he had 200 more prisoners with the compliments of
Company E. (81)

Lieutenant Low, the South African officer, was positive that
a large underground existed but no entrances could be found. The
main part of the underground network of rooms was thought to be
under Block 7. (82)

During the next two hours the 3rd platoon cleared Block 3
and 4 but could not gain entrance to the all important Block 7.
The western side of the block was strongly defended. (83)

The 2nd platoon had indicated by S.C.R. 300 that they now
had possession of Block 5. The Company Commander notified the
platoon leader to proceed to Block 6. (See Map F) About ten
(81), (82), (83) A-12;
minutes later the 2nd platoon's progress was checked by the Company Commander. Elements of the platoon were found going from Block 5 out through an opening in the wall and into the 3rd Battalion, 157th Infantry zone. This part of the city had been taken by the 157th Infantry an hour previous. The Company Commander asked the 2nd platoon leader where he was going. The answer was to Block 6. The Lieutenants map was checked, and it had been numbered correctly. The wall had been the left boundary of the platoon since its entry into the Walled City. The Lieutenant had not used his map and applied common sense. (84)

The 3rd platoon gained entrance to Block 7 (See Map F) after the 2nd platoon partially cleared Block 6 against light resistance. White phosphorus grenades (for protection) were again used as a means of getting into the block initially. The platoons forward movement was limited in the next couple hours by small groups of enemy defending every room in the western part of the Block. (85)

Meanwhile the 2nd platoon, making full use of its attached Tank Section had progressed to Block 9, (See Map F) by 1500 hours. In one instance an enemy position fired flanking machine gun and bazooka fire on one of the tanks. The tank could not put direct fire on the position but was able to put the muzzle through a front window and blow out the side wall. The tanker then was ordered to put 15 rounds through this opening. The result was a completely knocked out position. During this last hour additional prisoners were being taken at the rate of 25 to 50 in a group. At one time in Block 9 the "company cage" reached roughly 200 prisoners before they could be evacuated. In this (84), (85) A-12;
block the first of a series of tunnel entrances were found. In some cases a group of prisoners would be captured in a cellar and five minutes later fifteen or twenty more would be brought out of the same location. The 1st platoon was eventually called from its support position to act as guards at each entrance to a tunnel. As the attacking platoons progressed more entrances were discovered than there were men in the 1st platoon to guard them. Additional help was received from the 4th platoon.

The 2nd platoon reached the Pegnitz River by 1600 hours. Battalion was notified that all territory above ground had been taken and the final objective reached. The entire city of Nuremberg had fallen with exception of the underground in Company E's sector. (86)

Employment of the unit from this point was entirely by Squads working in through the maze of underground rooms and tunnels. The 2nd platoon was employed under Block 9 generally and the 3rd platoon under Block 7. (87)

At 1830 hours the Regimental Commander came to Company E to get first hand information on the situation. Colonel Duval was shown one of the underground areas. This particular tunnel was located approximately four stories below ground and consisted of numerous rooms equipped with food, clothing, ammunition and one of the strongest radio stations in Germany. The underground was lighted with electricity operated by generator located at ground level. Circulation of air was controlled by a ventilation system. While in the underground area the Colonel was shown one locked door made of heavy material. It was the opinion of the Company Commander that if this door could be opened it would lead

(86) A-1, p. 796; (87) A-12; 33
through a tunnel to the underground rooms in Block 7. Then the Company Commander tried to open the door a shot was fired from behind the locked door. The result of the shot was a welt in the door about knee high. The Company Commander said, "Come on out." The answer in very broken English was, "We will not come out, we are too strong for you." The unknown person was told that the city had fallen and that he had made his decision, he would be blasted out. This ended the conversation as the German would talk no more. Colonel Duval then said to the Company Commander, "What are you going to do?" Almost at a loss for an answer to the question the officer retorted, "If Engineer help could be obtained all entrances except one should be blasted shut." The Colonel agreed with one modification, that being, blast them all shut. The Colonel promised to send the Engineers requested and then left. The ventilation and electrical systems were cut off in order to further the difficulties of the enemy underground.

About 2130 hours Lieutenant Colonel Sandlin and two officers from battalion accompanied the Company Commander to the underground to hear what the English speaking enemy had to say. This time the German would not carry on any conversation. While exploring the other rooms with the aid of German captured flashlights, Colonel Sandlin located a framed map hanging on the wall. This map showed a complete floor plan and proved that the tunnel area leading to Block 7 was behind the locked door. The Company Commander made another attempt to get the German to talk. The door was knocked on, being careful to stay away from the front of the door should another shot be fired. Finally the same voice was
heard to say, "Yes," and then, "how do you want us to come out, we have wounded." The enemy had litters so permission was granted for them to file out bringing the wounded with them. The English speaking person was an S.S. First Lieutenant. The German Lieutenant unlocked his side of the door and led out a total of 65 defenders. The Lieutenant was held behind the door by the Company Commander and the Battalion Commander prevented the prisoners from going into the other rooms. This channeled them up the stairway to a receiving party at ground level. (89)

The end was almost in sight. The Lieutenant was taken down the long low tunnel ahead of the Company Commander. Colonel Sandlin decided to follow to give further protection, should it be needed. Approximately 50 yards through the tunnel was another door. The officer was taken through a door that led up a stairway and out into a court yard. The court yard contained many expensive civilian automobiles. The Lieutenant informed the Company Commander that this was Nuremberg Police Headquarters Parking Area. The Lieutenant was taken back down the stairway to where Colonel Sandlin had remained to guard the door. When the door was reached Colonel Sandlin was not to be found. The Colonel's name was called by the Company Commander. An answer came from far down the yet unexplored tunnel. The Colonel had reached a squad of the 3rd platoon. All concerned were busily engaged obtaining enemy pistols of all types left by the Germans. Gauleiter Karl Holtz was found in a pool of blood at ground level in a building in Block 7. (90)

On this date, Hitlers birthday the Gauleiter had sent this message to Hitler:

(89), (90) A-12;
My Fuehrer: The final struggle for the town of the Party rallies has begun. The soldiers are fighting bravely, and the population is proud and strong. I shall remain in this most German of all towns to fight and to die. In these hours my heart beats more than ever in Love and Faith for the wonderful German Reich and its people. The National Socialist idea shall win and conquer all diabolic schemes. Greetings from the National Socialists of the Gau Franconia who are faithful to Germany.

Karl Holz

The Fuehrer had replied:

.....I wish to thank you for your exemplary conduct. You are thereby bolstering the spirit not only of the people in your own Gau, to whom you are such a familiar figure, but also of millions of Germans. Now starts that fervent struggle which recalls our original struggle for power. However great the enemy's superiority may be at the present moment, it will still crumble in the end--just as it has done before. I wish to show my appreciation and my sincere gratitude for your heroic actions by awarding you the Golden Cross of the German Order.

Adolph Hitler (91)

Karl Holtz had remained and had paid the supreme price.

Nuremberg fell at 2230 hours. The company had captured 750 prisoners in the days action. (92) An estimated 45 enemy were killed. (93) The company losses were 3 wounded. (94)

(91) A-1, P. 795; (92) A-4, (Company E Section); (93) A-12;
(94) A-3, 20 April;

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ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

Immediately following the fall of Nuremberg the author could not understand why the enemy defended the city so strongly at this late date in the war. After analyzing the situation it is now evident that the city resisted to the very last because of political reasons. The fanatical efforts of the Nazi party in implementing its decision to defend the Shrine City resulted in heavy losses for both the allies and the enemy. While the "defend at all costs" directed by Nuremberg party officials probably did delay the end of the war somewhat, it was not worth the price paid. The battle waged by the enemy in its disorganized condition does bring out one fact to be remembered: Any city becomes a formidable obstacle when defended by its inhabitants, with or without adequate military force, if the people of the city are imbued with the will to resist. (94)

Tactics employed by Company E in this action were generally sound and followed accepted principles. The decision of higher headquarters to attack the city by envelopment and block off the surrounding area by encirclement was effective. The selection of this method of employing troops in the attack hastened the end of hostilities in Europe, for the enemy, after committing his forces to the defense of the city, was denied further use of his troops. (95)

Intelligence Agencies worthy of adverse mention since information about the underground in the Old Valled City was not collected, collated and disseminated to the assaulting companies. The mere fact that an underground existed "somewhere in Nuremberg", would have been of value to rifle companies, but.

(94), (95) Personal Opinion;

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even this was not passed down. (96)

In this operation hot meals were fed to the troops as often as time permitted when Company Z was not actively engaged in an assault. In one instance during the attack, forty-five minutes sleep was sacrificed to allow a hot meal to be fed before the company began the morning's action. On other occasions when time did not allow a normal hot meal to be served, hamburger sandwiches were sent from the company kitchen. (97)

Communication facilities were a contributing factor to the success of the company in this action. After the loss of two platoon leaders and a platoon sergeant, the two extra SCR 300's were especially appreciated. The extra radios were valuable aids to maintaining control when it was impossible for the Company Commander to personally check progress of new platoon leaders and platoon sergeants leading platoons, composed of men with little ability to read a map. (98)

The very presence of armor, used with the lead platoons, speeded the taking of various strong points immeasurably. Observation for armor was limited, but tank fire was generally effective when delivered. When tanks were used in close support the tank Infantry team was potent, but when either the Infantry Commander or the Tank Commander did not cooperate this combination ceased to exist as a team. (99)

Several times during the capture of the city the Company Commander allowed his desire to personally influence the action to place himself in situations from which he could not control his entire company. The choice in each instance had to be made on the spot, but had he planned his movements in advance some of his hours spent as a rifleman might have been eliminated. (100) (96), (97), (98), (99), (100) Personal Opinion;
The newly assigned officer showed many good qualities as a leader, however when this officer became excited, he was no longer properly able to lead the 3rd platoon. Probably the Company Commander contributed to the officers difficulty with this unit, by giving the officer command of the platoon in such a short time after joining the company. (101)

In the night attack, partial control of the company was lost by the Company Commander near the objective. Despite this the attack was successful because of the ability of each leader to control his squad or platoon despite the darkness and a stubborn enemy. (102)

White phosphorus grenades were used to good advantage to save many lives. For this reason the attack order included, for emphasis, that two white phosphorus grenades would be carried per man. Before each attack, the platoons were personally inspected by the Company Commander, to insure that the soldier had available all of the protection that could be procured for his use. (103)

Company attack formations were usually two platoons assaulting with one in support. The support platoon had to be very carefully moved in each instance. In rotating the attacking platoons, each platoon was used on a schedule of two days attacking and the third day in support. This method seemed to obtain the best results caused less dissatisfaction among the company than any other method tried. (104)

Inability of certain officers and NCO's to read a map almost caused a crossing of units during the action. While the basic training of newly arrived replacements is beyond the scope of (101), (102), (103), (104) Personal Opinion;
a company in combat, the Company Commander in this case should have included this grave training deficiency in his plans or reshifted certain key personnel. (105)

LESSONS

1. An envelopment of a terrain feature, such as a city is an effective way to reduce resistance, especially when the attacking force is on exploitation, and the enemy is fighting a series of delaying actions.

2. The use of Air Missions to reduce the effectiveness of enemy defenses can produce incalculable assistance to attacking units. Close coordination between air and ground must be accomplished especially, in city fighting where one built up area is indistinguishable from another.

3. In teaching the individual soldier map reading, too much emphasis cannot be placed upon the practical application of basic principles.

4. A retreating, disorganized army, can avoid final disaster for a sustained period, if its civilian populace is so imbued with an undying love for what is believed to be right, that it will deny the attacker any concession whatsoever.

5. Intelligence must be collected, collated and disseminated to the smallest unit.

6. Company Commanders must be aggressive but should refrain from becoming involved in platoon fire fights.

7. When it is necessary for a rifle Company Commander to assume temporary command of a platoon this should be the line of action to follow. The time spent with the platoon should be reduced to the absolute minimum time necessary to restore the (105) Personal Opinion

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platoon to its normal efficiency.

8. Civilians when acting as observers for a defender must be fired upon by attacking troops.

9. Hot food in the stomachs of your men is the responsibility of the Company Commander. That he should never evade regardless of circumstances.