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OPERATIONS OF COMPANY F, 314th INFANTRY REGIMENT,
79th DIVISION, IN THE CROSSING OF THE SEINE AND
EXPANSION OF THE MANTES BRIDGEHEAD, 20-28 AUGUST 1944
(Personal Experience of a Company Commander)

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ADVANCED INFANTRY OFFICERS CLASS NO 2
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ORIENTATION

INTRODUCTION

This monograph covers the operations of Company F, 314th Infantry Regiment, 79th Division in the crossing of the SEINE RIVER and the expansion of the MANTES bridgehead, 20-28 August 1944.

To orient the reader and better explain the operation, this study will cover briefly the actions of the division prior to the crossing of the SEINE.

The division landed on French soil the 14th of June 1944 or D plus 8 and were first committed at CHERBOURG. (1) Successive commitments were at LA HAYE DU FUITS (2) and the ST LO-PERIER highway line. (3)

At the breakthrough of Normandy the division was a part of VIII Corps, First Army and remained as such until the 28th of July when it became a part of Third Army and was delegated to support the 6th Armored Division in its mad dash to cut off the BREST peninsula. (4)

On the 3d of August the division was transferred to XV Corps where it was to remain until the 28th of August. (5) Protecting the right flank of the Third Army zone the division wheeled east to aid in repatriating the cities of FOUGERES, LAVAL, and LEMANS, not to mention the smaller towns that welcomed the Cross of Lorraine Division.

(1) A-3, P. 18
(2) A-3, P. 18
(3) A-3, P. 24
(4) A-9, P. 37
(5) A-3, P. 26
On the 12th of August the division moved to LA MELE SUR SARTHE where it helped close the southern pincer of the FALAISE pocket. (6)

Following the FALAISE incident the division was alerted for VERSAILLES and PARIS and dreams of the GI’s were high. Too high in fact as the division was ordered to swing north and seize MANTES-GASSICOURT, a city about 40 miles northwest of PARIS, to cut off the escape route for those Germans that had eluded the FALAISE pocket. (7)

With the 5th Armored Division on the left and the 79th on the right in the Corps area, the routes to MANTES were exploited and on the evening of 18 August, elements of the division were overlooking the SEINE. (8) From the heights west of the river it was apparent that no bridges were left intact; however, a patrol from Company A of the 314th did cross the next day to confirm that there were Jerries on that side. (9)

On the evening of 19 August, Lt. Gen. GEORGE S. PATTON, Third Army Commander, visited the division sector with Maj. Gen. IRA T. WYCHE, the Commanding General of the 79th, and a few hours after General PATTON’S departure from the area the division was ordered to force a river crossing before morning. (10)

THE GENERAL SITUATION

The general situation as of the night of 19-20 August was as follows: (See Map A.) In the Third U. S. Army zone, the XV Corps, comprising the 5th Armored Division and the

(6) A-9, P. 44
(7) A-3, P. 27
(8) A-3, P. 27
(9) A-3, P. 26
(10) A-9, P. 48
79th Infantry Division, was in the northeast sector, with the 5th Armored on the left and the 79th Division on the right, with both divisions along the SEINE RIVER line. Further to the south and southwest of PARIS, three combat command teams of the 7th Armored Division (XX Corps) were echeloned northwest to southeast from RAMBOUILLET, ST. ARNOULT to ETAMPES. While further to the southeast, the 5th Infantry Division (IX Corps) was at MALHERBES, and elements of the 4th Armored Division (XII Corps) and the 80th Infantry Division (V Corps) were to the southeast of CHARTRES. (11)

To the north and west of the Third Army were the First U. S. Army and the British 21st Army Group. To the south, the only known unit was the German 16th Infantry Division. (11)

Confronting the units of the Third Army mentioned above were the known German units disposed from north to south; the 2d SS Armored Division opposite the 5th Armored Division; the 18th GAF and the 49th Infantry Division opposite the 79th U. S. Division; the 325th Infantry Division across from the 7th Armored Division; the 6th Parachute Infantry Division opposite the 5th Division; and the 48th Division and elements of the 338th Division opposing the 4th Armored Division (minus) and the 80th Division (minus). (11)

Third Army's plan was for XV Corps (79th Infantry Division and 5th Armored Division and supporting troops) to secure and hold the bridgehead east of the SEINE at MANTES-GASSICOURT, deny the use of crossing sites to the enemy as far north as LOUVRES until relieved by First Army, and be prepared to advance east from MANTES or southeast, west of the SEINE. (12)
XV Corps ordered the 79th to cross and secure the bridgehead at MANTES-GASSICOURT with the objective of denying the routes to PARIS and the east in general to the elements of the German Army who had escaped from the FALAISE pocket. (13) 5th Armored was to hold the west bank of the river line.

THE XV CORPS SITUATION

The condition of the troops was good at this time; morale was at a high level. Losses from the start of the breakthrough in Normandy had been low and the terrain ahead was a welcome sight in comparison to hedgerows of the previous weeks. Supplies were sharply becoming a problem, for the fast moving columns were outrunning the efforts of the supply groups in the rear, making it difficult for them to maintain a normal supply rate. Supplies of 1st and 3d class nature were especially low; however, this condition was alleviated by the first airborne shipment of supplies in the army area: twenty-one C-47's landing 47 tons of Class I and 3 supplies near LE MANS on the afternoon of the 19th. LE MANS was approximately 100 miles to the rear of the 79th position. (14)

The morale of the enemy in mid-August was distinctly lower than it had been the month before. This was revealed by the FW's who passed through the Allied cages. A lack of determination was particularly noticeable among the infantry, whose outlook, for the most part, was one of bewilderment and helplessness, produced by the rapidity of the Allied movements and overwhelming superiority in equipment (both on the ground and in the air), and by the German's own loss of arms and

(13) A-9, P. 48
(14) A-8, P. 36

6
transport, which left them without the necessary means of mounting an adequate defense. Only in those younger officers in whom the Nazi spirit was strongest was there a feeling of German invincibility. (15)

The terrain in this area was of a rolling type, heavily wooded in parts, but with an abundance of roads leading in all directions. Across the SEINE from MANTES, the land rose abruptly 433 feet from the river to form a plateau from which the enemy could command the ground to the west for 10-15 miles. (See Map B.) The weather was variable; bright sunny days predominating, with an occasional rain which, though dampening the spirits of the men, had no ill effects on the operations. (16)

DISPOSITION AND PLAN OF THE 79TH INFANTRY DIVISION

The position of the 79th was a precarious one, with German units to the east capable of organized counterattacks and possible envelopment from the north. Their position might be described best by a statement made by LEE McCARDELL, war correspondent on the scene, "The 79th's position is like a stubby finger sticking into enemy territory," while a commentator in the U. S. lauded the 79th as a "burr under the German's saddle." (17)

The disposition of the 79th was as follows: the 313th had passed beyond MANTES and north to ROLLEBOISE where it found a cat walk at a dam site which it was ordered to destroy; however, demolitions to do so effectively were not available, which was fortunate as we shall see later. The 314th was at MANTES-GASSICOURT, while the 315th was at HOUDAN, 20 miles southwest of MANTES. (18)

(15) A-10, P. 51
(16) Personal knowledge
(17) A-9, P. 48
(18) A-9, P. 48
After receiving the Corps order to cross the SEINE, the plan of the division was for the 313th to cross the cat walk beginning at 0120 and secure the high ground near VETHEUIL. (19) The 314th was to cross at MANTES after dawn with the aid of Company B, 304th Engineers and 76 assault boats, and to disperse along the black top road leading from LIMAY to PONTENAY-ST. PERE. The 315th was to move from HOUDAN as soon as possible to strengthen the crossing site. (20) A 40-ton treadway bridge was ordered from the 5th Armored Division and placed at LONGNES where Corps Engineers were to obtain it and construct a crossing at a ferry site near ROUSY-SUR-SEINE. (21) DISPOSITION AND PLAN OF 314TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

On the 19th of August the 314th Infantry was located on the high ground west of the SEINE, overlooking MANTES-GASSICOURT, with the 1st Battalion in the left of the regimental sector, the 2d Battalion on the right and the 3d Battalion in reserve. In compliance with the division order to cross the SEINE, the Regimental Commander chose to put the 314th across, with 1st Battalion leading, followed by 3d Battalion, and 2d Battalion in that order. (22) After crossing the river the 1st and 3d Battalions were to swing east and take up positions along the black top road connecting LIMAY and PONTENAY-ST. PERE, with 3d Battalion on the right and 2d Battalion in division reserve behind the 3d, protecting the right flank of the regimental sector. (23)

BATTALION PLAN

The 2d Battalion plan was for G Company to cross the river followed by H, F, and E Companies in that order. Immediately

(19) A-9, P. 48
(20) A-9, P. 48
(21) A-11, P. 11
(22) A-3, P. 29
(23) A-3, P. 29
following reorganization, the battalion was to move up the black top road leading from DERNEMONT to POLLAINVILLE, swerve to the right behind the 3d Battalion and be prepared to support the 3d Battalion in event of a counterattack. (24)

(24) Personal knowledge
NARRATION

The 314th began their crossing at 0825 on the 20th, and completed the movement at 1100. (25) Upon gaining the east bank of the SEINE, the units of the 314th reorganized and carried out their plans with the 1st Battalion on the left and 3d on the right moving towards the road running north from LIMAY. In their advance they came upon small groups of Germans and from 1500 to 1930 some skirmishes took place; however, they were in positions along the road at 2130. (26) The 2d Battalion, in reserve, moved from DENNEMONT to the high ground east of FOLLAINGVILLE where it could best support the assault battalions. (27) The few remaining hours of daylight were used to dig in and in some cases improve those positions vacated by the Germans in their hasty retreat. The night was quiet except for an occasional artillery shell lobbed over from, first, the Jerry positions and then by friendly artillery. It is interesting to note that in the area surrounding the Regimental CP (the high ground to the east of MANTES-GASSICOURT), a total of five 88mm guns and eight multiple 20mm guns, with plenty of ammunition, were found. They could have made the landings fairly interesting if there had been any crews to man them, but the Germans had squandered their one opportunity, evidently counting on a breathing spell of several days patrol activity before the 79th would cross in force. (28)

To further harass the enemy, there was the engineer bridge, a massive 40-ton affair, 565-feet long, which had

(25) A-3, P. 29
(26) A-9, P. 48
(27) A-9, P. 48
(28) Personal knowledge
been completed late on the 20th. This had enabled the regiments to move their organic vehicles across. On the 21st, Corps and division artillery moved across the bridge, which, at the time, had become a top priority for the Luftwaffe; however, our ack-ack crews gave them more than they could stand and the score at the end of the day was 11 enemy planes down and the bridge intact. (29)

On the 21st a group of approximately 150 Germans was sighted approaching the town of Limay from the direction of Guitrancourt, (30) whereupon the 2d Battalion CO designated Fox Company the mission of greeting them, for artillery fire from the 311th Field Artillery Battalion had failed to discourage them. After a hurried trip with the platoon leaders to Limay and a quick estimate of the situation, it was decided to send the 1st and 3d Platoons on the two roads leading from Limay, the 3d Platoon to take the road bordering the river. The 2d Platoon was to follow the 1st Platoon on the main road. Both assault platoons had a section of tanks attached, and, in addition, an antitank platoon was attached to the company for the mission. In approaching the outskirts of Limay, the 1st Platoon was fired upon by small-calibre automatic weapons, evidently the advance party of the German column. The riflemen dispersed and the lead tank in the column moved up to where it could spray the position with its machine gun fire and 75mm gun, and the results were a handful of frightened PW's. (31) A limiting line had been assigned the company beyond which it was not to pass, as the 3d Battalion of the

(29) A-3, p. 30
(30) A-3, p. 30
(31) Personal Knowledge
315th was to pass through and block all territory to the right of the 314th Infantry and the SEINE. This limiting line or point was a hydro-electric station, approximately one mile southeast of the town. It was planned to build a skirmish line at that point to welcome the enemy, but, before reaching the plant and before the enemy had come in sight, the forward observer that was with company headquarters and who had been reconnoitering to higher ground on the left of the highway, radioed and asked permission to fire on the column. Permission was granted, and after the first adjustment had been made by the forward observer and fire was effected, the Germans decided against entering LIMAY. At 1900 on that day, the company was relieved by elements of the 315th Infantry and again joined the 2d Battalion in reserve behind the 3d Battalion.

At 2030 that night, the 1st Battalion was subjected to a vicious attack, the first real counterattack thrown against the regiment by the enemy, and the 2d Battalion was alerted for action. Troops of the 36th GAF Regiment, (18th GAF Division) fresh from Holland, supported by five Tiger Royals, drove back a 30-man outpost of Company A and only after murderous artillery barrages by the division artillery, plus 30 batteries from Corps, was the attack stopped. The infantrymen were somewhat jittery the remainder of the night and many a round was fired at shadows. (32) Being in reserve was ideal in the minds of the 2d Battalion, but this thought was soon abandoned with the expectation at any moment of orders to move to some part of the regimental zone to reinforce an assault.

(32) A-3, p. 30
battalion. The Jerries were probing for a weak spot to regain the river line and the division was determined to hold.

The 22d was uneventful for the 2d Battalion and administrative details were brought up-to-date. Of course, this was done piecemeal, as once in a while a Jerry shell would lob over to keep the troops awake as well as to remind them that a war was still on.

On the morning of the 23d, an enemy force with four tanks hit the 3d Battalion sector and forced ITEM Company back, at which time 2d Battalion was alerted. However, the enemy tanks were stingy in their support of the infantry and pulled back to their assembly areas. Company I regrouped and, with Company B of 749th Tank Battalion supporting them, surprised the enemy as they were taking inventory of the captured American equipment; results, 65 FW's. (33) The remainder of the day was comparatively quiet for FOX Company and practically everyone was occupied in cleaning equipment, improving foxholes and some even shaved.

At 0600 on the 24th, the XV Corps was put under First Army control (34) but no change in the situation accompanied the switch, except that the 5th Armored Division, minus reconnaissance forces, which were left in the VERNON area, (35) withdrew. The 314th units were occupied laying antitank mines and stringing wire for the next Jerry attack, which was felt sure to come. The Luftwaffe, which had made itself scarce the past couple of days, worked over the 3d Battalion sector, and

(33) A-3, p. 30
(34) A-11, p. 13
(35) A-6, p. 20

13
2d Battalion was alerted for an expected breakthrough in that area. The enemy failed to bother the 314th but hit the 313th sector only to be repulsed again. At midnight there was a small-scale attack in the 314th area, but that was also thrown back with the aid of artillery. (36)

The 25th found the enemy grouping for a show-down so it was comparatively quiet. Patrols sent out from the regiment confirmed this bit of G-2 information and the day was well spent preparing for that moment when the Jerries decided to attack. On the 26th at 1630, a battalion of infantry emerged from the woods east of GUITRANCUORT and hit Company B hard while five tanks struck further to the right in the battalion sector. In the 3d Battalion area, precisely at the same time, an attack was made by infantry unsupported by tanks in a maneuver that resulted in practically wholesale slaughter for the enemy, with artillery, 57mm guns, and rifle fire blasting their stubborn attempts to regroup. (37) The tanks in Company B sector were raising havoc; knocking out two anti-tank guns, four jeeps and a 1 1/2-ton truck. It took the combined efforts of the infantry, artillery, and tank destroyers to repulse the Heinies and send them back minus two Tiger Royals. (38) Included in the offensive of the Germans on this attack was their use of the Nebelwerfer, the first received since CHERBOURG. (39) Orders were received from XV Corps at this time that the bridgehead was to be expanded and plans were as follows: the 79th was to attack on the left

(36) A-3, P. 31
(37) A-3, P. 31
(38) A-3, P. 31
(39) A-9, P. 49
with the 30th Infantry Division (which was to cross the SEINE on the morning of the 27th) on the right. (40) The attack was to be launched at 1600 on the 27th with limited objectives for each unit. Plans were made for the 30th Division, which was to form the Corps right flank on the new drive, to take over the 315th Infantry sector to the south-east and the 315th slid left, infiltrating into the 314th's 3d Battalion area on the 314th Regiment's right. Relieved by this maneuver, the 3d Battalion moved to an assembly area 200 yards south of FONTENAY-ST PERE and wheeled up on the 2d Battalion's right for the jump-off of the new attack, which was to move out from the 1st Battalion's line. The 1st Battalion was to be in regimental reserve.

In the 2d Battalion sector, Company F was to attack on the right with G Company on the left, supported by a platoon of tanks. FOX Company's objective was HILL 192, which rose to a height of 320 feet above the level of the line of departure and was quite heavily wooded. (See Map C.) The most unsatisfactory portion of the sector was the flat open space of 800 yards that confronted the unit the moment it left the line of departure. It was felt that the enemy, with any defense at all, could make it rough for whoever attempted to cross the open ground. The company plan was for 1st and 3d Platoons to be the assault platoons; the 1st on the left and the 2d in support, with the machine gun sections of the weapons platoon attached. The 60mm mortars were to support the attack from positions to the rear of the line of departure.

(40) A-9, P. 49
along with the mortars of the 1st Battalion and then move forward after the objective was taken. The platoons were to move from the line of the woods that formed the line of departure (see Map C) in staggered columns and to keep that formation until fired upon. (41) After receiving the battalion order from the Battalion Commander early on the 27th, a ground reconnaissance was made by the Company Commanders, and elements of the 1st Battalion, which was on the line, were contacted to learn of the enemy disposition, if any existed. The Company Commander of Company F was told that the sector to his front was quiet and devoid of any enemy as patrols had returned the previous night from that sector. (42) This had a tendency to relieve the anxiety of the commander who returned to meet with his platoon leaders and issue the company order. The company was moved into a forward assembly area about 500 yards in rear of the line of departure where extra ammunition was issued and last minute instructions were given. The move to the line of departure was started 30 minutes prior to H-hour, but, although ample time had been allowed, the jump-off did not take place until 1605. This time lag was due to the density of 1st Battalion troops who were preparing to evacuate prematurely instead of waiting for the assault troops to pass through. Consequently, the company did not fully benefit from the artillery preparatory fires that was to help them on to the objective. The advance had not proceeded 200 yards when intensive mortar fire caused the men to seek cover that did not exist in that

(41) Personal knowledge
(42) Personal knowledge
terrain. (43) The platoon leaders finally got the men to advance by bounds and the leading elements finally gained the protection of the ditches on the side of the road that cut diagonally across the company sector. (See Map C.) This road was still some 350 yards from the edge of the woods and small arms and automatic fire was added to that of the high-angle weapons, which forced the men to take cover again. The Company Headquarters Group had advanced to a spot some 200 yards west of the road and all attempts made by the Company Commander to contact the assault platoon leaders were futile. It was his plan to have the men of the 3d Platoon advance by two's to a point in the right of the company sector where a bit of woods jutted out to give some protection and fire could be returned. (See Map C.) Not having any success with the 536 radios, the Company Commander contacted the Battalion S-3 and asked for some tanks to help gain the wood's edge. He was granted this request, and about 30 minutes later the platoon of tanks, which had supported G Company's entrance into the woods, drew up beside the road across the company sector. With their machine guns spurting and 75's picking out pockets of resistance, the assault platoons started to move. The wood's edge was gained at 1745, (44) one hour and forty minutes after the jump-off, but the enemy were not cleared as yet and were determined to hold HILL 192 at all costs. The tanks were not on maneuvering terrain, so were turned back to battalion at this time. A few PW's were taken at the edge of the woods and interrogation decided to wait for the line to straighten before advancing.

(43) A-7, P. 38
(44) A-7, P. 38

17

(45) A-7, P. 39
(46) Personal knowledge
(47) A-3, P. 31
revealed that there was a company of infantry reinforced with machine guns and mortars on HILL 192. (45)

This proved to be no understatement on the part of the Fw's, as the company, after reorganizing in the woods, moved out with the 1st and 3d Platoons in the assault positions, and met strong resistance every foot of the way up the hill. The advance was slow and considerable maneuvering was necessary for the forward elements to place themselves whereby they could rout the enemy. (46)

The company finally reached the objective at 2150 and closed in along side G Company on its left and 3d Battalion on its right. The woods behind were a tangle of splintered trees, with dead Germans and their equipment strewn about as if an unearthly storm had struck. After continuous hammering by the barrages of the 79th Division Artillery, the enemy artillery was either wrecked or pulling out to the north. (47)

On the 28th, the 2d and 3d Battalions continued the attack in the 314th sector with G and F Companies in the assault positions in the 2d Battalion. The objective for the battalion was Green Phase Line (632688-649677) (see Map C), and an intermediate objective in the form of the hill northwest of DROCU RT for F Company was established. The company jumped off at 0800 and, meeting little resistance, was on its intermediate objective at 1035. (48) With G Company alongside and the battalion well ahead of adjacent units, it was decided to wait for the line to straighten before advancing.

(45) A-7, P. 39
(46) Personal knowledge
(47) A-3, P. 31
(48) A-3, P. 31
At 1420 artillery fire from the vicinity of LESSEVILLE (to the east) fell in the 2d Battalion area with no effective results. (49) At 1600 the attack was resumed with minor resistance on the part of the Germans. At 1800, having reached the objective (Green Phase Line), the company stopped and prepared positions for the night. (50)

Prisoners taken that day numbered amongst them a Jerry 1st Sergeant who was unfortunate enough to be taken with the company roster in his possession. As each PW came before the interrogator, his name was checked off the roster. The killed and wounded were accounted for by this action and the morning report was made out for that unit, but instead of being sent to Personnel of Der Fuhrer, it went to Division G-2. (51)

In the preceding week's action, F Company had done its part in helping 79th Division to nearly deplete the 18th GAP Division, which had been assigned the key job of defending the routes to PARIS. The enemy had failed in its assignment and had suffered extremely heavy losses in personnel and equipment in the attempts to destroy the bridgehead and to prevent the expansion. (52)

(49) A-7, P. 41
(50) Personal knowledge
(51) A-3, P. 32
(52) A-11, P. 16
ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

1. GENERAL

As was stated earlier in this manuscript, supplies of 1st and 3d class nature were especially low when the division reached the SEINE. With the 79th being in a position as it was, with all supply installations so far to the rear, a large-scale counter-offensive by the enemy (had he been able to organize one) could have cut off all contact with the rear and adjacent units that the division had, and the resulting supply problem would have been doubly critical. As it was, with the enemy disorganized and with the opening of the air supply depot at LE MANS, the division and the Third Army on the whole was relieved of a tremendous problem confronting the commanders.

2. PATROLLING

This phase of warfare is one of the most important. Units relieving another unit should be able to gather near-accurate information concerning the enemy to the front with whom the relieved unit has been in contact. Patrols that returned with negative reports were too frequent in the past war, and would lead one to believe that the extent of their patrolling was not near any enemy lines or positions. It is possible that the enemy abandoned prepared positions after dark only to return during the daylight hours. In that case, combat patrols, or patrols to make contact, should be substituted for reconnaissance patrols at night.
3. EVACUATING POSITIONS PRIOR TO UNIT PASSING THROUGH

The case of the elements of the 1st Battalion evacuating their front-line positions before the assault units passed through could cause more of a problem than that of delaying those units crossing the line of departure. If the enemy had timed their mortar fires at that precise moment, due to observed movement in the area, a maximum of casualties would have resulted. The assault unit was above ground with no cover available if needed. The relieved unit, by milling around outside their prepared positions, did hold up the assault platoons by creating confusion.

4. KEEP MOVING

Units in the assault quite frequently have a tendency to hit the ground when subjected to mortar fire; whereas, according to all teachings, the best method is to advance rapidly to get between the mortar fire and the enemy. By hitting the ground immediately after the first few rounds land, the soldier is inviting the enemy observer to zero in on him. Open terrain that offers no cover at all should be traversed rapidly, especially by forward elements of the assault units, as a battle-wise enemy, by shifting his fires beyond the forward elements, could also subject the waiting echelons to intense concentrations that would result in needless casualties.

5. COMMUNICATION

The fact that the 536 radios failed to function properly when needed most was a common occurrence, for various accounts have been sited where they failed, so this event was no exception. It is felt, however, that some improvement could be made to give more reliable communications for Company Commanders and platoon leaders.
6. **TANK SUPPORT**

Any unit that has open ground in excess of 200 yards to traverse should be given armored support in spite of advance notice that the area to the front is void of enemy. A coordinated attack by armor and infantry is ideal, in that it gives the infantryman moral support as well as a maximum amount of fire support. The enemy, seeing armor accompanying infantry, is not prone to expose himself, respecting the shock action of the armor. By getting across open terrain, the infantry is forcing the enemy to fight on more even terms and possibly on his exact position.
LESSONS

1. Supply planning should include resupply of fast moving units by air transport if those units outrun the supply lines.

2. All units should be trained in the importance of patrolling to include reporting definite information required for an operation.

3. Units that are to be relieved by another unit passing through their lines should stay in position until the relieving unit has cleared.

4. All personnel should be taught to advance rapidly to place themselves between the mortar fire and the enemy.

5. The 536 radios, even at short distances, should not be relied upon as a sole means of communication.

6. Armor supporting infantry in open terrain gives the infantryman the moral "boost" to keep him moving to the objective.