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THE OPERATIONS OF THE COMMUNICATION PLATOON, 149TH INFANTRY, (35TH INFANTRY DIVISION) IN THE BATTLE OF THE SIBROS MADRAS 16 MAY - 30 JUNE 1945  
(LUZON CAMPAIGN)  
(Personal Experience of a Regimental Communication Officer)

Type of operation described: REGIMENTAL COMMUNICATION PLATOON IN A MOP UP OPERATION.

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ADVANCED INFANTRY OFFICERS CLASS NO I
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THE OPERATIONS OF THE COMMUNICATION PLATOON, 149TH INFANTRY, (38TH INFANTRY DIVISION) IN THE BATTLE OF THE SIERRA MADRE 10 MAY - 30 JUNE 1945 (LUZON CAMPAIGN) (Personal Experience of a Regimental Communication Officer)

INTRODUCTION

This monograph describes the activities of the Regimental Communication Platoon, Headquarters Company, 149th Infantry, 38th United States Infantry Division, during the "Sierra Madre" operation, (Luzon Campaign), 16 May - 30 June, 1945.

For purposes of orientation it will be necessary to briefly review some of the events in the Philippine Liberation in order to bring the reader up to date on this narrative.

The Philippine Campaign was launched by American Forces under command of General of the Armies, Douglas A. MacArthur, during the latter part of 1944, when an amphibious force consisting of the I and XXIV Corps of the Sixth United States Army struck the island of Leyte on 20 October, 1944. (1)

Shortly after, on 15 December 1944, another amphibious landing was made on the island of Mindoro by elements of the 11th Airborne and 36th Infantry Divisions. (2)

Following these operations, the third and most important step in the Philippine liberation occurred, 9 January 1945, when the Sixth United States Army launched the now world famous landing in the Lingayen Gulf Area on the East Coast of the island of Luzon. (3)

On 29 January 1945, just twenty days after the initial Luzon assault, the 38th United States Infantry Division, XI Corps, Eighth United States (1), (2) A-1, p. 9; (3) A-1, p. 1
Army, affected an amphibious landing in the vicinity of San Narciso, Southern Zambales Province, Luzon. On landing, the 38th Division reverted to control of the Sixth Army. (4) (See Map A)

Throughout the remainder of winter and during early spring of 1945, the Division, with its Regiments, 149th, 151st and 152d Infantry, had secured "Zig-Zag" Pass and liberated Bataan. By 30 April 1945, the Division had almost completely annihilated the Japanese forces in the Clark Field-Fort Stotesenburg Area. (5) (See Map B), and on 1st May, less the 149th Infantry and with the 145th Infantry attached, relieved the Sixth United States Infantry Division in the "Sierra Madre" Area. (6)

SITUATION, 149TH INFANTRY

The 149th Infantry had been engaged in mopping up activities in the Stotesenburg Area; therefore, did not initially accompany its parent organization to the area east of Manila. (7)

On 5 May 1945, a warning order from Headquarters, 38th Division indicated that the 149th Infantry would proceed on further order to an encampment located approximately ten miles northwest of San Mateo. (8) (See Map B)

Reconnaissance and quartering parties, including communication personnel, preceded the Regiment and established facilities prior to arrival of the main body on 8 May 1945. (9)

Due to the fact that this was the first time in months that elements of the Regiment had been in an area smaller than fifteen miles in depth and because everyone anticipated a lengthy stay in this camp which boasted

(4) L-2, p. 8; (5) L-2, p. 13; (6) L-2, p. 93; (7) L-9, Statement of Winfred G. Skelton, Colonel Infantry, Commander 149th Infantry during Sierra Madre operation, Personal knowledge; (8), (9) Personal knowledge.
pyramidal tents, showers and the like, the Regimental Communication Platoon went "all out" in an effort to establish a communication system worthy of such an installation. (10)

All wire lines were cabled and placed overhead and every individual who could conceivably have had any need for a telephone was given one for his personal use. (11)

Message Center and radio facilities were made available to the Command Group and the Communication Platoon settled down to prepare itself and its equipment for operations in the distant future. (12)

It is doubtful whether or not all of the contemplated communication was established when on 16 May 1945, the 149th Infantry was ordered to relieve the 145th Infantry in place in the San Mateo-Mt. Pacawagan Area. (13) (See Map C)

**SAN MATEO**

On 16 May 1945, an advance detail consisting of the Regimental Commander, several members of his staff and elements of the Communication Platoon, preceded the Regiment to the 145th RCT command post in San Mateo in order to coordinate the details of the relief. (14) (See Map C)

Upon arrival in San Mateo, members of this group contacted their counterparts of the 145th Infantry.

The Communication Officer learned from the Communication Officer 145th RCT that an extensive wire system was already installed to the Battalions and Regimental OP’s of the 145th and that the 149th Infantry could take over the existent wire lines if so desired. (15)

It was also learned that radio communication, to include the smaller equipment (SCR-300, SCR-536) was excellent in this area. (16)

(10), (11), (12) Personal knowledge; (13) A-2, p. 101; (14) Personal knowledge; (15), (16) Personal knowledge.
Messenger service, messenger routes, Battalion Command Post locations and other details of communication were discussed at this time.

Following this orientation, the Communication Officer of the 149th directed the wire chief to have all wire lines reconnoitered by wire teams to facilitate maintenance, and gave instructions to other Section Chiefs to stand by for further orders. (17)

On rejoining the Regimental S-3, the Communication Officer recommended that buildings occupied by the 145th not be used as CP installations, but that other buildings be employed to expedite the installation of communication and avoid confusion. (18)

These recommendations were submitted to the Commander and approved, whereupon the Communication Officer rejoined his Section Chiefs, who had remained at the 145th RCT CP and issued orders for the installation of the communication system. (19)

The CP itself was a two-story house in the basement of which was the Message Center. A large vacant yard adjoining the CP, served as a motor pool for the communication vehicles, so that they were readily available for messenger runs, reconnaissance, and wire maintenance. All electrical communication was established in a two-story house across the street from the CP proper. (20)

In the house assigned to the Communication Platoon, the first floor was given over to the Wire Section and the second floor to the Radio Group. (21)

The switchboard was installed on the first floor with the wire lines in cable from a window located near the board into a terminal strip along the street. This served to facilitate the connection of incoming circuits. (22)

(17), (18), (19), (20), (21), (22) Personal knowledge.
Radios were put into operation on the second floor of the building. The antennae were connected between nearby trees with lead-in wires coming in through a window. (23)

All installations were complete by 18 May 1945 when the relief of the 145th Infantry in the Mt. Pacawagan-Sananyan Area was completed. (24)

On completing the relief, the 149th Infantry occupied positions as follows: 1st and 3d Battalions in the vicinity of Mt. Pacawagan and 2d Battalion in Mt. Binacayan. (25) (See Map C)

The tactical plan for the operation was to capture the WaWa Dam and destroy the enemy north and east of the Marikina River. (See Map C)

Patrolling action was the principal occupation of the Regiment until 26 May 1945 when a reinforced platoon from the 1st Battalion entered the WaWa Dam Area. (26)

During the period 27-28 May, WaWa Dam, a key to the water supply of the City of Manila, was captured after an Infantry-Tank attack by the 1st Battalion. Second and 3d Battalions continued to advance in their sectors.

While the Battalions were advancing, the Regimental Communication Platoon was enduring a series of misfortunes caused by the wire lines that had been taken over from the 145th RCT. One difficulty encountered was the fact that the circuits were not tagged. This caused much delay in repair of broken lines, thus adding to the time necessary to transmit messages. In addition, large portions of insulation were completely destroyed, a result of having been on the ground exposed to the weather for a long period of time. This condition resulted in short circuits which were difficult to locate and repair. (27)

(23) Personal knowledge; (24) L-4, "Sibert Madras", p. 4; (25) L-2, p. 102, Sketch; (26) L-2, p. 113; (27) Personal knowledge.
It is unquestionable that the Regimental Communication Officer erred in directing that the wire system of the 145th RCT be utilized rather than installing new circuits. On several occasions the Regimental Commander had to resort to means of communication other than wire to transmit important orders to his subordinate commanders. (28)

This situation was finally remedied by installing new lines to replace the old circuits. (29)

Fortunately however, radio left nothing to be desired. Almost perfect reception and transmission was present during this period. In addition to the SCR-694 regimental command net which included the Commander, three Battalions, I and R Platoons, Anti-tank Company, Cannon Company, S-3, and Service Company, the Regiment operated a similar command net employing the SCR-300. It is interesting to note that the SCR-300 although rated in range at only three miles, operated perfectly in this mountainous terrain up to 10 miles. (30)

**EVACUATION OF SAN MATEO**

New wire circuits were hardly completed to Battalions when orders were received, 29 May 1945 to evacuate the buildings in San Mateo immediately and establish a Regimental CP approximately two miles west of San Mateo. (31)

This order presented some difficulty to the Communication Officer initially but while reconnoitering for a command post location, several wire lines passing the tentative CP site were observed. Upon testing the wire it was found that these circuits were those which connected the switchboard at 38th Division Headquarters in Marikina (See Map C) and the board at the 149th Infantry.

The Division Signal Officer was contacted immediately and per-

(28), (29), (30), (31) Personal knowledge.
mission was obtained from Division to tap the wire lines near the new
CP. This eliminated need for the construction of new circuits. (32)

It should be here noted, that throughout this and other opera-
tions, the highest degree of cooperation was obtained by the Regimental
Communication Officer, from the IBO and all members of the Division
Signal Company.

As soon as the reconnaissance of the new area was completed,
the Communication Officer requested permission to move the major por-
tion of the wire, radio and message center sections to the new location.
This would insure that communication would be established quickly and
that it would be available for the commander and staff upon their
arrival at the CP. (33)

Permission was granted by the Commander and the Communication
Platoon displaced the installations.

In moving the CP to its new location the normal procedure for
CP displacement was followed. New installations were set up before
the old system was abandoned. Communication was obtained with all
units through facilities at the CP west of San Mateo and the old CP
was closed at approximately 1400 hours, 30 May 1945. (34)

A FORWARD COMMAND POST

By 31 May 1945, the Battalions had reached a line extending
generally along Mt. Lemita. (35)

The Commander decided to install a forward command post in the
vicinity of WaWa Dam in order that he and members of his staff could
better direct the operations. (36)

A reconnaissance was made of the area and the site selected
was an open area approximately 1000 yards west of the Dam on the friendly
(32), (33), (34) Personal knowledge; (35) A-2, p. 102; (36) Personal
knowledge.
side of the Marikina River. (See Map C)

A switchboard connecting the rear and forward command posts was installed. Message Center personnel established a small Message Center and local telephones were provided for the Commander and S-2-S-3. In addition, one SCR-694 ground mount and one SCR-300 were provided at this location for use by the S-2-S-3 in the Regimental Command nets. (37)

This forward command post was put to excellent use both by the Command Group and Communication personnel. It served the Command Group well in that close contact could be maintained with the Battalions, and on-the-spot decisions could be made. That this Regimental installation was well forward is exemplified by the fact that on the first day of its operation, it was approximately fifty yards ahead of the 1st Battalion CP. (38)

Because it was established so far to the front was a distinct advantage to wire personnel of the entire Regiment as it acted as a switching central which in effect shortened the wire lines between Regiment and Battalions. This permitted the major part of maintenance to be handled by Regimental linemen who were in a better position to service the circuits due to the fact that they could employ vehicles whereas the Battalion personnel could not. (39)

During the period 1st June to 8 June, elements of the 3d Battalion captured Mt. Lamita and were probing the area to the north. The 2d Battalion had crossed the Marikina River and was pushing to the east. The 1st Battalion made a wide sweep to the south and was rapidly pushing to the east. (40) (See Map C)

Not much change occurred in the Regimental communication system (37), (38), (39) Personal knowledge; (40) A-2, p. 102; A-7.
during this period as far as the actual modification of installations was concerned. Wire lines were policed, equipment was cleaned and tested, and maintenance which had been woefully neglected was performed on unserviceable radios, telephones and switchboards. (41)

**SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE**

This period of relative inactivity permitted the solution of two of the most difficult problems which had confronted the Communication Officer since assuming his duties in April 1945. These were the problems of supply and maintenance.

It was an established fact that due to the difficult terrain, inclement weather, and the additional problem of Battalions being widely separated and seldom if ever having access to vehicles or shelter, signal equipment received the worst type of treatment.

Not only were the previously mentioned conditions present but in addition, due to the abnormal situations in which the Regiment was normally engaged, many signal items over and above TO/E were needed. These items included telephones (EE-8), large quantities of wire and particularly, additional SCR-300 radios. (42) These overages in equipment were vitally necessary to success in an operation of this type.

It may be mentioned that it was not unusual for platoons to be separated by only a few yards but unable to make physical contact due to precipitous terrain and dense undergrowth. One may easily realize need for the maximum of communication equipment in a unit which operated in terrain of this type. (43)

The problem of supply was critical because of one particular factor. That factor was that in the event a piece of equipment within a company or battalion became unserviceable to the extent that a replacement item was necessary, a great deal of time was lost exchanging (41), (42), (43) Personal knowledge.
the item at the Division supply point. (44)

In a previous operation an inserviceable SCR-300 had to be trans-
ported approximately ten miles by hand and approximately fifteen miles
by motor (one way) before it could be exchanged at Division. It can
readily be seen that this procedure was highly unsatisfactory. (45)

Another supply problem was that of battery resupply. Because of
the large number of radios and telephones operating 24 hours each day,
the drain on the small number of batteries retained on hand by the
Regimental Communication Platoon was so great that on several occeas-
sions Battalions were without adequate radio facilities for extended
periods during actual combat. (46)

The supply problem was finally solved when the Assistant Regi-
mental Commanding Officer, CWO Frank W. Becker, suggested that a Regi-
mental signal supply installation could be established if additional
transportation were made available. (47)

Additional transportation was approved by the S-3 for the Comman-
der and the plan was put into effect.

A sufficient quantity of equipment and batteries was obtained
to insure expeditions replacement of not only completely inserviceable
equipment, but an exchange of items which could be repaired. Approx-
imately 50 miles of field wire was retained on hand at all times.

Initially the supplies were stored in a pyramidal tent near the
command post, but in a short time it was necessary to enlarge the in-
stallation, therefore another pyramidal tent was obtained and used for
this purpose.

The results of this experiment were so gratifying that the Communi-
cation officer directed the Assistant Communication Officer, assisted
by the radio technicians, to devote the greater portion of their time
(44), (45), (46), (47) Personal knowledge.
As previously mentioned, maintenance of the signal equipment presented a serious problem. The chief difficulty did not lie in the fact that radio repairmen were not adequately trained nor that tools and spare parts were not available. The technicians were hindered by the lack of a power source to supply the testing devices and the lack of a work bench on which to test and repair the equipment.

The solution to the requirement for a power source was evolved by the radio technicians when they attached a captured Japanese generator of proper output to the triangular framework which supports the towing ring of a 1/4 ton trailer. This generator was modified, so that it could be used to operate the testing equipment. (See Sketch A)

The ingenuity of the repairmen was also evident when they attached wooden table tops to the sides of the trailer which, when raised, served admirably as work benches and when lowered, fit snugly against the sides of the trailer and could be easily transported without removal of the benches. (49) (See Sketch A)

Another communication obstacle was overcome during this period. Due to the fact that tactical situation was never too stable, and the necessity for the Regimental Commander to be continuously on the move, there were many instances in which he could not be contacted by Division while moving between units. This problem was solved by installing an additional SCR-694 radio in his 1/4 ton truck permitting him radio channels with both the Division Command net and Regimental Command net.

In addition, an SCR-300 which communicated with all Battalions was installed. This modification was most successful, particularly when radios were replaced after several days operation. (See Sketch B) (48), (49) Personal knowledge.
DISPLACEMENT OF THE FORWARD CP

During the period 12-17 June, the lst Battalion, 149th Infantry advanced approximately 5000 yards in its sector. (50)

The 3d Battalion, continued toward Mt. Caypipili which was taken 16 June. (51)

The 2d Battalion was placed in Regimental Reserve. (52) (See Map C)

By this time the advance had progressed to the extent that the Regimental Commander deemed necessary the movement of the forward CP to a new position.

It was then decided that rather than displace forward, following the Battalions, it would be more profitable to select a position which would serve both as an OP and a forward command post.

Following the decision by the Regimental Commander to move the CP, the S-3 and Communication Officer, with the Wire and Radio Chiefs, reconnoitered the area in the vicinity of Mt. Purros. (See Map C)

Both were surprised to note that although this sector was not more than 1000 yards south of the lst Battalion's route of advance, it was necessary to travel approximately fifteen miles doubling back through Marikina and using other roads to the new position. (53)

As previously mentioned, the Division command post was at Marikina, and was on the route that had to be taken to reach the new forward CP. (54)

The Communication Officer reached the conclusion that approximately five miles of wire could be saved if permission were obtained from the Division Signal Officer to begin the installation of the wire line to the new position at the Division switchboard. (55)

(50), (51), (52) Ad-2, p. 111; (53), (54), (55) Personal knowledge.
On returning from the reconnaissance the Communication Officer consulted the Division Signal Officer and was elated to not only have his request granted, but to receive the assurances of the DSO that if the new OP site was approved by the Regimental Commander, a wire team from the Division Signal Company would install the necessary wire. (56)

The Communication Officer and S-3 returned to the Regimental rear command post at San Mateo, received approval of the recommendation of the proposed forward site, and having notified the DSO, set to work to coordinate the details of the impending displacement.

In view of the fact that the present forward OP was, in effect, a switching central, and served all wire lines from the rear installation to the Battalions, two courses of action were open to the Communication Officer. First - should it be abandoned as a tactical installation, it could be retained as a switching central and continue to service the circuits between Regiment and Battalions, or second - new wire could be installed from the proposed Forward OP to the Battalions. (57)

The second course of action was chosen as the plan for several reasons; the principal one being the fact that wire lines would be materially shortened, thus reducing the maintenance problem.

In carrying out this plan however, a coordination problem presented itself.

In order to maintain uninterrupted communication between all units, it was necessary to permit the present Forward OP to remain in operation until the proposed location was operating.

This could be easily solved however by close supervision of personnel, therefore the Communication Officer presented his recommendations to the S-3.

(56); (57) Personal knowledge.
The S-3 concurred in the recommendations of the Communication Officer. The Communication Officer called together his Section Chiefs, informed them of the situation and plan and directed that they begin work immediately.

Prior to beginning work on the new installation however, orders were received from Headquarters, 38th Division, to move the Regimental rear CP to the Division Camp at Marikina. (58)

This presented another problem, in that another installation would have to be established. No change was made in the initial plan for the establishment of the new Forward CP however and little difficulty was encountered in displacing the rear CP to the Division area at Marikina. It is worthwhile, however, to mention that during the displacement of these command posts, the Communication Platoon operated four complete installations simultaneously, at Wawa, San Mateo, Marikina and in the Mt. Purro Area. (59)

Each of these installations was served by wire, radio and message center facilities. These equipment facilities, particularly wire and radio were made possible through the Signal Supply System employed by the Communication Platoon. (60)

Upon opening the new Forward CP and the new rear CP, the installations at Wawa and San Mateo ceased to function and all communication personnel except those actively engaged in operating the Mt. Purro establishment moved to Marikina to install the Regimental Communication System at the Division Camp. (61)

In the new rear area the normal communication facilities were made available to the Commander and his staff, and in addition, a large Japanese gasoline generator of sufficient output to furnish power for a (58) Personal knowledge; (59) A-5, Lessons; (60), (61) Personal knowledge.
fair sized community was installed by the Communication Platoon for
electricity to supply the Headquarters area. Light sockets and bulbs
were obtained and an excellent lighting system was the result. (62)

NORZAGARAY

After several days in the new area, the Communication Officer
was informed that elements of the Regiment would be sent to the Ipo
Dam Area to carry out "mopping up" operations against the Japanese
Forces which remained in the hills east of the Ipo Dam. (63) (See
Map C)

Additional information revealed that the Regimental Commander
anticipated establishing a Forward Regimental Command Post in the town
of Norzagaray, (See Map C), and retaining the Camp at Marikina as a
rear echelon.

The receipt of this information did little to perturb the Regi-
mental Communication Officer primarily because he had no idea of the
location of Norzagaray and secondly because he had become accustomed to
operating a minimum of two Command Posts in almost every situation. (64)

He requested and was granted permission to accompany the S-3 on
his reconnaissance and on 23 June 1945 with the S-3 and four wire teams,
one radio team and several message center personnel, proceeded to Norza-
garay. (65)

Having arrived at Norzagaray, the Communication Officer was sur-
priised to find that the distance travelled was approximately twenty-five
miles, which meant that in order to maintain wire communication with
the rear area, an extremely long circuit would have to be installed. (66)

With this problem still unsolved, the Communication Officer was
informed that the Commander's plan was to have the 1st Battalion in the
"Personal knowledge."
Ipo Area and the 2d Battalion in the Sibul Springs Area (See Map C), and the 3d Battalion at Marikina when relieved from the area east of Wawa. (67)

To establish communication with the 1st Battalion was a comparatively easy task because wire could be installed very quickly and the distance was well within the range of the SCR-694. The 2d Battalion at Sibul Springs however, was approximately twenty miles' road distance from Norzagaray, with mountains between, therefore wire installation and wire maintenance, in addition to probable radio difficulty, presented problems. (68)

It was expected that the 2d Battalion would close in to Sibul Springs Area 26 June 1945, so it was necessary to gain communication as quickly as possible. The Communication Officer directed that one wire team start laying at Sibul and one team at Norzagaray and install wire as rapidly as possible to effect early contact with each other. Other than routes to be taken, no further orders were given to these wire teams. (69)

One wire team was dispatched to install a line to the proposed 3d Battalion CP in the Ipo Area. The remaining personnel were directed to establish wire and radio communication in a house which had been selected as the Command Post. (70)

The Communication Officer then returned to Marikina and consulted the DSO regarding communication between Marikina and Norzagaray. Once again the DSO came to the assistance of the Regiment by delegating Signal Company linemen to install this lengthy circuit. In addition, he furnished an SCR-193 radio with operators and teletype equipment at Norzagaray to insure adequate communication between Regiment and Division. (71)

(67), (68), (69), 4-5; (70), (71) Personal knowledge.
Installation of the system continued and by 28 June 1945 the Battalions had closed into the new area. (72) (See Map C).

Communication was for the most part satisfactory except for the wire line between Norzagaray and Sibul Springs, which was unserviceable most of the time.

Wire personnel dispatched to repair the circuit would report on almost every occasion that large sections of the wire had been cut and removed. This condition led the Communication Officer to suspect sabotage, but investigation disproved this suspicion. The real reason for this wire cutting was the need of the Filipino civilian for something with which to hitch his water buffalo to a cart, and apparently field wire served his purpose. (73)

Whatever the feelings of the communication personnel for the needs of the Filipino, it was evident that wire maintenance was of sufficient difficulty under normal conditions, therefore measures were placed into effect which did much to reduce the cutting of wire lines. These measures included the use of guerrillas and I and R Platoon personnel to patrol the circuit.

Patrolling somewhat alleviated this condition, but wire service was frequently interrupted during the operation. Added to this difficulty was the intermittent radio communication between the Forward CP and 2d Battalion at Sibul Springs. Frequently important messages were held up and could only be delivered by motor messenger. By June 30th however, the communication system was fairly stabilized and the Platoon began to prepare for further operations. (74)

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

In analyzing this operation from the viewpoint of a Regimental (72) A-5; (73), (74) Personal knowledge.
Communication Officer, several factors must be considered. Of primary importance is the fact that only in isolated instances, in any tactical situation, will a signal system of an Infantry Regiment be normal. This fact is emphasized throughout this operation. In spite of the abnormal conditions that exist, communication must be available at all times or control is irreplaceably lost.

This operation also emphasized the fact that never, in combat, will tactics be designed to coincide with the capabilities of organic signal equipment. In any operation, the signal system must be applied to fit the tactical situation, regardless of the limitations of equipment and personnel.

Normal means of signal supply and maintenance were not adequate to meet the requirements of the Regiment. This problem was solved by the Platoon when a specific Regimental installation was organized under the active supervision of the Assistant Regimental Communication Officer.

During the early phases of the Sierramedre, a problem presented itself in which the lack of communication available to the Commander, while moving between units, was a distinct handicap. Additional equipment, including an SCR-694, SCR-300 and HE-8 telephone with test clips, in the Commander's vehicle, furnished the solution.

The assistance given by the Division Signal Officer to the Regiment throughout the operation, was instrumental to the success of the Communication Platoon in carrying out its mission.

The Communication Officer may be criticized for his failure to personally reconnoiter the wire lines of the 145th Infantry before directing that they be integrated into the wire system of the 149th Infantry. Had a personal reconnaissance been made, much time and effort on the part of the wire section would have been saved.
The Communication Officer may further be criticized for his failure to personally reconnoiter a wire route between Norzagaray and Sibul Springs. In addition, he erred in judgment when he directed this wire line be installed as quickly as possible without regard for suitable adherence to wire construction principles.

If more time would have been devoted to the installation of this circuit, efficient wire service between Regiment and the 2d Battalion would have resulted.

Finally, the factor which contributed more than any other to the success of the Communication Platoon in this operation, was the coordination between the Commander, S-3 and Communication Officer.

The Commander and S-3 realised the necessity for an adequate signal system. They were also cognizant of the important fact that the Communication Officer must always be familiar with the tactical situation and must be among the first to be aware of any contemplated change.

By including communication personnel in all advance or reconnaissance parties, the Commander assured himself of early communication with subordinate elements.

LESSON

1. In order to achieve success, a Regimental Communication Officer must have the maximum cooperation of the Commander, Division Signal Officer and the Regimental S-3.

2. Too/3 equipment is often insufficient in quantity to permit the installation of a signal system which meets the requirements of the tactical situation.

3. A communication officer must be familiar with the situation in order to estimate equipment requirements.

4. Signal supply for Infantry Battalions may often be facilitated by the Regimental Communication Officer, rather than normal supply
channels.

5. It is necessary for the Communication Officer to personally reconnoiter routes for wire lines of unusual length or unusual construction requirements.

6. Captured signal equipment may often be employed to augment a signal system.

7. Modification of organic equipment may often increase the efficiency of the system.

8. If the maximum in communication facilities are furnished the Commander, control is increased and the possibilities of success are enhanced.

9. Emphasis cannot be placed on one means of communication to the exclusion of others.

10. When relieving a unit, it is frequently more profitable to install new wire circuits rather than attempt to incorporate existing lines into the unit signal system.

11. The greater part of communication training should be under abnormal conditions.

12. The unit communication system should always be completely installed prior to the beginning of the tactical operation.

13. The communication system must always be installed to fit the tactical situation.