I love the infantrymen because they are the underdogs. They are the mud-rain-and-wind boys. They have no comforts, and they learn to live without necessities. And in the end, they are the guys that wars can't be won without.

Ernie Pyle
New York World Telegram
5 May 1943
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In 1934, then-Colonel George C. Marshall commissioned Infantry in Battle to “check the ideas acquired from peacetime instruction against the experience of battle.” In his introduction, Marshall wrote: “there is much evidence to show that officers who have received the best peacetime training available find themselves surprised and confused by the difference between conditions as pictured in map problems and those they encounter in campaign...In our schools, we generally assume that the organizations are well-trained and at full strength, that subordinates are competent, that supply arrangements function, that communications work, that orders are carried out. In war, many or all of these conditions may be absent.” Today, in 2005, we find that Marshall’s observations, recorded pre-WWII, are still true and relevant.

At the time that the original Infantry in Battle was written, the face of war was in the midst of a transformation—from WWI trench warfare to maneuver warfare, enabled by armor and air support. The technology of the day added another dimension to the battlefield; thus, leaders had to adjust their thinking to incorporate these new technologies. Today, the Army finds itself, again, transforming to incorporate new technologies, certainly, but also to defeat a different type of enemy—the asymmetric threat. Our enemy is less predictable and less visible than in the past, and, thus, the lessons of those who have faced this threat become critical to those who will.

Today’s Army faces challenges that Marshall’s Army did not. The Army of 1934 studied tactics and trained in preparation for the conventional war that would come in the next decade, and this study and training held its leaders in good stead. What the Army of 1934 did not have to consider was the wide range of tasks and the relative reduction in time and space
that our Soldiers face today. As we fight the Global War on Terror, our leaders must be able to deploy anywhere in the world on short notice to conduct operations, ranging from Stability and Support to major combat operations and back again. This requirement for agility and adaptability necessitates that we turn to the experiences of those who have faced these challenges—in Somalia, Kosovo and Macedonia, Afghanistan, and Iraq—to guide us and assist in ensuring our success.

As in 1934, we have drawn information from the personal experience monographs on file at the Infantry School; however, we have also included first-hand accounts of actions published in Infantry Magazine and other professional journals, input from the field, and information from personal interviews. Unlike the original, which limited its discussion to operations during WWI, this edition covers a broad variety of conditions, including operations in Kosovo, Macedonia, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, to account for the range of challenges faced by today’s Infantry leaders.

According to Marshall’s introduction in the original book, “(t)he aim of its authors has been to develop fully and emphasize a few important lessons which can be substantiated by concrete cases rather than to produce just another book of abstract theory.” It educated leaders who triumphed against the threats of the 20th Century. Our hope is that we can do the same for our leaders facing the threats of the 21st Century.

Benjamin C. Freakley
Major General, U.S. Army
Commandant, U.S. Army Infantry School
Fort Benning, Georgia
May 15, 2005
EDITOR’S NOTE

Twenty years ago, the Infantry School restarted the monograph program that had languished after WWII. I was fortunate to be able to assist the writers as they came to the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, later known as the Infantry Captain’s Career Course, and it is from these monographs that most of the vignettes come. Therefore, I would first like to thank those officers who captured their operational experience so others could learn from them. Thanks also to Judith Sasser who assisted in this effort in more ways than I can count.


COL Edmund W. Woolfolk Jr., COL (ret.) Frank J. Stone, LTC John D. Harding, LTC James G. Riley, CSM Kevin T. Dalley, and 1SG (ret.) Gary Connor were an integral part of this project, providing oversight, feedback, and support.

Finally, thanks to MG Benjamin Freakley—who commissioned this work.

Joanie Horton
Editor
CHAPTER 1: Leadership

The moral equilibrium of the man is tremendously affected by an outward calmness on the part of the leader. The soldier’s nerves, taut from anxiety of what lies ahead, will be soothed and healed if the leader sets an example of coolness. Bewildered by the noise and confusion of battle, the man feels instinctively that the situation cannot be so dangerous as it appears if he sees that his leader remains unaffected, that his orders are given clearly and deliberately, and that his tactics show decision and judgment...But if the leader reveals himself irresolute and confused, then, more even than if he shows personal fear, the infection spreads instantly to his men.

Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart
Thoughts on War, 1944

INTRODUCTION: When one considers the combat power the Infantry brings to the fight, the fundamental element of that combat power is Leadership. The other elements—Maneuver, Protection, Firepower, and Information—are assets brought to bear through effective leadership. While leadership may be difficult to codify—why else would the sheer number of books be devoted to the topic—the Army defines it as “influencing people, by providing purpose, direction, and motivation.” The combat leader, from the individual Soldier to the commanding general, brings his values and attributes; becomes a master at his skills; and then acts to influence, operate, and improve his unit. Leadership qualities are born from tough, realistic training and honed by experience. The study of the profession of arms
and of leaders of the past provides the foundation from which great leaders can begin to develop.

**On 5 April 2003, the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) for TF 1-30, 3rd ID, received the order for the TF to attack north toward Baghdad.**

The following morning, we began our attack. The initial leg of the drive took several hours and was uneventful, but before we knew it, we were on the outskirts of Baghdad, crossing the Euphrates River, and driving straight down the middle of a six-lane western interstate-style hardball road, heading into Baghdad. Artillery was landing nearby, destroyed civilian vehicles were strewn across the landscape, and here we were driving down the road as if we were going to the mall back home in Columbus, Georgia. We were actually reading the green road signs (which were in English) and using them to help guide us onto the proper exits off the interstate.

The tank company was traveling at the front of our Task Force formation, as was always the case. It was periodically calling in spot reports during movements. Suddenly, a report we had not received before came across the radio, “enemy tanks to our front.” The order was given to close with and destroy them. This brought our Task Force convoy to a halt in the middle of the six-lane interstate around Baghdad. As the tank company continued to engage and destroy the enemy tanks in the front, we pulled security as best as possible. We herringboned our vehicles, dismounted, and assumed security positions. I was the fourth vehicle back from the front of my approximately 20-vehicle TOC convoy, and we were at the tail end of the Task Force convoy. About five vehicles behind me was a standard highway overpass, and some of the vehicles from my section were under it, using it as overhead cover. To
my front, there was another overpass under which sat the lead vehicle of my TOC convoy. I noticed that to the right side of the hardball where we sat, there was a concrete wall dividing the two directions of traffic, approximately 6-10 feet high. On the shoulder of the road to our left was a steep ditch about 4-6 feet in depth. On the far side of that ditch was a small two-lane dirt road running in front of some houses. Unbelievably, there were civilians sitting in the yards and on top of cars along the streets, just watching us. About the time I received the Tank Company Commander’s report over my radio that the enemy tanks to our front had been destroyed, my head suddenly felt numb, and it seemed like everything around us had turned instantly white. A split second later, I felt a blast of air get sucked out of me with a deep rumbling crack. We were taking indirect fire.

Immediately, I realized we were in a textbook kill zone for an enemy ambush, canalized on all sides by existing obstacles. There were potential enemy observers all around to call for and adjust indirect fires. I radioed a report to my Task Force Commander, who was trying to continue developing the situation to our front with the Tank Company; the TF Commander acknowledged but gave no guidance. I radioed the commander of the vehicle at the front of my convoy, telling him to move out immediately, but he did not. The vehicle was tucked nicely under the overpass ahead, and he was not willing to move out from his cover while under indirect fire. I then radioed the commander of the vehicle directly to my front, telling him to move out and go around the two vehicles to his front. He did not. I told my driver (I was in an M577) if they were not going to move, then we would. I turned to my rear, gave the old Infantry “follow me” hand and arm signal, and started carefully weaving a path between the vehicles to our front. As far as I knew, the battle drill for receiving indirect fire
was still to move out smartly in a designated distance and direction, and that was just what I was going to do.  

I watched as the vehicles behind me were quickly loaded up. Finally, the second vehicle from the front of our convoy began to move. I radioed to the commander of that vehicle and told him to cross the ditch on our left, get onto the dirt road on the far side, and move north. To my amazement, I watched as the vehicle turned at a ninety degree angle, headed straight down into the ditch, and hit with a thud; it was stuck. Meanwhile, indirect fires continued to rain down around us. I watched as Soldiers poured from the stuck vehicle, like bees leaving a hive; they were frantically looking for a vehicle to get into, and people were not allowing them in. I couldn’t believe it! I ordered my driver to go get them; and he did just that, loading all six into the back of my M577.

I radioed a spot report to the Task Force Commander, again reporting the loss of the vehicle and the actions we were taking. I ordered my driver to cross the ditch, and he found a fordable spot and crossed at a proper angle. We immediately began moving down the side street out of the kill zone. I turned and watched to ensure all vehicles followed us, and they did; they all crossed at the site where we had crossed. We maneuvered to the location where the tanks had just recently been destroyed by our tank company and established a secure perimeter to regain accountability.

Fortunately, for us, we had sustained minimal damage to our vehicles; the vehicle stuck in the ditch was recovered by our maintenance team, as the team approached from our rear. No serious injuries had been sustained. The convoy was secure and prepared to resume the mission.

From the personal experience monograph by CPT Martin Jeremy Bowling, who served as an assistant S-3, TF 1-30, 3d
DISCUSSION: This example exhibits both good leadership and, conversely, a TOC that is focused on administrative training, rather than battle focused training.

The most dynamic element of combat power is leadership. The assistant S-3 in TF 1-30 exhibited the very essence of leadership by understanding the situation and conducting a react to indirect contact battle drill. He assessed the situation by analyzing the terrain and then determining how the enemy would use the terrain. Leaders must quickly develop the situation, and then they must have an appropriate reaction. In this example, the assistant S-3 went back to his battle drill—react to indirect fire. He made a decision and directed his Soldiers to follow him. He exhibited outstanding leadership in the face of adversity and reacted with an appropriate response to ensure his unit’s protection and security.

The TOC had focused its preparation on its C2—command and control—role and not on its Warrior battle drills. Many times, TOCs prepare, plan, and execute outstanding battle focused training for their subordinate units, but they forget to incorporate the same for the TOC. The TOC must rehearse the react to contact battle drill as a part of its assigned mission essential task list (METL), under a variety of conditions. Individuals manning TOCs must stay abreast of their own force protection while continuing to do outstanding work for their units.

On 7 April 2003, TF 3-15, 3d ID, departed to seize three key intersections along Highway 8—a four-lane highway with concrete dividers—to secure the MSR for 2d Brigade’s operations in Baghdad. Team Alpha (Alpha Company)
would seize “Moe,” in the north; Team Bravo would seize “Larry,” in the middle; and Bravo Company would seize “Curly,” in the south.

The morning of 07 April, after a sleepless night, the Support Platoon conducted refuel operations, topping off all the combat vehicles in the Task Force and then refilling our own fuel trucks. To date, we had not conducted any resupply of ammunition. Each vehicle in the Task Force was loaded with
almost twice the combat load of ammunition normally carried. Even with the firefight the night prior, Team Alpha had only expended a small fraction of its ammunition.

I had ten cargo HEMMTs, five fuelers, my Platoon Sergeant, and me lined up on Highway 8, facing north approximately 250 meters from the Brigade TOC. My HMMWV was the lead vehicle, and my Platoon Sergeant’s HMMWV was the trail vehicle. Objectives Larry, Moe, and Curly were approximately 15 kilometers north of our position. The buildings were hampering our FM communications with the three companies, so CPT Bailey (S-4) pushed the combat trains approximately eight kilometers further north, so he could communicate with the Task Force Executive Officer (XO), MAJ Knapp, who was located on Objective Curly. The Task Force Commander, LTC Stephan Twitty, was on Objective Larry. From what little radio traffic I could pick up, I could tell all three companies were in contact with enemy fighters on each of their objectives. I also knew it would not be long before the tanks would need fuel, and it sounded like the Mortar Platoon on Objective Curly was expending a large amount of high explosive (HE) rounds and would probably need a resupply of ammunition. I traveled to each vehicle in my platoon with a crew-served weapon and instructed the Soldier manning that weapon system to mentally prepare himself to engage the enemy.

Team Bravo on Objective Larry was reporting its tanks were nearing “black” fuel levels and requested an emergency resupply. The Mortar Platoon on Objective Curly was reporting “black” on HE rounds and also requested an emergency resupply. LTC Twitty ordered the XO to bring up the Re-Arm/Re-Fuel package and conduct an emergency resupply of fuel and ammunition. MAJ Knapp, TF 3-15 XO, relayed this order to CPT Bailey.
As we began to move, our convoy consisted of two sections. The first section consisted of three vehicles: a gun truck in the lead; an M577 APC, carrying the S4 and S1; and an M113 APC, carrying the battalion maintenance technician, Chief Warrant Officer Angel Acevedo. The second section consisted of the Support Platoon, with the Scout Platoon’s Platoon Sergeant’s HMMWV in the lead approximately 100 meters behind Chief Acevedo’s M113; then my HMMWV; and the remainder of my platoon.

After traveling approximately three to five minutes, our convoy came under intense RPG and small-arms fire from enemy fighters positioned in buildings approximately 300 meters from the road along the east side of the highway. I saw the first RPG streak towards the Scout Platoon Sergeant’s HMMWV directly in front of me and impact squarely in his upper torso, blowing him out of his turret and onto the road. Despite the fact he had been wearing body armor, the RPG had almost completely severed his body in half. The impact dazed the driver of his HMMWV, and he came almost to a complete stop. As we veered around his vehicle, I hollered for him to keep driving. Knowing that follow-on elements would retrieve the Sergeant’s body, I did not stop for fear the rest of the convoy behind me would also stop, and the enemy would destroy us in his kill zone. We were now the lead vehicle in the platoon convoy. I began to return fire with the MK-19 in the direction of the enemy positions and ordered my driver to
increase our rate of speed and close the distance between our vehicle and Chief Acevedo’s M113. As we closed to within 25 meters of Chief Acevedo’s vehicle, a second RPG impacted his M113, instantly killing his gunner, SSG Robert Stever, who had been firing his .50 cal at the enemy. The impact also dazed his driver, and the M113 veered left, crashing violently into the median in the center of the road. Again, I ordered my driver to increase our rate of speed and bring us directly behind CPT Bailey’s M577. The enemy fired subsequent RPGs at my vehicle and my fuel and ammo trucks, missing their marks by mere inches.

*From the personal experience monograph by CPT Aaron Polsgrove, who served as the Support Platoon Leader, TF 3-15, 3d Infantry Division, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.*

DISCUSSION: In this summary, TF 3-15’s mission was to support the 2nd Brigade Combat Team’s (BCT) mission—to seize key infrastructures within the Iraqi capital—by seizing key intersections along Highway 8 and securing the 2nd BCT’s main line of communication into Baghdad.

From his position in the rear, CPT Polsgrove could garner only a few key pieces of the battle raging throughout the task force and knew only a few of the key munitions that would quickly be needed by other units in his task force. However, he immediately began to prepare his support platoon for the call that he knew he would eventually receive from the task force commander. He briefed the platoon on the situation, ensuring that his Soldiers were mentally and physically prepared to fight their convoy into the task force objective areas to deliver much needed fuel and ammunition.
He led his convoy into the fight through withering automatic weapons and RPG fire to resupply the Infantry companies and mortar platoon in contact. His personal courage to gain control of the chaos and keep his men focused on the mission is evident in the summary. When his lead convoy vehicle commander was killed in action by RPG fire, CPT Polsgrove assumed the role of not only the convoy commander, but also the lead vehicle, ensuring that the convoy did not stop inside the kill zone. His outstanding leadership, and that of many of his Soldiers, ensured the delivery of critically needed fuel and ammunition, allowing the task force to continue its mission.

**From 03 March to 01 May 2003, the 3rd Ranger Battalion conducted operations in Iraq. During the campaign, two separate company-sized airborne assaults were conducted in the western part of the country. A high number of jump-related casualties immediately hindered operations and forced Rangers to adapt.**

In an effort to attack in the western part of Iraq while most of the mechanized forces assaulted in and around Baghdad, 3rd Ranger Battalion conducted two company-sized airborne assaults in late March and early April. Charlie Company, with attachments of snipers and mortars, as well as the Tactical Operational Command II (TOC II), jumped into a Desert Landing Strip (DLS) in late March. Alpha Company, with its attachments and TOC I, jumped into the abandoned Iraqi airbase of H1.

It was not known when Charlie Company would receive a resupply of food, water, etc., so the guidance was to jump with enough items to sustain the company for a week. The individual loads were so heavy that Rangers could not walk to
the MC-130s without assistance. One Ranger even collapsed fifty feet from the plane and was not able to make the jump; the medics stated that he suffered an injury to his back. The planes almost took off late due to the lengthy process of sitting each Ranger down with his massive rucksack and weapons cases.

One of the MC-130s conducted a ramp jump instead of the normal exit through the side door. As one of the Rangers was walking to the ramp, his heavy rucksack disconnected from his reserve parachute, and he immediately fell to the floor of the aircraft as other jumpers behind him were also preparing to exit. The air-land safety, SFC Morgan, immediately saw this, grabbed his knife, and cut the Ranger’s static line. The Ranger did not know that his static line had been cut and tried to get up to walk to the end of the ramp. SFC Morgan raced toward the individual and laid on him so that he did not exit without an active parachute. As a result, the remaining jumpers barely made it out of the aircraft as they exited right before the red light.

Almost twenty Rangers (of the nearly 200 jumpers) were injured badly enough to be evacuated from the DLS. The impact was severe, as key leaders were some of the wounded. The Sniper Team Leader broke both legs on impact and was later medically discharged from the Army; he jumped the Barrett .50-cal weapon as well as a large amount of ammunition. The commander’s plan immediately changed as Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) became the new priority. Due to low visibility and the austere environment, it took several hours to account for everyone; some of the injured Rangers were still unconscious. Medical aircraft were called upon earlier than the initial planning estimates to transport the wounded Rangers to a hospital in Jordan. The loss of such combat power was critical (as one-third of Charlie Company
was involved two weeks later with the seizure of the Hadithah Dam).

Just a week after Charlie Company jumped into the DLS, Alpha Company and TOC I seized an abandoned airbase named H1. Instead of the MC-130s, the jump was conducted using the new C-17 Globemaster airplanes. It was not known when a resupply would occur at H1, so these Rangers were also instructed to bring enough equipment for at least one week. The jump produced nearly the exact number of injuries as that of Charlie Company. The Rangers of the Casualty Collection Point (CCP), who searched throughout the battlefield for injured jumpers, were initially without direction for the first hour. 1SG Smith, the leader of the CCP, was flipped upside down upon exiting the aircraft as his right ankle-brace became tangled within his risers. He lay unconscious from the pain from the dislocation of his knee and the tear of every ligament and tendon. Other key leaders, to include two squad leaders, were evacuated due to injuries. Like the jump with Charlie Company, medical assets had to be diverted to H1 to treat such a large number of injuries.

From the personal experiences of 1LT Chris DeMure, who served as Support Platoon Leader, HHC, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: 1LT DeMure’s account of two separate Ranger airborne assaults in Iraq (C/3-75 IN and A/3-75 IN, respectively) demonstrates the need by unit commanders to better evaluate Soldiers’ load capabilities. We include this vignette in the chapter dealing with leadership because leaders must manage the operational risk of their formations and are ultimately responsible for the consequences of their risk
acceptance decisions. Charlie and Alpha companies each sustained approximately 20 casualties out of 200 jumpers on their drop zones – a significantly higher jump related casualty rate than in training. Most of these casualties were due to the enormous loads (150 lbs average) jumped by the Rangers into their objective areas. Ranger commanders approved these loads for their Rangers and, given the opportunity to ‘Monday morning quarterback’ those decisions, may have failed to adequately consider the potential effect.

“Army research indicates that a soldier can carry an amount equal to 30 percent of his body weight and still retain a high percentage of his agility, stamina, alertness, and mobility …these loads are divided up into three major types: combat, sustainment, and contingency loads…” (FM 3-06.11)

Rangers are, by definition, trained to move further, faster, and fight harder than any other Soldier. However, the Rangers in this vignette were clearly not trained to jump with these loads. One hopes that an adequate assessment was completed during the preparation time available to tailor their loads (both companies were instructed to take a week’s worth of supplies). A failure to adequately plan a Soldier’s load that was commensurate with Ranger capabilities and realistic resupply alternatives may have caused the large amount of casualties sustained at both DLS and H1 drop zones.

In any event, this vignette offers another example of how, if ignored, a Soldier’s load can become the central issue inhibiting mission accomplishment. Leaders are faced with many tough decisions in combat, but decisions to exceed established norms for Soldier combat load must only follow a rigorous analysis of risk.

On 4 April 2004, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, (TF Lancer) of the 1st Cavalry Division assumed responsibility
for the Sadr City area of Baghdad. The unit had just completed two weeks of familiarization, conducting combined operations with the unit it was replacing at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Eagle. Because TF Lancer lacked tanks, C Company, 2nd Battalion, 37th Armor, was attached to it. Sadr City, a six-by-eight-kilometer slum, was home to 2.5 million people—ten percent of Iraq’s population. The departing unit had been in Sadr City for a year and had experienced low levels of violence and unrest. The commander of TF Lancer had little reason to believe that before that first day was over, his Soldiers would be fighting for their lives against a fanatical enemy determined to defeat the Americans and force them out of the city.

Late in the afternoon of TF Lancer’s first day on its own in Sadr City, the 1st Platoon of C Company escorted a sewage removal truck to the southern part of the city and then moved to observe the Sadr Bureau headquarters for one of the many political factions in the city suspected of sponsoring subversive activity. As the Platoon approached the Sadr Bureau complex, three large groups of Iraqi men scattered to the north. Almost immediately, there were bursts of automatic weapons fire from east of the four-lane road that ran north and south directly to the west of the Sadr Bureau. First Platoon halted and dismounted its Infantry squads. As they moved towards the sound, they began to take fire from every direction that rapidly increased in intensity and accuracy. One of the platoon’s machine gunners identified the enemy positions and initiated suppressive fire. Following his lead, the platoon’s other gunners engaged multiple enemy forces.

At approximately 1800 hours, the platoon leader reported that the enemy was emplacing obstacles made of concrete blocks, metal spike strips, and scrap metal along the major
roads to both his front and rear as he fought his way forward. Aided by the fire from the platoon’s heavy machine guns, the HMMWVs pushed through obstacle after obstacle despite fire from the front, the rear, and from elevated positions on both sides of the road. Their luck ran out when the second vehicle in the column hit an obstacle but didn’t make it across. Seeing the vehicle stopped, the enemy massed fires on it. The gunner was mortally wounded in his exposed position, killed fighting to protect his comrades as they dismounted and moved to safety.

Without hesitation, the driver of the third vehicle moved his vehicle to push the stalled vehicle over the obstacle. Unfortunately, heavy fire also disabled this vehicle before it was able to move the one that was stuck. The Platoon Sergeant in the trail vehicle moved to the disabled vehicles and established a security perimeter. The platoon leader, in the lead vehicle, turned around and linked up with his two disabled vehicles.

After receiving the initial report, the Task Force Commander, LTC Gary Volesky, alerted A Company, 2-5 Cavalry, and ordered it to move to and reinforce the isolated platoon. Simultaneously, the Commander of C Company, 2-5 Cavalry, instructed the Platoon Leader to break contact, get his unit off of the road, and consolidate and reorganize. LTC Volesky then ordered the Task Force to assemble and move to assist the platoon in contact. Within minutes of assuming responsibility for Sadr City, Task Force Lancer was committed to high intensity urban combat against an unknown number of heavily armed insurgents in unfamiliar territory with night soon approaching.

With 20 Soldiers and two of the original four vehicles operational, 1st Platoon, C/2-5 Cavalry, took over a building west of Route Delta. After moving the casualties and vital equipment inside, they placed the two operational vehicles in
Infantry in Battle

blocking positions on both ends of the alley next to the building. The Platoon Sergeant remained at his vehicle by himself for the next three hours, under constant enemy fire, providing the only communications link between his Platoon and the rest of the Task Force. During this time, the Platoon repulsed three attacks by Iraqi militiamen in civilian clothes who attacked with RPGs, small arms, and hand grenades.

At the TOC, the Task Force Commander, Operations Officer, and company commanders assembled to plan how to rescue the isolated platoon. The TF Commander ordered a powerful penetration of the city along a single route to limit the risk of another platoon becoming separated along the way. The distance from Forward Operating Base (FOB) Eagle to the beleaguered platoon was nine kilometers. Alpha Company, 2-5 Cavalry, and C/2-5 Cavalry would depart the camp immediately, with C/2-5 Cavalry leading. Charlie Company, 2-37 Armor, would move north from its original location southwest of Sadr City and mass with the other companies to reinforce the platoon in contact. Bravo Company, 1-12 Cavalry, and C Battery, 1-82 Field Artillery, were put in reserve with extra recovery and medical assets and were told to be prepared to reinforce the main effort, if required. The companies assembled quickly, with Soldiers jumping into whatever vehicles had open seats or floor-space. Incredibly, less than fifteen minutes after receiving the first reports, Task Force Lancer began the attack to rescue its isolated platoon.

As the rescue effort began, the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) liaison at FOB Eagle reported that Mahdi Army elements (fanatical followers of the firebrand Moqtada al Sadr) had seized all of the police stations in Sadr City.

Charlie Company, 2-5 Cavalry, attacked south, bypassing numerous obstacles to get onto the attack axis. It forged ahead under withering RPG and small arms fire but soon encountered
a complex obstacle that it could not breach. A bypass route was blocked with debris and overturned carts from the local markets. The company continued to fight its way north until the lead vehicle was destroyed by heavy small arms and RPG fire, blocking the road. By that point, C Company had taken several casualties and had numerous vehicles damaged or disabled. Enemy fire was coming from all directions. The Task Force Commander, with C/2-5 Cavalry, ordered the company to move back, collect its casualties, and evacuate them.

Meanwhile, A/2-5 Cavalry had started receiving small arms fire, while breaching numerous obstacles in its attack. The volume and intensity of fire increased as the company continued to fight its way through the city. Soldiers reported seeing countless muzzle flashes from rooftops, windows, and alleyways. Concrete, metal scrap, and burning debris blocked the road. The Company continued to fight north but was forced to negotiate each obstacle individually, slowing movement under the intense enemy fire. Although the Soldiers responded with a high volume of well-aimed fire, destroying many enemy fighters, the Company began to take significant casualties and lost communications with the Task Force. With the lead vehicle disabled, no communications with the Task Force, and all vehicles in the convoy damaged by fire, the Commander rallied his men and returned to the FOB to evacuate casualties and reorganize for another assault into the city.

Charlie Company, 2-37 Armor, had begun its attack north into the city along with the other units. In the vicinity of the Sadr Bureau, however, a man in an Iraqi Police uniform shot and killed one of the tank loaders. The company moved south back to reorganize.

At the C/2-5 Cavalry casualty collection point, the Task Force Commander and the Company Commander developed a new course of action. They would make a northern approach
and move south to relieve the isolated platoon of C/2-5 Cavalry. Within minutes, they launched the hasty attack.

Almost immediately, C/2-5 Cavalry came under direct fire from the south side of the road. Soon, enemy forces were firing from every direction. The farther west the element moved, the more intense the fire became. With steadfast determination, the company fought through the enemy’s obstacles, firing steadily with deadly 25-mm High Explosive rounds.

As C/2-5 Cavalry turned south, the small arms fire became deafening. The enemy was heavily barricaded and delivered continuous fire. The Iraqi Police assisted insurgent personnel, joining them in fighting or opening doors from which the enemy shot. Enemy weapons included small arms, pipe bombs and grenades, RPGs, and IEDs constructed with propane and gasoline. The streets were littered with weapons and enemy bodies—most dressed in black.

At the same time C/2-5 Cavalry had begun its attack, C/1-82 FA and B/1-12 Cavalry were moving into the fight. C/1-82 FA was working with A/2-5 Cavalry to escort recovery assets, retrieving disabled vehicles, while B/1-12 Cavalry moved to assist C/2-5 Cavalry in casualty evacuation. As these units moved south, however, the Operations Officer redirected them to clear barriers that OH-58D helicopters, now in support, had spotted on a parallel route. This would improve the freedom of maneuver for the rest of Task Force Lancer. Although both the units came under heavy fire from numerous buildings, rooftops, and alleys, they continued moving and engaging the enemy with precision fires as they cleared the critical routes and secured key intersections in support of the Task Force mission to rescue the isolated platoon.

Charlie Company, 2-5 Cavalry, continued to attack south, firing 25mm HE, 40mm grenades, .50 caliber machineguns, and all its small arms. The lead Bradley had taken multiple
Chapter 1, Leadership

RPG strikes that knocked out its communications. As a result, it unknowingly passed by the isolated platoon. Due to the smoke, obstacles, and heavy fire, the rest of the element was not able to stop the errant vehicle. As the convoy reached and passed the isolated platoon, the platoons reported they had numerous casualties and were low on both 25mm and machine gun ammunition. Minutes later, the Task Force Commander received a report that C/2-37 Armor had initiated a second attack after evacuating its casualty. The route of attack took it north. Fearing the potential for fratricide due to the converging of C/2-37 Armor and C/2-5 Cavalry, the Task Force Commander ordered C/2-5 Cavalry to establish a stationary blocking position and continue CASEVAC operations. Charlie Company, 2-5 Cavalry established its casualty collection point and began to consolidate and reorganize.

At this point, the Task Force’s wheeled vehicles were almost all beginning to fail mechanically due to battle damage; however, the tanks of C/2-37 Armor soon approached from the south, passing by C/2-5 Cavalry’s position. As it passed, the tank company fired main gun rounds into enemy locations. The tanks were able to fight through the enemy gauntlet and reach the isolated platoon’s position. They linked up with the platoon and escorted it back to Camp Eagle. Task Force Lancer consolidated, reorganized, and started preparations at FOB Eagle to take back the Iraqi Police stations that the Mahdi Army had occupied.

At the end of the first battle, Task Force Lancer had eight soldiers killed in action, and 51 soldiers wounded in action. Of the soldiers wounded in action, 15 returned to the fight after treatment. Many more wounded warriors never left the fight, not seeking medical treatment until long after the first battle ended.
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In the aftermath, the estimated size of the enemy was 2000-3000 fighters. The report from the Iraqi Ministry of Health reported 500 killed in action. Notably, the Ministry of Health confirmed that the majority of the casualties were wearing the black Mahdi Army uniform.

From the Narrative for Presidential Unit Citation for Extraordinary Heroism, Task Force Lancer, 1st Cavalry Division, written by 1LT M. Jordan Inman, who served as Battle Captain, 2-5 Cavalry, Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: On 4 April 2004, Task Force Lancer—2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st BCT, 1st Cavalry Division—effectively massed combat power in Sadr City to rescue the isolated 1st Platoon, C/2-5 Cavalry. This success is directly attributed to the outstanding leadership of this battalion.

TF Lancer went into Sadr City with the expectation that the area was relatively peaceful. The unit TF Lancer replaced had spent the previous year conducting stability and support operations and had spent the majority of its efforts on providing basic services to the people of the area, as it had been long-neglected by Sadaam Hussein’s government. Therefore, before arriving in country, TF Lancer had spent considerable time training on tasks associated with providing those basic services as well on its combat-related METL. This superior training paid off when, on TF Lancer’s first day on its own in the area, the fanatical Mahdi Army attacked to push U.S. forces from the area.

Immediately, TF Lancer Soldiers went from the mindset of providing aid to the people in Sadr City to conducting intense urban combat operations. Examining the vignette, it becomes
apparent that the tough, realistic combat training the TF had conducted allowed the isolated platoon to survive and the rest of the TF to begin combat operations to defeat this new enemy. The platoon immediately and effectively organized its defense, and the TF leadership quickly leveraged all elements of combat power to come to its rescue. Good training and leaders who provide direction and motivation allowed TF Lancer to succeed in this situation and throughout the next four months of combat operations in Sadr City.

CONCLUSION: One of the strongest attributes of an effective leader is his ability to assess the circumstances correctly and then act appropriately, in any given situation. Memorizing templates and reciting doctrine cannot take the place of the individual’s ability to think clearly, act decisively, and influence the fight at the decisive point. This ability is critical in accomplishing the mission, while taking care of our most precious resource: the Soldier.
CHAPTER 2: Initiative

I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign: but simply to lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave you free to execute it in your own way.

General of the Army Ulysses S. Grant
Orders to General Sherman, 1864

INTRODUCTION: There are two primary components to Initiative: individual and operational. Individual initiative is the ability to act within the commander’s intent in the absence of clear orders or when the situation changes. Operational initiative is determining the time, place, pace, and terms of action, imposing the commander’s will upon the enemy, rather than reacting to the enemy. Initiative retains options for the commander and enables freedom of action, while denying options to the enemy. For military units to be successful, both components must be present, particularly in today’s contemporary operating environment where we face a clever, adaptive enemy who changes as soon as we believe we understand him.

The original plan of the 75th Ranger Regiment, to conduct an airborne assault into Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), was cancelled and new objectives in the western portion of Iraq emerged. As the 3rd Infantry Division was advancing north, a need arose for Special Operations Forces to secure the Hadithah Dam and prevent the explosive-rigged facility from being blown and disrupting the Coalition movement. Elements of 3rd Ranger Battalion planned and led an attack to seize the Hadithah Dam in western Iraq on 31 March 2003.
Just before daylight, and as soon as the Rangers first saw the towers of the dam facility, the Gun Mobility Vehicles (GMVs) began their race toward the entrance at 60 miles per hour. A guard-shack, constructed of cinder blocks and a metal roof, was identified on the southern portion of the dam. Inside were four enemy soldiers who were all promptly killed by a two-man Ranger entry team. Attached Ranger snipers oriented on the adjacent low ground and made several long distance kills. One shot in particular was directed at a propane tank, which had three enemy soldiers around it. When the sniper’s bullet from the Barrett .50 caliber entered the tank, it exploded, killing all three soldiers.

Just as the Company Commander directed 2\textsuperscript{nd} Platoon to cross the surface of the dam to the eastern tower, a truck approached the dam from the east; .50 caliber machine guns engaged the truck and killed its occupants. During this exchange of fire, an MK-19 40mm round ricocheted off a metal light post and exploded over the heads of one of the vehicle crews, injuring two Rangers. Minutes later, a flatbed truck full of enemy soldiers moved quickly toward the dam. Again, one of the fifty-caliber machine guns engaged the vehicle, as six soldiers emptied into the street once the machine gun began to impact. Four enemy soldiers were killed with direct fire while two others fled, injured, to the southern low ground. The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Platoon Sergeant and CSM decided to retrieve the enemy wounded, an act for which the two men were later awarded the Silver Star.

As the fighting continued on top of the facility, a Ranger element, with attached Special Operations Forces, began the arduous task of systematically clearing the eleven floors and hundreds of rooms throughout the facility. After nearly twelve hours, the Rangers determined that the dam was not rigged.
with explosives. As the Rangers expanded their area of operations, teams of GMVs established blocking positions along the perimeter of the dam. By the mid-afternoon, it seemed as if enemy personnel had either been captured or killed.

Suddenly, during the first period of darkness, a barrage of indirect fires began. Enemy mortar and towed artillery rounds landed all around the Rangers’ locations. Throughout all of the incoming fire, Ranger forward observers and Air Force Enlisted Terminal Attack Controllers (ETAC) continuously directed overhead Close-Air Support airframes and counter-mortar fire onto suspected enemy locations. S-60 anti-aircraft guns impacted the metal crane atop the dam’s surface to our rear while the eastern tower sustained multiple direct hits. The first night atop the dam was spent at 100% alert. All available night vision devices and thermal viewers scanned the area to make sure the enemy did not infiltrate. The intense enemy indirect fires lasted for three straight days. On 8 April 2003, Charlie Company arrived by rotary-wing and vehicle convoy and relieved Bravo Company at the Hadithah Dam.

*From the personal experience of 1LT Chris DeMure, who served as Support Platoon Leader, HHC, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.*

**DISCUSSION:** In this summary of the Rangers’ actions on Hadithah Dam, we see the importance of initiative—a tenet of Army operations.

The Rangers succeeded in their mission of seizing and controlling the dam to prevent the enemy from destroying it and flooding the avenues of approach Coalition forces needed for their assault to Baghdad, despite the fact the Rangers
sustained heavy indirect fire in the days following the dam’s seizure. However, we included this vignette, as it provides a “falcon’s view” on initiative.

Although having successfully conducted the mission of seizing the dam, the Rangers found themselves in a defensive position, and because of their small numbers, unable to exploit the success of the initial assault on the objective. This vignette highlights the difficulty in retaining and exploiting the initiative when in static defensive positions, particularly so in the non-contiguous and non-linear battlefield the Rangers faced in Iraq.

According to doctrine, “offensive action is key to achieving decisive results,” and we must “seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.” (FM 3-0) It can be easily argued that the initial success of this operation was due to the Rangers’ application of this guidance. However, it was in the transition from an offensive to the defensive mission that we see the violation of initiative at a higher level and, thus, the difficulties experienced by the Rangers in exploiting the initial shock they created.

After the initial seizure of the dam, it appears that the initiative hung in the balance, and, then, as night fell, it fell heavily in the hands of the enemy. The Rangers, limited by troop numbers to continue offensive operations, consolidated their defense around the dam. Alternatively, the Iraqi forces, given a period to reorganize and freedom to maneuver around the isolated defense of the U.S. forces, seized the initiative by directing artillery and mortar fire onto the defending Rangers. From this point onward, it is debatable who actually had the initiative.

Although U.S. forces were ultimately successful in countering the enemy indirect fires using close air support, they could not immediately regain the initiative because of their limited numbers and inherent light organization. At the same
time, it is hard to accept that Iraqi forces held the initiative when relying largely on indirect fires. Given the information available, we can reasonably conclude that this vignette demonstrates a failure on the part of the Iraqi ground commanders to reorganize for a coordinated ground offensive against what we know was a largely unsupported light infantry force that ultimately defeated the Iraqi intent of blowing the dam.

On 6 April 2003, on the outskirts of Baghdad, OBJ Saints, all key leaders from the 3-15 IN Battalion, 3rd ID, along with all the attachments, sat, stood, or crouched under a tarp draped over a bombed-out building. The mission was for Task Force 3-15 to seize three key intersections—Larry, Moe, and Curly—along HWY 8 to keep the LOC open and facilitate the movement of CSS assets to the tank battalions. The two tank battalions, 1-64 and 4-64, would lead the way and seize presidential palaces and government buildings in central Baghdad. An armor company, Charlie, would seize OBJ Larry, while one Infantry company, Alpha, would seize OBJ Moe, and the other Infantry company, Bravo, would secure the BDE TOC. That would leave OBJ Curly to one Infantry platoon from Bravo Company, a few scouts, a few engineers, the main aid station, the TOC, and my mortar platoon. The C2 for these elements would be an S3 battle captain named CPT Zan Hornbuckle.

Our mortar platoon was comprised of four M113s, each with a 120mm mortar tube and a .50 cal.; two HMMWVs, one equipped with a .50 cal., one with an MK-19 and each had an M240B; and our M577, equipped with an M240B and a trailer full of additional ammo. It was a very somber mood as we
moved into the order of march at around 0530 hrs. I remember seeing an interstate sign, saying, “Baghdad Airport straight ahead” and then the arches stretching across the four and sometimes six lane highway. After driving on dirt and gravel roads for the past few weeks, it was a shock to see what resembled a major interstate, such as I-85. After we crossed an extensive minefield that the engineers had cleared just hours earlier, we started to receive sporadic gun fire. What puzzled me was that there would be a goat herder or a group of kids waving off the side of the road, and then no more than three hundred meters down the road, enemy fighters would be firing at us. Finally, through the thick smoky haze, I could make out the overpass. It was approximately 0700 hrs.

As Team Zan reached the cloverleaf, we all came towards the center of the intersection then cleared out about 200 meters, conducting a recon by fire. The Infantry platoon quickly took up defensive positions on the overpass and behind the embankments bordering the on and off ramps. Before we could even get set, A/3-15 IN and B/4-64 AR began calling for fire missions to the north on both OBJs Moe and Larry. We had already planned to use two tubes for Larry and two tubes for Moe, so within about two minutes, we were executing fire missions. What concerned me was the consistent enemy fire we were receiving from the surrounding buildings and even from down the road. For the first time, I heard the whiz of an RPG right over my head as I tried to figure out where the enemy was located to our south. My squad leaders were trying to control their fire missions while simultaneously engaging enemy personnel with their .50 cal. machine guns. The .50 caliber machine gun is an excellent suppression weapon, but we could not hit specific windows or get into enemy bunkers on the sides of the road.
The situation was gradually getting worse. One of my gunners, PFC Taniguchi, was hit by a piece of shrapnel in the chin, but he continued to fire his M4 between making adjustments and giving fire commands to his assistant gunner. I got a call from my PSG, asking me if we could direct lay, that is, fire the mortar as a direct fire weapon, on the buildings and enemy positions surrounding our tight perimeter. I knew the mortar platoon was a Battalion asset, and we were shooting fire missions as fast as we could compute them for both B/4-64 AR and A/3-15 IN. On the other hand, what good were we if one gun went down due to enemy fire? I had to make a call that was best for not only us, but also the entire perimeter. It was plain to see that even the TOC was coming under fire.

So, I decided my number three and four guns would be used for the companies to the north, while number one and two guns would be used in direct lay to destroy enemy positions around our perimeter. It was a scary sight to see the elevation on those big 120mm tubes cranked so high that they appeared to be straight up and down. The first round was shot behind a stone wall to the east into a mud hut which the enemy was using to regroup. The ground trembled as the round landed only 250 meters away. I received a call from the Infantry platoon’s PSG saying, “Cease Fire, Cease Fire, Danger Close.” I had seen the dismounted Infantrymen only fifty meters to our front, but it appeared they had good cover from the round. My biggest fear of fratricide was quickly dispelled as the PSG came back over the radio and said, “Do that again! That was right where we need it.” I quickly told number two gun to Fire for Effect!

Meanwhile, we were still receiving fire from a very large warehouse to the southwest. We quickly changed the fuse setting on the mortar rounds to high explosive delay so that the mortar round would explode one second after impact. The
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rounds punched through the roof and exploded inside, shattering all the windows where we were receiving fire. Needless to say, we didn’t have any problems from that warehouse any more. It wasn’t long before CPT Hornbuckle called me up and said he needed some fire support on the northwest side of the objective. Evidently, the enemy was set up in a courtyard beside a water tower. We quickly walked the rounds in, as CPT Hornbuckle made adjustments for us, chopping down buildings filled with enemy fighters.

At 1024 hrs., the BDE TOC was hit by a surface to surface missile, but the situation at OBJ Curly was deemed to be more desperate, so, soon thereafter LTC Twitty launched CPT Johnson with the rest of Bravo Company to reinforce us at the cloverleaf. Just then, I noticed that one of our mortars had ceased firing. I was beginning to move in that direction to find out what was going on, but then I saw them kicking the tube. They were conducting misfire procedures. Normally, the crew would exit the track and wait for a specified time at a specified distance away before reentering the vehicle. No time for that today, and I discouraged my platoon from dismounting and exposing itself to enemy fire. However, once the dud round was removed, two of my Soldiers had to discard the round away from friendly troops. I had never seen misfire procedures done so quickly before.

By 1130 hrs., my platoon was running desperately low on mortar rounds. I sent the report up that I was amber on ammo and quickly found out that I was not the only one. Both Larry and Moe also were running low on ammo and fuel. As a result, the CSS assets, consisting of fuel trucks, ammo trucks, mechanics, and a few scouts, were launched from OBJ Saints to resupply the task force.

As the fuel and ammo trucks moved between the on ramp and overpass in a tight formation, I thought to myself, “what an
excellent target that would be for the enemy.” Once the ammo trucks were set, our ammo bearers began to download rounds from the trucks so we could continue to fire. Somehow, they were able to carry three mortar rounds each, back to their guns and back again several times. Keep in mind, each round weighs thirty-eight pounds. To this day, I’ll never know how they did it. We were shooting fire missions faster than we could resupply ourselves.

I then got the call on the radio that the situation had become too dangerous for our unit, so we were to move north to a secure area at the Ba’ath Party Headquarters Building. By this time, five ammo and fuel trucks were engulfed in flames, having been hit by enemy mortar rounds, so Soldiers were scrambling everywhere trying to find a ride. Tank and mortar rounds were cooking off and exploding, making the situation even worse.

As the remaining vehicles attempted to get on the road and ready to move, I called my squad leaders and asked if we were ready to move. “No Sir,” was the reply. Apparently, when the ammo and fuel trucks were hit, we had three ammo bearers caught on the far side. The convoy was beginning to move, and I became frantic that we would be left there if I didn’t find my Soldiers. I was attempting to find out if there were any casualties or if they were picked up by another vehicle, when I saw my number one gun, SPC Smith, whom we all called Smitty, charging right through the exploding ammo to the far side. He reappeared only minutes later with all of our missing mortar men. They were trapped behind a pillar on the far side of the overpass trying to gain cover from the monstrous explosions. Another heroic act by one of my Soldiers had saved the day. As we moved out at about 1400 hrs., heading north down HWY 8 towards safety, I looked back at the dreadful intersection and thought how truly fortunate we were.
From the personal experience monograph by CPT Robert Woodruff, who served as the Mortar Platoon Leader, TF 3-15, 3rd Infantry Division, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: Professional military journals are filled with articles stating that junior leaders are required to make more significant decisions in the Global War on Terror than they had to make in the past. This example from a significant fight during Operation Iraqi Freedom does more to highlight this concept than any article currently available. The actions of a few junior leaders and Soldiers and the initiative they demonstrated were critical to the task force’s successful mission accomplishment on that day. FM 3-0 states that Soldiers “must exercise mature judgment and initiative under stressful conditions...to meet the demands of full-spectrum operations.” The manual further defines individual initiative as the ability “to act when there are no clear instructions or when the situation changes.”

Initially, the mortar platoon leader made the difficult decision to use his guns to protect his position. He knew his fires were critical on the other objectives, but he also understood that his assets, the mortar tubes, were critical to the task force’s success and to its ability to continue the fight at this location. He exercised initiative in a changing situation and made the decision to direct-lay the guns without specific guidance. This action protected his guns and ensured that the Soldiers on the other objectives continued to receive fire support.

Throughout the fight, CPT Woodruff’s Soldiers acted with initiative and contributed to overall mission accomplishment. In a firefight, a leader cannot issue clear instructions to every
Soldier. The leader must depend on his Soldiers’ ability to recognize what needs to occur and then to exercise the initiative to make it happen. Soldiers who continued to fight while injured, conducted misfire procedures while in contact and then continued to fight, and exercised great personal risk during the ammunition resupply while in contact all contributed to the successful mission and made the platoon leader’s job significantly easier. The Soldier who risked his life to account for the three separated Soldiers acted at the right time and allowed Team Zan to depart the area in time to meet further mission requirements.

The initiative of the Soldiers in this fight is indicative of what junior leaders and Soldiers are doing on a daily basis while in contact. Many of their actions will not be recorded, but they are just as critical.

Commanders must ensure they foster an environment where bright leaders and Soldiers are able to exercise initiative. This is best accomplished in peacetime by allowing them to make decisions, both tactical and administrative, and then discussing their decisions afterward. Such experiences allow the commander to gain trust in his subordinates and then give the subordinate experience operating within the commander’s intent. As Soldiers and junior leaders gain proficiency in small things and demonstrate they can be trusted, commanders must give them increasingly larger and more difficult tasks to continue to hone initiative. This practice will help ensure junior leaders make sound decisions—while in contact—that are critical to mission success.

CONCLUSION: A study of military history reveals that the force that seizes the initiative tends to be successful. Good planning is critical in achieving operational initiative; good training ensures individual initiative. As our Infantry forces
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continue to adapt to meet the challenges of the asymmetric threat, we must continue to seek and retain the initiative. We create a culture of initiative by conducting tough, realistic training that rewards individual initiative and by ensuring our leaders on the ground, with a clear understanding of their commanders’ intent, have the authority to take the fight to the enemy.
CHAPTER 3: Adaptability

In any problem where an opposing force exists, and cannot be regulated, one must foresee and provide for alternative courses. Adaptability is the law which governs survival in war as in life—war being but a concentrated form of human struggle against the environment.

Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart
Strategy, 1944

INTRODUCTION: When viewed 100 years from now, the hallmark of today’s Army will surely be its ability to adapt. Not since the Viet Nam War has the Army faced an enemy that was unpredictable and asymmetric rather than the symmetric enemy of the Cold War years. This current enemy, understanding it would not find success in a conventional fashion, had to strike in an unexpected manner to achieve its desired endstate. To stay ahead of this enemy, our forces must be able to adapt to any given situation to rob the enemy of his initiative. At the tactical level, every leader should be prepared to act quickly to execute the “next step” in an operation and to take advantage of an immerging situation. He must train himself to fight the enemy and not the plan—only then will he be able to adapt to a changing environment.

In this chapter, we see Soldiers who, within the commander’s intent, accomplished their missions by examining their list of options and choosing the most effective one for that situation: the result of a trained and disciplined force.

During Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, 1993, L Company, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, was tasked with the
mission of conducting a food relief convoy to the village of Dhex-Yaal to distribute grain and supplies. The writer was a platoon commander in L Company.

Task organization included my platoon of 42 Marines, a machine gun section, four HMMWVs mounted with .50 caliber machine guns, eight CARE civilian relief workers, and a translator. The mission would be conducted in two distinct phases: the convoy movement to Dhex-Yaal, and the issue of food and supplies to the Somalis. The CARE agency had coordinated for the feeding center and informed the village headmaster of our impending arrival.

The plan to establish the relief site was to use 5-ton trucks, connected by engineer tape to form a perimeter, with one lane into it where we could escort one person at a time to receive supplies and grain. We would use the gun trucks to isolate the village and overwatch the food relief center. Expecting a large crowd, we brought twenty ten-foot plastic tent poles for Marines to use on the perimeter to control and hold back the crowd. To ensure that no one tried to go through the line twice, the CARE workers had a list of every head of household, and we brought black markers to mark the thumbnail of every Somali who had received his ration of supplies.

At 0630, on 7 January, the convoy moved out from the town of Baidoa. As we made the 30-40 minute movement through the town, a growing crowd of Somalis, hoping to be issued or to steal the supplies, followed us. Once we passed out of Baidoa, I spread out the convoy interval so that the lead gun truck was about 1000 meters ahead of us to provide early warning as we moved.

At 0845, about 20 km outside of Baidoa, near a town called Awlo, the lead HMMWV reported hearing shots fired. I stopped the convoy, asked for a SITREP, and could then hear
the rattle of small arms fire. It was sporadic and sounded like nothing heavier than AK-47 and light machine gun. The lead vehicle reported that he was not being engaged, but there was a firefight about 400 meters to his front involving about 50 lightly armed Somalis. I moved forward to assess the situation and observed Somalis behind a four-foot wall exchanging fire with other Somalis in adobe huts on the other side of the road. I also observed that the terrain to the west was visibly lower than the area of the firefight and that a bypass would be possible. I disseminated instructions to the convoy, leaving the one HMMWV to observe the firefight, and we prepared to move. The concern was that if the armed Somalis saw the cargo, we could become a high-priority target to them. We began our movement off road. Two of the CARE vehicles, with their heavy loads, got stuck, but, with the manpower available to us, we were able to free them and continue the one-hour movement around the firefight.

As the convoy pulled into an open field just past Dhex-Yaal, I saw a large crowd of about 500 Somalis gathered and awaiting our arrival. We pulled the trucks into position and established the perimeter, while Marines held back the crowd. The translator explained to the people what was happening to keep them calm, and two of the CARE workers talked to the headmaster while the others began unloading grain and supplies. When the CARE workers began to call out names to receive goods, problems erupted. Many Somali names are combinations of Mohammed, Ali, Aideed, and Mahdi, in different orders. Fights began to break out in the crowd over who was who, and the only way we found to solve the problem was to let the headmaster choose who got relief supplies and who did not. At 1445, one of the HMMWVs overwatching the area reported that large numbers of Somalis from nearby villages were heading toward Dhex-Yaal. The crowd around
our site swelled to around 2000 Somalis, and they became more aggressive as the supply of grain dwindled. Some Somalis began testing the perimeter by charging the Marines who secured it, while the remainder became more frustrated and vocal. The lead CARE worker and I began to work out a plan to withdraw from Dhex-Yaal and avoid violence.

At 1505, we began to slowly shrink the perimeter, moving one empty 5-ton at a time to linkup with the isolation force HMMWVs one km away. When we had three 5-tons and ten Marines left on the ground, we took three of the last five bags of grain and threw them into the crowd. As the crowd focused and began to fight over the grain, we rapidly loaded on the trucks, did a head count, and started to drive away. The crowd began to chase us, so we took the last two bags of grain and dumped them out of the last truck. The closest Somalis began to scoop up the grain, effectively blocking the pursuit of the rest of the crowd. We linked up with the remaining vehicles and returned to base. The return was uneventful, and the convoy reached Baidoa by 2015.

*From the personal experience monograph by CAPT Jay Rutter, who served as a platoon leader in L Company, 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.*

**DISCUSSION:** In this summary of combat operations, we see a platoon commander tasked with establishing, securing, and aiding in the distribution of humanitarian aid (HA) at a site in Somalia. His actions illustrate the adaptability necessary of a combat leader to perform support operations. The platoon commander was tasked to work in conjunction with a nongovernmental organization (NGO) to effectively distribute the supplies. When tasked to perform a support operation, a
leader must understand how to: 1) display the capability to use force in a non-threatening way; 2) act decisively to prevent escalation; and 3) apply force discriminately and selectively.

Capt Rutter moved his platoon—42 Marines, a machine gun section, and four gun trucks—and eight NGO workers, and a translator to the relief site. Upon reaching the relief site, after conducting a bypass of an internal Somali firefight, a crowd of 500 local nationals began gathering. By use of non-lethal means, to include tent poles, he was able to ensure that none of the local nationals could penetrate his perimeter. He additionally placed his gun trucks in overwatch positions to isolate the site. To ensure the rapid and correct amount of humanitarian aid was distributed, Capt Rutter developed a marking system for each local national. However, based upon the fact that a majority of the Somali names sound the same, fights began to break out in the crowd.

At this time, Capt Rutter received word that more local nationals were en route from neighboring villages, and he began to collapse the perimeter to prevent further escalation of the violence, using the tent poles to hold back the crowd. Additionally, he gave the order to throw the rest of the grain into the crowd to focus the crowd away from his Marines. By throwing the rest of the grain into the crowd, the Marines were able to withdraw from the aid site. By applying force selectively and discriminately, Capt Rutter’s platoon was able to ensure that the local nationals were unharmed and that his Marines were able to leave the area without undue casualties. By acting decisively to diffuse the situation, Capt Rutter prevented uncontrollable escalation of the situation and was able to complete his mission.

Early in 1993, the 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, in Somalia was assigned responsibility
for a humanitarian relief sector at Marka. For the next four months, the battalion was involved in security and counter-bandit operations along the entire length of the Shabele Valley. These operations included convoy security, show of force, patrolling, and cordon and search.

Cordon and search operations were normally conducted when the battalion received intelligence of bandit operations in a certain area. This intelligence, normally obtained through interrogation or volunteered by locals, had to be accepted with some skepticism, but we eventually developed a good idea of where selected bandit groups were in the valley.

One of the areas of frequent bandit activity was the airfield south of Afgoi, near the small village of Lantabur. This airfield was the main site for delivery of Khat, the mildly narcotic stimulant grown in Kenya and chewed by most Somalis. Its traffic was very profitable, and many of the bandits in the valley either participated in the Khat trade or preyed on the traders. Unfortunately, they also preyed on normal commerce in the valley. The airfield was a constant hub of activity, and our intelligence about banditry in the vicinity was fairly consistent. The battalion decided to conduct a cordon and search of this area to catch the bandits in the act. We placed an OP at the airfield that gave us a confirmed base of intelligence on the periods of maximum activity there.

If the pattern of daily activity held true, on 16 January, the battalion would conduct a cordon and search of the airfield. Only one company-sized element was available for the operation. The cordon would have three blocking positions, one inserted by air and two by ground. Helicopters would secure the western flank of the cordon, which consisted mostly of open ground. The recon and surveillance plan called for the anti-armor section of A Company to be inserted on 13 January
to observe the airfield for up to three days. Because of the relative openness of the terrain, a single OP from the tree line to the end of the airfield was adequate.

![Map of the area](image)

**INDIAN OCEAN**

Unfortunately, during the early morning hours of 14 January, the HMMWV that was inserting the anti-armor section to man the OP got stuck in a conspicuous place along the trail. Although it was camouflaged as well as possible, it was likely to attract attention, and we did not want to lose the element of surprise. Company A immediately launched along the beach to link up with the reaction platoon and get into position east of the OP. A resupply convoy, which was headed to the Baledogle airstrip under the battalion XO, was redirected into providing the southern blocking position. Coordination was made for aircraft, but the only ones available were two UH-60s that made daily logistics flights, placed under our control until 1200 hrs. When the anti-armor section reported a tremendous amount of activity at the airfield, the commander decided to execute the operation at 1100, the earliest time that all ground and aviation elements could be in position.
The scheme of maneuver was fundamentally unchanged. Company A would provide the majority of forces, with the Baledogle convoy occupying a blocking position along the main road south of the airfield. The company would move along the coast in HMMWVs and approach the airfield along the dirt track until it was short of the OP. The Baledogle convoy would hold in the vicinity of Mundun and then move up the road until it reached the blocking position. Simultaneously, the Company A’s Air Assault platoon was to land on the road south of Lantabur and north of the airfield. Upon discharging the troops, the helicopters would move off to positions west of the airfield to discourage escape attempts over the open ground. Once the troops landed, Company A would move in from the east and clear the airfield complex, searching all vehicles and huts for weapons and detaining any bandits who offered resistance.

The operation went off almost flawlessly, with the nearly simultaneous establishment of all key blocking positions. The two helicopters dropped the air assault platoon at the same time the convoy arrived and set up the blocking position to the south. As soon as the Somalis saw the helicopters fly in and land troops, the airfield came alive with vehicles leaving as fast as they could. Most of them traveled north and were stopped and searched by the northern blocking position. A few tried to go west, away from the troops. Company A moved in from the east and began its search of the airfield and the few vehicles that remained.

The helicopters worked well, pursuing vehicles that tried to escape in their direction and forcing them back to the road and to our checkpoints. The aircraft were assisted by elements of the 3rd Battalion, 17th Cavalry, which was conducting operations in the area. After hasty face-to-face coordination on the ground, the 3-17th Commander had agreed to provide one
gunship and two scouts to help our battalion maintain the western end of the cordon. The five helicopters were intimidating and succeeded in keeping the Somali vehicles on the road. They were also a key factor in discovering the Somali bandits who were inclined to fight. No vehicle that was inside the cordon escaped the search.

The vast majority of vehicles carried nothing but Khat, which we allowed the occupants to keep. We picked up about a dozen discarded rifles on the road leading to the checkpoint, but the biggest find was in two abandoned dump trucks at the airport—box after box of small arms ammunition, hundreds of rifle grenades and RPG rounds, three heavy machine guns, an RPG-7 launcher, and a 75mm recoilless rifle. Apparently, we had interrupted a major weapon shipment from an arms cache.
in our AO to the militia forces in Mogadishu. The search of all vehicles concluded around 1400 hrs., and all elements returned to the battalion base site at 1530.

*From a November, 1994, article in Infantry Magazine by Major Martin N. Stanton, who served as S-3 for 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division.*

**DISCUSSION:** In this vignette, we see the practical application of our intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process. The IPB process focuses our analysis and evaluation of our forces, our threat or enemy forces, our terrain and weather. The IPB process is a continuous process that begins upon mission receipt and is not completed until the operation is determined to be completed. We also see the application of pattern analysis through a cordon and search operation.

The subordinate units of the 2-87th IN used active patrolling and observation posts to gather intelligence on threat actions in their area of responsibility. The unit continuously analyzed the patterns of the threat and local populace to determine when and where the threat was conducting operations. Through this analysis, the unit was able to plan and prepare for a cordon and search. It is evident through the unit’s actions that the plan was briefed and understood by all members of the battalion. The plan and, more importantly, the commander’s intent were understood throughout the unit. This was evident when the conditions changed during the execution of the operation. The commander was able to adjust his plan during execution by using combat power that was not originally planned for during this operation. This adaptable formation was then able to execute through an understanding of the commander’s intent. The unit understood that the blocking position in the south was essential. The convoy, led by the battalion executive officer,
was able to adapt to the changing conditions through the understanding of the mission and resulted in the successful completion of the operation.

The 2-502nd Infantry of the 101st Airborne Division deployed to Kosovo in May, 2001, as part of the NATO peace enforcement operation in the war-torn Serbian province. Its deployment coincided with the escalation of an ethnic Albanian insurgency in the neighboring Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). To prevent the Albanian guerillas from transporting weapons and personnel from Kosovo into the FYROM, NATO introduced Operation Relentless Denial.

Albanian smugglers had been moving drugs and illegal goods through the area known as the chicken-leg for decades (see maps), taking advantage of the geographical isolation and austere terrain. When the Albanian National Liberation Army looked to use the region to move weapons and supplies, it had a cadre of experienced smugglers who were happy to lend their expertise.
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There were no drivable roads into the FYROM from the “chicken-leg,” so, at some point near the border, Albanian National Liberation Army smugglers would unload the weapons and equipment and carry them across the border with pack animals or by foot. These smugglers were tactically adept. They would move at night, camouflage themselves with fresh
vegetation, and avoid trails whenever possible. Often, they would walk through streambeds to avoid leaving tracks.

What made the system most effective was the security and reconnaissance screen that accompanied major shipments. Rarely would weapons move without at least one forward security element clearing the road ahead. These elements would move anywhere between five hundred meters to five kilometers ahead of the shipment and, using cell phones, would report on checkpoints, KFOR patrols, and anything that might pose a risk to the shipment.

Closer to the border, where the density of KFOR troops increased, the Albanian National Liberation Army smugglers used local citizens to create an even more elaborate reconnaissance screen. People in the “chicken-leg” would observe KFOR movement and signal whether or not the area was clear. They occasionally used cell phones, but usually they would simply flash their house lights on and off to indicate our presence. When patrolling in the southern chicken-leg, our patrols routinely watched houses flash their lights as the patrols approached.

Due to the surveillance and security employed by the Albanian National Liberation Army smugglers, secrecy was key to mission success. It was critical that their forward security elements and local civilians not know that U.S. forces were in the area. To accomplish this, I divided the platoon into three reconnaissance and surveillance squads and a quick reaction force squad. The basic plan was that the reconnaissance and surveillance squads would covertly overwatch possible smuggling routes. When they identified Albanian National Liberation Army smugglers, they would allow the forward security element to pass and find the main shipment. They would then call the platoon quick reaction force to conduct the actual capture. They would conduct the
actual interdiction themselves only if the quick reaction force could not arrive in time. This would trick the captured Albanian National Liberation Army smugglers into believing that they had merely chanced into a KFOR patrol. They would not understand the mechanism of our interdiction system, and, if released, could not advise their counterparts on how to avoid capture.

I normally put two reconnaissance and surveillance squads on the border and one further inside Kosovo, all covering potential avenues of approach. I assigned each of the reconnaissance and surveillance squads a sector and let the squad leaders determine where to position their observation posts. The squad leaders would analyze their assigned terrain and set up one or two surveillance sites.

By day, they sent out reconnaissance teams to look for buried caches and signs of smuggling routes. In this manner, the squads continuously developed their own intelligence and were thus able to adapt to changing Albanian National Liberation Army routes and tactics. They also occasionally identified buried weapons caches. The Albanian National Liberation Army employed these caches as temporary storage sites when they had too many weapons with which to cross the border at any one time.

An excellent example of our interdiction system at work occurred one evening in June. Two Soldiers from First Squad were overwatching the Lipkovsko Valley path when they observed two men with backpacks stealthily attempting to cross into Kosovo. The Soldiers called the quick reaction force and explained the situation. Within five minutes, the quick reaction force squad leader had his Soldiers (plus my radio operator and me) briefed, loaded up, and on the road. He established communications directly with the overwatching Soldiers on his hand-held radio and asked for directions. While
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they vectored us in, we dismounted and moved quickly to surround the two men.

Our appearance surprised the men in such a way that they did not even attempt to run when confronted. In rudimentary Albanian, one of the team leaders ordered the men to freeze and drop their weapons. One was unarmed; the other pulled a Russian 9mm pistol from his belt, cleared it, and offered it handle-first to the searching Soldiers. While one team secured the prisoners, the other team cleared the surrounding area and searched for any hastily discarded weapons or documentation. The entire operation took less than ten minutes.

The armed man carried documentation identifying him as the Commander of 5th Battalion, 113th Albanian National Liberation Army Brigade. The 5th Battalion was responsible for re-supply and logistics within the eastern National Liberation Army’s area of operations. His capture represented an intelligence windfall for KFOR and a major blow for NLA operations in the Kumanovo region.

From the personal experience monograph by CPT Andre Rivier, who served as a platoon leader with 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: In this summary, we see how a platoon leader developed tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs) to capture smugglers with contraband crossing into Kosovo. He describes how the locals developed a system to warn the smugglers that the U.S. Army was operating in the area. The locals would flash their house lights, and the smugglers, usually on foot or with pack animals along trails, would have enough warning to either change their path or vacate the area. CPT Rivier soon realized that he needed to change the way in which his Soldiers
conducted their missions to be more effective at catching smugglers. What he began to do was to put three squads in overwatch while a fourth squad, his quick reaction force (QRF), would be postured to interdict the smugglers. When one of the squads in overwatch would identify smugglers, they would call the QRF which would be able to rapidly move towards the smugglers and capture them before they would could run away. This TTP proved to be successful as CPT Rivier and his platoon captured smugglers with weapons, including the commander of the 5th Battalion, 113th Albanian National Liberation Army Brigade.

In the months following the conclusion of major combat operations in Iraq, U.S. forces assumed a variety of missions, from hunting down terrorists to stability and support operations to assisting the Iraqis in setting up governments and standing the new Iraqi Army.

On May 17, 2003, at 0930 hrs., I was the XO in Chosen Company, 2-503rd, 173rd Airborne Brigade, conducting morning LOGPAC operations in Kirkuk, Iraq. By 1130, I was a team leader, stacked against a wall, preparing to clear a house. During those two hours, my company responded to reports of rioting between the Arabs and Kurds throughout the city as part of a Task Force effort to restore peace.

While conducting the morning LOGPAC, we received reports of protests and gunfire. At 1000 hrs., I conducted link-up with my Company Commander, CPT Arie Richards, and together we resumed efforts in trying to control the volatile situation. 1SG Nick Rolling reported that he was trying to contain a firefight in D6, a hostile sector within the city. He reported to the CO that he needed more Soldiers and that he had fixed the location of the gunfire. With two HMMWVs, the
CO, four Soldiers from our company HQ, one squad from 1st Platoon, and me, we moved to the 1SG’s location and the sounds of gunfire and women yelling.

The CO stopped the vehicles perpendicular to our 1SG’s position. This allowed our force to clear street-to-street while the 1SG and his force could engage anyone we flushed. We determined the 1SG’s position and cautiously began to clear the street leading to the area from where the gunfire was coming. With four members of the headquarters element, I moved forward down the street. Bullets, coming from a nearby rooftop, ricocheted off a wall in front of us near a local man. I stacked with two Soldiers against the corner of a building adjacent to the building from where we were taking fire. From there, we could see the top of the gunman’s turban behind a wall that was located on the roof. I shot a spotter round at the wall where his head was to gain a quick zero and to check the consistency of the wall. The two other HQ Soldiers moved along a wall on the opposite side of the street from us to gain a better angle. As they moved, I aimed three feet above the wall where we saw the gunman’s turban. At that moment, he stood up and sprayed gunfire in the vicinity of my Soldiers across the street. Although I shot, I did not see if I hit the gunman.

Immediately following the engagement, CPT Richards told us to hold our position and await Bradley support. The gunfire had stopped on our street, but 1SG Rolling reported gunfire from his position near a school located in an open area. The Bradley Fighting Vehicles were called forward to suppress the school by fire and to breach the building.

Meanwhile, a family came towards us, screaming that there was an unattended baby in a nearby house with an armed gunman. SGT Neal, our company medic; one of our translators; two Soldiers; and I stormed the house, sequentially clearing the rooms. SPC Tusa and I cleared the second floor
while SGT Neal and SPC Tanaka continued to clear the ground floor. SGT Neal secured the baby, but the gunman had fled. We moved back onto the street to join our company.

Just prior to the Bradleys’ arrival, C Co, 1-508th, arrived to assist in controlling the sector. When the Bradleys arrived, we prepared to conduct the raid of the school. 1SG Rolling and elements from 1st Platoon arrived just as CPT Richards conducted hasty coordination and situation briefs with the Bradley commanders. Because he had been near the school, 1SG Rolling aided in giving the Bradley commanders a more in-depth perspective. Simultaneously, both company elements began maneuvering to buildings near the school, posturing themselves for the assault. The Bradley Platoon loaded our company radio frequency and then proceeded across the open area to the school. Thus far unopposed, one Bradley in the lead breached an outer wall and crashed into the front entrance, while a second maneuvered to support. Both of our companies began maneuvering behind the Bradleys as they continued to breach and isolate. The lead Bradley completed its task of breaching the structure, and a mix of both companies of Soldiers began clearing the school as an F-18 Hornet screamed overhead, providing close air support to our maneuver forces. As the Bradleys provided overwatch, our Soldiers searched for the enemy, but the gunmen had fled during the Bradley advance.

From the personal experience of 1LT Steve Brignoli, who served as the Executive Officer, C Co., 2-503d IN (ABN), 173rd Airborne Brigade, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: Adaptive leadership can be defined as the creative application of battle command; the leader is able to
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visualize a situation in terms of enemy, terrain, and the higher commander’s intent; describe tasks and requirements in quick mission-type orders to meet and accomplish commander’s intent; and direct action that creatively accomplishes the unit’s mission. 1LT Brignoli was able to quickly change his focus based upon rapidly changing conditions. His ability to execute LOGPAC operations for his company one instant, and then transition to a quick reaction force in the next, demonstrates adaptability.

Doctrinally, agility is a tenet of Army operations. According to FM 3-0, Operations, “agile commanders can anticipate a full range of tasks and include capabilities to accomplish them.” Further, “commanders develop this state of mind through rough, realistic training” and implement “tactics to mission requirements in dynamic environments.” Adaptability, although not clearly defined by doctrine, is really the ability of the Soldier/leader to react to unanticipated circumstances or unexpected challenges by making quick and effective changes to his list of options. 1LT Brignoli understood the complex nature of the terrain. He also realized that the asymmetric enemy in contact with his 1SG posed the greatest threat to his company’s security and the Iraqi civilians’ survival in his sector. Though his job requirements to the company were traditionally understood to be combat service support-oriented by design, he was adaptive enough to become a combat Infantryman and lead an element to assist in destroying the enemy when the situation required. Adaptive leaders like 1LT Brignoli lead by example and are “able to adjust plans with minimal loss of combat power, making Army forces more agile today than previously.” (FM 6-0).

In early June, 2003, Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, received a FRAGO for a company air
assault in northern Iraq and raid of a suspected terrorist camp in northern Iraq. Intelligence sources had observed the terrorist group infiltrating the Iraqi border from Syria and establishing a base camp in a wadi system just north of a small town. The intelligence community believed this group was within 24-48 hours of conducting a suicide bombing on Coalition forces in the Ramadi/Fallujah region of Iraq.

First and Second platoons, with the Company Headquarters, would air assault into four different Helicopter Landing Zones (HLZs) on the eastern side of the wadi system and assault two different objectives simultaneously, while Third Platoon, with the mortar section and the Company Executive Officer, would infiltrate via ground mobility assets and establish an engagement area to the western side of the wadi should anyone flee from the objective or try to reinforce from the west. In addition to establishing the engagement area, Third Platoon would secure the entire objective after the rest of the company exfilled and conduct a battle hand-over with the 101st the following morning. Our platoon had been tasked to clear OBJ Auburn and establish a blocking position to the north of OBJ Auburn.
As the platoons were boarding the Black Hawk, I heard over the headset that one of the birds was a “Lame Duck” on start. “Oh crap,” I said to myself, “I am going to have to bump my 1st Squad.” Unfortunately, due to the bump plan, if one of 1st Platoon’s helicopters broke, I would have to bump my 1st Squad off because it was in the bump bird. Within minutes, the bump plan was executed, and we were airborne.

Although I was angry that 1st Squad had been left behind, there was nothing that I could do about it now. I had to worry about the mission at hand. Luckily, this was one of the contingencies that we had rehearsed and were prepared to execute if necessary. Over the headset, I told the pilot to make sure that my Platoon Sergeant, who was on the other bird, got the word that 1st Squad would not make it. Then I told the 2nd Squad Leader, with whom I was riding, what was going on and
what he needed to accomplish. The plan now called for 2\textsuperscript{nd} Squad to assume 1\textsuperscript{st} Squad’s mission to clear the northern portion of OBJ Auburn and establish the blocking position to the north of the objective. Third Squad would now become the main effort and clear the portion of OBJ Auburn where the templated buildings were. Obviously, there were some gaps to be filled in between the two squads, which I would have to adjust once we got on the ground.

As soon as the birds touched down, we were off the helos and began to receive sporadic fire from the objective. I was amazed at how many people were still alive on the objective after six 2000lb JDAMs were dropped on the objective, AC 130s had been on station for 15 minutes, and the Little Birds had been conducting gun runs for over five minutes. The Second Squad Leader began to maneuver his squad forward and suppress known, likely, and suspected enemy positions. Off to my left flank, I could see the Chinooks coming into their HLZ’s as tracer fire flew through the air from random spots on the objective. We quickly moved up to the edge of the wadi that looked down onto OBJ Auburn and began to throw grenades into the wadi. During our platoon rehearsals, we had decided to treat the wadi just like a trench line, which it essentially was. When clearing a trench line, the battle drill calls for soldiers to throw grenades into the trench, then follow the explosion into the trench, or wadi in this case. We would later discover that we killed at least two enemy personnel by doing this.

Once 2\textsuperscript{nd} Squad reached the edge of the wadi, I had it hold up and overwatch for 3\textsuperscript{rd} Squad. I also instructed my Weapons Squad Leader to bring himself and one gun team over to link up with me on the north side of OBJ Auburn. At this point, my plan was for SSG Williams to use his machine guns to establish the blocking position to the north and suppress
anyone who attempted to reinforce OBJ Auburn from the north. SFC Albert called me over the radio and informed me that he had linked up with elements of 1\textsuperscript{st} Platoon and that we were clear to move into the wadi now.

By this time, 3\textsuperscript{rd} Squad was moving in the wadi and then clearing the building complex on OBJ Auburn. From my position, I could see 3\textsuperscript{rd} Squad as it assaulted through the objective, and I also could see my PSG, SFC Albert, moving behind 3\textsuperscript{rd} Squad.

Realizing that we may have bypassed some individuals who now may be trying to flank us, I had 2\textsuperscript{nd} Squad re-clear back to the HLZ and then to the north. SSG Casey called over the platoon assault net and informed me that the buildings on OBJ Auburn were clear and that he had killed two more enemy personnel. I then had him cross the wadi and begin to clear on the eastern side to the north to ensure that no one was trying to maneuver on us from the east. I also called 1LT Wertz, the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Platoon Leader, to inform him that I had a squad moving in the vicinity of Engagement Area Hammer, and it was marked with a directional strobe for identification. SSG Nolan came back to my position and reported that his squad had not found any more enemy personnel back to the east; I then had 2\textsuperscript{nd} Squad link up with 3\textsuperscript{rd} Squad and clear the north on his side of the wadi. Both squads moved up about 500 meters on each side of the wadi and then came back. I called 06 and informed him that the buildings on OBJ Auburn were clear,

From the personal experience monograph by CPT Scott B. Cheney who served as the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Platoon Leader, Bravo Company, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Battalion, 75\textsuperscript{th} Ranger Regiment, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.
DISCUSSION: This vignette is a great example of units fighting the fight, not fighting the plan. Adaptive thinking, coupled with strong unit rehearsals for bump-plan contingencies, enabled CPT Cheney and his platoon to effectively accomplish their assigned mission.

Each squad leader had a clear visualization of success. CPT Cheney’s OPORD and subsequent rehearsals allowed for seamless transition from one squad, a planned supporting effort, now assuming 1st Squad’s mission when it was bumped. At this point, the Ranger leadership was able to choose from a menu of capabilities, options, and choices based on these unanticipated changes in the situation to accomplish the mission endstate. Leaders and units become adaptive based upon their understanding of commander’s intent, their training, and their abilities to make quick, sound decisions in the face of adversity.

From 6 April to 20 May 2004, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, executed combat operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Many of these operations consisted of zone and area clearance missions in which Rangers would saturate a specific area in an attempt to garner intelligence and hunt enemy combatants.

Over the course of the deployment, the 2nd Ranger Battalion operated in an area in proximity to the Pakistan border that was suspected of having high amounts of Taliban/Al Qaeda activity. Although it was thought that terrorists and criminals found sanctuary in this region, it was extremely difficult to pinpoint where the enemy operated from because locals claimed to have no knowledge of enemy activity in the area. These difficult circumstances required that Rangers
be extra vigilant in attaining actionable intelligence and pursuing anti-coalition forces. First Platoon, Alpha Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, deployed to this region in early May, expecting to find the perpetrators of an ambush that killed one Ranger just days prior. For this operation, our mission was to clear a series of villages to disrupt enemy operations and kill or capture enemy personnel in our area of responsibility.

The operation commenced with a ground assault convoy (GAC) a few hours after nightfall from our forward operating base to the first objective in sector. Due to ongoing operations that required the Company Commander’s presence, I was sent to be the ground force commander and was responsible for providing overall command and control for the operation. Our company had traveled this same route previously, thus allowing us to move with speed and get established on the first objective quickly. After a few hours of sleep in the assembly area, we rose at sunrise to begin the clearing operations that would last the better part of the day. Our efforts in the area did not yield much in terms of information, and it was not until late in the afternoon that the first significant action occurred.

Throughout the day, one squad from 1st Platoon was conducting Traffic Control Point (TCP) operations along the main road in the area. Stopping and searching vehicles passing through the area, the squad found nothing of interest until one car, carrying an older man we had come across a few nights earlier, passed through the TCP. The man was a doctor in a local village and claimed to know the whereabouts of a younger man who might have ties to the ambush that previously occurred. Although uncomfortable and somewhat afraid, the doctor eventually agreed to lead us to the suspect’s house in a nearby village, and, in return, we assured him that his identity would not be compromised. We compared the
name he gave us to the names listed on a black list of potential participants in the ambush that our Tactical HUMINT Team (THT) was carrying. The names matched, so we began preparing for a late night raid on the suspect’s house.

Through satellite imagery and maps, we ascertained the general location of the house. Once we moved into the vicinity, the plan was to have the doctor use a set of night vision goggles to pinpoint the exact house and relay the location through the interpreter to the Platoon Sergeant who was riding with him. We moved approximately three kilometers by vehicle to the target, and, once we got there, the doctor identified the house to the interpreter, at which time the Platoon Sergeant radioed the house location over the net and identified it by “painting” the house with a laser. This method of identifying a particular house from others of common size and structure was both effective and simple. By focusing the light from his hand-held laser on the target house, the Platoon Sergeant showed the Rangers exactly what house they needed to move to. In addition to searching the suspect’s house, we cleared the surrounding houses as well in an attempt to gain more useful information regarding this individual. After the raid was complete and the doctor identified all of the individuals detained during the search, we knew that our primary suspect had fled the area prior to our arrival. However, the doctor confirmed that we had detained the suspect’s father, and, while the father had no knowledge of his son’s current location, we detained him for further questioning.

We took the suspect’s father with us and moved to an assembly area for the remainder of the night. The following day, 1st Platoon continued to clear more villages in the area while the THT interrogated the father. It appeared as though the interrogation and the searches would provide no additional information to act upon, but, late in the day, the THT informed
me that the suspect’s father claimed to know the location of a very powerful Taliban official who potentially had a connection to the ambush. The father pointed out the general location of the house and assured us that he could identify the house once we got there. At this time, I informed Battalion headquarters of the situation. After a condensed period of planning of approximately two hours, I received approval to execute the search, and we began preparing to move.

In an identical fashion to the previous night’s mission, the father wore night vision goggles and would identify the house to the interpreter, who would then relay that information to the Platoon Sergeant. After an approximately five-kilometer movement by vehicle, the father pinpointed the house, and a squad of Rangers moved to search it. Again, the suspect was not in the house, but a neighbor stepped forward and told us that he knew the suspect’s current location and was willing to take us there. We mounted our vehicles again and moved forward through the extremely arduous terrain to the suspect’s location. The route leading up to the target area was typical for that region: a dirt trail not much wider than our vehicles. However, as we moved closer, the incline dramatically increased, the rocks became more abundant, and eventually the trail ended at the foot of a very steep hill. We left the vehicles there and began a dismounted assault of the suspect’s hideout.

With the neighbor by his side, the Platoon Leader led three of his squads up into a mountainous hideaway to search the scattered houses. After conducting an exhaustive search of the area, the Platoon Leader moved with a squad into one of the last houses left and found the Taliban suspect. He was immediately identified by the neighbor traveling with the platoon; the father, our original source, who was waiting by the vehicles at the bottom of the mountain, also confirmed the identity of the suspect. In addition to the primary suspect, the
neighbor identified five additional Al Qaeda operatives who were living in the hideaway, all of whom were detained. After reporting our actions to the battalion headquarters, 1st Platoon conducted a late night GAC back to the FOB where we turned all six suspects over to interrogation professionals. A few days later, I received word that the Taliban official was indeed who we thought he was, and his days of fueling terrorism and criminal acts were over.

*From the personal experience of 1LT Kirby R. Dennis, who served as Executive Officer of Alpha Company, 2nd Ranger Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.*

**DISCUSSION:** This vignette highlights two very important enduring lessons from operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq. First, it highlights the differences of and challenges of attacking a network instead of a more traditional enemy or terrain oriented objective. CPT Dennis’ and the Rangers’ operation more closely resembles police work than warfare. In fact, OGA efforts with counter-drug, organized crime, and gang warfare illustrate the complexities and patience needed to incrementally win such a fight. Their persistence, patience, and agility enabled them to penetrate the network faster than the enemy’s controls could reform or inform its cells. Units fighting in such a conflict must plan for multiple sequels to counter the perishable nature of intelligence on a network.

What is laudable about this operation is that CPT Dennis and his Rangers were able to actively find and use human intelligence sources without revealing their identities and putting them in danger. Usually indicative of U.S. Special Forces missions, these activities are not trained and practiced by Infantrymen. The Rangers’ use of civilians to gather
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actionable intelligence, while preserving the safety of those civilians, was an adaptive measure used by CPT Dennis to effectively find and capture high payoff targets. His unit’s ability to identify the value of using civilians in the local area to augment his patrol activities is something that reflects his ability to react to the unanticipated circumstance quickly and effectively.

The second enduring lesson is the synergy created between the Rangers and the tactical HUMINT teams (THT). Each of these units has their inherent strengths and weaknesses. This vignette shows how to properly complement and compensate for those, respectively. In this case, the team was far enough forward, yet detached enough from the unit, to perform its appropriate role.

These two enduring lessons were key to the Rangers’ success. Agility led to the adaptability required for our leaders to think and act faster than our enemy. This vignette shows us what persistence and the exploitation of properly acquired intelligence can do.

CONCLUSION: Given an effective mission-essential task list (METL); clearly communicated rules of engagement; and tough, realistic training as a foundation for action, our Infantrymen have the assets to adapt to any situation they face. That, combined with a strong IPB, will allow our leaders to read the situation and then be able to develop and apply the TTPs that will allow for success. The Army’s transformation into modular organizations—which are adaptable to any situation Soldiers may face—will ensure Soldiers and leaders have all of the tools necessary to succeed.
CHAPTER 4: Using Terrain

The contour of the land is an aid to the army; sizing up opponents to determine victory, assessing dangers and distances…those who do battle without knowing these will lose.

Sun Tzu
The Art of War, c. 500 BC

INTRODUCTION: While joint operations occur in three dimensions, Infantry commanders must focus on the ground. Once a commander receives an operation and analyzes his task and purpose, he immediately begins analysis of the terrain upon which operations will take place. This analysis includes all terrain features, how the terrain can be used to friendly advantage, how the terrain can be used against the enemy, and how the enemy may use the terrain against friendly forces. Although small Infantry units cannot often choose the terrain over which they will attack or upon which they will defend, they can make the best of it.

Army operations in the past 15 years have occurred in areas that we have traditionally avoided, for good reason; there can be no more challenging environment than the mountains of Afghanistan, as the Soviets discovered in the 1980’s, or the complex urban areas of the Middle East. Our Infantrymen in Somalia, in Afghanistan, and in Iraq who have taken the challenge of fighting the enemy in these inhospitable regions have succeeded, in large part, because of their ability to analyze the terrain and use it to their advantage.

On 2 March 2002, troops from the 2-187th Infantry, 101st Airborne, conducted an unopposed night air assault
Two hours after sunrise, on 3 March, CPT Kevin Butler and his Soldiers were just starting to wonder whether they were missing all the action when, with a whistle and an almighty boom, the first Al Qaeda mortar round hit barely 50 feet from their position. A second round exploded moments later, as Alpha Company's Soldiers scrambled to find cover and to locate the enemy who had them in his crosshairs.

It took only moments for the Alpha Company troops to spot one of the three positions that had them in its range. “They're on the snow-covered mountain,” shouted the observers posted on the low hills around the command post, pointing towards the peak in question. Soon the Soldiers realized they were...
being attacked from three different positions simultaneously. One Al Qaeda mortar was firing rounds at them from a position to the south, while another was shelling them from a peak to the west. In between the mortar volleys, the enemy was raining fire from a 57mm recoilless rifle, a 12.7mm heavy machine gun, RPGs, and Kalashnikov rifles on Alpha Company from a third position that no one could pinpoint immediately.

As his Soldiers scrambled for cover, Butler faced a crucial moment in any young officer's career: his first time under fire, with about 100 Soldiers – almost all of whom were equally new to combat – looking to him for leadership. What they may not have realized at the time was that Butler had already made two decisions that would likely save some of their lives. One of those was his decision, made in the bitter cold in the early hours of that morning, to locate his command post, and the bulk of his force, in a deep wadi. The dried-up stream bed was wide enough to allow Soldiers to walk through it and sleep in it but so narrow that it would take an extraordinarily lucky—or skillful—mortarman to land a shell inside its steep, rocky walls. The other decision that would prove crucial over the next few hours was Butler's determination that bringing his company's own two 60mm mortars would be worth the hassle of lugging the bulky weapons through the thin mountain air.

Butler quickly brought his two-mortar section into the fight, and from a protected position in the wadi, it started returning fire on the two enemy positions within its range. Its first shots brought a wry comment from Butler. “It's all fun and games until the other guy has a mortar too,” said Butler, whose radio call sign was “Black Hawk 6.” But, even Butler's skilled mortar section needed help. The mortar position to the south was beyond its range. Only air power could destroy it. SGT Corey Daniel, the company's fire support NCO, called in F-16 and F-15E attack jets. At 1021 hrs., a series of loud explosions
from the direction of the southern Al Qaeda positions announced the arrival of the close air support and was met with cheers from the Alpha Company troops. A combination of air strikes and Alpha Company's mortars put an end to the other, closer position where the recoiless rifle lay, but there still remained the mortar on the western ridge. It was inside of the Alpha mortars' range, but the four Al Qaeda troops knew their business. As soon as they heard the drone of incoming aircraft or the distinctive bang of the Alpha Company mortars firing, they would run from the ridge to take cover, reappearing after the U.S. ordnance had landed to wave defiantly and send another shell Alpha Company's way. Knowing that if any of the Al Qaeda rounds found their target, he could lose several Soldiers, Butler thought quickly. “I was trying to come up with a way of sneaking the round in quietly,” he said. He settled on a novel approach.

CPT Butler ordered SGT Daniel to call in another air strike and had his mortarmen calculate how long their rounds spent in the air on their way to the ridgeline. The answer was 32 seconds—long enough for the enemy mortar crew to run for cover, wait for an explosion, and reappear. Butler directed his mortar crews to fire several rounds at the moment they heard the explosion from the close air support. “I thought maybe we could mask the sound of the 60 mm mortars firing with the sound of the close air support,” he said. As the booms from the Air Force bombing echoed across the valley, Butler's crews went to work. “The boys were just hanging rounds like nobody's business,” he said. Seven rounds flew out of the tubes toward the ridgeline. Watching through his binoculars, SGT Daniel saw the four Al-Qaeda troops reappear on the ridge. As they taunted the American troops, all seven rounds came down on them, blowing them off the ridgeline and killing them. “We've got the best mortarmen in the battalion,” one Soldier
could be overheard telling a buddy after the fight. “And the best company commander,” the other Soldier replied.

*From a March, 2002, article by* Army Times *staff writer Sean D. Naylor*

**DISCUSSION:** This vignette illustrates the importance of cover and the use of mortars in mountain warfare.

The use of cover is seen in the selection of the location of the command post. CPT Butler took advantage of the wadi’s narrow and steep rocky walls that provided cover to all but the luckiest of indirect shots. The cover provided by the wadi allowed U.S. forces to organize and rest as the battle progressed.

The wadi also provided cover for Alpha Company’s mortar positions. The mortars, although bulky and heavy to carry in the thin mountain air, provided the commander with responsive and accurate fires to counter the enemy’s use of mortars firing from more exposed firing positions. Moreover, his ingenious use of CAS to capitalize on the enemy’s predictability can’t be overstated. In the end, the U.S. commander was able to effectively read the terrain and use combined arms to defeat the enemy.

**At 0630, 2 March 2002, the TOC for TF 1-87, 10th Mountain Division, air assaulted into the Shah-I-Kot Valley as part of Operation Anaconda.**

As the CH-47 landed with a thud, all I could think about was getting off of that huge target. As the Chinook flew away, the seven of us formed our own perimeter as we prepared our SKEDCO (field litter) with extra water, MREs, long-range antenna, and batteries. After 30 seconds on the ground, the
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CSM and I located a small rise in the flat valley only thirty or forty meters away. The “Bowl,” as it is fondly known now, was basically centered between BP Ginger and BP Heather, and it would provide good cover and concealment as there were no trees on the LZ or in the desert valley.

Maybe 45-60 seconds after landing, red tracers began kicking dirt up just a few meters from my front, and then came the report of the rifle fire and loud snaps as the rounds traveled next to my head. We dropped the SKEDCO and ran to the ridgeline for protection. As I was getting ready to go over the top of the rock ridge, I saw the Operations Sergeant, SFC Robert Healy, who was leading the remainder of the TAC, including the S-3, MAJ James Hall, to link-up at my location. As he closed to within ten feet of me, close enough for us to hear each other, we confirmed accountability, and, simultaneously, an RPG landed between us, no more than five feet away. It did not explode but lay there, sparking; I cannot remember ever running so fast with my ruck on in my life.

As the remainder of the TAC moved over the mound, we set up communications and a hasty command post in the dried out creek bed cut out in the center of the bowl; this was our home for the next 18+ hours. The dried creek bed was nearly 200 meters long, surrounded by high ground on the east, west, and north. To the south, the little bowl was open, looking out to the dried up Sorbaghi River. The aircraft I was on in HLZ 13 and the one at HLZ 13A carried the Soldiers who were supposed to establish blocking positions Ginger and Heather. The bowl was at the edge of BP Heather so that was established; however, C Company never made it all the way to BP Ginger.

As the situation developed, we realized that the enemy was executing the most dangerous course of action we had discussed in mission analysis: he was not occupying the
villages but defending fearlessly from the hills. Initial estimates ranged from 200-400 enemy fighters; later reports concluded that up to 800 hard-line Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters were killed in and around the valley and mountains.

With 82 personnel on the ground, fixed by heavy small arms and RPG fire from the ridge line to the east, the Takur Ghar Mountain, now known as Ginger Mountain, we were unable to maneuver. The battalion mortar section set up the sole 120mm mortar and was firing it as fast as it could, but enemy direct fire was landing within feet of the tube. The enemy mortar-men began to adjust 82mm mortar rounds in on the 120mm mortar position. On one occasion, five rucksacks were destroyed and subsequently detonated a Claymore mine concealed within one of the rucksacks. The enemy was also attempting to place indirect fire on our position with 122mm towed howitzer fire from within the valley. We later found three artillery pieces and a large cache of artillery rounds three to four kilometers away, so we confirmed the enemy had artillery in the area.

The first CAS asset to come on station for us was the AH-64s, flying low over-head. However, the Apaches could not elevate from behind a terrain feature to establish traditional support by fire positions because they could not hover at that altitude. LZ 13 and 13A were at approximately 8500 feet, and the enemy fighters were anywhere from 8500 to 10000+ feet on the mountain. A total of six Apaches were used that morning; five of the six were damaged from ground fire vicinity LZ 13. The Apaches tried to fire the 30mm cannon and 2.75” rockets at the dug-in enemy, but the amount of ground fire and elevation was too much for the Apaches.

After the first couple of Apache runs, we received priority of fast moving CAS. All types of aircraft were flying, from B-52s to F-14, F-15, F-16, and F-18s. The first bomb dropped
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for us in the Shah-I-Kot was a 2000 lb. JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munitions), the Global Positioning System (GPS) guided bomb that was dropped from a B-52 flying at 50,000 feet, which landed only 300 meters to our east. Several others followed, but none were any closer.

The enemy had discovered from other engagements that when the jets are flying over-head, the bombs will follow, so they would retreat into their caves. Once the bomb landed, they would run out again and engage us again. The enemy firing mortars at us had the base plates cemented into the ground near caches of ammo. They would remove the tube, hide in the cave, and then run out set up and aim, using Kentucky windage, or hip-shooting, with the firm base plate. We determined that the enemy had likely registered his mortars in the valley floor where we were, near trails and passes through the lower Shah-I-Kot. To distract the enemy mortars, we would try to fix them with small arms or machine gun fire or Apaches, if on station, then bring in a jet to drop bombs while the enemy was busy fighting the Infantry.

The battalion’s first casualties came as enemy mortar rounds landed on our 120mm mortar position. I recall looking down to the mortar firing position, then an explosion and black cloud of smoke then screams. The CSM said what everyone else was already thinking, “We have just taken our first Killed in Action.” Although no one was killed, we had 6-8 wounded from the shrapnel alone. Throughout the day, most casualties were due to mortar shrapnel, but several Soldiers had bullet wounds to the extremities. One Soldier actually had two 7.62mm round strike him in his new Interceptor Body Armor; he yelled he had been hit, but the bullets had been stopped by the ceramic plate.

Throughout the day, both direct and indirect fire remained heavy until around 1300 hrs., when it seemed, if only for 30 to
45 minutes, that there was a lull in the fighting, with only sporadic small arms fire from the hills. After the lull, enemy fire rained down on our position, as if he was committing all of his assets to the fight.

That was about the time one of the enemy mortars seemed to be bracketing rounds in on the bowl; eventually, an enemy mortar round found its way into the center of the BN TAC. The round landed strangely in small creek bed, in the center of our perimeter. The splash and shrapnel came to the eastern side of the small creek where the S3; FSO; CSM; Ops SGT; our senior Radio Telephone Operator (RTO), SGT Black; and I were sitting. Each took shrapnel in the extremities, particularly SGT Black who received a severe gash in his lower right leg. Once the initial shock of the round and the injuries wore off, we quickly assessed each other and moved about fifteen feet up the eastern side of the ditch. At least two or three subsequent rounds landed to the left and right of the position we had previously occupied; had we not moved even fifteen feet, we may have taken several more casualties.

At approximately 2000, under cover of darkness two UH-60 Air ambulances flew in to extract the eight most critical Soldiers. As the two aircraft flew in over the top of the bowl, enemy 12.7mm DSHk fire and airburst RPGs almost shot down one of the aircraft. The UH-60s were able to land on the west side of the bowl, covered from enemy fire by a small ridge line, to load and exfil the casualties back to Bagram airbase. The remainder of C Company and TAC would have to wait for another four hours to be exfiltrated on CH-47’s, as several other lifts on 101st Soldiers were flying in to the north of OBJ GINGER.

From the personal experience monograph of CPT Timothy Gittins, who served as the Assistant S-3, TF 1-87, 10th
DISCUSSION: CPT Gittins’ vignette demonstrates what Infantryman can do to maximize the benefit terrain offers when the enemy situation is not as they originally envisioned. The enemy situation is never a “known” entity and oftentimes changes when the first contact occurs. What does not change, however, is the terrain that defines the battlespace.

The enemy was not intermixed with the civilians in the villages on the Shah-I-Kot valley floor, as most planners assumed prior to Operation Anaconda. The enemy was actually located in the surrounding ridgelines and cliffs that overwatched the Americans’ landing zones. Taking severe fire upon landing, Gittins and LTC LaCamera’s TAC made a quick assessment of the terrain at hand and maximized the only cover and concealment afforded by a small depression in the valley floor a few hundred meters away. Later known as ‘Hell’s Halfpipe,’ this ground lent itself to protection from enemy fires, as well as an adequate mortar firing point for a section of the battalion’s 120mm mortars.

As our doctrine on the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) indicates, “step two of the IPB is evaluating the battlefield effects with which both sides must contend…Infantrymen consider the possible actions of the enemy they are about to contend with and how the terrain will affect both themselves and their adversary.” (FM 34-130) The IPB is a continuous process. The Infantrymen who air assaulted into the HLZ 13 and 13A fought the enemy and not the plan; they did a quick assessment and used the existing terrain to their advantage against an enemy that occupied dominating positions on key terrain.
From 17 March until 1 April, 2003, C Company, 2-7 Infantry, 3\textsuperscript{rd} ID, as part of TF 3-69 Armor, had fought its way from the Kuwaiti border to the Euphrates River. On 1 April, TF 3-69, traveling ahead of the main body, was tasked to secure a large bridge, known as Objective Peach. The writer served as XO, C Company, 2-7 Infantry.

Company A (Tank) led the battalion, and C Company was second in the order of march. When an A Company tank crew reported it could see the Euphrates Bridge, C was to take the lead and suppress the far side of the objective, while the engineers came forward, along with Bravo Company, 3-7 Infantry, to check for demolitions on the bridge. This required them to check under the bridge using boats. The battalion had an engineer boat team attached to it specifically for this mission.

Captain Kelly, C Company Commander, directed 1\textsuperscript{st} Platoon move to right side of the bridge and provide suppressing fire from that side while 2\textsuperscript{nd} Platoon moved to the left of the bridge to provide a support by fire. The 3\textsuperscript{rd} Platoon, the assault element, would cross the bridge and secure a foothold for the Battalion to pass through and continue its attack. Battalion fired a smoke mission to obscure movement, but the smoke landed directly on top of the 1\textsuperscript{st} Platoon element. Meanwhile, as 2\textsuperscript{nd} Platoon was moving into position, the Platoon Leader encountered a marshy area, and his tank became mired. When his Platoon Sergeant attempted to pull him out with his tank, his tank became mired as well. The Platoon Leader radioed me that his two vehicles were stuck and that he would not be able to observe the far side of the bridge. I called up my mechanics and had them move their M88 to the mired tanks. Because they were a few kilometers away from
us, I informed the Commander that it would be a while until we got the two tanks unstuck.

He then told me to take my Bradley, along with the Smoke Platoon, to provide overwatch and destroy any enemy that we could engage on the far side of the bridge. During this time, the other companies lined up behind our company position while the engineers were moving the boats towards the bridge. I looked at my map and had to figure a way to take the Smoke Platoon. I found a trail on the map and told the Smoke Platoon Leader to follow me, as we headed towards the trail.

The trail was very narrow, with about a ten-foot drop on either side of it. It looked like about six inches of my track was hanging off the trail, and I was praying that the trail would not start to collapse. Along the winding trail, there were places where I had to go between two trees, and the Bradley would rub half the bark off because the trail was so narrow. After about ten minutes of weaving my way through, I found an opening where I could see the other side of the bridge. I was directly beside a house, and there were some other houses around my area as well. As I called the Commander that I was in position, an old man, who looked like a farmer, came out of a hole which resembled a bunker and began to walk towards me. I thought this might be a trap, and I pointed my weapon at him and told him to move in the opposite direction of me. After many hand gestures, he got the idea and began to move the opposite way.

Soon, mortar rounds began to land in our area, and I buttoned up but realized I couldn't really see anything, so I opened my hatch and hoped that a mortar round wouldn't land on top of me. My gunner spotted three motorcycles with mortar tubes, and we destroyed them with HE rounds. As soon as we were done destroying the motorcycles, a troop transport truck began to move towards the bridge, and we destroyed that as
well. I called to the Commander and let him know what I was seeing; it seemed that I was the only person who could see to the other side of the bridge. Battalion radioed and told us to go ahead and start employing the smoke. The Smoke Platoon Leader did so, and soon the whole battlefield was covered with smoke. As I spotted more enemy vehicles trying to reach the bridge, my gunner destroyed them. The Iraqis were trying to get to the bridge to detonate explosives to destroy it and, although they were successful in detonating one part of it, they only caused minimal damage to the bridge.

During this time, the engineers had managed to get the boats in the river, disarmed the remaining explosives under the bridge, and said it was clear to cross. I was relieved because I felt like a huge target on the battlefield and was tired of sporadic mortar fire that was landing around me.

Captain Kelly ordered 3rd Platoon to cross the bridge and establish a foothold on the far side of the bridge. As 3rd Platoon crossed, it destroyed the remaining enemy vehicles in its area.

By this time, a Bradley section from 2nd Platoon relieved me, and I brought the smoke vehicles back to the rear of the company. The remaining two companies then moved across the bridge and began to destroy targets as they moved into the area. The battalion was all across, and other battalions then began to move through our position on the bridge. There was a great sense of pride knowing that we had been the first unit to secure the Euphrates Bridge.

From the personal experience monograph by CPT Michael M. Pecina, who served as Executive Officer, 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry, 3rd Infantry Division, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.
DISCUSSION: CPT Pecina’s actions along the near side bank of the river clearly reinforce a Soldier’s absolute requirement to continuously evaluate terrain in his battlespace as part of his analysis of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).

CPT Pecina called for additional smoke to obscure his element’s maneuver onto OBJ Peach. He accurately analyzed the ground and understood that the weather effects would allow for effective smoke obscuration due to the proximity of the Euphrates River. The temperature and humidity of the area would prolong the effects of the smoke, thus allowing for effective maneuver. In contact with the enemy, which was on the far side of the bridge, CPT Pecina used battlefield effects to further his advantage and decided to maneuver cross-country along a cross mobility corridor he identified on his map. His ability to visualize and understand the terrain enabled him to maneuver to a key vantage point along the river and contributed significantly to the overall success of his unit. With the Al Mussayib Euphrates Bridge crossing site secured, other units of the 3rd Infantry Division maneuvered on toward Baghdad.

On 2 April 2003, the 3rd Infantry Division approached Karbala, located approximately sixty miles south of Baghdad. Because it had a bridge that allowed for mechanized movement across a large wadi in the middle of the desert, known as the Karbala Gap, it became decisive terrain for the 3rd ID’s movement to Baghdad. The nearby city of Karbala afforded the enemy the opportunity to cover this bridge by fire and had been occupied by the Iraqi Army for the conduct of an area defense. The 3rd Infantry Division saw no reason to enter and clear the city during its push to reach Baghdad, so it isolated and bypassed the city. The 3rd ID did leave behind a small
element to secure the bridge crossing the Karbala Gap, thus providing mobility to all follow-on Coalition forces. The 101st Airborne Division was assigned the mission to relieve the 3ID security force and clear the city of Karbala on April 4th, 2003.

By the time my Battalion, the 3-502nd, reached Karbala on April 5th, we had taken part in numerous small unit level engagements—approximately 4-6 man security positions—some random mortar fire, the occasional sniper -- but in all cases, they were one-sided fights. The enemy, which consisted of not only the Iraqi Army, but Fedayeen soldiers as well, would fire a few perfunctory rounds and then withdraw so as to not become decisively engaged.

I went to the Battalion Operations Order at 0600 hrs. on April 5th. The general concept of the operation was for B/3-502nd, the Bulldogs, to Air Assault to the southwest of the city to seize a water treatment plant for the Battalion to use as a CTCP (Combat Trains Command Post), and then move northeast through the city, stopping to set up Company battle positions at night and continuing in the morning, until the entire sector was cleared. We would then be met by Black Hawk helicopters on the northeast side of the city for extraction and movement to the next city north.

The Black Hawk helicopters arrived, and we conducted our air assault into Karbala. I had four aircraft for my PLT, which put a squad plus—about 10-12—fully loaded Infantrymen per aircraft. I rode in the first aircraft of my lift with my 1st Squad and headquarters section. Just prior to getting on the aircraft, I had been discussing with my 1st Squad Leader, SSG Luke Carr, that the likely LZ was only 500-1000 meters from the city itself, with the worst case scenario being our landing upon Highway 1, no more than 4km away.
As we approached Karbala at 500 feet, we could see tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles from 1-41 IN interspersed with their Infantrymen on the outside of the city, exchanging fire with what must be the enemy within. I watched a section of Kiowa Warrior helicopters conduct an attack on something that was unseen to me; then I heard the “cherry” call come over my headset from the pilot, meaning the pilot had determined the LZ to be hot. We were coming into Karbala under fire.

Our aircraft were checked off of the original LZ and flew out to the west of the city. I was desperately trying to orient myself from the air to our Company’s sector of the city, which was falling further by the second into the eastern sky, when SSG Carr pounded on my chest and leaned in close to be heard over the rotor wash of the helicopter; he pointed down out the window and yelled, “Is that Highway 1?” I looked down out the other side of the aircraft at a paved highway running generally north-south, surrounded by miles and miles of barren, open desert, broken only by the city of Karbala to the east and yelled back, “You see any other road out there?” I could not hear SSG Carr’s response, but I think I read the blasphemy on his lips—we were going for a long walk in the hot desert sand.

My platoon dismounted the aircraft and formed a battle line on a berm 4km to the west of Karbala, while we waited for the remainder of the inbound Company. We were to be the last platoon in the Company order of march, so we were the first on the ground to provide security. As the Company’s elements landed, they immediately formed and began movement, with 1LT Joe Thomas and his 2nd Platoon leading off. We were in a Company column, platoons in column, squads in wedge formation which stretched out over the desert about 1000 meters from head to tail and at least 200 meters wide. As we maneuvered toward the city in a very long company column, the Commander tasked the attached mechanized platoon to race
north and south to our front to create a cloud of dust and sand to provide obscuration for our very exposed formation.

Enemy artillery and mortar fire was our greatest threat at this point. The ground we walked upon was like that of a beach: loose and deep. With every step forward, we felt as though we were falling half a step back. Every Soldier was loaded down with combat gear, assault packs, and body armor—weights ranging from 80 lbs, for the average rifleman, to 120 lbs for a machine gunner or RTO. We took only the essentials: if it was not bullets, body armor, batteries, or water, we left it behind. It was about 1000 hrs. when we left Highway 1, and the temperature was already into the mid-nineties; most Soldiers in the Company were already down to their final canteen.

My Platoon began to pass Bradley fighting vehicles and tanks in battle positions about 2000 meters from the outer walls of the city, which meant that Joe Thomas and 2\textsuperscript{nd} Platoon were only about 1000 meters from entering the city proper. If one was not tracking the Company progress by GPS, it was hard to tell how far from the city we were—it was like an old Bugs Bunny cartoon I remembered seeing as a kid where the mirage just remains out of reach, no matter how long Bugs walked towards it. It was impossible to judge distances in the open desert. My 2\textsuperscript{nd} Squad Leader called me on the icom radio and asked, “How much further to the city?” I looked around at my Soldiers, panting and trudging through the sand and beating sun; checked my GPS; and called back, “Just another klick.” A klick later, I would answer the same question with the same answer. SSG Ryan Alfaro (2\textsuperscript{nd} SL) came back immediately, “Hey, you said ‘a klick’ a klick ago.” I replied, “Ohh, you wanted to know how far until we hit the city, I thought you meant until the Company enters the city.” There was a moment of silence on the radio while I listened to a few chuckles from
the men around me, then SSG Alfaro said, “OK, how much farther until we—3rd Platoon—enter the city?” I replied, “About a klick.” I only caught half of SSG Alfaro’s reply, which had something to do with my mother, because he stopped transmitting it over the net. My RTO, SPC Schake, began singing the Alice in Chains’ song, “Man in the Box,” a tradition we had started to kill the boredom of long road marches while training at Fort Campbell. It seemed very appropriate, and more than a few of the boys joined in. Halfway through the song, 2nd Platoon entered the city and immediately came under direct fire.

I maneuvered my platoon to the left flank of Gary Bartels and his 1st Platoon and established an overwatch position on a line of berms about 400 meters from the outer walls of the city, while 1st and 2nd platoons ran to the cover provided by the buildings. Once both platoons were inside the street system, my Platoon picked up and followed. The sounds of small arms fire was constant but always just ahead of my platoon, as we rushed to catch up with the rest of the Company. A few blocks in, we finally found 1st Platoon halted in the street, while 2nd PLT was clearing and securing the water treatment plant. I moved forward to link up with Gary Bartels to find out what was going on. The cross street separating the tail of his platoon from the head of mine became its own little war for a few minutes while we all exchanged M4 for AK-47 fire and M203 HE for RPG rounds with some enemy soldiers a few blocks to the northeast. My RTO and I crossed at a momentary lull, and I ran into Gary. He pointed out the water treatment plant and our Company’s breach point and said it should not be more than a few minutes until Joe was finished clearing and we could move in.

We were going to have to cross a large open area, about 300 meters long, to get inside the water treatment plant, and
none of us wanted to leave the cover of the city street walls. Gary and I wished each other good luck, and I watched as bullets kicked up dust on the berm surrounding the water treatment plant as 1st Platoon made its run for it.

Then it was our turn. We crossed just as we had trained to cross open areas in the urban environment, just a little faster. Bullets provide great motivation. Once inside, our Company Commander, CPT James McGahey, set 2nd Platoon into its SBF position oriented to the east and had me place one squad on an outer berm to overwatch the southern approach to the water plant. The remainder of the Company hunkered down inside two buildings on the compound awaiting the drop of a JDAM (500lbs bomb) seven blocks away in the monument sector. It seems a large formation of enemy soldiers had been observed there.

It was 1200 hrs. The Company was almost completely out of water. My Platoon was down to its last two or three canteens for the entire platoon. My medic, SPC Jarod “Doc” Herniak, had begun to consolidate the remaining canteens for use only upon our expected casualties. The Battalion Trains decided they could not make it to the water treatment plant; the area was just too hot.

I was called into the CP to receive my orders from CPT McGahey. He was in his usual orders position, kneeling on the ground over his map, using his knife as a pointer. He said we were leaving, we were going to take the fight to the enemy, and 3rd Platoon was on point. He ordered my Platoon and 1st Platoon to search and attack the “monument sector.”

It took a little more personal will than I would have liked to exercise to bring myself and my Platoon outside the seeming safety of the water plant and the protection its walls provided. I could feel the fear and uncertainty of my Soldiers as I told them to exit the entry breach of our safe haven and hoped I was
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not showing my own. SFC Stone and I moved forward in the formation and led the Platoon out of the fence surrounding the water plant; once the men saw that we were all right, it was as if their heads cleared, and they returned to the aggressive mentality they had always had. The 105mm artillery prep fires started just as we entered the streets. I could feel the concussion and hear the enemy AKs and Kiowa choppers playing tag with each other, not 500 meters away. The CO halted my Platoon in the street while we waited out the prep fires. SGT Jason Sypherd, 1st Squad’s lead Team Leader, yelled back from the road intersection he was holding at, “I feel pieces of shrapnel flying over my head.” I yelled back, “Well, keep your head behind that wall.” It was a very long five minutes listening to the war.

My mouth was so dry, whether from fear or lack of water (we left the CTCP “black”) I don’t know, probably both. The order to continue movement was both a blessing and a curse: I was happy to be moving again, for it took my mind off my own welfare, but we were pushing into the area that had previously been reported to contain an enemy regimental headquarters—enough enemy soldiers to warrant my chain of command attempting to drop a JDAM five blocks from where I was standing. We turned the corner into the city proper and immediately came under sniper fire. We could not see them, just their bullets ricocheting off walls and kicking up dust at our boots. We kept moving, straining to see any threat before it saw us.

Two blocks in, we received very effective volleys of AK-47 fire in the street. We knew the street was the kill zone—we had to get out of it. I ordered everyone to enter the buildings. Our tactic of having one squad on the left side of the street, and one squad on the right with a MG attached to each, paid dividends. Both squads ended up in secured positions with
heavy weapons capabilities. I personally breached the house SSG Carr was to go to and began to clear with my RTO (SPC Schake) and my FO (SGT Slaton), until the line squad entered.

It was obvious that this house had felt the effects of the 105-artillery fire, a portion of the roof had caved in; there were two men inside, one of them with pretty severe wounds on his face. Doc Herniak began to treat the wounded man, while SSG Carr’s squad moved to the roof. While we moved from the street to the rooftop in under two minutes, the firing had stopped. We never did see the guys who shot at us.

After about 15 minutes, we left the house and continued our movement north. We pushed up another two blocks and saw what we believed to be the rooftop from which we had been receiving the vast majority of fire. We entered and cleared two houses on the opposite side of the street. We found nothing but empty shell casings and two very frightened people, a man and his wife, the woman screaming and crying uncontrollably. As I knelt in front of what used to be their living room window, looking at my men maneuver on the two houses across the street, listening to all of the automatic gunfire going on around me, I briefly considered how it would feel to have my own home in the middle of a war zone when a foreign army kicks in the door, knocks out the glass windows, and starts shooting at my neighbor’s house.

At this point, Gary Bartels and 1st Platoon had come under extremely intensive fire and were fighting a few blocks to the east. We moved another block north and turned east to relieve some of the pressure upon 1st Platoon and eventually link up. CPT McGahey and I identified a three-story building at the end of the block and decided that, as the highest building in the area, it was a good point of domination, with excellent observation. Plus, we needed a break; we had been out of water for a few hours, and it was 104 degrees. I called SFC Stone on
the platoon radio and told him I wanted that building. In true Platoon Sergeant-fashion, SFC Stone had been moving to seize that building before I could even order it. Just as my 1st Squad began to enter the building, we came under a surge of effective fire from the west. CPT McGahey recalled, “I literally watched tracer rounds go between the arms of SPC Brady, who was returning fire to the west from the rear of 3rd Platoon. Brady and I looked into each other’s eyes, and we both knew we had to get out of that street, now.”

The Platoon ran into the building, the CO and I last, covering each other. Once inside, the Platoon got on the second story and then the rooftop. We could see for miles and soon discovered all of the enemy positions to our north and east. It was a shooting gallery. We decimated them. The locals kept coming out to watch; we yelled at them at first but soon discovered only warning shots fired generally towards them dispersed the crowds. It was like entertainment for these people to watch a battle going on. We began to realize that most of the enemy, who, at one time wore OD green uniforms, now wore civilian clothes. Crowd control took on a whole new meaning, as we attempted to distinguish combatant from spectator and spectator from spotter for enemy mortar fire. There were numerous repeat customers hidden amongst the civilian spectators, who we finally identified as spotters. We shot them. Events like this went on for hours. We fired over 100 rounds of 105 artillery and uncountable rifle rounds.

We had not had a drink of water since morning. I almost passed out from dehydration, since I had given all my water for the past 30-hours to my Soldiers. One of my NCOs, SSG Alfaro, ordered me to sit down and drink from his quarter filled, final canteen. It was an order I followed. CPT Johnson was diligently fighting to get water pushed up to us and later stated, “…the issue was that the Battalion Commander had
The 1st Platoon and 2nd Platoon began arriving at the three-story at about 1600 hours. My Platoon had already been fighting there for about three hours. As the other Platoons began to relieve my men, my men moved to the cooler internal rooms of the building and got a much-needed break. My PSG, SFC Stone, took a small quartering party and went to find a local water source for us all to use our iodine tablets on. The locals brought us a few pitchers, and there was a slow pouring spigot we were raiding on the next block. It was not much, but it kept us moving.

CPT McGahey started prepping the military HQ based in the school from where we had identified most of the resistance was coming. I was exhausted, starving, and dehydrated; my boys were much worse. By 1700 hrs., the Battalion Scouts took over the “shooting gallery,” as the three-story building had become known, while we prepared to seize and clear the school suspected to be housing the military HQ.

Joe Thomas with 2nd Platoon and Gary Bartels with 1st Platoon would assault this one, while my Platoon remained in SBF position on the three-story. SFC Stone and his water party were still out scouring the neighborhood, when CPT McGahey called to give me the “all is clear” call over the Company net. We found tons of weapons within the HQ objective, both heavy and light, and an entire room filled with a to-scale terrain model depicting the planned defense of Karbala. It seemed the Iraqis took with them all the dead bodies they could; there was nothing but pieces of bodies left in the HQ building.
Company B stayed in the military HQ building for one night. The next morning, we continued our clearance operation to the north but did not make contact with any further enemy personnel. We ended up spending four days total in the city of Karbala, the last two primarily spent resting and prepping for the eventual air assault into Baghdad.

From the personal experience monograph by CPT Jason Davis, who served as a platoon leader in B Company, 3-502\textsuperscript{nd}, 101\textsuperscript{st} Airborne Division, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: Key terrain is defined as “any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either combatant.” (FM 1-02) This discussion on the events in Karbala illustrates key terrain on all three levels of warfighting: strategic, operational and tactical. Strategically, Karbala is the center of the Shiite Muslim religion, as it is the pilgrimage site for the Shiites. Operationally, the Karbala Gap was key because it had the best maneuver corridor to Baghdad. The city overwatched the bridge and the area around the bridge to build combat power. Additionally, this was truly the last Shiite-dominated city as coalition forces progressed north, so this was the convergence of a melting pot of ethnic, political, and military groups. Tactically, key terrain within the city was the governmental area in the center of town. Military complexes and other municipal buildings outside the center were also key terrain to subordinate units.

Key terrain in this situation was initially the water plant for the military use of the compound. Although the security of this complex was important for future stability operations, in the current fight, it lost its key terrain status. Key terrain quickly became the rooftops, as they could cover both the ground and
the sky, and we need to own the third dimension. From the ground, the ability to see the different levels was difficult; however, once the company identified the three-story building, its value became painfully obvious. As the Company fought to the dominant building, it was prepared for a massive fight. The continued and massive use of artillery and mortars with proximity or timed fuses continued to prevent the use of the rooftops outside of the risk estimated distance. The fight within the buildings really never materialized. The enemy used the rooftops as a large avenue of approach and never became pinned into the buildings. As the company seized the building, it provided more than just observation and fields of fire over the other rooftops in the area—it covered four major roads and was a premier support-by-fire position for the seizure of the military compound 500 meters away.

Just like the decisive point, key terrain can change throughout the operation or will change in order of precedence. Terrain within the IPB process must be continuously analyzed, thus changing the unit’s plans and operations. Continuously analyzing METT-TC brought out positive changes to the operational plan, and this, combined with solid execution, equaled mission success.

At 0500 on 3 April 2003, 2-7 IN (M), 3rd ID, having seized Objective Lions on the eastern portion of Baghdad International Airport, now pushed out, forming a perimeter to the east and south of the airport. The 1st Platoon, A Co, was assigned a blocking position to the southeast of “Four Corners” — the main intersection of roads leading into the airport from Baghdad. With two Bradley fighting vehicles (BFVs) and a squad of dismounted Infantrymen, the platoon leader cautiously moved the platoon to establish its position.
As I approached the planned location, two U.S. Soldiers were desperately running up the road towards us yelling, “two tanks, two tanks,” as they went past us in a panic. I recognized the two Soldiers as the Battalion Mortar Platoon Leader, CPT Matthew Paul, and one of his squad leaders, Sergeant Jose Adorno. They had gone outside of our planned perimeter to set up the mortar firing position, and the two enemy tanks had actually driven right past them. I radioed the contact to my Company Commander, CPT Robert Smith, and was ordered to engage and destroy. One of the tank commanders attached to my company overheard the report on the company net. He happened to be passing by our current position, towing another disabled M1, and immediately volunteered to join my section and assist.

The road we were on made a sweeping turn to the left and was lined with trees. The enemy tanks were approximately 400m further south along the road and outside of our line of sight due to the trees. I dismounted my Infantry to get eyes on ground level, and my Soldiers immediately spotted the enemy. No sooner had my squad leader, SSG Robinson, pointed in the direction of the tanks, when one of them fired a main gun round, and I watched in horror as the round impacted a BFV from an adjacent unit that was passing over a bridge 800m back to our north. There were other vehicles on the bridge, and I knew we had to take action quickly to prevent further damage.

SSG Robinson took up a position in a ditch along the road and ordered his squad to engage the tanks in an attempt to kill or at least distract the tank commanders. I maneuvered the attached tank out into a field to my right, left my wingman on the road, and positioned myself in between them in the field. As we began to advance, I knew the M1 would be able to spot
the enemy tanks first, one at a time, and with the advantage of knowing their general location, would be able to acquire the target and fire before the enemy had a chance to react.

Before our vehicles were even in a position to advance, SSG Robinson reported that he had killed the tank commander of the lead tank and that the tank was now stationary, directly behind a red building. He completed his report in haste, and I observed his squad fleeing out of the ditch, while the second tank was traversing its turret and taking aim on my dismounted Soldiers. The enemy tank round impacted less than five meters away from the nearest Soldier with no effects (the Iraqi tank commander must have fired an armor piercing round rather than a high-explosive round by mistake).

I relayed the information that SSG Robinson had reported to the attached tank commander and ordered the tank to advance. The tank commander reported: “I see the building…I’ve got him.” The M1 fired, and the destruction of the enemy tank was obvious. “One down. Where’s the next one?” asked the tank commander. A second report from SSG Robinson placed the second tank only 20m behind the first one, both directly on the road. I again relayed the information to the M1, and we advanced. With the accurate report from SSG Robinson, the second tank was destroyed just as easily as the first.

The marksmanship and accurate reporting of SSG Robinson saved lives that day. The T-72s were 400m down the road from our position. With the way the road bent, I estimated the straight-line distance to the tanks at just over 300m. SSG Robinson was always a standout at the rifle range, and, before deploying to Iraq, I named him as the platoon sniper. He purchased a small civilian scope, mounted it to his M4, and was anxious to put his skills to work. His successful engagement of the lead enemy tank commander all but
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prevented the enemy from firing on the friendly vehicles that were left on the bridge to the north. The crew of the lead tank was undoubtedly occupied with the treatment of its commander and was thus eliminated from the fight. The second tank was directly behind the first and had no field of fire in the direction of the bridge.

*From the personal experience of 1LT James A. Horn who served as 1st Platoon Leader, Alpha Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry, 3rd Infantry Division, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.*

DISCUSSION: This engagement in the Baghdad area is a good example of using terrain to develop situational awareness and standard operating procedures (SOPs) between BFV platoon leaders, tank platoon leaders, and dismounted squad leaders. By placing the dismounted squad leader on the ground to observe below the tree line, the platoon was able to maneuver along the direction of the attacks to destroy the enemy tanks. Leaders must always consider the importance of their dismounted infantry in restricted terrain. Infantry provides critical combat power on the battlefield that enhances situational awareness for everyone.

By properly analyzing how the enemy used the terrain, the platoon leader was able to develop his course of action to destroy the threat and provide situational awareness for the tank platoon leader. The Bradley platoon leader ensured that the tank platoon leader understood the situation by providing accurate and timely information about the disposition, composition, and strength of the enemy threat. Because there was a clear understanding of the SOPs established by the task force in theater, the platoon leaders were successful in synchronizing their efforts.
At 1400, 5 April 2003, 2-7 IN (M), 3\textsuperscript{rd} ID, having now occupied Baghdad International Airport for more than two days, established several ambush sites along main avenues of approach to the south and east of the airport. The 1\textsuperscript{st} Platoon of A Co was ordered to establish an antiarmor ambush approximately one kilometer south of “Four Corners,” the main intersection of roads leading into the airport from Baghdad.

I was given a verbal order to destroy as many enemy armored vehicles as possible with the end-state of no enemy armor permitted north of my position.

This was the first time since before the war had begun that I was able to go through the proper steps of mission analysis and course of action development. My platoon was currently occupying a hasty defensive battle position oriented south with a sector of fire of almost 180-degrees. From previous engagements in that battle position, I knew that, if at all possible, our next position should have a reduced sector. Though the engagement area (EA) was not too large, covering such a wide sector made it difficult to quickly identify enemy presence and required several pairs of eyes. Having fought constantly for the past five days, rest was a crucial factor for maintaining combat power, and the constant surveillance of such a wide area was taxing.

I selected an ambush site that allowed one kilometer of standoff and up to four enemy armored vehicles to be destroyed with a flank shot at one time in the EA. From where my platoon would be located, we could observe the entire EA with only having to scan a 30-degree sector. By establishing a good alert plan, I was able to allow the majority of my Soldiers to rest in their fighting positions with only two pairs of Soldiers
effectively monitoring the EA and the avenues of approach leading to it. Adding two more Soldiers for rear security and an NCO for C2, I was left with two-thirds of my platoon on rest.

To facilitate my Commander’s specified end-state of no enemy armor permitted north of my position, I wanted to create an obstacle along the high-speed avenue of approach that ran through our EA. The main road leading into the EA was lined with ten-foot high, concrete walls. Destroying a vehicle while between the walls would block the avenue. Engagement priority went to the lead vehicle and then either the trail vehicle or fourth vehicle, whichever came first. The former was to be destroyed while still between the concrete walls. Before I moved the entire platoon into position, my Platoon Sergeant, SFC Irwin, and I conducted reconnaissance of the area, confirming the fields of fire and planning the positions of the two Bradley Fighting Vehicles and two Infantry squads that would be positioned there. In the back of my track, I also brought two Infantry squad leaders and a Javelin team.

Shortly after arriving at the site, with everyone still mounted on the vehicles, my Platoon Sergeant made a quick report of a vehicle in the EA “right now,” and I watched as a TOW2-B impacted a T-72 at the edge of a line of brush. Having already seen numerous destroyed tanks, I knew the one in front of us was still intact because of the small impact the missile had made. SFC Irwin fired a second TOW2-B with the same effects, and I immediately ordered my gunner to fire a missile as well. The two TOW2-Bs fired from SFC Irwin’s track had properly detonated above the tank and shot straight down into it, but there was no explosion or fire. The TOW2-B fired from my track had malfunctioned, and, even with my gunner’s hand still squeezing the hand station, it flew off high into the air and was gone. At the first report of enemy armor, I had dismounted the Javelin Team and squad leaders. After
having fired three TOW2-Bs with no obvious effect on the T-72, the Javelin team was now ready, and it engaged the tank.

Having never before been close behind a Javelin when it was fired, I was surprised to see the steep flight path of the missile. My first inclination was that it too had malfunctioned, but I quickly saw the rocket come screaming down on top of the T-72, and, with grave destruction, the tank was eliminated. The T-72 driver never moved or even traversed his turret. I believe that the vehicle was either abandoned or disabled upon impact of the first TOW2-B. My platoon-minus occupied the ambush position as planned and remained there for two days with no further contact with armored vehicles.

*From the personal experience monograph of 1LT James A. Horn who served as 1st Platoon Leader, Alpha Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry, 3rd Infantry Division, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.*

**DISCUSSION:** Besides illustrating the lethality of the Javelin, 1LT Horn’s vignette demonstrates the importance of seeing ourselves, the enemy, and the terrain.

Understanding that all the elements of METT-TC influence or impact each other during mission analysis is crucial to COA development. Ultimately, these factors determined the terrain 1LT Horn selected to defend. A few of the considerations 1LT Horn factored in about the troops available were the fatigue level of his Soldiers, his mission requirements, and the capabilities of his weapon systems.

During prolonged periods of continuous operations, leaders must understand the impact of fatigue on the Soldiers’ ability to perform even simple tasks. 1LT Horn identified the lowered readiness level of his troops and factored that into the planning process, resulting in a reduced sector but allowing him to
implement a rest plan. Through this effective use of terrain, he was able to ease the strain on his Soldiers while still maintaining the ability to complete his assigned mission.

His terrain analysis determined the enemy avenues of approach. He then identified the site along the avenue that provided both stand-off and a restrictive enemy mobility corridor. While building his engagement area (EA), he identified the need for an obstacle effect to slow enemy forces in the EA. Often times, austere engineer support may not allow for dedicated obstacles effort. In this instance, 1LT Horn identified the effect he needed and determined the best way to achieve that effect with resources on hand: the hulk of the first enemy vehicle at a specific location. LT Horn did an excellent job of seeing himself, the enemy, and especially the terrain.

On 21 July 2003, an informant had gone to American forces, claiming to be housing Saddam’s two sons in an affluent section of northeast Mosul. The informant, a cousin of Saddam Hussein’s, claimed that both sons had been living on the second floor of his house, located in a neighborhood in the city of Mosul, with seven bodyguards while they waited on passports so they could flee to Syria. Several hours later, members of the elite Special Operations unit, Task Force 20 (TF20), arrived at the 3rd Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment’s tactical operation center (TOC) in northeastern Mosul. The commander of the TF20 element began discussing a potential mission involving forty operators from TF20 and forces from 3rd Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment, Task Force Battle Force. The two commanders, along with the staff of Battle Force, began to plan a raid on high-value targets number two and three on the V Corps “Black List.”
At 0900 hrs. on 22 July 2003, the two TF commanders decided to execute the planned raid. Throughout the night, subordinate leaders had been summoned to the TF Battle Force TOC to receive course of action briefings for their portion of the raid. Charlie Company, 3rd of the 327th Infantry Regiment, was tasked to provide a platoon of Soldiers to man the northern side of the objective and prevent anyone from leaving or entering the objective. Delta Company, 3rd of the 327th Infantry Regiment, was tasked to provide gun-trucks at each of the six battle positions that surrounded the objective and formed the inner cordon. A squad from Bravo Company, 3rd of the 327th Infantry Regiment, was tasked to provide drivers for TF20 as it rode into its initial positions outside of the target house. A Military Police platoon was tasked to provide crowd control and establish the outer cordon.

Since the intelligence gathered on the two sons stated that seven bodyguards were with them at all times, the U.S. forces
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suspected that they would have observation posts established to monitor any coalition traffic approaching the house with the two sons in it. This would require a nearly simultaneous occupation of all six inner cordon battle positions as TF20 moved into its initial position outside the target house. Multiple routes were planned for the different elements based on a synchronized occupation of battle positions from all sides. Based on time-distance analysis, each moving element had a different trigger for initiating its movement to its position. Each element established its positions immediately after the TF20 element moved into its initial position. TF20 moved to the objective in several different vehicles, and once the operators were at the objective, they began moving by foot to different portions of the building in 3-5 man teams. TF20 snipers occupied three firing positions south of the house, but no one initiated fire. I was with the Battalion Commander at the battle position 150m south of the target house, with one of the TF20 snipers.

The TF Battle Force Commander received the occupation of battle position brevity codes from each position and notified the TF20 Commander. The well-orchestrated movements of many moving pieces then froze in place. The TF20 interpreter, using a bull-horn, told the persons inside the house to surrender because they were surrounded. The owner of the house, the informant, and his family, made it outside and into the custody of the U.S. forces. The men inside the house responded with shots aimed at the various battle positions around them. The hopes of a non-violent surrender were shattered with each round that pierced the cinder blocks providing protection for the U.S. Soldiers around the house.

TF20 went into the execution of the breach and assault on the house. From the inner cordon, TF20 requested that the TF Battle Force suppress, with small arms fire, the second floor of
the house. Once inside of the house, the operators realized that a central stairway was the only way to the second floor, where the four men easily maintained a wall of lead. With only one access point to the second floor, it was very easy for the four men upstairs to repel each assault by TF20. After the first assault was repelled and two members of TF20 were wounded, the TF20 Commander requested that the inner cordon use small arms and .50 caliber weapons mounted on the gun trucks from the southern battle position. The TF Battle Force Soldiers at the southern battle position had also received rounds from within the house and were more than happy to be cleared to fire at any moving object on the second floor.

Now that the inner cordon was providing suppression, the TF20 assault element again attempted to gain access to the second floor and again ran into the same withering wall of lead as before. Several more TF20 Soldiers were wounded in the second attempt to take the upstairs floor. The TF20 assault team pulled back again, and several teams began to move along the street outside the house to a neighbor’s house. The teams quickly moved onto the roof by climbing up from the outside of the house. The TF20 Soldiers’ level of fitness to accomplish this feat was nothing short of amazing. Once on the roof of the neighbor’s house, they began climbing and jumping from rooftop to rooftop until they made their way onto the target house’s rooftop. The rooftop teams tried in vain to find a way into the second floor from the roof. However, through their internal communications, a TF20 Soldier would lean over the edge of the roof and designate for the inner cordon Soldiers of TF Battle Force rooms at which to shoot. With a controlled and escalated response, the inner cordon, at the request of the TF20 Commander, began increasing the caliber and volume of suppressing fire into the second floor. Gun-trucks from TF Battle Force, along with Soldiers at the Battle Positions, began
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firing MK-19, .50 caliber, and machine gun fire into the second floor.

TF20 had sustained several casualties from the initial two assaults and requested a casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) of their wounded Soldiers from TF Battle Force. When the call came over the radio, the TF Battle Force medics were too far away from the fight to provide a rapid response, so the TF Battle Force Commander asked for someone to volunteer for the CASEVAC. An officer, an NCO, an enlisted man from Delta Company, and I volunteered for the mission. We moved from the southern Battle Position through the open street to the gate of the house and picked up two wounded TF20 Soldiers, placed them into a HMMWV, and drove them north to a house that was secured by Soldiers from Charlie Company. The TF20 Soldiers hydrated and provided expert self-aid to their injuries and were soon trying to influence the fight again in spite of their wounds.

Immediately after the CASEVAC team got the TF20 Soldiers to a secure location, the TF Battle Force Commander initiated fire onto the second floor with the first of eighteen TOW missiles. Due to the high volume of fire and the large caliber of the weapons, the rounds began to penetrate through the target house and into two more houses immediately to the north of the target house. In such a dense urban area, the impact of the rounds from the southern battle positions was now affecting several of the battle positions to the north of the target house. I was in the street, near the two injured TF20 Soldiers, when I started to hear rounds crack over my head. I could not figure out where they were coming from to return fire; then I saw that it was .50 caliber rounds from my original battle position coming through the target house and through the house I was near, north of the target house. To avoid fratricide, the Charlie Company Commander repositioned his platoon
inside the courtyard and in the ground floor of a house that was under construction north of the target house. The impact of the TOW could be felt two houses north of the target house as the TOW rounds penetrated through the house and continued into the homes directly north of the target house.

After eighteen TOW rounds and thousands of rounds of 5.56mm, 7.62mm, and .50 caliber, the fourth and final assault achieved its goal of entering the second floor. On the final assault, a fourteen year-old boy upstairs, grandson of Saddam, was still firing a weapon from under a mattress. Members of the assault team shot and killed the boy as they assaulted through the second floor.

All four men upstairs had been killed, and their bodies were carried downstairs to a waiting vehicle and then on to helicopter back to Baghdad for autopsy reports and forensic dental and blood work to match DNA to those of Uday and Qusay Hussein. Security forces were brought in to secure the site of the raid to ensure that no riots or violence were started by the indigenous population over the death of the two sons of Saddam Hussein. The relative of Saddam who turned in the two sons to the U.S. forces was taken back to TF Battle Force’s TOC to await his link-up with CIA handlers. The informant did not seem to mind that his home had been completely demolished from the fighting that day; he was all smiles as he planned how to spend his thirty million dollar reward. Later that evening, General Sanchez officially announced the news that the two bodies were, in fact, the two sons of Saddam Hussein.

From the personal experience monograph by CPT C. Quay Barnett, who served as a scout platoon leader and Battalion S-1 in 3-327th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.
DISCUSSION: This vignette demonstrates important aspects of several doctrinal concepts: encirclement techniques, the task to support by fire, direct fire suppression, and weapons effects.

The fugitive Hussein brothers and their small security element certainly typified the elusive leader cells of a fledgling insurgency as they attempted to avoid capture, while spreading subversion and enlisting support for future guerilla tactics. Moving from one temporary site to another, they were avoiding direct contact and defensive actions of any kind. The counterinsurgency tactic of encirclement, executed in text book fashion by TF20, is designed to cut off all ground routes for escape and reinforcement of an encircled insurgent force. It offers the best possibility for fixing insurgent forces in position and for achieving decisive results. The outer and inner cordons in the TF20 plan certainly achieved this purpose.

More problematic during execution of the operation was the reduction of the encirclement in the face of desperate acts by the isolated fugitives. Doctrine further tells us that the capture or destruction of the trapped insurgent force is methodical and thorough. Fire and maneuver are used together in a controlled contraction of the encirclement. The assault force alone had difficulty achieving adequate suppression within the building to allow the force to clear the objective. The TF20 commander properly adjusted his plan and used part of his inner cordon force to provide suppressive fires to support the continued efforts of the assault force. The assault force was able to methodically control the location, caliber, and volume of the suppressive fires of the support-by-fire element to eventually seize and clear the entire objective.

Although the assault on the building occupied by Uday and Qusay was an obvious tactical success, the conduct of the operation also risked possible fratricide and led to significant
collateral damage. The commanders on the ground eventually employed overwhelming firepower to destroy the enemy in the building but, in doing so, also failed to adequately account for the dense urban battlespace that good terrain analysis affords. The increased penetration of the thousands of .50 caliber rounds and 18 TOW missiles against a heavy-clad framed building proved more than sufficient and was actually tactically risky. The kinetic effects of these rounds completely penetrated the structure, impacting other friendly units nearby (C/3-327 IN) and causing increased collateral damage to the surrounding urban area.

As our doctrine on urban terrain indicates, “the risks of friendly fires, ricochets, and fratricide must be considered during the planning phase of operations, and control measures must be adjusted to lower the risks…the enclosed nature of combat means that weapons’ effects, including muzzle blast and back-blast, must be considered as well as the round’s impact on the target.” (FM 3-06.11) As the plan adjusted out of situational necessity, better direct fire control measures and a better understanding of the munitions effects on the terrain were needed by all units and commanders involved.

In November, 2003, the 3d Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) deployed to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. After a month of downloading and prepping equipment in Kuwait, 3d SBCT moved to FOB Pacesetter in central Iraq. At FOB Pacesetter, 3d SBCT prepped for combat operations in the city of Samarra. The 3d SBCT and a brigade from 4th Infantry Division split the city of Samarra, with 3d SBCT’s sector further split between two of its battalions: 5-20 Infantry and 1-23 Infantry. These operations were supposed to last only a few days. U.S. forces were to conduct several raids to capture
or kill noncompliant forces and Saddam loyalists. Other U.S. forces had met stiff resistance in Samarra; thus, 1-23 IN planned for the worst as it got ready for operations in a city that had been dubbed the “wild west.”

The 1-23 IN had a series of targets. It assigned B and C Co the highest priority targets within the series for the first night of operations. Battalion kept A Co in reserve should B or C Co uncover intelligence on its objectives that needed to be targeted by a company-sized element. C Co’s target was Aziz Abas, code-named Abigail, a high ranking Ba’ath party official and leader of a terrorist cell.

The day prior to the Battalion departing FOB Pacesetter and moving to Samarra, the Reconnaissance Platoon reconnoitered the routes and objectives. After several days’ postponement, possibly due to Saddam’s capture, the battalion departed FOB Pacesetter in the afternoon of 16 December. A recon section guided the two lead companies to their assault positions outside of Samarra, and then the companies waited until dark.

For this raid, C Co task organized its platoons as such: 1st Platoon was the isolation platoon; 2nd Platoon was the reserve; 3rd Platoon was the assault platoon; and the MGS Platoon, with the company sniper team, was the overwatch platoon. The 2nd Platoon’s priorities for planning were first to reinforce the assault platoon and then to assault Objective Copper, a house a few blocks away that possibly contained non-compliant forces. The MGS platoon was overwatching the large open area just to the west of the objective while the sniper team overwatched the rooftops around the objective.

At 0200 hrs. on 17 December, C Co departed its assault position and moved into Samarra. The company initiated the raid on Objective Cobalt, Abigail’s house, by plowing through
the gate with the Company’s Engineer Stryker Vehicle (ESV). By the time the ESV had backed out of the gate, the assault platoon’s Infantry squads had dismounted and moved through the broken gate. Simultaneously, the isolation platoon dismounted and moved to its blocking positions and isolated the block. Also, the company snipers and MGS platoon assumed overwatch positions in the vicinity of an abandoned school. The snipers took up a position on top of the school to overwatch the roofs near the target house, and the MGS platoon oriented south to overwatch a large open area.

The majority of the company’s Strykers picked up the racetrack after dismounting the Infantry squads. The racetrack was a series of blocks that the vehicles could drive around. Thus, the vehicles would not be easy targets because they would not be stationary or massed together. For contingencies, the company had a “911” package that could recover vehicles, casualties, or EPWs. The package consisted of the XO’s Stryker, the medical Stryker, and the two mortar carriers. Mortars could not fire into the town, so the mortarmen were the vehicle recovery team and the EPW handlers. Additionally, one of the MGS platoon’s vehicles would join the “911” package to provide additional security. The reserve platoon stayed mounted while the Strykers drove the racetrack. Thus, should the company’s Strykers come into contact, a rifle platoon could target that contact.

Once inside the gate, the assault platoon breached the front door with a shotgun and then began to clear the house and look for Abigail. They found him still in bed; thus, detaining him was very easy. With the target detained and the house cleared, the assault platoon began to search the house with the help of the engineer squad. Their search found nothing out of the ordinary. Upon completion of the search, the company exfiltrated in the following order: the 911 package, the assault
platoon, the overwatch platoon, the reserve, and then the isolation platoon. The C/1-23 IN’s raid on 17 December 2004 was successful. The man it detained was Aziz Abas.

*From the personal experience of 1LT Vince Kaster, who served as Executive Officer, C/1-23 IN, 3rd SBCT, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.*

**DISCUSSION:** C/1-23 IN’s actions in the raid at Samarra highlight excellent urban terrain analysis and the application of those deductions about terrain to the friendly plan. The vignette begs the question: why not use these awesome Stryker vehicles to provide their support (firepower and mobility) to the objective area? The answer is that the urban terrain analysis conducted by the commander indicated that the streets were too narrow, the fields of fire too restrictive, and the objective too small for more than just the two dismounted Infantry platoons (isolation and assault).

Having conducted a thorough urban analysis and a good COA development, the commander knew his understanding of the terrain and his task organization was appropriate. The question then became what to do with the vehicle sections and the reserve. The commander’s answer, for the security of those forces and immediate response to the objective as required, was the racetrack.

By keeping those forces doing “laps” around specified city blocks, he prevented them becoming a stationary target for enemy forces, kept them near the objective area to provide the support required to the main effort (nesting), and maintained command and control over his separated forces. In the troop leading procedures process, identifying and planning all of this would have occurred during COA analysis.
This vignette highlights how a commander takes a significant deduction from terrain analysis, applies it throughout the TLP, and turns a possible disadvantage into a successful piece of his course of action.

CONCLUSION: Units are successful when they use the terrain to their advantage, and that can only occur with a thorough analysis of the battlespace in which they will fight. Only through this analysis can the leader plan his fires, place his forces, and determine their movement. Furthermore, although friendly forces can never know the disposition of the enemy they face, an effective analysis of the terrain and how it affects the enemy will give the leader a picture of the enemy upon which to base his plan.
CHAPTER 5: Reconnaissance

Agitate the enemy and ascertain the pattern of his movement. Determine his dispositions and so ascertain the field of battle. Probe him and learn where his strength is abundant and where deficient.

Sun Tzu
The Art of War, vi, c. 500 BC

INTRODUCTION: “The side possessing better information and using that information more effectively to gain understanding has a major advantage over its opponent.” (FM3-0) Although the U.S. forces, by merit of their technological superiority, may enjoy the advantage in surveillance assets, those assets must be complemented with aggressive and continuous reconnaissance to ensure timely and accurate intelligence.

Every commander has unique information and intelligence requirements specific to his operation. Commanders can gain information on the enemy through a variety of means, but we continue to see that the information gathered by reconnaissance units—the commander’s “eyes on the ground”—provide the most specific and relevant information. Reconnaissance units begin their operations as early as possible to collect information not only on the enemy, but also the terrain, and they continue to provide timely and accurate information throughout the tactical operation. This information enables situational understanding, further enabling appropriate and decisive tactics.

In 1992, President Bush ordered the U.S. Marines to Mogadishu, Somalia, to facilitate the distribution of relief supplies. The 10th Mountain replaced the Marines, and in
April, 1993, the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division arrived in Somalia. With the murder of 22 Pakistani peacekeepers on 5 June by pro-Aideed forces, the focus of 10th Mountain changed from humanitarian relief to combat operations. One such operation was to seize and destroy all ordnance and any radio retrans equipment within a radio relay compound to prevent Aideed from transmitting negative propaganda within the city and, using that propaganda to incite violent riots within Mogadishu. The writer served as a squad leader for 1st Squad, Scout Platoon.

The plan was for my squad to insert to an LZ about 2000 meters from the objective by Blackhawk at approximately 0100 hrs. on 12 June with 3rd Squad and the PL. My squad would infiltrate south 2500 meters, drop the Platoon Leader at a central CP along the way, and then continue to move into our southern surveillance position. The mission for my squad was three-fold: first, to recon for and establish the landing zone for First Platoon, Alpha Company, the assault element; second, to recon and find the route for Alpha Company from the LZ to an entry point into the compound; third, to ensure the route was free of mines (intelligence stated that mines were present).

During our mission planning and rehearsal phase, I had the opportunity to do an actual aerial reconnaissance of the compound and infiltration route. It was then that I realized that the portion of the objective I was to observe and into which I was to guide 1st Platoon, A Co, did not have a hole for the assault element to enter. The actual terrain model depicted a hole in the eight-foot compound wall that the assault element would assault through to gain a foothold. I disproved this during the aerial recon, so I talked to the Platoon Leader and
told him that there was no hole in the wall. He insisted there was and disregarded my information.

Having to go over the wall, instead of through it, could expose the assault element to a waiting and eager enemy and would slow the tempo of the raid. However, the other options were to blow a hole with demo or AT-4s and lose the element of surprise or to enter through the front gate, likely meeting a waiting enemy. Going over the wall was the least risky way to maintain surprise.

After landing at our LZ, the squad moved out on the route to the objective. During movement, we stopped at a major road that we had to cross en-route to the objective. When we stopped short in some coarse thorn bushes and prepared to cross the linear danger area, we heard voices speaking in Somali coming down the road. I gave the hand and arm signal for freeze as the voices got closer, thinking that some combatant Somalis were coming toward the LZ where they heard the landing Blackhawk. I then saw the glow of a cigarette in my NODs and smelled the odor. Neither of the two men had weapons, and they kept walking down the road in the opposite direction of the objective. We came close but did not get compromised, and we still had to move 2200 meters through a shantytown-desert scrub gauntlet to our surveillance overwatch position.

On our route, we came across a cluster of about three small shanty-type buildings with a donkey and stray dogs outside the structures. I stopped and looked for ways to bypass this danger area. The problem was that various rows of impenetrable thorn hedges as tall as a man surrounded this shanty area. I decided to bypass to the left where the way appeared to be easier, and we moved quickly in a five-man file, avoiding the thorn hedges. We did not see any more activity on our movement into position. The next task I had was to find a good LZ on
which to land the assault element. We then needed to clear the route from the LZ and find the best place for the assault to go up and over the wall, checking for mines. Finding the LZ was easy because the whole area was relatively flat and sandy except for some sporadic clumps of scrub like the one I selected to halt behind for concealment. I then sent SGT Davidson to look for an entry point along the wall.

SGT Davidson went up to the wall and then reported seeing no mines, but he had found a place where there was a mound of dirt piled up against the wall, making it only about five feet from the top of the wall and easy to scale. SGT Davidson looked over the wall to see if there was anything that would hinder the assault force from establishing a foothold on the far side. He called back and said it was about the best place to go over the wall. With the route cleared, the point of entry confirmed, and the LZ selected, I called Battalion with the eight-digit grid to the LZ. I reiterated the fact that the assault element would have to go over the wall and that we had found a good place to scale it. Once First Platoon landed, I physically linked up with SFC McDowell and linked him up with SGT Davidson who guided them up to the wall for entry into the compound. The time from landing until the entire assault element was over the wall was about five minutes.

From the personal experience monograph by CPT Rick Storm, who served as a Recon squad leader in 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: In this summary of the actions of 1-22 Infantry, we see the importance of reconnaissance during the ‘preparation phase’ of offensive operations. At the company level, this phase includes the planning and issuing of orders,
the preparation of personnel and equipment, and the conduct of rehearsals. Another task, usually generated through the commander’s warning order, is the conduct of reconnaissance. This reconnaissance is focused on obtaining information about the enemy or the terrain and, specifically, on information critical to the attack.

The reconnaissance squad’s mission required three tasks to be achieved that would facilitate the assault forces’ landing and movement to and seizure of the compound. Using these forces, the commander was able to maximize the Principle of War—Surprise—while also maintaining Security (another Principle) for his forces. Likewise, Security remained an important factor for the reconnaissance forces themselves, as remaining undetected to achieve their tasks enabled the resulting operation to be successful.

Another lesson we can take is the importance of ground reconnaissance. Doctrine states that ‘a ground reconnaissance effort is essential if the mission is to conduct detailed reconnaissance of the route and the terrain around the route.’ (FM 3-90, Tactics) In this example, had the assault leaders’ original information—that there was a hole in the compound fence—not been confirmed or denied by the reconnaissance, the operation may well have lacked the surprise and security that were important to its success.

On 22 March 2003, the 3d BCT, 3ID, attacked to seize Objective Rams, an area south of Najaf, to secure it for use as a logistics support area. To support the attack, V Corps inserted LRS teams to conduct reconnaissance.

Despite all of the planning, not all insertions go as planned. SSG Peter D. Armstrong’s surveillance team, Team 1-2, E/165th MI BN, was one of three teams inserted for the
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campaign. Bedoin dogs compromised the team soon after its insertion into central Iraq. After the dogs followed the team to its secondary site, the team quickly moved to its tertiary site and went to ground.

As an example of how disciplined the Soldiers are and how effective their hide techniques are, SSG Armstrong’s team spent over 48 hours in an 18-inch hole with a sheet covering six Soldiers. Iraqis were actively searching for them, coming as close as ten feet away. SSG Armstrong lay flat on his back, peering through a small hole in the camouflaged sheet with his weapon tracking the Iraqi leader who was looking for them. Once the Iraqis moved off, the team exfiltrated to an alternate extraction site and were picked up safely.

From a 1 June 03 interview with LTC Robert P. Walters Jr., Commander, 165th Military Intelligence Battalion, included in the OIF Study Group publication On Point, Ch 4, pg 163.

DISCUSSION: SSG Peter D. Armstrong’s surveillance team was successful in avoiding detection by the enemy in preparation for the 3rd ID attack of Najaf because it thoroughly applied the fundamentals of reconnaissance in accordance with FM 7-92, The Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon and Squad. It is clear that the LRS commander effectively briefed his teams on the engagement criteria and risk acceptance for this mission. The illustration shows the engagement decision process applied by SSG Armstrong’s team. The first engagement decision required by the team involved the dogs. Did the team need to destroy the dogs in self-defense? Certainly, the team could have shot the dogs and moved to an alternative position, but SSG Armstrong was aware that this engagement could have compromised his team and alerted Iraqi forces in the area. SSG Armstrong chose not to engage but instead to move to his
alternative and tertiary site. It was in this tertiary site that SSG Armstrong again had to apply the engagement decision process to determine if he should engage the Iraqi force searching for his team. SSG Armstrong organized and prepared his forces and then positioned to defend if necessary. This action allowed him to defend his force but did not compromise his mission to support the 3rd ID.

In the months following the conclusion of major combat operations, U.S. forces assumed a variety of missions, from hunting down terrorists to stability and support operations.
to assisting the Iraqis in setting up governments and standing the new Iraqi Army.

On 26 February 2004, my company commander assigned me the mission of conducting a detailed reconnaissance of a bomb maker’s house in Mosul, Iraq. I was the Company Executive Officer, and I planned and executed all sniper missions with my sniper section. My sniper section leader was SGT Joseph Brown. His shooter was SPC Carlos Garcia, and his spotter was SPC Bill Hansen. SGT Brown and SPC Hansen were Sniper School qualified, and the entire team was very good at target interdiction and reconnaissance missions. The mission would require them to infiltrate, undercover, during hours of limited visibility to the house of a known bomb maker and conduct a detailed reconnaissance of the target house, which would include taking detailed footage of the house with a night vision camera. This was an extremely difficult and dangerous task because the house was in the middle of Mosul, a very large city.

I went through a quick but detailed mission analysis and determined that I would need a Stryker Infantry platoon to support this mission as a quick reaction force. The difficulty would be to infiltrate the sniper team close enough to the objective to minimize the distance from the support unit but also far enough away to prevent compromise. I finally decided that I would use 3rd Platoon as the infiltration and quick reaction force for my snipers. The primary reason for using 3rd Platoon was that it was going to be the one to assault the objective the day after we conducted the reconnaissance. This would allow its platoon leader, LT Paul Blanton, an early look at the target house.

The plan was to depart from the Forward Operating Base (FOB) Marez at 260100FEB03 and drop the snipers off in an
abandoned lot that was obscured from the target area. This lot was one km northwest of the target house. I then set up a small tactical assembly area in this abandoned lot with 3rd Platoon. The snipers moved to the target house along a small side street that did not have any activity on it. They moved in buddy teams, always maintaining good overwatch of each other. They moved silently and used the dark areas of the streets to hide their movement.

Once they had identified the target house, SPC Hansen and SPC Garcia set up an overwatch position of the target house. SPC Garcia used the night vision optics on his M24 sniper rifle to provide security for the reconnaissance element. They observed the house for 15 minutes to ensure that there was no activity in the house. Everyone was asleep in the house, so they determined it was safe to proceed with the reconnaissance. They called me back at the tactical assembly area, and I gave them the go ahead for the reconnaissance. SGT Brown and LT Blanton moved in to take detailed video footage of the target house. LT Blanton went along to get a detailed look at the house, but SGT Brown was in charge of the actual reconnaissance. SGT Brown used the digital video camera with night vision capability to film the front gate, the inside of the courtyard, all the outside doors, and the accesses to the roof. The actual reconnaissance only took 15 minutes.

When the reconnaissance was complete, SGT Brown called me and said he was moving back to the tactical assembly area. The entire force then moved back to the FOB and delivered the video tape to my Company Commander, CPT Robert Robinson. I conducted a detailed debriefing with the sniper team and provided this information to my Company Commander and 3rd Platoon. The next night, we conducted a raid, and 3rd Platoon captured the bomb maker. The video footage of the target house provided the detail the platoon
needed to conduct a successful raid. The 3\textsuperscript{rd} Platoon was able to assault the house from the top floor and the bottom floor simultaneously. The Soldiers used a water impulse charge to breach the outer gate and the outside door on the roof. This technique enabled them to dominate the house quickly and prevent the bomb maker from putting up any resistance. The bomb maker was captured without a shot being fired.

*From the personal experience of 1LT Benjamin D. Tiffner, who served as Executive Officer, Bravo Company, 1\textsuperscript{st} Battalion, 23\textsuperscript{rd} Infantry, 2d Infantry Division, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.*

**DISCUSSION:** 1LT Tiffner’s sniper section reconnaissance in Mosul is an example of using a sniper asset to perform a sniper’s secondary mission: reconnaissance. In this case, the sniper section executed an area reconnaissance of a suspected bomb maker’s house in Mosul. The snipers performed well, and the subsequent raid, executed by B/1-23 IN (SBCT), resulted in the capture of the bomb maker.

Snipers, primarily used to deliver long-range precision fire, can adequately and accurately perform zone, area, and route recons if properly trained to do so. This mission’s success supports the argument for unit commanders to become knowledgeable about sniper employment and to trust their sniper team’s capabilities. Well-employed sniper teams are combat multipliers to the company and battalion commanders who know how to plan and use them.

**In April and May of 2004, Coalition Forces (CF) fought and won several costly victories in Fallujah, taking heavy casualties in the process. Since then, Coalition Forces had essentially contained enemy forces in this key enemy strong**
point, with only limited forays into the actual city. In November, 2004, 1st Marine Division (1 MAR DIV) assigned 1st Regimental Combat Team (RCT 1) to be the main effort for the attack to destroy the terrorist forces in western Fallujah. A mechanized Infantry task force, formed around the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment (TF 2-7 CAV), of the 1st Cavalry Division, was tasked to support RCT 1 as the main effort in the attack to regain control of Fallujah.

Reconnaissance and surveillance showed that the terrorists had developed a three-layered defense in the city of Fallujah and planned to execute a mobile defense, much as they had in April, 2004. The Jolan District on the western side of the city, along the banks of the Euphrates River, appeared to be the enemy’s primary defenses. The RCT 1 intelligence officers determined that the Jolan Park was the enemy’s key assembly area and command and control node to which they planned to withdraw and deploy defenders throughout the city. Based on the decisive value of this terrain to the enemy, RCT 1 tasked TF 2-7 CAV to seize this terrain to prevent the enemy from using it.

Upon receipt of the mission, the Task Force Staff began analyzing the mission and providing the commander with various courses of action. Ultimately, the commander chose to execute a frontal attack on the Jolan Park, supported, if necessary, by an armored company penetration to attack from the east. The risk of the frontal attack was seen as acceptable due to the limited enemy presence anticipated on the objective during the initial stages of the battle. Furthermore, as the RCT main effort, TF 2-7 CAV had priority of fires, ensuring that preparatory fires would be available to shape the battlefield.
All of these mitigating factors combined to reduce the risk of a frontal attack to an acceptable level.

On the evening of 8 November, Team A/2-7 CAV (consisting of 1st and 2nd Platoons of A/2-7 CAV, augmented by tanks from 3rd Platoon of C/3-8 CAV) staged in its attack position in Assembly Area Otter. Earlier that afternoon, Apache 6, CPT Ed Twaddell, the Commander of A/2-7 CAV, conducted a short leader’s reconnaissance of the breach site with the Task Force Commander and 2LT Mike Duran, the Team’s lead platoon leader (2/A/2-7 CAV). This reconnaissance proved to be invaluable, as later, in the darkness, the winding approach lane to the breach would be exceptionally challenging to navigate. The reconnaissance also served as a route rehearsal for the approach to the breach. Upon returning to the assembly area from the reconnaissance, Apache Company established positions along the perimeter to provide the battalion with 360-degree security. Once it was set, the company conducted final preparations for combat.
Throughout the day and into the evening, the Marines conducted preparatory fires into the city. These fires began in earnest around 1830 and included fixed wing aviation (AC130 gunships), attack helicopters, and heavy artillery. Forces arrayed north of the city watched as F-15s soared overhead, turned, and flew out of sight, followed by the distant rumble of their exploding bombs. The 155mm howitzers from Camp Fallujah fired numerous missions, using variable timed fuses (VT) for airbursts to clear the rooftops along primary attack routes. TF 2-7 CAV’s Mortar Platoon began firing missions prior to midnight, launching 120mm high explosive projectiles into the city, two and three at a time.

TF 2-7 CAV attacked into Fallujah early on the morning of 9 November 2004. Team C/3-8 CAV led the Task Force through the breach cut through the railroad tracks north of Fallujah and onto Phase Line APRIL (PL APRIL), the city’s outer ring road. Team A passed through the breach at approximately 0100 hrs. The Task Force Commander ensured that Team A did not begin movement towards the breach until Team C/3-8 CAV had cleared the breach lane with its last vehicle and had turned east onto PL APRIL, towards its assault position. Once that occurred, CPT Twaddell gave 2LT Duran the order to begin movement. The order of march was simple: 2/A/2-7 followed by 3/C/3-8 (led by 2LT Matt Wojcik), followed in trail by 1/A/2-7 (led by 2LT Dan Kilgore), with the company headquarters element (the Commander, CPT Twaddell; the Company Executive Officer, 1LT Hank Wiley; the Company Fire Support Officer, 1LT Demetrius Parrott; and the company’s M113 ambulance, carrying 1SG Steven Vigil) moving between 3/C/3-8 and 1/A/2-7. The company passed through the breach without incident and turned east onto PL APRIL.
As the Task Force began its attack, shaping fires were employed within the constraints of the current Rules of Engagement (ROE). During this battle, the ROE required positive identification of enemy forces within a structure before indirect or aerial delivered fires could engage the building. The Task Force Tactical Operations Center (TOC) oriented the Battalion’s Raven Unmanned-Aerial Vehicle (UAV) to identify enemy locations within the Jolan Park. Once these positions were identified, preparatory fires from AC-130 gunships and 155mm howitzers (again using VT fuzes to clear exposed rooftop positions and minimize collateral damage) were brought in on these positions. These fires shaped the battlefield for Team A’s subsequent attack.

Once Team A was arrayed along PL APRIL, the platoons moved to their assault positions and prepared to advance through the city from north to south, towards the Jolan Park, designated Objective (OBJ) PENNSYLVANIA. En route to OBJ PENNSYLVANIA, the Task Force had designated a series of march objectives, each named after a State, allowing the Task Force Commander to focus his companies on templated enemy positions to ensure the destruction of enemy forces north of the Battalions’ primary objective. The Commander arrayed his company with tanks in the middle, 1st Platoon on the west, and 3rd Platoon on the east, linked in with Team C/3-8 CAV on its eastern flank. The 1st Platoon was oriented down RTE JACOB, but in reality that route served as a western limit to its axis of advance.

CPT Twaddell had tasked 2LT Kilgore’s platoon with suppressing enemy forces on OBJ VERMONT to prevent the enemy from enveloping the western flank of the tank platoon. The 3/C/3-8 was oriented on RTE ISAAC as the Team’s Main Effort, and CPT Twaddell instructed 2LT Wojcik to destroy enemy forces on OBJs VERMONT and NEW HAMPSHIRE to
enable the attack of 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines (3/1 MAR). The 2nd Platoon attacked south as well, utilizing RTE HENRY as its left handrail, preventing 2d Platoon from moving into Team C/3-8 CAV’s fields of fire. Apache 6 also ordered 2nd Platoon to suppress any enemy forces on OBJ NEW HAMPSHIRE to prevent the envelopment of 3/C/3-8 from the east. The Team’s mission was two-fold: to destroy enemy forces enroute to the OBJ PENNSYLVANIA to allow 3/1 MAR to pass follow unhindered and then to seize OBJ PENNSYLVANIA to enable the attack of 3/1 MAR into the heart of the Jolan District.

On order from the Task Force Commander, the Apaches began their advance to the south. They moved slowly. The 1st Platoon was slowed by the very narrow and winding streets that emerged from the “Old City” to its west that snaked through this area, forcing the Platoon to move in column, separating into sections to allow overwatch of the lead element. CPT Twaddell had deliberately placed 3/C/3-8 on the fastest, widest, and most direct route to OBJ PENNSYLVANIA (RTE ISAAC) to allow it to move south quickly and, thus, if necessary, bring the tanks’ firepower to bear very quickly on the decisive point. The 2nd Platoon also had a fairly high-speed and direct avenue of approach to OBJ PENNSYLVANIA although the small alleys and narrow roads in the zone of attack also canalized it to some extent. As the Team moved south into the city, it made light contact. As a result, it was ordered to hold in place and conduct survivability moves as it approached PL CATHY, immediately north of OBJ PENNSYLVANIA. The 3/1 MAR’s movement was slower than expected, and the Battalion Commander did not want to leave space between the two battalions that might allow the enemy the opportunity to isolate the force and attack it piecemeal or to lie in wait for the Marine infantry. The Apaches held their positions for approximately three hours, and
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during that time, both First and Second platoons engaged several RPG teams with coaxial machine guns, killing approximately eight insurgents who had come out in the darkness to test their abilities.

As dawn broke on 9 November, Team A received orders to begin its assault of OBJ PENNSYLVANIA. While planning the attack, CPT Twaddell had divided OBJ PENNSYLVANIA in half, designating the two sub-objectives as PENNSYLVANIA WEST and PENNSYLVANIA EAST. He tasked 1st Platoon to conduct a deliberate clearance of the buildings on PENNSYLVANIA WEST to seize the park as a whole. Apache 6 viewed the early seizure of OBJ PENNSYLVANIA WEST as decisive since this would facilitate the rapid passage of 3/1 MAR into the heart of the “Old City” of the Jolan District. He instructed 2nd Platoon to seize PENNSYLVANIA EAST to prevent the enemy from massing on 1st Platoon. The tanks were to establish the western portion of what would become the company’s perimeter. CPT Twaddell instructed 2LT Wojcik to orient his fires to the west toward the “Old City” to prevent the enemy from repositioning against the attack on OBJ PENNSYLVANIA. He had drawn a close-up sketch of the objective area, labeling buildings with numbers; distributed them down to the squad leader level; and provided the Battalion TOC with a copy. This would allow all leaders to track where individual units were moving as they cleared the objective and allowed a common frame of reference when reporting to the Task Force so that it could easily track the unit’s progress. At the battalion-level, the Task Force Commander ensured that Team C/3-8 CAV was arrayed 300 meters to the east of Team A, allowing C/3-8 to execute an attack to the west in the event that the company met stiffer than anticipated enemy resistance. As often happens in combat, the plan changed to some extent as they began their assault.
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Upon further evaluation of the terrain, CPT Twaddell ordered 3/C/3-8 to stay on the north side of the objective and 1st and 2nd Platoons to move on line with their rifle squads down the west and east sides of the objective, blocking possible enemy egress routes as they went. The 3/C/3-8 established the support by fire position on the north side of OBJ PENNSYLVANIA and breached four walls by driving into them with the tanks to allow the rifle squads easier access to the courtyards within the objective area. The platoon leaders dismounted with their rifle squads and began to clear the buildings on the objective one at a time. Meanwhile, their platoon sergeants maneuvered each platoon’s Bradleys to establish defensive positions to the west and east of the objective, while the tanks secured the northern portion. The 2nd Platoon discovered a major enemy arms cache, containing approximately 50kg of PE-4 plastic explosives and a vehicle, the body and trunk of which had been filled with another 100kg of PE-4 and artillery shells, converting it into a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED). Team A secured this vehicle and continued its assault. In another building, 2nd Platoon discovered several hundred mortar rounds of various calibers, as well as several surface-to-surface missiles, parts for a heavy machine gun, and several hundred rounds of ammunition. During the assault, 2LT Duran’s platoon killed one insurgent who, for some reason, had not fled the area already.

Meanwhile, 2LT Kilgore’s 1st Platoon continued to clear the western portion of the objective, making no contact with the enemy. SFC Calvin Smalley, the Platoon Sergeant for 1st Platoon, secured the western side of the objective, orienting his Bradleys to the west. He began to report that multiple RPG teams were running out into the middle of the street to the west, attempting to engage his Bradley from the middle of the
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street. Over the next several hours, SFC Smalley and his crew would engage and kill multiple RPG gunners who attempted this tactic.

As soon as Team A had initially secured the northern portion of OBJECTIVE PENNSYLVANIA, it consolidated its rifle squads and began to prepare to pass 3/1 MAR. While Team A fought to secure the northern portion of OBJ PENNSYLVANIA, 3/1 MAR had continued to move forward and was closing on Team A’s position. As the lead Marine rifle company began to pass through Team A’s positions, the team was still in contact with enemy forces south of PL DONNA in the actual park. Prior to the attack, the operations officers of both battalions had developed a plan to control the passage, but this operation had not been rehearsed. Also, leaders had not anticipated this passage occurring while Team A was still in relatively heavy contact on the southern portion of OBJ PENNSYLVANIA. This continued heavy contact on OBJ PENNSYLVANIA forced the Task Force Commander to commit his Tactical Command Post (TAC) to the north side of OBJ PENNSYLVANIA to assist with further coordination for the passage. The Company Commander eventually handed control of the passage of lines off to his company executive officer, 1LT Wiley, while he continued to fight the company. Over the course of the afternoon, 1LT Wiley successfully passed three companies through Team A’s forward trace and to the west to continue the fight in the “Old City.”

The Team’s rapid attack and ability to seize the northern portion of OBJ PENNSYLVANIA enabled several key events to occur. Most importantly, the seizure of this terrain prevented the enemy from using it as an assembly area to mass forces and executing their mobile defense. Secondly, this attack quickly isolated the Jolan District from the remainder of the enemy defenses in Fallujah. Finally, the rapid passage of 3/1 MAR
allowed RCT 1 to attack the Jolan District from two directions (north and east), facilitating the destruction of the enemy’s key defenses. All of these events were critical in preventing the enemy from executing his planned mobile defense, denying him the tactic that had worked so well in April, 2004.

Thus, TF 2-7 CAV’s rapid and destructive attack during the first 12 hours of the Battle of Fallujah proved decisive and was the first victory in a string of victories that would last through the next 12 days. The decisive impact of the attack on the Jolan Park cannot be overestimated. Throughout the next 24 hours, the enemy made repeated attacks, attempting to force A/2-7 from this position, to no avail. This attack illustrates the value of determining the decisive point and its relationship to the enemy, then attacking violently with overwhelming force to seize that point.

*From the personal experience monograph by Major Tim Karcher, Operations Officer, TF 2-7, 1st Cavalry Division, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.*

DISCUSSION: In addition to the writer’s lessons on the importance of speed in taking away the enemy’s mobility, this vignette serves as an excellent example of reconnaissance. It highlights not only reconnaissance for planning and execution, but also the incorporation of higher’s reconnaissance; physical/personal reconnaissance; and, presumably, map reconnaissance and other means.

The intelligence provided by RCT 1 to 2-7 CAV outlined the enemy’s defenses and his type of defensive operation, all of which proved to be accurate and timely. This is reconnaissance for planning, which helps confirm or deny initial commander and staff assessments and, if provided early enough in mission
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analysis, helps shape COA development by focusing effort on specific COAs or eliminating infeasible ones.

After receiving the 2-7 CAV Battalion OPORD, CPT Ed Twaddell conducted a personal, physical reconnaissance of the breach site. His reconnaissance helped ensure his unit’s success during the stress and obscuration inevitable at a combat, night, breach site.

Although this vignette does not highlight all the reconnaissance assets employed at the regimental, battalion, and company levels, the unit’s success in identifying, targeting, and decisively engaging the enemy’s center of gravity in the Jolan District is proof of the successful use of reconnaissance during the planning process and good execution by warfighters on the ground.

CONCLUSION: In war after war, conflict after conflict, our Army has demonstrated we have the finest finishing force in the world; if we can find the enemy, we will kill him. Today, we must fight for the same information and intelligence that we fought to attain in the past.

On today’s battlefield, we have an asset that is better than the finest computer ever imagined—the Soldier—but he must be prepared to receive and send the information the commander requires—the priority intelligence requirements—to meet with and defeat the enemy. This chapter demonstrated why we must remain focused on training our reconnaissance Soldiers to standard. In future battles, it will be the reconnaissance Soldiers who will provide our warfighting leaders with the actionable intelligence that will be required to kill the enemy. Our finishing forces will not let us down, but we must ensure that we find the enemy first.
CHAPTER 6: Combined Arms

There is still a tendency in each separate unit...to be a one-handed puncher. By that I mean that the rifleman wants to shoot, the tanker to charge, the artilleryman to fire...That is not the way to win battles. If the band played a piece first with the piccolo, then with the brass horn, then with the clarinet, and then with the trumpet, there would be a hell of a noise but no music. To get harmony in battle, each weapon must support the other. Team play wins. You musicians of Mars must not wait for the band leader to signal you...You must each of your own volition see to it that you come into the concert at the proper time...

GEN George S. Patton, 8 July 1941
Address to the men of the
2nd Armored DIV
The Patton Papers, Vol. II, 1974

INTRODUCTION: General Patton’s comments above foretold the advent of combined arms warfare—the synchronized application of several arms to achieve an effect on the enemy that is greater than if each arm is used independently or in sequence. For the task force to create the effects that the commander desires, each battlefield operating system must be synchronized with all of the others. Today’s application of combined arms at the lowest level would have made General Patton proud.

There are two principles that guide leaders in fighting combined arms—complementary effects and reinforcing effects. Leaders create complementary effects when they arrange elements with different characteristics together to protect friendly vulnerabilities and enhance effects on the
enemy. Reinforcing effects occur when leaders arrange similar combined arms elements together, either simultaneously or sequentially, to either augment the effect of one element with another or to sustain the effect longer than if just one element was used. Commanders create effects based on, first, an understanding of the enemy’s capability and tendencies as well as their own and, second, the ability to visualize the enemy and themselves throughout the battle in time and space, from initial contact until culmination. The commander organizes, arranges, and applies his force to maximize each arm and the battle operating system at each decision point, attaining synergistic effects.

In every doctrine manual that speaks to combined arms warfare, and even in the first edition of this book, published in 1939, the point is made that the arms must not just work in concert, they must form cohesive teams focused on common goals. The examples in this chapter illustrate both the synergistic effects of combined arms and the teamwork necessary to achieve this synergy.

**Early in the afternoon of 3 October 1993, elements of TF Ranger were stranded during a daylight raid to capture key members of General Aideed’s Somali National Alliance. Following the first unsuccessful rescue attempt by C Company, 2-14th, 10th Mountain Division, a second rescue attempt was conducted, with Company A in the lead, followed by Company C, attacking to secure the second crash site and retrieve the dead and wounded.**

The movement to National Street, the main east-west running road through Mogadishu, was uneventful. As the column approached the turn onto National Street, all hell broke
loose. I heard small arms fire and RPG explosions and felt shrapnel hitting the vehicle.

The vehicle began to pick up speed. We started going over curbs and obstacles in the road which threw us around. Unknown to me, the first vehicle, carrying the 1st Squad Leader, and my vehicle began pulling away from the rest of the column. The third vehicle, the commander’s HMMWV, kept the rest of the Malaysian Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) from following my two runaway lead vehicles. This effectively separated my two squads from the rest of the company, and we would remain separated until the following morning.

The two APCs continued west on National Street, then turned south toward crash site 2 and continued past it. The vehicles were about one kilometer south of crash site 2 when they entered a Somali ambush. RPG fire struck the lead vehicle head-on, mortally wounding the Malaysian driver. My vehicle was struck a moment later, in the right-front side, in the engine
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compartment. The 1st Squad Leader called from the lead vehicle requesting guidance, and I told him to dismount and establish security. I was doing the same. When I got out, I realized we were on our own. Green tracers and RPG rounds were hitting all around us. We moved to a building east of the vehicle and occupied some low ground on the south side. I made contact with the squad leader and told him to stay in his secure position and that we were going to move north up the hill and try to reestablish contact with the company. Low ground and buildings were blocking all radio transmissions.
I led my element north past two buildings, attempting to gain sight of the company. Small arms fire began to intensify from the direction of travel farther up the hill. The M60 gunner engaged targets from the corner of what appeared to be some sort of garage. All he was actually doing, however, was drawing fire; every time he engaged a target, the RPG fires into our vicinity intensified. I told the gunner to engage only identified targets to limit RPG fires at us. He said that he was only engaging identifiable targets and that there were a lot of people up the road. With the increasingly heavy enemy fire, and the fear of the enemy moving between my divided elements, I decided to return to the original location. Before moving out, I heard the clearing of a weapon on the other side of a wall. I pulled out a grenade, pulled the pin, flipped off the thumb clip, and threw it over the wall. There was no explosion. I pulled out another grenade, repeated the arming process, released the spoon, and the spoon did not fly off. The tape we used to silence the pull rings had left small strands that kept the grenade from arming; I then pulled the spoon off and threw the grenade. A huge explosion followed, and the weapon noise stopped.

Throughout the entire movement back, the RTO tried to establish radio contact with the company with no success. About 15 minutes from the time of the ambush, we reached our original position and reestablished a secure perimeter. I then sent an M60 assistant gunner back to the APC to retrieve gear and additional ammunition; he returned with the Malaysians in the vehicle who had decided to join our perimeter. At this point, we were still under heavy fire, and I decided we had to get inside a building to survive. I asked the engineer squad leader if he could make a hole in the wall, and he assured me that he could. I contacted the squad leader and told him that we were going to blow a hole in the compound so that he could
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ensure his men were out of the danger area. After receiving confirmation that all of his personnel were out of the direct blast radius, I had the charge set.
Everything on the battlefield seemed to go quiet after the blast, as if it had surprised the Somalis. The blast was so large that it not only made the hole we wanted, but also knocked down the wall and a small building on the other side. The squad leader reported that part of the wall on his side had come down on his Soldiers as well. (Next time, I will specify how large of a hole I want.) In the quiet after the blast, someone had to make the initial entry, and all my Soldiers were pulling security. I jumped up, sprinted across the street, and entered the compound, firing at the house I was entering. No fire was returned, and I called the squad into the perimeter to establish a more defensible perimeter. We formed two mutually supporting positions with the Infantry squad oriented south, and the engineer team with the M60 oriented north. The RTO and Malaysians also entered the compound. The RTO put up the long whip antenna and tried to establish communications on different nets. I placed the Malaysians in a hallway in the rear of the building, and the squad’s combat lifesaver began working on the injured while I checked security. Two adults and several children who were in the house moved to the back room, and we left them alone.

At this time, screams of pain were reported coming from the lead APC, apparently from a wounded Malaysian who had been left behind. I told a team leader to go out there and get the man. Without concern for his own safety, he ran back into the kill zone, retrieved the mortally wounded man, and attended to his wounds. (This act earned him a Bronze Star with Valor device)

Finding that the RTO still had not been able to contact anyone on any net, I pulled the radio out of the rucksack, took off all of the secure devices, and transmitted in the clear. The Battalion Commander’s voice was the first I heard and was the most calming influence I had that night. He said “keep doing
what you’re doing. You’re alive, and I will work on getting you out.” I then contacted the C Company Commander, and we each fired a star cluster signal, determining that we were about one kilometer apart. He said that he would get the company down to our location once the search of the crash site was completed. An AH-1 Cobra flew east over us and started engaging targets a block or two away. This prompted me to place my M203 gunners on the roof of the building, and they engaged targets to the east. Throughout the night, the Somalis continued sporadic attacks, usually standing off to fire RPGs at the compound; I counted no less than ten impacts in a one-minute period.

Around 0300 hrs., the C Company Commander told me that they were having trouble moving south and wanted us to try and move north and link up with his lead platoon. I called my leaders together to formulate a plan. The engineers would lead, followed by the machine gun teams with me, the Malaysians, and 1st Squad trailing. The intent was to use the engineer team as a base of fire, and be able to maneuver the 1st Squad if needed. I had the Malaysians carry the stretcher with their wounded comrade.

The engineers moved up past the garage where we had been earlier that night. I positioned myself on the corner of the garage looking north. The Malaysians were streaming by, moving toward the engineers, when a Somali gunman stepped out in front of the engineers and engaged them with small arms fire. Three men were injured; one took a round in the chest and later died in Germany when surgeons tried to remove the bullet. I moved forward to a door stoop and began suppressing the gunman’s position. An engineer helped pull the wounded men back behind the door stoop. From that stoop, all I could do was to suppress the gunman; I needed a better shot if I was going to kill him.
I yelled back to the 1st Squad Leader to take a team across the street, move up the wall, and kill the gunman. He came back with, “This street? The one with bullets flying down it?” I said “Roger.” Reluctantly, he and the combat lifesaver moved across the street and worked their way forward. The medic came to my location to help with the wounded and see if I needed help suppressing the gunman. I had him treat the wounded, as there was only room for one man to fire from the small stoop. Just as I ran out of ammunition and was changing magazines, the gunman moved around the corner and began shooting at my location. His actions gave the squad leader enough time to draw a bead on him and kill him. I was so eager to ensure he was dead that I grabbed grenades from the medic and hurled them into the building. We had no more shots from that gunman, but another one began engaging us from across an open lot to our north.

The new gunman’s fire was accurate enough to keep the squad leader and the combat lifesaver pinned against a building. At this point, I had two casualties who were litter urgent and eight who were walking wounded. We needed help. I had the RTO contact C Company to request transport out. He informed me that the Malaysians were on the way and that we had “Little Bird” on station. Yelling over to the squad leader, I asked him if he could mark the building with an M203 flare, and he said he could. I told the RTO to relay to the pilots. The flare was fired, but it hit the wrong building, which the Little Bird destroyed. I then told the RTO to relay that I was marking the building with tracers. Standing up from behind the stoop, I emptied an entire magazine of tracers into the building. The Little Bird came in perpendicular to our location and fired his 7.62mm gun followed by rockets, and the building disappeared. Shortly thereafter, we were extracted.
DISCUSSION: This vignette illustrates that the combined arms concept does not just apply to higher level units. In this particular case, we see a textbook application of combined arms at the platoon level, using assets normally seen at much higher levels of command.

The platoon leader with A Company, 2-14 IN, was tasked with securing the second crash site in Mogadishu, Somalia. In the first phase of the operation, enemy resistance was initially not present. However, as soon as the convoy, which consisted of an Infantry platoon, an Engineer squad, and a section of Malaysian armored personnel carriers, turned into the street that led to the crash site, the enemy engaged with a combination of RPGs and small-arms fire. By successfully integrating and fighting as a combined arms team, the platoon leader was able to destroy the enemy, keep his men alive, and eventually be extracted.

During the course of the battle, the platoon leader realized that his machine guns were drawing an inordinate amount of enemy fire when they engaged indiscriminate targets. Quickly analyzing the situation, the platoon leader ordered his gunners to engage only identifiable targets to limit the enemy’s ability to place effective fire on the machine gun team. The platoon leader also synchronized his small-arms assets, which were organic to the platoon, to maximize their effectiveness. For example, his decision to place his M203 gunners on rooftops to engage the enemy contributed greatly to the success of the platoon.

The platoon leader’s ability to synchronize and integrate combined arms at the lowest level was outstanding. One
example that exemplified using combined arms was marking buildings with tracers to facilitate the destruction of the structure by rotary wing CAS. Another example was using the attached engineer squad to blow a hole in a wall to get the platoon behind some cover. His use of the MH-6 “Little Birds” and engineers enabled his platoon to maximize the enemy’s casualties while diminishing friendly wounded.

In conclusion, the application of combined arms at the lowest level resulted in a well-synchronized and successful fight in very difficult terrain. By integrating all of his organic assets and successfully using available external assets, the platoon leader was able to destroy the enemy and, most importantly, ensure the safety of his Soldiers.

TF 2-327 conducts a search and attack 1200Z 31 MAR 03 to destroy enemy forces and equipment IOT hasten the surrender of enemy forces within An Najaf” (2-327th IN Valorous Unit Award Recommendation for Operation Iraqi Freedom). The TF commander’s guidance for the operation was five-fold: first, the enemy would be unable to influence 1-327th IN, the brigade main effort, from 2-327th’s sector; second, the tanks and antitank TOW vehicles would secure the intersections; third, the Infantry would protect the tanks and TOW vehicles; fourth, the task force would influence the local populace to turn on the Fedayeen within the city; and finally, the attack in the city would be methodical. The commander’s end state for this phase was to isolate Fedayeen in the vicinity of the mosque, develop a positive relationship with the local population, and finally, to posture the task force to isolate the mosque and continue offensive operations.
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On the morning of March 31, Task Force 2-327 (TF No Slack), comprised of 2-327 Infantry, 1/A/2-70 Armor, 2/A/2-44 Air Defense Artillery, 2/A/326 Engineers, A/311 Military Intelligence, and members of the 431st Civil Affairs, conducted an armor/armed reconnaissance. At 1100 hrs., an armed reconnaissance element of OH-58Ds and AH-64s, the attached tank platoon, and Delta Company commenced the first phase of the attack, focusing on the escarpment that dominated the approaches from the south leading up to the city. The purpose of this phase was to identify the enemy’s defensive scheme and, armed with that intelligence, use both direct and indirect fires to destroy the enemy’s main defensive positions before committing any rifle companies to the attack.

Armed with the improved anti-armor sight (TOW ITAS), with target acquisition capabilities exceeding ten kilometers, Delta Company established a support-by-fire position to observe the escarpment as the tank platoon maneuvered forward to gain contact with the enemy in the oasis that lay at the foot of the massive earthwork, OBJ FOX. Preceded by echeloned close air support (CAS) attacks, 105mm artillery fires, and 81mm mortar fires, the tank platoon maneuvered forward along the avenue leading up to the city, operationally designated ROUTE TAHOE, with the intent of forcing the enemy to reveal his positions amid the thickly vegetated terrain of palm trees. As the tank platoon approached the objective, it received small arms fire and heavy mortar fire from the enemy defensive positions. Now able to identify the hidden enemy positions firing upon the tank platoon, Delta Company began engaging from the support-by-fire position with MK-19 and .50 caliber fires at maximum standoff distance. Due to the angle of the sun reflecting off of a small lake in their line of sight at the time of the attack, the enemy could not pinpoint friendly positions. Unhindered by enemy fires, Delta Company
maneuvered forward to more effectively support the tanks and remain out of enemy small arms’ range. To cover the tank platoon’s run up the escarpment, Delta Company conducted a recon by fire to the platoon’s front. Immediately, Delta Company began receiving small arms fire from two buildings on the escarpment to its front, though out of range of the enemy weapons.

During the course of this recon by fire, a sniper team attached to Delta Company identified bunker positions and muzzle flashes emanating from below the two target buildings. The location of the two target buildings was in the line of fire of the most sensitive religious site in An Najaf—if not the entire Shi’ite Muslim world—the Golden Mosque of Ali. To prevent any damage to the Mosque, the Task Force Commander ordered the Delta gunners to fire the more accurate TOW missiles at the buildings. The gunners continued to use Mark-19 and .50 caliber fires to suppress the bunker positions below the target buildings. To maximize the destruction of the enemy battle positions, the Task Force Commander integrated close air support and close combat air attack missions. With the battalion’s combat observation lasing team (COLT), equipped with designators to direct laser-guided munitions, the Commander was able to call for close air support from F-16 fighters to complete the destruction of the enemy within the target buildings. The OH-58D’s played an invaluable role in destroying enemy positions within the oasis with their rocket and .50 caliber fires, while continuing to attack and support the tank platoon in the face of heavy small arms fire.

Upon reaching a mine/wire obstacle blocking the avenue leading up the escarpment to the city, the tank platoon attempted to clear a lane by shooting the poorly emplaced mines with their coaxial machine gun. While proofing the lane
with the plow, the lead tank struck a mine, damaging the lifter and causing the tank to become immobile without immediate repairs. Delta Company maintained its suppression of the remaining enemy on the escarpment, thereby enabling the tank crew to secure the plow and withdraw from enemy fires.

At approximately 1400 hrs., while continuing suppression of enemy on the escarpment, a battalion sniper identified a towed artillery piece being moved into a firing point. Shortly thereafter, a TOW gunner identified three more artillery pieces already in firing position 500 meters south of the target buildings. During this time, enemy fighters in a third building began engaging friendly forces with small arms and RPG fires. The Task Force Commander called for immediate indirect suppression on the artillery pieces until close air support assets could arrive on station. Delta TOW gunners also engaged the artillery pieces with missile fires, scoring a direct hit on one tube, resulting in large secondary explosions. Indirect fires, close air support, and TOW missile fires completed the destruction of the remaining pieces, which was confirmed by the OH-58D pilots.

Around the middle of the afternoon, enemy fire from the escarpment decreased significantly. The battalion received intelligence reports that the Fedayeen fighters were withdrawing to the north in the vicinity of the Mosque of Ali and the adjacent cemetery, as well as other protected sites such as hospitals and schools. Shortly thereafter, the battalion reconnaissance elements withdrew back to the battalion attack position, thereby completing the first phase of the operation in preparation for the attack on March 31. Of significant note during the attack is that because of the precision of the direct and indirect fire in the vicinity of the holy Mosque, the Mosque sustained no damage.
DISCUSSION: The first phase of TF 2-327 search and attack on 31 March 2003 is an excellent example of just how effective a well-coordinated combined arms battle can be. This vignette clearly demonstrates the importance commanders at all levels should place upon effectively understanding and employing key weapon systems to ensure weapon capabilities are used to appropriate effect. In the example above, this meant minimizing potential damage to a sensitive religious site—as was the case with the use of the TOW missiles or the use of coordinated heavy suppression on enemy artillery pieces using artillery, close air support, OH-58Ds, and TOWs.

With the initial and subsequent synchronization of echeloned close air support, 105mm artillery fires, and 81mm mortar fires, combined with the combat maneuver elements of the OH-58Ds, the attached tank platoon and Delta Company undoubtedly overwhelmed the enemy. TF 2-327 applied combined arms warfare at its greatest potential: delivering timely and effective combat power, which disrupted the enemy’s cohesion and will to fight and resulted in the enemy’s withdrawal. The fact the TF 2-37 sustained no damage is great testimony to the courage and skill displayed by all.

On 07 February 2004, B Co., 1st BN, 23rd IN (SBCT), and Special Operations Forces conducted a raid to capture a former major general in the Iraqi Army who had a direct link to former Iraqi President Sadaam Hussein.
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We received the mission from our Battalion Commander, LTC Buck James, who had received it from a Special Operations Force (SOF) working in Mosul, Iraq. The SOF unit wanted us to isolate the objective using our superior firepower and maneuver capabilities to accomplish the mission: to capture an Iraqi major general to gather intelligence on High Value Target (HVT) #6, Izzat Ibrahim Al-Douri, so he could be captured. I was the Company Executive Officer and was in charge of establishing the outer cordon and sniper position to isolate the target building. My Company Commander, Captain Robert Robinson, and First Sergeant Robert Swift had planned the mission in detail. The plan was simple, and we had approximately two days to plan and rehearse the mission.

We met with the key players—our BN S3 and the SOF assault team leader—the day prior to the mission to finalize the plan. During this meeting, the SOF assault team leader reviewed the plan and made some key suggestions that we incorporated into our plan. The SOF assault team leader recommended adding an additional sniper team to overwatch the target building and stated that his men would conduct the explosive breach for us. These changes proved to be the key to success on the raid.

The final plan for the mission had one Infantry platoon, one MGS platoon, and two sniper teams as an outer cordon around the city block of the target building. Their task was to isolate the target to prevent anyone from coming on or off the objective. The assault force was one Infantry platoon with four SOF members, who would capture the major general.

At midnight on 7 February 2004, B Co., 1st BN, 23rd IN (SBCT), moved from Forward Operating Base Pacesetter and conducted a linkup with the SOF unit at the attack position. This position was on the far side of an inter-visibility line that prevented anyone from identifying our approach to the
objective. The linkup took place around 0030 hrs., and we made final coordination with the SOF unit to ensure the success of the mission. We conducted our final radio checks and confirmed our signals with the SOF unit. I took the isolation force into the target area and set up the outer cordon. I set up three mounted blocking positions and then dismounted with my sniper team, infiltrated, and set up in the building across the street from the target building. My sniper position provided CPT Robinson with direct fire overwatch of the entire target building and detailed intelligence of the target building and the occupants. We accomplished the infiltration of the isolation force without being compromised by the enemy. The Stryker vehicles are very quiet and were able to block all the key intersections around the target building.

Once the outer cordon was set, the assault force moved to two separate assault positions and dismounted 1st PLT and the SOF unit. One assault position was in the west, and one was in the north. The only activity that we identified from the sniper position was a single person walking around on the second floor of the target building. This person had no idea that 40 Infantrymen were moving to his house to capture him.

The house had two gates on the outer wall, one in the north and one in the west. The two assault elements moved to the outer gates of the target building, and the SOF Soldiers placed two charges on the outer gates. They used a rubber strip charge on the outer gates of the house to gain access to the courtyard. At this point, the enemy still was not aware of our presence.

Soldiers emplaced the charges on the gates. On a simultaneous countdown, they command-detonated the rubber strip charges and breached the outer gates. Then two SOF Soldiers entered the courtyard and set two more rubber strip charges on the outer doors of the house and detonated both of these simultaneously. The assault squad followed the SOF
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Soldiers into the courtyard, entered the house, and cleared the kitchen, which allowed us to establish a foothold. It took eight seconds to get the assault squad from the street into the house.

Once the assault platoon leader secured the foothold, he passed a second squad into the house and cleared the first floor within two minutes after the first charge was detonated. Then the assault platoon leader passed a third squad through the second breach point and cleared the second floor and roof. On the second floor, one of the rooms was locked, so the SOF Soldiers breached it with their final charge. The major general was captured on the second floor in his bedroom. The entire building was cleared and secured three minutes after the initial charge was detonated. The enemy was taken by surprise and could not recover in time to put up any resistance. The mission was a complete success without a shot being fired.

From the personal experience of 1LT Benjamin D. Tiffner, who served as Executive Officer, B Company, 1st Battalion, 23rd In (SBCT), 2d Infantry Division, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: The success of the raid described by 1LT Tiffner can be attributed primarily to the synchronization of the combined arms team, in particular, Infantry and Special Operations forces. B Company’s close integration with SOF forces, along with its wise use of snipers in support of the raid did, in fact, result in the successful capture of the General and ultimately the capture of Izzat Ibrahim Al-Douri in Mosul, Iraq.

1LT Tiffner’s outfit successfully combined garnered SOF intelligence, Infantry snipers, an Infantry cordon, and an Infantry/SOF assault force that seamlessly captured a known
Iraqi general. This vignette also demonstrates a great example of SOF integration at the lowest tactical level.

CONCLUSION: Combined-arms warfare is a team sport and must be planned, rehearsed, practiced, and executed with the whole team. The successful use of combined arms does not occur merely because it appears in doctrinal manuals; it occurs as a direct result of education and training. Commanders and their staffs must have a solid concept of the application of combined arms, which starts with a well-grounded expertise in weapons and systems’ capabilities and experience in tactical situations. It is also a result of the study of past battles. However, commanders must also seek every opportunity to train their units in combined arms tactics, techniques, and procedures. Finally, the whole team must train together as often as possible. All battlefield operating systems must be integrated, and the different arms must speak the same language and know each other’s capabilities and limitations and the power of their synchronized effects. This allows the commander to develop trust and confidence in all team members.
112th Infantry in Kosovo

110th Infantry in Kosovo
Daychopun Province, Afghanistan

82nd Airborne in Afghanistan

152
Tirin River, Afghanistan

Shkin firebase, Afghanistan

153
10th Mountain destroying cache, Afghanistan

Orgun-E, Afghanistan
Infantry assault

Karbala, Iraq
B/3-502 IN officers

Infantry
Objective Moe, 8 April, ground level north

3rd ID, Iraq
1st ID, Samarra

82nd Soldier with Iraqi soldiers
Haifa Street, Baghdad

Dealing with civilians
Baghdad, Iraq
CHAPTER 7: Mutual Support

The hardest task in war is to lie in support of some position or battery, under fire without the privilege of returning it; or to guard some train left in the rear, within hearing but out of danger; or to provide for the wounded or dead of some corps which is too busy ahead to care for its own.

GEN William T. Sherman
The Memoirs of General W.T. Sherman, 1875

INTRODUCTION: It is no mistake that this chapter on mutual support follows the chapter on combined arms as, in many cases, it is through the use of combined arms that mutual support is achieved. However, the presence of other branches of service is not a requirement to achieve mutual support—two Soldiers can achieve mutual support. Mutual support is support that units render each other against an enemy because of those units’ assigned tasks, their positions relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities. Maneuver units attain mutual support when their fires capabilities and CSS are within supporting distance and supporting range of an enemy attempting to engage the other unit.

With the decentralized nature of the Global War on Terror and the anticipated future fight, mutual support must be foremost in each Soldier’s mind; this only comes about through realistic training. Likewise, planning for mutual support—between squads, platoons, companies, and above—must be foremost in the leader’s mind; again, the result of good training and strong military education.
By 4 April 2003, V Corps and I MEF had almost completely surrounded Baghdad and had begun planning for operations within the city. In an effort to pierce the heart of Saddam Hussein’s regime, 3ID conducted “thunder runs,” probes, into the city to “see what would happen.” The first raid, conducted on 5 April by TF 1-64 Armor, resulted in fierce Iraqi resistance. The second run, conducted by 2d Brigade, 3ID, on 7 April was significant: 2d Brigade would remain in the city. To ensure supplies would reach 2d Brigade, controlling Highway 8, south of Baghdad, was critical. Task Force 3-15 would seize three cloverleaf intersections along Highway 8, from south to north, objectives Curly, Larry, and Moe, and retain them to allow movement of supplies into the city.

LTC Stephen Twitty, the Commander of TF 3-15, arrived at OBJ Daly, south of Baghdad, following offensive operations south of the Brigade at OBJ Grady. Because of the operation at OBJ Grady, he had not received the brigade operations order, but he had sent his S-3 to the OPORD. LTC Twitty, arriving at OBJ Daly with his three maneuver companies and a small portion of his Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) assets, found his staff, which had arrived there hours earlier, in the midst of the Military Decision-making Process. The Battalion S-3 briefed LTC Twitty on the current situation and the upcoming offensive into Baghdad. The warning order that he had gotten three hours earlier had directed that he detach B/3-15 IN, with its Commander, XO, and two mechanized Infantry platoons, to secure the Lines of Communication (LOCs) around Brigade OBJ Saints. LTC Twitty had under his command a tank company team, B/4-64 AR, and one mechanized Infantry company team, A/3-15 IN, along with the normal attachments. As his companies refueled
and rearmed, he and his staff huddled in a bombed-out building to complete the order for the attack the next morning.

At 0100 hrs., LTC Twitty called his commanders to the building—its missing roof replaced with a tarp and the windows blacked out with ponchos—and issued his order for the attack. His Infantry combat team, A/3-15 IN, led by CPT Josh Wright, would attack to seize the northern objective, OBJ Moe; his Armor company team, B/4-64 AR, led by CPT Dan Hubbard, would attack to seize the center objective (Larry); and TM Zan would seize objective Curly in the south. Team Zan consisted of a single mechanized Infantry platoon, an engineer squad, the mortar platoon, a scout section, and the TF Command Sergeant Major with an M88 and a HMMWV. It was commanded by one of the battalion's battle captains, CPT Zan Hornbuckle. The company team commanders had six hours from the time they received the mission to the time they would cross the Line of Departure.

The enemy at Moe, Larry, and Curly was a combination of fanatical Syrian Jihadists, Special Republican Guards, Republican Guards, Saddam Fedayeen, and members of the Regime’s Al Kuds brigades, all determined to fight and die. They attacked incessantly for 12-18 hours, firing small arms and RPGs from buildings, trenches, bunkers, and rubble alongside the cloverleaf intersections. They “charged” the U.S. positions in taxis, cars, trucks with heavy machine guns mounted, and even on motorcycles with recoilless rifles tied to the sidecars. They drove cars loaded with explosives at high speeds towards the U.S. positions, hoping to destroy the Americans when they exploded. The Mortar Platoon occupied the southern part of OBJ Curly, with two tubes aimed north and two aimed south. It fired simultaneous indirect fire missions in both directions, while the gunners on the .50 caliber machine guns engaged the enemy in the defense of their positions.
The mortar men continued to fire missions even while under ground assault and indirect fire, firing over 20 direct lay missions against buildings housing enemy forces and against “Technical Vehicles” assaulting their position. They also supported the forces on the two other objectives with nine DANGER CLOSE missions: seven in support of OBJ Moe and two in support of OBJ Larry.

The Combat Engineers earned that title. They were magnificent both as Infantrymen and as Engineers. They exposed themselves to incredible fire to emplace demolitions, dropping light poles to make abatis to stop the suicide taxis. The drivers of the Armored Combat Earthmovers went outside the perimeter, alone, to build berms and remove guardrails to allow movement between positions. They formed ad hoc teams, along with radio operators and drivers, and cleared trenches and bunkers against fanatical defenders, at least one of whom was a woman, armed and fighting to the death in the trench line.

Everyone fought! There was no choice; it is not overly dramatic to state that it was a case of “fight or die.” TF objectives had to be held. If the Task Force could not keep the main supply route open, the two armor task forces further north would be cut off and isolated deep within the city. Already the Brigade Combat Team Commander had ordered the tankers to shut off their engines to save the little remaining fuel. Everyone was critically short ammunition, but the company team fighting on Objective Moe was “AMBER” on main gun, machine gun, and small arms ammo. If Curly fell, so would Moe, and TF 3-15 would face defeat in detail.

As the battle entered its fourth hour, the Task Force Commander called and asked the key question of CPT Hornbuckle: “Can TM Zan hold CURLY and let the ammunition and fuel trucks roll north to the other forces?” CPT
Hornbuckle said that he thought he could hold, but the Task Force Commander heard the stress and worry in his voice. He knew that CPT Hornbuckle was a fighter, but he worried that TM Zan was facing a crisis, and he needed to know for certain. He called the CSM and asked him, straight up, did the team need help. CSM Robert Gallagher, who had been wounded fighting with the 75th Rangers at Mogadishu, didn't hesitate. He told LTC Twitty that he needed to do something to help relieve TM Zan, and he had to do it fast! At that time, CSM Gallagher was already wounded again, and he was standing on one leg beside his M88, engaging the enemy with his M4 carbine.

The medics had armed themselves, and all the drivers and RTOs who could be spared were defending the company’s tactical operations center against suicide attackers working their way through the rubble and along the off-ramps of the cloverleaf.

LTC Twitty had no other forces, but he did have the uncommitted elements of his last mechanized Infantry company, B/3-15 IN (-), back at the OBJ Saints. Although it had been fighting a series of engagements itself, it was ready to move. LTC Twitty called the Commander, CPT Ronnie Johnson, and told him get ready to send a platoon to Curly. CPT Johnson made a counter-recommendation. He wanted to take his entire company: the two mechanized platoons, the BFIST, and the maintenance and 1SGS's M113s—all the armored fighting vehicles he could lay his hands on. This was probably the crucial decision of the battle. LTC Twitty agreed and asked the BCT Commander to release the company, which he did. B Co, 3-15 Infantry, attacked north, every weapon in the convoy engaging the enemy, as B Company assaulted to Objective Curly. It arrived literally in the nick of time, although it lost a scout HMMWV and one NCO killed in action.
by a rocket propelled grenade. With the additional forces, CPT Johnson, who took over command at Curly, reinforced the defenders and expanded the perimeter further out, far enough that the vital re-supply convoy that was right behind him had a chance to make it through.

Even then, the situation was not secure. The sight of 20 heavy trucks loaded with ammunition and fuel reinvigorated the Syrian Jihadists attacking Curly. They assaulted with renewed fury. In a moment, several trucks were burning, and the fire was spreading. A sergeant ran out into a hail of fire to try to start one of the trucks to move it away, but it was already too damaged to drive. At this time, LTC Scott Rutter arrived with the lead elements of TF 2-7 Infantry. He had been sent, with only an hour's notice, on a long, circuitous route from his position near the airport to reinforce the 2\textsuperscript{nd} BCT. He fought his way through to the objective and assumed control at Curly. CPT Johnson moved the remaining re-supply trucks to Moe and Larry with his forces and then escorted them further north for the armored task forces, thus ensuring that they could stay in the city for the night and the next day. LTC Rutter had a hard fight at Curly the next day, but the heart had been cut out of the enemy forces, and the 3rd Infantry Division was in Baghdad to stay.

*From interviews with Soldiers of 3-15 Infantry, conducted by Art Durante, included in the OIF Study Group publication On Point, Ch 6, pgs 362-367*

DISCUSSION: This vignette captures lessons from a significant engagement during the offensive operations of Operation Iraqi Freedom, one of which is mutual support. In this vignette, we can see the application of our doctrinal definition of mutual support: support which units render each
other against an enemy because of those units’ assigned tasks, their positions relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities.

TF 3-15 had the mission to seize key terrain along Highway 8, a key line of communication (LOC) for the adjacent task forces in the brigade combat team (BCT). The arrangement of Highway 8 made this task force fight a linear fight in terms of disposition of friendly forces. Objectives Moe, Larry, and Curly were arranged in the area of operations in a linear fashion, from north to south, respectively, each within supporting range of the next. The placement of the objectives themselves illustrates the planning for mutual support necessary to ensure that the LOC remained open. Placing the companies, the mortars, and the CSS in this manner ensured each could react to influence changing events, particularly in a fluid environment such as this.

The task force commander had determined that OBJ Moe was his main effort, as it possessed the decisive terrain for the task force, and arguably for the BCT as well. The success at OBJ Moe was predicated on the support from, and, thus, the success at objectives Larry and Curly; without the mutual support from the southern objectives, actions at Moe would have been for naught. This can be seen through the placement of the mortars on OBJ Curly which ensured the mortars could support operations on the other objectives while, at the same time, being supported by the Soldiers on those positions.

Finally, we can see how another unit’s actions, B/3-15 IN, reacting to changing battlefield conditions, greatly contributed to the successful accomplishment of the mission at OBJ Curly. It was positioned so as to be able to influence the fight as needed, and did so. This example can be extended as we see TF 2-7’s ability to relieve B/3-15 IN at OBJ Curly to enable the
B/3-15 IN’s continued support to the logistics operations and to resupply units still in contact at OBJs Moe and Larry.

On April 6th, 2003, elements of 3-187th IN, 101st ABN (AASLT), relieved elements of the 1st Brigade, 3rd ID (MECH), on the V Corps’ front line along the perimeter of the recently-seized Saddam International Airport.

My battalion was posturing for a sequential attack on key sites of Iraqi infrastructure and probable enemy locations. These locations included the Iraqi Secretariat, Spiral Hill, and a Special Republican Guard (SRG) compound, all in plain view of my assigned engagement area. As a platoon leader for A/3-187th IN, I was a little hesitant when my commander told me that the mechanized team had maintained steady contact for the last 72 hours on or around the engagement area. While I was more than happy to give our brethren from 3rd ID an opportunity to refit at the airport, the prospect of replacing mechanized and armored forces with my rifle platoon did not thrill me.

I knew we would have to remain vigilant as the enemy would know the heavier forces were leaving and probably probe our positions. When I made coordination with the platoon leader of the outgoing mechanized platoon, he showed me the most likely enemy avenues of approach which helped me develop where I should place my key weapons systems. The battlefield was dirty, filled with remnants of recent fights. Behind what became my platoon command post were two destroyed T-72 tanks. Around the destroyed tanks and forward of this particular position were several dead Iraqi soldiers and another destroyed T-72 tank. I realized there was the possibility of an armored threat in my engagement area.
Our company was arrayed in mutually supporting platoon battle positions, and I arrayed my platoon in mutually supporting squad positions. I received an anti-tank section and incorporated this asset into my defense, dismounting the MK-19 and placing it in a location where it could best cover dead space. In addition to this asset, we had many other modes of indirect fire in support of our battle position: 60/81mm mortars, 155mm, and close air support from A-10s. I placed my two Javelins down the most likely avenues of approach for the enemy: one was focused on the armored threat, while I wanted to focus the other Javelin’s thermal-viewing command launch unit (CLU) to better observe my dismounted threat.

Before the mechanized team withdrew, I emplaced my key weapons systems and briefed my squad leaders on my concept. I walked each of the squad leaders over the entire platoon area of operations, so he could see how each position was mutually supporting the other. After this recon, 3ID pulled back, and my platoon began to dig its fighting positions. We finished suitable positions for our defense just as the sun was going down. This proved to be very important because nightfall brought our first contact.

Throughout the night, we came in contact with enemy patrols, the largest being at squad level. I suspected the enemy was not positive that any American forces were left in our positions after the mechanized team left, and these attacks were just probes, perhaps to find a route out of the SRG compound to our 12 o’clock. I could hear our adjacent companies experiencing similar contacts about the same time as we did.

As these attacks occurred, my squad leaders had difficulty identifying the enemy with their night vision capabilities. The terrain was sparsely wooded, but illumination was poor. Instead, we had to rely on our thermal capabilities and lasers to point out suspected enemy locations. The PEQ-2A and the
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PAC-4C were crucial in identifying enemy positions to subordinates. I also relied on the use of our new 60mm infrared illumination round to identify these enemy locations. Rather than allow the threat to close the distance on our locations, we began to call for and adjust 60/81mm mortar fires. The most effective combination proved to be a mixture of high explosive rounds and white phosphorous. Due to the lack of illumination and my decision that they would not compromise our positions, I used 40mm illumination rounds to identify enemy positions. This was imperative because of the frequency of thermal ‘hot spots’ on the battlefield and what I decided was a need to accurately bring our indirect fires to bear. I directed the use of the 40mm illumination in a unique way. If my right flank was in contact, I would direct my left flank to place the illumination. Because of the earlier leader’s recon, my subordinate leaders were able to accomplish this task. The end result of this technique was a success. I did not deplete the mortar ammo, and my M203 gunners could mark targets with HEDP rather than focusing on illuminating the battlefield. In the morning, we realized that we had not destroyed the remnants of a platoon but the remnants of an Infantry battalion.

As the war transitioned to support and stability operations in May, 2003, and our company moved north to Rabea’a, a border town near Syria, a local Sheik recalled the events that occurred on April 6th and how he narrowly escaped death. Apparently, this former Iraqi battalion commander, in this interesting, new post-war dynamic, was now a major social power with whom we had to deal with for credibility within our new area of operations.

*From the personal experience of 1LT Jaron Wharton, who served as a platoon leader in A/3-187 IN, 101st Airborne*
DISCUSSION: It is our ability to integrate and synchronize the combined arms fight that distinguishes our Army from others in the world. The foundation of a combined arms engagement is the principle of mutual support. Mutual support is a method to create a relative combat power advantage in a fight. It is maintaining a positional relationship to another element while providing support with reinforcing or complementary effects.

1LT Wharton clearly demonstrated initiative in the defense. His analysis of the situation using METT-TC focused the platoon’s efforts during the preparation and execution of the defense. The lesson in the vignette is not the techniques employed with the various weapons systems but the manner in which the platoon leader arrayed the squads. The effectiveness of techniques varies relative to the situation METT-TC. What worked in Saddam International Airport may not be effective in another area of operation. Techniques for achieving mutual support might differ from situation to situation, but the concept of mutual support remains constant throughout full-spectrum operations. This platoon was able to maximize its relative combat power in the engagement area by providing reinforcing and complementary effects on the enemy force. One side of the battle position provided illumination so the other side could focus its direct and indirect fires on the enemy in the engagement area.

Leaders should always apply the mutual support test to their plans. As a platoon leader, ask yourself, “Have I created conditions for a platoon fight or a squad fight?” If METT-TC allows, the right answer is always a platoon fight. Mutual support gives an attacker or a defender a positional advantage, even though elements may not be in visual contact. The idea of
mutual support is embedded in our TTPs. However, some leaders will still choose a course of action that sends elements piecemeal to separate objectives over a course of action that maximizes combat power with maneuver from LD through endstate.

In November, 2003, 3d Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) deployed to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. By January, 2004, 3d SBCT was in and around Mosul, Iraq. Two of its Infantry battalions had sectors of the city, with 1-23rd having most of the city on the western side of the Tigris River.

The city had been fairly quiet, compared to other parts of the country, since 3d SBCT arrived. The majority of operations were to capture weapons and to capture or kill weapons dealers and terrorists. Information on these targets came from a variety of sources: some came from BDE intelligence sources, and some target information was developed at the company and battalion level. This bottom-up driven intelligence came from squads talking with local neighborhood leaders and other reputable sources or from Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) Soldiers who volunteered to go undercover.

The 1-23rd divided its portion of Mosul up among its companies. Each company was responsible for getting to know its part of the city by frequent patrolling as well as by interfacing with neighborhood leaders, police chiefs, heads of banks, heads of schools, and any other prominent people. The companies operated out of Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). The A Co and B Co were together at the very large FOB, Marez, near the Mosul Airfield, and C Co was at FOB Blickenstaff, near the heart of Mosul. The level and type of development in each company’s sector dictated the type of
patrolling it could conduct. The A Co and B Co had primarily urban and industrial sectors with wide streets; therefore, they conducted a combination of mounted and dismounted patrols. C Co’s sector was smaller but much more densely populated. C Co had the city center and “old town” Mosul. This portion of the city was built in ancient times and has very few streets where a Stryker can negotiate, so C Co conducted mostly dismounted patrols.

The patrols executed by 1st BN served a variety of purposes, but each patrol had to have a specific purpose. For example, some patrols were to find and meet local leaders, others were to encourage Iraqi policemen to get out of their stations and do their jobs, and others were to recon routes or objectives for up-coming missions.

In mid-February, 2004, various sources began to indicate that weapons dealers were operating out of a prominent marketplace in C Co’s area of operations. Once enough sources validated the presence of weapons dealers, the Company planned a cordon and search of the marketplace.

Late in the morning on 20 February 2004, C Co cordoned and searched the marketplace. The primary purpose was the capture of weapons and ammunition, but a major plus would have been the capture of the dealers. Since we had no photos or names for the dealers, the only way to capture them would have been to catch them with the weapons in hand. Thus, the cordon and search took place during daylight hours since the Iraqis were averse to doing much business at night.

Doing a daylight cordon and search presented many issues that we had not had to face up to this point. We had to be careful not to alert the dealers that the search would occur, and we had to be prepared to search a large market filled with bystanders and, possibly, fight in a very busy marketplace. So as not to tip off the dealers, we knew that nothing could appear
out of the ordinary. Since most daily patrols were squad-sized, we knew that anything significantly larger would make the enemy suspicious. We also knew that the cordon had to be established quickly. If we established one side and then the other, the dealers could potentially escape out the un-cordoned side with their weapons. To mitigate both of these risks, we had two cordon elements, each about the size of a squad plus, move dismounted from opposite directions. Since both elements needed to arrive simultaneously, we made extensive use of phase lines to control and coordinate their movements.

To deter any weapons dealer from trying to fight his way out of the market, we rapidly massed the rest of the company with Strykers around the market. Once the dismounted cordon element was in place, the company’s Strykers would arrive with the other two platoons who executed the search. The cordon platoon’s Strykers would then join the cordon to provide additional firepower, protection, and maneuverability should they need it. The other two platoons’ Strykers moved back and staged out of a safe area a few kilometers away, as too many Strykers around the market would have hindered movement. In our estimation, the rapid establishment of the cordon, followed immediately by the arrival of forces with armored vehicles, deterred any weapons dealer from trying to fight his way out.

With the cordon established and all elements on site, we began the search. One platoon searched the targeted shops and warehouses within the market while the other platoon searched people and vehicles. The Soldiers in the platoon searching the target shops and warehouses made extensive use of metal detectors which is how they found several bags of 7.62mm ammo, several pistols, a grease gun, and one RPG sight buried in sacks of grain.
DISCUSSION: This vignette provides an example of how to use the Stryker unit’s capabilities to achieve mutual support in one of the most commonly performed operations in Iraq, the cordon and search. Additionally, one can extract basic characteristics of both offensive and defensive operations, namely surprise and flexibility, and the criticality of both while conducting operations.

While planning this particular operation, the commander determined that any patrol consisting of an element larger than a dismounted squad might raise enemy suspicions and enable the enemy to safely exfiltrate from the target area prior to the establishment of the cordon. Thus, to achieve surprise, dismounted squads converged on the market street along multiple avenues of approach and established the cordon, fixing the enemy in his position, while the Stryker vehicles maneuvered through the streets to reinforce the cordon.

From the cordon’s blocking positions, the Stryker vehicles, with their mounted weapon systems, were able to cover the dismounted Infantry as they cleared the shops in the market. The rapid mobility of the Stryker vehicles also provided the ability to maneuver inside the cordon to maintain constant overwatch of the searching element, or if casualties were taken, the Stryker could have easily provided CASEVAC. This type of mutual support is critical to maintaining security while conducting operations, especially when working in a heavily populated area.

In addition to using the Stryker vehicles for support within the cordon, the troop-carrying capabilities and mounted
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weapon systems provided flexibility to counter a threat outside of the cordon or to make the fluid transition to a follow-on operation. As is the case many times, a cordon and search will lead to time-sensitive intelligence that requires immediate action, but the new target might be outside of the initial targeted area. The Stryker unit could have quickly determined the new target, remounted its vehicles, and moved to the new target.

What is essential in conducting a cordon and search is the establishment of direct fire control measures. The units in the cordon must be able to track the movement of the searching units; likewise, the searching element must know where the cordon is capable of engaging. When there is more than one searching unit, each must be fully aware of the movement of the other search teams and what its response can be if contact is made.

While this example deals with a Stryker unit, the basic concept can be applied with HMMWV gun trucks and Bradley fighting vehicles working with dismounted Infantry. Depending on assets available, a simple cordon and search can also involve the use of a fully integrated combined arms team. Aviations assets can assist with cordon establishment and possibly close air support. The commander might have an armor unit as part of his cordon, and artillery and mortars can provide indirect fire support. While the forces available to conduct these missions might change, the basic concept of mutual support will remain constant throughout.

The ability to provide mutual support, both internal and external to the unit, will be a cornerstone to future operations in the War on Terror. The potential to use mechanized, light, SBCT, and Special Operations units in mutual supporting roles is unlimited and is well-suited to address the flexible response required when operating in an urban environment.
On 14 February 2004, the Special Operation Force (SOF) unit in Mosul, Iraq, brought to 1-23rd Infantry detailed intelligence on a bomb maker who was providing many of the terrorist cells in the city with improvised explosive devices.

I was the Bravo Company Executive Officer and was in charge of establishing the outer cordon and sniper position to isolate the target building. LTC Buck James, our Battalion Commander, and the SOF Team Leader decided that we would conduct the raid, and the SOF operators would conduct Sensitive Sight Exploitation.

The bomb maker’s house was in a very poor section of Mosul. This area of the city consistently gave us problems. This was the part of the city from where the terrorist organizations would hire their shooters and bombers. The young men of this area were easily manipulated because they were poor and out of work. These factors caused us to have a lot of direct fire contact in this part of town. We decided to use three platoons to carry out this raid.

My Company Commander, CPT Robert Robinson, decided to divide the company into an isolation force and an assault force. I was in charge of the isolation force, and I had 3rd PLT, 4th PLT, the Company Sniper Team, and a Battalion Sniper Team. My plan was simple; I task-organized my force into four separate elements that included one Infantry Stryker, one Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) Stryker, and one Infantry squad. Each one of these elements would set up a blocking position on the four corners of the city block, preventing anyone from moving into or out of the target area. Simultaneously, I would establish SGT Joe Brown and his company sniper team into a three-story house overwatching the
entire city block. I kept the Battalion Sniper Team with me to move onto the upper floor of the target house to establish overwatch to the south, once we had secured the bomb maker. This plan gave me the flexibility to deal with any threat with precision fires from my Company Sniper Team and maneuver with my Infantry and Strykers in the four blocking positions.

CPT Robinson planned to use 1st Platoon as the assault force. It would move to a dismount point 100 meters to the north of the bomb maker’s house. The 1st Platoon would then move to the target house dismounted, establish an inner cordon, breach the outer gate and the inner door with a battering ram, and secure the target house with two assault squads. We decided to use mechanical breaching on the gate and door because the door was very weak, and we did not want to cause any secondary explosions because we knew the bomb maker stored explosives in his house. The isolation and assault forces would move into position simultaneously to prevent the bomb maker from escaping. The plan was simple, but it required speed, stealth, and violence of action to be a success.

At 141230February04, the company left Forward Operating Base (FOB) Marez in three separate elements to conduct the raid. I controlled two of the elements that made up the isolation force, and CPT Robinson controlled the assault force. I had one element approach from the south and establish the two southern blocking positions, and I traveled with the isolation element in the north.

We established the four blocking positions, and I dismounted with the Company Sniper Team and helped it clear the three-story building where it was establishing overwatch of the target area. Simultaneously, 1st Platoon dismounted from its Strykers and moved to the target house. LT Moreno, the 1st Platoon Leader, used the weapons squad to establish an inner cordon. He then breached the outer gate and inner door with his
breach squad. As soon as the inner door flew off its hinges, SGT Perdue, a Team Leader in the breach squad, noticed the bomb maker running out of his room and heading for the stairway to the roof. SGT Perdue immediately threw a flash bang down the hallway, and it exploded right beside the head of the bomb maker. He collapsed to the ground, and the assault squad captured him as it entered the target house.

The house was secured two minutes after the outer gate was knocked down with the battering ram. The SOF operators moved into the house and conducted the interrogation of the bomb maker. We searched the house and uncovered plastic explosives, mortar rounds, rocket propelled grenades, mortar tubes, AK47s, TNT, and two booby traps. The SOF operators took the bomb maker back to the detention facility. During his interrogation, he revealed ten other terrorist leaders in Mosul. All ten of these terrorist leaders were captured on 3 March 2004 when my brigade conducted ten simultaneous raids across Mosul, Iraq.

From the personal experience of 1LT Benjamin D Tiffner, who served as the Bravo Company Executive Officer, 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment (SBCT), 2d Infantry Division, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: In this vignette, we see how conventional forces supported Special Operations Forces (SOF) to accomplish their mission of capturing and interrogating a bomb maker in Mosul, Iraq. This vignette demonstrates the concept of mutual support, not only between conventional forces and SOF, but also between elements within the conventional force. The SOF supported the conventional forces by providing them detailed information about the objective area. Based on this information, the battalion commander decided to conduct a
cordon and search of the objective area and supported the Bravo Company commander by providing him with a battalion sniper team and an ATGM Stryker. The Bravo Company commander decided to task organize his company into an isolation force and assault force (FM 7-10, Appendix A calls these elements the security element and the search element) to provide the maximum mutual support needed to accomplish the mission. 1LT Tiffner further task organized his isolation force so he could establish the outer cordon of the objective area, while 1LT Moreno used elements of his platoon to establish the inner cordon. Both the inner and outer cordons mutually supported each other to prevent the enemy from influencing the assault force.

1LT Tiffner also achieved mutual support by placing the battalion snipers in locations that could overwatch the objective area once it was seized. After the objective area was isolated, the assault force was able to quickly capture the bomb maker which allowed the SOF to interrogate him under the security of Bravo Company. The success of this operation is a direct reflection of the mutual support units give each other because of their assigned tasks, position on the battlefield, or inherent capabilities.

CONCLUSION: Units achieve mutual support not only to defeat the enemy, but also to ensure the Soldier, or unit, in proximity is protected. As it is one of the basics of warfighting, Soldiers at all levels must be trained to achieve it, and leaders must consider it at all time. Only then will a unit be successful in accomplishing its mission.
INTRODUCTION: Firepower—an element of combat power—at its most fundamental level is achieved through the individual Soldier’s mastery of his weapon. Every Infantryman, from private to the general officer, is first a rifleman. As such, he is a master of his basic skills: move, shoot, communicate, fight, and sustain. The Infantryman’s primary weapon is the rifle; placing well-aimed effective fire on the enemy is his primary capability. Once the Soldier masters his primary weapon, his training can, and many times will, extend to the other weapons in the unit’s inventory, but the emphasis must remain at the mastery level for each weapon system.

One of the primary objectives of initial entry training is to provide the training for each Soldier to become proficient in marksmanship. This competence must be reinforced frequently once the Soldier leaves initial entry training and arrives in his unit, as the muscle memory necessary for mastery is perishable. Every commander must ensure that Soldiers fire their weapons frequently and under a variety of conditions to ensure the unit can maximize firepower effects on the battlefield.

On 3 October 1993, Company A, 2-14, 10th Mountain Division, part of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) for missions within Mogadishu, was alerted that it would
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conduct operations in support of TF Ranger. Company C, 2-14, had already attempted a link-up with TF Ranger but had sustained heavy casualties and was forced to return to its base. At 2145 hrs., 3 October, Company A was en route to downtown Mogadishu. After traveling several blocks, it began to receive enemy fire from both sides of the street; thus began several hours of combat as it moved to link up with the Rangers.

The Commander was pinned down with 1st Platoon by crossfire coming from the hotel and several other buildings. He told me to get a MK19 equipped HMMWV forward for suppression. I talked to the squad leader of the nearest one and moved him forward, around the APCs, to the front of the column. We learned that a large amount of fire was coming from the large hotel on the left side of the street, about 50 meters to the front of the lead platoon. So the gunner could occupy a support by fire position, I guided the MK-19 up onto a steep sidewalk and told him to watch my M16 tracer rounds and to suppress the building from top to bottom. I fired several tracers into the hotel; the gunner fired a spotting round into one of the top-story windows and then fired the grenade launcher on automatic, hitting every single window in the building. The effects were devastating; concrete fragments flew everywhere, and one or two Somalis fell out of the building. When the gunner ceased firing, I asked the lead element where else the heavy fire was coming from. The response was – the right side of the road, so I further directed the MK-19 fire into a building about 40 meters to our front. I then directed the lead platoon to begin maneuvering forward again, and eventually, we linked up with TF Ranger.

Later, as the company began to move out of the city with TF Ranger, heavy small arms and RPG fire erupted on all
sides. Squads and platoons bounded by fire and movement, engaged with heavy suppressive fire while elements sprinted across alleys. Several Somali gunmen were shot and killed at almost point-blank range by the lead element. The Somalis seemed to know that we were disengaging and were giving us all they could. The company was now spread across a distance of four to five city blocks, maneuvering at a fast pace. The Commander directed gunship strikes along both sides of the road to cover our movement and to suppress heavy fire from the Olympic Hotel until we were clear of the city.

During this operation, everyone carried a double basic load of ammunition. Because of disciplined fires, most Soldiers had some ammunition remaining after nine hours of sustained battle.

*From a September-October 1994 article in Infantry Magazine by Captain Charles P. Ferry, who served as a company executive officer in 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division.*

**DISCUSSION:** In this summary, we see the executive officer of A Company, 2-14, effectively employing his forces through maneuver combined with firepower to link up and relieve TF Ranger in downtown Mogadishu, Somalia. The company was provided with Malaysian armored personnel carriers to augment its protection and firepower.

The enemy effectively engaged the QRF from positions of advantage (for example, upper floors of buildings and alleyways). Therefore, CPT Ferry directed his forces to concentrate their fires on the upper floors of the buildings and the alleyways, orienting his forces on the greatest enemy threat first. CPT Ferry used his own weapon system to orient the crew-served MK-19 to effectively engage the enemy; this is a
leader task. This vignette demonstrates the necessity for quality crew drills, application of the principles of direct fire control, and the application of advanced marksmanship skills. CPT Ferry accomplished this by using his organic crew-served and individual weapons, the main weapons systems of the Malaysian APCs, and disciplined firing which prevented the unit from running out of ammunition. By concentrating his available combat power, CPT Ferry was able to maintain his momentum and dominance over the enemy which led to the successful link-up with TF Ranger. Consequently, CPT Ferry was able to evacuate numerous TF Ranger casualties to the battalion aid station for treatment.

In March, 2003, shortly after entering the CENTCOM AOR, a Special Operations Task Force called on 2nd Ranger Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, to execute the first air assault raid into hostile enemy territory in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The 2nd Platoon, Alpha Company, 2-75th Ranger Regiment, was chosen to be the Ranger element to execute this spearhead mission. Its task for this operation was to block enemy forces from influencing actions on the objective to facilitate the exploitation of sensitive material.

The operation commenced shortly after nightfall with a helicopter infiltration from a forward operating base to the town of Al Qaddisiyah, located in the Sunni heartland of west-central Iraq. My platoon was cross-loaded over four Blackhawk helicopters and would be the first assault element in this operation. Minutes behind our aircraft were two CH-47 Chinook helicopters, which carried the Task Force’s primary assault element. The four Blackhaws approached the outskirts of the town traveling in formation, and each would soon break
away and move toward its respective helicopter landing zone (HLZ). Just seconds away from landing, we were engaged by enemy small arms fire from the ground and immediately responded with M4 and helicopter machine gun fire. We later learned that, during this first exchange of gunfire, at least one helicopter sustained serious mechanical damage and that one of our Rangers was seriously wounded. Despite this, all four Blackhawks continued movement to the objective and landed with pinpoint accuracy on all four HLZs.

Upon landing, my platoon immediately occupied four geographically-separated battle positions outside of the objective compound, which was located on the edge of town. Within a matter of seconds, we isolated the target, blocked all avenues of approach, denied egress routes out of the objective, and established the link-up point where we would establish contact with the assault force. All of this happened while AH-6 “Little Bird” aircraft were circling the objective overhead and suppressing enemy forces moving in the town. My platoon could not observe these hostile forces but did encounter noncombatants seeking cover and fleeing the area.

At this point in time, the CH-47 aircraft were approaching the objective and receiving enemy fire along the same route that we had taken earlier. Their infiltration mirrored my platoon’s in terms of friendly damage, as one CH-47 suffered serious mechanical setbacks and one helicopter door gunner sustained serious gunshot wounds. Just prior to them landing at the HLZ, I received reports from all of my battle position leaders that they were established and prepared for the assault force to attack the objective. Using infrared (IR) chemical lights, my closest battle position conducted a link-up with the assault force and guided it to the target building.

My platoon received enemy small arms fire from a moving vehicle within minutes of the assault force entering the
objective area. The vehicle approached our positions along a main road leading up to the objective. Upon seeing U.S. forces on the ground, the automobile accelerated through an emplaced obstacle and began engaging my Rangers with small arms fire. Immediately after identifying the threat, accurate crew-served weapon fire engaged the enemy vehicle, and, shortly thereafter, the vehicle was immobilized due to overwhelming, accurate firepower from numerous weapon systems. Once the two enemy personnel dismounted the vehicle, they were designated by IR lasers from every weapon on the ground and were subsequently engaged and killed in a very one-sided firefight.

Following this contact, the town quieted down, and the assault force conducted a thorough search of the target, obtaining numerous pieces of intelligence for further analysis. Shortly thereafter, the assault force moved to its HLZ and withdrew from the objective. Minutes later, our four Blackhawks arrived in the HLZ and moved us back to our forward operating base.

*From the personal experience of 1LT Kirby R. Dennis who served as 2nd Platoon Leader, Alpha Company, 2nd Ranger Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.*

DISCUSSION: Many factors can influence mission success, but poor marksmanship can guarantee mission failure. The United States Infantryman is outfitted with the best marksmanship equipment in the world, but this alone does not ensure success. As we see in this vignette, he is most effective on the battlefield when he can employ well-aimed, accurate fires to destroy enemy combatants.

Units must follow the example set by the 2nd Ranger Battalion during operations in Al Qaddisiyah and in training.
All too often, units are not trained on the proper use of assigned weapons, optics, and laser aiming devices. Individual weapons qualification must be the first step in the unit’s marksmanship training program, not the last step. Unit commanders and leaders need to ensure that all Infantrymen fully understand the ballistic characteristics of their assigned weapon, the four fundamentals of rifle marksmanship, and the characteristics and use of assigned optics and laser aiming devices. The goals of unit marksmanship training programs should include engaging single and multiple targets, both moving and stationary, at distances varying from 0 meters to the maximum effective range of the weapon. Additionally, leaders must know how to distribute these lethal fires.

There is nothing more deadly on the battlefield than an Infantryman with his individual weapon, as is evidenced by the Rangers’ ability to mass accurate direct fire, but only if he can accurately engage enemy combatants at all ranges. Marksmanship training is the foundation that leaders can build lethal units upon.

In early June, 2003, Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, received a FRAGO for a company air assault and raid of a suspected terrorist camp in northern Iraq. Intelligence sources had observed the terrorist group infiltrating the Iraqi border from Syria and establishing a base camp in a wadi system just north of a small town. Intelligence assessments indicated that this group was within 24-48 hours of conducting a suicide bombing on Coalition forces in the Ramadi/Fallujah region of Iraq.

The 3rd Squad was moving in the wadi to clear the building complex on OBJ Auburn. From my position, I could see 3rd Squad as it assaulted through the objective, and I also could see
my PSG, SFC Albert, moving behind 3rd Squad. Concurrently, SSG Williams linked up with me, and I was instructing him where he needed to move his machine guns to establish the blocking position. Just then, a tracer zipped by my head, and I heard the burst from a M240B machine gun. I spun around and saw CPL Matthews, one of my machine gunners, engage and kill an insurgent just 20 meters behind my position. CPL Matthews had been moving to link up with SSG Williams when the enemy popped up from behind a rock outcropping and attempted to engage my position. CPL Matthews engaged and killed him with a couple bursts from his machine gun. Of note, he fired both of his bursts from the hip.

*From the personal experience monograph by CPT Scott B. Cheney, who served as the Platoon Leader of 2nd Platoon, Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.*

**DISCUSSION:** This vignette clearly demonstrates the importance professional Soldiers must place on realistic marksmanship training, specifically the requirement to train to fire from alternate firing positions until it becomes instinctive. These skills are an emerging requirement, and units train these as advanced marksmanship skills. Confidence in handling personal weapon systems to the high level demonstrated in this vignette is the direct result of the high levels of realistic live-fire training and weapon familiarization.

“In no other professions are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or irrevocable as in the military.”

General Douglas MacArthur, 1933
CONCLUSION: As we have seen from these vignettes, our forces cannot be successful in defeating our enemies without frequent training under various conditions. Regardless of which weapon the Soldier is assigned, mastery of the weapon and the ability to use lethal fires must be maintained.
CHAPTER 9: Security

Even in friendly territory, a fortified camp should be set up; a general should never have to say, “I did not expect it.”

The Emperor Maurice
The Strategikon
c. AD 600

INTRODUCTION: The Principles of War are the enduring bedrock of Army doctrine. The U.S. Army published its original Principles after WWI and, in the following years, adjusted them, but they have stood the tests of analysis, experimentation, practice, and time. The Principles of War do not constitute a checklist; rather they summarize the characteristics of successful military operations. They provide a powerful tool for analysis in the study of war.

Security, one of the Principles, protects and preserves combat power. It does not involve excessive caution; calculated risk is inherent in conflict. Security operations are conducted by the commander to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the commander to use the protected force effectively. The threat of asymmetric action requires emphasis on security, even in low threat environments.

On 23 December 2001, Company A, 1-187th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, deployed to Jacobabad, Pakistan, to provide airfield security.
When we arrived in Pakistan, we joined with our sister companies in improving the existing security perimeter established around the outside of the Jacobabad airfield. The perimeter consisted of an outer ring of Pakistani Army and Air Force defense forces and an inner ring of U.S. forces. The original U.S. forces’ perimeter had been constructed by Marines from the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit. It consisted of open foxholes spaced along the airfield with little existing support for each other and no overhead cover. The first Army forces, the leading edge of my battalion, had assumed the positions in the perimeter and improved them with overhead cover—although they still did not support each other with fields of fire.

While my company worked to integrate into and improve the existing defense, we quickly realized that the true threat to our mission in Pakistan was not to the airfield or existing equipment operating there, but to the American personnel who were staged there. The Al Qaeda terrorist and Islamic Fundamentalist threat that we were primarily concerned with were focused on inflicting casualties to turn American public opinion against the presence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and the deployment of military forces in support of the War on Terror. This analysis was to serve us well in preparing us to operate in Afghanistan and to be properly oriented against enemy forces.

We recognized that the primary technique that the enemy would employ would be to attempt to infiltrate a bomb or a small team into the airfield to attack exposed personnel within the security perimeter. This would be the most effective way of inflicting casualties on coalition forces in country. The secondary technique that we determined the enemy would employ would be to use snipers, mortars, or remote detonating munitions to minimize his exposure to our defenses while still
allowing him to inflict casualties. The best way to counter these techniques was to emphasize observation and detection over battle positions and heavy fortifications.

After conducting this analysis and reaching our conclusions, we began to improve the defense. First, we adjusted the existing positions and created new positions so that each position complemented the other, emphasizing the maximum field of fire and observation possible. Initially, we built each of the positions down into the ground as a regular fighting position with overhead cover to provide the most protection to the Soldiers inside. The major avenues of approach were covered with checkpoints and crew served weapons.

Once this initial series of positions was completed, we continued to improve the defense. Although the perimeter was complete with interlocking fires, we next looked to increase the observable distance for each position. To do this, we increased the height of each position, in effect transitioning from fighting positions to observation posts. Based on a design that the platoon leaders and company executive officer devised, we built wooden platforms on stilts to raise each ground-level position about eight to twelve feet into the air. Each raised position was then sand-bagged to provide cover for the Soldiers within. Although the positions did not offer as much cover as the built down fighting positions had, they offered increased observation while still offering some protection from direct and indirect fire to the Soldiers within. The positions at or near the base of buildings were moved to the tops of the buildings, allowing for similar trade-offs in protection and observation.

The final step in improving the defense was to expand the current fields of fire and observation. To accomplish this, we used Pakistani bulldozers to knock down trees and then burned
off all existing ground vegetation. We then augmented the wire perimeter with additional wire and trip flares. Once these improvements had been accomplished, we were satisfied that we had successfully prepared for the risks posed by the potential enemy forces.

From the personal experience monograph by CPT Timothy B. McColloh, who served as a rifle platoon leader in 1-187th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: In this vignette, the company commander ensured that the plan provided early and accurate warning. He accomplished this by expanding the field of fire and observation from the built-up guard towers. He also used bulldozers to remove restrictive vegetation and then further augmented the area with concertina wire and trip flares to provide the force with a way to detect movement outside of the perimeter.

The plan also provided for increased reaction time and maneuver space. When the company arrived at the airfield, the commander decided to construct observations posts that extended 12 feet into the air. This, coupled with the efforts to remove restrictive vegetation, allowed the Soldiers manning the observation posts to greatly increase their fields of fire, providing increased reaction time for the company. The commander also ensured that all of the observation posts mutually supported each other to provide the maximum amount of security for the airfield.

By conducting a detailed intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), the commander successfully oriented his force on the facility that he was tasked to secure. He deduced that car bombs and small-unit raids were the modus operandi of
the enemy. Therefore, he focused much of his combat power on the avenues of approach into the airfield, while greatly reducing the capabilities of a small-unit raid by improving reaction time and maneuver space through active and passive security measures.

Through a thorough understanding of the doctrine associated with security operations, the company commander was confident that his force was prepared for the risks posed by a potential enemy force.

**On 24 March 2003, 2-7 Infantry Battalion (M) of the 1st Brigade, 3rd ID, was established in Assembly Area Raider just south of Karbala, Iraq.**

As the Platoon Leader for 1st Platoon, A Co, 2-7 Infantry, I was assigned a section of the perimeter along the northern wall of the assembly area. The 3rd ID had now maneuvered over one hundred miles of desert terrain since attacking into Iraq, and its supply lines were stretched far behind the Division. Screen lines and blocking positions were established along high-speed avenues of infiltration in an effort to prevent Iraqi forces from conducting harassment raids on combat support elements.

The major highway running north/south leading into Karbala, Hwy 9, had been identified as a potential enemy avenue of approach, and 2-7 Infantry was given the task of blocking the highway to prevent the disruption of supply lines. The tasking was rotated between A Co and B Co, each company dedicating six to eight combat vehicles and three Infantry squads to accomplish the task. The blocking position was established with four perimeter security positions, triple-strand concertina wire across the southbound lanes of the road, and the combat vehicles spaced evenly around the perimeter. A four-man search team was used at the wire to stop
and search each vehicle that approached from the north. Civilian vehicles traveling on the highway were allowed to travel north, but all traffic moving south was stopped, searched, and turned around.

The 1st Platoon, A Co, assumed the tasking from 3rd Platoon, A Co, on the morning of 25 March. As the Platoon Leader for 1st Platoon, I was very concerned about being stationary in a position that was exposed to enemy forces, with very little cover or concealment. When I met with the 3rd Platoon Leader, 1LT Brian Johnson, he informed me that his platoon had been engaged by small arms fire on each of the past four days from as many as twenty enemy combatants at a time. He also reported being engaged by a few inaccurate RPG rounds but had sustained no casualties and stated that his platoon had destroyed two civilian vehicles trying to drive through the wire.

My platoon assumed the blocking position at 1000 hrs. and immediately began improving the Infantry fighting positions. With no Class IV or engineer support, it was a long, arduous, and dangerous process to dig the fighting positions with only our e-tools. Once the sun had set on the first day, we were able to work under the concealment of the darkness and in the relatively cool temperatures of a desert night. With the good fortune of no enemy contact the first day or night, we were able to complete our positions to standard before being told there was a water shortage, and we now had to ration our water to three canteens a day per Soldier.

Several of the vehicles that we searched at the blocking position were carrying all male passengers and had bags in the trunk containing military uniforms. All personnel traveling with uniforms or military items were detained and turned over to the Battalion detention center to be interrogated and passed on for further questioning. Many of the detained Iraqis claimed
to be fleeing from their military units because they did not want to fight the Americans. Several of them were freely offering up any information they had; some cried in fear; and a few just stared at us with indignation and hatred.

On the third day, several of the Iraqis we had detained that day reported that our current blocking position was being targeted for a mortar attack that night. I immediately reported this information to the Company HQ and was told to stay in place and prepare for an indirect fire attack. I dug the fighting positions down deeper, ensured that all Bradley Fighting Vehicles were “buttoned up,” and limited movement outside of fighting positions. That evening, when the detainees were transported back to the Battalion, two things were apparent: they were visibly happy to be leaving the area, and many believed some sort of attack was imminent.

The night of 27 March was long but uneventful. No attack came, no mortars, nothing; it was a very quiet night. The 3rd Platoon, A Co, was scheduled to relieve my platoon at 1000 hrs. on 28 March. When it arrived, I again met with 1LT Brian Johnson and passed on to him all relevant information. We decided to change out the perimeter security positions first, and then the blocking position itself would be relieved. 1LT Johnson and I stood near the wire at the blocking position and watched two cars crest the hill just north of our position heading towards us. With the security positions having already been passed to his platoon, we decided that my search team would clear the first car, and his team would then search the second car, and that would be the battle handover.

I moved my Bradley closer to the blocking position to allow 1LT Johnson’s Bradley to take my place on the perimeter and so I could load the last of my Soldiers on the vehicle. I was standing on the rear ramp, accounting for the Soldiers and their sensitive items, when an enormous explosion blew me to the
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ground. (To this day I still feel the intense heat from the blast on my right side.) In the split second after the explosion, my initial reaction was to run towards the blast in complete rage. I took about four or five steps before I came to my senses (my brain was a little disoriented) and began ordering my Soldiers to take cover from the apparent mortar attack. With no further rounds suppressing our position, I moved forward to assess the situation.

As it turned out, the second car that approached our blocking position had been rigged with explosives. The car containing the explosives was almost completely disintegrated; the car that was previously beside it had been blown to the other side of the highway with only the frame remaining. The four Soldiers who had moved forward to search the car were mortally wounded; two of the bodies were incomplete, and two of them were scarred and badly burned. One of the four Soldiers sustained life for almost two minutes after the blast; his fellow squad members rushed to his aid and futilely attempted to apply buddy aid. An M113 ambulance with three medics was collocated at our position only 50 meters from the site of the blast. The medics, paralyzed with fear, did not attempt to move forward and treat the wounded until several minutes after the blast occurred.

When I realized it had been a car bombing, I moved my platoon out around the blocking position, creating a larger perimeter to tend to the wounded. The platoon sergeant of the Soldiers who had died, SFC Henson, approached one of my squad leaders and, in a tearful request, asked that the squad leader help him pick up and identify “his boys.” Once the bodies had been collected, 3rd Platoon took control of the position, and my platoon returned to the assembly area.

We later learned that opening the car trunk had been the trigger to detonate the explosives therein. A single Iraqi man in
civilian clothes with no distinguishable characteristics occupied the car and was also killed by the explosion. The attack was the first car bombing to occur during the war.

*From the personal experience monograph of ILT James A. Horn, who served as 1st Platoon Leader, Alpha Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry, 3rd Infantry Division, Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, GA.*

**DISCUSSION:** In this vignette, security in the defense was discussed several times. Security includes all active and active/passive measures taken to avoid detection by the enemy, deceive the enemy, and deny enemy intelligence elements information on the friendly battle position.

The Soldiers in the vignette recognized the relatively open terrain and the lack of existing cover and concealment. To minimize the vehicles’ signature, the unit dug in the vehicles using the entrenching tools, which were the only means available. This was the first step in improving the battle position and continuing with the sequence of the defense. When the unit established the vehicle control point, the use of wire and a basic obstacle plan was included to provide a marked area to conduct the search of vehicles and occupants. These obstacles should be established in such a manner as to make the cars slow and, thus, decrease their ability to breach or bypass the control point.

Conducting vehicle control points creates the necessity to come into close contact with both the vehicle and its occupants. While conducting traffic control points, it is beneficial to be accompanied by local security, if available, who can convey guidance to the occupants of the vehicle and give basic commands to open all doors and hatches and lay any contents of the vehicle out in clear sight prior to the occupant stepping
to the side to be searched for any possible triggers that might detonate a hidden bomb. Furthermore, vehicles must be stopped outside of the blast radius to protect Soldiers at the check points. These measures will minimize the risk to friendly forces but will not eliminate the threat if the driver of the vehicle is willing to die to injure or kill friendly forces.

On 30 March 2003, the 1-325th, 82nd Airborne Division, arrived at As Samawah. Its mission was to seize the town of As Samawah, a Fedayeen stronghold, and secure the bridges across the Euphrates to protect 3d ID’s line of communication (LOC). Therefore, the 1-325th was also tasked with destroying the Fedayeen resistance since it was largely responsible for the attacks on the 3rd ID’s supply lines.

I was on the southernmost security and, thus, was to position my platoon before the rest of the Task Force did. Once I was set, the other Delta platoons would move into place, and the rifle companies would begin to maneuver through the trench network and clear it. Our intelligence was that this trench network, on the southeast side of the city, was supposed to hold a reinforced squad. My first task was to identify the trench and any enemy locations. During our hasty map reconnaissance, CPT Boone, my Company Commander, and I found some high ground where I would be able to use my Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS) thermals to provide overwatch and early warning to the rest of the Task Force.

Unfortunately, things did not go exactly according to plan. It was not lack of trying by any means, simply inaccurate intelligence. When I moved up to the trench network, I noted that this no was ordinary trench network but, instead, was a
landfill. As I maneuvered my vehicles through the trash, I began to realize that the trench network was no more than cuts in the trash which, on satellites, looked like trenches. They could be used as trenches but were certainly not part of some master plan except by some trash man or perhaps vagrants who needed a way through the landfill. We scanned through and around trash heaps but did not find any reinforced squad. Meanwhile, the other Delta platoons were maneuvering into position, and the Task Force, on Light Medium Tactical Vehicles (LMTVs), was filling into the far eastern side of the bowl. Companies moved into their assembly areas, and men instinctively sought cover and established local security. Alpha Company sent LT Dave Powell, my good friend and drinking buddy back in Fayetteville, first through the “trench network.” I watched anxiously, oriented my weapons on target reference points, and kept myself updated on the continuous scanning, overwatching his maneuver. I reported to Alpha 6, CPT Shannon Nielson, whenever I could, but otherwise I was restricted to overwatching the maneuver elements.

As I sat waiting while the rest of the forces moved into place, my gunner noticed a man walking with a donkey in the middle of the landfill. I notified the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and continued to observe. We watched the donkey man with some interest, wondering what he must have been thinking watching us maneuver forces into the lip of the trash dump.

Soon after the man and his donkey returned to the buildings on the west side of the dump, Fadayeen fighters, who had taken up positions in the cement factory, houses, and other buildings overlooking the landfill, began to engage our forces. Alpha Company continued to move its other platoons through, and LT Powell maneuvered his machine guns forward. Bravo Company, led by CPT Gabe Barton, was north of Alpha
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Company, moving likewise from east to west through the trenches. When LT Powell began receiving mortar fire, we realized what the donkey was for – the strange man taking his donkey out for a walk was actually pacing off the distance for the Iraqi mortars hidden in the housing complex. They moved spotters up onto the roofs to adjust the mortars. Our naiveté had been taken advantage of, and it would not happen again.

*From the personal experience monograph by CPT Jeff Wilbur, who served as a platoon leader, Delta Company, 1-325th, 82d Airborne Division, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.*

DISCUSSION: The situation that CPT Wilbur encountered is a common occurrence on the modern battlefield. Soldiers and leaders are continually confronted with civilians on the battlefield and must make rapid decisions that will affect the unit’s security. The individual with the donkey was not armed and did not display a hostile intent towards friendly units but was conducting reconnaissance. When confronted with a situation like this, leaders and Soldiers must decide to use lethal force to stop the individual, risk American Soldiers by moving forward to detain the individual, or to observe the individual’s movements and actions. To rapidly react to these situations, Soldiers and leaders must be fully informed about current operations and thoroughly trained in the rules of engagement.

On 3 April 2003, the 3d BDE of the 3d ID had entered the outskirts of Baghdad, Iraq.

Although we were literally in Baghdad, we were not in a traditional urban environment; instead, we were in a
well-vegetated farming area approximately 15 kilometers outside of the city center. There were approximately 40 single-story homes interspersed among large open fields. Our area of operations measured approximately three square kilometers. I was leading a Bradley Fighting Vehicle platoon that had been task organized to the tank company in our battalion for the entire war.

In this area, we encountered what appeared to have been an abandoned tank regiment and estimated that the Republican Guard had abandoned these tanks within hours of our arrival. Two BMPs still had some crew remaining who attempted to engage us with direct fire, but we immediately destroyed them. We assumed that meant remnants of the enemy were still nearby.

Sure enough, we began to receive sporadic suppressive fire from small arms, machine guns, and rocket propelled grenades. It was impossible to ascertain the exact location from where it came, so our commander ordered our Infantry platoon to clear buildings in the farming village. Our platoon destroyed a van carrying seven armed insurgents as it sped through our checkpoint, while proceeding to systematically clear the homes and buildings in the farming community. We found signs of insurgents everywhere, from abandoned uniforms of the Iraqi Army to small weapons caches inside the homes.

At approximately 1900 hrs., as I was speaking with a local farmer, my platoon sergeant yelled to me from the Bradleys: “Sir, the Commander is in trouble!” We quickly remounted our vehicles, and my PSG explained the situation to me as we moved about two kilometers through irrigated farmland and houses to the CO’s location. The CO and XO were conducting a leaders’ reconnaissance of the local area that we would occupy that night. They entered a very wet area, and the ground gave way, sending the 60-ton M1A2 Abrams tank on
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its side into a ravine, rendering the main gun and mounted .50 cal inoperable. Local insurgents immediately attempted to capitalize on the situation. The Commander calmly engaged them but was at a decided disadvantage. We maneuvered our four Bradleys and quickly established a defensive perimeter. As daylight waned, the mechanics brought in two M88s to retrieve the tank. With 22 Soldiers on the ground, we established sectors of fire, identified target reference points, determined mortar targets, and established priorities of work.

Throughout the night, while the mechanics worked with the two M88s to retrieve the tank, we received sporadic gunfire, but it never posed a serious threat. My Platoon Sergeant, SFC Ohlemann, had most of the enemy actions in his sector. He expertly employed his section to destroy the enemy in their hide positions and as they attempted to maneuver on our positions by low crawling through a field. Meanwhile, I took Infantrymen to set into hasty battle positions and provide additional observation, using our NVGs and our Javelin CLUs. At this point, we had been awake for over 32 hours, since the previous morning. At approximately 0800 hrs. the tank was fully recovered, and we maneuvered to link up with the company and prepare on our next mission.

From the personal experience monograph of 1LT Sean Morrow, who served as a platoon leader, B TM, 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: When conducting troop-leading procedures, company and team commanders need to plan for the security of battle damaged or stuck vehicles, recovery of injured Soldiers, and recovery of the combat vehicles. This is a combined arms
operation that requires leaders to plan and synchronize numerous battlefield operating systems, with the focus centered on security. A secure perimeter must be established using maneuver and fire support assets. The area secured must be large enough to allow medical evacuation and vehicle recovery assets to operate with little or no influence from enemy combatants. After the perimeter is established, the unit will then conduct the evacuation of injured Soldiers and the combat vehicle. The requirement for the unit in contact to secure the recovery assets is not complete until the recovery assets have returned to a secure area or have been passed to another unit responsible for providing security. This causes the unit in contact to employ even more combat power for a short period.

Due to outstanding Soldier discipline, training, and leadership, the Soldiers of 3d Platoon quickly reacted and prevented the loss of life or combat power. This action shows that the importance of tactical logistics cannot be stressed enough when conducting offensive operations against an asymmetric threat. The failure to recover a combat vehicle would have degraded the combat power of the company/team and provided the enemy with additional weapons, ammunition, communication equipment, and a tool for international propaganda.

Combat recovery operations are resource intensive and time consuming but are critical to mission success. Units can ensure their success by planning for and training for combat vehicle recovery operations, with a focus on security operations, prior to combat operations.

The 1st BN, 505th PIR, 82nd Airborne Division, was given responsibility for Fallujah, Iraq, on 11 September 2003. Its task was to secure Fallujah to allow support and stability operations to be conducted in the area.
I was appointed the Battalion’s Liaison Officer for Civil Military Operations and rebuilding the government of the city. Being the Liaison Officer involved going into the city every day to check on the mayor and how he was running the city, as well as to hear about the problems of the city’s people.

On 2 October 2003, my liaison team and I were to conduct a routine council meeting with the mayor and some sheiks at the Fallujah Government Compound. The team consisted of CPT Cirino, the HHC Commander who handled security; SPC Dudin, an Arab-American, who was a medic but acted as a translator; two rifle platoons; an Anti-Tank platoon; an Army Reserve Civil Affairs team; an Army Reserve vertical engineering team; and me. We had Infantry patrols, moving two to three blocks out from the meeting location, and protective positions overwatching the two major buildings in the government compound.

One of the Infantry patrols, just across the street to the south of the government compound, surprised an Iraqi rebel moving into position with an RPK machine gun. The rebel yelled, “Allah Akbar” (Allah or God be praised) and fired at our patrol. The rounds hit the lead Soldier in his ammo pouch and knocked him down; the team leader then fired two rounds in the Iraqi insurgent’s chest, wounding him.

I was just about to start the meeting when this happened. Hearing the shots, I went to the front hall of the building just as other Iraqis who were trying to attack us engaged. The rest of the enemy force was using the apartment complex across the street as its attack by fire position. The building provided an elevated advantage against us and was a good attack by fire position. However, they were not expecting that the U.S. patrol would surprise their other gunner as he was moving to the building next door.
Our patrol maneuvered to a protected position, while I went out the side door and repositioned at the front wall of the compound across from the enemy. Our Soldiers, while still under enemy fire, carried the wounded enemy Iraqi to the government office. The U.S. positions on the rooftop and those of us who were on the ground level covered their movement and suppressed the enemy on top of the apartment. We suppressed the enemy and perhaps killed the insurgents there; however, we also had some direct fire engage the complex where there were noncombatants. Our Soldiers then lifted fire, the platoon that was across the street cleared the building from where the enemy was firing, and we seized control of the area.

However, a female civilian on the third floor was wounded in the neck, and the public outcry was immediate. It appeared that we had won the fight but not the battle. We got permission from her brother-in-law to treat her, so we didn’t break cultural law. Then we called in the battalion surgeon, and he helped the woman. The next day, we brought food and supplies to the complex. Over the course of the next few months, we strengthened our relationship with the residents by bringing them clothes, food, and toys.

From the personal experience monograph of ILT Ryan Edward Huston, Sr. who served as Liaison Officer for 1st Battalion, 505th PIR, 82nd ABN DIV, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: Security, a Principle of War, is fundamental to all operations. In this example, the leader chooses to secure a site by having both overwatching security and Infantry security patrols maneuver throughout the area of operations.

The patrol secured the meeting and its attendees, both American and Iraqi. The aggressive and alert Infantrymen on
patrol located an insurgent moving to a position of advantage and disrupted a planned enemy ambush on the meeting attendees. Their actions prevented the enemy from establishing an interlocking base of fire on the friendly forces. Of primary importance, the patrol’s actions stole the initiative from the enemy on that day and tipped the balance in favor of the U.S. forces. By losing the initiative, the insurgents were unable to act on their timeline and lost the tactical advantage over the Americans. Finally, the patrol’s unexpected presence forced the enemy to fight in two directions. The added threat of Infantrymen maneuvering from an unanticipated direction during the engagement certainly helped to both shorten the fight and prevent not only U.S. casualties, but also further civilian casualties.

The value of a security patrol in an urban environment cannot be overstated since the terrain is complex and observation is very limited. Although necessary in a complete security plan, even observation posts on top of a building have a limited effect in many places. In this instance, local static security elements alone would not have detected the first insurgent, and the outcome of this fight could have been much different. As forces fight in urban environments and against an asymmetric threat, security patrols must become part of the overall security plan for all elements from the squad-sized observation post to the brigade combat team forward operating base.

The excellent security plan led to the enemy’s failure on that day in Fallujah. All leaders must develop robust, aggressive security measures to ensure mission success and force protection in all operations.

October 27, 2003, marked the end of R&R—a four-day rotation to Qatar—for 95 soldiers in the 173rd Airborne
Brigade. Soldiers going on R&R would ride buses down to Balad then fly from Balad to Qatar. The buses that dropped those Soldiers off would take other Soldiers coming from R&R north to Kirkuk.

After a C-130 flight into Balad from Qatar, we boarded buses for the four-hour trip back to Kirkuk in northern Iraq. The route we were taking, Highway 4 through Tikrit, was considered by all to be very dangerous. Before departing, SFC Juan Pena and I gave a mission brief to alert the Soldiers of the possibility of being engaged and actions to take on contact. Each Soldier had his own weapon, plus a weapon from the Soldiers going on R&R. There was also one set of additional body armor per man from the incoming Soldiers. We stuffed that armor between the seats and the side of the bus, to include its windows, for added protection. At the conclusion of the brief and bus preparation, I informed 1LT Diggs, the Convoy Commander, that we had accountability. We started movement toward the main gate. Before exiting, we kept in the back of our minds that the Balad Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD) had a recent history of mortar attacks within its perimeter, affirming to us that some of the local population was opposed to the U.S. presence.

Our convoy included three locally contracted buses, two cargo HMMWVs, two 5-tons with logistical packages, and one HMMWV gun truck. The gun truck took the lead, followed by a bus, a cargo HMMWV, the bus with SFC Pena and me, the other cargo HMMWV, the last bus, and then the 5-ton trucks.

Five kilometers north of Balad APOD, on Highway 4, we heard a loud explosion. The gun truck in the lead and the bus in front of us disappeared into a large cloud of black smoke. I directed the driver to stop the bus while SFC Pena directed the 30 Soldiers to dismount from the bus. As we quickly exited the
bus, I took half of the Soldiers on the bus with me to clear the left side of the road, while SFC Pena took the other half to clear the right. As we moved forward, I noticed there were very few Iraqi residents who were present at the site, and most of those were women and children. None were armed or running; none were celebrating what had happened. Everyone in the direct vicinity of the explosion was carrying out his daily routine as if nothing had happened. Nobody, at the time, was suspicious or showed probable cause for detainment.

As we continued forward, the smoke began to clear, and I could see the gun truck pulling off to the left side of the road. The gunner, who had been positioned behind the .50 cal., was not present behind the weapon. The bus behind the gun truck was attempting to maneuver off to the right side of the road. As SFC Pena’s element and my element moved forward toward the explosion site, we could see a U.S. Soldier limping toward the gun truck. It was the gunner, a SPC from our Forward Support Company (FSC). His Platoon Leader, 1LT Diggs, reached him first and evaluated his condition. As I approached them, the SPC stated that he had been thrown from his truck by the blast but was OK. I left them to go examine the blast site. There was blown wire that led to the side of the road but no sign of a detonation device. The explosion left no cratering effects to the pavement, which meant that it was simply laid there and had not been dug in. Size or type of the explosive was unknown.

While we finished securing the area, Soldiers on the first bus detained two Iraqi men for being in the direct vicinity of the blast. They would be making the ride with us back to Kirkuk for questioning. Elements from the 4th Infantry Division that were moving south along Highway 4 stopped to give assistance. While they helped us with security, the bus driver from Bus 1 was telling 1LT Diggs that his bus had broke down.
and that he could not make the trip. This was seemingly an excuse, so we forced him to show us the problem. Somehow, the clutch on the bus did not work; therefore, the bus would only be drivable at 20-30km an hour. We had seen this tactic in the past as a way to slow movement for anti-coalition forces to easily ambush a convoy. Since we had no expertise on fixing the bus or figuring out the problem, we took all 31 Soldiers who were on Bus 1 and the two detainees and cross loaded them onto the vehicles that were still functional.

The pending crisis we now faced was time. We had departed from Balad at 1430 hrs. which would have gotten us to Kirkuk before dark. However, forty-five additional minutes were lost to securing the site and cross loading soldiers which meant that our route through the ridgeline past Tikrit would be in darkness. The ridgeline was known as a perfect ambush site for the enemy due to its mountainous terrain. As we departed for Kirkuk, 1LT Diggs reported the incident to the 173rd Brigade TOC, and our convoy continued on through Tikrit.

As we entered the ridgeline, the sun crept behind the mountains. All of the Soldiers in the convoy stood poised for the worst, but we entered Kirkuk Airbase at 1930 hrs. without being engaged. I reported to our Battalion Headquarters, briefed the XO about the incident, and stated that there needed to be an alternate mode of transportation for Soldiers going on R&R. Buses carrying Soldiers to Balad along a dangerous route, with little security and at the same time every week, would eventually be costly. We began discussing the air assets, which were limited, but our conversation was cut short to react to a 107mm rocket hitting 150 meters from our TOC.

A week later, as the acting Company Commander, I received a report that two of our Soldiers, PV2 Jacob Fletcher and SGT Joseph Minucci, were being evacuated for injuries sustained from an IED while riding back on the bus from R&R.
The only information we received was that they were litter urgent. At 0630 the following morning, LTC Caraccilo, our Battalion Commander; CSM Rice, the Battalion Sergeant Major; and Chaplain Wheatley arrived at our safehouse to inform 1SG Nick Rolling and me that Minucci and Fletcher had died from their wounds.

From the personal experience monograph by 1LT Steve Brignoli, who served as XO of Chosen Company, 2-503rd Infantry (Airborne), 173rd Airborne Brigade, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: In this example, the unit is faced with a common problem on the asymmetric battlefield: how to ensure security for routine convoys when there are limited routes available. Every Soldier learns that patrols have to vary their routes and times to prevent the enemy from patterning our behavior and targeting us; however, in many situations, it is neither possible nor practical to adhere to this fundamental principle.

The most obvious challenges in varying convoy times and routes are that there may not be additional trafficable routes or there may be operational reasons for not using different routes. In those instances, units must stagger departure times and induce uncertainty into the enemy’s plan. However, in the end, varying routes or staggering times are passive measures and will not adequately increase security if used alone. Additionally, as our forces tend to operate from forward operating bases, the routes into and out of these bases are known and are almost certainly being observed, and our movement on them likely serves as triggers for enemy actions.

Another technique is to permanently secure the route. This requires a significant commitment in terms of manpower and
time. If the commander determines the route is critical to the unit after conducting mission analysis, he can fully commit a unit to secure the route. Through a series of observation posts (OPs), sniper positions, and well-planned patrols, the commander can make the route reasonably safe for large convoys. An enemy facing this threat is unable to establish complex ambushes, and he cannot emplace effective improvised explosive devices on the route. The OPs serve an additional function of providing quick reaction forces that are already deployed in the AO and can quickly respond to any incident on the route or in the immediate vicinity.

If the commander determines that he does not want to secure the route permanently, he must take actions to induce uncertainty in the enemy’s decision cycle. The first step in this is to identify likely ambush and overwatch locations and the routes into them. Next the commander has to commit combat power directed against these likely areas, which can be done by increasing patrols on a route, establishing both overt and covert OPs, and using snipers at key locations. After the enemy is ambushed where he previously acted with impunity, he will often move to another area or he will expose himself to our fire and be destroyed.

Despite a commander’s active measures, he must still ensure that his Soldiers are properly protected and that passive measures are being used as much as possible. Every Soldier must wear all available protective equipment, and vehicles must be armored to the greatest extent available.

This vignette illustrates the challenge that our forces face every day in Iraq in that large convoys, moving both personnel and materiel, are important to all forward deployed units. Ensuring these convoys arrive safely at their destination requires deliberate planning with a tactical focus on security. Commanders have many methods to choose from, but, in the
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end, they must analyze the enemy’s tactics and design a security plan that best protects their Soldiers.

CONCLUSION: To summarize, our forces cannot permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage. The ultimate goal of security operations is to protect the force against surprise and reduce the unknowns in any situation.
INTRODUCTION: Soldiers communicate to provide accurate and timely information to those who need it. Information is key in helping commanders to successfully execute combat operations. It enables leaders to achieve situational understanding, make decisions, and give orders. As you will read in this chapter, poor communication will adversely affect mission accomplishment and can possibly cost lives.

Good communication does not necessarily come naturally; like everything else we do, it must be trained. Leaders must demand accurate reports, develop and use effective procedures for transmitting information, and ensure they communicate effectively to their superiors, peers, and subordinates.

In the spring of 2002, the 2-14th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, deployed to Kosovo, and its reconnaissance platoon was often placed under the operational control of the rifle companies to search the perimeters of buildings and towns for illegal items—weapons or drugs—while the rifle companies conducted searches of the houses and buildings. Usually, these perimeter searches would occur from the immediate vicinity of the buildings to approximately 300 to 500 meters away from them, terrain dependent.
It was in the capacity of a perimeter search team that we were being used on a Saturday morning in April, 2002. We were placed under the operational control of C Company, 1-30 Infantry, a mechanized Infantry company that was attached to Task Force 2-14 Infantry throughout the deployment. The three platoons in C/1-30 would search the interior of houses throughout one sector of Petrovce. My reconnaissance platoon had the responsibility of searching the western side of Petrovce, from its southern boundary to the main east-west road located approximately halfway through town, a road that did not extend into the hills to the west where we were to search. This meant our northern boundary would be a subjective, imaginary line east of town.

This imaginary line was significant because the 13th Russian Tactical Group (TG), the unit responsible for the entire area we were searching, was responsible for the search north of the boundary.

Following the completion of this uneventful mission, we headed for the battalion TOC because that is where CPT Taylor, Commander of C/1-30, had ended up at this point of the operation. Driving north along the town’s main street, across a short and narrow bridge, we passed a squad of Russian Soldiers sitting on a BTR—a Russian wheeled armored vehicle—in the middle of the town square. There was no room to turn around, so I informed my Platoon Sergeant and squad leaders to stay put while I dismounted to find the command group. I located the Assistant S3 within a few minutes, and, as soon as he saw me, I recognized that he was somewhat frantic, hurriedly asking me why I wasn’t still up on the hill. One of the Kiowa helicopters had spotted a man walking west out of the town with a rifle. No other information was forthcoming, just a directive to get back up on the hill to apprehend and disarm this man. As I was turning to head back to the platoon, the
Assistant S3 mentioned that the Russians, along with an unknown number of Special Forces soldiers, were already looking for the suspect.

I assembled my subordinate leaders once I was within eyesight and unfurled my map on the hood of a HMMWV to brief the platoon. One squad would maneuver from a draw heading west that we had previously identified as our northern boundary. The squad was to move west up the draw and try to turn the suspect north into the other squad. The other squad was to maneuver directly uphill in a northwest direction, placing it in a position to have the suspect moved into it and simultaneously preventing him from heading back east into town. I would move up the middle, back from the squads but within visual contact of them and thus better able to control movement.

Within 500 meters, SSG Tuttle had run into the Russians. They were now moving north and into the avenues I had designated for my squads. Instead of letting this become an issue, SSG Tuttle began turning his squad to the north, earlier than I had anticipated, but fine under the circumstances. Within another 400 meters, we would be up onto flatter ground, and, if the Russians had already cleared west up the hill and were turning, then the suspect had to be to the north and closer to my platoon. If SSG Tuttle and the Russians were on line heading north, then SSG Wilkes would be in position, waiting for the suspect when he came out onto the open ground.

As for SSG Wilkes, he had moved up the steep slope to the northwest and, by heading more immediately uphill, had already reached the plateau atop the hill. Unbeknownst to me, upon cresting the hill, one of the helicopter pilots had spotted him and landed to tell him which way the suspect had headed. The pilot told Wilkes that the suspect was approximately 600 meters northwest of Wilkes’ current position. SSG Wilkes,
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extremely spent from going straight up 800-1000 meters in Interceptor body armor, Kevlar, and load bearing equipment, didn't ask the pilot what the suspect was wearing, what type of weapon he had, or what he looked like. The pilot took off without having offered the information.

I called the TOC and requested a description of the suspect. “Orange shirt, black pants” was the response. As I approached the plateau, I simultaneously called SSG Wilkes to relay the suspect’s description. “Orange shirt, black pants,” I said. “We got him!” was his response. I tried to calmly tell him over the radio to proceed with caution and take no chances with this man. Then he told me that he didn't quite have him yet, that he only had visual contact with him. A moment before, I believed the ordeal was over. Now, being told that he was not in our custody yet, I pictured SSG Tuttle heading north in hot pursuit, probably unable to monitor my transmissions with SSG Wilkes. Immediately to his west would be a gaggle of Russian Soldiers and, on top of all of it, an unknown number of Special Forces Soldiers. Just as I was about to tell SSG Wilkes to hold tight while I tried to contact SSG Tuttle, Wilkes came over the radio to tell me that he had indeed physically apprehended the suspect.

The prisoner made it to the TOC and was interrogated. My platoon searched the area where the suspect had been apprehended as well as multiple routes leading up the hill. No rifle or any other type of contraband was ever found, and the suspect ended up being a mentally challenged individual, probably incapable of committing an act of violence. The helicopter pilots claimed that they never reported any weapons, and no one in the TOC knew from where that report came. Our adrenaline-charged pursuit of an armed and potentially dangerous suspect quickly became an embarrassing case of
misidentification and miscommunication, based on incomplete intelligence.

From the personal experience monograph by Captain Matthew R. James, who served as a reconnaissance platoon leader in 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: Reporting of accurate information is critical to shaping a unit’s situational understanding. Units can ensure proper reports by being observant, using proper formats, and updating information as soon as possible. In this vignette, the reconnaissance platoon received incomplete information, which originated in the TOC, and then the information was not properly communicated to the reconnaissance platoon and the helicopter pilots.

Battle captains must develop an organized and effective way of collecting spot reports and producing significant activities and then employ an easily understood format to communicate the information so it is understood by all. Communicating the information using the SALUTE format—size, activity, location, uniform, time, and equipment—would have ensured the reconnaissance platoon received all of the information it needed. In addition, units should consider having helicopter pilots on the same frequency, so the pilots do not have to leave their highly efficient reconnaissance and surveillance platforms to land and coordinate with units on the ground, thus, increasing the pilots’ risk. Reporting of information is critical to shaping a unit’s situational understanding and enabling the commander’s decisions.

On 26 March 2003, the 3d BDE of the 3d ID was performing line of communication security near As
Samwah, while other elements of the division advanced north towards Karbala. The writer’s platoon was part of an Armor combat team, and his platoon was at full strength, with 38 Soldiers and 4 vehicles.

We woke that morning and received plans to attack a known Fedayeen camp. The camp was approximately ten kilometers away--through urban terrain. As we began to move, the dust that was swirling did not seem like the typical Middle East sandstorm. The storm built into what historians later said was the worst sandstorm in 900 years. An eerie red dust covered everything, and our observation was only about ten meters at best. We approached within about two kilometers of the camp and set into an assault position near a rail yard. Our Infantrymen got out of the Bradleys, and, although they were only yards away, I could not see them. The company commander decided we would wait for the storm to lift. The storm held, and, after about four hours, the mission was aborted.

We made our way back to the assembly area by way of Highway 8, right through the heart of As Samwah. The order from the previous day was to not decisively engage small pockets of enemy resistance on the sides of the roads but rather to pass the target from one vehicle to the next as we moved in convoy. This order made more sense on this day because, if anyone conducted a battle drill, we would have immediately broken visual contact with the rest of the company due to limited visibility.

Due to the treacherous weather conditions, a scout section from another unit had become separated from its element. Our commander made contact with the section leader and told him to fall into our movement formation, and we could return the section to their battalion. Suddenly, a call came over the net
that two truckloads of Fedayeen were coming our way on HWY 8. As the trucks appeared out of the red dust clouds, their AK-47s and RPGs became visible.

Immediately our platoon engaged the enemy, and I gave the order for each BFV to stay close with the vehicle to its front. I was outside of the turret and gave the command to fire as soon as the enemy was acquired. As the enemy fired their machine gun, I dropped into the turret and looked through the sight. After telling my gunner to continue engaging, I got back out of the turret to look at my other section, which was behind me, to assess the situation. I saw SFC Ohleman, my PSG, directly behind me, engaging an enemy machine gun position. He calmly rode high in the turret and destroyed both truck-mounted Fedayeen and a pre-existing ambush position.

As we destroyed the two trucks and the 10-14 personnel, the scout section pulled out from the column and began to close on the enemy. This put the scouts directly in our field of fire. Near fratricide was averted only by the quick net call of a driver who saw the 25mm round fly over and narrowly miss our scouts. Fortunately, the rounds found their target, and no American Soldiers were hurt. We ensured the enemy was destroyed and continued back to our base.

From the personal experience of 1LT Sean Morrow, who served as a platoon leader, B TM, 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: This vignette vividly describes the challenges of command and control during limited visibility. It was only the alertness and training of the Bradley driver that averted a tragic fratricide of a sister unit.
Due to the severe dust storm that occurred in late March, 2003, American forces were forced to execute a temporary halt in combat operations. Several decentralized units, such as the battalion’s scout platoon, had to join their parent battalion’s convoy along Highway 8 for better protection and support due to the lack of visibility. The scout section was attached to a company team for this purpose.

When this occurred, it would have been prudent for the company team commander to have outlined his command and control relationship with the scout section sergeant, informing him of unit-specific SOPs indicative to that company and giving him instructions on what his expectations were if they, in fact, made contact with the enemy. Based upon changing conditions of battlefield effects and troops assigned, “signals must be planned, widely disseminated, and understood by all assigned, attached, or OPCON” units. (FM 3-90.1) Had the company commander done this, the scout section may have chosen a different course of action, rather than to violate the surface danger zones of the adjacent infantry platoon executing a react-to-contact battle drill.

Further, 1LT Morrow’s platoon needed to execute better situation reports to his commander, as well as adjacent units, to inform them of his intentions to initiate direct fire contact with the approaching Fedayeen troops. “A platoon leader who encounters an enemy force immediately sends a contact report to the company commander and then updates him with a SITREP once contact has been executed.” These reports serve to “keep higher headquarters and adjacent units informed of changes in the situation” (FM 3-90.1). Had 1LT Morrow done this IAW the company SOP, the scout section may have been alerted to the Infantry platoon’s actions and not have risked masking friendly fire.
Good command and control SOPs, guidelines, and reporting procedures serve to bolster force protection and enhance situational awareness, especially when the combat situation is further obscured by the elements and an asymmetric enemy.

CONCLUSION: Leaders must ensure that their intent is understood by their subordinates. In fluid situations, as we have seen here, the leader must make an extra effort to ensure his intent is understood and that he has the information to make timely and accurate decisions. The more complex the situation—due to likely enemy contact, terrain challenges, or adverse weather—the more important it is for the commander to specify his intent and issue clear and concise orders to subordinates.
CHAPTER 11: *Patrolling*

When the enemy is at ease, be able to weary him; when well fed, starve him; when at rest, to make him move. Appear at places at which he must hasten; move swiftly where he does not expect you.

Sun Tzu
*The Art of War*, c. 500 BC

INTRODUCTION: A patrol is, by definition, a detachment of forces sent out for the purpose of gathering information or carrying out a destructive, harassing, mopping-up, or security mission. A patrol is an operation that performs small unit actions. Throughout this book, the reader sees various examples of patrolling; in fact, an entire book could be written on what we have learned about patrolling from our current operations in Iraq and in Afghanistan.

The principles of patrolling are planning, reconnaissance, control, security, and common sense. Like any other operation, the leader must plan the patrol from beginning to end, to include any contingencies that may arise during the conduct of the patrol. Route reconnaissance must be conducted to minimize those contingencies that may disrupt the mission. Control measures, to include communications and security, must also be developed and clearly communicated. Finally, common sense must play a role; there must be a clear task and purpose for the patrol, with a clearly defined end-state.

In June, 2001, the 2-502d Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, was tasked to prevent the movement of weapons across the Kosovo-Macedonia border.
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The task of halting the movement of arms into Macedonia fell to our battalion. Given that our battalion also had to police a large area of southern Kosovo, we could not move our entire battalion to the border. The terrain at the border made the situation much more difficult. The mountains by themselves were large and steep, with any number of tree-covered ridges jutting out toward the Kosovo plain beneath. The best maps available showed dozens of trails crossing through the mountains, but behind every ridge lay more unmapped trails waiting to be discovered. In many cases, due to the thick vegetation, our forces only discovered these trails when they moved onto them through the wood line. At the bottom of each ridge, the vegetation was thick enough to seriously impede even foot movement, but there were almost always trails, many of them large enough to allow passage of sport utility vehicles crossing through these thick woods.

We could not confine our efforts to any specific type of trail or area along the border. Weapons smuggling was the one activity in Kosovo that crossed ethnic lines, and we were unable to develop any information on weapons movement from inside Kosovo. In early June, our initial deployment along the border centered on populated areas and along the main crossing sites into Macedonia. We maintained platoon-sized formations along the main ridgelines throughout the sector, and the Brigade Reconnaissance Troop (BRT) from 3rd ID patrolled the rugged terrain to the west. At night, the platoons reorganized into squads to block along the trails. Additional squads from the peacekeeping base camps maneuvered up to the border at night to further block the border. This initial array of forces was not successful. Signals and human intelligence from our Headquarters indicated that the weapons smugglers were continuing to operate unimpeded within our sector.
C Company, the company that controlled the center of the battalion’s sector, was the company that was most tied to the populated areas, allowing the smugglers to bypass those areas by following trails in the surrounding low ground. C Company initially maintained two platoon-sized base camps on the border, one at Mijack and one at Debelde. The base at Debelde blocked the main road between Macedonia and Kosovo in the region. Within sight of Debelde was the platoon at Mijack. The platoon at Mijack blocked nothing more than a few trails that led directly into the “teeth” of the Macedonian border force. The platoon on Mijack was not allowed to deploy outside its defensive positions at night, which effectively prevented it from blocking any of the arms flow into Macedonia.

With the bulk of our forces confined to base camps along the border, the majority of our movement took place during daylight when no smugglers were moving. The Brigade Reconnaissance Team patrols to the west of Mijack did not find any significant signs of activity. However, the patrols between A Company’s position at Letnica and the C Company’s position on Debelde frequently found fresh tracks on the trails, and the occasional night-time fire fights in the area on the Macedonian side of the border seemed to indicate that this was the main area of weapons smuggling into Macedonia. We would need to shift our forces if we were going to successfully block the movement of arms across the border. The platoon on Mijack, established opposite a Macedonian platoon, was doing little more than reassuring the Macedonian Army of U.S. intentions. As the position was only accessible by helicopter, it was also a significant logistical burden. The decision was made to abandon the position on Mijack and shift our forces further east. With this decision, we suddenly found sufficient forces to seriously begin the task of blocking the border. The squads on the border began
conducting daylight mounted and Infantry patrols through the mountains to identify the crossing points into Macedonia. At night, our squads would establish ambush positions along the trails identified during the day. As our intelligence about the activities near the border increased, our patrols began to have their first successes.

Toward the end of June, 2001, the Battalion Scouts, operating along the border, intercepted a convoy of seven sport utility vehicles moving along an unmarked trail. The scout teams identified likely crossing sites during the day and then concealed themselves in the woods using standard ambush techniques. As the vehicles approached, the scout teams moved from the wood line and secured the front and rear vehicles in the convoy. The sudden appearance of armed Soldiers moving out of the woods along the border took the smugglers completely by surprise. With no way of maneuvering their vehicles, the convoy and all of the smugglers were caught. The convoy contained everything from machine guns and rockets to uniforms and boots. It was the largest weapons seizure during the operation.

The battalion averaged one large weapons seizure a week until mid-August, when all activity in the area stopped. With the success of the border closure, all guerilla activity around Kumanovo ground to a halt. The guerillas were able to continue their operations around Tetovo, using supply routes through Albania and portions of Kosovo not controlled by U.S. forces.

From the personal experience monograph of CPT Eric Greek, who served with 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.
DISCUSSION: In this summary of the 2-502 Infantry’s operations along the Kosovo-Macedonia border, we see the practical application of our intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process. The IPB process focuses our analysis and evaluation of our forces, our threat or enemy forces, and our terrain and weather. The IPB process is a continuous process that begins upon mission receipt and is not completed until the operation is determined to be completed.

The subordinate units of the 2-502 Infantry used both static positions and patrols to confirm smuggling routes. They not only used existing maps to plan patrol routes, but also took advantage of debriefs that further developed the analysis and understanding of the terrain and, more specifically, the aspects of terrain—avenues of approach. It was this continuous analysis of the terrain, signals intelligence, and human intelligence that led the unit to understand when and where the smugglers would attempt to traffic arms and equipment. This understanding of the IPB process enabled the unit to adjust and refocus combat power to prevent the smuggling of this contraband, which ultimately led to stabilization in the unit’s area of operation.

CONCLUSION: One of the chief results of any patrol’s operation is the information that it gathers. The leader must train his Soldiers in what to look for and accurate reporting techniques. Above all, analysis, planning, and effective execution are paramount in conducting successful patrols.
CHAPTER 12: Rules of Engagement

The Soldier always knows that everything he does…will be scrutinized by two classes of critics—by the government that employs him and by the enemies of the government.

Field Marshall Viscount Slim
Unofficial History, 1959

INTRODUCTION: Operational requirements, policy, and law define rules of engagement (ROE). Effective ROE are enforceable, understandable, tactically sound, and legally sufficient. They are also responsive to the mission and permit subordinate commanders and Soldiers to exercise initiative when confronted by opportunity or unforeseen circumstances. In all situations, the rules of engagement recognize the right to self-defense; the commander’s right and obligation to protect assigned personnel; and the national right to defend U.S. forces, allies, and coalition partners against armed attack. In all situations, Soldiers and commanders use the degree of force that is militarily necessary, proportional to the threat, and prudent for future operations.

From 25 August until 3 October, 1993, Task Force Ranger conducted seven combat missions in Mogadishu, Somalia. The seventh and final mission, on 3-4 October, known as “The Battle of the Black Sea,” was the catalyst for a change in the United States’ policy in Somalia. What began as capture of some of Mahamed Farah Aideed’s lieutenants escalated when Somali RPG fire destroyed two Blackhawk helicopters, and TF Ranger went to their rescue, while defeating attacks by thousands of armed Somalis. During the battle, which would be the most intense
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fighting seen by American forces since the Vietnam War, 18 American Soldiers were killed, and 83 were wounded. The International Red Cross estimated that Somali casualty figures exceeded 1,000.

Every Ranger studied the Rules of Engagement (ROE), yet there was still confusion as to who would be regarded as a noncombatant. Some Somalis were allowed to carry weapons, as the Red Cross and other humanitarian agencies hired locals to provide security against looting gangs and militia.

During the fight, while securing the area around the first destroyed Blackhawk, Freedom Road and the adjoining alley had become a killing zone. AK-47 bullets flew overhead with a loud pop, punctuated by the shriek of Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs). As the Rangers fought to keep the crowds back, target identification was becoming a problem. There were combatants mixed in the crowds of non-combatants. Women and children were screaming and running at us from all directions. Some of them had weapons, ranging from machine guns to small knives and machetes, and some did not.

Some men would stand near the corners of buildings. They looked like they were non-combatants observing the action. Other men, unknown to us, hid around the corner, loaded a weapon, and handed it to the man who was in sight. The man in sight would then fire the weapon as fast as he could, hand it back to the loader, and just smile and wave his hands at us. Women would walk in front of the men, acting as human shields. The men would fire weapons from behind and under the armpits of the women as they both walked toward us.

The Soldiers did not know what to do at first. Some Soldiers yelled across the streets at me, asking what to do. Small children had weapons and sometimes were more of a threat because they had no fear.
Meanwhile, at my position, small crowds of Somalis had begun to form. The crowd was mostly men and women, curious to find out who had just landed in their neighborhood. We cleared them out of the way by gesturing and throwing flash bang grenades. Gradually, the direct fire around the area began to increase. Shortly after scattering the curiosity seekers, my blocking position began to receive sporadic fire from the south and west. I diverted my attention from the radio and concentrated on the fight at hand. No one in my chalk could identify exactly where the fire was coming from, but I could see that the AH-6 Little Bird helicopters were engaging enemy targets to the south with their 7.62 caliber mini-guns.

The situation became even more intense when a woman stepped out into the street south of our location and began walking toward us with her arms outstretched. Behind the woman was a man with an AK-47, apparently using her as a human shield. PFC Heard cried out, “I can see him. Right behind her. He’s got an AK.” PFC Heard fired a long burst from his M60 machine gun, killing the two Somalis.

A couple of minutes later, several children walked out and began pointing out our locations. Not wanting to take any chances, I placed several well-aimed shots at the feet of the children and sent them running for cover. Bullets began cracking over our heads from the east, and my other M60 gunner, SPC Hawley, fired in the general direction of the enemy fire. Another burst of fire impacted mere feet from
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SPC Hawley, but he still continued to engage enemy targets down the street.

By this time, almost everyone in my chalk began to engage armed Somalis as they ran out into the streets. Somalis were firing RPGs at us and the helicopters overhead from every direction. Out of the corner of my eye, I spotted a woman carrying an RPG across the street about 150 meters away. I aimed my CAR-15 and fired three rounds. The first shot was behind her, but the next two found their mark, and the woman fell down in a heap.

From personal experience monograph by CPT Larry D. Perino, who served as a platoon leader in Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA..

DISCUSSION: In 1993, to an Army finally recovered from Vietnam, with many of its Soldiers and leaders being post-Vietnam recruits, lessons concerning ROE had to be relearned. The importance of these lessons are magnified because of the close scrutiny the contemporary media places on our Soldiers in combat zones, which has lent itself to the new phrase, “don’t make a mistake at the tactical level that has strategic repercussions.”

Rangers Di Tomasso and Perino both provide excellent personal examples of why Law of Land Warfare training has become so important in recent years. In fact, their experiences, if not their names, are known throughout the force because, in ROE training, the lawyer conducting it will cite these examples, or the Soldiers hearing the brief will question the lawyer about the “what ifs” included here.

This vignette enables the reader to visualize the absolute chaos that is encountered on the battlefield. The application of
the ROE mitigates the chaos—the “fog of war”—that Soldiers routinely encounter on the battlefield. It is imperative that the leadership identifies combatants from noncombatants and translates this information without confusing the Soldier on the ground. By strictly adhering to and training on ROE, this is successfully accomplished.

Enemy forces who conduct themselves like this are not planning on the American Soldiers mistakenly firing, but on their hesitancy and, thus, tactical mistake in not firing. They know a child or a woman carries an emotional, cultural, and psychological reflex in most people and certainly Americans. The enemy knows that, regardless of the level of training, experience, or maturity of the individual involved in the situation, except with the most callous person, there will be a hesitancy. Every ROE incorporates the right of self-defense, from the smallest battalion deployment to the overarching Geneva Conventions for all signatory nations, but under fire, potentially for the first time, it is easy to forget, to doubt, to question.

Thus, again, firing at an individual who has plainly demonstrated his hostile intent, regardless of age or gender, is always lawful if appropriate force is employed and has been escalated accordingly. Tactically, the mistake could only occur if appropriate force is not used (for example, criminal negligence). Operationally, strategically, or politically, a mistake in the public affairs and media relations arena could be made if we fail to protect our Soldiers by reinforcing their actions and countering the certain use of the media by the enemy.

For our Soldiers’ benefit, the easiest way of explaining it is this: the ROE always protects their right to self-defense but never justifies illegal actions. When Soldiers make the right call within these parameters, the Army will address the public
affairs. The Army does not pretend that it is an easy decision, but we train Soldiers, prepare Soldiers, and trust Soldiers to make the right call.

On April 4, 2003, A Company, 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, 3rd Brigade, 3rd ID, which had been cross-attached to 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry, 1st Brigade, 3rd ID, entered the outskirts of Saddam International Airport.

The airport complex was huge. The basic design was divided between a military side and a civilian side. The military side housed concrete reinforced hangers, military buildings, and the Iraqi Missile Defense School. Special Republican Guards were stationed throughout the airport complex, as were more air defense artillery guns than I ever imagined existed in one place. At dawn, we were to begin seizure of our objective on the airport, the VIP Terminal complex. To do so, we attacked straight up the middle of the center runway, which had been cratered and rubbled, oriented north on the control tower. To our right flank, Team 3-69 Armor was continuing its clearance of the airport. To our left flank, C/3-7 IN (M) would clear the initial portion of the military portion of the airport complex.

As I monitored progress and reported to Battalion on our status, my gunner, Staff Sergeant Diggs, interrupted me, saying that he had thermal signatures to our immediate front at about 400 meters or so. By this time, the fog limited visibility to around 250 meters or less. I dropped down, looked into the commander’s sight, and clearly saw three thermal images of men in the night site. They appeared to be standing in the tree line. I could not positively identify any weapons, so I told him to continue observing the target area.
As I said this, one began moving forward alone. As he approached out of the fog, we could see he was wearing dark colored clothing but could not see much else. He appeared unarmed but did not have his hands raised in surrender. I told my gunner again to hold fire until we could ID a weapon of some sort in accordance with our Rules of Engagement. As the man drew closer, we could see he was wearing an Iraqi military uniform but still could not see any weapon. At about 200 meters, his long trench coat moved just enough to show the barrel of an AK-47 pointing out and magazines strapped to his chest. As soon as I saw the weapon, SSG Diggs yelled, “He’s got an AK Sir!” I simultaneously shouted “Engage, Coax!” One round fired, and then the 7.62mm Coaxial Machine gun jammed. I attempted to clear the weapon twice, but it continued to jam, no longer firing at all. Quickly, I popped up, grabbing my M4 from the turret where I had it secured, and told my gunner to engage with 25mm High Explosive (HE).

My gunner engaged with several rounds HE, which impacted directly on top of the enemy soldier. Miraculously, he somehow survived and threw his rifle one way and dove into the bushes, stripping off his clothes at the same time. I do not know how this man lived. My only conclusion is that the HE was either bad or it didn’t arm since the impact was far too small for high explosive rounds. As the first enemy soldier dove out of sight, we traversed onto the other two, still at 400 meters’ range, and observed what appeared to be an RPG launcher or some other cylindrical type weapon. I ordered my gunner to engage with HE again. The fog was too thick to assess weapon effects among the trees and underbrush. I requested to move forward 200 meters, but Captain Whyte told me to hold in place and sent an Infantry squad from an adjacent platoon to my position.
DISCUSSION: Before engaging targets in limited visibility or unfavorable conditions, positive identification of the target is not only necessary, it is required. Once the target is positively identified, the leader can then assess the threat accurately and respond to the danger with appropriate force.

CPT Tagg and SSG Diggs followed the rules of engagement, while maintaining operational security and individual self-defense, by maintaining visual contact with the three enemy soldiers until CPT Tagg or SSG Diggs could identify weapons or hostile intent. SSG Diggs identified the three enemy soldiers and informed the Bradley commander prior to engaging. When CPT Tagg could not identify any weapons, he instructed SSG Diggs to maintain visual contact with the enemy. When one individual was identified wearing an Iraqi Army uniform, CPT Tagg still did not give the order to engage. Upon positive identification of weapons, CPT Tagg gave the fire command to engage the three individuals.

Following the end of major combat operations in Baghdad during May, 2003, 3-187 IN, 101st Airborne Division, was reattached to the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) from the 3rd Infantry Division and moved to positions in northern Iraq. Company A, 3-187th was given the responsibility for the small border town of Rabea’a, which was located on the Iraqi/Syrian border and controlled a main road connecting the two countries. During its seven month stay, A/3-187 essentially rebuilt every public work and component of infrastructure in the
town, to include implementing the first elections, establishing a city council, and training a new police force and border guard force. As the battalion prepared to pull forces out of sector for another task force operation, the former Alpha Company forward operating base was turned into a platoon position.

The troop-to-task ratio increased because the one remaining platoon was tasked with monitoring the previous several months’ worth of implemented systems, along with the enforcement of trade across the border at the authorized crossing site and customs house. The 1st Platoon was also tasked with augmenting the new border patrol force to limit illegal border crossings over a 75 kilometer span of border. This task required nightly U.S. and Iraqi joint patrols that occasionally were engaged in operations that frequently resembled “cat and mouse” games by both Iraqis and Syrians who had been crossing the border covertly for years. Most of the smugglers were moving benzene or cigarettes across the border and trying to make as honest a living as they could, but the occasional small weapons dealers would also attempt to cross.

At about 1400 hrs. on October 14th, 2003, a Soldier who was on the roof of our one-building compound pulling security noticed a group of men and women gathered about 150 meters to the north of the compound, on the Iraqi side of the border, acting as if they might cross over illegally or waiting for someone who was going to cross from Syria. It was extremely odd for people to cross the border illegally during the day, much less in open sight of our compound. The Soldier quickly relayed this information to the platoon command post located downstairs, and a squad (-) deployed to respond. The “reaction team” consisted of two sergeants, two M249 gunners, three
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	raiflemen, and an interpreter. This may seem like an ad hoc task organization, but each of our platoons was short on Infantrymen.

The people on the Iraqi side were quickly gathered and secured in a nearby farm pen, and the interpreter began asking them questions regarding their actions. At the same time, three men drove to within 50 meters of the border from the Syrian side. The men exited their vehicle unarmed and moved across the border into Iraq where they began to get very angry about the team’s questioning of the people. A verbal and then a physical fight ensued between the two sergeants and the three Syrians who refused numerous orders to leave the scene.

The detained Iraqis told the interpreter they had no idea who the “Syrian” men were. Meanwhile, the physical fight continued, despite the two sergeants attempting to handle it in a passive way. Every opportunity was provided for the three Syrian men to just leave, but they refused. One man did leave; however, he went back across the border into Syria and retrieved an AK47 from his van and then returned back to Iraq.

The two sergeants immediately went to a much more aggressive posture, raising their rifles at the Syrians. A stand-off at close range began as the sergeants began walking the Syrians at gunpoint back across the border. About 10-15 meters inside of Syria, one of the unarmed Syrians tried to grab a weapon away from one of the sergeants. The sergeant pushed the man back and was simultaneously shot at by the man with the AK47. The second sergeant rapidly returned fire and eliminated the close range threat. With the elimination of the threat, the situation was quickly over, as the other Syrian became completely passive.

This entire incident took place in less than 15 minutes with an ad hoc organization of a diminished squad with an Iraqi interpreter.
Chapter 12, Rules of Engagement

A very elaborate investigation followed this incident as there are obvious political ramifications involved with killing a Syrian in his country during a time when the tensions were mounting between the United States and Syria. However, the investigation found that the squad leader operated within his rules of engagement and acted accordingly.

From the personal experience monograph by SFC David J. Roels, who served as the Platoon Sergeant of 1/A/3-187th, and 1LT Jaron S. Wharton, who served as the Executive Officer for A/3-187th Infantry, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: Rules of engagement (ROE) are directives issued by the competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. The ROE impact on how Soldiers and commanders conduct operations in all military operations by imposing political, practical, operational, and legal limitations on their actions. Regardless of any restrictions imposed by the ROE, one factor is always constant: the right to self-defense.

In this vignette, we see the challenges posed by the ROE to a noncommissioned officer (NCO) in the company. One of the company’s missions entailed combat patrols of the Iraqi-Syrian border. During its patrols, the company operated in a complex, uncertain, and violent environment—which included smugglers, small arms dealers, refugees, and possibly insurgents—since the patrols would occasionally receive direct fire. These different scenarios illustrate the complexity in applying the ROE to various conditions on the border. The actions that followed are demonstrative of the NCOs in the
company applying the ROE to a potentially politically, volatile incident.

When we examine the vignette, we see a U.S. Soldier observing and then detaining a group of people on the Iraqi side of the border—much to the consternation of the Syrians who were extremely upset at the proceedings. In the meantime, a physical fight ensued between the Syrians and the NCOs; however, the NCOs responded to the Syrians’ aggression as passively as possible. At this juncture, the American Soldiers must have realized the political implications of getting involved with Syrian nationals at a time when tensions between the U.S. and Syria were tense. Furthermore, the Syrian nationals did not produce any weapons at this point to justify elevating the threat response.

Although the Syrians’ hostile acts justified the Soldiers’ use of deadly force, once the Syrian nationals had retrieved AK-47s from their vehicle and pointed them at the American NCOs, the Soldiers continued to show restraint. However, when the Syrian nationals made an attempt to wrest the weapon away from one of the NCOs and then simultaneously discharged his weapon, the American NCO responded with deadly force.

Despite the fact that the NCO showed more restraint than what the ROE required, it clearly illustrates the intent behind the ROE. The American NCOs from the company responded to each elevation of threat with logic and sound decision-making. Additionally, the NCOs understood the political implications of the ROE by using deadly force on a Syrian national in his home country. In the end, however, the inherent right to self-defense mitigated all of these factors and saved the life of the NCO and his comrades.
SPC Eric Huth, a 22 year-old Infantryman assigned to B/3-15 IN, 3rd ID, witnessed an incident in which a Bradley from his company engaged a van loaded with 19 civilians, killing and injuring many of them. SPC Huth was driving the company executive officer and was able to monitor the radio conversations between the company commander, CPT Ronny Johnson, and the platoon leader manning the roadblock.

The van approached a checkpoint but would not stop, even though the Soldiers at the roadblock held up their hands as a “HALT” signal. CPT Johnson reiterated his order for the Soldiers to halt all vehicles and not to let that van approach American positions close enough to cause casualties, should it be filled with explosives.

When the van ignored the signal to halt, CPT Johnson ordered the platoon leader to shoot at the van’s radiator and tires to make it halt. The platoon leader did that, but the van continued to advance, without slowing at all. As it approached the U.S position, the 1st Platoon Leader decided to initiate 25mm High Explosive fires to disable the van.

SPC Huth drove the Executive Officer to the site within a minute or two of the van being engaged. He witnessed the medics treating the survivors from the van and their medical evacuation. SPC Huth thought the unit had done the right thing, that there was no other way to protect U.S. Soldiers from the suicide bombers. The 1st Platoon Leader felt very bad about killing the non-combatants, but the consensus within the unit was that it was regrettable but unavoidable, given the situation.

*From a 24 MAY 03 interview with SPC Eric Huth of B Company, 3rd Battalion, 15th Infantry; included in the OIF Study Group publication *On Point*, Ch 4, pg 160.*
DISCUSSION: When conducting a traffic control point (TCP) or checkpoint, the ROE become extremely important. It is also imperative that the leadership employs a policy of escalation to meet the unknown threat that is facing its forces.

Prior to the engagement in this vignette, U.S. Soldiers in other parts of Iraq had been killed by vehicle-borne improvised explosive devises due to the leaders’ hesitation in using deadly force. Having said this, when conducting a TCP, the use of deadly force is the last resort—only used when all other means of stopping the vehicle or threat have not worked. In this vignette, the Soldiers effectively escalated the amount of force as the threat approached.

Therefore, the leaders and Soldiers of B/3-15 IN acted appropriately in accordance with the ROE. The Soldiers first showed a visual “halt” signal to the approaching van before initiating less than lethal means to stop the van. When necessary and proportional force did not stop the van, the first platoon leader made the right decision to use necessary force to stop the van before it could approach close enough to injure American Soldiers. In accordance with the ROE, the Soldiers of B/1-30 IN also provided medical care to injured civilians.

CONCLUSION: As we see from the events described in this chapter, the ROE must allow for the right of self-defense, while ensuring that the objectives of operations are met. The ROE provide a framework for decision-making within the chaos of the battlefield, and our Soldiers do a superb job of ensuring that the intent, as well as the letter, of the rules is met.
CHAPTER 13: Casualties

It is right to be very concerned about the wounded. If we neglect them, we will find the rest of the troops will deliberately not fight well, and our remissness will cause us to lose some who could have been saved.

The Emperor Maurice
The Strategikon, c. 600 AD

INTRODUCTION: Leaders have three priorities: accomplish the mission, care for Soldiers, and steward resources. Leaders are challenged to make good decisions that simultaneously accomplish each of these priorities without violating the others.

Close combat is inherently dangerous. It presents hazards to both accomplishing the mission and to caring for Soldiers. Unfortunately, there never seems to be enough qualified medically trained personnel available on the battlefield. This presents hazards to both accomplishing the mission and to caring for Soldiers, but primarily to Soldier care. Hence, the leaders’ challenge is to manage this risk. They do so by understanding and employing medical treatment and evacuation processes.

All medical operations have two basic elements—treatment and evacuation. These elements are also categories for analyzing risk. The leader must consider the following:

Risk to treatment: Risk to treatment is defined as the inability to provide the casualty with proper medical treatment which results from the wounds being beyond the capability of the medical person at the scene.

Risk to evacuation: Risk to evacuation is defined as the inability to move the casualty from point of injury to the proper medical treatment in a timely fashion. This can result from many differing factors—from presence of
enemy to lack of evacuation platforms or to time-distance factors.

The forms of treatment are complementary with the forms of evacuation. That is, the relative weaknesses of treatment capabilities are protected by strengths of evacuation assets. The opposite is also true. The weaknesses of evacuation assets are protected by the strengths of treatment capabilities. Therefore, as a general rule, risk in one category is mitigated by the other category.

On 3 October 1993, Task Force Ranger received information that two primary leaders of the rogue clan—headed by Mohamed Farrah Aideed—were meeting in a building near the Olympic Hotel in downtown Mogadishu, Somalia. What began as a mission to secure the area
around the hotel, allowing Special operators to seize the clan leaders, changed dramatically when two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down by RPG fire, and TF Ranger moved to secure the crash sites. Thus began the most intense combat seen by U.S. forces since Vietnam.

We traveled a short distance when CPT Steele—B/3-75\textsuperscript{th} Commander—called me on the radio and told me that I was about 100 meters from the (first) crash site and to turn left (north) at the next intersection. We moved forward until we reached the intersection, and, immediately, we were suppressed by intense enemy fire. We quickly returned fire and continued to move. With Somalis shooting at us from every direction, it seemed as if we had run into a wall of lead. We began to bound from wall to wall and low crawl to any available cover.

I briefly paused outside of a courtyard with Sergeant Goodale and tried to call LT Tom Di Tomasso—2d Platoon Leader in B/3-75\textsuperscript{th}—on the radio to get him to guide us to his location at the crash site. He answered me, but I couldn’t understand him due to all of the weapons’ fire around us. As I began to move down the street, a hail of bullets landed where I had been kneeling. One of those bullets hit SGT Goodale. He began yelling, “I’m hit! I’m hit!” I looked down and saw a pool of blood gathering underneath him. Surprisingly, his wound did not seem to be too bad, so I immediately grabbed him under the arms and dragged him into the courtyard. Almost immediately, one of our medics ran into the courtyard and began to administer first aid. I checked with the medic who assured me the wound wasn’t serious, so I headed out into the street and linked up with my lead element.

Up the street, I saw two American Soldiers about a block ahead. I figured that they were either with the Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) element or from LT Di Tomasso’s chalk.
As the first man in my lead element was crossing a small alleyway, a large volley of fire from the west erupted, but luckily, he was able to dive out of the way and crawl to safety. The next few Rangers crossed and established covering positions for the rest of the element to cross. I waited for the signal from the man ahead of me and then sprinted across the alleyway. I got half-way across when bullets began kicking up the dirt at my feet. The man covering me, CPL James Smith, fired a 40mm high explosive round from his M203 grenade launcher toward the unknown assailant, and the enemy fire ceased by the time I finished crossing.

We linked up with Di Tomasso’s platoon at the crash site, and SSG Boorn and SSG Elliot began to position their men to secure the western portion of the perimeter of the crash site. The volume of fire seemed to increase every minute we were there. The Somalis began volley firing RPGs at our location, and bullets ricocheted off the walls over our heads. My M60 machine gunners and M249 squad automatic weapon gunners were engaging enemy targets of opportunity and met with some success. The moment any Somali with a weapon popped out, he was killed. Our M203 grenade launchers were also very effective neutralizing Somalis firing at us from the windows of buildings. Despite numerous attempts by the Somalis to overrun us, we were effective in stopping wave after wave of Somali gunmen.

I found cover in the street behind some stairs leading into a small courtyard. CPL Smith was just ahead of me, behind a tin shack. All of a sudden, I heard bullets cracking above my head. I peered around the steps and fired my CAR-15 at a group of Somalis about 150 meters away, firing on our position. I could not get a good shot from where I was, so I moved a few feet toward CPL Smith to tell him to engage with a few high explosive M203 rounds. Suddenly, another burst of fire landed
all around us, and CPL Smith began howling in pain. I yelled at the men behind me to help move CPL Smith and that I needed a medic immediately.

We dragged CPL Smith up the stairs where I had been taking cover moments before and moved him into a small courtyard. A medic arrived at my location almost immediately and began to treat CPL Smith. I radioed CPT Steele that I had another casualty and was down to ten men. I left the courtyard and ran into SSG Elliott. I told him that CPL Smith was wounded and that a medic was treating him in the courtyard behind me. At that moment, another burst of machine gun fire landed directly between us. SSG Elliott said to me, “Uh, sir, I think that it would be a pretty good idea if we go into that courtyard.” The only reply I could think of at the time was, “Do you really think so?” SSG Elliott answered by grabbing me by the arm, and we both dove into the courtyard. The medic was working frantically on CPL Smith. CPL Smith had two IVs running, and another Soldier had two hands buried in Smith’s inner thigh, attempting to stop the bleeding. Smith was not doing too well: the bullet had severed his femoral artery, and the wound was too high on the leg to apply a tourniquet. The only way to stop the bleeding was by direct pressure. I informed my commander about the seriousness of the situation and moved to the entrance of the courtyard to see how my Soldiers were doing on the other side of the street.

By this time, we were receiving very heavy suppressive fire from the north and the west. I watched helplessly as four more of my Soldiers were wounded within four minutes. They were all pulled to safety in a courtyard directly across the street from my position. I radioed CPT Steele that I now had only three able Soldiers left, including myself.

CPT Steele then told me that the ground reaction force was unable to find our location, was under heavy fire, and was
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breaking contact to bring the wounded and the captured prisoners back to the airfield. I looked at my watch; it was 1730 hrs. We had been on the ground for two hours, and it was getting dark.

As my chalk and the forces following me attempted to secure the western perimeter of the crash site, LT Di Tomasso’s chalk and the CSAR team were frantically attempting to pull out the pilots of the MH-60. The frame of the helicopter had collapsed around the pilots, pinning their bodies inside of the wreck. They had both probably died on impact. The rest of the crew survived the impact and assisted the efforts in recovering the pilots’ bodies. To protect themselves from the enemy fire and RPG shrapnel, Sergeant John Belman, with the help from others, pulled the Kevlar blankets off the floor of the helicopter and used them as shields. After much effort, the body of Chief Warrant Officer Donavan Bailey was pulled free. The Rangers and the CSAR team continued to try to pull out the other pilot, Chief Warrant Officer Clifton Wolcott, but they began to suffer casualties to the extent that LT Di Tomasso decided to move what was left of his element to a building adjacent to the courtyard where I was. He reported his situations, posted security, and began the treatment of casualties as darkness fell.

Back at my position, CPL Smith was deteriorating; he was losing blood at an alarming rate. We were running critically short of IVs, and I realized that CPL Smith would die if he was not evacuated immediately. I requested MEDEVAC on three separate occasions, but each time I was denied—enemy fire was just too great, and we had already lost three helicopters to enemy fire. All we could do was post security and wait. We were resupplied with ammunition and IVs at 1900 hrs., ensuring our ability to fight throughout the night.
Despite all attempts to keep my Soldier alive, Corporal Smith died at 2027 hrs. All of my other casualties were stable, thanks to the work of our medics and combat lifesavers.

At 0155, the relief force linked up with us at CPT Steele’s position. Malaysian Armored Personnel Carriers stopped at our location, and Soldiers from the QRF secured the perimeter. SSG Elliott and I helped to load our casualties on an APC. I then moved with the remaining two men of my chalk to link up with Chalk 3 and the remainder of my platoon. What was left of my platoon sat inside a building while the relief force secured the area and attempted to pull Clifton Woolcott’s body out of the helicopter. It took some time, but the body was pulled free of the wreckage at 0530.

*From the Infantry School personal experience monograph of CPT Larry D. Perino who was a platoon leader in Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment*

**DISCUSSION:** This vignette highlights many lessons, not the least of which is the value of Ranger training in first aid. Moreover, it is a story of courage and adherence to the Ranger Creed’s call to never leave a fallen comrade to fall into the hands of the enemy. However, it also highlights the challenges of casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) for all forces, particularly for Infantry and Special Operations forces in large cities.

Let us review the medical course of action. The medical treatment plan was organic combat medics with no forward physician/physician assistant. The medical evacuation plan was to backhaul casualties on the ground assault convoy (GAC), as the Rangers appreciated the risk to rotary wing aircraft in a large, urban environment. The Rangers, who were concerned about operational security on this mission, decided to accept risk in both medical evacuation and treatment: there were no
redundant means of forward treatment capabilities or evacuation assets allocated to the mission. The Rangers’ extensive training in first aid and combat lifesaving treatment mitigated some of the risk in treatment, but there was no mitigation in the CASEVAC piece. Ultimately, this left the Rangers relying on the backhaul plan of evacuating casualties on the ground assault convoy.

Only the courage and the competence of our Rangers kept the numbers and severity of casualties down; their first aid skills kept many wounded Soldiers alive.

In early June, 2003, Bravo Company, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Battalion, 75\textsuperscript{th} Ranger Regiment’s mission would involve the company air assaulting into northern Iraq and raiding a suspected terrorist camp. Second Platoon had been tasked to clear OBJ Auburn and establish a blocking position to the north of OBJ Auburn.

Off to the south of another of B Company’s objectives, I could see elements of 1\textsuperscript{st} Platoon engaging enemy personnel and the burning hulk of a pickup truck. It was also about this time in the fight that I heard over the company assault net that one of the team leaders in 1\textsuperscript{st} Platoon had sustained an RPG wound to the leg. We would later learn that SGT Walters, the lead fire team leader for 2\textsuperscript{nd} Squad, 1\textsuperscript{st} Platoon, had received an RPG round to the left leg, which completely severed his leg below the knee. He also lost a large piece of his right thigh and sustained shrapnel throughout his body. The only place that he did not receive any wounds was in his upper torso, which was protected by his body armor. 1SG Rodgers quickly began to work the CASEVAC to get SGT Walters out of there. Within 15 minutes of SGT Walters sustaining his injury, a MH-47 was on the ground to evacuate SGT Walters back to the Forward
Army Refueling Point where he would be flown via fixed wing assets to Kuwait to be treated.

*From the personal experience monograph of CPT Scott B. Cheney who served as 2nd Platoon Leader, Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, GA.*

**DISCUSSION:** The evacuation off of Objective Alabama is a good example of the use of nonstandard evacuation or CASEVAC. The MH-47 in this case was much more responsive than a standard platform could have been. The lack of treatment capability was mitigated by the strength of redundant evacuation means.

The other issue of importance referenced in this vignette is the timeliness of evacuation. SGT Walters was evacuated within 15 minutes of sustaining his injuries. Historically, 80% of casualties who die of wounds will die within the first hour after sustaining the injuries. This time is regarded as the “golden hour” of care.

The lesson for Infantry leaders to take from this vignette is to thoroughly plan, coordinate, and rehearse evacuation to include nonstandard platforms. More often than not, these nonstandard platforms can be more responsive than their standard platform counterparts. Coordination, synchronization, rehearsals, and good communication are imperative to the success of CASEVAC operations.

**CONCLUSION:** Medical considerations must be planned and trained for all operations, whether it be a field training exercise or combat. When faced with another human being who has been injured, the average Soldier will freeze. It is realistic training that results in that Soldier taking swift action. To
ensure that medical aid is close at hand, the Army has increased the number and required skills of combat lifesavers, greatly enhanced the individual Soldier first aid kit, ensured that training in self and buddy aid has been emphasized, and emphasized to Army leaders that planning for casualty evacuation occurs.
CHAPTER 14: Civilian Considerations

...contrary to trivial opinion, all professional military men do not walk blind and brutal. I have known some who demonstrated as much pity as they did courage, and they showed a lot of that.

General Curtis LeMay
Mission with LeMay, 1965

INTRODUCTION: The acronym METT-TC refers to factors that are fundamental to assessing and visualizing; collectively, they are the elements of the commander’s mission analysis. The first five—mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, and time available—are not new. However, the nature of full-spectrum operations requires commanders to assess the impact of nonmilitary factors on operations. Due to the complexity and explosive growth of world population, civilian considerations has been added.

Civilian populations, cultures, organizations, and leaders within the area of operations must be considered in friendly planning and operations. How the enemy may exploit civilians must also be considered. Civilian considerations at the tactical level generally focus on the immediate impact of civilians on the current operation and how they may limit or aid friendly action; however, commanders must also consider the larger, long-term diplomatic, economic, domestic, and international informational impact as well.

In May of 2001, 2-502nd Infantry Regiment of the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) deployed from Fort Campbell to Kosovo for six months of peace-keeping operations in the Vitina Opstina.
The Vitina Opstina, an opstina being roughly equivalent to a county, is 90% Albanian, and the few Serbians are concentrated in exclusively Serbian towns, such as Klokot. Klokot is known as the “hotspot” in the opstina because of the tension between its Serbian residents and the Albanians who live in all of the surrounding communities. Because Serbs are the minority in the area, they are regular victims of minor assaults and, less frequently, of assassinations and house bombings, and they are not able to move around the opstina safely which largely prevents them from working or marketing products.

The 2-502nd Infantry Headquarters, with one of the rifle companies, was stationed in Vitina proper. The other subordinate companies were stationed in outlying towns. Delta Company—to which my Mortar Platoon was attached—was stationed at a small, fortified base camp in the town of Klokot, about three kilometers north of Vitina. Delta Company was assigned to Klokot because it had adequate organic vehicular support for the increased threat; we could respond quickly with enough firepower and mass of troops to deal with almost any foreseeable situation.

There were three operations that the Mortar Platoon conducted during those six months: indirect fire missions, daily Stability Operations, and numerous Cordon & Searches. Aside from supervising my platoon in all of these activities, I also was also assigned as the “mayor” for Klokot. Most company commanders assigned each of their lieutenants to one town to act as the “mayor,” which meant we were responsible for establishing a relationship with the community leadership, being the Kosovo Force (KFOR) point of contact for them, disseminating KFOR information, and knowing what the local issues were so as to preempt any problems that might arise.
On 21 July 2001, the Serbs of Klokot had a planned religious celebration for St. Peter. This is a yearly event and their most robustly celebrated day. The year prior, the peacekeeping unit in the area had granted the Klokot Serbs' request for a one-night reprieve from the KFOR-enforced curfew. This had created an expectation in the population that they would be granted the same exception this year. However, our Battalion decided to keep the curfew enforcement which caused significant tension in the community. Part of the reason for keeping the curfew in place was that this holiday presented an increased security risk: Albanians had shot and killed a prominent local Serbian religious figure as he was leaving Klokot after the last year’s celebration.

Delta Company’s plan for securing the area during the celebration included increased patrolling and joint patrols with UNMIK-P (United Nations Mission in Kosovo-Police) officers, the interim civilian police to whom we would turn over any minor violators of laws.

Early in the day, with all of KFOR’s patrols and sites in place, the Serbs began their drinking and dancing. I took a man-pack radio in a small rucksack and linked up with an UNMIK-P policeman. I rode in his vehicle, and we made periodic checks at the various static positions in and around town. We also patrolled the outer edges of Klokot, looking for potential sniper positions and likely avenues of approach for any potential threats, namely Albanians who might want to commit a terrorist-type strike on the celebration.

The celebration went on into the night with no serious incidents. As the curfew time of 2200 hrs. drew near, Delta Company began massing troops and vehicles near the town center because it was apparent that much of the crowd had no intention of dispersing. The UNMIK-P had left the area, and we were now reinforced with the U.S. Military Police platoon.
that was supporting our battalion. I was on the ground with a
dismounted patrol. The Delta Company Commander was also
present, and he began negotiating with Trejan, the Serb mayor.
Trejan had been drinking all day along with most of the Serbs
present.

Approximately 30 minutes prior to the curfew, at the
request of the Company Commander, the Battalion
Commander granted a three-hour extension to the curfew. We
couraged the remaining celebrants to move to a local bar,
which they did. As the new 0100 hrs. deadline approached, we
further conceded our position to the crowd by agreeing that the
people could stay in the bar beyond the deadline as long as they
did not come outside. This was a problematic position to take
because there were too many people to fit comfortably in the
bar. As I saw it, our other choices were either to back down
completely and lose our position as “enforcers” in their minds
or to enter the bar and forcibly remove them. Our best option at
that point, I thought, was to do what the Company Commander
had agreed to: let them continue their party but keep them in
the bar.

Trejan, the Serb mayor, who was now quite drunk, was in a
difficult position. He was generally cooperative with KFOR
because he saw that that was the best way to help his town. He
was also being pressured by the people around him, at this bar,
to stand up to KFOR and demand that we leave them alone.
This conflict in his priorities resulted in his negotiations with
the Company Commander turning into a shouting match. The
Commander eventually told Trejan, “if you continue to yell at
me I will detain you.” Ignoring this, Trejan yelled, and the
Commander signaled to a sergeant to detain him. During the
arrest, a pistol was found in his belt line which was a serious
violation of KFOR enforced rules. Trejan was taken to Vitina
for detainment.
The following morning, a patrol reported that there was a major incident occurring on the Main Supply Route (MSR) to Vitina. A crowd had gathered and was blocking the road. We all knew that the arrest of the local Serb mayor was going to create a volatile situation. Upon getting the report that there was a civil disobedience incident occurring, Delta Company reacted in accordance with all of its training. The Anti-Tank section that was designated as the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) was out of the gates within moments, mounted in its vehicles and armed with its riot control gear. It set up a position at a safe distance from the crowd and waited while the remainder of the company prepared and deployed to reinforce it. Battalion had been notified, and the Battalion QRF was prepared to reinforce us if necessary.

In accordance with our training, we quickly established a formation within shouting distance of the crowd, dressed in our combat gear with batons and riot shields. The desired intent was to intimidate the crowd into dispersing. If that failed, we were prepared to physically force the crowd off of the MSR, detain the instigators, and use whatever minimal force was necessary to restore order. It would have been entirely justified by the Rules of Engagement (ROE) and our training to march into the crowd and use physical force to disperse them.

Because of our training, we were seeing a “crowd obstructing an MSR.” An equally valid, but very different, perception of them was that they were a destitute, frustrated minority, surrounded by hostile Albanians, who had just had its spokesperson arrested by the only group that kept it somewhat safe from its neighbors. The Serbs had no valid interest in blocking the road between Klokot and Vitina, and their “riot” was just a transparent plea for attention. Had we seen them in this light, we could have approached them without our intimidating riot gear and talked to them. We were reacting in
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accordance with our training but doing so could have caused serious injuries to the civilians and, undoubtedly, would have significantly degraded KFOR’s relationship with Serbs throughout the entire area of operations.

Fortunately, there were Special Operations Force (SOF) Soldiers working in the same area as our Battalion, and they heard reports of this incident. They were under different ROE, which I believe were more appropriate for the current threat level, and were able to walk directly up to the crowd without riot gear, body armor, or even visible weapons. They arrived and moved directly into the crowd to talk to them, literally only a couple of minutes before the Delta Company Commander would have given us the order to begin our movement forward.

After about ten minutes of non-threatening dialogue, the SOF Soldiers got the crowd to disperse in exchange for an assurance that there would be a town meeting between KFOR and some of the local Serb leaders.

The Battalion Commander arrived for the town meeting and asked them why they would engage in disruptive, dangerous activities, such as blocking a road that KFOR demanded to be kept open. Their response was simply “if we didn’t, you wouldn’t be talking to us right now.” They were extremely upset that their mayor had been detained and threatened that Serbs throughout the area would be completely uncooperative with KFOR until he was returned. The Battalion Commander assured them that Trejan would be treated fairly, but also that KFOR peace-keeping rules were not going to be ignored and that weapons violations were serious.

There were no major incidents following that. Trejan was released pending a trial. The relationship between KFOR and the Klokot Serbs was somewhat more frigid for a while but eventually returned to the cordial status quo.
DISCUSSION: This is an interesting case study in not only civilian considerations, but also in the conflict that can arise concerning tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); rules of engagement; and a good analysis of the situation. We have two events here to examine: the incident in the bar that resulted in the arrest of the town’s mayor and the events on the MSR.

The commander showed his flexibility in dealing with the civilians who wanted to continue their celebration, despite the bloodshed the previous year on this holiday. When the mayor became belligerent and was found to be in possession of a firearm, the commander acted appropriately in arresting the mayor. This action, while angering the townspeople, reinforced the fact that U.S. forces were in the area to protect the peace and could not be bullied into backing down.

The next day, the commander faced a crowd on the MSR—a tactical mission for which he and his unit had trained. The commander, knowing the TTPs for dealing with an angry crowd blocking the MSR, decided, in accordance with the ROE to employ a show of force—albeit minimal—to clear the life-line of his unit. As the vignette’s writer points out, although the commander believed the show of force would accomplish the mission, this show of force may well have caused the situation to escalate.

The commander clearly failed to analyze the situation beyond task and purpose. Had he analyzed the enemy, he would have realized that the angry mob was not the enemy—it never had been. In fact, it was his primary task to protect the town of Klokot from the hostile elements surrounding it.
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Although the commander might have analyzed terrain, troops available, and time, which becomes second nature to Infantry leaders, he clearly did not analyze the civilian component. In mistaking the Serbs in Klokot for the enemy, he skipped the analysis of the effect that military action would have on the civilians.

Thankfully, the SOF Soldiers who happened upon the situation were able to defuse the situation, and the repercussions of the commander’s faulty analysis were never realized. However, this vignette is worthy of study to ensure that each element of the METT-TC is considered in the future.

On 4 April 2003, after six days of intense combat for control of As Samawah, the 1-325th Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division, had yet to begin transition from combat operations to stability operations. This transition would not occur until 8 April.

Throughout the day of the 4th of April, we continued guard duty on the road which was adjacent to the battalion TOC and from where we had received multiple RPG attacks, and in the early evening, we received our next mission. During the early morning hours of the 5th, Alpha Company was to conduct an attack on the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) Headquarters in As Samawah. I had my doubts about moving through the same road we were ambushed on the night prior, called RPG Alley, but it was the only way through. We sped as fast as we could and provided overwatch on the IIS building, while Alpha Company cleared it. The remainder of the day, we secured the outside of the building and controlled the traffic circle, a chokepoint to get into the compound.

Iraqis began to come out and slowly circulate through the city. They were not forward with us but looked at us from a
distance with suspicion. The one exception was when a father brought his injured son to us on the street. He had been shot in the head by a 9mm bullet—a ricochet from a neighborhood robbery attempt. The son was lying down in the back of their pickup truck, unconscious, and breathing only with extreme difficulty. His uncle was in the back with him, swatting the flies away from his head. His father pleaded with me to take his son to an American hospital since the Iraqi facilities were not up and running. The structures themselves were intact, but the doctors were not brave enough to come to work.

There were rules about treating the local civilians. The Red Crescent Society was supposed to handle them since our limited treatment facilities were reserved for American Soldiers. I radioed to my CO and asked if we could make an exception. One of the medics came out and said that, at this point, there was nothing he could do because the boy’s condition was too far gone. The CO, after having worked things out with the TOC, came back on the radio and said that we could take him to the aid station; however, by this time, the boy died. Because the boy’s father did not yet know of his son’s death, SSG Cottrell and I took the boy to the aid station anyway, so that the father would think he had done everything he could for his son. The PA, understanding this, cooperated and attempted to treat the boy, although knowing it was futile, before officially declaring that the boy had died. The father was sad about the death, of course, but believed that he had taken all measures he could to try to help his son.

By the 6th, the fight for As Samawah was practically over. The brigade was in firm control of the bridges and key infrastructure in the city. By the 8th, we found ourselves fully transitioned from high intensity conflict to stability operations.
DISCUSSION: Commanders must consider the impact of civilians on operations; our doctrine directs it, and common sense demands it. In this vignette, we see Soldiers who have been participating in intense urban combat operations allowing their sense of compassion and their respect for the love between father and son to influence their actions. Although some readers would object to the ruse, resulting in the father believing that the boy was still alive and that medical personnel were rendering life-saving aid, in this case, comforting the father outweighed an explanation of the cold, hard facts.

The immediate benefit of their actions in regard to the treatment of the boy was that the father believed he had done the correct thing in seeking the assistance of American troops and that those troops had tried to help him, thus earning his trust. The long-range benefits of their actions, although difficult to quantify, are critical, particularly in the environment faced by our Soldiers in Iraq. The father would not keep the compassion shown to him a secret—this story would be told to family, friends, and neighbors—who, in turn, would conclude this American unit was worthy of their trust, despite rumors and propaganda that would suggest otherwise. This trust would then have a positive effect on combat and—later—stability operations. “A supportive populace can provide resources that facilitate friendly operations…A hostile populace threatens the immediate operations of deployed friendly forces…” (FM 3-07).
On the 25th of April, 2003, 1st PLT, D Co, 1-327th IN, 101st Airborne Division, transitioned from brigade tactical command post security to stability operations in the region of Qayarrah, Iraq. Its operations focused on conducting traffic control points (TCPs).

On the 27th of April, 2003, my platoon, along with a reconnaissance squad, executed a TCP operation. The first two traffic control points were at night and were successful.

At sunrise on the 28th, we moved to another location and set up another TCP. While conducting this TCP, my platoon searched approximately 35 vehicles in two hours time. While conducting the TCPs, one of my section leaders noticed that a Toyota Landcruiser did not look right. After inspecting it, I found that it was hotwired; it had been stolen from the United Nations. The UN Vehicle Identification Numbers were listed on numerous plates under the hood. We confiscated this vehicle and returned it to United Nations personnel in Irbil, Kurdistan, Iraq.

After this excitement, we moved to the next location, about 20 kilometers to the south. Within a half hour of setting up the TCP, there were cars lined up for a mile on each side. Therefore, I ordered my men to search only loaded trucks, vans, buses, or any vehicle that seemed suspicious. We spent a long four hours at this site with a lot of progress. We confiscated five AK-47s and 200 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition loaded in magazines. When I called in a status report to my company commander, he ordered me to continue our operations at that location.

I ordered my men to employ concertina wire with chemical lights attached to the front of each HMMWV. In addition, I emplaced security and search teams out about 30 feet in front of the concertina wire. With the sun about to set, I repositioned
one vehicle to guard an adjacent road near our TCP. After some time, local traffic started to bypass our TCP, making it easy to move large amounts of weapons or anything else that was illegal.

My platoon began breaking down the TCP an hour later as darkness arrived, per my company commander’s guidance. When I finished talking with my company commander, I told my Soldiers that it was time to start their vehicles, turn on their headlights, and prepare for movement back to our FOB (Forward Operating Base). Then one of my men heard something moving faintly in the distance. Even with Night Vision Goggles on, we could still barely see anything due to the limited illumination from the moon. A car, with very, very dim headlights, was moving in our direction at a high rate of speed. One of my gunners yelled out to me that it was about 50 meters out. I could see the car’s outline and signaled the driver with a Surefire flashlight trying to get him to slow down. The car responded, flashing its lights two times in response to my signal. Noticing that the vehicle still had not slowed its speed, I turned around and ran to the opposite side of my HMMWV. When this happened, one of my gunners initiated fire with his M249 SAW as the vehicle ran through our concertina wire. Luckily, I had moved to the other side of my HMMWV because that car had crashed through the concertina wire right where I had been standing. As the vehicle entered into the secured area of the TCP, my gunner ceased fire until the vehicle hit an open area again. Shortly thereafter, the vehicle came to a halt at the side of the road.

Two of my Soldiers, who were conducting forward security, began firing at the vehicle. However, I was in between them and the car. I went to a prone position and shouted for a cease fire three times, along with the hand and arm signals. Once the two Soldiers stopped firing, I called them
in to get security on the site and immediately informed my company commander of the situation. With all of this happening, the vehicle I had sent to secure the bypass called up on the radio inquiring what happened. I told that section to return to the TCP. Meanwhile, two Soldiers from the reconnaissance squad approached and began to help in sorting out the situation. There was a family of five riding in the car that had sped through our checkpoint. The father, who was driving, and his son were both wounded. The father was the most seriously hurt. He received two bullet wounds to the shoulder and was bleeding profusely; additionally, he was in a state of shock. A ricocheted bullet had grazed his son.

The whole situation turned into pure chaos because the father would not calm down, and his family was trying to form a perimeter around him, attempting to provide protection. A member of the reconnaissance squad, SGT Vietch, who had experience as a combat medic, pushed forward with a gurney while, at the same time, two of my men pulled the family back from the wounded man. Finally, the father calmed down and sat still on the gurney while SGT Vietch tended to the man’s wounds. My company commander began calling for medical support which arrived half an hour later.

A medic from an adjacent company showed up and made an assessment of the father and son’s wounds. The rest of the family, during this tough time, was calling us thieves and murderers. One of my men and a member of the reconnaissance squad brought out candy for the children and began talking respectfully with the mother, son, and daughter. The son was medically released on site, but the father was taken to TF 1-327th IN Intermediate Surgical Site for treatment.

Within an hour, neighbors of the family showed up, and my men aided them in recovering the car. While aiding in the recovery of the vehicle, I talked about the incident with a
neighbor of the family. The man told me several vital facts that helped me understand the situation. First, the father was nearly blind in both eyes; thus, driving fast at night provided him little reaction time. Secondly, his headlights were too dim for either him or my platoon to see clearly. In addition, the neighbor stated that most of the local populace would not stop for any kind of traffic control point at night. In this culture, thieves used this same technique to stop traffic in an attempt to steal cars. None of this information made me feel any better about the situation. There was a man and his son who we wounded, and they will probably always remember this experience as the night the Americans intentionally tried to kill them.

The next day, the local civilian hospital released the father, and he was brought to the medical facility at our FOB to get a checkup before returning home. Although this encounter was unavoidable, it could have been mitigated by the presence of a generator lamp set or a higher powered spotlight. I know if the man could have identified my platoon as American Soldiers, he would have slowed down and stopped.

From the personal experience of 1LT Daniel J. Rogne who served as an Anti-Armor Platoon Leader for 1st Platoon, Delta Company, TF 1-327th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, Donovan Technical Library.

DISCUSSION: With our forces currently operating in both Afghanistan and Iraq and dealing with a complex insurgent campaign, conducting traffic control points (TCPs) and checkpoints are vital in controlling the flow of illicit arms. The difficulty in executing these tasks, which are difficult in and of themselves, is compounded by the plethora of civilians operating in the area.
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In this vignette, the leadership responded to an obvious breach of the TCP in accordance with its published ROE. Unfortunately, the vehicle that attempted to crash through the TCP was filled with civilians; subsequently, a child and his father were injured by direct fire from American Soldiers. However, the issue here does not revolve around the ROE, it centers on the leadership’s positive reaction to the unfortunate incident and how the leadership focused its efforts to diffuse the understandably tense atmosphere. The Soldiers immediately began to apply first aid and eventually saved the father’s life. Additionally, the American Soldiers recovered the vehicle and placated the family by, in part, offering candy to the kids and comforting the other passengers.

It is important to note that the leader immediately began a self-assessment to understand what could be improved in the future to prevent such accidents from happening again. By talking to the victims’ neighbor, the platoon leader came to understand why the vehicle would not stop at the checkpoint. Based on that conversation, the platoon leader came away with a better understanding of civilian interaction at checkpoints and on the battlefield.

On the 23rd of May, 2003, the 1st Platoon, Delta Company, 1-327th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, was responsible for patrolling villages near Makmuhr, Iraq.

While we patrolled the area, we surveyed the village sheiks to find out their living conditions with regard to water, electricity, and their schools and to inquire about criminal activities in the area. The surveys highlighted a common problem: the newly-trained policemen would patrol the economic centers of their region but not the outlying villages.
This caused the crime rate to rise in the countryside farm communities. Because of the increasing crime rate, the local populace had little respect for the police departments and their legitimacy. This was not a new problem; most police departments under Saddam Hussein’s regime performed minimal duties. They were primarily used to report troubled areas to local Iraqi Army units, and then the Army would suppress any criminal activity with overwhelming combat power. This destroyed the common trust in the abilities of the police departments.

MAJ Blain A. Reeves, S-3 for TF 1-327th IN, coordinated with each of the newly formed police departments to conduct joint patrols with platoons of our Delta Company. My platoon was responsible for patrolling with the Karach and Makmuhr Police departments. The Karach Police Department was responsible for 27 villages within its region, but many of these villages had a population ranging from 25 to 40 people. The Makmuhr Police Department was responsible for Makmuhr and the four small towns clustered on its border.

Daily, we would link up with a squad of policemen (nine men) and escort it to each town in its area. After several of weeks of joint operations, the Karach Police Department would lead the patrols, with my platoon in trail. Both the Chief of Police and his assistant would lead these patrols. The chief was Arabic, and his assistant was Kurdish. Between the two of them, they commanded the respect of both Arabic and Kurdish families.

It was obvious that the local nationals respected the U.S. Army and its Soldiers, as evidenced by the number of people who brought their troubles to us instead of their local government agencies. They knew that we would help solve their problems but, given their lack of trust in their local police, did not trust the local police to do the same. By conducting
joint patrols with the local police departments, we established their legitimacy. Eventually, the local populace approached their policemen rather than us when they had a problem. This aided the locals in a more efficient manner as the policemen knew the individuals who lived in their area of responsibility. Also, as the number of their rural patrols increased, the police departments were able to answer a call faster than U.S. forces in the region could.

The beginning of June marked a reduction in crime, but it did not disappear. By this time, however, the local populace had a trustworthy, trained police force on which they could depend. This was one facet in creating an environment that moved Iraq one step closer to a self-governing body. As the Iraqi people began taking care of their own problems, their level of independence increased.

From the personal experience of 1LT Daniel J. Rogne, who served as the Platoon Leader for 1st Platoon, Delta Company, TF 1-327th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: The vignette by 1LT Rogne demonstrates the importance of understanding the local culture. The U.S. force conducted joint patrols that were made up of several different ethnicities to mirror the villages that were being policed. The platoon leader also conducted his initial surveys to the cultural leaders in the village to discover the Iraqis’ needs in terms of electricity, water, and medical care. This set a positive climate for future interaction.

This vignette illustrates how the lieutenant initially established his platoon’s legitimacy, used that legitimacy to shore up joint patrolling, and then eventually stepped back into
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a supporting role. This evolution cannot be on a time-table; it will vary from area of operations (AO) to AO; the variables in each AO will impact on when the transitions can occur.

In March, 2004, Task Force Courage (2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division and an attached company from 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division,) conducted Operation Mountain Snow—its largest operation of Operation Enduring Freedom IV deployment. Its purpose was to destroy or detain anti-coalition forces in the Char China Valley, north of Kandahar, Afghanistan.

We conducted Operation Mountain Storm in the Char China Valley, lying due north of the Deh Rawod Firebase. The companies had multiple cordon and search missions in small villages north of the firebase, while A-Troop, 3-17 Cavalry, conducted an isolation operation south of Deh Rawod. Company A, 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry, faced fierce resistance at the town of Mimdo on the 18th of March, resulting in two American KIA and two WIA and the end of enemy resistance from inside a large compound. The other companies of the Task Force faced similar challenges in rugged terrain against sometimes hostile local populations.

Approximately six days after this action, after accomplishing its purpose, the Task Force began exfiltration from the Char China Valley. An important component of the exfiltration process was the distribution of Civil Affairs’ supplies and equipment. The distribution of these materials ensured that the local population believed in the sincere commitment U.S. and Coalition forces were making with the Afghan people. Company commanders fulfilled their promise
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to local leaders, which we hoped would have positive long range impacts in this area for generations to come.

Planning for this Civil Affairs operation began several weeks earlier through the coordination of local officials and the Task Force Civil Affairs Section. LTC Joseph Dichairo, the Task Force Commander, had directed his staff to requisition two Massey-Ferguson farm tractors for the farmers in our area of operations. The Civil Affairs Section worked with Afghan General Gallali, who was in charge of the Kandahar area. A contract was drafted between the Task Force S5 and the Kandahar Finance Office to purchase the two tractors on the local economy. Upon receipt and approval of the contract, General Gallali directed the acquisition of the two tractors and two sets of farming implements that could be connected to the rear portion of the tractors. Additionally, the local population would receive school supplies, wheelbarrows, hand tools, medical supplies, small generators, and bundles of blankets.

While my logistical section and the Civil Affairs Section worked on the acquisition of the aforementioned supplies and equipment, I worked with the Task Force S3 Air Officer to develop a distribution plan. The plan was based on the recommendations of each company commander and the Task Force S3, with the Task Force Commander making the final decision. Each village was evaluated based on local requirements, local cooperation with U.S. forces during the operation, and need.

The final distribution plan was solidified on March 22, two days prior to the planned exfiltration of the Task Force. The air movement plan required multiple trips by CH-47 aircraft to complete the exfiltration. Each lift would deliver supplies and equipment to the selected village and return the companies to Kandahar Airfield. Detailed supply and equipment configurations and weight information were incorporated into
the air movement plan to ensure aviation weight and space restrictions. The two Massey-Ferguson tractors were the crucial planning consideration.

The vehicles arrived at Kandahar Airfield on March 23, one day prior to execution. I directed my logistical team to weigh, measure, and configure the tractor implements for air-loading. The tractor’s exhaust system’s length did not permit the loading of the two tractors on CH-47 Aircraft; therefore, the system was removed and secured to the tractor’s frame. The next issue we had to contend with was operators for the vehicles, as no one had operator experience on the vehicles. A quick class by the Civil Affairs Officer (a reservist officer with farming experience) rectified the situation. The supplies and equipment were also configured for delivery the next day. On the morning of 24 March, the supplies and equipment were delivered as planned, and exfiltration was completed late in the afternoon.

From the personal experience of 1LT Craig Johnson, who served as the BN S-4 of 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: The civil affairs (CA) team supporting the maneuver battalion obtains relevant information about specific areas within the unit’s area of operations (AO), area of interest (AI), and area of influence from host nation governmental organizations and the civilian population. Fundamental to the CA team’s success in the AO is integration with the staff. Civil affairs teams must plan, synchronize, and rehearse operations with maneuver commanders to ensure that the local civilian communities and their leaders understand what projects and priorities military leaders have inside their areas of
responsibilities. Ultimately, this mutual understanding contributes to setting a positive condition for cooperation with the civilian population.

1LT Johnson’s unit, TF 2-22 Infantry Regiment, was successful in executing civil military operations (CMO) due, in part, to the close relationship built with the civil affairs team operating with his unit and local civic leaders. As the battalion S4, he and the CA team sought out opportunities and planned for the sequel that followed combat operations in the Char China Valley.

Considering long-range CMO activities and controlling the ability to understand the requirements of the local population contributed extensively to securing the respect of local citizens. Providing vital heavy farm equipment and supplies added to the legitimacy of the operation and demonstrated to the Afghan people that the United States and Coalition forces were operating in the best interest of the people. Prior to making agreements with indigenous citizens and leaders, an operator must be one hundred percent sure that the organization is in a position to follow through on its commitments. TF 2-22 Infantry set the example by ensuring the staff synchronized the CMO operation and then ensured that the promised equipment and supplies were delivered.

CONCLUSION: The media guarantees that a global audience views U.S. operations in near real-time. Many times, the focus of this media attention is on the civilians in the area and how military operations effect the population. The activities of the force—including individual Soldiers—can have far reaching effects on domestic and international opinion. As we have seen in the vignettes in this chapter, Soldiers must “treat others how they wish to be treated.” This will not only ensure that the civilian population will assist rather than inhibit operations, but
it will also help to ensure that the global audience understands that our Soldiers strive to do the right thing. In this case, doing the right thing will always involve helping the civilian population they are striving to protect.
CHAPTER 15: *U.S. Army Values*

At a difficult time, a prince of my royal family sent me a small portrait of Frederick the Great on which he had inscribed these words that the great King addressed to his friend, the Marquis d’Argens, when his own defeat seemed imminent. “Nothing can alter my inner soul: I shall pursue my own straight course and shall do what I believe to be right and honourable.” The little picture I have lost, but the King’s words remain engraved on my memory and are for me a model.

Colonel General Heinz Guderian
Panzer Leader, 1953

INTRODUCTION: The majority of this book focuses on everything outside of the Soldier—his tactics, his equipment, his leadership. This chapter focuses on the character of the Soldier, and with good reason: it is the values of the Soldier, captured in the Army Values, that lead to our success as an Army. This chapter was the most rewarding to write, as it is filled with descriptions of Soldiers doing great things under the most difficult of situations.

**INTEGRITY**

A man of character in peace is a man of courage in war. Character is a habit. The daily choice of right and wrong. It is a moral quality which grows to maturity in peace and is not suddenly developed in war.

General Sir James Glover
“A Soldier and His Conscience”
Parameters, September, 1973
In late November of 2003, the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 508th Infantry, was tasked to conduct a cordon and search of the town of Pir Ahmed, located approximately 60 miles south of the city of Kirkuk, to locate and detain suspected anti-coalition personnel and seize illegal weapons and equipment found in the process.

Upon reaching Pir Ahmed, CPT Kilbride confirmed that Alpha Company was in position to block any personnel fleeing from the town towards the south. Upon confirmation, 2nd Platoon immediately established a cordon on the southwest outer edge of the town, while 1st Platoon simultaneously established its cordon on the northwest portion of the town. 1LT Jeter, accompanied by CPT Kilbride, led 3rd Platoon to the middle of the town, where each squad began a systematic search of its assigned areas.

The Noncommissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC) at 1st Platoon’s traffic control point (TCP) was SSG Dus. One issue that became a concern was the handling of personnel who were detained as they tried to come into the town. The guidance to the Soldiers was that all personnel attempting to come into town were to have their identification checked and to be searched if necessary. Furthermore, personnel on the Battalion’s black and grey lists were to be detained. Detainment of personnel on the two lists was easy since Soldiers knew exactly where to take them: to the detention facility, which was located near Pir Ahmed.

The problem arose when more and more personnel who were not on these lists attempted to come into town. While some of these personnel were men, most were women and children. The only guidance given regarding handling of these personnel was to keep them at the TCPs until told differently. By noon, SSG Dus, the NCOIC at 1st Platoon’s TCP, was faced
with over 50 personnel held at his TCP. Most of these people had been there since 0800 hrs., and despite repeated requests from me and SSG Dus, we were told to continue to keep them at the TCP. Some of the older women and men were obviously frustrated and refused our offers to give them food and water while they waited, or blankets to sit on, since the ground was damp. Equally as frustrating to some Soldiers was that many children on their way to school had been kept at the TCP for several hours.

Finally, at approximately 1300 hrs., the Battalion S3 gave instructions to allow searched personnel, who posed no threat, to enter the town. This situation brought to light the importance of a plan for dealing with all personnel other than anti-coalition and non-compliant forces. The sentiment among some Soldiers at the TCPs was that Battalion needed a more detailed plan concerning the handling of locals at TCPs on the cordon.

With the exception of the larger-than-expected number of civilian personnel at the TCPs until 1300 hrs., the search of the town went smoothly. However, later in the day, at approximately 1400 hrs., another situation arose at the detention facility, which was run by the Battalion Mortar Platoon. Earlier in the morning, a search of a suspected insurgent yielded a large sum (approximately $1,200.00 in U.S. currency) of money. The man was detained, and the 1st Platoon Soldiers who detained him transferred his belongings, including the U.S. currency. Several hours later, prior to the Battalion’s departure from Pir Ahmed, the man was released, but when given his belongings, all the U.S. currency was missing. Nobody knew what happened to the man’s money, and the money was never found.

Following the discovery that the money was missing, the Mortar Platoon took accountability of all remaining detainees’ personal effects and accounted for every other possession kept
from detained personnel. This incident was the only one of its kind in the Battalion in which detainees’ personal property came up missing while in the possession of the detention facility’s Soldiers. This incident emphasized the importance of a meticulous, accurate chain of custody.

By 1800 hrs., Charlie Company’s 3rd Platoon was nearing completion of its searches in Pir Ahmed. 1LT Chris Guderski, Alpha Company XO, recalls that Alpha Company, located to the south, was now finished and focused on maintaining its position to block any personnel moving to or from Pir Ahmed. Upon Charlie Company’s completion of its searches, at approximately 1815 hrs., the Battalion detained over 24 suspected anti-coalition and non-compliant personnel, including one suspected Iraqi insurgent wounded, and seized several AK-47 rifles with hundreds of rounds of ammunition.

After returning to the FOB, CPT Kilbride had an After Action Review (AAR) with his platoon leaders, the FSO, the First Sergeant, and me. During this meeting, we identified key issues, particularly establishing SOPs for handling non-combatants at TCPs, chain of custody for evidence handling, and establishing the requirement to bring all radios on missions so that all vehicles in the convoy have communications established with each other. This became important because some detainees had vehicles which we had to drive to the Bayonet Base detention facility impound lot. We did not have enough radios for the Soldiers driving these vehicles (other than unsecured short range radios) and had to pay close attention to their locations and disposition within the company’s convoy on the way to Bayonet Base.

*From the personal experiences of CPT Robert Przybylski, who served as Executive Officer, for 1st Battalion (Airborne), 508th*
DISCUSSION: Integrity means doing the right thing, legally and morally. People of integrity do the right thing, not because it’s convenient or because they have no choice; they choose to do the right thing because their character permits no less. The operations highlighted in this book and the contemporary operational environment reflect a wealth of cross-cultural interactions; but regardless of the peoples involved, the concept of integrity is both recognized and valued around the globe. Our actions as Soldiers and as an Army must always reflect our underlying sense of integrity to justify trust and cooperation for our efforts worldwide.

In this vignette, we see two examples of integrity, one a positive example and one a negative one. Detaining obviously innocent civilians, including women and children, for an extended period of time violated what SGT Dus, CPT Przybyliski, and the other Soldiers at the TCP knew to be the right thing. Although the civilians were offered food, drink, and blankets, their pride would not let them accept that, and the Soldiers understood this. Therefore, CPT Przybyliski and SGT Dus repeatedly requested the release of the civilians detained at the TCP, even at the risk of annoying higher—the epitome of doing what is right.

The second example provides the reader with a violation of integrity, and that is the case of the missing money. The Soldiers conducting the searches did the right thing by turning over the money to the Mortar Platoon manning the detention facility; however, apparently one of the Soldiers there took the money. We can only imagine the damaging effect this single act might have had on efforts to earn Iraqi trust and confidence in our efforts to stabilize and rebuild their country. Our goal
was to end the legacy of corruption that characterized the former regime and its military—unfortunately the message this Iraqi man received in this case is that the legacy continues despite our claims of freedom and democracy. Soldiers, particularly in the current operating environment, must ensure they are doing the right thing, as the civilians in the area will either judge Soldiers’ actions or emulate them. In Iraq and Afghanistan, where the people are establishing their own governments, the new government officials must see what “right” looks like, and those examples must come from Soldiers with integrity.

RESPECT

Friends, I promise you this conquest, but there is one condition you must swear to fulfill—to respect the people whom you liberate…otherwise, you will not be the liberators of the people, you will be their scourge.

Napoleon
27 March 1796
Warriors’ Words, 1992

On April 3, 2003, the Soldiers of the 2-327 Infantry moved into AN NAJAF, which is the home of one of Iraq’s leading holy men, the Grand Ayatollah Ali Hussein Sistani, to gain crucial support for their stay in the town. As they turned a corner, a group of men blocked their way, shouting in Arabic, “God is great.” The crowd quickly grew, many of whom mistakenly thought the Americans were trying to capture the town’s holy man and attack the Imam Ali Mosque, a holy site for Shiite Muslims around the world. Someone in the crowd lobbed a rock at the troops, then another. LTC Hughes was hit on the head, chest, and the corner of his sunglasses with rocks.
Appraising the situation and thinking as he was leading his troops: “Why does a guerrilla want to fight? Give him what he needs, and he will not fight.” LTC Hughes lived by the philosophy of Sun Tzu: “A great commander is one who does not shoot a weapon.”

Contemplating these thoughts, he yelled to his troops, “Take a knee, point your weapons to the ground, smile, and show no hostilities.” Some of the Iraqis backed off and sat down, which enabled LTC Hughes to identify the troublemakers in the crowd. He identified eight. Wanting to make sure that it would be clear where the shooting would come from, he gave the order: “We’re going to withdraw out of this situation and let them defuse it themselves.” With his own rifle pointed toward the ground, the Lieutenant Colonel bowed to the crowd and turned away. LTC Hughes and his Infantrymen marched back to their compound in silence. When tempers had calmed, the Grand Ayatollah Sistani issued a decree (fatwa), calling on the people of Najaf to welcome LTC Hughes’ Soldiers.

“This gesture of respect helped defuse a dangerous situation and made our peaceful intentions clear,” commended President George W. Bush during his weekly radio address.

From an 11 JUL 03 interview with LTC Christopher Hughes, Commander of 2nd Battalion, 327 Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, included in the OIF Study Group publication On Point, Ch 5, pg 271

DISCUSSION: LTC Hughes’ actions in Najaf obviously represent how an effective combat leader rapidly adapts to changing conditions within the contemporary operational environment, but more importantly, they demonstrate a deep understanding of respect. Faced with a riot, in which LTC
Hughes himself was pelted with rocks, the easy answer would have been to engage the people throwing rocks with proportional force, which would have resulted in civilian casualties. However, understanding the “sociological demographics” of Shia Muslims in the area and the power of “information” that a negative media could use to inflame anti-coalition sentiment, LTC Hughes chose the difficult course of action—that of ordering his men to point their weapons at the ground and assume a non-threatening stance. This decision took an extreme amount of “gumption,” considering it would leave his Soldiers in a position in which they could not quickly engage. As President George W. Bush himself commended this action during his weekly radio address, “This gesture of respect helped defuse a dangerous situation and made our peaceful intentions clear.”

On Dec 2, 2003, the 2-503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade conducted a cordon and search of the village of Hawija, 40 miles west of the city of Kirkuk, Iraq. The 2-503rd occupied Kirkuk during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 1 to stabilize the city after the fall of the Ba’ath Party. The village of Hawija, predominantly Arab, was responsible for harboring anti-coalition forces and terrorists who would frequently destabilize support operations in Kirkuk.

Our company was responsible for searching half of the village. Each platoon had its own sector. By 0700 hrs., the village was isolated, and the search for specific individuals on our Black and Gray list was underway. Due to little resistance during the initial isolation, our operational tempo and use of force diminished. Instead of kicking down doors and storming houses, we transitioned into what we called “Cordon and
Knock”—Soldiers simply knocked on doors and were permitted into homes to conduct their search.

The Company Commander, 1SG, and I (XO) traveled with each one of the platoons as additional Command and Control. I traveled with 1st Platoon as it conducted a systematic search of its assigned platoon sector. At one particular house, Soldiers from 1st Platoon discovered a large quantity of blasting caps and wire. Traditionally, blasting caps are an integral element in creating Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Since our company had lost two Soldiers to an IED two weeks prior while returning from R & R, I ordered a more thorough search be conducted. Upon further discovery, Soldiers found nine sticks of PE-4 explosives and a banner that read: “We will die in support of you Saddam,” with a picture of Saddam Hussein. We questioned both occupants in the house, both in their 80’s. Due to their age and physical capabilities, I assumed that the paraphernalia did not belong to them. They claimed that the items belonged to their son, Adel, and that he was not around. We continued the search and discovered more bomb-making paraphernalia. If the parents’ story were true, their son, Adel, needed to be found and captured. With the amount of IED material we found, coupled with pro-Saddam propaganda, he was unquestionably acting against Coalition Forces. Although fully knowing the seriousness of the situation, the old couple refused to give up Adel’s location.

I radioed the CO and asked him to meet me at the house. Upon his arrival, I showed him the cataloged items we had found in the house and told him the family refused to tell us their son’s location. We both agreed that Adel needed to be found to prevent further loss of friendly lives. I told him about how I had heard U.S. forces further south using M1 Tanks to destroy houses where bomb-making material was discovered. He radioed the S3 and requested that one of the M1 tanks in
support of the Cordon be brought down to our location. He informed the S3 of his intent: to posture the tank outside the house as a show of force to get the location of the bomb maker. The S3 radioed back, “The tanks are tasked to the Cordon—all I can send is a bulldozer.”

Fifteen minutes later, engineers from our Brigade showed up with the bulldozer. I directed them to position it in front of the wall that surrounded the property to the house. Following behind the bulldozer were the Brigade Public Affairs Officer and reporters from PBS Frontline. This created a dilemma for both the Commander and me. We discussed the ramifications of media coverage of this event and decided that capturing Adel was worth it. Preventing the loss of Soldiers’ lives is our job as leaders, no matter what the situation.

While our company translator informed the couple of our intent, a crowd began to gather. One of the reporters walked up to me with a camera and asked, “what do you plan to do with the bulldozer?” I went into detail that the two occupants of the house were harboring a terrorist and refused to give his location. I stated, “if you are going to harbor a terrorist, we are going to remove you from the community.” I informed the reporters that Adel’s parents had one last chance to inform us of their son’s location; otherwise, we were going to destroy their house. The house had become a military target. It was a definite source of bomb-making material intended to kill American Soldiers. I also informed the reporters of our mission intent: “to embolden local authorities through this show of force.” This was to help legitimize the local police force and show our sincerity against anti-Coalition forces and activities.

With the bulldozer positioned to push down the outer wall, Adel’s parents stood firm: they were not going to tell their son’s location. By this time, Adel’s brother arrived with other members of his family. A significant crowd had gathered from
the community, along with other Command elements from both our Battalion and Brigade. I signaled the engineer who was operating the machine to move forward. The wall crumbled effortlessly as the bulldozer loudly progressed forward. The effect was decisive. The community thought the act was a bluff until they realized we were taking action. The message was clear: harboring terrorism in Hawija was not tolerated.

Adel’s brother stepped forward and spoke with his mother. After about 15 minutes of deliberating, the brother informed me and the CO that he would lead us to his brother Adel. “I am only doing this because I don’t want them to destroy the house,” he said. My commander took his Command HMMWV and two other gun trucks to escort the brother to Adel. Adel was located in a field working four miles from central Hawija. As the HMMWVs approached, he raised his hands behind his head, knowing his arrest was inevitable. Our forces captured and processed him through our detention center in Kirkuk.

From the personal experience monograph by I LT Steve Brignoli, who served as Executive Officer of C Co. 2-503rd, 173rd Airborne Brigade, 173rd Airborne Brigade, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: This is a remarkable example of small unit leaders demonstrating respect in difficult circumstances. Although most would say that threatening to knock down someone’s home would be the epitome of disrespect, a close read of the vignette reveals that the leaders on the ground chose the courses of action that, in fact, did illustrate their respect for the people and their culture, which recognizes strength as a value, while still accomplishing their mission.
The Army defines respect as “treat(ing) people as they should be treated.” In the first part of the mission, the men conducting the search modified their search technique of the homes in the area out of respect for the innocent people in the area. Military necessity dictated that the Soldiers search every home in the village to find contraband and anti-U.S. forces. However, they knew that there were very few likely insurgents in the search area and transitioned to the Cordon and Knock. This search technique allowed the Soldiers to perform their duty while showing respect for the good people in Hawija.

Once the men located a cache, the leaders directed a more detailed search and found more contraband. The Executive Officer used common sense and treated the elderly occupants with respect by attempting to determine the weapons’ owner. In the Islamic culture, respect for elders and to women is very important and, in this case, ultimately allowed the U.S. Soldiers to get the information they needed. Had he treated them without respect, he would have alienated the local population and risked failure.

Although it may seem unlikely, the commander’s use of the bulldozer further demonstrates his respect for others, while accomplishing his mission. The commander understood that what he was asking the elderly couple to do was counter to the strong cultural bonds of family in Iraq and that their sense of pride would cause them to resist. He used the dozer in a graduated response that began with positioning it near the outer wall. Once he had the driver knock the wall down, he allowed the family time to talk about the situation. The commander demonstrated respect for the family by giving them one final opportunity to save their home and retain their inherent sense of pride. The decisions that the commander and Executive Officer made throughout this operation ultimately paid off, as they caught the IED maker, without having to destroy a
family’s home. This clearly demonstrated that respect in every part of this operation was clearly visible to all present and contributed to the favorable news coverage they received as well.

From 10 January until 06 April 2004, members of the 3rd Ranger Battalion established a forward operating base (FOB) 1,200 meters from the Pakistan border in Shkin, Afghanistan. The establishment of the FOB was intended to be short-term and serve as a platform for time-sensitive missions throughout the region. The Rangers relied heavily on the local population for supplies due to the austere environment and severe weather that limited the use of helicopters.

The camp that we controlled had been occupied one week prior by the Afghanistan Military Force (AMF). With roughly ten Rangers present, it was obvious we needed additional labor to construct a functional FOB. We met with the local elders and explained that we wanted to hire personnel to live in our camp with us; we would provide a standard of living much better than other bases. Due to Operational Security (OPSEC), we did not want the Afghans to return home at night or roam outside of the FOB during the day.

In the previous three years, many units, particularly Special Operations Forces (SOF), gave false promises in an effort to ease their particular deployment. We paid the locals more than the other FOBs paid their workers and provided clothing, shelter, and food, as well as many other amenities. When we departed, we also made sure our replacements from the 2nd Ranger Battalion would adhere to the wages and amenities we had provided during our mission.
Infantry in Battle

It was important for us to use the locals in tactical operations as well for construction. Since many of our workers had experience with the AMF, we used them for indigenous operations such as a Close Tactical Reconnaissance (CTR) of potential objectives. These missions gave the locals a sense of ownership by patrolling their villages and provided us with capabilities we did not organically possess.

We demonstrated a humane side to the Ranger persona by involving the locals in our games and events during our time between missions. The Paktika Province of Afghanistan is extremely austere, and available entertainment is very limited. For a small price, we were able to purchase a television set and a DVD player for our workers, something they had never seen. Overall, the workers respected our position of authority but also saw the human dimension of our forces. I believe their willingness to put their lives in harm’s way stemmed from their genuine concern for our well-being.

The locals even risked their lives when enemy personnel entered our area of operations on March 22, 2004. It was evening, and we had just returned from a meeting with the village elders when suddenly we heard two AK-47s and loud explosions to our immediate south. B Co, 3-75th, had just departed two days prior for a five-day mission. With most of the Rangers away from the FOB, our strength was less than twenty, and we had been rocketed less than twenty-four hours earlier.

1SG Dennis Smith and I ran to the perimeter wall with our weapons and a pair of binoculars. We immediately saw movement, possibly two to three individuals, running to the hilltop. Another NCO was relaying the information to the Ranger Tactical Operations Center in Bagram while we were trying to gather the facts. We both flipped the cover on the optics of our rifles to identify and engage enemy personnel.
Then, out of nowhere, a group of ten to fifteen locals (many of whom we employed) appeared in our scopes as they chased the other individuals over the hilltop. Less than five minutes later, we heard a large explosion similar to a hand-grenade. The locals later delivered a handcuffed enemy soldier as well as one of their villagers who was bleeding profusely.

A team of five Al Qaeda fighters had crossed over from Pakistan the night prior in an effort to fire upon our FOB as well as to engage a coalition rotary-wing asset. When identified by local Afghans, the Al Qaeda terrorists stated they only wanted to harm Americans. A quarrel broke out, and four of the terrorists managed to escape, but one began throwing grenades before he was caught. The injured villager attempted to throw back a grenade, but it exploded in his hand.

*From the personal experience monograph by 1LT Chris DeMure, who served as Assistant S-4, HHC, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.*

**DISCUSSION:** Army doctrine outlines six critical considerations leaders and units must address while conducting stability operations: leverage interagency, joint, and multinational cooperation; enhance the capabilities and legitimacy of the host nation; understand the potential for unintended consequences of individual and small unit actions; display the capability to use force in a nonthreatening manner; act decisively to prevent escalation; and apply force selectively and discriminately. The Rangers of 3/75 applied them all, but, most notably, the consideration of enhancing the capabilities and legitimacy of the host nation.

Through demonstrating proper respect to the local people of Shkin by inviting them into the Ranger FOB, employing
them, and always being cautious of how the actions of the Rangers would be perceived, the Rangers earned their respect to such a degree that the local men took up arms against the Al Qaeda fighters.

The Rangers’ long-term investment in winning over the minds of the local populace with dignity, respect, and responsibility was paramount when the enemy attacked on 6 APR 2004 and had, moreover, set the conditions for future full-spectrum operations in that region.

**PERSONAL COURAGE**

Bravery is the capacity to perform properly even when scared half to death.

Omar Bradley
J. Garagiola,
Baseball is a Funny Game

Throughout the night of 4 April, TF 2-7, 3rd ID, received routine shelling in its positions at the Four Corners. The next day, while planning operations, the TF received orders to conduct a relief in place with 2-187th, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), to allow TF 2-7 24 hours of rest and refit. A few hours after moving into the airfield itself, TF 2-7 received orders to secure 2d Brigade’s LOC. The TF then moved to the southwest of Baghdad to the intersection of Highway 1 and Highway 8. To make arrangements to conduct a relief in place with TF 3-15, MAJ Coffey, TF 2-7 Operations Officer, moved north along Highway 8 and reached an overpass known as Objective Curly, TF 3-15’s TOC, receiving sporadic gunfire all the way.
Fire became heavier, and rocket propelled grenades engaged us from both sides of the highway. Shocked, MAJ Coffey looked around and realized no one was returning fire. Instead, the Soldiers cowered behind anything providing cover, leaving their weapons unmanned. He tried to communicate with his Bradley crew and get the Soldiers back in the Bradley. “Move forward and engage the enemy!” he yelled. Two minutes later, the Bradley thundered forward, dropping the two-man Infantry security team that began suppressing the enemy, killing several with well aimed M16 shots. The gunner began firing the Bradley 25mm chain gun, suppressing and destroying the enemy. A Special Forces Soldier at the Tactical Operations Center manned one of the .50 caliber machine guns and returned fire. Enroute to his Bradley, MAJ Coffey was severely injured when an RPG struck his communications HMMWV. Despite his injuries, MAJ Coffey manned his Bradley, getting the crew and Infantrymen into the fight on Objective Curly.

With the report of the S3 injured, LTC Rutter began rapidly moving with TF 2-7 to stabilize the situation. LTC Rutter, working with the Fire Support Officer (FSO) and the Enlisted Tactical Air Controller (ETAC), destroyed the building the enemy had been using as a base of fire, ensuring the security of that portion of 2nd BCT's Line of Communication (LOC).

*Unit History of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 1LT Mark K. Schenck, TF 2-7 Infantry, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division, and On Point, page 367.*

**DISCUSSION:** Personal courage is the ability to face fear, danger, or adversity. Although it can be said that personal courage is inherent in certain individuals, it is clear that good training and discipline can facilitate ordinary individuals to do
extraordinary things. In this summary of operations conducted by TF 2-7, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, we see the importance of courage and discipline to combat operations. Discipline was the contributing factor that allowed Soldiers to overcome the initial shock and fear associated with hostile fire and the human instinct for self-preservation—displayed here—and begin to engage the enemy. More than any other factor, an environment of realistic and battle-focused training will inculcate the discipline necessary in military forces and create brave Soldiers and leaders who are confident in battle.

One of the ten principles of training in U.S. doctrine is “train for combat proficiency.” This principle includes the requirement to train under “realistic conditions,” which builds competence and confidence by developing and honing skills and develops aggressive and disciplined Soldiers. (FM 7-1) This said, the vignette highlights the difficulty in replicating conditions encountered on the modern battlefield, especially fire on a “two-way range.” However, we also see that once the operations officer identified the need for his intervention and direction to get effective fires on the enemy, and directed the Soldiers accordingly, they reacted to his command instinctively and executed the drills learned through hours of repetitive training. Although at first not evident, the discipline and courage displayed to expose themselves to hostile fire—when the Soldiers’ natural reaction was to take cover—demonstrates how training in a realistic and stressful environment is a valuable tool to the commander who must ask ordinary individuals to commit themselves to situations that common sense tells them should be avoided.

The commander’s continuous quest in training is, therefore, not only to recreate the conditions encountered in war, but also to increase the challenges faced by Soldiers and leaders in
training. By continual exposure to demanding and stressful situations, Soldiers and leaders alike will gradually become desensitized to the fear associated with the highly dangerous tasks that they are expected to perform. They will also learn to identify and manage stress in themselves and in others. By doing this, and through continually exercising discipline in battle drills and tactics, techniques, and procedures, Soldiers can overcome the stresses and shock associated with the unfamiliar and dangerous situations of war, and leaders will encourage personal courage in their Soldiers.

**DUTY**

If I do my full duty, the rest will take care of itself.
General George S. Patton
8 November 1942
The Patton Papers, Volume II

In March, 2002, elements from 187th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), and from the 87th Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division, conducted an air assault into the Shah-I-Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan.

As the helicopter touched down, the platoon rushed off in anticipation of enemy contact. I swear, we got off of the bird in 30 seconds. With the weight of our rucks, along with the added burden of having a Gator multipurpose vehicle, I expected to be on the landing zone for five minutes or more. Thankfully, we did not receive any enemy fire as we moved to where I thought our link-up would take place.

Once the helicopter cleared the area, I called the Battalion S3 to verify our location. The original intent was for our platoon to land just east of a road that bisected the objective
area. It was now about 0500 hrs. and still dark, and a haze of
dirt created by the departing Chinook helicopter covered the
area. It was hard to determine my exact location by terrain
association, but I knew that our battalion positions were located
along the ridgeline of the mountains to our east.

We began establishing our position when I received an
urgent call on the radio from CPT Kuth, the Bravo Company
Commander. He told me that two F-16s were inbound and that
I was in the middle of their engagement area. Evidently, the S3
had thought that our helicopter had landed on target. We
frantically threw our gear back in our rucks and quickly moved
toward one of Bravo Company’s observation posts to the east,
which was signaling us with IR flashes. The move was about
400 meters, but it felt like a thousand miles. The combination
of adrenaline, weight of our equipment, and the altitude made it
impossible for us to move as quickly as the situation warranted.
In fact, two of my guys couldn’t make it up the final last hill to
the position. They both fell and physically could not get up and
make it the last 100 meters. I can think of no other motivational
tool to get them up and moving more inspiring than the fact
that we were getting ready to die, but their bodies refused to
cooperate. Finally, I instructed them to ditch their gear in place,
and we pulled them to safety. The F-16s conducted their strike
on time, and we were left gasping for air in the comfort of
covered positions.

Once we got word that the area was safe, we returned to get
our equipment and searched for anything else we may have
dropped. It was now sunrise, and I could see how far off course
the landing had been. It was then that we experienced our first
enemy contact. Apparently, a sniper decided that our close call
had not been enough. He shot a couple of rounds at us, forcing
us to again move to cover. Almost immediately, we heard the
distinct report of a friendly .50 caliber machine gun engage the
enemy sniper position. This allowed us to retrieve our gear and move to a more secured location farther to the east.

Once my platoon was consolidated at a prospective mortar firing position, I met face-to-face with the S3. Together, we walked some of the terrain to identify where we could best support the battalion. He conveyed to me the importance of mortar indirect fires in this mountainous terrain and instructed me to set our position oriented to the south. He also told me that the biggest threat to my platoon would be the enemy’s indirect fires.

We emplaced our mortars and immediately began digging protective positions. Once our mortars were emplaced, I radioed to the Operations Officer and the Battalion Commander that we were in position, ready to fire.

Over the span of the next few hours, we fired several missions, mostly targeting groups of three or four Al Qaeda personnel or supply points. Our primary forward observers, our own Battalion Scouts, did a terrific job of adjusting fires using the “polar” method of call-for-fire. The Scout Platoon Leader, 1LT Justin Overbaugh, emphasized the art of calling for fire during his long train-up, and it certainly paid off. In fact, the most remarkable thing to me during this time was how much these missions seemed like training. That all changed in the afternoon of March 6.

At about 1400 hrs., we heard the distinct report of an enemy mortar firing from the south. It is distinct because the deep, guttural “thump” of the 82mm mortar is loud when the tube is facing you. At first, I really wasn’t concerned. My first thought was that the 1-87th Infantry Mortars were firing from the north. That theory was disproved exactly 34 seconds later when an incoming mortar round landed 300 meters from our position. We knew it was 34 seconds because SSG Johnson timed the flight of the round. I called the Operations Officer
and informed him that we were under enemy indirect fire. At this point, we had a decision to make. We could displace the platoon to a different location. However, I knew that the position we were in was the best available to enable our support of the battalion. We were far enough south to range Ginger Mountain, the TF Rakkasan name for the hill thought to have the highest concentrations of enemy. We also had the luxury of having a small hill to our west, which concealed us from a huge hill mass in the west known as “The Whale.” This position, too, was thought to have high concentrations of enemy. The bottom line was that moving at this point would have negatively impacted on our mission and our ability to support the mission.

We heard it again. “Thump.” This time, the round exploded about 100 meters to the west of our position. It landed just on the other side of that little hill that protected us from view of The Whale. I knew that the round landing so close was evidence that the enemy was targeting my platoon and that he had the range and distance to fire for effect. We jumped back out of our holes after the round impacted and continued firing our mission, all the while waiting for the inevitable sound of multiple mortar rounds being fired.

After a couple of minutes, I began to feel a little more relaxed, thinking that we had been forgotten. However, just a few minutes later, we again heard the distinctive “thump” along with three other “thumps.” We moved to our fighting positions, yelled “incoming,” and waited for the rounds to impact right on top of us. SSG Johnson immediately began calling out the time of flight every ten seconds. I remember lying flat on my stomach, wishing that I had spent more time digging my own position. I also remember thinking how helpless we were. There was nothing we could do. Enemy mortar rounds were on the way, and all I could think was how
surreal all of this was. This wasn’t like being shot at with direct fire where you didn’t have time to think and everything was instinctive. No, we knew for 34 seconds that this could be it, and we were powerless to do anything about it.

The rounds did not explode. I don’t know where they landed or if they exploded in a completely different area and I didn’t hear them impact, but they did not land on our position. My relief was quickly replaced with anger as I radioed a situation report to our Tactical Command Post (TAC). I was actually mad that someone was shooting at me. Seconds later, two AH-64 Apaches screamed overhead and began firing on a position thought to be where the enemy mortars were located. Again, I’m not sure whether the enemy was killed or whether he took cover in a cave and moved on to other targets, but we never heard from him again.

We continued to support the battalion for the next couple of hours, targeting enemy personnel and vehicles with good success. At one point, my RTO and I walked to the TAC just to get a better view of the battlefield. The TAC was located along the ridgeline, which overlooked not only my position, but also most of the valley. This visit to the TAC also gave me the opportunity to see 1LT Overbaugh, the Scout Platoon Leader. His platoon was also located along the ridgeline and had been the one who called the majority of our fire missions. I can not say enough about their call-for-fire skills.

After a few minutes, my RTO and I returned to the platoon position. At the time, the platoon was in the process of firing another mission. Suddenly, I looked up and actually saw a huge, incoming round screaming our way. Of course, it impacted at almost the same time, and all I could do was yell “incoming.” I dove to the ground and felt the earth shake. Dirt and debris filled the air, as I was sure the round had impacted within 50 meters of my location. After the impact, I got out of
my hole to survey the damage. Miraculously, the round had not exploded. This was incredible considering the amount of dirt and noise it had produced. As it turns out, the round was actually a 2000-pound Air Force JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munitions), which had flown off-course and had landed virtually on top of our Bravo Company. This was the same type weapon that was involved in the accidental deaths of Special Forces Soldiers in November. Initially, I believed that our enemy mortar friend had returned, but these fears were dismissed when I radioed a situation report to the S3.

We concluded firing our mission and actually had time to continue digging our positions. At this point, I had a little time to reflect on the day’s events. In our first day in the valley, we were engaged by a sniper, bracketed by a mortar, and inadvertently targeted by our own Air Force. I was wondering what the rest of the day and tomorrow would bring. As it turns out, the events of March 6 marked the highlight of our combat experience. For the next seven days, we fired only two more missions.

From the personal experience monograph by CPT Edward Mills, who served as the Mortar Platoon Leader, 1-187th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division. Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: The Army values consist of loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honesty, integrity, and personal courage. Duty—perhaps the most important Army value—means fulfilling obligations.

In addition to vividly describing the psychological impact of indirect fire, this vignette showed tremendous aspects of duty in the actions of the Mortar Platoon Leader and his platoon. Civilians become Soldiers, and Soldiers defend the
Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic. The Soldiers of the mortar platoon understood their mission and, regardless of the risk, immersed themselves into the hazardous duty. Duty is critical in assuring Soldiers complete their missions even if they are performed under extreme conditions or circumstances. Lastly, a sense of duty ensures cohesion among Soldiers, which, in turn, ensures the safety and protection of the Soldiers to the right and left of them. Duty is the essence of being a Soldier in garrison and even more so in combat.

Soldiers from the Mortar Platoon serve as the epitome of duty by meeting their obligations to the Nation. The Soldier’s Creed best summarizes the actions of each individual in the platoon:

I am an American Soldier.
I am a Warrior and a member of a team. I serve the people of the United States and live the Army Values.
I will always place the mission first.
I will never accept defeat.
I will never quit.
I will never leave a fallen comrade.
I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my warrior tasks and drills. I always maintain my arms, my equipment, and myself.
I am an expert, and I am a professional.
I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat.
I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life.
I am an American Soldier.

The 1st BN, 505th PIR, 82nd Airborne Division, was given control of Fallujah, Iraq, on 11 September 2003. The
battalion’s task was to secure Fallujah to allow support and stability operations to be conducted in the area.

I was appointed the Liaison Officer for the Battalion, in charge of Civil Military Operations and rebuilding the government of the city. Being the Liaison Officer involved going into the city every day to check on the Mayor and how he was running the city, as well as to hear about the problems of the city populous.

On the morning of 31 October 2003, an Iraqi insurgent had infiltrated the police force and put a satchel charge in my office. Luckily, my team had not planned to go downtown that day, so, when the time charge blew, it didn’t kill us. Insurgents then tried to storm the compound and kill Mayor Taha. Luckily, he had called us before they attacked.

The Battalion Commander, LTC Drinkwine, wanted to take a team down to the office, assess the damage, and defend if needed. We had Bravo Company, minus, commanded by CPT Mobley; some scouts as snipers; and an anti-tank section. LTC Drinkwine asked CPT Zahczewsky, who was the intelligence operations officer, and me to go as well because we knew the people and the location the best. The Battalion Commander also had SPC Dudin with him; SPC Dudin is a Jordanian-American who enlisted as a medic and became our interpreter in Fallujah; he was a valuable asset to the battalion.

We arrived in the afternoon, and LTC Drinkwine assessed the area. The bomb had been placed in my office, completely destroying it, and the Mayor’s office had been totally burned. In the confusion of the bombing, some of the people ran out and grabbed all the gas being sold on the side of the road and started burning everything. The building and vehicles around it were still on fire, and the Iraqi policemen, although frightened, had their RPK machine guns out and guarding. When we got
there, we set up a perimeter, and the Battalion Commander put me in charge of the Iraqi Police and security. After we got set up, he decided to stay and help defend. We established our position for the night and received chow and supplies.

I was in the front of the building at about 2030–2100 hrs., about an hour after we had established the perimeter, when the first attack began. I was talking to the Mayor’s assistant when an RPG and small arms started whizzing past me. CPT Zahczewsky and I ran to the roof. Tracers were flying by my head; I saw where they were coming from, so I shot at them, as did the team on the roof. We estimated that we killed at least five out of about twenty insurgents. I noticed that everyone was on one side of the roof, so I yelled for everyone to establish a 360-degree defensive perimeter.

Then I noticed some flashlights on the ground beneath me. I shouted, “Is someone hurt?” They said “yes,” so I shouted for the medics. We had four wounded in total. We got them stabilized and placed them on a Bradley fighting vehicle that the Battalion Commander had requested for CASEVAC. I then focused on setting up roadblocks with the Iraqi Police. We had insurgents shooting randomly throughout the night. We stayed awake and defeated some minor attacks. The Battalion Commander left at about 0500 hrs., leaving me with B CO and CPT Mobley to defend.

By the morning of 1 November 2003, most of us had been up through the night because of the random fire we received. The Battalion Commander had said he wanted us to defend until at least that evening or the next morning, so we could be sure the Iraqi Police were prepared to assume their duties. Some of the mayor’s staff came back to work (mostly the interpreters); however, we didn’t want too many people around, so we just kept our two best local interpreters and told everyone else to leave. This actually helped because we had
been having trouble speaking to the Iraqi policemen through the night, and all I could do to position them was use hand and arm signals, pictures, and broken Arabic/English. The mayor’s staff was impressed that we were still defending there, and some sheiks came by to say they would help rebuild. We didn’t suffer a major attack during the day, probably because it was Ramadan.

As soon as the sun started going down, though, we were attacked from the north. As the Support and Transportation Platoon arrived with a resupply of ammunition, I looked out to see who was there, and a rocket flew by the window, about two feet in front of me. I went on the roof with CPT Zahczewsky and returned fire. I directed the seven Iraqi policemen we had with us to get the roadblocks set up; however, communicating with them was, again, very difficult because we only had two interpreters, and they were stretched thin.

The Battalion Commander showed up at about 2130 to 2200 hrs., but he had left SPC Dudin at the Forward Operating Base (FOB VOLTURNO) to interrogate some prisoners captured the day before. Right after the Commander showed up, we had a rocket and small arms attack from the south side, engaging the Bradleys that had come with the Battalion Commander. I happened to be standing next to them instructing the Iraqi policemen on their roadblock, and, again, luckily, no one got hurt.

When the Assistant Police Chief, LTC Jalaal Khamis, arrived, we decided to try and turn the operation over to him. We told the assistant police chief we would withdraw at 0300 hrs., and he needed to have the security established. We finally withdrew at about 0345 on the morning of 2 November 2003. We had been through seven major attacks and about a dozen harassments in total; most of us had not slept since 31 October.
It was a very trying experience for all but showed the will and intestinal fortitude of our Soldiers to the enemy.

From the personal experiences of 1LT Ryan Edward Huston, Sr. who served as Liaison Officer for 1st Battalion, 505th PIR, 82nd Airborne Division, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.

DISCUSSION: Duty and personal courage, two of our Army values, are a testament of our military culture. They serve as a guide for a Soldier’s everyday life and, most importantly, on the field of battle. The actions of the men of the 1st Battalion, 505th PIR, in Fallujah, Iraq, on 30 October, 2003, symbolize a Soldier’s duty and personal courage.

Faced with a difficult situation, CPT Mobley and Bravo Company maneuvered to a position to assess and take charge of the situation. LTC Drinkwater, the Battalion Commander, issued orders, and Bravo Company began to execute the plan. Confronted with attacks from insurgents, the team developed a sound plan to defend the area and provide security for the mayor and local citizens. The team held together under heavy enemy fire because the Soldiers understood their duty and remained loyal to their leaders. The Soldiers were committed to the team, and the presence of leadership instilled confidence.

The operation proved valuable for several reasons. It demonstrated to the Iraqi Police that United States forces would support them when they were under attack. The Iraqi Police learned that they could rely on American and coalition forces to fulfill their promises. The American Soldiers set an example for the Iraqi people about the values of courage and integrity, cornerstones necessary to build a system built on values-based laws.
The American Soldiers earned the respect of the Iraqi people in the area by demonstrating their unwavering commitment to the mission, protecting the rights and freedoms of the Iraqis, and eliminating insurgent activity in the area. The Soldiers in the battalion exhibited personal courage and sent a message to the insurgents: America was there to stay and help the Iraqi people, and Americans would not run from a fight.

**SELFLESS SERVICE**

It so often happens that, when men are convinced that they have to die, a desire to bear themselves well and to leave life’s stage with dignity conquers all other sensations.

Winston Churchill
Savarola, 1900

The QRF from 10th Mountain, led by Company A, 2-14th Infantry, left its base at 2200 on 3 October 1993 and moved through the downtown streets of Mogadishu toward the downed Blackhawks and TF Ranger. As soon as the convoy turned on National Street and headed west, it came under heavy fire. What followed was continuous combat.

When I made the turn back north, the company was stopped, with a lot of incoming and outgoing fire. Both 1st and 2nd platoons were taking and receiving heavy small arms fire from the Olympic Hotel and nearby buildings and alleys. The Commander was with 1st Platoon, suppressed by effective crossfire coming from the hotel and several other buildings. The company was only five or six blocks from TF Ranger and having a hard time pinpointing which street we should take to affect a linkup (the maps did not match the ground).
After fighting through the city streets, becoming pinned down by enemy fire at several locations, the lead elements of 1st Platoon, 2-14, made contact with the TF Ranger at 0300 hrs. Under continuous fire, the Quick Reaction Force and TF Ranger began loading the casualties in the armored personnel carriers while some of the Rangers and one squad from the QRF moved to the helicopter crash site to try to extricate the body of the pilot. By 0600 hrs., the pilot’s body had been removed, casualties were loaded, and the column began moving out as fast as possible toward base.

Small arms fire whizzed over my HMMWV, and an RPG round exploded near the vehicle in front of me. Everyone in the column was firing into every building and alley that could be used as an enemy firing point. I had stepped out of the HMMWV, crouching for cover and trying to monitor the company and battalion nets. The sound of small arms fire mixed with enemy RPG fire, friendly MK19 grenade launcher fire, and exploding M203 rounds was deafening. My RTO yelled that he saw some Somalis and started firing down an alley. I turned, spotted the running men, and engaged them.

The Malaysian APC gunners were now suppressing the second and third floors of the surrounding buildings. The lead platoon of the company was now moving so fast that 2nd Platoon and the Rangers were falling behind. As my RTO and I neared the hotel, an RPG round exploded several feet behind me. A few moments later, my RTO was wounded in the arm by a bullet, which spun him around and knocked him down. Although bleeding, he picked up his M16 and the 1st Sergeant applied an ace bandage on the move.

I returned my attention to TF Ranger, now beginning to break contact with us. They were visibly tired, having to fire and maneuver continuously throughout the city, and many of them were walking wounded. I moved back to encourage them.
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to keep moving and continued to bang on the APCs to keep them moving. I moved with TF Ranger to ensure that everyone stayed together. The rest of A Company had now reached National Street, and the Commander told everyone to get on a vehicle any way they could. When we linked up with the rest of the battalion, there was still a lot of fire, incoming and outgoing especially near the rear of the column at the intersection we had just passed.

*From a November 1994 article in *Infantry Magazine* by Captain Charles P. Ferry, who was a company executive officer in 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division.*

DISCUSSION: The U.S. Army defines its Army value “selfless service” as follows:

“Put the welfare of the Nation, the Army, and your subordinates before your own. Selfless service is larger than just one person. In serving your country, you are doing your duty loyally without thought of recognition or gain. The basic building block of selfless service is the commitment of each team member to go a little further, endure a little longer, and look a little closer to see how he or she can add to the effort.”

This is a strong charge and one that every Soldier faces in the most difficult of circumstances. Yet again, the Soldiers of today have shown themselves equal to the task, measuring up admirably to the “Greatest Generation” of World War II and living up to the highest standards established by our revolutionary founders.

In truth, CPT Ferry’s men are representative of all the Army’s Soldiers today who are continuing the glorious tradition of American Soldiers. The rebuilding of the “hollow
Army” of the 1970s is complete, and these men and women, as well as their deployed contemporaries around the world, are the current generation’s heroes. There is a bit of irony in this statement, for, like their predecessors, they do not view their actions as noble, historic, or heroic. But they are.

Is staring at your enemy and death, charging that weapon-wielding adversary, and putting your all against his in mortal combat different today than it was during the Revolutionary War, WWII, Vietnam or the battles in between? It is not. Ask any of those who have been in combat, either today or in the past, and they will tell you that they do not view their actions as heroic. They look at their peers as being heroic, but not themselves—they believe they were just doing their jobs. That is the essence of selfless service.

A Purple Heart, Silver Star, and even a Medal of Honor do not mean less because you earned it. Instead it confirms your place in the honored rolls of American heroes and that your actions are as exemplary for those who will follow you. It is not about the medal; it is about selfless service. It is not proactive, but reactive and awarded in retrospect. The medal is the Army’s way of codifying your actions for history.

For those new Soldiers reading this, the lesson is that war heroes are, by their own admission, just like you. They were dirty and scared, but they did their jobs, and they were selfless in their service when it mattered most, and you can be, too.

LOYALTY

Loyalty is developed through the unifying of action. The more decisive the action becomes, the greater the bond.

BG S.L.A. Marshall
The Armed Forces Officer
1950
For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty: Sergeant First Class Paul R. Smith distinguished himself by acts of gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action with an armed enemy near Baghdad International Airport, Baghdad, Iraq on 4 April 2003. On that day, Sergeant First Class Smith was engaged in the construction of a prisoner of war holding area when his Task Force was violently attacked by a company-sized enemy force. Realizing the vulnerability of over 100 fellow Soldiers, Sergeant First Class Smith quickly organized a hasty defense consisting of two platoons of Soldiers, one Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and three armored personnel carriers. As the fight developed, Sergeant First Class Smith braved hostile enemy fire to personally engage the enemy with hand grenades and anti-tank weapons and organized the evacuation of three wounded Soldiers from an armored personnel carrier struck by a rocket propelled grenade and a 60mm mortar round. Fearing the enemy would overrun their defenses, Sergeant First Class Smith moved under withering enemy fire to man a .50 caliber machine gun mounted on a damaged armored personnel carrier. In total disregard for his own life, he maintained his exposed position in order to engage the attacking enemy force. During this action, he was mortally wounded. His courageous actions helped defeat the enemy attack and resulted in as many as 50 enemy Soldiers killed, while allowing the safe withdrawal of numerous wounded Soldiers. Sergeant First Class Smith’s extraordinary heroism and uncommon valor are in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon himself, the Third Infantry Division “Rock of the Marne,” and the United States Army.
Citation, Medal of Honor, awarded posthumously to Sergeant First Class Paul R. Smith, 4 April 2005.

HONOR

A man has honor if he holds himself to a course of conduct because of a conviction that is in the general interest, even though he is well aware that it may lead to inconvenience, personal loss, humiliation, or grave personal risk.

BG S.L.A. Marshall
The Armed Forces Officer
1950

Master Sergeant Gary I. Gordon, United States Army, distinguished himself by actions above and beyond the call of duty on 3 October 1993, while serving as Sniper Team Leader, United States Army Special Operations Command, with Task Force Ranger in Mogadishu, Somalia. Sergeant Gordon’s sniper team provided precision fires from the lead helicopter during an assault and at two helicopter crash sites, while subjected to intense automatic weapons and rocket propelled grenade fires. When Master Sergeant Gordon learned that ground forces were not immediately available to secure the second crash site, he and another sniper unhesitatingly volunteered to be inserted to protect the four critically wounded personnel, despite being well-aware of the growing number of enemy personnel closing in on the site. After his third request to be inserted, Master Sergeant Gordon received permission to perform his volunteer mission. When debris and enemy ground fires at the site caused the first attempt to be aborted, Master Sergeant Gordon was inserted one hundred meters south of the crash site. Equipped with only his sniper rifle and a pistol, Master Sergeant Gordon and his fellow
sniper, while under intense small arms fire from the enemy, fought their way through a dense maze of shanties and shacks to reach the critically injured crew members. Master Sergeant Gordon immediately pulled the pilot and the other crew members from the aircraft, establishing a perimeter which placed him and his fellow sniper in the most vulnerable position. Master Sergeant Gordon used his long range rifle and side arm to kill an undetermined number of attackers until he depleted his ammunition. Master Sergeant Gordon then went back to the wreckage, recovering some of the crew’s weapons and ammunition. Despite the fact that he was critically low on ammunition, he provided some of it to the dazed pilot and then radioed for help. Master Sergeant Gordon continued to travel the perimeter, protecting the downed crew. After his team member was critically wounded, and his own ammunition was exhausted, Master Sergeant Gordon returned to the wreckage, recovering a rifle with the last five rounds of ammunition, and gave it to the pilot with the words, “good luck.” Then, armed with only his pistol, Master Sergeant Gordon continued to fight until he was fatally wounded. His actions saved the pilot’s life. Master Sergeant Gordon’s actions were in keeping with the highest standards of military service and reflect great credit on him, his unit, and the United States Army.

Citation, Medal of Honor, awarded posthumously to Master Sergeant Gary I. Gordon, 23 May 1994.

Sergeant First Class Randall D. Shughart, United States Army, distinguished himself by actions above and beyond the call of duty on 3 October 1993, while serving as a Sniper Team Member, United States Army Special Operations Command with Task Force Ranger in Mogadishu, Somalia. Sergeant First Class Shughart provided precision sniper fires from the lead
helicopter during an assault on a building and at two helicopter crash sites, while subjected to intense automatic weapons and rocket propelled grenade fires. While providing critical suppressive fires at the second crash site, Sergeant First Class Shughart and his team leader learned that ground forces were not immediately available to secure the site. Sergeant First Class Shughart and his team leader unhesitatingly volunteered to be inserted to protect the four critically wounded personnel, despite being well-aware of the growing number of enemy personnel closing in on the site. After their third request to be inserted, Sergeant First Class Shughart and his team leader received permission to perform this volunteer mission. When debris and enemy ground fires at the site caused them to abort the first attempt, Sergeant First Class Shughart and his team leader were inserted one hundred meters south of the crash site. Equipped with only his sniper rifle and pistol, Sergeant First Class Shughart and his team leader, while under intense small arms fire from the enemy, fought their way through the dense maze of shanties and shacks to reach the critically injured crew members. Sergeant First Class Shughart pulled the pilot and the other crew members from the aircraft, establishing a perimeter which placed him and his fellow sniper in the most vulnerable position. Sergeant First Class Shughart used his long range rifle and side arm to kill an undetermined number of attackers while traveling the perimeter, protecting the downed crew. Sergeant First Class Shughart continued his protective fire until he depleted his ammunition and was fatally wounded. His actions saved the pilot’s life. Sergeant First Class Shughart’s extraordinary heroism and devotion to duty were in keeping with the highest standards of military service and reflect great credit upon him, his unit, and the United States Army.
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Citation, Medal of Honor, awarded posthumously to Sergeant First Class Randall D. Shughart, 23 May 1994
CHAPTER 16: Conclusion

Editor’s note: In most instances, the Soldiers who wrote the personal experience monographs would conclude their papers with lessons learned. Therefore, I thought it appropriate to end this book with the lessons learned from CPT Self’s monograph, as they apply to so many of the vignettes found in this book.

Although peacekeeping operations can in no way replicate the conditions and stresses of combat, my deployment to Kosovo started me along that road. I began to gain an overall understanding of how the world really is and how the complicated people who live and die for competing causes relate to each other. I quickly saw that the environment we operate in does not have cleanly drawn lines, but blurry edges of what we all see as good and evil, depending on the viewing lens. I learned that a man’s intentions may not be played out until it’s too late for you to do anything about it, but that’s the benefit of the doubt we give to everyone out there who chooses to blend in. I learned that you don’t have to be shot at to be killed and that just training for war produces casualties. I learned that a quick reaction force that is not informed will not have a very beneficial reaction, but one that is too informed will not be very quick. I learned that easy decisions are still hard to carry out and that hard decisions will never have a right answer, aside from your gut. Most importantly, I learned that death is seldom planned, is always final, will always move you, is profound in and of itself, and despite all its pain, provides a comfort in knowing that those who know Him will live eternally.

From the personal experience monograph by CPT Nathan E. Self, who served in both Kosovo, conducting peacekeeping
operations, and in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom, Donovan Research Library, Monograph Collection, Fort Benning, GA.
The legitimate object of war is a more perfect peace.
General of the Army William T. Sherman,
20 July 1865
## GLOSSARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>armored combat earthmover</td>
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<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>area of interest</td>
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<td>AMF</td>
<td>Afghanistan Military Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>AREA OF OPERATIONS</td>
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<td>APC</td>
<td>armored personnel carrier</td>
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<tr>
<td>APOD</td>
<td>aerial port of debarkation</td>
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<tr>
<td>BFIST</td>
<td>Bradley fire support vehicle (M7)</td>
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<td>BRT</td>
<td>brigade reconnaissance team</td>
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<tr>
<td>BTR</td>
<td>Bronyetransporter (Russian class of armored vehicles)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>civil affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>close air support</td>
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<td>CASEVAC</td>
<td>casualty evacuation</td>
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<td>CCP</td>
<td>casualty collection point</td>
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<td>CLU</td>
<td>command launch unit</td>
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<td>CMO</td>
<td>civil military operations</td>
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<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
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<tr>
<td>COLT</td>
<td>combat observation and lasing team</td>
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<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>common operational picture</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSAR</td>
<td>combat search and rescue</td>
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<td>CSS</td>
<td>combat service support</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTCP</td>
<td>combat trains command post</td>
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<td>CTR</td>
<td>close tactical reconnaissance</td>
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<td>DLS</td>
<td>desert landing strip</td>
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<td>EA</td>
<td>engagement area</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPW</td>
<td>enemy prisoner of war</td>
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<td>ESV</td>
<td>engineer Stryker vehicle</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ETAC</td>
<td>enlisted terminal attack controller</td>
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<td>FARP</td>
<td>forward army refueling point</td>
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<tr>
<td>FO</td>
<td>forward observer</td>
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<td>FOB</td>
<td>forward operating base</td>
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<td>FSC</td>
<td>forward support company</td>
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<td>FSO</td>
<td>fire support officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<td>GAC</td>
<td>ground assault convoy</td>
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<td>GMV</td>
<td>gun mobility vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPS</td>
<td>Global Positioning System</td>
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<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>humanitarian aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>HE</td>
<td>high-explosive</td>
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<tr>
<td>HEDP</td>
<td>high-explosive, dual-purpose</td>
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<tr>
<td>HEMMT</td>
<td>heavy expanded-mobility tactical truck</td>
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<tr>
<td>HLZ</td>
<td>helicopter landing zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMMWV</td>
<td>high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>HVT</td>
<td>high value target</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAWS</td>
<td>Infantry Antiarmor Weapon System</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICDC</td>
<td>Iraqi Civil Defense Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive devise</td>
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<td>IPB</td>
<td>intelligence preparation of the battlefield</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>infrared</td>
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<td>ITAS</td>
<td>Improved Target Acquisition System</td>
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<td>JDAM</td>
<td>joint direct attack munitions</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo force</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>LMTV</td>
<td>light medium tactical vehicle</td>
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<td>LOC</td>
<td>line of communications</td>
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<td>LOGPAC</td>
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<td>LZ</td>
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<td>MDMP</td>
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<td>METL</td>
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<td>MGS</td>
<td>mobile gun system</td>
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<td>MRE</td>
<td>meals ready-to-eat</td>
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<td>MSR</td>
<td>main supply route</td>
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<td>NCO</td>
<td>noncommissioned officer</td>
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<td>NLA</td>
<td>National Liberation Army</td>
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<td>NOD</td>
<td>night observation devise</td>
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<td>NVG</td>
<td>night vision goggles</td>
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<td>OBJ</td>
<td>objective</td>
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<td>OP</td>
<td>observation post</td>
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<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>operational security</td>
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<td>POI</td>
<td>Programs of Instruction</td>
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<td>PSG</td>
<td>platoon sergeant</td>
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<td>QRF</td>
<td>quick reaction force</td>
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<td>R &amp; R</td>
<td>rest and relaxation</td>
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<td>RPG</td>
<td>rocket-propelled grenade</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPK</td>
<td>Ruchnoi Pulemet Kalashnikov (Russian light machine gun)</td>
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<td>RTO</td>
<td>radio/telephone operator</td>
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<td>S2</td>
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<td>Definition</td>
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<td>S3</td>
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<td>S4</td>
<td>supply officer</td>
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<td>S5</td>
<td>civil affairs officer</td>
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<td>SALUTE</td>
<td>size, activity, location, uniform, time, equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>SBCT</td>
<td>Stryker brigade combat team</td>
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<tr>
<td>SBF</td>
<td>support by fire</td>
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<tr>
<td>SITREP</td>
<td>situation report</td>
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<tr>
<td>SKEDCO</td>
<td>litter without poles</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRG</td>
<td>Special Republican Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAC</td>
<td>tactical command post</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>traffic command post</td>
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<tr>
<td>THT</td>
<td>tactical human intelligence team</td>
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<tr>
<td>TLP</td>
<td>troop-leading procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOC</td>
<td>tactical operations center</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOW</td>
<td>tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOW ITAS</td>
<td>TOW Improved Target Acquisition System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>unmanned aerial vehicle</td>
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<td>UNMIK-P</td>
<td>United Nations mission in Kosovo-Police</td>
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